Deviance as Pedagogy: From Non-Dominant Cultural Capital to Deviantly Marked Cultural Repertoires

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Deviance as Pedagogy: From Nondominant Cultural Capital to Deviantly Marked Cultural Repertoires

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Background/Context: Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has been employed extensively in sociological, educational, and anthropological research. However, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of cultural capital has often been misread to refer only to “high status” or dominant cultural norms and resources at the cost of overlooking the meaningful and productive practices of nondominant and marginalized cultural communities.

Focus of Study: By reconceptualizing Cohen’s politics of deviance, this paper leans on post-structuralist thinkers to develop a conceptualization of the cultural repertoires of marginalized communities, hereafter referred to as deviantly marked cultural repertoires, that places at the center labeled practices of deviance. It is posited that in these labeled deviant cultural practices—which are often overlooked, shunned, and ignored—are valuable and meaningful experiences of learning and development.

Research Design: Using scenes from the HBO series The Wire as a cultural text, a materialist analysis is conducted to demonstrate empirically the pedagogically rich processes of deviantly marked cultural repertoires.

Conclusions: This paper argues for a research agenda on the learning and development present in the often overlooked, shunned, ignored, and marked/labeled practices of deviance as a way to explore the transformative pedagogical possibilities in marginalized youth cultures.

“You put a textbook in front of these kids, put a problem on the blackboard or teach them every problem on some statewide test, it won’t matter, none of it. . . . Cause they’re not learning for our world, they’re learning for theirs.”

—Buddy Colvyn, The Wire, Season 4 Episode 10
Despite the pathologizing tone of this quote, it comes from a character in one of the most highly acclaimed series on television, *The Wire* (Simon, 2002–2008). More importantly, the quote speaks profoundly to a social, cultural, and educative process that this article seeks to take up more rigorously, theoretically and empirically. In this manuscript I seek to engage both theoretically and empirically the meaningful and rich pedagogical resources and processes present in cultural practices of the marginalized that have been labeled as deviant; what Bourdieu referred to as habitus and others have characterized as nondominant cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977; Bullen & Kenway, 2005; Carter, 2005; Thornton, 1995).

The French social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and cultural capital have provided rich theoretical lenses with which to critically examine inequality and its reproduction in education and society. Cultural capital, in particular, has received a tremendous amount of attention in conceptual and empirical work in educational research as a lens on educational inequality.

Although Bourdieu never suggested that cultural capital does not exist in marginalized communities, his conceptualization has been misconceived in U.S. sociological and educational research as referring exclusively to high-status culture. This misconception has led to a body of research that has overemphasized dominant group cultural practices and norms (DiMaggio, 1982; DiMaggio & Mohr, 1985; Farkas, 1996; Lareau, 2003; Roscigno & Ainsworth-Darnell, 1999) while only a few studies have considered nondominant forms of cultural capital (Bullen & Kenway, 2005; Carter, 2005; Thornton, 1995). The importance of examining dominant forms of cultural capital to investigate the reproduction of inequality is clear; however, in this paper I also argue exclusive focus on dominant culture leads ultimately to overlooking the potential cultural and pedagogical resources that exist in marginalized communities. The few efforts that have attempted to discuss and study nondominant forms of cultural capital have failed to consider the potential pedagogical experiences that might be present in the everyday practices of marginalized youth. Moreover, their appropriation of “capital” in reconceptualizing nondominant forms of cultural capital is theoretically in contradiction to the Marxian conceptualization that Bourdieu inherited (Leonardo, 2012, 2013). Although these studies consider the nonconforming practices among marginalized groups, they do not place at the center of their analysis those practices labeled as deviant. In the present paper, I am particularly concerned with the subversive acts of those who, in the words of Cohen (2004), exist “on the (out)side . . . [and who] are thought of as morally wanting by dominant society and other . . . [marginalized] group members” (p. 29)—agents who engage in practices that have successfully been labeled by others as “deviant.”
My focus here is on those practices labeled and sanctioned by the
dominant society as deviant and that are often overlooked, ignored, and
shunned—practices that not only serve as cultural currency and legiti-
macy in marginalized communities, as others argue (Bullen & Kenway,
2005; Carter, 2005; Thornton, 1995), but are also processes of complex
pedagogical experiences. This is what I refer to as deviantly marked cultural
repertoires. I am particularly interested in those marked bodies of deviance
[embody] an outsider status” (p. 27). These acts might consist of the many
practices that pertain to participation in gangs, the street labor market,
hip hop culture, poor single Black mothers (who are symbolically in con-
flict with the ideals of heteronormativity and the nuclear family), lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender or queer youth, teenage pregnancy, homeless
youth, and youth with prior criminal records. Rather than refer to these
nondominant acts as “capital,” a theoretical misrecognition of the rela-
tions of power, I use the term repertoire to refer to the cultural “tool kit”
of acts, practices, skills, and styles (Swidler, 1986). I argue that present in
these cultural repertoires or acts of nonconformity, ruses, and processes
of adaptability exist complex and meaningful experiences of learning and
development. The term “deviantly marked cultural repertoires” centers
those practices that are labeled deviant and considers the rich pedagogi-
cal experiences that are present in these practices.

Relevant to the argument I make is a longstanding literature on cultural
and ecological perspectives on learning and development. This literature
goes back several decades and is most attributed to the intellectual contri-
butions of scholars such as Levy Vygotsky (1978), Michael Cole and Sylvia
Scribner (1974), and Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979) among others. This lit-
erature suggests that learning and development occurs within a multilay-
ered context and is a product of the sociocultural context by which learn-
ing is situated. More recently, scholars such as Carol Lee (2001), Barbara
Rogoff (2003), Norma González, Luis Moll, and Cathy Amanti (2005),
and Herve Varenne (2007) have extended this literature with research on
culture and cultural practices as processes of learning and development.
What this literature has not focused on are the pedagogical experiences
present in those cultural practices that are labeled deviant and that might
contribute to our greater understanding of the phenomenon of learn-
ing and development for youth who embody outsider status through their
nonconformity.

I begin by discussing Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, how it has
been used throughout most of the literature, and its critiques. I then dis-
cuss the brief literature on nondominant forms of cultural capital and its
limitations. Using Mary Douglas’s framing on “dirt” and Cohen’s politics
of deviance, I subvert the greater normative structure of a politics of respectability. Next, I employ Derrida’s understanding of the double injunction of inheritance to consider those social interstices of (im)possibility of deviant acts. It is in and through these social interstices that I inject de Certeau’s conceptualization of the tactics of everyday practices as a way to frame practices of deviance. I then argue that labeled deviant practices are cultural practices, and I present some of the longstanding literature on cultural practices as learning and development as evidence. Lastly, I present a materialist analysis of deviantly marked cultural repertoires in and through two scenes from the HBO series *The Wire*. In my conclusions, I begin to raise questions of what a research agenda on deviantly marked cultural repertoires might examine and consider its transformative possibilities. I now turn to Bourdieu and his concept of cultural capital.

BOURDIEU’S CULTURAL CAPITAL AND LIMITATIONS

As mentioned earlier, Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital has been employed extensively throughout sociological and educational research. However, the use of cultural capital in U.S. scholarly research has referred primarily to high-status or dominant cultural norms, codes, and practices. As Lamont and Lareau (1988) wisely note, Bourdieu was not consistent in his own definition of cultural capital. In *Reproduction* (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970/1977) he discussed the concept within an overall framework of symbolic violence as “the cultural goods transmitted by the different family PAs [pedagogic actions], whose value . . . varies with the distance between the cultural arbitrary imposed by the dominant PA and the cultural arbitrary inculcated by the family PA within the different groups or classes” (p. 30). Bourdieu and Passeron (1964/1979) argued that other types of preferences, attitudes, and behaviors, such as familiarity with high culture, that are valued in school settings, are more typical of the transmitted culture found in the homes of the dominant group. Additionally, Bourdieu (1979/1984) theoretically and empirically explored how cultural capital as socially structured aesthetic dispositions, preferences, and tastes contributes to reproducing the social order. It is clear from this definition that Bourdieu was concerned with the variation of culture that is produced as a result of societal stratification and how these processes contribute to the reproduction of inequality.

Later, he further developed the concept in a well referenced book chapter titled “The Forms of Capital” where he captures how cultural capital, which was grounded in Marx’s conceptualization of capital, is convertible to other forms of capital, especially economic (Bourdieu, 1986). For example, a person with a high degree of competence with the dominant group
cultural norms and codes would be more likely to be able to engage in, and have stronger membership in, the social networks that might be used for economic endeavors. In addition, he discussed the various manifest states of cultural capital: objectified, institutionalized, and embodied. The objectified state refers to those physically obtainable cultural goods such as art, books, music, plays, and the like. The institutionalized state refers to the degrees and certifications that are conferred by dominant institutions of education, while the embodied state—which he also referred to as habitus—is the socially structured scheme of dispositions that are produced given one’s social location within social structures and their externalized practices. Deviantly marked cultural repertoires are more concerned with the embodied states of cultural capital; e.g., the cultural practices that are produced by youth of marginalized communities.

Given the evolution of definitions/uses of cultural capital by Bourdieu, Lamont and Lareau (1988) suggest that his overall framework is alternatively an informal academic standard, a class attribute, a basis for social selection, and a resource for power that is salient as an indicator/basis of class position. They further argue that the aforementioned forms of cultural capital cannot perform their theoretical functions. For example, educational degrees and certifications cannot be a signal of class culture because these are variables that apply to members of all social classes. Therefore, they propose to define cultural capital as institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high-status, cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods, and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion.

Although I agree with Lamont and Lareau’s (1998) critique of Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, their proposed definition deals with the exclusionary processes that contribute to the reproduction of inequality. The focus on deviantly marked cultural repertoires has less to do with reproduction (in fact, they are processes that are likely to contribute to reproduction) and more to do with the disruptive and subversive behavior of the marginalized that is normatively stigmatized by the symbolic order as inappropriate, nonconforming, or rule-breaking behavior. I argue that this subversive behavior was missed by Bourdieu, given his structuralist leanings and focus on reproduction; that is, despite his efforts to consolidate between the dualisms of structure/agency and objectivism/subjectivism he still overdetermines the schemes of dispositions and externalized practices that reproduce social structures. Even though Bourdieu’s lens of the reproduction of power can be helpful, his ardent push back against Sartrian existentialism, economist human capital theory, and the political project of neoliberalism leads him to overlook the potential moments, spaces, and processes of resistance that might be located in the
nonconforming dispositions and practices of the marginalized. As others have noted (Calhoun, 1993; de Certeau, 1980/1984), Bourdieu gives more attention to social space and not enough attention to the practices situated within time (or the historical) and social space. It is these limitations of Bourdieu’s articulation of cultural capital that have led a few scholars to begin to consider the nondominant forms of cultural capital.

LITERATURE ON NONDOMINANT FORMS OF CULTURAL CAPITAL

It has been noted by other scholars that “lower class high status cultural signals” (i.e., being streetwise) perform within the lower class the same exclusivist function that the legitimate culture performs in dominant society (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). In fact, Lamont and Lareau (1988) argue that the term cultural capital is not applied to these signals because they cannot be equated with the legitimate culture and lead us in a promising direction of a new concept such as “marginal high status signal.” To my knowledge, this concept was never fully developed, but others have posited other nondominant expressions of cultural capital.

One of the first conceptualizations of nondominant cultural capital is found in the work of Sarah Thornton (1995). In her text Club Cultures she develops the concept of subcultural capital as a way of framing youth participation in club cultures. This concept, a mapping of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies subcultural theory onto Bourdieu’s framework of cultural capital, makes it possible to observe subforms of capital that operate within other, less privileged domains. Thornton employs the term subculture to refer to “taste cultures” and ideologies through which “youth imagine their own and other social groups, assert their distinctive character and affirm that they are not anonymous members of an undifferentiated mass” (p. 10). Bullen and Kenway (2005) adopt Thornton’s subcultural capital and extend it to include social and symbolic capital. They apply this evolved concept of subcultural capital to exploring the school lives of economically disadvantaged girls. Although both Thornton (1995) and Bullen and Kenway (2005) developed a concept that considers those who exist on the outside, neither consider the potential pedagogical experiences present in these practices. Moreover, their situating in subcultural theory (Hebdige, 1979/2008) falls prey to the homogenization of subcultures, fixing them in time and place at the cost of not accounting for the fluid, multiplicative, and dynamic processes of culture.

Other forms of nondominant cultural capital have been posited in order to dispel the “acting-white” theory (Fordham & Ogbu, 1986). Carter (2005) suggests that the acting-white theory misexplains the racial/ethnic
authenticity and cultural conflict with school culture of Black and Latino youth as oppositional to education in general. She suggests that nondominant cultural capital “consists of a set of tastes, appreciations, and understandings, such as preferences for particular linguistic, musical, and dress styles, and physical gestures used by lower status group members to gain ‘authentic’ cultural status positions in their respective communities” (p. 50). She applies this notion of nondominant cultural capital to her concept of “black cultural capital.” Black cultural capital refers to the resources, codes, and symbols of the particular low-income African American youth she was studying. Carter continues:

Strategically, these youth use their capital to signal their own cultural competences by adhering to certain speech codes, dress styles, music preferences, and gestures. Black cultural capital also helps to protect boundaries around racial and ethnic identity. Thus an African American student’s cultural status depends upon the degree to which he or she can “do” or “act” blackness appropriately in his or her peers’ eyes (Jackson, 2001). If he or she either refuses or fails, the student might be perceived as “acting white” . . . Often we ignore the very real tensions between the symbolic, cultural boundaries established by racial and ethnic minority students—which have little to do with their desire for achievement, mobility, and success—and the cultural markers used by educators to mark intelligence and to categorize students. (p. 52)

Black cultural capital has also been taken up by others to conceptualize the cultural import hip hop has in the lives of South Asian American immigrant youth (Sharma, 2010). While Carter posits a nondominant form of cultural capital that captures the processes of nonconformity she uses this as a lens in order to debunk the false ideology of “acting white” and doesn’t consider the potential pedagogical experiences that may exist in Black cultural capital. Moreover, given that her ethnographic study was based out of the homes and schools of her sample of Black and Latino youth she was not able to capture the everyday practices that go on in spaces between these institutions, such as in the streets and on the corner. It is these places and spaces that are marked as deviant and called the “evil other” by even the adults and leaders of the marginalized community institutions (McRoberts, 2003).

Beyond the mentioned limitations of each of these conceptualizations of nondominant cultural capital, they each fall trap to a theoretical contradiction (Leonardo, 2012, 2013). “Capital,” as deployed by Marx and inherited by Bourdieu, refers to the proprietary accumulation of wealth. Marx (1906) states:
As the conscious representative of this movement, the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts and to which it returns. The expansion of value, which is the objective basis or main-spring of the circulation M-C-M [money-commodity-money], becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. (p. 130)

Despite the problematic binary of possessor/consumer, this notion of “capital personified” was further developed by Bourdieu, with the theoretical help of Weber and others, as the embodied state of cultural capital. Indeed, as Leonardo (2012, 2013) argues, cultural capital is about wealth and power, which is a theoretical contradiction or misrecognition of the adjective “non-dominant.” However, to account for the ways in which the marginalized do engage in counterhegemonic maneuvers, I argue for the focus on cultural repertoires. In other words, the marginalized possess a cultural tool kit of acts, practices, skills, and styles (Swidler, 1986) that enable the social negotiation and navigation of the everyday. It is the cultural repertoires of those bodies, practices, and spaces labeled as deviant that are often overlooked, shunned, criticized, and not taken seriously. Before I move to discussing why those practices need to be given more serious attention and focus for their present pedagogical resources I first theoretically reframe how deviance is conceptualized in public discourse and research.

“THEY’RE DRAGGING ME WAY DOWN”: FROM A POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY TO A POLITICS OF DEVIANCE

Ladies and gentlemen, the lower economic and lower middle economic people are not holding their end in this deal. In the neighborhood that most of us grew up in, parenting is not going on. . . . Looking at the incarcerated, these are not political criminals. These are people going around stealing Coca Cola. People getting shot in the back of the head over a piece of pound cake! Then we all run out and are outraged: “The cops shouldn’t have shot him.” What the hell was he doing with the pound cake in his hand? . . . Brown V. Board of Education—these people who marched and were hit in the face with rocks and punched in the face to get an education and we got these knuckleheads walking around who don’t want to learn English. . . . When you walk
around the neighborhood and you see this stuff, that stuff’s not funny. These people are not funny anymore. And that’s not my brother. And that’s not my sister. They’re faking and they’re dragging me way down because the state, the city, and all these people have to pick up the tab on them because they don’t want to accept that they have to study to get an education.

—Bill Cosby, NAACP Address, 2004

Cosby’s address at the NAACP 50th Anniversary of Brown versus Board of Education reflects the greater sense of moral policing and sanctioning that exists in the middle and upper class of the Black community. This policing of behavior was also exhibited in the Don Imus controversy where Imus referred to the Black female players of the Rutgers State University basketball team as “nappy-headed hos.” He argued his use of such labels was justifiable because rap artists use this language all the time. Rather than undermining the logic of his argument by arguing against the homologous structural influences that produce such ideologies, so-called Black leaders such as Al Sharpton allowed hip-hop culture to become the scapegoat of his policing of Black women’s bodies. The controversy and scapegoating led acclaimed talk show host Oprah Winfrey to air a three-show series that produced a discourse on pathology, blame-the-victim, and bootstrap perspectives regarding the state of Black youth. Not one show discussed or mentioned the structural forces that produce differential practices and behaviors and, moreover, the implicit framing of the overall discourse was based on ideologies of respectability.

Although much more could be said about these examples, they are not the focus of this paper. I mention them as materializations in the media of the moral policing, sanctioning, and labeling of those who exist on the margins of society as nonconforming, morally wanting, and deviant. However, the policing of the practices and behaviors of those with outsider status in the Black community is not a new phenomenon. The genesis of what Higginbotham (1993) calls a politics of respectability began in the early 1900s with the creation of the Women’s Convention, an auxiliary organization to the National Baptist Convention. Their agenda was born out of the women’s movement in the Black Baptist church and sought to contest racist discourses, rejecting White America’s depiction of Black women as immoral, childlike, and unworthy of respect or protection. Their religious and political message was informed by biblical teachings, the philosophy of racial self-help, Victorian ideology, and the democratic principles of the U.S. Constitution. Higginbotham states that the politics of respectability was Black Baptist women’s opposition to the social structures and symbolic representation of White supremacy. As part of the agenda of the
politics of respectability, they not only were oppositional to White supremacy, they also condemned what they perceived to be negative practices and attitudes among their own people leading to insistence upon Black conformity to dominant society’s norms of manners and morals.

These same ideologies of the politics of respectability can also be found throughout many of the major works in the social sciences. They can be found, for instance, in William Julius Wilson’s (1987) heteronormative leanings in his perspectives on family structure and fatherless homes and in Elijah Anderson’s (1999) pathologizing of the “street” and “decent” continuum of behaviors. Moreover, the politics of respectability can be critically analyzed via Mary Douglas’s (1966) framing of “dirt.” Douglas defines “dirt” as the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, insofar as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. The politics of respectability seeks to maintain and separate the symbolic systems of moral purity from those labeled as morally wanting and nonconformist, the dirt of the social order. However, I argue, given that the idea of dirt is a result of symbolic ordering, what might constitute dirt for the morally compliant might be purity for the outsider and, vice versa, what might constitute dirt for the outsider might be purity for the morally compliant.

Howard Becker (1963) insightfully argues along a similar line of logic, suggesting that the person who is labeled an outsider may have a different view of the matter. The labeled outsider “may not accept the rule by which he is being judged and may not regard those who judge him as either competent or legitimately entitled to do so,” and indeed “the rule-breaker may feel his judges are outsiders” (pp. 1–2). Becker later defines deviance as “not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’” (p. 9). Therefore, not only is deviance in the eye of the beholder, but also a reflection of the person’s individual or group symbolic capital. For example, as is well known, racial profiling continues in practices of surveillance. It is seen in the institutionalized criminal justice strategies that target poor minority communities (e.g., in Chicago the panoptic lens of poor minority communities is evident in the surveillance cameras with blue lights) as well as the post-9/11 profiling of men and women of Islamic appearance. On the other hand, corporate crimes go on every day, but they rarely make the front page of the New York Times or get the attention of the evening news. Corporate crimes (and medical crimes alike) are often not even brought to the criminal justice system at all, in order to save the respectability of the profession. And, as we have seen with the 2008 financial crisis, it is corporate crimes that can have the greatest impact on the social and economic order. It is symbolic capital that makes the labeling of the deviant contingent upon a person’s ascribed identity.
Following this argument, I incorporate Cohen’s (2004) framework of a politics of deviance into my conception of deviantly marked cultural repertoires. She calls for the construction of a field of investigation that is “centered around the experiences of those who stand on the (out)side of state sanctioned, normalized White, middle- and upper-class, male heterosexuality,” suggesting “a paradigmatic shift in how scholars . . . think and write about those most vulnerable . . . [in marginalized] communities—those thought to be morally wanting by both dominant society and other . . . [marginalized] group members” (Cohen, 2004, p. 29). Cohen argues that a politics of deviance, with a focus on the transformative potential found in deviant practices, might be a more viable strategy for radically improving the lives and possibilities of those most vulnerable in marginalized communities.

While I agree with Cohen on the need to focus on the transformative potential of practices of deviance, she also suggests that in order for deviance to be political resistance there has to be intent by the subject. As has been deconstructed by others (Adorno, 1972/1991; Bourdieu, 1977; Derrida, 1972/1982), the privileged access to human intent, consciousness, or meaning is an impossibility. It is for this reason that I argue for a politics of deviance that moves from an assumption of intentionality to effect (Foucault, 1980). Like power, resistance manifests itself in multiple forms and ways. These various manifestations are not always identifiable as many of them attempt to escape the purview of the apparatuses of the state so as not to become disciplined or hegemonized. Moreover, as mentioned, there is no way to know the full and total intent behind actions and practices, but it is plausible to observe and know the effects of these actions and practices. Analogous to power, what makes resistance effective is if it subversively produces things that disrupt or counter normalizations, particularly in knowledge, truth, and discourse. In shifting the conceptual foci from intent to the productive forces of labeled practices of deviance, we are also forced to pay particular attention to the various materialized historical forces that have enabled the possibility for the productive forces of labeled deviance. This conceptualization of resistance redefines resistance to be not about whether there was intent by the actor(s) but rather whether the acts or practices have a subversive or productive effect.

While a shifted focus from intent toward effect of labeled practices of deviance is important in conceptualizing resistance, deviantly marked cultural repertoires are concerned with practices of deviance, more generally, and their disruptive possibilities. I argue that there may be present in practices of deviance transformative pedagogical possibilities that may be strategic to radically improving the lives of marginalized youth. However, in order to discuss the deviant practices among the marginalized there
must also be a framing by which to understand the social interstices of space and time in which deviant practices are produced. It is to this topic that I now turn the discussion.

MOMENTS OF (IM)POSSIBILITY: THE SOCIAL INTERSTICES OF DEVIANCE

In order to talk about the cultural repertoires of practices of deviance it is important to discuss the processes that enable those moments, spaces, and intervals of (im)possibility. More specifically, what are the social processes that enable moments of possibility within the social space and time of hegemony? How do these social processes create the social cleavages within time and space? Given that Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital is situated in the social process of inheritance, I consider a conceptualization of inheritance that recognizes its breaks, ruptures, and social interstices; that is, the double injunction of inheritance (Derrida, 1996/1998; Derrida & Roudinesco, 2001/2004; Dixon-Román, 2010). The double injunction of inheritance holds that people do not choose their heritage, it chooses them. Simultaneously, the heritage choosing of the social subject enables the possibility for the social subject to choose to keep it alive. It is that process of being chosen that enables those moments of possibility of constrained or discursive agency.

Moments of possibility are enabled through the structured and constrained choice and process of reappropriating that which (violently) chooses (or appropriates) the social subject. At those moments of being chosen one must not just accept (or appropriate) the past, one must reappropriate the past in order to keep it alive. Given that language and culture are not pure, universal, or material possessions, the appropriated social subject (re)appropriates an inheritance that is never fully or completely appropriable. Thus, there is always a process of (re)appropriating in the appropriation.

Analogously, the experience of inheritance is autoheteronomous, implying its constrained autonomy or discursively structured choice. It is heteronomous because it not only chooses and appropriates the subject, it structures the subject’s very social ontology. However, the heteronomy of inheritance simultaneously enables the possibility for structured and constrained autonomy via one’s discursively structured choice of what one inherits, one’s agreement to it, and how one (re)appropriates it. It is this very process of (re)appropriation, structured choosing, and constrained autonomy that provides the possibility for ruses, subversive acts, and practices of the cultural repertoires of deviance; for, inherently, deviance is what disrupts or breaks the rules or logic of that which is socially constituted as “normal” or sanctioned as “appropriate.”
I will further explicate this process using the opening quote from *The Wire* (Simon 2002–2008). As a former police commander of West Baltimore, Colvyn knew very well the norms, practices, and processes of the streets. On the one hand, he speaks to the conditions and resources that the youth inherited in their schools, communities, and homes. These conditions were not only heteronomous in their lives but, in fact, chose them and appropriated their bodies. On the other hand, while there may be social and cultural discontinuity between what they are learning in schools in contrast to what they are living and learning on the streets Colvyn suggests that the youth are reappropriating the time, space, and practices of schooling for the learning that they need on the streets—e.g., one of the youth skipping class to sell snacks and drinks during lunchtime to his peers or youth engaging in sex work in the school bathroom. Colvyn insightfully argues that the youth find ways of reappropriating that which is legally heteronomous in their lives (i.e., the structure of public schooling) as a way to engage in constrained autonomous acts of socially constituted deviance. As I will explicate later present in these constrained autonomous acts are meaningful and rich pedagogical experiences.

This example speaks to the process of the double injunction of inheritance that enables the moments and spaces of possibility for ruses and acts of subversion. To be more specific, the moments, spacings, and intervals of (im)possibility within the heteronomy of the school were enabled by the community and school conditions that appropriated the students’. The conditions that appropriated the students, which simultaneously enabled the social interstices of possibility, also occasioned the opportunity for disobedience, ruses, acts, and tactics—the cultural repertoires of practices that are often labeled deviant—that challenge, disrupt, and subvert the relations of power of the dominant social, economic, and symbolic order of the schools. In order to more fully understand these marked practices of deviance it is critical to provide a framework of everyday practices within the temporal-spatial interstices of the social world.

**WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: THE TACTICS WITHIN SOCIAL INTERSTICES**

The social interstices that are enabled by the double injunction of inheritance make possible the acts and practices of deviance and resistance. These acts, practices, and tactics are the very weapons the marginalized use in order to “make do” in their everyday lives. As de Certeau (1980/1984) reminds us, we must move toward a polemological analysis that examines the battles between the strong and weak with particular attention to the (re)uses of dominant forms of production in the consumption of the marginalized. That is, how do the marginalized (re)interpret, (re)use, and
(re)invent products with and within the dominant forms of production? In this spirit, de Certeau argues against the notion of the marginalized as “culturally duped” and “complicit” passive consumers and posits that it is through the (re)interpretation, (re)use, and (re)inventing that consumption is turned into another form of production, one that the producers of the original products rarely anticipate. Here, I lean on de Certeau’s notion of tactics as a way to conceptualize the everyday practices of the marginalized that are socially marked as deviant.

The (re)interpretation, (re)use, and (re)invention of consumption is what de Certeau (1980/1984) refers to as tactics. Tactics are calculated actions determined by the absence of a proper locus; that is, tactics are the actions produced given the absence of a place of power. This place of power is both theoretical and physical and reduces temporality to spatiality as such maintaining the theoretical fallacy of power. Thus, tactics “do not obey the law of place”; they cleverly maneuver through the utilization of time that is enabled by the heteronomy of place. The heteronomy of place—with its surveillance, rules, and legitimating authority—misses the guileful ruses and tactics that occur within the social interstices of time and space.

Tactics include what de Certeau (1980/1984) calls *la perruque*, bricolage, and poaching. *La perruque* is when workers engage in their own production under the auspices of their employer, utilizing the free “scraps”: for instance, the selling of snacks and drinks during lunch time as the character Randy Wagstaff does in *The Wire* in order to make do given his existence in the child welfare system. Borrowing from Levi-Strauss (1976), the practice of bricolage also uses scraps, the additional elements, and produces its own products (similar to sampling and turntablism in hip hop) but occurs outside of the place of employment or dominant production. As an example, the homeless recovering heroin addict, Bubbles, collects and sells discarded cell phones, white t-shirts, and other products out of a shopping cart. The insinuation, reinterpretation, and (re)appropriation of a text (in reading a book, TV, social space, or situation, etc.) for one’s own use and purposes—where the reader replaces the author or producer of the text—is referred to as poaching. We see poaching at various moments throughout *The Wire* as the youth reinterpret the social spaces of the housing projects and the street corner, for instance, for their own economic production. These are just a few examples of the cultural repertoires of tactics the marginalized practice in order to “make do.”

Each of these small acts often goes undetected by the dominant order and alone has little to no independent effect. But, in fact, it is the cumulative of these undetected actions, “thousands upon thousands,” that disrupt the greater symbolic and economic order (Scott, 1985). Some of
these undetected everyday forms of resistance that Scott (1985) refers to include foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on. These tactics of the cultural repertoire of practices of labeled deviance that occur within the social interstices of time disrupt, challenge, and resist the dominant social, economic, and symbolic orders.

However, what are often overlooked in the everyday practices of labeled deviance are the processes of learning and development. It is to this that I now turn.

DEVIANT PRACTICES AS LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Up until this point of the article I have attempted to reconceptualize and reframe how we understand, on the one hand, what we know of as deviance, and on the other hand, the deviant practices that exist in marginalized communities. However, can practices of deviance, by those who are marked with marginal or outsider status and successfully labeled as deviant, be processes of learning and development? The prior discussions in this paper have fertilized the ground for discussion of the processes of learning and development that are potentially present in deviant practices.

Deviant practices are an extension of, and a special case of, the cultural repertoire or tool kit of cultural practices. They are produced out of cultural communities and the only distinction between cultural practices that are successfully labeled as deviant versus those that are not is that they are labeled and defined in relation to the symbolic order of respectability. Thus, labeled practices of deviance are cultural practices.

By extension, there has been a longstanding body of research that has examined the ways in which culture and ecological contexts shape learning and development. Vygotsky (1978), being one of the seminal thinkers in this line of work, posited a model of learning and development that was situated in sociocultural context. Cole and Scribner (1974) are also well known for their work in capturing the differential processes of cognition between the Kpelle tribe of West Africa and Western European Americans. More specifically, their work suggests that the demands of the cultural context are what shape, in part, the processes of cognition. Bronfenbrenner (1979) developed a multilayered ecological framework that organizes and characterizes the various forms of interaction and influence on human development. He characterizes these ecological systems as the microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, and macrosystem, each of which has meaningful influences on human development.

While these perspectives investigate the ways in which the cultural and ecological context shapes learning and development, there has been
more recent work that deals more with the everyday practices of various cultural communities as learning and development. Lee (2001) has developed a framework of cultural modeling for designing instruction that makes explicit connections between students’ everyday knowledge and the demands of the subject-matter learning. She repositions language and community-based practices as sites of complex reasoning applicable to particular tasks in academic subject-matter learning. Nasir and Saxe (2003) have built on others’ work to argue that cultural practices are important for the enactment and formation of identity through everyday practices such as the playing of dominos. Spencer (1995) has developed a theory she refers to as PVEST, phenomenological variant of ecological systems theory. PVEST seeks to explain how members of all groups learn to cope with different sources of everyday stress as part of normal human development. Rogoff (2003) has examined cultural patterns of human development by looking at the regularities that make sense of differences and similarities in communities’ practices and traditions. She argues that people develop as participants in cultural communities.

In a study of what they referred to as street mathematics (the kinds of mathematical activities that are learned and conducted outside of school), Nunes, Schliemann, and Carraher (1993) examined the relationship between this “everyday mathematics” and the mathematics learned in schools. This work was conducted in Brazil with a varied age group of participants. Although the subject might not always be aware of these similarities, the authors found connections between the mathematics of cultural practices, out-of-school learning for children, and the kind of mathematics learned in schools. Moreover, their findings suggest that the distinctions between institutionalized and particular forms of mathematics knowledge need to be reformulated to account for the connections and lack of rigidity. This study blurs the lines of mathematics learning and doing in schools and in everyday cultural practices.

The very notion of street mathematics, or everyday mathematics, is in the spirit of the more anthropological understandings of learning and development where the human organism is always in process of becoming. In their classic text Situated Learning, Lave and Wenger (1991) move away from the perspective that cultural practices are subsumed within processes of learning and toward the position that learning is an integral aspect of cultural practices. They argue that “learning is not merely situated in practice—as if it were some independently reifiable process that just happened to be located somewhere; learning is an integral part of generative social practice in the lived-in world” (p. 35). They move toward a theory of learning that is not simply situated within the acts of pedagogy within schooling but situates learning as part of the generative process of cultural practices.
In related work, the funds of knowledge approach posits learning as a social process that occurs beyond the walls of the classroom (González et al., 2005). Moreover, González et al. (2005) state that funds of knowledge assumes that all people are competent and knowing and that what they know is produced from their experiences in the world. Similarly, Varenne (2007, 2008, 2009) applies a cultural theoretical lens to Cremin’s (1975/2007) notion of thinking comprehensively about education. This conceptualization understands education as a social process that is ubiquitous to being human. By taking seriously the notion that the structures of education are rather arbitrary (Garfinkel, 2002), Varenne (2007, 2008, 2009) posits that humans are inherently ignorant, and it is the lack of knowledge that produces the desire to seek knowledge. This constant seeking of knowledge, an ongoing process of “becoming,” is how humans make sense of the world in which they are situated—a process of learning how to “be” and “do” in the world as constituted by social space.

This body of work has provided consistent evidence of how in addition to cultural and ecological contexts everyday cultural practices are processes of learning and development. Although very little work has begun to explore how labeled cultural practices of deviance by those of marginal or outsider status are valuable and important processes of learning and development, the foundation has been laid for such an inquiry. With that, I now turn to the materialist analysis of two scenes from *The Wire*.

A MATERIALIST ANALYSIS OF *THE WIRE*

In order to illustrate the kind of processes of learning and development that are ubiquitous in practices of labeled deviance, I conduct a materialist analysis of two scenes from the HBO series *The Wire* (Simon, 2002–2008). The five-season series is a story of post-industrial urban United States; of the role and failure of institutions in advanced capitalism; of the social and legal structuring of post-9/11 politics; of the influence of neoliberal politics not just in policy but in the everyday practices of everyday social subjects; and much more. Each of these narrative dimensions builds for a rich, complex, and multilayered rendering of the street economy and culture of Baltimore.

While there are many scenes to choose from in *The Wire*, the two scenes I have chosen provide variability in place and the socially constituted spatial practices of deviance. Moreover, both scenes capture different processes of learning and development that are present in deviant practices.
HOPPERS, STREET ETHOS, & DOING THE MATH

Mathemathetical knowledge is often learned in tacit and unconventional everyday practices. In Episode 8 of Season 1 (08:37 to 10:47), one of the youth finds out that what they have been doing on the streets is mathematically analogous to what they are learning in school.

In order to get help on a textbook math problem, Sarah awakes Wallace from sleep in his room in the house that they are squatting in with many of the apparently homeless kids in the community. Sarah and Wallace both are hoppers (i.e., drug dealers at the bottom of the totem pole of the street economy hierarchy) although high school-aged Wallace is Sarah’s senior in age. Sarah asks Wallace for help on a word problem from a math textbook and Wallace helps with surprise that Sarah is unable to solve the problem. Wallace proceeds to read the textbook word problem.

A bus traveling on Central Ave begins its route by picking up 8 passengers. At the next stop it picks up 4 more and then an additional two at the third stop while discharging one. At the next to last stop three passengers get off the bus and another two get on. How many passengers are still on the bus when the last bus stop is reached?

He tells her to figure it out in her head.

Meanwhile, Poot enters the room to inform Wallace that a new package of drugs was coming out that day. Wallace was having a tough time dealing with a murder that he enabled. Thus, unbeknownst to others, he had not been to work because he was using drugs to get by. Poot earnestly tries to convince Wallace to come back to work. Poot explains to Wallace that he had been telling D’Angelo that Wallace was sick but that D’Angelo would only believe that for so long. Despite Poot’s efforts Wallace snaps back at him by telling Poot to “Fuck all that shit!” and asks Poot to borrow $10. He reluctantly gives it to him knowing that if he doesn’t work he will not be able to pay him back.

Throughout the exchange between Poot and Wallace, Sarah attempts to answer the word problem, but is again incorrect. It isn’t until Wallace translates the problem into hopper language and ethos Sarah calculates and responds almost instantly with the correct answer.

Damn Sarah, look! Close your eyes. You working the ground stash. Twenty tall pinks. Two feigns come up to you and ask for two each and another one cops three. Then Bodie hands you off ten more. But, some white guy rolls up in a car, waves you down, and pays for eight. How many vials you got left?
Sarah responds almost instantly with 15, the correct answer. Wallace then questions Sarah as to why she is able to keep the count right but not able to do the book problem. Sarah responds, “Count me wrong, they fuck you up.” Wallace’s response is a facial expression of shock and dismay.

This scene, situated in an unauthorized lived place, is during an act (i.e., squatting) and discourse (i.e., drug dealing) of marked deviance. A range of cultural repertoires that are particular to this discursive space are being deployed. In the two seemingly separate yet very related conversations within this scene both symbolic and embodied acts and skills are deployed and referred to. On the one hand, Sarah’s asking for help on a textbook math word problem is poached into a hopper situation word problem by Wallace in order to reinterpret and recast an analogous form of quantitative reasoning in and through the familiar embodied acts and skills of counting the stash. While on the other hand, Poot implores Wallace to come back to work after having missed several days due to his new use of drugs that Poot and others are unaware of. In this latter conversation, Poot has to sit down to talk to Wallace to speak intently about the problem this is creating by Poot having to cover for him. Implicitly, Poot is suggesting that there could be consequences if D’Angelo finds out he is just laid up in the house. Both of these conversations take place within a discursive space and practice of marked deviance on two seemingly unrelated topics.

What connects these two seemingly unrelated conversations are the hopper social practices and ethos. Sarah gave a look of shock when Wallace stated “Fuck the testers! Fuck all that shit!” Her shock was based on her understanding of the social ethos of the streets; an ethos that later results in the murder of Wallace due to his perceived weakness. Thus, this ethos has physically harming and potentially life-threatening consequences for the hoppers. When Wallace reinterprets and translates the word problem into an analogous hopper situation Sarah not only is able to socially understand and calculate the problem with ease but she further states her understanding of the stakes tied to the ethos of the streets (i.e., “Count me wrong, they fuck you up.”). Indeed, her cultural familiarity of the various social factors in the hopper situation enabled her to reason through an analogous quantitative task.

Wallace’s use of a hopper example in order to pedagogically mediate her learning on how to reason through this word problem is what Lee (2001) would refer to as the cultural modeling of the hopper’s funds of knowledge. Wallace recognizes that the textbook word problem is not making sense to Sarah hence he turns to what he knows Sarah is culturally familiar with: her existing knowledge as a hopper. His use of the hopper situation pedagogically models what Sarah is culturally familiar with in
order to take the unfamiliar situation of the word problem and resituate it in familiar social and cultural processes. However, to Wallace’s surprise, Sarah is able to reason through the word problem not just because of the situated familiarity but because of the stakes that are tied to the situation—a sign of her lost innocence.

The situated knowledge of the hopper example is what Nasir (2000; Nasir & Cooks, 2009) has captured in her work on the doing of mathematics in youth sports such as basketball or track and field. In the everyday hopper practices of marked deviance we see in this example the situated knowledge of the doing of mathematics. This is a doing of mathematics that is unrecognized and overlooked by society, the adults of the community, and seemingly the doer, Sarah. As Gutiérrez and Dixon-Román (2011) argue, traversing the belief of a universal mathematics and recognizing that individuals produce different mathematics in relation to others (over time) allows for the understanding that academic mathematics is a universalized particularity of mathematics that is often culturally in conflict with the particularities of marginalized cultural communities. Moreover, it is due to this cultural conflict that the academic mathematics does not always function effectively within the particularities of marginalized communities as we see with Sarah and her textbook word problem. However, as Wallace demonstrates, there are deviantly marked cultural repertoires that can be culturally modeled in order to pedagogically mediate one’s textbook learning experience.

It is also very critical to mention that Sarah, Wallace, and Poot did not choose the social and economic conditions that they were born into. However, as discussed earlier, inheritance is a social process of double injunctions. These inherited social and economic conditions as well as symbolic order also enable the situated possibilities for their discursively constrained choosing. In this scene, we see both Wallace and Sarah calling upon their deviantly marked cultural repertoires in order to make do despite those inherited conditions. In the larger space, we see that Wallace and Poot have reinterpreted and reappropriated the space of the vacant row home for their own housing needs while providing housing for other homeless kids in the community. With the pedagogical assistance of Wallace, Sarah is able to reinterpret the quantitative reasoning of the word problem with her existing cultural repertoires as a hopper. Thus, while Poot, Wallace, and Sarah did not choose their inherited social conditions they have acquired deviantly marked cultural repertoires that enable them to (re)appropriate and (re)interpret in order to make sense of and make do within the marginalized conditions of their social world. This is a social world that has its own social order and economy.
CHESS AND THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE STREET ECONOMY

The rules, structure and strategizing of chess has a homologous structure to the social world and can be analogized for pedagogical purposes. In Season 1 Episode 3 (00:10:40 to 00:14:15), we get one instantiation of this. The scene opens up outside on a sunny day on the lawn of the low-rise housing projects. D’Angelo walks up to Bodie sitting in a chair and Wallace sitting on a milk crate with a make shift table in between them playing checkers on a chessboard with chess pieces. D’Angelo asks them for an update on their drug sales and Wallace informs him that there was no delivery of drugs for them to sell. Bodie then hands D’Angelo a paper bag filled with a stack of money and informs him that they have a new rare package of drugs coming because what they have been selling is weak and the users are looking for something stronger. As Wallace and Bodie continue with this exchange they also continue with their game of checkers. When D’Angelo sees the move that Wallace makes he asks, “Yo, what was that?” He then goes on to explain how the castle can move in chess. Bodie and Wallace respond by telling him that they are not playing “that”; they are playing checkers. It was then that D’Angelo chuckled and eventually realized that they did not know how to play chess.

Although Wallace and Bodie were reluctant D’Angelo convinces them to allow him to teach them chess. He begins by setting up the chessboard.

    Now look. Check it. It’s simple. It’s simple. See this. [Holds up the king and kisses it.] This the king pin. Aight? And he the man. You get the other dude’s king, you got the game. He tryna get your king too so you gotta protect it. [Puts king back down.] Now the king. He move one space any direction he damn choose ‘cause he’s the king. Like this . . . this . . . this. [He demonstrates movements of the king on the board.] But he ain’t got no hustle. But the rest of these muthafuckas on the team they got his back and they run so deep he ain’t really gotta do shit.

Insightfully, Bodie asks if the king is like his uncle, Avon Barksdale, who is currently running the streets of the West Side of Baltimore. D’Angelo confirms and Wallace nods his head with a smirk. D’Angelo then holds up the queen and explains, “This the queen. She smart, she fierce. [Puts the piece back down on the board.] She move anyway she wants as far as she wants. And she is the go get shit done piece.” Wallace likens the queen to Stringer Bell, Avon Barksdale’s right hand person.

    D’Angelo then analogizes the castle to the stash (i.e., the stash of drugs) and the pawns to the hoppers. Beginning with the castle, he holds up the castle and relates it to the stash and shows what kind of moves it can make.
Wallace disagrees with D’Angelo by stating that the stash doesn’t move but D’Angelo reminds him that they move the stash house often throughout the week and every time they move the stash house they have to move protection with it. Bodie agrees and asks about the pawns. D’Angelo holds up a pawn and explains that they are the frontline soldiers and shows how they move. Perceptively, Bodie recognizes that D’Angelo is suggesting that the hoppers are the pawns on the chessboard and directly asks how do pawns get to be the king. D’Angelo responds

> It ain’t like that. See the king, stay the king. Aight? ‘Erything stay who he is. Except for the pawns. Now if a pawn make it all the way down to the other dude’s side . . . [Taking the pawn and knocking a piece off the board on to the ground.] he get to be queen. And, like I said the queen ain’t no bitch. She got all the moves. [The sound of a helicopter goes by above.]

Bodie, then, inserts himself into his questioning by asking, “Aight, but if I make it to the other end, I’m top dawg?” D’Angelo responds sternly by stating, “Na yo it ain’t like that. Look, the pawns man, in the game, they get capped quick. They be out the game early.” Bodie leans back in his chair and immediately retorts, “Unless they some smart ass pawns.” D’Angelo looks at him intently and nods his head looking back at the board.

This scene reminds us that the social world has rules and logics of engagement. The game of chess can be thought of in analogy to various fields in society. As Bourdieu (1980/1990) defines them, fields are spheres of action of produced and reproduced power relations that have particular rules of engagement that socially structure human behavior. There are different types of fields in society (i.e., cultural, educational, economic, religious, etc.), and the rules of engagement are particular to each field and the localization of that field. Chess has its own rules of engagement and within those roles many different logics of play. There is a clear social order where the king is on the top of the social order and the pawns are at the bottom of the social order and they could never become one another. D’Angelo knows this well and insightfully poaches the rules of the chess game in order to culturally model the social order of the street economy. By doing this, he is able to not just teach them about chess but, more broadly, about the political economy of the streets.

Relatedly, the ways in which you are taught a game is how you play it. The rules to a game can also be understood as an inheritance. As a social process of double injunctions, the inherited rules that we are taught how to play a game are already ideologically constructed for us and given to us. Whether we choose to play by those rules is already constrained or structured by the rules that we have inherited. The structuring of these rules
is also part of the structure of the game—e.g., the red and black squares of the chessboard. While Bodie and Wallace bricolaged the chessboard in order to play checkers this was prior to their learning of the game of chess and they were still constrained by the rules of a game they had already learned to play on an analogous board, checkers. Thus, rule breaking behavior is already structured by the rule and the structure of the conditions of engagement.

In explaining the rules to chess and his analogizing to the streets, D’Angelo makes a point to mention that “Erything stay who he is.” Even when he gives the exception of the pawns being able to move up he makes it clear that they will never become the king. In an earlier episode (Season 1, Episode 2) Marla Daniels, the wife of police Commander Cedric Daniels, states this quite succinctly, “The game is rigged. But you cannot lose, if you do not play.” While stated in the context of another matter applies quite insightfully here. The only pieces on the chess board that can move up are the pawns and the highest rank they can become is the queen (assuming the queen has already been lost during play). They can never become the king (or “top dawg”) as D’Angelo wisely explains to Wallace and Bodie. In fact, D’Angelo states that in the game the pawns are on the frontlines and killed quickly. While winning in chess means taking the other players king, for Wallace and Bodie, as hoppers, their social reality is that they have to be “some smart ass pawns” if they want to stay alive and move up the social ladder of the street economy.

Chess is a game of not just knowing the rules but of problem solving, logic, and reading and predicting human behavior. Studies have found that there is a positive correlation between learning to play chess and academic achievement (Smith & Cage, 2000). Smith and Cage’s (2000) work indicates that students who received instruction in chess performed substantially higher on measures of math, spatial analysis, and nonverbal reasoning ability in contrast to those who did not receive instruction. Thus, within the social interstice of this deviantly marked social space and practice we see D’Angelo, Bodie, and Wallace engaging in a rich pedagogical exchange with its various double entendres, poaching, and philosophizing of their social ontologies. The marked deviance of this space and practice would generally be overlooked by even the adults of marginalized communities. Moreover, the cultural modeling of the social order of the street economy that D’Angelo utilizes would be shunned by the politics of respectability of the service providers of social and educational institutions let alone be known. Thus, the rich and valuable pedagogical experiences that are present within this social space and practice would be ignored and not considered. It is for this reason that I posit the importance of a research agenda on deviantly marked cultural repertoires.
TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA ON DEVIANTLY MARKED CULTURAL REPETOIRES

Wallace and Sarah’s exchange as well as D’Angelo’s analogistic teachings on the political economy of the streets with the game of chess remind us of the creative cultural repertoires marginalized youth employ; these youth (re)appropriate and (re)invent the heteronomy of their inherited conditions of existence as a way to make do. However, their cultural repertoires are often labeled deviant by even the adults of marginalized communities. Moreover, the (re)appropriating of the space that these scenes are situated in reminds us that acts and practices such as squatting and drug selling are produced within marginalized conditions of existence. These examples and the kinds of research questions on learning and development that could be examined are special cases of the more general questions that may be part of a program of research on deviantly marked cultural repertoires.

The research literature on cultural practices as learning and development has provided rich knowledge about how “being” and “doing” human is a process of learning and development. However, I am not seeking to develop a theory of human learning or development here. Rather, I seek to push the conceptual purview of educational and cultural studies on marginalized and outsider cultural practices that have been labeled deviant. More importantly, I am calling for closer examination of how these labeled practices of deviance serve as functioning and familiar resources for transformative pedagogical experiences within marginalized communities. These deviant cultural practices that function socially and are culturally familiar are what I am calling here deviantly marked cultural repertoires.

Therefore, the research questions that need to be addressed on deviantly marked cultural repertoires include (but are not limited to) examining the social, cultural, and pedagogical processes present within the embodied acts and practices of marginalized youth cultures. For example, what are some of the everyday practices that are particular to specific marginalized youth cultures? How do they function socially, and how do they (re)appropriate the heteronomy of their inherited conditions? What is the range of their cultural repertoires, and what are/were the structural forces that contributed to their production? What (if any) are their social, cultural, economic, or political effects on factors such as ideological shifts on social issues or disrupting of the local economy or changes in dominant everyday social practices? How might they be organized for more targeted social or political interest? How might these everyday practices be modeled socially or culturally for community-based efforts of comprehensively conceived education (Dixon-Román & Gordon, 2012), or for pedagogical
practices in schooling? And, how might they provide further understanding of how the pedagogical acts and assessment items of schooling misfire for many youth of marginalized communities? These are some of the questions that a program of research on deviantly marked cultural repertoires could profitably address.

These research questions would call upon a variation of methodological tools where some might be much more limited than others. For instance, the scenes from *The Wire* analyzed here are situated in discursive spaces and practices that could not be captured by the quantitative. Due to spontaneity within an unauthorized lived space, such scenes would likely slip the purview of the ethnographic. As we see here, TV and film media, documentaries, web-based images, and videos, as well as literature, each have their own way of gaining access and/or depicting the spontaneous and unanticipated acts, situations, and events of socially constituted deviance. Thus, this work might employ a range of quantitative, ethnographic, literary, and media analytic methods to capture the slippery cultural data of deviance.

These research questions and methods would be applied to the kinds of practices that were described in the above scenes from *The Wire*. As was discussed earlier in this paper, there is already a longstanding literature that has examined cultural practices as learning and development. However, these questions must suspend any politics of respectability and shift their ethnographic gaze on deviant practices with a different framing and conceptualization of deviance.

I call for a reconceptualization of deviance that is in the spirit of Cohen’s politics of deviance with a focus on *effect* rather than intentionality. There is need for a politics of deviance that is centered on those bodies, spaces, and practices that exist “(out)side of state sanctioned, normalized White, middle- and upper-class, male heterosexuality.” And it will be important to frame deviance to focus on the transformative potential found in deviant practices by paying special attention to the kinds of ruses, tactics, and subversive acts in which the marginal engage, within the social interstices of time and space.

The ruses, tactics, and subversive acts that subvert, disrupt, and challenge the dominant social, economic, and symbolic order are what Bourdieu overlooked in his focus on reproduction as he conceptualized cultural capital. While Bourdieu’s conceptualization of cultural capital has been important and meaningful to understanding the process of reproduction, it has been at the cost of blanketing or not considering the kinds of meaningful and valuable (re)appropriations, (re)significations, and (re)productions of the marginalized that do subvert, disrupt, and challenge the dominant order.
Conceptualizations of nondominant forms of cultural capital have also theoretically contradicted and misrecognized Marx’s conceptualization of “capital.” The adjective “non-dominant” misrecognizes the relations of power implied in the term capital as the proprietary accumulation of wealth and power. In contrast, deviantly marked cultural repertoires move away from the notion of capital and consider the cultural repertoires marginalized youth deploy as they maneuver in and through the system of hegemony. Thus, deviantly marked cultural repertoires seek to (re)conceptualize the kinds of cultural practices that are products of marginalized communities with a focus on the pedagogical experiences within practices of deviance. I am not suggesting that it is the site of these practices that will reduce the reproduction of inequality, but I do contend that there are socially disruptive and pedagogically transformative possibilities present in these practices that need not be overlooked or ignored because of a politics of respectability. It is likely that what exists and is missed in the practices of deviantly marked cultural repertoires are the meaningful and transformative social and educative possibilities for marginalized youth.

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Notes

1. In accordance with Paulo Freire (1970), I use the term pedagogy to refer to the philosophy of learning and development, not just teaching. Pedagogy is a philosophical anthropology that is inherently directive and always transformative.

2. This assumption of intent raises several questions. What makes intent political? What is at stake in this assumption of intentionality? How does Cohen’s assumption of intentionality construct an implicit hierarchical opposition that falls subject to her own arguments against a politics of respectability? Moreover, how does her assumption of intent invariably define her conception of political
resistance? As Hall (1974/1993) argues, such constructions of political/nonpolitical boundaries “are themselves, political acts and reflect the structure of power and interest” (p. 63). And, more importantly, how do we know what’s intentional? As Bourdieu (1977), Adorno (1972/1991), and Derrida (1972/1982) argue, can we ever really trust subjects to explain their own behaviors? In Cohen’s (2010) more recent work, she not surprisingly empirically finds that Black youth have a doxic embrace of the dominant norms and judgments and thus rhetorically seem to not engage in intentional acts of resistance to dominant norms.

This assumption of intentionality rests on the assumption of the metaphysics of presence drawn from Western philosophy. The metaphysics of presence assumes full and total human presence and consciousness and as such complete access to the inner workings of the human mind via verbal or written language. However, there are always prior structurings in the present and the deferral of meaning in the “to come” (Derrida, 1972/1982). In other words, we never fully know why we do what we do because it is always structured by previous conditionings and our meaning of it is constantly moving and shifting in time. Thus, expressed intent is always part and partial, divided and deferred, absent and present; but never full and total.

References


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