Review of Studia Grammatica, Akademie Verlag

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 Reviewed by Ernst Pulgram, University of Michigan

The purpose of the present brief notice is primarily to remind linguists of the continuing publication of this important reference work. (See my earlier reviews in Lg. 34.289–93, 536–7, 36.419–21.)

The lemmata end on p. 603 of vol. 2 with the item dzustillu (the spellings z, ts, and dz are all treated under z). There follows an Appendix, listing reviews of the DES that had come to Wagner's attention, and giving a few words of comment on some of them (604–6), additional etymologies previously overlooked or recently published (606–12), a supplement to the bibliography in fascicle 1 (613–5), corrections of errors and misprints (616–8), and a table of contents of vols. 1 and 2 (619).

The third volume, beginning with fascicle 18, will contain the various indexes. These are of inestimable value, indeed they are indispensable to all linguists who do not know Sardinian as thoroughly as Wagner did—and that, I dare say, includes all of us. It is through these indexes that the dictionary becomes an instrument of research. Index 1 consists of the Varianti sarde (1–122). This is really a dialect glossary, in which dialectal variants that are not separately listed in the dictionary proper are glossed by the lemmata under which they are discussed; for example, aba may be found under abba, culcittu under körtsu, pampòre under sapòre, melarda under arridu. Clearly, etymologies of many of the variants that the linguist may encounter in fieldwork or in texts would be undiscoverable without these cross references, especially when the two items are not cognate or phonemically similar. Index 2, Italiano–sardo, now complete to the entry seccare (122–320), is an Italian-Sardinian glossary, whose aim and usefulness are obvious, especially where the Italian word is translated by more than one Sardinian equivalent (avaro, for example, by twenty-two). Various other indexes are presumably to be expected.

It is sad to note that the remainder of this work will be published posthumously. With Wagner, one of the giants has passed from the scene.


Reviewed by Emmom Bach, University of Texas

Structural linguistics has always been something of an outsider on the German academic and cultural scene. Although there has been increasing evidence of a concern with the description of present-day German (Curme's monumental grammar of 1922 has been supplemented but not replaced by such works as the 1959 Duden and the studies of Hans Glinz, Karl Boost, and Johannes Erben), little of this work has been based on the common assumptions of the international scientific community, and much energy has gone into such questions as how to
stem the ‘Akkusativierung des Menschen’. The slim volume under review bears witness to a radical break in this tradition apparently under way in East Germany. It is the first in a projected series of irregularly appearing studies and monographs (two more have since been published) growing out of the work of the Arbeitsstelle Strukturelle Grammatik of the Berlin academy. The framework most in evidence is that of transformational grammar. The work that has appeared both here and elsewhere is of considerable general interest in that it is devoted to a well-known language and hence offers to many linguists the opportunity to study the successes and difficulties of transformational grammar in its application to one more language, where hypotheses and results can be readily controlled. Indeed, it is probably true to say that at present German is being as intensively studied from this viewpoint as English or any other language.¹

The volume consists of a brief Vorwort, a set of nearly 100 unsigned ‘Thesen über die theoretischen Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen Grammatik’, and three theoretical studies. The Thesen (9–30) are devoted in part to a restatement of various assumptions and arguments brought into prominence in recent years by Noam Chomsky. I paraphrase (in part). A scientific theory is ideally a system of statements which is internally consistent, accounts exhaustively for its subject matter, is as simple as possible, and fits in as consistently and simply as possible with the scientific description of other sets of data (i.e., science is ultimately one). If the statements are logically related so that some can be deduced from others, the description is a theory. If the subject matter of the theory is an unbounded set (nonclosed corpus) of data, as is a language, the statements of the theory are called hypotheses and the theory is a predictive theory. A predictive theory for a given language is called a grammar.

The Thesen continue with a description of a grammar as a set of rules of the familiar kind, that is, a descriptive system for deriving representations of sentences on various levels. Transformations are considered to be rules for mapping the phrase markers of (sets of) sentences into the phrase markers of equivalent sentences, and the discussion of transformations is related to the discussion of semantics. The attempt to differentiate between semantics and grammar belongs to the more original portions of the Thesen, although much that is said is superseded by more recent work.

Of the remaining parts of the volume, the first two are devoted to general questions, the last to a particular problem in German. In the first, ‘Zur Stellung der “Wortbildung” in einem formalen Sprachmodell’ (31–50), Wolfgang Motsch

considers the question where to include information about the composition and derivation of stems in a generative grammar. The answer is given in a rule of the phrase-structure type (39). Strictly speaking, it is a rule schema or abbreviation for several rules, since it utilizes complex symbols consisting of element symbols like \( w \) for Wurzel and \( St \) for Stamm, with subscripts like \( A \) for Adjektiv and \( S \) for Substantiv, the latter referring to the syntactic class of the underlying and resultant forms. Examples are from German. Motsch shows how the rule can be used to derive an indefinite number of new stems and to assign to each a constituent structure in the familiar way (although three of the examples on 39 are not assigned the purported structure by Motsch's rule: \( \text{unmännlich}, \text{unbeugbar}, \text{and unverkäuflich} \)). Later Motsch considers the possibility of deriving the new stems at least in part by equivalence transformations: \( \text{der hölzerne Tisch} \) from (the string underlying) \( \text{der Tisch ist aus Holz} \).

Such discussion brings into sharp relief questions of productivity and grammaticality. Motsch distinguishes two extremes: a set of rules which operates with large classes of bases, allowing, for instance, the combination of all nouns and all adjectives in compounds of the form \( N + A \); at the other extreme a very detailed set of classes allowing only the 'usual' combinations. The first grammar will yield all the combinations of the second (\( \text{riesengroß}, \text{staubfrei}, \text{etc.} \)) but many others as well (\( \text{riesenfrei}, \text{steinklar}, \text{katzenalt}, \text{etc.} \)). If we restrict the description too severely, says Motsch, we are not doing justice to the open-ended nature of language, which must continually supply new designations for new situations. (On the other hand, if we relax it too much, we destroy the capacity of the description to account for the speaker's ability to recognize anomalous expressions.) Motsch seeks to clarify the issue in terms of a contrast between usage and system, and draws upon notions set forth in the earlier Thesen. Subclasses must be set up where the nonoccurrence of certain compounds cannot be exclusively accounted for on the basis of extralinguistic semantic considerations. Many putatively impossible combinations (\( \text{verheirateter Junggeselle} \) 'married bachelor') are contradictory only within a limited subsystem of the total language (e.g. the language of sociology). The problem is troublesome and not yet solved to anyone's satisfaction. (It is no solution to relegate the problem to some as yet undeveloped department of human knowledge, the 'lexical hierarchy', 'semantics', or 'ontology'.)

As mentioned, Motsch considers transformations to be meaning-preserving (equivalences) and hence primarily semantic in nature (in the sense of dealing with what is called in the Thesen indirect relation between expressions). In the final pages of the article Motsch shows how the 'meaning' of suffixes like \( \text{-ig}, \text{-lich}, \text{-haft}, \text{and -bar} \) can be explicated on the basis of such transformational relations. All in all, the discussion is illustrative rather than definitive, and Motsch does not really concern himself with the position of the rules discussed in a 'complete' grammar of German. It is likely that the simplest treatment for any language will include some derivational and compositional processes in the (lexical) phrase-structure rules, others in the transformations, namely those in which some other changes or relations in the derived sentences must be accounted for.
Both Motsch's contribution and the following one—Manfred Bierwisch, 'Über den theoretischen Status des Morphems' (51–89)—are good examples of the light that can be thrown on old questions by new insights and points of view. Just as the concept of the phoneme has been subjected to searching criticism, so the morpheme can hardly be expected to remain untouched by the Copernican revolution of recent years. Bierwisch's paper offers a parallel to the later article of Andreas Koutsoudas in *IJAL* 29.160–70 (1963). The study is considerably more general than the title indicates, being in fact a comparison of five different models or conceptions of grammatical description. The difficulties, both theoretical and practical, of such comparison can hardly be overemphasized. Since there is no common agreement on the degree of precision necessary in proposing a new or allegedly new theoretical framework, the writer who, like Bierwisch, undertakes to compare several theories is faced with the thankless job of restating in a sufficiently explicit and uniform way the conceptual systems to be compared. Bierwisch has chosen to deal with systems that are from the outset couched in relatively precise and transparent terms (with the possible exception of Hjelmslev's glossematics).

Bierwisch begins by noting that most definitions of the morpheme suffer from the assumption that it is possible to define a basic theoretical unit by means of concepts from everyday language ('smallest meaningful unit', 'form which bears no partial phonetic-semantic resemblance to any other form'). Such definitions are either unworkable or lead to unwanted results, for example that lord and lady share phonetic and semantic resemblances. As a matter of fact the usual definitions lead to etymological units and fragments rather than synchronically functioning elements. The difficulties are not to be removed by refinement but by recognizing that the fundamental units of a theory can be defined only within the framework of that theory. Given such a theory—and Bierwisch feels that we have come significantly closer to it in recent years—many problems disappear.

A second trouble with many characterizations of the morpheme is the notion that it can be defined by the procedures used to discover it (or examples of it). The main objection to such an idea—which is a relic of the forms of positivism happily discarded in most fields about three decades ago, discarded because it was found that they would eliminate most of science as it was practiced—is that there is no known effective means of applying the definitions, where 'effective' means applicable in a finite series of steps. This objection relates, for instance, to all definitions in terms of 'distribution', since there is no guarantee that the distribution is finite. Take the statement 'a and b are members of the same morpheme x if and only if their distributions are disjoint and equal in sum to the distribution of some c'. Since there is no longest environment it is always possible that the linguist has not yet stumbled onto an environment which violates the first or second condition.

Bierwisch attempts then to explicate the concept within two theoretical frameworks: a production grammar (he has in mind essentially a transformational grammar) and a recognition grammar ('Identifikationsgrammatik', equated with the categorial grammars of Bar-Hillel and others). It should be noted, by the
way, that the term 'morpheme' never occurs in either of these types of grammars; Bierwisch is suggesting the use of the term to talk about some type of element in such grammars. In the first type of theory, the morphemes are identified with the individual terminal elements of the syntactic portion of the grammar—that is the T-terminal atoms, where 'atom' is defined on the basis of the operation of concatenation: an atom is a string m which is not null and for which there are no nonnull strings x and y such that m = x + y. With respect to the morphophonemic or phonological component of the grammar, the morphemes are the elements that appear on the left in rules of the form (55):

(1) nehm + Prät[eritum] → /nam/;
(2) sag → /saɡ/ [sic, presumably /zaɡ/]

Since the term 'morpheme' is so deeply imbued with the connotations of the procedural theories in which it has been primarily used, it is unlikely that this explication will be accepted—witness the continuing hassles about old, middle, and new phonemes. It is probably best to abandon the term. The notion of terminal atoms is probably of some importance for transformational grammar, however, since it often seems to be useful in transformational rules to use variables that refer to nonnull but atomic terminal elements. The bad fit between the units of transformational grammars and those of traditional discussions arises from the insistence in the latter on fixed levels of 'emes' and 'allos'—also in various 'tagmemic', 'stratificational', and similar systems. Consider the element 'plural' which occurs as a nominal affix in a transformational grammar of English. It has a number of morphologically conditioned 'allos' including φ in sheep, /in/ in oxen, minus /n/ in phenomena, a fused reflex via rules like (1) above in forms like feet, and a regular allo[morph?] Z. The latter, however, itself has several phonologically conditioned allo[allomorph?]s /z, iz, s/ which are identical in distribution with the forms of four other 'morphemes': 'possessive', a verbal affix, the final element in ours, his, its and the reduced form of is. The differences and identities among these various items are always—or should be—kept straight by the rules. In the light of such analyses, various arguments about forms like sheep and feet or the statement that you can have zero allomorphs but not zero morphemes seem strangely scholastic.

A categorial grammar (cf. Bar-Hillel, Lg. 29.47-58 [1953] as well as later articles by Bar-Hillel and his associates and by Joachim Lambek) is a system comprising a set of elements each labeled as belonging to one or more categories. On the basis of a few simple rules of 'cancellation', strings of elements are reduced to strings of categories, which are in turn reduced until (for well-formed strings) one category ('S') remains. Cancellation is thus the inverse of derivation in a production grammar. As a matter of fact, as has been repeatedly pointed out, both operations are different ways of using a single type of theory (a generative grammar), and several equivalences between categorial and phrase-structure grammars have been proved. In such a grammar, the closest approximations to

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2 For a short survey with references see Y. Bar-Hillel, 'Some recent results in theoretical linguistics', Logic, methodology and philosophy of science 551-7 (ed. E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski; Stanford, 1962).
morphemes are the elements of the vocabulary. Bierwisch shows how such grammars differ from production grammars (apart from the absence of transformations) by the lack of rules of type (1) above.

Bierwisch then turns to an examination of three different systems. The first is that of ‘distributional analysis’ as formulated by Zellig Harris, Methods in structural linguistics (Chicago, 1951), and ‘From phoneme to morpheme’, Lg. 31.190–222 (1955). Bierwisch asks whether Harris’s model is closer to a production grammar or a categorial grammar. There are connections in each direction, as worked out by Harwood on the one hand, Lg. 31.409–14 (1955), and Bar-Hillel on the other. Bierwisch’s conclusion is interesting: the segments into which utterances are first decomposed (‘morpheme alternants’, ‘morphs’) are closer to morphemes in the sense of a categorial grammar, while the morphemes (as classes) into which they are grouped correspond more closely to morphemes in the sense of a production grammar, especially when alternants of the type /ey/ → /u/ are used in the description. Endless discussions about the ontological situs and permissibility of various types of elements either disappear or can be translated into the more nearly answerable question: what kind of grammatical model shall we use for a particular purpose?

A further point is raised by the author: if the model implicit in the distributional statements is a production grammar (generative grammar), of what sort is it? According to Bierwisch, an analysis which assigns the constituent structure \( Vv (V^1 Pb) \) to the phrase closed down (where \( Vv \) is -ed) can be interpreted most directly by transformational rules. It is probably not correct to say, like Bierwisch 61, that such an analysis can play a part only in a transformational grammar. But it does seem to be true that most alleged alternatives, when they are made explicit and formulated in such a way as to yield workable structural descriptions for the generated strings, are really transformational in nature. This is to claim that the most reasonable and direct explication of statements about discontinuous constituents is to provide the necessary phrase structure plus transformational rules to yield the analysis. Yngve’s rules of the type \( A → B + ... + C \) would be another possible interpretation for some situations.

Bierwisch next attempts to cut through Hjelmslev’s terminological miasma. A grammar in the sense of a predictive theory corresponds most closely to what Hjelmslev calls ‘system’. But ‘system’ and ‘process’ (‘language’ and ‘text’) do not stand, for Hjelmslev, in the relation of theory to subject matter, but are rather in some sense two parts of one object. For the reasons mentioned, Bierwisch leaves aside questions of discovery procedures and attempts to interpret Hjelmslev’s categories in the postulated general framework. First he points out that the hierarchy of categories established by progressive division according to syntactic functions is more or less equivalent to the system of a generative grammar. A basic difference consists in the initial division of the ‘text’ into two planes, the categories of which are ‘deduced’ in two separate hierarchies. Within Hjelmslev’s system, the terminal syntactic categories (‘taxemes’) of the content plane correspond most closely to the morphemes of previous discussion. (Hjelmslev himself uses the term ‘morpheme’ in another sense as an inflectional category.)
The fact that it is often impossible to establish one-to-one correspondences between these units and units of the expression plane is another way of saying that rules like those of type (1) above are necessary, or at least very useful.

Of fundamental importance is the discussion of the biplanar character of glossematics, which is opposed to the system of a generative grammar. The latter moves in a unified manner from the most general categories (e.g. 'Sentence', or ultimately perhaps some higher unit) down through smaller constructions and classes, finally specifying in detail the phonetic shape of each enumerated sentence—where 'moves' is not to be interpreted in any genetic, psychological, or heuristic sense. Now presumably the justification for assuming two planes is the lack of isomorphism between them, or else there is no need to postulate two sets of units—just as we can dispense with 'real' chairs an sich underlying the chairs that we sit on. But in the transition from the syntactic to the phonological level, a transformational grammar is able to account for such incongruencies and to characterize them precisely. The rejection of such a unified theory must be based on the greater explanatory power of a biplanar (triplanar etc.) theory. Bierwisch argues that the definition of taxemes (morphemes) by a system of glossemes is either a priori, in which case it can have no empirical value as an explanatory theory (if you make certain assumptions and your analysis consists simply in the deduction of the consequences of these assumptions, you are doing mathematics but not science), or else a semantic description, which on the one hand is not formal, as Hjelmslev claims, and on the other cannot be confined to the description of the taxemes. (The discussion sometimes becomes a bit muddy here, but that is not Bierwisch's fault.) The argument applies mutatis mutandis to all systems which set out by dividing language into two, three, or more 'hierarchies', 'planes', or 'levels' independently organized. What is taken apart must be put back together, and transformational grammar has at least the virtue of being explicit about the relations among its levels. The proposals of Katz and Fodor, *Lg.* 39.170–210 (1963), which postdate Bierwisch's article, are perhaps concerned with part of what Hjelmslev calls the content plane. The bridge between their 'semantic theory' and the apparatus of a transformational grammar is, for the most part, explicitly and clearly constructed.

The final system considered by Bierwisch is the set-theoretical model of O. S. Kulagina, 'Ob odnom sposobe opredelenija grammatičeskix ponjatij na baze teorii množestv', *Problemy kibernetiki* 1.203–14 (1958; a translation of the article, 'On one method of defining grammatical categories on the basis of set theory', was published by the U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 10 April 1959, 646-D). Since this paper is probably not widely known, and is tough going for nonmathematicians like me, Bierwisch's discussion provides a useful summary. The article is almost purely mathematical, and is (refreshingly) not at all concerned with discovery procedures. For Kulagina a language is defined as a set of words, a set of well-formed sentences constructed out of them, and a partitioning of the set of words into disjoint subsets called 'neighborhoods' (a term taken from point-set theory). A 'neighborhood' is roughly the set of all different (inflected) forms of the same 'word'. The three sets are taken as given and further features of the system are deduced from these properties. A new set of subsets is
formed by considering all sentences that differ only in one word. The new subsets (called ‘families’) consist of all words that are mutually substitutable in a given sentence. Every sentence can now be represented either as a sequence of ‘neighborhoods’ or as a sequence of ‘families’. The first representation gives roughly the lexical content of the sentence, the second its grammatical structure.

After giving the basic outline of the system—in view of his special purposes, it is natural that he omits most of the details—Bierwisch asks what might be considered a grammar (in his sense) in such a scheme. A grammar is a theory about an empirically given set of sentences. The set cannot be considered finite or else the theory—and probably the simplest theory in most cases—could be merely a list of the sentences. To escape triviality and for other reasons, it must be assumed that the set of sentences constituting the language is infinite, but that it is to be characterized by a finite set of elements and rules. Bierwisch re-interprets Kulagina’s system to meet this requirement: a given vocabulary, a partitioning of the vocabulary into families and neighborhoods. The set of sentences is now not given, but to be explained (predicted). To complete the re-interpretation it is necessary to add one operation, mentioned by Kulagina: the substitution of one family or its designation for a chain of at least two families or their designations. This operation, however, corresponds quite closely to the cancellation operation of the categorial grammars discussed above. With the assignment of the words to families (categories) and the designation of a highest configuration, Bierwisch is thus able to interpret such a system as a categorial grammar. The similarity to Harris’s morpheme-to-utterance procedures is also evident.

After some further discussion, Bierwisch comes to the conclusion that the ‘Produktionsgrammatik’, in its transformational form, provides the most suitable model for the description of natural languages. Not only does it allow simpler descriptions on the syntactic level, but it satisfies more fully than any proposed alternative the demands of intuitive adequacy and generality on the level of the morpheme and its relation to the phonological level. The final section of the paper deals with some further questions relating to the status of the morpheme from the point of view of simplicity.

As mentioned above, Bierwisch’s two types—‘Produktionsgrammatik’ and ‘Identifikationsgrammatik’—are not true alternatives; rather, one (the categorial grammar) is a special type of the other, but looked at from one end, so to speak, namely from the point of view of assigning structural descriptions to given sentences. The relation between the two is that of special case to general case. Every categorial grammar is a production grammar, but presumably not every production grammar (in particular, not Bierwisch’s transformational type) is a categorial grammar. Hence, Bierwisch’s conclusion does not seem surprising. Transformational grammars are simply the most comprehensive models that have yet been proposed and described in a fairly explicit way, and yet are specific enough to avoid emptiness and to make some claims about the structure of natural languages beyond the fact that they are systems of some sort. It is very simple to test this claim. Take any linguistic description of any format and restate it as a transformational grammar. I have yet to see a description for which
such a restatement is in principle impossible. In practice, on the other hand, it is 
often not possible, because the purported descriptions turn out to have many 
gaps, to leave many unanswered questions, or to reduce to collections of ex-
amples. The test then becomes much more than a restatement; rather, it is an 
important ‘discovery procedure’ in that it shows up inadequacies and suggests 
fruitful questions and directions for further research. It may be, of course, that 
transformational grammars are too comprehensive. Then the opposite test must 
be carried out: take a transformational grammar and restate it in the form of 
some more restricted system; see for instance Gilbert H. Harman’s attempt in 

The final paper of the volume is by Wolfdietrich Hartung, ‘Die Passivtrans-
formationen im Deutschen’ (90–114). It is intended not only as a contribution 
to the analysis of German but also as an example of a transformational analysis 
for German linguists unfamiliar with the techniques of the theory. Much of the 
discussion is of the sort that has become familiar from many early transforma-
tional papers, showing how the introduction of transformational rules serves to 
simplify the statement of selectional restrictions in the phrase-structure rules 
and to account for ambiguities unexplained (except in an ad-hoc fashion) in a 
purely phrase-structure description. A nice example is the sentence *Diese Ge-
schichte wurde von ihm erzählt*, where *von ihm* is either ‘by him’ or ‘about him’ 
(98–9). The introduction of a passive transformation serves both to simplify 
and to increase the explanatory power of the grammar, whereas in a phrase-
structure analysis the ambiguity can be accounted for only by decreasing the 
simplicity of the grammar.

Since the analysis is suggestive rather than definitive, and is modified in later 
papers in several points (see the study by Heidolph and Bierwisch’s monograph 
cited above in footnote 1), I shall not go into detail here or suggest revisions. 
Hartung posits three passive transformations for German, yielding in turn sen-
tences of the types illustrated by *Das Problem wurde (vom Redner) (nur) ange-
deutet* (from an underlying string with accusative object), *Dem Schüler wird (vom 
Lehrer) geholfen* (from strings with dative objects), *Vom Küchenchef wird für 
gutes Essen gesorgt* or *Von uns wird heute gearbeitet* (prepositional object or no 
object). In the presentation of his analysis Hartung touches upon the funda-
mental classifications of verbs necessary in a grammar of German, and the prob-
lem of the expletive *es* in the sentence *Es wird heute gearbeitet*. One point is of 
wider interest. Hartung mentions in passing the necessity for a rule eliminating 
the agent phrase when the underlying active sentence has for subject the in-
definite pronoun *man*, which occurs only as subject; it has other special charac-
teristics, e.g. it cannot enter into conjunction with other nominals: *Man und 
ich werden kommen*. He also posits a rule for reducing passive sentences by elimi-
nating the agent phrase. But this is unnecessary, since we can assume that a 
sentence like *Es wird getanzt* is derived from *Man tanzt*. Such a procedure suggests 
a parallel treatment for the troublesome ellipsis of the agent in English. We must 
surely set up in English an indefinite pronoun *they* to account for ambiguities in 
sentences like *They say he’s coming tomorrow*. This ambiguity is not present in
the corresponding passives; compare *It is said by them that he's coming tomorrow* and *It is said that he's coming tomorrow*. Perhaps all sentences in the passive without an agent phrase can be analyzed as derived from an underlying sentence with indefinite subject; this makes good semantic sense, too.


Reviewed by Emmom Bach, University of Texas

The present study is a continuation in detail of an earlier investigation published by the author in *Zfda* in 1957. The basic problem dealt with is indicated by the lengthy subtitle. Given a sentence in which *werden* is construed with an infinitive or present participle, Saltveit asks whether the construction is to be assigned to the category of tense, modality, or aspect. Given an answer (or answers) to this question, he proposes to trace the development of the function(s) through the history of German. I shall consider below some general problems involved in asking such a question.

The three functions may be illustrated by the sentences

- (1) Hans wird (morgen) zu Hause sein. (tense)
- (2) Hans wird (wohl jetzt) zu Hause sein. (modality)
- (3) *Es wird/wurde regnend. (aspect)

The third sentence is not possible in Standard German, but is represented in various dialects today and has a history reaching from OHG into early NHG times. In some dialects there has been a loss of formal distinction between the infinitive and present participle to yield sentences like

- (4) Es wird/wurde regnen.

In both (3) and (4) the construction usually has an inchoative meaning: 'It's starting / it started to rain'.

The introduction (7–37) is devoted to a survey of previous treatments and an outline of aims and methods. The remainder consists of the two main subdivisions of the book: a survey of *werden* plus infinitive or participle in the dialects and the 'Hochsprache' (38–177); and a historical sketch of the constructions from Old High German to Early New High German (178–253), with scattered comments and citations throughout the book on Gothic and Norwegian dialects. Finally, there is a short concluding section, an index of the verbs mentioned or cited, and a bibliography.

The main findings and contentions of the synchronic section are these (summary 174–7).

1. *werden* with present participle is well attested in some German dialects, especially in the central Bavarian areas and in Pomerania (maps 56–7 and elsewhere).