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Gareth Knapman, Australian National University
Asian Ethnicity
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caet20

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Gareth Knapman a
a Globalism Institute, RMIT University
Published online: 23 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Gareth Knapman (2006): Liberal dreams: Materialism and evolutionary civil society in the projection of nation in Southeast Asia, Asian Ethnicity, 7:1, 19-35
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631360500498429

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Liberal Dreams: Materialism and Evolutionary Civil Society in the Projection of Nation in Southeast Asia

GARETH KNPANMAN
(Globalism Institute, RMIT University)

This article focuses on the introduction of ethnicity into Southeast Asia, as a component of the nineteenth century British projection of empire. The argument is that rather than projecting a cosmopolitan vision of community, British liberalism naturalised ethnicity through the concept of civil society. This presented a global vision of societies being independent and emerging from the local landscape. These liberal notions of civil society represent an early incarnation of self-determination. The British Empire in Southeast Asia emerged within this intellectual climate, and its early construction reflected this vision. In essence, the British Empire in Southeast Asia was founded on the nebulous idea of providing self-determination to Southeast Asian nations. This notion of self-determination was a qualified concept of independence, framed around opening these civil societies to British trading hegemony.

Keywords: self-determination, nation, ethnicity, Malays, British Empire, liberalism

There is a problem running through the literature on liberalism and nation formation. This problem relates to the relationship between liberalism and nationalism, which is seen traditionally as an antipathy. Unveiled, liberalism reveals its own continuum between the liberal ideas of atomistic commercial society and the formation of nation and ethnicity in Southeast Asia.

Kantian and utilitarian views of liberalism have traditionally maintained that humans are universal beings. This universality meant that identity was based on the individual, not the collective, and as such, nation and nationalism had no place in liberal theory. The underlying assumption among liberal intellectuals that powered this cosmopolitan view of the atomistic self is that a global community will win the day and national parochial differences will disappear.\(^1\) This is the internationalist’s dream, held by socialists and liberals alike, and based on a materialist view of reality (Nairn, 1996).

The atomistic universalism of these materialist views hides deep ethnic-national assumptions (Nairn, 1996; Young, 1997). These ethnic-nationalist assumptions can be seen in seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century constructions of Anglo-liberal

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\(^1\) Since the nineteenth century there has been a legalist theoretical foundation for liberal nationalism. But this has been projected as civic nationality, which is effectively an atomistic identity wherein the individual has civic patriotism to the collective. In doing so, modern liberal theory downplays the role of the ethnic. Despite the recent work of writers such as Cochran (1999), Tamir (1995), Smits (2003) as well as a number of others, the dominant trend of liberal theory is towards atomistic civic identity.
political thought. The result is that ideas of nation were built into the materialist framework of liberalism. In terms of the political development of Southeast Asia, this is important because liberal modes of thought framed the construction of British colonial governance institutions; inadvertently these institutions propagated ideas of ethnic national identity in the colonial territories.

Liberalism breeds atomistic ideas of a cosmopolitan self, but at the same time its foundations naturalise cultural—national distinctions and actively blur the distinction between politics (state) and nation (culture). This blurring occurs though the fuzzy expression and use of civil society. Civil society was a nebulous concept in early modern British thought. It was used to distinguish society as separate from the state, but was also used interchangeably with the state. This inconsistent use of ‘civil society’ confused the distinction between state and culture in early British liberalism. This confusion would lead to the then future discourse of national self-determination.

In this article I argue that a self-determination (deconstruction) clause was built into the foundations of the British Empire by examining the relationship between the practice of empire and state and the role of political ideas in the construction of empire. The British Empire was an expression of power, but the constitutional construction of that power was diffused and, unlike the Spanish or French empires, was not centralised from the metropole (Burroughs, 1999, p. 170). This is representative of the greater distinction between continental European and Anglo-American conceptions of state and empire. The continental approach to state formation reduces empire to an adjective, which provides mere description of the expansionist state. The British Empire was not an expression of official state expansion. Outside the United Kingdom states of Scotland, Wales and Ireland, no other states were annexed to England. Overwhelmingly the British Empire expanded through the agency of private individuals, groups and semi-official bodies on the periphery (Davis & Huttenback, 1988; Fieldhouse, 1973).

This devolved concept of power meant that imperial expansion was in the hands of British actors on the periphery, who expanded the empire in the name of private profit. These endeavours were often funded by the private equity market, rather than through official state funding. This system of authority created an informal system of empire, but even the formal empire included territories that were based on pre-colonial polities. British rule over these polities often included a nominal recognition of pre-colonial past, and as such a recognition of a different civil society (Cannadine, 2002). It meant that the empire was far from being a unifying force. In fact, the British Empire provided both the fertiliser and the seeds for its own destruction. Through the notion of civil society and, by implication, the natural rights of civil society to develop along a civilisational trajectory, a belief in self-determination was built into the logic of the British Empire. This was a contradiction that made the end of the empire inevitable.

Rather than being an imperial state, where resources were extracted by direct control, the British Empire created a global marketplace. The principle of free trade was the ultimate expression of this idea and the ideal was a continuing theme in Anglo-liberal thought. Civil society derived from a belief in the primacy of the marketplace. From John Locke to Adam Smith and the Utilitarians, through to Richard Cobden and a myriad of lesser-known philosophers and proto-economists, there was a philosophical constant based on the notion that society is separate from state, and that society is civil, based on commercial interchanges.

Civil society was an underpinning normative belief that gave deference to the marketplace and gave a particular direction to the empire. The empire adopted the role of enabling global trade. Foreign civil societies that were unable (or unwilling) to partake in
open global trade were opened by imperial persuasion or coercion to the vicissitudes of the marketplace. In so doing, colonisation opened civil societies to follow their ‘natural trajectory’, one that through such a hubristic lens, only the British understood. However the legacy of these civil societies’ pre-colonial existence remained, courtesy of the distinctive racial/ethnic denotations of cultural difference that were inherent in imperial regalia and obscure border marking on an increasingly pink world map.

British colonists in Southeast Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century projected a particular form of ‘nation’, as a view of community, on to Southeast Asia, while at the same time naturalising capitalist market relations. That theirs was a liberal understanding of nation meant that principles of self-determination were laid out within the colonial framework of empire. This meant that the British Empire in Southeast Asia was inherently unstable. First, it projected the naturalness of nations while also assuming the common sense notion that the market would subsume all nations. Second, it assumed principles of national sovereignty while also arguing the primacy of individual sovereignty. Its eventual collapse was therefore written into its contradictory commercial foundations.

The future logic of self-determination was determined by interaction between ideas about national character and civil society, with its implicit notion of conjectural history (economic, political and social growth through developmental stages). These two forces, which would underwrite the logic of self-determination, were reasoned from materialist assumptions about nature. First was the recognition that nature included material production. Second was the recognition that nations were nurtured products of nature, based on the creation of a civil society. The modes of production distinctive to a particular environment created social norms and helped to nurture a national character. Here was also recognition of the naturalness of civil society, the basis of which was the freedom of individual property. This logic determined that civil societies were societies based on the consumption of local resources and through their ownership of these resources the societies produced territorial borders (Locke, 2004b, p. 299; Grotius, 2004, p. 14; Smith, 1981, pp. 16–8; Burke, 2004; Ferguson, 1767). This notion of territorial ownership dictated that civil societies were self-governing and self-determined. Each civil society claimed its own resources and has natural rights over these resources.

British keenness to establish this particular form of civil society emphasising capitalist market relations and the individual meant that the focus of the British in Southeast Asia was to free individual Malays from feudal bondage. The objective was pursued zealously by Stanford Raffles in his reforms of Java (Bastin, 1957). The British argued that trade should be open to all levels of Malay society to bring on the social

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2 This logic originally derived from Thomas Hobbes’ arguments on desires and human nature (Hobbes, 1985), John Locke’s arguments on property (Locke, 2004b) and John Harrington’s proto arguments on property and formation of class (Pocock, 1975, 1985; Robbins, 2004). From this point onwards, it became a norm to view politics from within a materialist lens of interests and desires (Porter, 2001, 2004).

3 This is not to say that nation and civil society are the same thing, but that, as ideas, they emerged at the same time and became overlapping and mutually supporting ideas. The central difference between civil society and nation is in the role of agency. Civil society was an actively material process whereby society became civilised through material and commercial transactions. These material transactions meant that the people became unified as a society. The material order meant that society existed beyond the realms of the political state, with state becoming a mere reflection of civil society.

4 From John Locke (2004, pp. 285–302) and Hobbes (1985, pp. 223–8) through to Jeremy Bentham (1807) and beyond, civil law existed to protect individual property. Hobbes saw civil society as existing force, while the Locke tradition saw civil society as being based on consent and reciprocity. The important point was that society existed to enshrine property rights and therefore in all liberal theory society existed to protect the individual’s rights.
revolution that they desired and that they believed would flow from free trade. This social revolution would come about from changes in ownership of the means of production that free trade would induce, and would subsequently change the natural material environment and therefore the national character.

The implication was that nations had a natural right to exist. A nation was a self-determined product in the sense that local material conditions produced a civil society and national character, but the modern economy demanded change. The market-oriented logic of civil society dictated that self-determination was based on the ongoing flow of commerce. It meant that if commerce was rejected, the self-determined independent status of a civil society would be in question. The national character of recalcitrant nations therefore needed to be nurtured towards the true path of independence through benign nurturing. In the early nineteenth century, British imperialism was only beginning and much of Southeast Asia was still independent. The justification for British intervention in this region in the early nineteenth century drew from the paternalistic vision of nurturing the national character. But once these national characters had been ‘developed’, British imperialism would face the dilemma of legitimacy that was rooted in its intellectual founding. This meant that the logic of decolonisation was built into the early justification of colonial rule in Southeast Asia.

Over the last 30 years, a body of literature has been produced in Malaysia and India dealing with the colonial origins of race and nation. Broadly speaking this literature is part of postcolonial studies and is heavily influenced by Marxism and poststructuralism. It presents two central claims. First is that race and ethnicity were a direct creation of the colonial state (Abraham, 2004; Anderson, 1991; Chakrabarty, 2002; Chatterjee, 1999; Gandhi, 1998). Here the emphasis is on examining the process of divide and rule that made the colonial state possible. Tools of administration such as the census, identity papers, medicine and anthropology were all used to divide groups within the colonial state, and the colonial state has therefore been promoted as peacemaker between the conflicting racial-ethnic groups. Second is that the anti-colonial nationalist movements that ended European imperialism developed within the confines of the colonial state (Anderson, 1991; Chatterjee, 1999). The future postcolonial states therefore adopted the discursive practices of the colonial state.

The emphasis of these analyses is on structures. Here the state is the central structure and colonial ideology is seen as the mechanism of the state apparatus. This means that ideology is a subservient reflection of the structures of state and is not a principle structure in itself. Put more directly, the colonial state is little more than a functional institution that enabled the plundering of colonial societies. Colonial ideologies of race and identity were therefore little more than justification and legitimisation of organised theft. But the problem with this argument is that it puts the cart before the horse, by discounting the fact that colonial ideologies of race had their origins in pre-colonial British liberalism. In doing so, these arguments reject the creative role of ideology in framing the direction of structures. Emphasising its ideologies shifts our interpretation of the British Empire. It makes the empire a project of nation

5 Post-structuralists argue that this does not make any difference because for them all ideologies are about control and power. This may be so, but their claim disregards the fact that ideologies have a genealogy that is often derived from power relations different to the ones that the ideology is eventually used for. In the case of Anglo-liberalism, we see that it derives from ideas of common law and the resistance to Stuart Absolutism, which is a very different scenario to nineteenth century colonial Asia. This means that colonial ideologies were more then just the legitimisation of theft and therefore they need to be examined in their own right.
creation, where liberal ideology framed the political and economic expansion of British power. The result was recognition of separate civil societies and early recognition of these civil societies as nations.

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, energetic traders built the second British Empire (the post-American Revolution empire). Five of these individuals were William Marsden, Stamford Raffles, James Brooke, John Anderson and George Windsor Earl. Four of them—Raffles, Marsden, Brooke and Anderson—were at some stage officials of the British East India Company. We see among these four considerable similarity of thought favouring free trade and belief in civil society as an evolutionary project. The similarity of their thought is one indication of the hegemony of liberalism within British imperial ideology.

The British Enlightenment influenced each of these individuals. Marsden, Raffles and Anderson were direct products of the British Enlightenment and participated actively in the intellectual culture of their day (Quilty, 1998). Earl and Brooke, however, were nineteenth century inheritors of the Enlightenment tradition. These writers saw Southeast Asia as a construct of nations and states, each of which had formed as a separate marketplace. Individually these men promoted a programme of imperialism in Southeast Asia, which entailed the commercial development of civil societies. It was presumed that the flow-on would be the evolution of native societies. Here the underpinning argument was that a developed civil society would transform these nations into self-determined polities.

Civil Society and Self-determination

Civil society was a formative part of liberal ideology and played an intrinsic part in early conceptions of nation and self-determination. Nation was the by-product of civil society and became the common term that reflected the accomplishments of a civil society. Through this discourse on civil society, an idea of self-determination existed before the colonial state, in the realms of internal British political legitimisation. Self-determination was a conditional independence, based on a particular philosophy of free commercial exchange. Societies that did not correspond to this model of exchange were deemed fallen or degenerate and were seen to need a good dose of humanitarian imperialism. Civil society and the subsequent right to self-governance were in the foundation stone of imperialism, but the flawed nature of its philosophical source meant that this foundation stone had cracks, and these cracks eventually led to imperial break-up.

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6 Raffles was the founder of Singapore and the colonial governor of Java during the Napoleonic Wars. Marsden was the principal secretary of the East India Company’s station at Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra from 1771 to 1779, effectively the governor although he did not possess that titular rank. Anderson was a lower-level official who was given the task of formulating policy on Sumatra and the Malay peninsula in relation to the Kingdom of Siam. Anderson argued that Britain should champion the cause of Malay independence from both Dutch imperialism and Siamese imperialism. Unlike Raffles and Marsden, Anderson was too junior to implement his ideas, and his writing was an extension of his official duties rather than an attempt to objectively study Southeast Asia. The work that Anderson produced in this capacity is a reflection of early official discourse on Southeast Asia. Earl spent some time as a colonial official, but he was not a career colonial official. He became a leading academic and linguistic scholar on Southeast Asia and a popular travel writer. Earl's 1837 book, The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipelago, in 1832–33–34, could be considered the Lonely Planet Guide of its day but, importantly, it was also a foundational text in the study of Southeast Asia (Turnbull, 1971).
The essence of the cracks can be found in conjectural history, of which civil society was a key component. The origins of conjectural history can be found in Lockean ideas of development, that professed a ‘stages’ approach to individual and social development. This approach became a central plank of the social contract theory then holding sway in both Britain and France. In Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) and in The Social Contract (1762), which outlines the basis for a legitimate political order, Rousseau reasoned that history was a series of developmental social stages in which the social contract was an enduring principle. But unlike Rousseau’s gloomy view of human development, the view of the conjectural historians was positive, focusing not on the creation of government but on the creation of civil society. In their own lifetimes they had seen economic improvements accompanying improvements in civility. They therefore saw civil society as a development in conjunction with the material pursuit of affluence (Buchan, 2004).

Understood as the material pursuit of affluence, the study of civil society became focused on economic transformations. Studies found that civil society had developed through a stage-by-stage historical framework. Its genesis was in savage society, which was the hunter-gatherer society; it moved on to pastoral society, which was nomadic herding society; developed into agricultural society; and in time became ‘perfected’ as civilised society with a developed commercial economy.

The central point we can take from this discussion is that British political discourse focused on nation as an economic entity. Here the aim of the nation was material development, which became the purpose of politics. The political aim of conjectural history was thus to provide a goal for political, economic and social advancement. Conjectural history saw that all societies were the same and therefore the purpose of government was the same anywhere in the world. Thus civil society, as a universal truth, became a useful criterion for legitimising British commercial society and explaining Britain’s frustration with foreign nations that were uncooperative in this British-designed commercial world. This thinking held that civil society ‘naturalised’ capitalist market relations, so nations that did not fit with this view of civil society (i.e., they had not progressed beyond a particular stage of ‘development’, or worse) showed that they were degenerate, and challenged the natural commercial material order.

This ideology of social evolution became a legitimising element in the purpose of empire. Belief in the material naturalness of civil society was united with a belief in the naturalness of national character. The effect was to inspire a discourse justifying state intervention to support civil society by educating its members to overcome a nation’s recalcitrant character. The philosophical basis of this thinking can be found in eighteenth century discourse on the moral development of national character.

Eighteenth century political thinking emphasises custom as an evolving entity that binds people together while providing distinctive markers that separate communities. Unlike nature, custom was a human construction that fascinated eighteenth century liberals. This belief derived from John Locke’s arguments on psychology and education, where character was nurtured on a blank page (Locke, 2004a, p. 109). Addison (2005) argued that this approach could be used to reform the collective human condition by promoting civility. Addison saw civility as the highest stage of

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7 Conjectural history was a system of writing history in which there was scant surviving evidence to produce a factual narrative. Although the evidence had not survived the tyranny of time, the conjectural historians believed a history of the past could be deduced out of the remaining evidence. Conjectural history provided a theoretical framework on which civil society evolved (Meek, 1976).
human existence and therefore society needed to be cultivated into civility (Porter, 2004). This is the kernel idea of a liberal education in which people are taught to be politically aware, self-determined humans. The political implication is that people with civility have a duty to teach the ‘primitive’ beings who lack civility. The basic logic of the nineteenth century civilising mission was therefore a collective extension of the liberal education, where national character took on the role of individual character.

The idea that the nation had a collective character was carried throughout the eighteenth century, with David Hume attributing national character to two forces: (1) civil society, which arose through commercial or civil interaction between individuals (Hume, 1998, p. 114); and (2) beneficial government intervention. Hume saw that particular policies of government help to form a particular character among a group of people living together as a nation (Hume, 1998, pp. 113–26) and this was a central theme of his mammoth six-volume 1778 work, History of England (Hume, 1983). For Hume and his followers, national character was formed through the interrelationship between laissez faire interaction and state intervention.

This belief in the capacity of government to intervene in society to nurture an ideal political character was a core element for the Benthamite utilitarians. It is reflected in ideas such as Jeremy Bentham’s model prison (the panopticon), James Mill’s History of India, Mary Wollstonecraft’s ideas about association and equality of the sexes, and William Godwin’s approach to philosophy. Many members of the influential Birmingham Lunar Society also held this belief about general social intervention (Porter, 2004, pp. 374–98; Uglow, 2002).

It was a natural extension of thinking for British traders and colonists to apply this stereotyping approach as they tried to understand and re-organise/control the societies that they found in Southeast Asia. For example, the British commonly characterised the Malays as lazy, the Dyaks and Batuks as primitive savages, and the Chinese as industrious. In linking politics (as material advancement) to the national character, an ontological connection was made between material progress and the right to independence. A nation had the right to independence only if it observed its obligations to nature, which included making material progress.

The future logic of self-determination was determined by the twin liberal ideas of character and civil society, which together had an implicit notion of conjectural (progressive) history. These two ideas derived from materialist assumptions about the relationship between humans and nature, and they powered early liberal discourse. The ideas rested on three basic tenets. First was the belief that nature included material production, therefore modern industrial practices were natural. Second was that the experience of nature acted as a nurturing force that developed the character of the nation. This meant that both the environment and the modes of production it necessitated also helped to nurture national character. The third cast civil society (an expression of national advancement) as a natural process of development because the materialist epistemology espoused by early liberals naturalised the concept of freedom of the individual to own property.

With this idea concerning the natural development of civil society normalised by its advocates, it was commonly accepted—in British intellectual and government circles at least—that societies would develop by natural law through the stages that the conjectural historians had identified. From Locke to the Utilitarians, the belief gained ground that artificial intervention could correct the divergent character of a society or nation. This logic underpinned the liberal mandate of the British Empire. It was Britain’s role to artificially develop floundering nations towards full achievement of civil society.
This liberal rationalisation gave redemptive purpose to the British Empire, but at the same time it outlined the battleground on which the empire would meet its destruction. This is because of the implicit notions in this liberal logic that nations are natural, self-determined and bedded within the landscape, and that modern economy demands change in the nation. If nations with a recalcitrant national character need to be nurtured towards independence in the changed material environment of modernity, once this has been achieved the nations no longer need the intervention. Destruction of the British Empire was therefore a logical consequence of this empire’s liberal constitution.

**National Characterisation and Civil Society in Southeast Asia**

The stereotyped characterisations of Southeast Asian peoples in literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century corresponded to the wider process of conjectural history. Conjectural history was a pivotal point of meaning in William Marsden’s *History of Sumatra* (Quilty, 1998). Using the evolutionary idea of civil society, Marsden examined the peoples of Sumatra in relation to people of other nations, and using conjectural history he placed them on a five-staged system of development.

Though far distant from that point to which the polished states of Europe have aspired, they yet look down, with an interval almost as great, on the savage tribes of Africa and America. Perhaps if we distinguish mankind summarily into five classes; but of which each would admit of numberless subdivisions; we might assign a third place, to the more civilized Sumatran, and a fourth, to the remainder. (Marsden, 1996, p. 204)

In Marsden’s world the Sumatrans represented a particular stage in human development, and could be ‘considered as a people occupying a certain rank in the scale of civil society’ (Marsden, 1966, p. 204). Movement on this scale was based on material progress, to which Marsden alludes:

As mankind are by nature so prone to imitation, it may seem surprising that these people have not derived a greater share of improvement, in manners and arts, from their long connection with Europeans. … Some probable cause of this backwardness may be suggested. We carry on few or no species of manufacture at our settlements; every thing is imported ready wrought to its highest perfection; and the natives, therefore, have no opportunity of examining the first process, or the progress of the work. (Marsden, 1966, p. 205)

Marsden’s thinking places art and manners as subservient to—and as side effects of—technological advancement. The connection between art and manners to material development corresponds to the materialistic nature of conjectural history. Raffles makes a similar acknowledgement when comparing the Javanese, Malay and Bugis nations:

The comparative advancement of these three nations in the arts of civilized life, seems to be directly as the fertility of the soil they occupied, or the inducements they held out to foreign intercourse; and inversely, as the indulgence of their own roving, adventurous spirit, and piratical habits. The arts never fix their roots but in a crowded population, and a crowded population is generally created only on a fertile territory. (Raffles, 1965, p. 58)

Like Marsden, Raffles emphasised productivity and technological development. Explicit in these arguments is a belief that the nation should be developed materially,
and as such the nation is dependent on materials for the production of character. But
the nation’s character limits the nation’s capacity to develop further on the scale of civil
society. Recognising the utility of the raw materials of wealth (agriculture and
resources) to character-building, this reasoning provided an explanation of why, in the
view of the likes of Marsden and Raffles, the Javanese (who farmed on very fertile soil)
appeared to be more civilised than the Battacks of Sumatra (whose farm soil was less fertile) (Quilty, 1998).

This materialist theory of civil society was used to cast Southeast Asian nations as
exemplifying a lower form of social development. The British stereotyping of the
Malays as warlike pirates, who had particular fascination with individual honour and
were governed by despotic Sultans, correlated with European ideas of aristocracy and feudalism. In classifying Sumatrans, Marsden (1966, p. 204) did not draw an analogy
between the Sumatrans and the people of feudal Europe, but instead argued that the
developed Sumatran states ‘should rank [with] the nations on the northern coast of
Africa, and the more polished Arabs’.

British representations promoted the aristocratic pretensions of the Malays. But
British literature made no direct acknowledgement of the conjectural similarity between
the Malays and feudal Europe. The connection was made by Frenchman Pierre Poivre,
whose book, *Travels of a Philosopher*, reached three editions in Britain by 1770 and the
following sections were published in the leading British political journal, *The Annual
Register*:

> Travellers, who make observations on the Malais, are astonished to find, in the centre of
Asia, under the scorching climate of the line, the laws, the manners, the customs, and the
prejudices of the ancient inhabitants of the north of Europe. The Malais are governed by
feudal laws, that capricious system, conceived for the defence of the liberty of a few against
the tyranny of one, whilst the multitude is subjected to slavery and oppression. (Poivre,
1770a, p. 1)

Poivre was a former missionary in Indo-China who became enticed by the
opportunities of mercantile trade. But, like all enlightened individuals of the eighteenth
century, he also considered himself a philosopher. Poivre believed that civilisation
depended on agriculture. However, in a rather circular argument, he deemed that the
progressive force of agriculture languishes in the hands of those ‘still too much slaves to
the prejudices of their ancient barbarity’ (Poivre, 1770b, p. 10). For the British colonists
such as George Windsor Earl, who also saw themselves as intellectuals and not mere
adventurers, the Malays, Dyaks, Sumatrans and Javanese were capable of evolution,
and evolution was a direct result of material circumstances.

The dissolute mode of life for which the Malays are famed is, in a great measure, the result of
the circumstances under which they are placed. In the latter there is no grade between a noble
and a serf, the one being enriched by the oppression of the other. In some states similarly
situated, the lower classes are enabled to rise to distinction by engaging in commerce; but
among the Malays the nobles are also merchants, and as the people are unable to compete
with them, their energies are destroyed, and they have no wish to acquire anything beyond
the means necessary for their subsistence. (Earl, 1971, p. 374)

Earl readily acknowledges the feudal condition of the Malays and attributes this to
the material and structural conditions in which they lived. Earl finds that the
aristocratic monopoly on trade stifes the possibility of Malay improvement. Earl was
an advocate of free trade and saw it as the agent of progress. He believed that the British settlements as ‘free ports’ demonstrated the possibility for Malay progression, stating that the Malays ‘are not burthened with the support of a dissolute and luxurious nobility’ and ‘though not equal to those of the other native settlers, suffice to show that they are not incapable of improvement’ (Earl, 1971, pp. 374–5). Earl’s disdain for the Malay aristocracy and his belief in the progressive force of free trade needs to be placed within the wider context of the British Free Traders of the 1830s and 1840s. In his arguments against the Corn Laws, free trader Richard Cobden regularly argued that the British aristocracy was an anachronism that could not come to terms with the modern economy (Cobden, 1867, 1907, pp. 139–54, 1908). Earl critiqued the Malay aristocracy in a similar way, demonstrating that it was the institution of Malay aristocracy, not the Malays, that was the problem. Raffles made similar free trade arguments about Dutch protectionist trade in Java (Bastin, 1957).

A keen admirer of Adam Smith, Raffles also believed that free trade promoted civilisation (Raffles, 1965, pp. 230–2). As governor of Java, Raffles undertook a radical transformation of taxation and the land-rent system as a way to cripple and destroy the Javanese aristocracy, which he believed was hindering Javanese development (Bastin, 1957). The similarities in the thoughts of Raffles and Earl reflect the wider imperial project of free trade.

During the early part of the nineteenth century, a struggle was under way in Britain over the benefits of free trade versus protectionism, and the empire became one aspect of this wider debate. Britain’s relationships with the United States, Europe, India and the states in Southeast Asia were all part of this debate. In India, debate raged between advocates of free trade (who wanted to maintain British involvement as a trading empire) and followers of Robert Clive, Warren Hastings and more importantly Richard Wellesley, who shaped British policy in India as policy of extraction (Burroughs, 1999, p. 174). Clive and Hastings had begun the territorial conquest of India, but it was Wellesley who radically transformed the direction of the East India companies from aggressive trading to colonial governance.

Progressively, as the free trade reformers gained dominance throughout Britain, the free traders also gained dominance in India. In fact, the colonies became the canvas on which the reformers could enact their policies (Stokes, 1959). Central to this project was the end of slavery and bondage as a broad humanitarian objective. This was not limited to the African-American slave trade, and included forms of bondage in India and Southeast Asia (Ferguson, 2004, pp. 113–62). Colonial Office officials in Whitehall, such as James Stephen, worked actively to end the slave trade, promoting colonial governors on their zeal to end bondage in native societies and in the British Empire (Knaplund, 1953). The free trade reforms became linked with the wider utilitarian movement. For the utilitarians, all people were the same. Free trade could be made the focal point of this policy because it allowed all people to pursue their material interests.

This policy of universal free trade became a justification for empire. Edmund Burke had castigated the British East India Company in his campaign to impeach Warren Hastings. In doing so he aimed to create the ‘Magna Charter of Hindostan’ (Porter, 1999, p. 199). Burke’s emphasis was on restraining British interests in India and maintaining support for traditional Indian customs. Liberal reformers saw many of these customs as regressive and harmful to the individualism that utilitarianism held so dear. Between 1815 and the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the official policy was to modernise Indian society along utilitarian lines of individual atomism (Stokes, 1959). Local
traditional customs were seen as a problem to free trade because tradition created social norms that prevented people pursuing their own objectives. This directly affected the viability of free trade. It meant that local customs that impeded trade needed to be transformed so that trade could flow freely without military might forcing commodity transfers. This meant that imperialism became an essential tool in transforming native social attitudes to make free trade possible.

The conjectural levels of social development depended on maintaining liberal ideas of individualism, as the true path of civilisation (Meek, 1976). The racial divisions of the late nineteenth century created biological duality separating the European from the native, and these were in opposition to the *laissez faire* belief promulgated by British authorities and others in the early eighteenth century. The liberal reformers generally upheld the universal equality of humans, with their opposition to slavery as the utmost example. But they also argued that social customs meant that most native societies were incapable of achieving equality. The native was equal with the non-native before god, but on earth the native’s equality with the non-native depended on the native realising his/her own individuality and willingness to participate in free trade. This form of universalism thus reduced equality from a natural right to a theoretical framework of social development determined by colonial powers. The liberal logic of empire gave the native two choices: recognise free trade and choose to partake in the system, or be taught how to partake in the system. Self-government required the mind of a free trader.

Marsden, Raffles, Earl and many other leading British writers on Southeast Asia reflect the dominant progressive evolutionary ideas of the British Enlightenment and the predominance of the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century. Belief in character and material creation were central to their discourse. Discourse on Southeast Asia during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century was pervaded by belief in the material construction of character. Here humans were presented as being universally the same as each other, unlike later in the nineteenth century when humans were seen as effectively a blank page, upon which material circumstances forged a national character. Material circumstances could be understood as conjectural levels of social development through which all societies pass. This conjectural framework, within the greater logic of free trade, was a basic conception of national self-determination, where self-determination was the promise bestowed by inclusion within the free trade system.

**Characterising Nationality in Southeast Asia**

The idea of the Malays was central to the British discourse on national identity in Southeast Asia. From early to mid-nineteenth century, British colonial policy supported the independence of the Malay states (Tarling, 1969, p. 53). But by the late nineteenth century, the Malays had been made subjects of the British Empire, with the British establishing the Federation of Malay States as a colonial state encompassing the Malay peninsular. This eventual colonisation of the Malays was carried out under the pretext of protecting the Malays from Siamese aggression; from the economic threat of immigrant labour; and in the name of protecting the Malays in the new modernised economy (Abraham, 2004; Alatas, 1977; Tarling, 1969). British imperialism in Southeast Asia was presented as a project of modernising and then protecting Malay sovereignty. A central component in this project was the characterisation of the Malay identity.
In the early nineteenth century, the Malays were viewed as the dominant national group in Southeast Asia. They extended far beyond the Malay peninsula, with early travel accounts placing the Malays across the entire archipelago. Whenever the Malays are discussed in these written accounts, they are characterised as lazy, leading to the cliché ‘the lazy Malay’ (Alatas, 1977). The other common trait attributed to the Malays was ‘running amok’. This referred to a fanatical crazed trance that was understood to engulf the Malay’s personality and transform a placid individual into a mindless killer destroying everything in their wake. Yet by the late nineteenth century, the Malay was seen as a weak character, incapable of work and mentally unhinged.

These colonial depictions of the Malays go to the heart of the liberal dilemma over nature and nurture, the role of custom and the capacity of the native to live with self-determination. Characterisation of the Malays highlighted their irrationality, and thus their incapacity for self-determination. The Malays’ supposed lack of rational control was presented not as an innate ‘natural’ condition, but as a cultural formation that could be transformed. This meant that Malays were capable of being transformed into rational human beings who would be capable of self-determination.

Although Malay was the language of commerce and the structure of political power was based around control of ports (Reid, 1975), the Malays were not considered a maritime trading community. John Anderson claimed: ‘The maritime Malays are, in short, neither a useful or industrious people, and upon the whole, contribute more to harass and obstruct commerce, than to facilitate its operations’ (Anderson, 1971, p. 174). In viewing the Malays as not constituting a ‘commercial’ society, Anderson’s notion of commerce was limited to British perceptions of trade. This placed British trade systems as the central aspect of social development and delegitimised native forms of trade.

Piracy became a more important concern as the nineteenth century progressed and was eventually deemed illegal (Rubin, 1998, pp. 243–9). Marsden did not consider piracy a major issue, mentioning it only twice, briefly, throughout the entire 479 pages of his history of Sumatra. But Anderson, also writing on Sumatra, saw piracy as an endemic problem and Raffles cited piracy as a central endogenous cause of degradation to the Malay character.

The prevalence of piracy on the Malayan Coasts, and the light in which it was viewed as an honourable occupation, worthy of being followed by young princes and nobles, is an evil of ancient date, and intimately connected with the Malayan habits. (Raffles, 1965, p. 232)

Clearly Raffles does not agree that piracy was an ‘honourable occupation’. Unlike European piracy that was fringe activity conducted by renegade sailors (excluding the sanctioned acts of privateers), the Malay nobility itself sanctioned Malay piracy. This official sanctioning meant that piracy went to the heart of the Malay character, being romanticised in ‘old Malayan romances’ and in ‘fragments of their traditional history’ which ‘constantly refer with pride to piratical cruises’ (Raffles, 1965, p. 232). Implicit within Raffles’ words is a belief that the Malays do not understand the concept of honest work, and prefer the opportunities of plunder to the grind of industry.

The suppression of piracy and the more general notion of ‘outrage’ became a constant policy of Straits government in Singapore (Tarling, 1969, p. 53). The strategic structure of this policy was marked by rejection of territorial control, while the British instead favoured maintaining influence over the Malay states. In doing so, British
policy maintained the independence of the Malay states through an attempt to redefine Malay independence within the confines of British hegemonic policing. Suppressing piracy and inter-state disputes were ways used by the British to actively transform the nature of Southeast Asian commerce and statehood.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the historiography of Southeast Asia changed. Many new studies of early nineteenth century Southeast Asia were highly critical of the British and Dutch use of ‘piracy’ to legitimise imperialism in Southeast Asia (Tarling, 1999, p. 410). By crushing what they defined as piracy, the British destroyed roving sea-gypsy populations, and a long tradition of roving armed maritime populations. These populations were seen as a challenge to British commercial interests. This literature maintains that the word ‘pirate’ was a politicised tool of imperialism to destroy native power bases (Tarling, 1999, p. 410). Local traders who did not trade within the security confines of free trade, presented a potential challenge: they demonstrated that free trade depended on British naval hegemony. Liberalism had to be enforced through imperialism to create a universal system. This demonstrates the normative and hegemonic limits of free trade. Free trade produces cultural divisions, but these cultural divisions need to conform to the liberal norms of an atomistic individual.

James Brooke’s creation of a private state in the guise of a ‘traditional’ Malay kingdom was one of the more glowing examples of this policy. Brooke claimed to be creating a polity that protected indigenous customs and destroyed piracy, while creating an environment for commerce to flourish (Runciman, 1960; Tarling, 1992). These were enlightened liberal dreams to serve indigenous society, but indigenous society had to be transformed so it would not threaten Brooke’s broader commercial objectives for the region. Liberalism therefore promoted indigenous rights but within the confines that the liberal doctrine dictated. Native rejection of liberal policies was not tolerated, and any opposition was defined as piracy and justly crushed (Rubin, 1998, pp. 241–65).

Early British policy in the Malay Peninsula and in Borneo was therefore a duality. Primarily it created an environment where trade could flourish, but at the same time it maintained the independence of Malay states. Nevertheless, independence of the Malay states was curtailed by the broader policy of liberalism, which attempted to integrate these states into the British free trade political economy.

References to piracy corresponded to the discussion of Malay barbarism, which progressively acted as a means of characterising the Malays’ pre-modern character, and in doing so created the objective of ‘benign’ nurturing governance. Marsden (1966, p. 208) stated: ‘The Malay may . . . be compared to the buffalo and the tiger. In his domestic state, he is indolent, stubborn, and voluptuous as the former, and in his adventurous life, he is insidious, blood-thirsty, and rapacious as the latter’. Earl (1971, p. 1330) makes the direct connection between savagery and piracy, referring to the ‘savage race of Malays, who are located far up the numerous muddy creeks, and who rarely make their appearance, except when a vessel is thrown on the coast, in which event they flock around her in their little canoes, like gulls about a dead whale, and soon succeed either in capturing or in driving away the crew’.

Other characterisations concerned the Malays’ indolence at work and the importance of honour to them. Earl (1971, p. 374) argued: ‘The dissolute mode of life for which the Malays are famed is, in a great measure, the result of the circumstances under which they are placed. In the latter there is no grade between a noble and a serf, the one being enriched by the oppression of the other’. In terms of honour, Earl (1971, p. 186) claimed: ‘Every man caries a kris at his side, ready to avenge
an insult should it be offered to him’. Marsden observed of the Malay’s desire for honour that:

They retain a strong share of pride, but not of that laudable kind which restrains men from the commission of mean and fraudulent actions. They possess much low cunning and plausible duplicity, and know how to dissemble the strongest passions and most inveterate antipathy, beneath the utmost composure of features, till the opportunity of gratifying their resentment offers. (Marsden, 1966, p. 207)

There is a continuing theme in these passages: that the Malay demonstrate pride in barbarism. This is not pride from effort, but pride for pride’s sake. It is pride in violence, with a Nietzsche-like ‘will to power’. Unlike Nietzsche, who loved the idea of ‘power for power’s sake’, the British, as a ‘nation of shopkeepers’, saw Malay violence as indications of weak undeveloped character. These claims were broad, sweeping generalisations, producing stereotypes that conformed to Enlightenment ideas.

The characterisation of Malays demonstrates that those making the characterisations did not see character as innate and attributed it to material conditions. These material conditions were made worse by inefficient, corrupt and brutal leadership structures. Marsden, Raffles, Anderson and Earl made it clear that the primary reasons for the Malay’s bad habits were lack of free trade and bad leadership by the Malay aristocracy. By blaming political structures, Marsden, Raffles, Anderson and Earl made an ontological argument that structures could be changed and therefore the national character could be reformed.

The British Question: What is Our Purpose in the Malay Archipelago?

In 1817, Raffles was disappointed. His beloved colony of Java, which he had nurtured in the name of Javanese civilisation and global commerce, had been given back to the mercantilist Dutch. In his own words, ‘Dutch policy in the Eastern Isle seems to have been the exclusion of all foreign trade … [which] led to the vigilant suppression of all attempts at competition and independence on the part of the inferior state’ (Raffles, 1965, p. 230). Through Raffles’ eyes, this was a barrier to the promotion of Southeast Asian nations, and even possibly a source of social degeneration.

In dedicating his History of Java to the Prince Regent, Raffles argued that the British Empire had a higher purpose ‘to uphold the weak, to put down lawless force, to lighten the chain of the slave, to sustain the honour of the British arms and British good faith; to promote the arts, sciences, and literature, to establish humane institutions’ (Raffles, 1965, p. vi). Raffles acknowledges that British policy did not always uphold these high ideals: ‘Our intercourse with them had been carried on almost exclusively through the medium of adventurers, little acquainted with either the country or people, who have been frequently more remarkable for boldness than principle’ (Raffles, 1965, p. 231). By stating the purpose of the British Empire and acknowledging previous mistakes, Raffles was promoting a new vision of the empire, the essence of which was the introduction of free commerce as a means of recreating the former grandeur of Java (Quilty, 1998, p. 68). Like Raffles in wanting to improve the Javanese and the Malays, Earl also had a vision of modernising the native inhabitants, stating:

The Dyaks in the Chinese territory have totally abandoned their barbarous customs, and are milder in their conduct, and apparently in their disposition, than any of the natives of the Archipelago that I have met with. . . . Should the view which I have taken of the character of
these people be correct, their shocking pursuit of human victims will only tend to show how
strong an influence the force of habit, and the circulation of particular doctrines, can exercise
over minds naturally indisposed to cruelty. Freedom of commerce, which had hitherto been
found the best instrument of civilization, would rapidly improve the condition of these
people, and were an European settlement, with a free port, established . . . the Dyaks would
soon be brought into communication with it. (Earl, 1971, pp. 271–3)

Following in Raffles’ footsteps, Earl believed that the Dyaks of Borneo could be
‘improved’ through freedom of commerce. Earl makes similar claims about the Malays.
He argued that if the Malay aristocracy was curtailed, free trade would change Malay
society and improve life for the Malays. In wanting to make this improvement for the
Malays through free trade, Raffles and Earl were arguing that the British Empire
should act as a means of developing nations. Here they represented the broader
movement of British imperial humanitarianism, where the empire became an agent for
personal freedom and collective civic development of ‘rude’ nations.

The project of free trade is presented overtly in John Anderson’s work. Raffles and
Earl make these claims as side statements, but Anderson’s two central works, Political
and Commercial Considerations Relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British
Settlements in the Straits of Malacca (1824) and Acheen and the Ports of the North and
East Coasts of Sumatra (1840), both focus on protecting Malay sovereignty (Anderson,
1971, p. vi). Like Raffles and Earl, Anderson believed that free trade would improve the
national character of these nations (Anderson, 1971, pp. 172–6). He believed that
under British protection, these nations would become good trading partners (Anderson,
1971, pp. 1–12). The desire to transform Southeast Asia into a model trading society is
reflected in the politicised use of piracy and Charles Brooke’s establishment of his
private kingdom of free trade in Sarawak.

Conclusion

Central to all the arguments of the five British colonial participants considered above
is a firm belief in the virtue of free trade. But each of these men also acknowledged
that free trade could not operate in Southeast Asia without protection by the British
Empire. Therefore, to create free trade, these early colonialists argued for British
policy to focus on modernising the nations of Southeast Asia. In presenting this
claim, these individuals reflected the broad imperial agenda that had taken hold in the
British metropole. The empire, logically sustained through civil society and
conjunctural history, had taken on the mandate of promoting free trade in Southeast
Asia. In doing so, the empire recognised the sanctity of indigenous civil societies, but
deemed these civil societies as degenerate and needing reform. The actual element of
degeneracy was seen to be within the national character of these civil societies, and to
require benign imperialism to place these civil societies on the right path—the path of
free trade.

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