AGRARIAN REFORM AND PHILIPPINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

For about sixty-five years, the problem of landownership and control of resources continue to be a political development issue in the Philippines—between the wealthy landlords and the poor and landless farmworkers. Agrarian reform is viewed as a necessary condition for agricultural modernization and rural industrialization and the fundamental mooring for global competition. After 12 years of implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the Philippines, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources have redistributed 5.33 million hectares of land that account for 53.4 percent of the total farmland. This accomplishment represents 66 percent of the total CARP scope. About 3.1 million rural poor households, who constitute about forty-two percent of the total agricultural population, have directly benefited from the land redistribution. Agrarian Reform has contributed to improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of landless farmers and political development of the Philippines in terms of engaging the landless in the process of policy making and distribution of large private landholdings to the landless. The various modalities that give peasants a stake in society such as decisive role in agrarian legislations, engaging them in dialogue to resolve agrarian cases, presenting manifesto pinpointing their criticisms and recommendations on implementing rules and guidelines, identification of farmer beneficiaries and lands to be covered, negotiation on the mode of land acquisition and distribution and computation of land values, have significantly influence the process of democratization and establishment of participatory institutions at the local and national levels.

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I. INTRODUCTION

It was after World War II that many newly independent countries initiated development programs to reduce widespread poverty among landless peasants brought about by extreme income disparities between the landed and landless in the rural sector. A redistributive land reform was considered a panacea to address this social cancer.

The basic thrust was to attain political stability and sustained economic progress. The other objective was to prevent agrarian unrest and the communist-led revolutions to succeed. This is the reason why the Alliance for Progress of the United States supported the implementation of land reform. Because of this support, land reforms in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea were successfully implemented in a sweeping manner.

However, in Latin America (Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia), agrarian reform programs took place only in 1960s-1970s. On the other hand, it was only in the late 1970s and 1980s after the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, civil war in El Salvador and restoration of democratic rule in Brazil, that agrarian reform was also carried out in these countries. Only in Argentina was agrarian reform been completely absent (Leite, 1994, Groppo, 1996).

Land reform was initiated in the Philippines in 1934 under the Commonwealth Government of President Quezon. Government adopted it as a strategy to promote social justice and to build the foundation of broad-based growth and sustainable development.

For about sixty-five years, the problem of landownership and control of resources continue to be a political development issue in the Philippines. The fact that the country is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and participant in the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) aggravate this.

In these global bodies, agrarian reform is viewed as a necessary condition for agricultural modernization and rural industrialization. It is also a considered as the fundamental mooring for global competition. Hence, this transformation process is assumed to contribute not only for socio-economic development but for political growth as well. It is therefore imperative to assess the strategic role of government, other stakeholders, and institutions that either facilitated or hindered the implementation of agrarian reform.
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM

**Political development** is the institutionalization of political institutions and procedures (Huntington, 1964:387). It is a regularized pattern of social interaction that arises and affects individuals and institutions as it works toward the attainment of its objectives (Chilton, 1988; 6). Moreover, Chilton considers political development as a specific form of change in political culture.

Political development is not static and nonlinear nor is it governed by sharp and distinct stages. It is rather a dynamic process of social change in response to expanding needs and problems of a society. As a process, political development involves interaction of individuals and institutions imbued with values of rationality, participation, efficiency and effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. These values are essential prerequisites in ensuring society’s stability over time despite the changes of individuals in an institution.

Others, like Pye (1966) viewed political development as nation building, modernization and setting up of democratic institutions where individuals, institutions, other political systems interact, strengthen their values and practices to bring about social change and uphold certain commitments (such as nationalism and democracy).

As a whole, political development is a process of change involving acquisition and effective use of power (Greene, 1998). It is a system of institutionalized competition for power (Diamond, 1996:112). This power can be exercised through organization building, mass mobilization, participation, standardization, centralization, capacity building, resource generation and distribution.

Political development can also be an instrument for political stability and orderly change. This is based on the assumption that political systems have the capacity to moderate conflict, control social change and maintain order while pursuing economic and social advancement. This is possible when societies are not only governed by an explicit system of law that is supported by civil administrative system (Held, 1987) but also when citizens assert themselves and accept government authority as well (Diamond, 1996:119). In fact, the process of modernization is inherently revolutionary. Irrespective of the scenario, it is primordial that effective administrative system is developed, wider popular participation is encouraged, and evolution of democratic institutions are allowed to redress problems of civil society.

**Agrarian reform**, on the other hand, is a much more a comprehensive concept than land reform. It is defined as an integrated measure designed to eliminate obstacles to economic and social development arising out of the defects in the agrarian structure (Leong, 1990).

It involves transferring of land to landless tenants and laborers, transformation of institutions and structures (Hlatshwayo, 2000), modification of a wide range of conditions affecting the agricultural sector and provision of essential support to new owners (Chowdhury, 2000). The essential support services include measures of raising
land productivity, institutional credit, land taxes, tenancy and wage relations, cooperatives establishment, human investment and enlightenment, industrialization, trade and price policies, and population control (Cohen, 1978).

Agrarian reform entails changing price policies so as to turn the terms of trade in favor of the agricultural sector; increasing fund allocations to the agricultural sector in order to expand research, extension, training, and storage facilities; making physical supplies such as fertilizers available and increasing credit for their purchase or providing physical infrastructures to facilitate agricultural production.

Agrarian reform may or may not include land reform, in some instances there may be no need for land reform since land is already evenly distributed. In other cases, it may not be politically feasible to have land reform—though it might be both politically and economically feasible to raise agricultural output through the measures involved in agrarian reform.

III. ROLE OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

For agrarian reform to contribute in the process of political development, it must be able to address the problem of landlessness to ensure attainment of equity, and farm productivity goals. In developing countries, land continues to constitute the principal source of livelihood, security and status (World Bank 2000, Prosterman, 1990).

Statistics reveal that about six families out of ten are still engaged in agriculture and these families make a living principally from land they do not own. Some work as tenant farmers paying rent to a landlord, as agricultural laborers on large plantations or medium-sized farms, and work for a wage or as sharecropper in smallholding sector. In the Philippines, all the three types of agricultural families are prevalent. Together, this aggregation of insecure and impoverished non-landowning agricultural families, the poorest of the poor, are referred to as “landless” and is the target of agrarian reform.

Landlessness is the root of the world’s most serious and persisting problems, with consequences frequently extending to severe exploitation and deprivation of political rights and basic human needs (Cohen, 1978). Landlessness is also a cause of low productivity on lands farmed by poorly compensated and poorly motivated tenants and laborers (Prosterman, 1990). Farmers with insecure tenure lack the motivation and incentive to invest capital to make land productive. Where the mass population is unproductive, poor and hungry and has little income to purchase basic goods and services, the village economy stagnates and worse, stagnates.

Where landless families form a significant part of the population, their low productivity and lack of purchasing power in turn stifles the potential of the country to achieve long-term economic growth (Morales, 2000). Landlessness forces people to move into the overcrowded cities or move into the hillsides and other marginal farmland to cut down forests and contribute to the environmental degradation (Faryadi, 2000).
Continued landlessness leads to mutual poisoning of the rural and urban sectors. Rural to urban migration increases unemployment problems in the urban centers being that the rural migrants do not have the necessary skills demand of factories in the metropolis. These further results to congestion, increased rates of criminality, and other social problems. On the other hand, the country loses the farmers that produce the food for its people. Finally, landless farmers lack the dignity, status and economic stake in their society that accompanies landownership, limiting the prospects for the development of democratic institutions.

The contemporary political conflicts involving struggle for land have high implications on national political dynamics. The struggles involved life and death issues for the landless peasants to whom land is not just a factor of economic production but an integral part of their social and cultural being, as it is a political resource for many (Borras, 1999; Prosterman, 1990).

**Government Response**

In response to the problem of the peasantry and in seeking to modernize agriculture, technocratic and reformist governments often initiate agrarian reforms. Governments all over the world transfer ownership or ownership-like rights with respect to land to peasants. However, for the socially and politically excluded and economically marginalized peasants, redistributive land reform is the only public policy instrument through which social justice can be realized together with inclusionary rural economic development (Borras, 1999; Prosterman, 1987&1990).

Many agrarian reform advocates argue that equity goal is likely to be attained when direct land transfer scheme through confiscatory laws on redistribution of land (Prosterman, 1990) is adopted rather than the non-land transfer scheme such as tenancy and leasehold arrangements (Prosterman, 1987). In the context of both traditional landlord-tenant relationship and the modern scenario of skewed ownership pattern, equity is highly a political concern especially in the feudal and communal tenure systems.

In the study conducted by Prosterman (1987) in 23 countries on grain crops productivity on land reformed areas, about 60 percent of best or better on productivity index, 15 are small-owner-operator systems, three are large owner-operator systems and five are collective systems. The highest productivity rating for any system was in areas where broad ownership by the cultivators (more than 50 percent of landless proportion to agricultural population) was achieved. Aside from security of tenure, institutionalized credit, extension services and reliable marketing channels, the new owners provided additional investment or “sweat equity” that allowed them additional cropping cycles and to diversify to more lucrative cropping patterns that significantly increased family income.

The main legacy of agrarian reform is hastening the demise of the landed oligarchy, distribution of agricultural income due to the real reduction in land rent and
purchase price of land (Ledesma, 1980) and in removing the institutional problems that prevented the development of markets and full commercialization of agriculture.

Hence agrarian reform had provided a framework for growth, equity and sustainable development in rural society accompanied by complementary policies and appropriate macroeconomic measures. While clearly facilitated by favorable external environment, internal transformation remains critical for determining the outcome of agrarian process.

It is in this context, that World Bank once again has placed poverty alleviation as one of its top agenda. It offers a broad strategy for poverty alleviation through promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing security (World Bank, 2000, 6-7) Agrarian reform falls into each of these three categories. It creates jobs or employment opportunities for its beneficiaries and obtaining land empowers and gives the new owner a real sense of security. At best agrarian reforms aim at creating a more equitable and just society.

**Contribution of Agrarian Reform to Political Development**

The greatest contribution of agrarian reforms in political development lies in the stimulus given to institution building in the countryside. Government as a key player in the political arena advocates mass mobilization and participation of various stakeholders, especially the peasants, to effectively and efficiently implement agrarian reform. Through organization building of peasantry to trade unions and cooperatives, government eases the social conflicts, gain peasant support and integrates them into the national economy, society and polity (Kay, 2000).

The various modalities that give peasants a stake in society such as decisive role in agrarian legislations, engaging them in dialogue to resolve agrarian cases, presenting manifesto pinpointing their criticisms and recommendations on implementing rules and guidelines, identification of farmer beneficiaries and lands to be covered, negotiation on the mode of land acquisition and distribution and computation of land values, have significantly influence the process of democratization and establishment of participatory institutions at the local and national levels (Kay, 2000; Borras, 2000; Prosterman, 1987; and Faryadi, 2000).

Agrarian reform also contributes to political development when it borrows power and resources from progressive non-government and international organizations. These organizations play a catalytic role in helping peasant organizations organize and press their demands for land. They provide technical assistance, material resources, legal aid and advocacy to advance agrarian reforms. The existence of civil society is essential to warrant continued implementation of policy.

Considerably, agrarian reforms contribute to political development when it engage in network and alliance building and transformation of societal power relations among individuals and institutions such as other government institutions, peasant organizations, landlords, non-government organizations, church, business groups,
political parties, media and international organizations. The positive interactions between pro-reform mobilization “from below” and pro-initiatives “from above” and where landlords fail to match such reform alliance (Borras, 1999), have been implemented even under a politically hostile setting.

For agrarian reform to happen, interest groups should continue to put pressure on government to do action. At the same time, it is important that government should create legislative opportunities, favorable institutional environment, and democratic structures that will promote popular participation in governance and civil society interactions.

The pro-reform mobilization from below refers to collective actions by peasant groups and their allies to implement the reform. The peasant mobilization may take a variety of forms from “extra-legal” land occupation to dialogue with state agencies. Local peasant groups needs allies for political and logistical reasons so as not to be isolated and defeated by adversaries. Other pro-reform societal actions from the national leadership of peasant organizations, national and provincial non-government organizations, political movements, media and international groups are crucial in extending the political reach of peasant collective action beyond the local level. These pro-reform mobilization actors need to interact with the state or make use of “openings” from above.

The pro-reform initiatives “from above” refers to actions by some state reformists intended to implement the goal set by the agrarian reform policy. The state reformists are actors within the state that are tolerant or even supportive of social mobilization from below. These openings from above can be either the result of independent initiatives by state reformists or a response to social pressures. But the state reformists are often challenged by anti-reform forces within the state and society, so they themselves need allies in society to realize the goals set by agrarian reform program.

IV. AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES

At the end of the 20th century, the Philippine population was 75.32 million or about 12.7 families comprising of six persons for each family unit. These people are living in a country of 297,410 square kilometers, making the country’s population density of 253 people per square kilometer. The Philippine population growth is about 2.02 per year and in the next 25 year, the population is expected to double, unless abated by population measures. The unemployment and underemployment rate is 11.2 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. In 1998, the infant mortality rate was 41.2 per 1,000 live births.

Sixty percent of the Philippine population is rural. Over 11.32 million of all Filipinos make their living directly from agricultural cultivation. In 1991, some 9.50 million hectares were planted to various crops, out of a total farm area of 9.97 million hectares. Most of the remaining lands are identified to be idle lands but arable (0.10
million hectares) and non-arable land comprising meadows or covered with forest brown (0.15 million hectares). The current ratio of cropped hectares per farm family is 1.19.

The 1991 agricultural census confirmed the trends of growing population pressure and diminishing availability of land suitable for agricultural expansion. While there were increases in both the number of farms (from 2.35 million to 4.61 million) and the total area of farms (from 8.49 million to 9.97 million hectares), average farm size declined from 3.6 to 1.19 hectares over the 1971-1991 period.

**Relationships of Land Resources, Population and Farm Sizes**

The limited land resources relative to population and highly skewed distribution of land resources explain the Philippines’ acute and growing landlessness. The national pattern of farm holding size as of 1991 show evidence of concentration of landownership. Farms of less than three hectares account for 78.9 percent Filipino farms, yet their aggregate area is only 37.61 percent of the total farm area.

Farms above three hectares to 9.99 hectares account for 18 percent of all farms covering 38.89 of the total farm area. Farms of ten hectares and above include 23.47 percent of the total farm area yet represent a mere three percent of all farms.

In terms of landlessness, from 1971 to 1991, there has been an increase in the number of landless agricultural families, from 5.0 million to 11.32 million. Of these, roughly 4.6 million make their living from land they do not own. There are about 0.70 million families working on landholdings wholly or predominantly rented, some 2.0 million families are agricultural laborers and another 1.9 million families are farming as tenants. Landless families represent roughly 40 percent of the agricultural population and ten percent of the total population.

**Program under President Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992)**

Under the Aquino Administration, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 approved Section 21 under Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policy), which states “The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform”. Subsequently, President Aquino created the Cabinet Action Committee to draft the CARP.

It took the newly constituted Congress a year to come up with detailed law as guide for the CARP implementation. This was a colorful period marked with passionate debates in numerous public consultations conducted in the streets and halls of Congress.

On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657 or better known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was passed instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) to promote social justice and industrialization. It was a breakthrough yet far from perfect. It was not easy to operationalize, depending on which side one took.
It was either too little or too much. Despite all its flaws, R.A.6657 was still a product of adherence to democratic principles.

Because of the peasants’ dissatisfaction with this agrarian reform law, the Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR) proposed its own agrarian reform alternative. The proposals from the peasant groups, non-government organizations and grassroots agrarian reform initiatives were outside the framework of R.A. 6657. CPAR launched parallel campaigns in the countryside in order to implement the alternative agrarian reform program. However, this effort did not succeed.

**Highlights of Accomplishments**

**Land Transfer Component**

Under the CARP, a total of 10.3 million hectares of land was programmed for distribution over a ten-year period. This consist of 6.5 million hectares of public alienable and disposal lands and Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) areas to be distributed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and 3.8 million hectares of private agricultural lands and resettlement areas to be distributed by the DAR.

The total land distribution performance of DAR from July 1987 to June, 1992 was 1.77 million hectares benefiting .933 million agrarian reform beneficiaries, while DENR has distributed 1.88 million hectares to .760 million farmers. The overall accomplishment of this administration including land under P.D. 27 was 34.56 percent for land distributed and 49.79 percent for beneficiaries provided with land titles. Table 4 presents the detailed accomplishment.

For the non-land transfer scheme DAR was able to freed from the bondage of share tenancy 170,904 tenants tilling 267,160 hectares. Stock distribution option as an alternative to land distribution was implemented covering 7,275 hectares, wherein 4,900 hectares comprise the Hacienda Luisita of President Aquino. In terms of the production and profit scheme, 84 companies have distributed P216.2 million of production and profit shares to 81,992 farmworkers. This provision requires that, pending final land transfer, entities owning or operating agricultural lands and realizing gross sales of more than P5 million shall pay their farmworkers three percent of the gross sales as production shares and ten percent of net profit after tax, as profit shares.

Of the lands covered by land transfer scheme, 168,846 hectares have been processed for payment by the Land Bank of the Philippines as land compensation to landowners amounting to P1.87 million. In the resolution of agrarian cases, DAR has settled 219,286 of the 259,156 total cases involving administrative implementation of the law. Of the cases requiring quasi-judicial disposition, 4,672 were adjudicated. The performance was hampered by the lack of lawyers due to low salary scale.
Program Beneficiaries Component

The delivery of support services was an inter-agency collaboration activity involving the CARP implementing agencies. These support services are credit, construction of rehabilitation of physical infrastructure such as a farm to market road, access trails, irrigation system, small water impounding and post-harvest facilities, establishment of livelihood projects and organizing of the beneficiaries into cooperatives to manage the livelihood projects. To fund the program, P 50 Billion has been allocated. However, only P 24.01 Billion was made available by the government. Out of this amount, P20.86 Billion was utilized by various agencies to implement the program. The only amount available for the next administration was P 3.15 Billion unless new money from PCGG and APT are remitted to the Treasury for CARP implementation.

The Program under President Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998)

In July 1992, the Ramos administration has identified five major tasks to be done to sustain the gains of CARP: i) bringing back the support of CARP stakeholders; ii) energize the bureaucracy (DAR) and improve the program operating systems; iii) find more resources for the program; iv) bridge certain existing gaps in policy; and v) strengthen the program’s role in reducing rural poverty by raising productivity and incomes of farmer beneficiaries through an integrated and sustainable approach at beneficiaries development.

With deep appreciation of the potential of working with people’s organizations (POs) and non-government organizations (NGOs), DAR rebuilds its relationship with different pro-reform initiatives from below by conducting consultations with key program stakeholders, and holding joint targeting and planning sessions with them. The collaborative efforts resulted to joint formulation and lobbying efforts for the protection of the gains of agrarian reform and strengthening of the program.

At the end of the Administration, DAR and DENR have distributed a total of 4.6 million hectares of titled lands to 2.1 farmer beneficiaries. This is equivalent to 57 percent of the 8.1 million hectares total area for distribution. Landowners’ compensation has been approved amounting to some P13.82 billion by December 1997. About 428,000 hectares have been covered under leasehold arrangement In terms of the stock distribution option and production and profit sharing scheme, the administration relaxed the implementation of these schemes due to protest from peasants’ organizations and non-government organizations. In terms of delivery of agrarian justice, the DAR Adjudication Board resolved a total of 109,708 cases. And 80 percent of the cases at the field offices are less than a year old.

In 1993, the DAR launched the Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC) approach to program beneficiaries development. The approach aimed to concentrate the efforts of the DAR in support services delivery to selected areas to fast track the improvement of farm productivity and social infrastructure building.
Based on the results of the survey conducted by the Philippine Institute of Agrarian Studies, incomes of agrarian reform beneficiaries had increased by 21 percent from the 1989 levels. Average net income levels of ARB households of P47,561 in 1995 increased to P56,646 in 1997, with a higher income in the ARCs of P69,333. The farm yields in the ARCs have exceeded the national averages for rice, corn and coconut.

The original cost of the program, as estimated in 1986 was P221 billion. What was initially allocated was P52.7 billion. The total obligation incurred by the nine CARP Implementing Agencies as of December 1997 was P44.725 billion. This is 90 percent of the P49.685 billion net allotments released during the July 1987 to December 1997. Land tenure improvement had 37 percent share of total obligations at P16.533, while Program Beneficiaries Development or support services accounted for 30 percent with P16.632 billion. The remaining 33 percent represents the Operational Support component.

Despite the accomplishments of the program under this administration, there are problems that have not been resolved such as: i) cancellation of CLTs and CLOAs, these lands should not have been covered during the Marcos and Aquino administrations since these are retention areas of the landowners; property was not primarily devoted to rice and corn; no tenancy relation between the CLT holder and land owner; and the land is outside the coverage of the program; ii) low valuation of lands wherein DAR came up with proposal but the Court has the final decision over setting the value; iii) selling of titles but the extent of which could not be monitored considering the sales are not registered; iv) failure to install ARBs in the awarded lands due to enforcement; and vii) integrity of DAR data in terms of land distributed which is a carry-over of past administration.

However, the course of implementing the program, there are valuable insights, to wit: i) agrarian reform is a program can be implemented in a way that it enjoys a sense of ownership by the organized farmers through their participation; ii) agrarian reform can make faster headway with the partnerships between and among its key players: government, the farmers, the landowners and the NGOs; iii) dealing with farmers’ organizations can sometimes be exasperating. However, the call for social pressure, in most of the time, resulted in an empowered peasantry that is active in making claims for gains in land distribution and support services; and iv) It is better to work within the framework of an imperfect law rather than not all.

The Program under President Joseph E. Estrada (1998-2001)

The 1998-2004 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program puts the farmers as the center of development. Pushing for a vision of society where there is equitable land ownership with empowered agrarian reform beneficiaries, farmers shall be able to manage their economic and social development towards a better quality of life. To meet the objectives of equity, capability and sustainability, the Estrada administration implemented CARP by integrating land tenure improvement (LTI) and program beneficiaries development (PBD) to build farmers’ capacities at claim-making, further stimulate the empowerment of the farmers and ensures that the land transferred with
means will make its new owners productive and competitive in a globalizing environments.

The task of the current administration is to finish land reform in the program’s remaining balance of 3.466 million hectares wherein 1.592 million hectares are private agricultural lands broken down as 80 percent coconut lands, 15 percent sugar haciendas and five percent commercial farms. To complete land distribution would mean an annual output of about 267,000 hectares land transferred to farmers.

After two and a half years of the Estrada Administration, DAR and DENR distributed a total of 415,149 hectares of titled lands to 191,319 farmer beneficiaries. This is equivalent to 12 percent of the 3.460 million hectares remaining lands for distribution or five percent of the total CARP scope of 8.1 million hectares. Landowners’ compensation was approved amounting to some P11.252 billion by December 2000. In terms of delivery of agrarian justice, the DAR Adjudication Board resolved a total of 40,730 cases, which is 75 percent of cases received.

An addition of 391 Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC) were launched making 1,360 ARCs nationwide wherein 65 percent are assisted by foreign donors and the remaining are locally funded. Because of the resource mobilization efforts, the DAR was able to generate an addition of P9.44 billion from foreign donors. The detailed accomplishment for the period is presented in Table 7. The total ARF of P100 billion is allocated for the 20-year program implementation and of this amount, P44.725 billion was released to the different implementing agencies in June 1998. The remaining fund to be used amounts to is P55.275 billion. Under this administration about P18.618 billion was utilized leaving P36.657 billion for the remaining eight years of implementation period.

The July 1998-December 2000, implementation of CARP attempted to put the farmers in the center of development within the context of the fiscal crisis and globalizing environment. However, the program continues to be confronted with the following problems: i) strong landowners resistance since lands to be covered are small in size and predominantly privately owned; ii) the dwindling fund brought about by limited fund allocation provided for land tenure improvement by the legislatures to avoid coverage of the lands owned by Senators and iii) sixty percent of the agrarian reform beneficiaries are living below the poverty line, especially the coconut and sugarcane farmers and workers. Hence, innovative approaches were initiated to sustain the gains of the agrarian reform program.

Despite the limited time given to this administration there are vital lessons that can be drawn as input to the next administration in pursuing agrarian reform. These are: i) the need to complete land distribution component, speed up land valuation and payment of land compensation to show political will of the government; ii) the need to concentrate the distribution of lands where there is greater demand for it; iii) the need to continue the Agrarian Reform Community approach in order to generate greater impact; iv) the need to closely work with local government units, business sector and civil society, since government cannot do it alone; v) pursue the sustainable rural development efforts with the DA and DENR; vi) the need to adopt a more creative social marketing campaign to make farmers more aware of the program, to sustain the
interest of foreign donors and raise interest of local government, Congress, business sector and civil society; and vii) link the agrarian reform program with 20/20 Initiative. Finally, there is a need to conceptualize new approaches, a new way of doing things to build a new social architecture where the country’s food producers, government, private sector and civil society will work for the common good.

V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

After 12 years of implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), DAR and DENR have redistributed 5.33 million hectares of land that account for 53.4 percent of the total farmland. This accomplishment represents 66 percent of the total CARP scope. About 3.1 million rural poor households, who constitute about forty-two percent of the total agricultural population, have directly benefited from the land redistribution.

Out of the total CARP accomplishment, almost two-thirds, or sixty-six (66%) percent was delivered by DAR. Of these lands, 48.3 percent or 1.477 million hectares are private agricultural lands (PAL) acquired through Operation Land Transfer (OLT), Voluntary to Sale (VOS), Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) while 51.7 percent are government owned lands. The private lands are the most contentious and difficult to transfer because of landowners’ resistance. Out of the private agricultural lands, Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) and Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS) cornered more than fifty-two percent of the lands distributed.

By regime, the biggest accomplishment under DAR was achieved under the Ramos administration (1992–1998), accounting for close to two-thirds or 62.5 of the department’s total output. The rest is divided as follows: Aquino administration had 27.8 percent; Estrada administration (2 years) had 7.4 percent (6 years); and Marcos regime (13 years) had 2.3 percent.

The accomplishment of CARP in relation to farm and crop types revealed that about 92.5 percent of lands redistributed is monocropped farm. While the general pattern follows the skewed concentration of land distribution based on crops toward the traditional, low value crops like rice, corn, coconut and sugarcane, land redistribution has also gained ground in the highly productive, modern farms planted to crops like pineapple, banana, palm oil, rubber and orchards.

In July 1998, the remaining balance in land redistribution under DAR had the following crop distribution estimates: seventy-five percent coconut, fifteen percent sugarcane, five percent remaining rice and corn lands, as well as five percent commercial plantations whose redistribution was deferred from 1988 until 1998. Table 11 presents the land distribution by crop type.

Sugarcane haciendas have been largely untouched by land reform despite incessant attempts by past DAR administrations mainly because of strong resistance of landlords and the continued government subsidies the sugarcane barons enjoy. But coconut croplands that were originally thought would be relatively easy to expropriate
proved to have been left behind in the implementation because of the dominance of small coconut owners who are resistant to reform and relatively weaker reformist rural peasant movement.

Some highly modern plantations have been redistributed to farmworkers, despite the previous belief that redistribution was unlikely in these areas. This is due to the fact that most MNCs abandoned their alliance with local landed elites and maneuvered to implement land reform in these areas. The MNCs’ belief that CARP offers better opportunities for more profits via joint venture arrangements like contract growing schemes and leaseback. Basically, land redistribution has been uneven across farm and crop types.

The uneven and varied outcome of land redistribution can also be viewed based also on the geographic locations. Table 12 demonstrates the uneven redistribution outcomes from one region to another.

VI. LESSONS AND INSIGHTS

There are some insights that can be drawn from these accomplishments. First, agrarian reform has responded to the battlecry of the 1.3 million landless peasants to gain control of the land and address the issue of inequitable landownership. Second, improvements in land tenure status as in the case of leasehold, stock distribution and production and profit sharing schemes have benefited around 609, 562 farm families.

Third, a big percentage of the landowners have supported the program and were willing to give up their lands for the farmers as reflected in the VLT and VOS data. Fourth, the contour of power structures and relationship in the rural areas must have been changed through the breaking up big landholdings into small sized farm of about 1.2 hectares per farm family and improvements in tenurial rights of sharecroppers to leaseholders.

Fifth, equity goal may have been attained since redistributive land reform has been the main mode utilized. In fact, the leasehold arrangement is considered a transition phase to redistributive mode and production-profit sharing and stock distribution schemes have been suspended since the administration of President Ramos.

Sixth, CARP output in land redistribution is comparable with those in other countries. The top performers have either socialist-revolutionary government or military regimes during the land reform initiatives. The Philippines stands out among the countries in the category of “less-than democratic” regime that is neither revolutionary, nor military dictatorship, not fully democratic that have implemented agrarian reform and without foreign aids.

Seventh, most of the countries that launched land reform adopted the inward-looking, nationalist-protectionist development strategies and before the neoliberal resurgence. Among the few countries that carried out land redistribution during the neoliberal reforms are the Philippines, El Salvador, and South Africa.
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