Duality in Property: Commons and AnticommonsInternational Review of Law and Economics (2006)
AbstractCommons and Anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we endeavor to provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. The general model is then extended to consider the different equilibria obtained under vertical and horizontal cases of property fragmentation. The paper concludes formulating a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property.
Publication DateOctober, 2006
Citation InformationNorbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter. "Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons" International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 25 Iss. 4 (2006)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/francesco_parisi/19/