A widely accepted argument among scholars of presidential regimes in Latin America is that inter-branch cooperation is impaired when the president’s party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to take into account three factors that should have an effect on executive-legislative relations in the event that the president’s party has no independent control over the assembly: the location of the president’s party in the policy space, the capacity of the president to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in the cabinet. I propose the hypothesis that the greatest potential for conflict in a presidential regime occurs when the president’s party lacks the support of both the median and the veto legislator and no cabinet coalition holding a majority of legislative seats is formed. This hypothesis is supported using data on executive-legislative conflicts and on interrupted presidencies in Latin America during the period 1978–2003.
- Presidential Regime,
- Democratic Performance,
- Minority Presidents
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gabriel_negretto/11/