There can be no doubt that torture-derived evidence is inadmissible in any American legal proceeding – at any time, for any purpose, except against alleged torturers. After Petitioner’s counsel learned that prosecutors in this case had relied upon his torture-derived statements in a discovery proceeding before the military commission judge, the prosecutors scrambled to withdraw those statements, but did not disclaim the authority to use such evidence again in similar circumstances. Instead, they argued that, as a matter of law, torture-derived evidence is admissible to resolve “interlocutory questions” such as discovery disputes. The military commission judge agreed.

Respectfully, prosecutors and the military commission judge are wrong and grant of Petitioner’s extraordinary writ is necessary for myriad reasons. Amici focus here on prosecutors’ and the military commission judge’s implausible interpretation of a statute that the United States has long assured the international community means precisely what Petitioner says its means, and the grave consequences that would flow from endorsing their interpretation.

The Court should resolve this issue now to provide clarity across the remaining active military commission cases, which have been ongoing in different forms since 2008 - with many opportunities but no resolution of whether and when torture-derived evidence is admissible - and are still in pre-trial proceedings. Absent the Court's intervention, defendants will face substantial rick of future rights violations - about which, in some instances, they may never know because the government routinely makes ex parte submissions in these cases.

The court should leave no doubt that the government can never use torture-derived evidence in any phase of a proceeding (except against alleged torturers), and that military commission judges can never consider such evidence. If any orders in this case were predicated on pleadings or arguments that involved torture-derived evidence, the Court should vacate them.