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“Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America”
Latin American Politics and Society (2006)
  • Gabriel L. Negretto

A widely accepted argument among scholars of presidential regimes in Latin America is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to take into account three factors that should have an effect on executive-legislative relations in the event that the president’s party has no independent control over the assembly: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the capacity of the president to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. I propose the hypothesis that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president’s party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.

  • Presidential Regime,
  • Democratic Performance,
  • Minority Presidents
Publication Date
Fall 2006
Citation Information
Gabriel L. Negretto. "“Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America”" Latin American Politics and Society Vol. 48 Iss. 3 (2006)
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