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Article
Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence
Faculty Articles
  • Sandeep Dahiya, Georgetown University
  • Kose John, New York University
  • Manju Puri, Stanford University
  • Gabriel G. Ramı́rez, Kennesaw State University
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
7-1-2003
Abstract

Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing is unique secured financing available to firms filing for Chapter 11. Opponents of DIP financing argue that it leads to overinvestment. Alternatively, DIP financing can allow funding for positive net present value projects that increase the likelihood of reorganization and reduce time in bankruptcy. Using a large sample of bankruptcy filings, we find little evidence of systematic overinvestment. DIP financed firms are more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 than non-DIP financed firms. DIP financed firms have a shorter reorganization period; they are quicker to emerge and also quicker to liquidate. The reorganization period is even shorter when prior lenders provide the DIP financing.

Citation Information
Dahiya, Sandeep, et al. "Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics 69.1 (2003): 259-80. Print.