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Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms
Faculty of Business - Papers
  • Fang Hu, Griffith University
  • Xiaofei Pan, University of Wollongong
  • Gary Tian, University of Wollongong
RIS ID
81211
Publication Date
1-1-2013
Disciplines
Publication Details

Hu, F., Pan, X. & Tian, G. (2013). Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 24 235-255.

Abstract

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.

Citation Information
Fang Hu, Xiaofei Pan and Gary Tian. "Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms" (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gary-tian/98/