Testable Implications of Subjective Expected Utility TheoryGames and Economic Behavior
AbstractI show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent's payoffs or beliefs and can only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization problem under uncertainty.
Copyright2005 Elsevier Inc.
Citation InformationEduardo Zambrano. "Testable Implications of Subjective Expected Utility Theory" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 53 Iss. 2 (2005) p. 262 - 268
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ezambran/12/