“Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America”

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ABSTRACT

A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. This article argues that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.

A rich literature on presidential regimes has repeatedly associated party fragmentation and its likely effect, minority presidents, with ineffective government, high levels of executive-legislative conflict, and even democratic instability. So far, however, single-case studies have provided no persuasive explanation of the causal mechanisms behind this association, nor have large-N statistical studies proven beyond a doubt that the variables are significantly correlated. The absence of conclusive results stems from the lack of attention to variables that might explain the differing performances of presidential regimes, other than the share of seats of the president's party in Congress.

This study argues that three factors affect the level of interbranch cooperation in the event that the president's party has no independent control over the assembly. These factors are the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. Based on an analysis of these factors, this study proposes the hypothesis that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislators and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on the premature termination of presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.
The argument is presented by proposing a new typology of minority situations in presidential regimes and a series of hypotheses about levels of interbranch cooperation, based on whether the president's party controls the pivotal legislators necessary to pass a bill or sustain a veto. These hypotheses are then explored through analysis of how often majority cabinet coalitions are formed in minority situations and how they would be expected to affect executive-legislative relations. Preliminary support for the hypotheses is developed using an index of executive-legislative conflicts and cases of premature termination of constitutional terms in Latin America during the period 1978–2003. The discussion begins with a review of the literature on minority presidents and their impact on democratic government.

**MINORITY PRESIDENTS AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE**

Scholars of presidential regimes have traditionally focused almost exclusively on the share of legislative seats of the president's party to classify forms of government in presidential regimes. From this perspective, the main dichotomy is whether the government is unified or divided. A presidential government is unified when the president's party has a majority, and divided when the president's party has a minority of seats in a unicameral or bicameral legislature. A divided government refers to two different forms of separation between presidents and assemblies: "divided control," when a party other than the president's has control over a legislative majority; and "no majority" situations, when neither the president's nor any other party holds a majority of seats in the assembly.¹

Under any of these conditions, presidential regimes are generally assumed to increase the number of actors whose agreement is necessary to approve legislation and make political decisions. Unlike students of the U.S. presidential regime, students of political institutions in Latin America generally agree that divided government is almost always associated with gridlock; unconstitutional, unilateral actions; and interbranch strife.² Given the typical frailty of democracies in Latin America, moreover, minority presidents have also been considered a major factor leading to government instability and democratic breakdown. Mark Jones (1995, 38) summarizes this view well when he notes that even those who find merit in the maintenance of presidential regimes in the region usually agree that presidential systems that consistently fail to provide the president with sufficient legislative support are unlikely to thrive.

Because the probability of the president's party enjoying majority support in Congress tends to decrease as the number of parties sharing legislative seats increases, students of Latin American presidential regimes consider the level of party fractionalization in Congress, as
measured by the effective number of legislative parties, to be a crucial determinant of the performance of presidential regimes. Mainwaring (1993) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997a, 1997b, 466), for instance, argue that presidential regimes cannot work well under conditions of extreme multipartism. The underlying assumption is that party system fragmentation weakens the partisan power of the president, making legislative bargaining more complex and increasing the likelihood of executive-legislative deadlock. Although one way to overcome this situation is to rely on cabinet or legislative coalitions, these authors argue that the separate survival of presidents and assemblies provides parties with weak incentives for building and maintaining interparty coalitions.

The idea that only a majority president can secure a stable, effective democratic regime found empirical support in the experience of Latin American democracies during the 1960s and 1970s. The cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela were the only examples of stable presidential regimes during that period. All three had two- or two-and-a-half-party systems, which often provided presidents with regular support from legislative majorities. Since 1978, however, the large majority of presidential regimes in the region coexist with multiparty systems, under which presidents are most often minority presidents. From 1978 to 2002, 80 presidents have been democratically elected in Latin America, of which only 26 (32 percent) were majority presidents. The largest group, 54 presidents (68 percent), were minority presidents. Several of these presidents faced important constitutional crises. Yet in spite of wide variations in quality and performance, minority presidents did not lead to the massive failure of democracies in the region. Moreover, most of these presidents managed to govern and to implement costly economic reforms in the midst of dire social conditions.

The relative stability of presidential regimes with minority presidents during the last two decades seems consistent with the findings of recent statistical studies on the relationship between institutional and partisan variables and the survival of presidential democracies. Cheibub (2002a, b), for instance, shows that minority presidents, even when they govern in deadlock situations (the president's party holds less than a legislative majority but can sustain a veto), are not related to the collapse of presidential democracies. He also argues (2002b, 124) that it is not the level of party fractionalization per se that negatively affects the survival of presidential democracies but the existence of three large parties of relatively equal strength, a situation that tends to occur under conditions of moderate (rather than extreme) party pluralism.

The contribution of these recent works, however, is limited for understanding variations in the performance of contemporary presidential regimes. In the first place, outright democratic breakdown, so common in earlier decades of the twentieth century, became an increas-
ingly rare event in the 1980s and 1990s. For this reason, a comparative explanation of the differing performances of presidential regimes in the last two decades requires the use of less dramatic measures of performance, such as the frequency and type of executive-legislative conflicts, the capacity of presidents to pass significant legislation, or the premature termination of constitutional terms. Another limitation of recent studies is that they focus on democratic breakdown but have not been able to provide a positive explanation of the factors that affect the performance of presidential regimes. All they have shown to date is a series of negative findings, which should lead us to rethink some of the accepted views on the perils of minority presidents and divided governments.4

In spite of significant progress made during the last decade, the main problem with the traditional research and part of the contemporary work on presidential regimes is that they rely on rather blunt indicators to conceptualize different types of presidential governments and predict their performance. The share of seats of the president's party or the level of party fractionalization in Congress provides only a quantitative measure, not a causal mechanism to explain the performance of a presidential democracy.

From an analytic point of view, it is not apparent why the minority legislative status of the president's party should, by itself, have a negative impact on the level of interbranch cooperation. Even without majority support in Congress, presidents often have legislative powers to influence policymaking and obtain cooperation from legislators. A presidential veto, for instance, may be skillfully used to extract concessions from legislators by inducing either the introduction of a new bill or amendments to the original bill (Cameron 2000, 20). Presidents also have a wide array of agenda powers that they can use to force legislators to approve legislation that they would have not initiated or passed on their own (Carey and Shugart 1998; Negretto 2004).

Minority presidents also rely on informal legislative coalitions to obtain support in Congress. To forge these coalitions, the relative bargaining power of the president's party may be more important than its share of seats or the level of party fragmentation. If the president's party holds, say, 40 percent of legislative seats, and four opposition parties hold 15 percent each, the latter are individually weaker than the former. Under this distribution of partisan power, while the president is capable of forming four different coalitions, one with each opposition party, there is only one coalition (of all opposition parties) that can exclude the president's party. With the same share of seats, however, the president's party would be in a more vulnerable position if the opposition were concentrated in, say, only two parties sharing 35 and 25 percent of the seats each. In this situation, three possible coalitions could be formed, and the president's party, like the other two parties, could be included in two of them.5
The location of the president’s party in the policy space may also have an important effect on the formation of legislative coalitions. Suppose that the president’s party is a centrist party with 20 percent of the legislative seats, while opposition parties are divided between a leftist party holding 40 percent of the seats and two rightist parties with 20 percent of the seats each. If parties care about policy, they prefer to form legislative coalitions that are connected in the policy space. In this scenario, there are two coalitions that fulfill this requirement, and the president’s party is the only party that is a necessary member of both. In other words, if parties take policy considerations into account when passing legislation, then a small but relatively centrist presidential party may be more powerful than larger but more extreme opposition parties, regardless of the level of party fragmentation.

Besides legislative coalitions, minority presidents can build cabinet coalitions to seal a formal alliance with other parties in Congress. Recent work on coalition formation in presidential regimes has shown that presidents, just like prime ministers, often build multiparty cabinet coalitions to overcome the weakness of their parties in Congress. If the cabinet is composed of representatives of political parties that collectively control a majority of seats in the legislature, then government proposals may obtain majority support in Congress even if the president’s party alone has a minority legislative status.

This analysis indicates that the classification of presidential regimes and the construction of hypotheses about their potential performance cannot be based on quantitative measures and mechanical associations alone. To build a more adequate understanding of the nature and performance of different forms of presidential government, we need to start with a better sense of the distribution of preferences and institutional powers among the relevant actors in a system of separation of powers.

**Presidents in Minority Situations**

A simple spatial model of executive-legislative relations can be used to conceptualize the different minority situations that presidents may face. From these models, we may derive expectations about levels of interbranch cooperation. Let us assume that there are three decisive actors in separation-of-powers systems: the president’s party, the veto party, and the median party in Congress. The president’s party is the party that controls the executive office, the veto party controls the legislator whose support allows the president to sustain a veto, and the median party controls the median legislator; that is, the legislator whose proposals cannot be defeated by a legislative majority. The model assumes that each policymaker has a single most-preferred policy along a left-right dimension and that the utility derived from other policy alterna-
tives decreases monotonically as they move farther away from the ideal point. It also assumes that parties are cohesive, unitary actors.

To isolate the relative position of the president’s party in Congress, coalitions are excluded from the analysis. What matters in this model is the share of legislative seats of the president’s party, its location on the policy space, and the override requirement to sustain a veto. Following this logic, the model suggests that presidents may face three basic types of minority situations, which we may call median, divided, and congressional.

A median minority situation occurs whenever the president's party, holding less than 50 percent of the legislative seats, is appropriately located around the center of the distribution, so that no party or coalition of parties can defeat its proposals by majority vote. In this situation, it is the location of the president’s party in the policy space, rather than the size of its legislative representation, that makes possible the support of both the veto and the median legislator in Congress, as shown in figure 1a.8 Note that this is logically the same configuration as in "unified" majority situations, when the president's party holds more than 50 percent of the seats in the assembly. The difference, of course, is that in this case the president's party would always include both the veto and the median legislator, regardless of its location in the policy space.

Other things being equal, a president whose party controls a majority of legislators should have greater bargaining power than a minority
president to implement most of the legislative agenda with relatively little cost in terms of interbranch negotiation. This is the main reason why so many scholars argue that separation-of-powers systems cannot work well when different partisan interests control the presidency and the congress. Nevertheless, we should expect a median minority president to be more effective and face less executive-legislative conflict than any other minority president. Median presidents may have the support of a relatively small contingent in the congress but, as long as policy preferences matter, their parties are pivotal in the formation of any legislative coalition able to reach a majority.

A median minority president may, in this sense, be equivalent to a single-party minority government in a parliamentary regime. A single-party minority government can be a viable government in a parliamentary regime if there is no coalition of opposition parties that can defeat its proposals by majority vote (Strom 1990; Laver and Schofield 1990). Using the same logic, we could argue that a single-party minority government in a presidential regime could achieve a good record of legislative success and interbranch cooperation if the president's party controls the median legislator in the congress.

Presidents face what, in a strict sense, can be called a divided situation when the president's party controls the veto legislator but a party other than the president's has the support of the median legislator, as shown in figure 1b. The threshold required to override a presidential veto determines the occurrence of this minority situation. In particular, the probability of a divided situation is higher, the higher the threshold required to override a presidential veto in Congress, so, for instance, a divided situation is more likely with a two-thirds than with a one-half override rule. Given the override rule, a divided situation is also more likely when the threshold applies to each of the separate chambers of a bicameral assembly than when it applies to the joint vote of a bicameral assembly or to unicameral assemblies.

This type of minority situation is more closely associated with the notion of deadlock used by some authors (see, for instance, Cheibub 2002a, 288–89). This is because in this case, the congress can pass legislation and still be unable to change the status quo if the president prefers the latter to the new policy and the legislative majority lacks the necessary votes to override the president's veto. In other words, neither the president (who lacks a majority) nor the opposition parties (which lack the votes to override a veto) are able to rule. The risk of a stalemate, of course, is the reason that presidential regimes in this situation are often portrayed as indecisive, costly, and conflictive.

The occurrence of gridlock in a divided situation, however, depends on the location of the legislative status quo and the policy preferences of the pivotal actors (Krehbiel 1998). If the initial status quo policy is
located between the preferences of the median party and the president with effective veto, policy changes may, in effect, be impossible. The president will veto any change that brings the outcome too close to the median party’s preference and moves it away from the president’s preference. It is for this reason that the policy space between the two decisive actors defines the “gridlock interval”; that is, the set of policy decisions that will be stable in spite of a legislative majority favoring policy change, as illustrated in figure 1b.

Policy change, however, is possible if the legislative status quo is outside the gridlock interval. When the legislative status quo is located at a relatively extreme position with respect to the ideal points of the decisive actors, for instance, significant policy changes may occur precisely at the ideal point of the median party. This is because the president will not veto proposals made by the median party if they are closer to the president’s preferences than the status quo is. Policy change, though only incremental, may also occur if the status quo is outside the gridlock interval but close to the ideal policy of either the president’s or the median party (Krehbiel 1998, 34–39; Brady and Volden 1998, 11–38).

In other words, policy immobilism is not a structural trait of presidential regimes in divided situations. We can assume only that gridlock may occur from time to time, but not how often, or when it will lead to interbranch conflict. This does not mean, however, that we should expect the same level of legislative effectiveness and interbranch cooperation as in median minority situations. Keeping other factors constant, a president whose party is located at a median position in the congress should be able to obtain more support from the congress than a minority president invested with merely a veto.

A third possible minority situation exists when a party or parties other than the president’s controls the median and the veto legislator. One can call this situation congressional, as illustrated in figure 1c, because in this case, an assembly under the control of opposition parties dominates the legislative process.

This is potentially the most conflictive situation in a presidential regime. Chosen in a popular election, the president may believe that he or she has a popular mandate to implement a particular political platform, only to find that he has no institutional power to influence policymaking. This situation may invite policymakers to engage in what Juan Linz (1994) rightly identifies as conflicts of “dual legitimacy.”

A nonmedian minority president without a veto has two basic options: to accept or to challenge congressional rule. Acquiescence to congressional rule would usually take the form of a coalition government in which the president tries to overcome the disadvantage in Congress by distributing cabinet positions among parties whose votes are needed for a legislative majority. The other option, defiance of con-
gressional rule, would usually take the form of unilateral presidential government, either by the use of powers granted by the constitution, such as decrees, or by extraconstitutional actions, such as usurping legislative powers or dissolving Congress. The risk of a congressional situation is that the latter option may be particularly tempting in the event of a crisis that demands of the president a rapid and effective solution.\textsuperscript{12}

Table 1 lists the majority and minority situations under which presidents governed in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2003, classified according to the categories proposed in this model. For each country, the presidents' situations are classified according to the presidential party's share of seats and its policy position relative to the location of the median and the veto party on a left-right scale. Parties were located on this scale on the basis of expert judgments.\textsuperscript{13}

The table includes all the presidents who completed a full presidential term or whose terms were prematurely terminated between 1978 and 2003. Whenever a nonconcurrent congressional election changed the situation of the president's party, the corresponding years of the presidency were counted as a different case. Following this methodology, table 1 includes 75 cases, of which 24 represent majority and 51 minority presidents. Within the group of minority presidents, 15 governed in median, 19 in divided, and 17 in congressional situations.

Because this classification is based on the legislative status of the president's party, the party's policy position, and the president's institutional powers to sustain a veto, it does not take into account the legislative status of the whole cabinet, which may include parties other than the president's. But this factor may be crucial if we want to move from a classification of presidents to a classification of presidential governments. This is the next step in considering the full range of possibilities.

**Minority Presidents and Coalition Government**

This study has argued that we cannot predict the impact of minority presidents on interbranch cooperation without knowing whether the president's party has the support of the median and the veto legislator in Congress. But we also need to consider the impact of cabinet coalitions. Students of cabinet coalitions in presidential regimes have borrowed the distinction between single-party and coalition government from the analysis of parliamentary regimes. Each of these is classified into majority or minority government, depending on whether the parties included in the cabinet can muster a majority of seats in the congress (Deheza 1998, 152). The case of coalition majority government is particularly relevant here.

*(continued on p. 74)*
Table 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Legislative Status</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belaúnde</td>
<td>1980–85</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García</td>
<td>1985–90</td>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(APRA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimori I</td>
<td>1990–92</td>
<td>C90</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimori II</td>
<td>1995–2000</td>
<td>C90</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimori III</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>C90</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanguinetti I</td>
<td>1984–89</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacalle</td>
<td>1989–94</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanguinetti II</td>
<td>1994–99</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrera Campíns</td>
<td>1978–83</td>
<td>COPEI</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusinchi</td>
<td>1983–88</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Unified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pérez</td>
<td>1988–93</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldera II</td>
<td>1994–99</td>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chávez I</td>
<td>1998–2000</td>
<td>MVR</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Congressional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From a conceptual point of view, when a minority president appoints a cabinet that includes representatives of parties that collectively hold a majority of legislative seats, it is more appropriate to classify the case as a particular form of majority government. In addition, and in terms of the performance of presidential regimes, a coalition majority government might significantly improve the president’s bargaining position in Congress. Even if opposition parties receive a disproportionately small share of cabinet positions in relation to their legislative strength, we would expect executive-legislative relations to be smoother than when the president’s party governs alone or when a cabinet coalition is formed but falls short of a majority in the legislature.

The study of coalition formation is relatively recent in the comparative analysis of presidential regimes, partly because the conventional wisdom was that coalitions were not a significant phenomenon outside parliamentary regimes (see Deheza 1998; Amorim Neto 1998, 2002; Altman 2002; Chasquetti 2001; Cheibub et al. 2004; Martinez-Gallardo 2005). Just as in multiparty parliamentary regimes, however, coalition-making is an important activity in multiparty presidential regimes. The
main differences between cabinet coalitions in presidential and parliamentary regimes stem from the different conditions that determine the formation and duration of governments in each regime.

Whereas in a presidential regime, the president has the power to appoint the government regardless of the size of the presidential party in Congress and its policy location, in a parliamentary regime, the foramenteur is usually the largest or the median legislative party (Laver and Schofield 1990). In addition, although the autonomy of presidents in the formation and maintenance of cabinets may be subject to restrictions, parliamentary cabinets are strictly dependent on legislative support to obtain investiture and win confidence votes. This means that while minority governments (either single-party or coalition) exist in a parliamentary regime, they must always count, at least implicitly, on the support of a legislative majority (Strom 1990). A minority presidential government, however, can form and survive even with a hostile majority in Congress.

These structural differences should and do have an impact on the frequency and nature of coalitions in presidential and parliamentary regimes (Samuels and Eaton 2002). Cheibub et al. (2004), for instance, have found that cabinet coalitions in general, and majority cabinet coalitions in particular, are relatively more frequent under parliamentarism than under presidentialism. Amorim Neto (2006), on the other hand, has shown that executive coalitions in presidential systems also differ in kind from cabinet coalitions in parliamentary systems, in that in the former, presidents often include nonpartisan members and do not observe the norm of proportionality in the distribution of portfolios among coalition allies.

To account for the process of coalitionmaking among presidents in minority situations, this study examined the partisan composition of cabinets to determine whether these presidents built cabinet coalitions, and whether these coalitions had a majority status in Congress. Table 2 lists the cabinet coalitions formed with presidents in minority situations and the legislative status of the parties they included. A cabinet or executive coalition is defined here as the set of representatives of parties that hold cabinet positions. This coalition is considered to be a majority coalition only if the parties holding cabinet posts gather a majority of seats in a unicameral assembly or in both chambers of a bicameral assembly. Unless there was evidence that an appointment was made on individual rather than on partisan terms, it was assumed that the inclusion of a single cabinet member from a party other than the president's was sufficient to obtain support from that party in Congress. It was also assumed, again, that parties are cohesive, unitary actors.

Table 3 (p. 78) shows the frequency and type of cabinet coalitions formed. Such formation clearly is a relatively frequent phenomenon among presidents in minority situations. Of the 51 minority presidents included in the database, 27 (53 percent) formed cabinet coalitions.
Table 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Legislative Status of Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldera II</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chávez I</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Based on LAWRE, Keesing’s Record of World Events On Line; Fundación CIDOB; and database on cabinet coalitions provided by Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo. Data on Ecuador collected from Burbano de Lara and García 1998. Data on Panama and Uruguay provided by David Altman.

Within each category, it seems that the weaker the bargaining position of the president, the more frequent the inclusion of representatives from parties other than the president’s. Six (40 percent) of the presidents in median situations, 9 (47 percent) in divided situations, and 12 (71 percent) in congressional situations formed cabinet coalitions.

The situation is different with majority cabinet coalitions. Relatively few cabinet coalitions have a majority status in Congress. Of the 27 coalitions formed, 15 (29 percent) were minority and 12 (24 percent) were majority coalitions. Within each category, 4 (27 percent) of the presidents in median situations, none (0 percent) of the presidents in divided situations, and 8 (47 percent) in congressional situations formed majority cabinet coalitions. Here again, the largest percentage of majority coalitions in congressional situations is also consistent with the weakness of presidents in these cases.

With this information at hand, this study proposes a new classification. Instead of a simple division between majority and minority presidents, we may differentiate between majority and minority presidential governments. Majority governments will be divided into single-party and coalition. Single-party majority governments are all those cases labeled “unified” in table 1. Coalition majority governments include all the cases in which minority presidents built a multiparty cabinet coalition holding a majority of seats in Congress. Minority governments, whether single party or coalition, are divided into median, divided, and congressional, according to the typology in table 1. In other words, we assume that in the absence of a majority cabinet, what matters for the performance of presidential regimes is the relative position of the president’s party in regard to the median and veto parties.

With this revision, we are left with 36 cases of majority government (24 single-party and 12 coalition) and 39 cases of minority government (11 median, 19 divided, and 9 congressional). This classification will be used to test the main hypotheses of this study about the expected levels of interbranch cooperation in presidential regimes.
Table 3. Frequency and Type of Coalitions Among Presidents in Minority Situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Situation</th>
<th>Cabinet Coalitions (%)</th>
<th>Minority (%)</th>
<th>Majority (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6 (40)</td>
<td>2 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9 (47)</td>
<td>4 (47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12 (71)</td>
<td>4 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27 (53)</td>
<td>15 (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Testing the Performance of Minority Presidential Governments**

The conventional view of minority presidents, as noted, is that their performance is associated with high levels of executive-legislative conflict and democratic instability. This study critically examines that view by looking at three other variables: the policy position of the president's party, the president's veto-sustaining capacity, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. Two indicators were used to perform a preliminary test of the impact of these factors on the performance of minority presidential governments. These indicators were the frequency of executive-legislative conflicts and the number of premature terminations of a president's constitutional term in Latin America from 1978 to 2003.

Following a methodology proposed by Mark Jones (1995), an index was constructed of executive-legislative conflicts, based on information in the Latin America Weekly Report from 1978 to 2003. The index reflects the number of articles per year that reported executive-legislative conflicts, compared to the total number of articles that had politics as a main or secondary theme. The conflicts reported were related either to events of ordinary legislative bargaining, such as the rejection of presidential proposals or presidential vetoes, or to acts of congressional control, such as the censure of cabinet ministers or impeachments. The unit of analysis is each presidency classified according to the typology proposed in the previous section. The presidencies include constitutional periods duly completed or prematurely terminated by 2003.

Using the same universe of cases, a separate analysis of those presidencies that ended prematurely was also undertaken. A constitutional term was considered to end prematurely when presidents were ousted from office after a successful impeachment process; when they decided to dissolve the congress, either legally or illegally; when they were forced to resign after mass protests against the government; or when their government was overthrown by a military coup. Fourteen cases of premature termination occurred between 1978 and 2003.
Table 4. Executive-Legislative Conflict Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Frequency</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single party</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Executive-Legislative Conflicts

Table 4 shows the mean frequency of conflict and the standard deviation for each category of government. As might be expected, the mean level of executive-legislative conflict tends to increase as we move from single-party and coalition majority government to minority governments. Among the latter, however, the category with the highest mean level of executive-legislative conflict is congressional minority government.

A $t$ test of the equality of means shows that interbranch cooperation is severely impaired only when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. The mean levels of interbranch conflict of single-party or coalition majority government and median or divided minority government are not statistically different from 0. There is, however, a statistically significant difference, at the 0.05 level, between the mean levels of executive-legislative conflict of majority governments and congressional minority government. There is also a statistically significant difference, at the 0.10 level, between the mean levels of conflict of single-party or coalition majority government and congressional minority government.

The crucial factor for predicting the level of executive-legislative conflict, therefore, is not simply the share of seats of the president's party. Other factors must concur to account for a significant increase in the level of executive-legislative conflicts. These factors are related to the policy position of the president's party, the ability of the president...
to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet.

The main reason for these results is that several categories of government show wide variation in the levels of executive-legislative conflict. Among single-party majority governments, for instance, the Cubas presidency (1998–2002) in Paraguay had the highest frequency of interbranch conflict in the entire database (60 percent). A relatively high level of conflict (29 percent) also occurred during the presidency of Violeta Chamorro (1990–96) in Nicaragua. While these cases may be outliers, they suggest the need to find an adequate measure of intraparty factionalism to determine the level of interbranch cooperation in single-party majority governments.

There is also wide variation in the levels of interbranch conflict of median and divided minority governments. In the case of median governments, the assumption that parties are disciplined and legislators care mostly about policy does not hold equally for all the countries under consideration. Parties in Chile and Uruguay, for instance, seem to be more ideology-based than parties in Ecuador or Peru. This variation should have an impact on how the policy position of the president's party matters for interbranch relations. Among divided governments, the differences in performance may depend on the preferences of policymakers regarding the status quo. In the absence of an external shock, a president armed with only a veto and intending to introduce drastic policy changes may face intense interbranch conflict, as occurred during the presidencies of Febres Cordero (1984–88), Durán Ballén (1992–96), and Bucaram (1996–97) in Ecuador.

It is interesting to note that while coalition majority government does not appear to perform differently from median or divided governments, it does differ when compared to congressional governments. As argued earlier, presidents who face a congressional situation may be able to avoid conflicts with Congress if they attempt to distribute cabinet positions among parties whose votes are necessary to reach a legislative majority. The presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil serves as a good illustration. Although all presidents in Brazil governed in a congressional situation, only Collor (1990–92) failed to build and maintain a majority cabinet coalition during his term. He faced the highest rates of interbranch conflict among all Brazilian presidents and was forced to resign after an impeachment process.

**Presidencies Interrupted**

The cases of presidencies terminated before the end of the constitutional term merit a separate analysis. In the 1960s and 1970s, a constitutional crisis in Latin America typically involved the participation of the
military, whether to replace the democratic regime with a military dictator or provisionally to suspend the constitution. Since 1978, however, constitutional crises have had a different outcome. With the partial exception of Peru from 1992 to 1995, constitutional crises in Latin America have ended not in a formal breakdown or suspension of democratic procedures but in a premature termination of constitutional terms. As Pérez Liñán (2003, 162) points out, contemporary constitutional crises are more related to government than to regime instability.

Table 5 provides a list of interrupted presidencies from 1978 to 2003, indicating the president, year, and reason for termination. It shows that a total of 14 presidencies were interrupted from 1978 to 2003. In most cases, the origin of the crisis involved a complex interaction between social mobilization, either spontaneous or activated by political actors, and institutional conflict.¹⁸

In four cases (Collor, Pérez, Bucaram, and Cubas), presidencies were terminated in the context of an impeachment process, and in one case (Suazo) in the context of a series of executive-legislative conflicts that included the threat of impeachment. In five cases, presidents resigned or abandoned the office, three times (Alfonsín, De la Rúa, and De Lozada) due to mass protests against the government's policies, once (Mahuad) due to an attempted military coup, and once (Fujimori III) because of a corruption scandal. In one case (Balaguer III), the president decided to call early elections because of internal and international pressures. In one case (Chávez), the term was terminated by the president's decision to convene a popular constituent assembly and reelect authorities under the new constitution. In two cases (Fujimori I and Serrano), the crisis consisted of the illegal dissolution of the existing congress, although in one of these (Serrano) the president failed in this attempt.

In spite of the variations, there is a common element in all these cases: the premature termination of the presidential term signals, in its most extreme form, the breakdown of cooperation between presidents and congresses. Whatever the nature of the crisis that presidents and legislators had to face, it seems clear that in most cases, either the congress or the president saw the elimination of the other as the solution to the crisis. Even in cases in which social conflict preceded interbranch conflict, either the president or the congress decided to withdraw support for the other branch. From this perspective, the forced resignation or impeachment of presidents, on the one hand, and the replacement or dissolution of congresses by presidents, on the other, can be seen as symmetrical noncooperative outcomes.

Of the 14 cases of premature termination of terms, one occurred in single-party majority government, one in coalition majority government, one in median, six in divided, and five in congressional governments. If we divide the cases by type of government, we see that the category

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Table 5 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahuad</td>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>Abandoned office after massive protests against economic policies and attempted coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimori III</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
<td>Removed from office by Congress after corruption scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De la Rúa</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>Forced resignation after mass protests against economic policy, and after the congressional opposition in congress rejected national union coalition to support the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sánchez de Lozada II</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>Forced resignation after massive protests against economic policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on *Latin American Weekly Report*, 1978–2003; Fundación CIDOB.

with the highest relative percentage of premature terminations is congressional government. Five out of nine presidencies in this category—that is, 55 percent—were interrupted before the end of the constitutional term. Divided government, with 6 out of 19, or 32 percent of the presidencies interrupted, appears as the second most frequent type. At the other extreme, single-party majority government is the category with the lowest percentage of interrupted presidencies, followed by coalition majority governments and median minority governments. These relative frequencies are shown in table 6.

A rare events logistic regression was used to estimate the impact of each form of government on the probability of a premature termination of constitutional terms.\(^\text{19}\) The dependent variable is the interruption of constitutional terms, coded as a dummy variable, which equals 1 when the constitutional term was prematurely terminated and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable is the type of government. Model 1 traces the impact of majority presidents on the probability of early termination. The variable MAJORITYPRES is coded as a dummy variable, which equals 1 when the president's party has a majority status in Congress, and 0 otherwise. The main variable in model 2 is MAJORITYGOV, which equals 1 when the cabinet has a majority status in Congress, and 0 otherwise. Model 3 measures the impact of each form of minority government on the probability of a premature termination of constitutional terms. Three dummy variables are used: MEDIAN, DIVIDED, and CONGRESSIONAL, coded as 1 when the government is median, divided, or
Table 6. Premature Termination of Constitutional Terms by Type of Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Government</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Premature Termination</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single party</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

congressional, and 0 otherwise. Majority government, either single-party or coalition, is used as the implicit comparison group.

Two control variables, DECREE and CENSURE, were added to the three models. DECREE traces the impact of the president’s power to enact decrees of legislative content on the probability of a premature termination of constitutional terms. It is coded as a dummy variable that equals 1 when the constitution grants the power to issue decrees that become law immediately, and 0 otherwise. CENSURE measures the impact of the power of Congress to force the resignation of cabinet ministers on the probability of early termination. It is also coded as a dummy variable that equals 1 when cabinet ministers are subject to a binding motion of censure, and 0 otherwise.

Table 7 summarizes the results of the regressions. In model 1, MAJORITYPRES had the expected (negative) sign but did not reach statistical significance. DECREE and CENSURE were not found to be significant, either. In model 2, the coefficient of MAJORITYGOV was significant at the 0.05 level and negative, indicating that the probability of a premature termination of constitutional terms decreases from minority to majority government. The estimates of the coefficients of DECREE and CENSURE were positive, but neither was statistically significant. In model 3, the coefficient of DIVIDED was positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient of CONGRESSIONAL was also positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. MEDIAN, DECREE, and CENSURE were not statistically significant.

A comparison of the three models indicates that whether or not the president’s party holds a majority of seats is not the crucial variable for predicting an irregular interruption of the constitutional term. Having the support of a legislative majority is relevant only when we include the legislative status of cabinets. But even if minority government increases the likelihood of a premature termination of constitutional terms, the proba-
Table 7. Premature Termination of Constitutional Terms in Latin America, 1978–2003 (rare events logistic regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJORITYPRES</td>
<td>−1.559</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJORITYGOV</td>
<td></td>
<td>−1.778**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.761)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVIDED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.763**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONGRESSIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.776***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECREE</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.419</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.627)</td>
<td>(.656)</td>
<td>(.611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENSURE</td>
<td>−.089</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.607)</td>
<td>(.618)</td>
<td>(.621)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>−1.050**</td>
<td>−.990*</td>
<td>−2.775***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.525)</td>
<td>(.556)</td>
<td>(.801)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable: Premature termination of constitutional terms
N for all three models = 75
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

bility is only significant in divided and, particularly, in congressional minority governments. Specifically, while there is a 26 percent probability of premature termination of constitutional terms in divided governments, the probability rises to 50 percent in the case of congressional government. This means that the relative probability of an early termination of constitutional terms in a congressional government is almost twice the probability of an early termination in a divided government.

These results reinforce the conclusion of the previous analysis of executive-legislative conflicts. It is not simply the frequency of "minority presidents," as recently argued by some authors (Valenzuela 2004, 12), that facilitated the interruption of presidential terms in Latin America during the last two decades. The rate of interrupted presidencies per type of presidential government indicates that factors more crucial than the share of seats of the president's party are the location of this party in the policy space, the capacity of the president to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet.
Looking at the substance of actual interbranch conflicts, other presidencies that did end their terms without sufficient support from coalitions could very well have ended prematurely. Those presidencies tend to fall into the categories of divided and congressional governments.

This was the case for the divided presidential governments of Febres Cordero, Borja (for the period 1990–92), and Durán Ballén in Ecuador. All these presidents tried to alleviate Ecuador's fiscal crisis and debt problems with austerity policies that were paralyzed or watered down in Congress. In reaction to the massive protests generated by these policies, opposition legislators continuously harassed the president by impeaching his ministers (Conaghan 1995, 452–53). In the last year of Borja's presidency, moreover, Congress formally asked the Supreme Court to initiate impeachment procedures against the president himself. In 1995, after the censure of several of Durán Ballén's ministers, Congress impeached his vice president (see LAWR 1990, 1995). Durán Ballén responded with an unsuccessful attempt to call a constituent assembly and reform the constitution to strengthen the president's powers in relation to the congress.

The same is true of several presidents in congressional situations. Andrés Pastrana of Colombia (à la Hugo Chávez of Venezuela) tried but failed to call a referendum on constitutional reform, which included cutting the number of congressional seats by half and calling new congressional elections (LAWR 2000). During Juan Carlos Wasmosy's presidency in Paraguay, the president and legislators were engaged in a bitter conflict that included a congressional threat of impeachment (LAWR 1994b). Rafael Caldera's second presidency in Venezuela, like his first, became a symbol of divisive government. Caldera decided to face the country's deep economic crisis by suspending economic rights and implementing economic measures by decree (Crisp 2000). When Congress attempted to restore those rights, it was forced to back down by Caldera's threat to call a referendum on a constitutional reform proposal, which would have enabled him to dissolve Congress (LAWR 1994a).

Individual case studies would probably confirm the findings of both the comparative analysis of the frequency of interbranch conflicts and the special case of premature termination of constitutional terms. The probability of observing high levels of executive-legislative conflict or interruption of constitutional terms in presidential regimes increases when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has provided a first step toward developing a more theoretically grounded explanation of the causal mechanisms that foster or
hinder cooperation between executives and legislators when the president's party falls short of a legislative majority. It has argued that three factors, apart from the share of legislative seats of the president’s party, should affect the performance of presidential regimes: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the president’s capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. Following this logic, this article has proposed that the most conflictive situation in a presidential regime occurs when the president's party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed.

This hypothesis is supported by both the frequency of executive-legislative conflicts and the premature termination of constitutional terms in Latin America during the period 1978–2003. Both indicators show that the category of presidential government most often associated with high levels of executive-legislative conflict and interrupted constitutional terms is that in which the president's party has no control over the median and the veto legislator, and the parties included in the cabinet hold a minority of seats in the congress.

This analysis suggests that research on presidential democracies should shift from its exclusive focus on the electoral variables that determine the number of parties competing in elections to the electoral and institutional variables that make cooperation between branches possible in the absence of a legislative majority supporting the president. In this respect, a new research agenda should pay attention to electoral formulas that make the selection of presidents whose parties occupy a median position in Congress more likely than others, the influence of presidents' reactive and proactive legislative powers on policy outcomes, and the factors that hinder or foster the formation of majority cabinet coalitions.

A new research agenda should also explore more carefully the relationship between social conflict, interinstitutional conflict, and constitutional crises. Most cases of premature interruption of constitutional terms occurred in the midst of mass protests, usually in reaction to unpopular economic policies. If institutions really have had a decisive influence on these outcomes, then scholars of presidential democracies face the challenge of showing to what extent or under what conditions institutional rules played an independent causal role.

**Notes**

The author gratefully acknowledges valuable comments and criticisms on previous versions of this paper from Javier Aparicio, Josep Colomer, Bill Keetch, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, Bingham Powell, Jr., and Arturo Valenzuela; and research assistance from Luis Eduardo Escatel. The final version was also improved by the comments of two anonymous reviewers.
1. The definition of divided government as divided control is common among scholars who study the U.S. presidential regime and assume the existence of a two-party system. See, for instance, Laver and Shepsle 1991, 252. Students of Latin American presidential regimes include “no majority” situations in the definition because this is by far the most common condition in a region where multiparty systems abound. Shugart (1995, 327) is perhaps the only author who differentiates between divided government in the strict sense of divided control and “no majority” situations.


3. The effective number of legislative parties results from the application of the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula: 1 divided by the sum of the squared decimal shares of the seats won by each electoral party.

4. The only explanations advanced to date for the instability of presidential democracy are based on three rather disparate hypotheses: the existence of three parties of relatively equal strength, the frequency of presidential term limits, and decentralized policymaking processes. See Cheibub 2002a; Cheibub and Limongi 2002.

5. This scenario assumes minimal winning coalitions; that is, coalitions that turn into a losing coalition by the subtraction of any of their members. See Laver and Schofield 1990, 92.

6. A coalition is connected when all its members will be adjacent to each other on a single policy dimension. A coalition is minimally winning and connected when it is no longer winning or connected by the subtraction of any one of its members. See Laver and Schofield 1990, 97.

7. This model draws on Krehbiel 1998; see also Colomer and Negretto 2005.

8. Some authors (Jones 1995) have argued that interbranch cooperation in minority presidencies improves when the percentage of legislative seats of the president's party is close to a majority; for instance, equal to or greater than 45 percent. From our perspective here, however, this argument lacks theoretical foundation. If the president's party has 45 percent of the seats but is located at an extreme position on the policy space, executive-legislative relations may cause more conflict than when the president's party has, say, 30 percent of legislative seats but is located at a relatively centrist position.

9. In the extreme case, a president would always have a veto, regardless of the party's share of seats, if the constitution provided the executive with a veto that was not subject to override. This is the case in Ecuador, which provides the president with a veto that cannot be overridden for one year. This is the reason that most presidents in Ecuador have governed in a divided situation, even though most of them had only marginal support in the legislature.

10. Interbranch conflict may occur, for instance, when the president submits a proposal for legislative change and the status quo policy is close to the ideal point of the median party. Under this configuration of preferences, the
president's veto is ineffective; the pace and content of legislative change would be entirely in the hands of the median party.

11. In principle, one party may control both, or different parties may control each of these legislators.

12. According to Amorim Neto and Tafner 2002 and Amorim Neto 2006, presidents either seek a statutory implementation of policy goals by means of partisan and proportional majority cabinet coalitions, or attempt to legislate by decree. It could be argued that the latter strategy (whether or not those powers are granted by the constitution) is more likely when minority presidencies face a "congressional" situation.

13. Party policy positions were classified on the basis of a comparison of the expert opinions gathered by Coppedge (1997), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Alcântara and Freidenberg (2001a, b, c). Whenever the president's party was consistently labeled as populist or personalist during a particular period, the presidency was classified based only on the share of seats of the president's party, rather than on its location on the policy space. This was the case for the Partido de Reconstrução Nacional (PRN) in Brazil, Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (GFP) and Partido Roldosita Ecuatoriano (PRE) in Ecuador, Cambio 90 (C90) in Peru, and Convergencia Nacional (CN) in Venezuela.

14. One restriction to the autonomy of presidents in the appointment of cabinet ministers could be the congressional ratification requirement, as in the United States. A restriction on the autonomy of presidents in maintaining or changing their cabinets is the capacity of Congress to force the resignation of cabinet ministers, as in several Latin American countries.

15. A presidency was considered to have formed a majority coalition government when the cabinet maintained a majority legislative status until at least one year before the end of the presidential term.

16. Unlike Mark Jones (1995), who uses each presidential year as a unit of analysis, this study did not exclude from the count those years in which the number of articles was fewer than six. This means that in some cases, the index of the frequency of conflicts is lower (when no conflicts were reported that year) and in other cases higher (when conflicts were reported) than Jones'.

17. Collor maintained a cabinet coalition with majority status in both chambers of congress only from March to October 1990. See Amorim Neto 2002, 56.

18. On the role of social conflicts in the interruption of presidencies, see Hochstetler 2004.

19. A rare events logistic regression is used to obtain an approximately unbiased estimate of the probability of rare events, such as wars, coups, or revolutions. The model is described in King and Zeng 1999. The papers and the software are available online.

20. These probabilities are calculated based on the rare events logistic regression results, allowing the variable of interest to take a value of 1 while keeping all the other variables at 0. The stata commands are provided by King and Zeng 1999.
REFERENCES


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