Peacekeeping

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Chapter 12: Peacekeeping

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Chapter 12: Peacekeeping

Emma R. Norman

**Reader’s Guide**

This chapter introduces peacekeeping as one of the most urgent and crucial phases of conflict resolution and as a concept and a practice on which consensus is difficult to find. The disagreements start with how to define it, they permeate the soundness of its main principles and continue right up to what types of missions should be included, how many functions can be integrated into a mission and how to evaluate their success or failure. Acknowledging the disagreement and resulting confusion in all these areas, this chapter aims to develop a working command of some of the increasingly complex facets of peacekeeping and how it has evolved since 1948. It examines how failures in dealing with changing circumstances have led to severe criticisms of peacekeeping. It nevertheless concludes that the earnest reflection some criticisms have brought about has prompted positive developments in contemporary peacekeeping that attempt to account for new contexts and needs more adequately.

**Introduction**

Peacekeeping is variously described as a ‘tool,’ ‘technique,’ ‘type,’ or ‘phase’ of conflict resolution that plays an early and primary role in the process of settling violent conflicts. Without a successful level of peacekeeping, most other elements used to resolve violent hostilities are extremely difficult to begin, maintain and accomplish. Yet despite the urgent and crucial nature of this practice, and that it has been increasingly relied upon as a way of dealing with inter- and intra-state conflicts since 1948, it is not straightforward. Indeed, agreement between academics and practitioners on how the term is to be defined and over what practices it ought to cover is rather hard to find. This chapter therefore starts by looking at peacekeeping as a concept and seeks to tease out some of its primary features as well as explore how some of its difficult problems have been dealt with in recent years.

In section one, peacekeeping is situated vis-à-vis some of the other important partner-concepts found in peace studies and discussed in this book. Section two begins to ‘unpack’ some of the deeper ideas contained in peacekeeping by examining the central and
wider objectives or aims of peacekeeping missions. The basic structure of peacekeeping operations and its principles and mission types are covered in the following two sections. The chapter then turns to the difficulties that obstruct the path to successful peacekeeping and takes a deeper look at a few of the many criticisms that have been leveled at peacekeeping since the mid-1990s. The final section examines how responses to certain criticisms have led to what promise to be several positive developments for peacekeeping in the twenty-first century.

Breaking with what has come to be a tradition in peacekeeping literature, this chapter does not contain a section devoted entirely to the historical evolution of peacekeeping from its inception in 1948 to the present. This has been executed so well in so many of the books, articles and websites cited or listed at the end of the chapter, it is more useful to focus thematically here, drawing from historical points and cases as they pertain to, or exemplify, each element under discussion. In doing so, the following sections show how progressively complex the facets of peacekeeping have become, how quickly they can transform and how difficult it is for scholars and practitioners to keep up with its changing character.

**Peacekeeping as a Concept**

There are certainly strong links between peacekeeping and its sister practices of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement (see later chapters in this book). They are not, however, equivalent. It is therefore useful to start by situating these interconnected terms along what might be called a ‘peace process continuum’ before looking at the complexities of peacekeeping in more detail.

Very generally, **peacekeeping** refers to a third-party force deployed to stop or control armed conflict (often by physically separating the combatants) with the aim of preventing a recurrence of violent hostilities. Peacekeeping also has the job of preparing for peacemaking activities through creating an environment that is stable enough for peace talks to take place. **Peacemaking** concerns the (often political) processes whereby a peace settlement between disputing parties is negotiated, formulated and agreed upon. The long-term process of **peacebuilding** then begins, with the aim of promoting political and social acceptance of lasting resolutions to the dispute on both (or all) sides. **Peace enforcement**, or decisive military action by an impartial third party to recover peace, is a more recent
classification that lies somewhere between peacekeeping and large-scale military enforcement. If a violation of the ceasefire occurs or is imminent, peace may be enforced to recover and maintain conditions in which lasting resolutions to the conflict can again be worked toward.

A very simple outline of how peacekeeping fits into the nexus of these wider peace-process techniques is depicted in Box 1.

**Box 1: Basic Peace Process Continuum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Key Phrase</th>
<th>Basic Aims</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td><em>Keep</em> immediate peace</td>
<td>Stop/control armed conflict and maintain ceasefire. Often achieved by physically separating combatants and/or monitoring troop withdrawal. Stabilize environment in preparation for dialogue. Assist opposing parties to implement existing peace accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
<td><em>Make</em> a formal peace agreement</td>
<td>Bring hostile parties to negotiating table (and ensure they continue talks) to work out a peace settlement that is acceptable to both parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
<td><em>Enforce</em> peace militarily if peace agreement is violated</td>
<td>Decisive military action (force) is taken in response to violations of an established peace settlement by any and all parties in the dispute to restore and maintain ceasefire. Used in those cases where strong use of force is required to uphold peace agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td><em>Build</em> a long-term peace</td>
<td>Foster durable political reconciliation of rival groups, sustainable reconciliation of differences of those groups at the social level. Often includes representative institution building. Address resolution of underlying differences. Attempts to resolve root cause of the dispute(s).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This ‘basic peace process continuum’ is a useful starting point for thinking about how the many and varied paths to peace might proceed. However, fleshing out a deeper understanding of exactly what peacekeeping is, how to theorize it properly, what practices it covers and does not cover, and how it relates to the other elements in the continuum, almost always leads to disagreements both inside and outside academia. In consequence, a single, straightforward and adequate definition of the term that is currently accepted by a majority of scholars and practitioners is still elusive. There is even debate as to when the first peacekeeping operation occurred. \(^1\) This basic problem has prompted Oldrich Bures (2007: 408) to question whether defining peacekeeping in a way that is generally acceptable is, in fact, a “mission impossible.” Some of the most-cited definitions of peacekeeping are presented in Box 2. Taken together, they do suggest that agreement over the meaning of the term is one mission that remains persistently difficult to accomplish.

**Box 2: Common Definitions of Peacekeeping**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. (Diehl 1988: 487, citing Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge 1974: 5).(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operations conducted with consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict. (Global Security.org 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><em>Peace-keeping</em> is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. (Boutros-Ghali: 1992, sec. II).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Peacekeeping refers to a way of helping countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace. United Nations peacekeepers - soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries - monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. (United Nations DPKO 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though some of the definitions in Box 2 differ, several elements of what we mean by peacekeeping as a concept can be gleaned from them and carried forward into a functional working understanding (as opposed to a strict definition) of what peacekeeping is, who engages in it, and how it is achieved. These will be the subjects of the following sections.

Key Points

- Put most simply, peacekeeping involves operations that are charged with securing and maintaining an initial level of peace sufficient to prepare for peacemaking negotiations
- Peacekeeping is related to, but not equivalent to, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement
- The difficulty of defining peacekeeping adequately beyond the superficial level means scholars and practitioners still disagree greatly on what the definition should include
- Unpacking some of the more complex elements implied by various definitions of peacekeeping can nevertheless provide a deeper understanding of how to conceptualize it

What is Peacekeeping?

Broad agreement does exist in understanding peacekeeping in terms of its most basic aims. Given that the success of an operation is generally assessed in terms of how far it meets its objectives (Diehl 1988; Pushkina 2006), this seems to be an appropriate place to start to elaborate on the concept.

The primary aim of peacekeeping operations (also known as PKOs) is to stop, manage or moderate armed conflict between two or more hostile parties. By extension, preventing the recurrence of violent hostilities is the next goal. The third purpose is to establish and maintain the conditions in which peace negotiations can be carried out successfully. Fourth, PKOs are sometimes charged with maintaining elements of the peace settlements once they have been agreed upon. Less often mentioned, but clearly important is a fifth aim of offering security for UN and other officials participating in the peace process.
Generally speaking, consensus on what peacekeeping is starts to disintegrate at this point, but additional objectives can include elements of **preventive diplomacy** through introducing a third-party presence to defuse tensions in an area where violent hostilities are likely to break out (e.g., United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 2004), or where current skirmishes create fear of a major war (e.g., Lebanon 1978). Similarly, introducing peacekeeping forces to an area can dissuade belligerents from initiating violent hostilities, by effectively increasing the stakes (and thus the international recriminations) of doing so. Peacekeeping presences may also be used to stabilize situations where new political institutions (such as borders of new states, democratic electoral institutions) have been set up, but may still be fragile and in transition, and are seen to require assistance or protection (e.g., Cyprus 1964, Sierra Leone 1999, Haiti 2004, Timor-Leste 2006).

Other objectives have been referred to in literature that discusses post-Cold War ‘multidimensional’ or, more recently, ‘integrated’ peacekeeping operations. In their excellent discussion of multidimensional peacekeeping, Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2004: 4-5) cover political goals of peacekeeping such as monitoring electoral procedures, supervising elections, reconstructing political institutions and providing general guidance on political matters with a view to promoting a lasting peace.

Further objectives are singled out by works that directly or indirectly problematize how broadly ‘restore and maintain peace’ (see Box 2, definition 1) should be understood, particularly as it relates to the reduction of human suffering. This is especially true of those views of peacekeeping developed toward the end of the Cold War, and even more after the peacekeeping failures in Somalia (1992-3), Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995). These failures and several increasing complexities that face post-Cold War peacekeepers have meant that ‘peace’ is now often understood as related to more than just the military or political levels. The social level is now firmly implicated in the way peacekeeping is understood. The experiences of the peoples involved in violent conflicts are now inextricably tied to what PKOs are expected to achieve and in the overall assessment of their success. The associated objectives focus on the protection of civilians, including monitoring, protecting and promoting human rights and the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. The shift in emphasis continues to demonstrate that the Cold War preoccupation with national security is indeed giving way to a post-Cold War focus on human security (Blocq 2006: 204 citing Peou 2002: 51).
Key Points

- The objectives of peacekeeping are not always agreed upon, and have become more complex over the years
- Nevertheless, at least five main aims seem relatively straightforward: stop/control conflict; prevent renewed hostilities; establish conditions for peace talks; supervise peace settlements; provide security for officials in the peace process
- Wider military peacekeeping objectives include preventive diplomacy and defusing tension in potential conflict areas
- Multidimensional PKOs have additional political and social/humanitarian goals that, from the mid-1990s onward, form increasingly important parts of the mission

Who Engages in Peacekeeping?

Any answer to questions concerning PKO structure needs to first distinguish between who authorizes, commands and finances peacekeeping missions and who makes up the peacekeeping forces.

Peacekeeping Authorities

As some of the contents of Box 2 suggest, it is still fairly common to find definitions implying that PKOs are only those missions that are authorized, organized and/or commanded by an international organization, usually the United Nations. One former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations actually stipulated in his ‘first principle of peacekeeping’ that legitimate PKOs were only undertaken by the UN. “It was this United Nationsness which had made United Nations peacekeeping operations acceptable to member states who would not otherwise have accepted foreign troops on their territory” (Goulding 1993: 454). Such a marked focus on the UN is not surprising. While the original Charter of the United Nations did not mention explicitly the provision of peacekeeping forces (who are often known as “blue helmets”), the vast majority of peacekeeping activities have been UN operations, and/or have been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Not all recognised PKOs are UN operations, however.

Peacekeeping can also be conducted by nonUN forces, and even without UN sanction. This need not mean that the UN is against the mission, although permanent
members of the Security Council have vetoed peacekeeping intervention in the past—often for reasons of national self-interest. Examples include China’s 1997 veto of a mission in Guatemala and the Soviet Union also made much use of its veto in this way during the Cold War. But other occasions where an active UN ruling would have risked increasing tension between rival member states (also particularly notable during the Cold War) have effectively forced the organization to take a back seat in some peacekeeping activities. Sometimes the Security Council is involved only in authorizing a part of the force to intervene for particular objectives. More recently, the UN has shown willingness to increase collaboration with other peacekeeping organizations. A good example is its provision of the mandate for NATO to direct the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF VI) of 2004-5 in Afghanistan. NonUN (or independent) missions, tend to operate at the regional level. Examples include the Multinational Force of American, British, French and Italian Troops (MNF) deployed in Beirut, Lebanon in 1982 to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization which the invading Israeli forces would not allow the UN to oversee. Another example is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which monitors the implementation of the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. The MFO currently encompasses ten participating nations from Europe, North and Central America, Australasia and Africa.

UN operations are financed mostly through contributions—including armed forces—from member states, which are assessed under the UN peacekeeping budget. All members are expected to contribute toward the costs of UN peacekeeping, but the contributions themselves depend on how much and what kind of contribution a state’s domestic situation permits. Developed countries must contribute more than developing ones. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) figures placed the USA and Japan (26 percent and 17 percent, respectively) as the top providers of assessed contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Budget in January 2007. By March 2007, the top three contributors of uniformed personnel were Pakistan (10,173), Bangladesh (9,675) and India (9,471) (United Nations DPKO 2008). Yet it has not always been easy to ensure that contributions are made by everyone, and given that there are no strong mechanisms for enforcing payment, free-riding has been a problem in the past (Padelford 1965; Diehl 1988: 485-6, 494) and fair burden sharing is a contemporary difficulty (Yilmaz 2005: 21-5). The financing of nonUN operations is arranged by the nations participating in the mission.
Peacekeeping Forces

Who comprise the actual peacekeeping forces has changed significantly in terms of the diversity of nationalities and cultural backgrounds of personnel, and their occupations and functions within the operation. Since the United Nations has no standing army of its own, peacekeeping forces are drawn from the armed services of its member states. However, mission organizers must consider carefully which members are to contribute troops in any particular operation to guarantee the fair treatment of both (or all) ‘sides.’ A central UN principle of peacekeeping is that to qualify as a legitimate third-party, troops on any given mission are required to be neutral toward the claims of the disputing parties. Such neutrality (sometimes termed impartiality, though the terms are not synonymous) is partly expressed through ensuring that peacekeeping forces are comprised of nationals from countries that are unprejudiced toward (or against) any of the belligerents or their allies. For Diehl (1988: 498), this principle translates into twin rules: a peacekeeping operation should not include 1) participants from the states involved in the conflict, or 2) participants from the major power states or their close allies. Since major powers could have a biased interest in one ‘side’ benefiting more than another, peacekeeping forces should be clearly differentiated from ‘occupying’ forces deployed in the interest of maintaining some regional hegemonic power (Diehl 1988: 489). While these rules have not always been followed in practice, they are thought to increase the chances of a mission’s success. As the next section will show, neutrality is also partly expressed through the impartial conduct of PKO troops.

During the Cold War, the personnel involved in PKOs were mostly military, and in the twenty-first century the military still forms the majority of all peacekeeping forces. Yet, since 1991, a growing emphasis has been placed on increasing civilian police and other civilian participation in UN peacekeeping forces. Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (2004: 4) extol the major benefits of expanding the power base of a peacekeeping mission far beyond mere military influence in this way. For it takes advantage of the wider resources found in the technical, scientific, humanitarian, legal and diplomatic skills. Box 3 provides some statistics demonstrating just how the proportion of civilian peacekeeping personnel in UN operations has expanded since 1988.
Another area of force composition to capture international attention pertains to gender. Security Council Resolution 1325 was passed in 2000 in response to the fact that while many of the atrocities of armed conflict affect women as much—if not more than—men, very few women participate in most stages of the peace process. Among other things, Resolution 1325 called for increasing the military and civilian participation of women in peacekeeping field operations. There is evidence that some progress is being made in this and other areas of gender mainstreaming (United Nations 2005). But by 2008 the lack of serious growth in PKO gender representation in some areas of peacekeeping has been somewhat disappointing. Given the increased emphasis on protecting human rights as a crucial part of peacekeeping of the twenty-first century, there are many sound reasons (see e.g., Pessane 2007) why more effort should be made in this area in future.

**Key Points**

- During and after the Cold War the vast majority of PKOs have been largely authorized, organized and led by the United Nations. There have nevertheless been several nonUN-based regional peacekeeping missions
UN member states finance most peacekeeping activity through a contributions system scaled to the domestic circumstances of each country. This is intended to ensure that the financial and resource burden of peacekeeping is shared fairly and globally.

- The forces of each PKO should be specifically chosen from countries that are neutral (or unbiased) toward the belligerent parties or their allies.
- While peacekeeping forces were traditionally almost all-military, an increasing shift toward diversifying their composition has occurred. Forces now customarily include civilian police and other civilian personnel, and promote cultural diversity and the active participation of women.

How is Peacekeeping Achieved?

Again, there is much debate over exactly how the objectives of peacekeeping should be achieved. Answers to this question can take two routes. The first starts with how the principles underlying and guiding the planning, organization and execution of a mission affect the practice. The second focuses on the specific types and methods of peacekeeping missions.

Principles and Practice

Three traditional principles of peacekeeping have been set out by the UN to guide the conduct and indicate the limits of peacekeeping missions.

First the consent of both disputing parties must be given for the PKO. Before 1991, the majority of operations secured the active support of the host government. The exceptions were the UN Operation in the Congo, initiated in 1960, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, established in 1978. It should be noted that not all the definitions in Box 2 include the principle of consent, or include it unequivocally. Even the inclusion of the word “hitherto” in the 1992 definition of former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggests that while consent was given before, there may be cases where it is not needed to sanction a PKO. While Boutros-Ghali retracted this suggestion and reaffirmed his commitment to the three traditional principles in his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (Donald 2002: 22), several UN missions since 1999 have operated without consent.
The reasons for the principle of consent are fairly obvious. It is a clear demonstration—to the international community and to each other—that the belligerents are willing to cease fire and in some sense try to resolve the conflict. Giving consent is also assumed to minimize the threat of hostile confrontation between peacekeepers and combatants and thus to reduce the risk of harm to peacekeeping troops. Yet it is immediately clear that minimizing such threats and risks can only happen insofar as each opposing side continues to give their consent and cooperation to the presence of peacekeeping forces (Goulding 1993: 454). The standard illustration is the Six Day War of 1967. This took place shortly after Egypt withdrew its consent of the PKO (UNEF I) which was sent in 1956 to separate hostile British, French, Egyptian and Israeli troops in response to the Suez Crisis.

Second, the peacekeepers should be impartial (sometimes termed neutral) with respect to the disputing parties. As seen earlier, neutrality is partly expressed through the nationality of mission personnel, who should be contributed from states not aligned with any of the combatants. It is also, and more crucially according to Diehl’s (1988, 498-9) findings, expressed through the impartial (or nonbiased) conduct of personnel during the mission. Should the behaviour of members of the peacekeeping force appear to be benefiting one side in the conflict more than another, distrust can build, peacekeepers are placed at high risk of hostile attack and the success of the mission and the peace process as a whole is greatly jeopardized. Diehl (1988, 498) details how such behaviours led to disastrous results during the operations of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established in 1978, and the nonUN 1982 MNF operation in Beirut which, after its initial success, became very complicated and led to the loss of many peacekeeper and civilian lives. One difficulty with this principle concerns that it is the belligerent’s perception of biased peacekeeper conduct that usually matters (Donald 2002, 23) which may, or may not, be a fair representation of the activities of PKOs themselves. Yet even if it is the case that peacekeepers conduct themselves in a truly impartial manner, it is not clear whether this is in fact desirable or ethical, even if it is possible—a point that will be returned to in a later section.

The third principle is that peacekeeping should be nonviolent. That is, peacekeepers should use minimal or no force in their operations except in cases where self-defence makes it necessary. Again, for a great deal of the observation-based UN missions during the
Cold War, this principle appeared rather straightforward and self-explanatory. Peacekeepers were expected to be peaceful, as a commitment to impartiality implies and so mission mandates often explicitly prohibited the use of force beyond self-defence or did not even deploy armed forces. Yet as the volatility surrounding PKOs operations started to grow in the late-1980s and 1990s, the increased risk peacekeepers were facing on one hand, and the increased potential for huge numbers of civilian casualties—sometimes witnessed by peacekeepers who were authorized to do very little about it—on the other, led to challenges of a narrow understanding of non-use of force. That narrow understanding proved to be grossly inadequate in view of the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia.

The ethnic cleansing that occurred in Srebrenica, a Bosnian Muslim town, in 1995 is a chilling case in point. On April 16, 1993, the UN passed Resolution 819 designating the town a safe area which all parties must treat as a demilitarized zone under international protection and that must be free from armed attack and other violent hostility (United Nations 1999a: para. 55). The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was mandated to “deter attacks” from this and five subsequent safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Resolutions 819 insisted that UNPROFOR follow the traditional peacekeeping approach to (non)use of force. Two subsequent Security Council Resolutions (824 and 836, also passed in 1993), failed to address the inadequacy of this perspective for that mission.

UNPROFOR, as before, stated that it could not implement resolution [824] unless there were an agreement between the parties or unless it were given the resources to enforce it in the face of Serb opposition. References to enforcement measures, which had been proposed in a draft resolution submitted by members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, however, had not been included in the text of resolution 824. Instead, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen UNPROFOR with 50 additional unarmed United Nations military observers...It is essential to note that resolution 836 explicitly eschewed the use of the words “protect” and “defend”, and asked UNPROFOR only to “occupy some key points on the ground” and linked the use of force to the phrase “acting in self-defence”. (United Nations 1999a: paras. 68 & 79)

The result was catastrophic. 8,000 Bosnian civilians were massacred by Serb forces in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. In total, up to 20,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed in and around these UN safe areas in the conflict (United Nations 1999a: para. 3) in front of a peacekeeping force rendered essentially powerless by the inability of the international community to act.
In light of this and similar disasters, several subsequent PKOs, have been permitted a more “robust” perspective on how to achieve their objectives, via explicit authorization in their mandate to use force in protecting civilians. This is hoped to render them more flexible to deal with different circumstances, more able to protect themselves and better able to protect civilians. Examples include ongoing operations in the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Haiti (Blocq 2006, 201). As we shall see later in this chapter, all three of these principles are subject to fairly strong criticism.

Mission Types and Methods

The aims of peacekeeping are accomplished through several types of missions that have shifted from relatively clear-cut of traditional PKOs to far more complex, multidimensional mission types.

Traditional

Traditional operations are identified by generally working to a single-function mission, by being primarily military operations with little contact with civilians, and in possessing the support of the host government. Traditional missions revolve around observation and monitoring—usually of the movements of rival troops. Most prevalent during the Cold War, though not totally absent today, traditional missions can be unarmed (e.g., Middle East 1948, Western Sahara 1991), or armed (e.g., Cyprus 1964). Their focus can be on monitoring and verifying ceasefires (e.g., since 1971 in India and Pakistan); supervising demobilization; ensuring that heavy weapons are collected and protected from distribution back to the combatants; interposition, or the positioning of impartial forces physically in between opposing parties, leading to armed control of buffer zones (e.g., Cyprus 1964), which are physical spaces separating hostile parties in which rules apply that all parties must respect in the interest of preserving peace (Smith 2003). During the Cold War, traditional missions focused on inter-state conflicts almost exclusively. Combatants were relatively easy to distinguish from one another (on the basis of nationality) and where the legitimacy of territorial claims was somewhat simpler to consider and deal with than in later conflicts. For example, buffer zones separating combatants definitively along a linear border (as in Cyprus) generally present fewer difficulties to control and defend than ‘safe areas’ (as in Bosnia) which may well be little more than small and fragile islands in the middle of a turbulent and potentially overwhelming sea of hostility.
Increasing peacekeeper involvement in civil war and other intra-state clashes of the post-Cold War era (e.g., PKOs in the Congo, Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Sudan) presents a far more complex picture for missions to take into account and forces them to evolve beyond traditional methods. In intra-state conflicts, consent from parties in intra-state conflicts has been less forthcoming and trickier to maintain. It is hard to distinguish combatants from civilians, and belligerents are more difficult to physically separate in many intra-state settings, just as civilians are more difficult to evacuate or isolate from potential aggression.

With this growing complexity of circumstances in mind, it is not surprising that from around 1989, and particularly after 2000, there has been a significant shift toward increasingly intricate and multifaceted types of mission (sometimes called integrated missions). This explains in part why costs have escalated so drastically (as Box 3 shows) and accounts for the serious overstretch that many UN missions have experienced. Perhaps the most difficult cases occur when PKOs are deployed in areas where the state structure has collapsed.

Multidimensional operations have military elements that may well contain parts that correspond to one or more of the traditional mission types listed above as well as a new focus on land-mine education and clearance. Yet they can also involve at least three\(^5\) other dimensions of peacekeeping activity: political, humanitarian, and state-building. While involvement in these dimensions certainly fulfills the ‘support peacemaking and peacebuilding’ objective of peacekeeping, it also makes it more difficult to identify where peacekeeping stops and peacebuilding begins.

**Political**

This is where either or both military and civilian peacekeeping personnel assist to a greater or lesser degree with a variety of political matters, including institution building. The monitoring of traditional mission types is extended in this dimension to monitoring and verifying electoral processes, institutions and procedures. Many peacekeeping operations are now firmly engaged in assisting or supporting the creation and maintenance of successful electoral institutions or in assisting in the installation of new, ‘legitimate’ governments (e.g., Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste). Though there is not always direct reference to the democratic character of such political changes, this is largely taken for granted.
**Humanitarian**

As noted earlier, since the mid-1990s, the protection of civilians against gross atrocities has come to the fore in the objectives of peacekeeping missions and continues to be a huge concern. Military and civilian PKO personnel are often deeply involved in services related to humanitarian and human rights issues. This is the case with the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in addition to its military role in assisting the implementation of the 2005 Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Another expression of this dimension entails ensuring (as impartially as possible) that humanitarian aid reaches its intended destination and that it is not used by combatants as a source of exploitation for their own ends. Elements of the Somalian, Liberian, Rwandan and Bosnian PKOs were of this type.

The protection of minorities (e.g., ethnic, religious, gender, sexual orientation) has undoubtedly received escalating attention in peacekeeping. In line with the programme set out in Resolution 1325 (2000), efforts are well underway to ensure that **gender mainstreaming** is exercised in missions. This involves the recognition that the specific and often different needs and experiences of both women and men—in this case those involved in conflict and post-conflict situations—need to be understood and accounted for. From 2003, gender advisers have been appointed to all new multidimensional PKOs to this end. The general task is not only to prevent or address human rights violations committed on the basis of gender (or just as importantly, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation) during the conflict or committed after a ceasefire has been established. In conjunction with efforts in the political dimension, it is also considered crucial to assist in institutionalizing a respect for the equal rights of men and women once peace is established as well as assisting more women into the roles of key decision makers (see United Nations 2005).

It is also becoming important to guarantee that the peacekeeping forces respect human rights since Human Rights Watch accused UN troops in 2003 of perpetrating systematic sexual violence and other human rights violations against women in Sierra Leone. The sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004 has been a source of much disappointment in the UN and in peacekeeping, of lost credibility and of mistrust that is in dire need of rectification.

**State-Building**
The state-building enterprises that peacekeeping forces are now mandated to assist contribute an additional level of complexity to multidimensional peacekeeping missions. It is not always mentioned in the literature as a peacekeeping mission type, probably because it is another area that overlaps significantly with peacebuilding. However, it is included in the detailed classification of mission types given by Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998) and has gained in practical significance since this publication. Here, where the major institutions of a state have collapsed completely (failed states) or partially, peacekeeping forces are charged with helping to restore law and order (initially and subsequently, if it breaks down) and essential services, to monitor and train local law enforcement officials, and to provide sufficient stability to begin long-term post-conflict reconstruction. This is sometimes referred to as what former UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd once called “painting a country blue”—an assignment that extends well beyond traditional military peacekeeping missions.

Especially since 9/11, the security institutions of state are also of supreme interest to peacekeepers. Several operations now concentrate on what Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2007: paras. 56-7) called the critical role that control over security institutions plays in the creation and maintenance of a legitimate state. He stressed the importance of ensuring that states themselves should be encouraged, by peacekeepers, to create their own national security reform plans—the implication being that it is better for them not to be imposed from the outside. The plans themselves should move toward blocking military control of security forces and ensuring that they are accountable and respect human rights. Examples include PKO collaboration on reform plans for the Haitian police force in 2007 (MINUSTAH), reforming the police in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2002 (UNMIBH) and broad state reconstruction duties in Liberia, El Salvador and the Congo.

**Key Points**

- Three UN principles guide how peacekeeping missions are planned and executed: consent of the disputing parties must be given; peacekeepers should be impartial with respect to the disputing parties; and peacekeepers should not use force except in self-defence
• None of these principles are unproblematic. Consent may be withheld or withdrawn, belligerents may perceive troops as partial and mandates based on nonviolence have, in some cases, meant that peacekeepers are unable to defend themselves or others

• Mission types before 1989 were largely single-function, but have since become multidimensional. Four broad categories identify the varying methods used to maintain ceasefires and prepare for peacemaking

• First, unarmed or armed traditional operations are based on methods of observation, supervision and policing buffer zones.

• Second, the political dimension charges peacekeepers with monitoring and guiding political procedures, developments and electoral processes to advance their legitimacy and stability.

• Third, humanitarian elements are customarily found in contemporary PKOs, including protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid, preventing human rights violations, and assistance in institutionalizing a respect for human and equal rights.

• Fourth, peacekeeping forces may also be engaged in state-building tasks like monitoring and training police, and especially after 9/11, ensuring functional control of security services and institutions.

Problems and Criticisms of Peacekeeping

From the end of the Cold War a growth in optimism over the potential of PKOs led the number of operations to swell and caused similar growth in the ambition and multidimensionality of their objectives. As international enthusiasm started to wane, contributions dwindled, and any optimism was finally cut short in the mid-1990s by the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. A growing feeling that peacekeeping treated the symptoms of violent conflicts rather than their underlying causes replaced former enthusiasm for the technique. A barrage of criticisms leveled at the UN and at peacekeeping in general followed which, to a large extent, have spurred on the evolution and changes in the concept and the practice of peacekeeping. It is partly due to these changes, and corresponding developments in a globalizing world, that peacekeeping is so difficult to conceptualize and so difficult to practice successfully. Since the mid-1990s peacekeeping has periodically incited further intense scrutiny and criticisms of its
problems. There are many, and as one would expect, they are complicated. This section summarizes a few of the most important.

**Conceptual and Theoretical Problems**

Part of the reason for the lack of agreement in virtually all aspects of peacekeeping studies (as well as practical disagreements within the UN) is that there is still no significant body of work that theorizes peacekeeping adequately (Bures 2007). This does not mean that theory on the subject has been ignored, for quite a few publications that tackle peacekeeping in theory are available. Several authors of these publications (Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998: 34; Bures 2007: 408) bewail the fact that it is much more common to find descriptive, single-case studies of peacekeeping than systematic comparative analyses. Case studies may be interesting and informative, but they fail to provide the analytic components that could help to decide where the particularities of a certain case end and the generalizations between cases begin. And it is from these generalizations, and not from the uniqueness of single cases, that valuable theories are formed. The rapidity with which peacekeeping has evolved in practice has done little to help making generalized analyses easier.

In a detailed article on the subject, Bures (2007: 410) shows that the trend to redress the lack of peacekeeping theory has been to borrow and adapt theoretical frameworks from other related disciplines rather than to build peacekeeping a theoretical framework of its own. Surrogate frameworks have been drawn from conflict resolution (Fetherston 1994; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2000), conflict management (Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998), social and critical theory (Fetherston 2000), peacebuilding, and international relations theories and concepts (Kegley Jr. 1995). While the results of these attempts have generated some interesting arguments and insights, the strategy of importing other theories has tended to fog the issue more than clarify it. As a result, the theories now used in peacekeeping remain a somewhat confusing ‘hotchpotch’ of ideas.

The upshot of the theoretical ‘scatteredness’ facing peacekeeping studies is something this chapter has already touched on: central concepts and terms are rarely used with the same meaning by different authors (or practitioners), agreement beyond the most basic points is unforthcoming, and the limits of related, but different, concepts remain blurred. A firm conceptual distinction between multidimensional peacekeeping and
peacebuilding is lacking, and with the increase in ‘robustness’ of the use of force it is also difficult to identify beyond a fuzzy “grey area” (Goulding 1993: 461) just where peacekeeping stops and peace enforcement begins. But the problems created by such underlying conceptual confusion are not merely an academic matter of concern only to (presumably rather vexed) theoreticians. Conceptual confusion can obstruct the creation of an adequate peacekeeping theory from which systematic generalizations and accurate predictions can be drawn—generalizations and predictions that could well help reduce casualties in future PKOs. Conceptual confusion can also expose the practice of peacekeeping to serious ethical criticisms.

**Ethical Criticisms**

Criticisms have been leveled at each part of the interconnected trinity of UN peacekeeping principles.

**Impartiality/Neutrality**

It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that even if peacekeepers do conduct themselves in a truly impartial manner, it is not clear whether this is in fact desirable or ethical, even if it is possible. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1999: 4) is often cited for claiming that “[i]mpartiality does not—and must not—mean neutrality in the face of evil.” But it is easy to confuse the subtly different ways neutrality and impartiality are understood in peacekeeping and, if they remain confused, then it is similarly easy to see the impartiality principle as either practically impossible, or ethically dubious. Many peacekeeping activities, including ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, can be interpreted as benefiting one side more than another—exploding the idea of impartiality as practically achievable in all but the most traditional of missions. However, the ethics of peacekeeping took a serious knock when UN forces were apparently unable to do more than stand by and watch genocide happen in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Is this nonaction really what the principle of impartiality is supposed to sanction? If it is, then international peacekeeping runs the distinct risk of looking either coldheartedly inflexible, or afraid to take a moral stand which renders it too weak to justify its own existence. So, if a traditional and unreflective view of impartiality is used, then clearly significant ethical difficulties can be leveled at the whole idea of peacekeeping.
This kind of criticism sparked an enormous amount of reflection, rethinking and
reconceptualisation to find an ethically sound and practically functional position on
impartiality.

Faced in Rwanda with the risk of genocide, and later with the systematic implementation of
genocide, the United Nations had an obligation to act which transcended traditional
principles of peacekeeping. In effect there can be no neutrality in the face of genocide, no
impartiality in the face of a campaign to exterminate part of a population. (United Nations
1999b: sec. 19)

As a result, the term neutrality has now been dropped from much of the peacekeeping
lexicon of the last few years although, as Donald (2002) has argued in detail, conceptual
confusion and disagreement about what impartiality should mean still endures.

**Nonviolence vs. Robust Use of Force**

Earlier sections have already touched on the fact that the passive character of UN
peacekeeping before the mid-1990s has been replaced by a tougher, more ‘robust’ stance to
the use of force. Nevertheless, where broader mandates concerning force are authorized,
impartiality is likely to be compromised and it becomes progressively difficult to identify
where peacekeeping ends and peace enforcement begins. This can increase the likelihood
of opposition, and thus risk, to troops who are mandated to compel belligerents who may
have no intention to cease fighting against their will in some situations, but not others.
Additionally, if force is permitted, there is more room for ambiguity concerning when to
use it. PKO personnel may have to weigh in their own minds under extreme pressure
whether their use of force is morally justified in a particular case or not. Daniel Blocq
(2006: 202) mentions several potential dilemmas that illustrate this problem excellently.

Suppose a soldier witnesses the rape of a woman during a patrol. Should the peacekeeper
use force to stop the abuse when he or she knows that forceful interference is likely to result
in the death of the woman? Should the peacekeeper use force when such force jeopardizes
the mission or local stability? What about the peacekeeper’s own life? What if the
government of the peacekeeper has explicitly pronounced that it does not want any
casualties?

Blocq argues that traditional ethical guidelines of peacekeeping are nowhere near enough
for those who have to answer these questions in practice. In place of the vacuum he
advocates normative human rights training for PKO personnel, including discussion of case
studies to familiarize troops with different methods of arriving at sound moral solutions.

**Consent**
Emphasis on consent of the disputing parties has also waned as a more active approach to use of force increase has been adopted since 1999. The ethical difficulty with conducting PKOs in the absence of consent concerns the legitimacy of imposing the will of the Security Council (or in the case of non-UN operations, the leading powers involved) on parties who may not want it, and/or may have no intention of ceasing hostilities. The issue keys into current debates on how far, and under what conditions, matters of collective human security may be allowed to override state sovereignty and national security. In consequence, the UN and its leading members risk accusations of colonial behaviour (Yilmaz 2005: 25) or even cultural imperialism. This uncovers a rather ominous sense to the phrase “painting a country blue.” Again, such accusations can compromise the perceived neutral/impartial status of troops, increase opposition to their presence and heighten the risk of harm to peacekeeping personnel.

**Measuring Peacekeeping “Success”**

Another significant problem in peacekeeping studies and in practice concerns the longstanding lack of consensus on how to determine an operation’s success or failure and what criteria evaluations should use (Diehl 1988: 489; Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998: 50; Pushkina 2006: 133; Bures 2007: 414). An effective way of evaluating PKO success would, of course, be invaluable for planning future operations and anticipating potential difficulties. However, should success be measured on the basis of how far a PKO fulfills its mandated objectives (which is often the case)? What if it does fulfill its mandate, but fails to prevent significant human suffering while doing so, or fulfills it in such a way that future political or social cooperation by the disputing parties is obstructed? Is it still a success? What if the mandate was found to be too narrow, overambitious or otherwise unsatisfactory? Should mission success be measured in such a way that the effectiveness of the mandate can be assessed as well? Should only partial fulfillment of a mandate mean an operation is classed as a failure?

Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998, 50) argue that there would be merit in evaluating different kinds of missions (e.g., monitoring versus emergency) with different criteria and, likewise, that different types of missions will be influenced by different sets of factors. Yet, while this could certainly produce very detailed evaluations, their practical usefulness would depend on how accurately PKOs are classified into different mission types which, in
turn, depends on how well the model of mission classification itself is designed and applied. Darya Pushkina (2006) examines the way broader success criteria need to take into account those circumstances facing PKOs that are likely to affect their success the most. These include level of UN commitment (high = positive effect on success), whether combatants have external support (yes = negative effect on success); and whether PKOs have strong enforcement mandates (no significant effect on success). Under Pushkina’s criteria, UN operations in Mozambique (1992-4), Namibia (1989-90) and Macedonia (1995-9) are among the successful PKOs. Those in the Lebanon (1978-present), Somalia (1993-5) and Angola (1995-7) were failures, while the Congo (1960-64) and Cyprus (1964-present) were partially successful.

Pushkina’s (2006: 145) conclusion that PKOs can be successful if certain conditions are met carries with it the implication that the lack of these (or the presence of other) conditions could well thwart the success of an operation. The question then becomes, should peacekeeping be attempted at all in such situations, if it is somehow doomed to fail? Clearly it is helpful to know in advance on what grounds failure might be likely, to consider ways of countering it from the outset, especially in the mandate. However, tailoring a mandate to what is considered “achievable” is not tantamount to “success” because it may not necessarily be enough to deal with what some situations need. In such cases, maybe it would be more helpful to consider whether international intervention should take a form more suited to the conditions, such as peace enforcement from the beginning.

**Key Points**

- There is still no significant body of work that theorizes peacekeeping adequately, and confusions concerning key concepts in peacekeeping are likely to endure. These are not only academic problems, since conceptual confusion can obstruct the creation of an adequate peacekeeping theory from which accurate predictions could well help reduce casualties in future PKOs

- Ethical problems are associated with the impartiality principle which can and has been used to justify that peacekeepers should not take forceful action to protect civilians from appalling atrocities
• This problem has been dealt with by making the ‘use of force’ principle more robust, but doing so generates other moral problems and is extremely likely to increase risk to peacekeepers and, by extension, to civilians in a conflict

• This increased risk to blue helmets and civilians is exacerbated when a mission is conducted without consent of the parties. Additionally, lack of consent can expose peacekeeping forces and the UN to accusations of colonialism

• How to measure the success of peacekeeping missions is another area where disagreement is rife and which raises all kinds of difficult questions. What is important here is to use evaluation criteria that generate accurate predictions about future conflict situations so that PKOs can be planned and deployed more effectively, efficiently and safely

**Developments in Peacekeeping: Responses to Criticism**

The earnest reflection these and other criticisms have brought about in the theory and practice of peacekeeping has prompted positive developments that attempt to account for new contexts and needs more adequately. 1999 saw the publication of reports on the UN peacekeeping failures in Rwanda (United Nations 1999b) and Bosnia (United Nations 1999a) that were highly critical of the way these specific operations had been dealt with by the Security Council and in the field. In 2000, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi submitted the Report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations (or Brahimi Report) that was brutally critical about the problems that had afflicted UN peacekeeping as a whole. All three reports isolated similar central difficulties with post-Cold War peacekeeping principles and methods and made recommendations for change accordingly. Notable convergences concerned tackling PKO overstretch and mandates that were overambitious in some ways and appalling narrow in others. Missions, they stipulated, must be given the mandate they need, the troops and resources necessary to fulfilling them, and a more realistic authorization of the use of force, especially in the face of combatants who renege on ceasefires or engage in massive human rights violations. As earlier parts of this chapter have indicated, some progress in these directions has been forthcoming, but not without generating certain additional problems of their own—discussed in the previous section—that are only now becoming clear.
The Brahimi Report (2000: para. 5) warned that a most crucial problem facing peacekeeping was the lack of political will to support the UN in its attempts to reform peacekeeping in the necessary ways and cautioned that this must be reversed. It mentioned how information technology could be used to implement many of the recommendations it made concerning increased coordination between different peacekeeping agencies. It also recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission in an attempt to demonstrate a stronger commitment to dealing with the underlying causes of violent conflicts than peacekeeping has hitherto been able to evince. That commitment has certainly been reinforced by UN PKOs since 2000 whose integrated missions have, as we have seen, branched into political, humanitarian, and state-building activities. At the World Summit of 2005, the proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission was endorsed. It produced its first report in July 2007, reinforcing a commitment to addressing root causes of disputes, thus reinforcing the increasingly inextricable inter-relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Partly in a bid to continue to drum up the political will Brahimi spoke of, in early 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon submitted several proposals for peacekeeping reform. Taken together, these heralded a fundamental overhaul of United Nations peacekeeping, including “a major augmentation in working-level resources to carry out increasingly complex tasks” (United Nations 2007a). These proposals were not immediately and universally welcomed, particularly by developing countries. However, implementation has begun on several of the proposals. Perhaps most importantly, in June 2007 the General Assembly established the Department of Field Support which complements the existing DPKO and oversees 13 PKOs. In effect, this split UN peacekeeping across two departments. This may well be a strength in that a far greater amount of resources will be available. It may also be a weakness, as some member states have continued to point out, if coherent coordination between the departments is not kept a priority. Another response has been dealing seriously with the appropriate conduct of UN peacekeeping forces. A revealing comprehensive analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN PKOs was published in 2006 along with recommendations for a strategy to eliminate these practices in the future. In December 2007, a UN forum agreed on a strategy to provide medical and other assistance to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN
peacekeeping personnel, including children born as a result of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers (United Nations 2007b).

Although it is too soon to identify significant practical improvements as a result of these recent developments in peacekeeping, they certainly promise that, in some areas at least, the UN is committed to attempting to equip the blue helmets with better tools and tactics to tackle the daunting tasks ahead.

Key Points

- Many of the criticisms leveled at peacekeeping between 1995 and 2006 were successful in prompting significant reflection on the problems of post-Cold War peacekeeping
- Together, the independent reports on the failures in Rwanda and Bosnia and the Brahimi Report made several tough recommendations for how to address the general and specific lessons learned during the previous decade
- The recommendations for strengthening mandates concerning the use of force, and providing enough resources for these to be fulfilled adequately have certainly filtered into more recent peacekeeping practice, though not without creating their own problems
- In 2007 the UN Secretary-General proposed a major overhaul of peacekeeping practices and organization which reflect the depth with which the UN has been rethinking its whole approach to peacekeeping. The proposals are beginning to be implemented, but—as is so often the case with peacekeeping—not everyone agrees with what they are supposed to do and how they will achieve it

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted that, once one moves even slightly beyond the surface, peacekeeping is complex and, no doubt because of this complexity, perennially contested at both conceptual and practical levels. We have seen how disagreements abound not only what it is, what it should accomplish and how it should achieve its goals. They also pervade how to evaluate peacekeeping success and whether or not its key underlying principles are remotely suited to twenty-first century conditions without significant reconceptualization. Consistency, it seems, is not something that has accompanied many aspects of peacekeeping since that first mission in 1948.
What can be concluded from all this is that taking peacekeeping seriously requires
an awareness that what is said or decided about it at one point may well alter at another.
The constant game of catch-up that both scholars and practitioners have had to learn to
respond to the furiously evolving nature of the world’s violent conflicts with an adequate
view on peacekeeping is difficult to learn well. However, while it is important to recognize
that peacekeeping has proved to be extraordinarily time and context-specific, it is similarly
important to look for the constants in how it is understood, practiced and justified. If these
constants disappear, then peacekeeping will inevitably evolve into something else. It is
possible to conceive a not-too-distant future in which decisive peace enforcement followed
by deep peacebuilding activities could form the normal international response to violent
conflict. But, despite its glaring problems and devastating failures, there is something about
the core idea of peacekeeping that makes it a practice worth defending extremely strongly.
In consequence, any serious attempts to rethink and rework its basic ideas and practices to
fit the new circumstances and needs of conflict resolution are very much to be welcomed
and encouraged. It is for this reason that the 2007 peacekeeping reform proposals and their
implementation are heartening and positive, although it is almost certain that they will need
much further work and reflection.

Questions
1. What are the basic differences between peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and
   peace enforcement?
2. Of the many objectives of PKOs, which are the five most important?
3. On what basis are peacekeeping troops chosen for a particular operation?
4. List three reasons why intra-state conflicts can present more difficulties for successful
   peacekeeping missions than inter-state conflicts.
5. What are the three UN principles of peacekeeping and why are they important in
   guiding the planning, organization and execution of PKOs?
6. What exactly is the example of Srebrenica used to illustrate in this chapter concerning
   the principles of peacekeeping?
7. What are the main practical and ethical problems with the three UN principles of
   peacekeeping? Are these problems fixable?
8. How do traditional peacekeeping mission types differ from multidimensional ones?

9. Which of the three sets of ethical criticisms do you find the most damaging to peacekeeping and why?

10. What are they key difficulties with evaluating peacekeeping success?

11. What do you think is the most important lesson concerning peacekeeping that we have learned from Srebrenica?

12. After reading this chapter, which definition in Box 2 (if any) do you find the least problematic, and why?

Further Reading


Diehl, Paul F. (1988), “Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace”, *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 103, no. 3 (Autumn): 485-507. A key source for its analysis (which is in-depth but never heavy) of six Cold War missions: easy to read and bursting with information and insight.


Web Links
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ is the first place to start when looking for up-to-date information about all issues concerning practical UN peacekeeping. The website includes daily briefings, press releases, peacekeeping mission statistics and factsheets, material on gender and peacekeeping, deployment maps and links to key UN documents and reports.


http://www.berghof-handbook.net – The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management offers a comprehensive selection of cutting-edge articles and resources on all aspects of conflict resolution, and is particularly useful for its continuously updated material on peacekeeping matters.


http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf contains a useful list of all UN Peacekeeping operations, along with their acronyms.
**References: Chapter 12, Peacekeeping**


### Boxes

#### Box 1: Basic Peace Process Continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Key Phrase</th>
<th>Basic Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td><em>Keep</em> immediate peace</td>
<td>Stop/control armed conflict and maintain ceasefire. Often achieved by physically separating combatants and/or monitoring troop withdrawal. Stabilize environment in preparation for dialogue. Assist opposing parties to implement existing peace accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
<td><em>Make</em> a formal peace agreement</td>
<td>Bring hostile parties to the negotiating table (and ensure they continue talks) to work out a peace settlement that is acceptable to both parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Enforcement</td>
<td><em>Enforce</em> peace militarily if peace agreement is violated</td>
<td>Decisive military action (force) is taken in response to violations of an established peace settlement by any and all parties in the dispute to restore and maintain ceasefire. Used in those cases where strong use of force is required to uphold peace agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td><em>Build</em> a long-term peace</td>
<td>Foster durable political reconciliation of rival groups, sustainable reconciliation of differences of those groups at the social level. Often includes representative institution building. Address resolution of underlying differences. Attempts to resolve root cause of the dispute(s).</td>
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Box 2: Common Definitions of Peacekeeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. (Diehl 1988: 487, citing Rikhye, Harbottle and Egge 1974: 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict. (Global Security.org 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. (Boutros-Ghali: 1992, sec. II).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Peacekeeping refers to a way of helping countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace. United Nations peacekeepers - soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries - monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants to implement the peace agreements they have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. (United Nations DPKO 2008).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Box 3: UN Peacekeeping Personnel

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active UN Peacekeeping Missions</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries contributing troops</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>119*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military personnel</strong></td>
<td>9,570</td>
<td>73,393</td>
<td>30,350</td>
<td>72,924*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian police</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>7,038</td>
<td>9,617*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Civilian Personnel</strong></td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>3,243</td>
<td>4,847*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual UN Peacekeeping Budget</strong></td>
<td>$230.4 million</td>
<td>$3,610 million</td>
<td>$2,220 million</td>
<td>$5.4 billion**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes on Contributors

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Notes

1 The UN list of peacekeeping operations considers the first peacekeeping operation to be the unarmed observation force (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or UNTSO) sent to Palestine in 1948 (UN DPKO 2007; Goulding 1993, 452). Others take the armed UN Emergency Force (ENEF I) deployed in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956 to be the initial peacekeeping operation (Diehl 1988, 490; Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2004, sec. 2.1; Blocq 2006, 203).

2 The International Peace Academy definition cited by Diehl (1988), Keith (2000, 5); Rikhye Harbottle, and Egge (1974, 11) and by countless sites found on the internet such as Global Security.org (2008).

3 Of the 73,348 military personnel participating in the UN peacekeeping missions active on November 30, 2007, 1,408 were women—only 173 more than in August of the previous year. See the gender statistics in the website of the United Nations DPKO (2007).

4 Note that in his 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali retracted this suggestion and reaffirmed his commitment to the three traditional principles (Donald 2002, 22).

5 Although some scholars have identified more and Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998, 39-40) manage to stretch this to a round dozen mission types.

6 The International Peace Academy definition cited by Diehl (1988), Keith (2000, 5); Rikhye Harbottle, and Egge (1974, 11) and by countless sites found on the internet such as Global Security.org (2008).