Article
The Dependency of Wage Contracts on Monetary Policy.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
(1995)
Abstract
In response to the new-classical argument that anticipated monetary policy is ineffective, one New-Keynesian rebuttal posits sticky wages stemming from long-term labor contracts. We argue here that such fixed-wage contracts may reflect stabilization policy itself. Using an illustrative quantitative model, implemented by a computer program that computes the game payoffs, we analyze wage-contract strategies that could arise in response to various monetary policy strategies. (JEL: E 24, E 25).
Keywords
- Monitoring costs,
- Monetary policy,
- Price levels,
- Wage contracts,
- Economic costs,
- Variable costs,
- Money supply,
- Contracts,
- Wages,
- Nominal wages
Disciplines
Publication Date
December, 1995
Publisher Statement
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Citation Information
Fred E Foldvary and George Selgin. "The Dependency of Wage Contracts on Monetary Policy." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 151 Iss. 4 (1995) p. 658 - 676 ISSN: 0932-4569 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/fred_foldvary/33/