Skip to main content
Article
Detention as Deterrence.pdf
Stanford Law Review (2019)
  • Emily Ryo
Abstract
Over the past few decades, the federal government has justified the use of immigration detention on the basis that it deters unauthorized migration. Simply put, the idea is that detention will send a message that harsh consequences await apprehended migrants, and that such a message will discourage individuals from undertaking the journey to seek entry into the United States. This Essay applies insights from research on deterrence effects of criminal law to explain why immigration detention is unlikely to produce the intended behavioral effects that some policymakers desire. Specifically, I explore three hurdles to achieving deterrence through immigration law: the legal knowledge hurdle, the rational choice hurdle, and the perceived net cost hurdle. I conclude by discussing key questions that detention-as-deterrence policy raises for future research and policy in this area.
Keywords
  • immigration detention,
  • deterrence,
  • criminal law,
  • immigration enforcement
Publication Date
Spring March, 2019
Citation Information
Emily Ryo. "Detention as Deterrence.pdf" Stanford Law Review Vol. 71 (2019) p. 237 - 250
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/eryo/21/