University of Massachusetts Amherst

From the Selected Works of Elizabeth Sharrow

2020

Just Locker Room Talk? Explicit Sexism and the Impact of the Access Hollywood Tape on Electoral Support for Donald Trump in 2016

Jesse H Rhodes

Elizabeth Sharrow

Jill Greenlee, *Brandeis University*

Tatishe Nteta

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_sharrow/29/

Just Locker Room Talk? Explicit Sexism and the Impact of the Access Hollywood Tape on Electoral Support for Donald Trump in 2016

Jesse H. Rhodes, Elizabeth A. Sharrow, Jill S. Greenlee & Tatishe M. Nteta

To cite this article: Jesse H. Rhodes, Elizabeth A. Sharrow, Jill S. Greenlee & Tatishe M. Nteta (2020): Just Locker Room Talk? Explicit Sexism and the Impact of the Access Hollywood Tape on Electoral Support for Donald Trump in 2016, Political Communication, DOI: [10.1080/10584609.2020.1753867](https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1753867)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1753867>

View supplementary material [↗](#)

Published online: 23 May 2020.

Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)

Article views: 94

View related articles [↗](#)

View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Just Locker Room Talk? Explicit Sexism and the Impact of the Access Hollywood Tape on Electoral Support for Donald Trump in 2016

Jesse H. Rhodes^a, Elizabeth A. Sharrow ^a, Jill S. Greenlee^b, and Tatishe M. Nteta^a

^aDepartment of Political Science & Department of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA; ^bDepartment of Political Science, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, USA

ABSTRACT

Scholars have long debated whether and to what extent citizens punish political candidates for explicitly racist rhetoric. However, few studies explore whether a similar dynamic occurs when explicitly sexist messages are conveyed on the campaign trail. Do citizens recoil when exposed to explicitly sexist messages? To investigate this question, we exploit the unique opportunity afforded by the release of the “Access Hollywood” tape during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Using data provided by the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and employing a variety of analytic approaches, we find consistent evidence that the release of the tape modestly, though significantly, reduced support for Donald Trump during the 2016 campaign. Surprisingly, these effects were similar among men and women, but they were noticeably larger among Republicans compared to Democrats.

KEYWORDS

Donald Trump; sexism; voting; 2016 election; Access Hollywood Tape

Introduction

On October 7, 2016 – just 1 month before the U.S. presidential election – *The Washington Post* published an audio tape recorded in 2005 of then reality TV star, Donald J. Trump, and Access Hollywood co-host, Billy Bush, having a conversation in which Trump made several vulgar sexual comments and gloated about his own history of sexual aggression toward women. The release of the Access Hollywood Tape (AHT) was a major event in the 2016 presidential campaign, which pitted Trump, the Republican nominee, against Democratic standard-bearer Hillary Clinton. Within a week of release of the tape, 95% of American adults reported that they had seen, read, or heard about the recording (Shepard et al., 2016). Furthermore, following the release of the tape numerous media organizations and elected officials, including a number of prominent Republicans, condemned Trump for the sexually aggressive behavior he boasted of engaging in on the tape (e.g., New York Times Editorial Board, 2016; Traister, 2016; West, 2016).

The AHT was notable not only because of its extensive circulation and near-universal condemnation but also because its content was unlike anything heard before from a modern presidential contender. While sexist language, stereotypes, and statements have long been a part of American political campaigns (e.g., Dolan, 2010; Kahn, 1996), never before had the mass public been exposed to content in which a presidential candidate’s own words expressed such graphic, lewd, and abusive language about women.

CONTACT Jesse H. Rhodes jrhodes@polsci.umass.edu Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1753867>.

© 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

With universal condemnation of Trump's comments, even by the candidate himself, did the release of the tape have any effect on citizens' evaluations of Trump? While some argued that the release of unambiguously chauvinistic content would hurt Trump (Konitzer et al., 2016), others suggested that strong partisan attachments would overwhelm any possible influence of the tape (Azari, 2016; Clement & Balz, 2016; Tesler, 2016). Still other observers suggested that the effect of the AHT would be mediated by voters' sex, diminishing support for Trump among women voters more so than among men (Hook, 2016).¹ Which, if any, of these claims were correct? While such discussions circulated widely in public conversation during the final month of the campaign, they have not yet been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny (Kam, 2018, p. 209).

In this paper, we investigate the impact of the Access Hollywood Tape on support for Trump in the 2016 general election campaign. Drawing theoretical and empirical guidance from the literature on racial priming (Mendelberg, 2001) and the roles of sex and gender in campaign environments (Bauer, 2015, 2017; Cassese & Holman, 2019; Holman et al., 2016; Mo, 2015), we theorize the release of the AHT as an *explicitly sexist appeal*. We argue that, up until the release of the AHT, Trump waged an "implicitly" sexist campaign. By implicit, we mean that although Trump repeatedly made crass, unapologetic, and belittling comments about individual women, he largely stopped short of blatantly misogynistic statements about women as a group.² However, the release of the AHT featured, in his own voice, Trump's unambiguously predatory, stereotypical, and misogynistic attitudes toward women in general. As we argue below, his explicitly sexist comments – in line with the conventional definition of an explicit racial appeal – employed gendered nouns and adjectives, promoted notions of male dominance and entitlement, expressed contempt for women as a group, and exhibited stereotypical thinking on Trump's part (Mendelberg, 2001, p. 8). Thus, we believe the 2016 campaign was characterized by implicit sexist appeals made by Trump up until the release of the AHT, at which point an explicit sexist appeal was injected into the campaign.

In line with the literature on racist appeals in campaigns, we hypothesize that exposure to an explicitly sexist appeal would reduce support for Trump's candidacy among potential voters given that, by unambiguously maligning women as a group, it violates norms of gender equality which increasingly prevail in American society (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Horowitz et al., 2017). To test this hypothesis, we leverage the variation in date of completion of the 2016 Congressional Cooperative Election Study (CCES, described in [Appendix A](#)), comparing support for Trump among respondents who completed the survey prior to release of the AHT with support among respondents who completed the survey after the release of the tape. Using a variety of analyses, including exact matching and a regression discontinuity design, we find consistent evidence that individuals who completed the survey following the release of the AHT were moderately, but meaningfully, less likely to express a preference for Trump than were those who completed the survey prior to release of the tape.

Additionally, we provide a preliminary assessment of whether the effect of exposure to the AHT was conditioned by partisanship, voter sex, or media usage. Our results provide some indications that the negative effect of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump was stronger among Republicans than among Democrats. However, we do not find a conditioning effect of voter sex, as men and women similarly reacted negatively to Trump's candidacy after the release of the recording. We also find little support for the

conditioning effect of media usage, most likely due to the fact that (because the AHT was such a big news story) almost all likely voters were exposed to information about the tape.

On the whole, our results suggest that the AHT had a modest, but significant, negative impact on support for Trump in 2016. Our findings indicate the value of using the implicit/explicit framework to study the impact of sexist appeals in politics and point to the ways in which sexist messages do (and do not) affect the public's support for candidates in presidential campaigns. These also supplement the large survey experimental literature on gender and campaign effects (see Bauer, 2016) with a context akin to a natural experiment from a real campaign environment. Ultimately, contrary to the work on partisan motivated reasoning and affective polarization, our results indicate that, even in extremely polarized times, voters will punish candidates who flagrantly violate prevailing gendered norms (Flynn et al., 2017; Mason, 2018).

Racial Priming and the AHT

To develop our hypotheses concerning the impact of the AHT, we draw theoretical inspiration from the scholarship on racial priming and the implicit/explicit framework developed by Tali Mendelberg (2001, 2008). Mendelberg's approach was developed to theorize about ordinary citizens' responses to campaign appeals concerning African Americans in the context of American presidential campaigns. At the heart of her framework are two key insights. First, Mendelberg argues that invidious messages about African Americans have played a central part in American elections throughout American history, as candidates have sought to use these messages to mobilize support among white audiences. Second, Mendelberg suggests that the character of these messages has varied depending on the broader normative framework surrounding racial politics. During periods in which prevailing racial norms endorse racial hierarchy, white audiences will be receptive to *explicit* racial messages featuring "racial nouns or adjectives to endorse white prerogatives, to express anti-black sentiment, or represent racial stereotypes, or to portray a threat from African Americans" (Mendelberg, 2001, p. 8). In contrast, during periods in which a "norm of racial equality" is ascendant, white audiences will recoil from explicit racial messages and will punish candidates who employ such appeals. However, this does not mean that white audiences will reject racial messages entirely; rather, they will be relatively more receptive to *implicit* racial messages that appeal to whites' racial animus through more subtle channels that do not directly violate norms of racial equality (i.e., negative images of people of color, references to racialized "code words" such as welfare and crime, and so forth) (see also Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005).

Mendelberg investigates the use of racial appeals in U.S. presidential contests, and argues that in contemporary American politics implicit appeals are the most effective at engaging and mobilizing likeminded voters without raising alarm among segments of the electorate that do not hold similar views. Explicit racial appeals are too clear in their violation of modern norms of racial equality, and therefore are not effective in mobilizing voter support for the candidate expressing them. Considerable empirical research provides evidence for this theoretical framework, suggesting that under most conditions contemporary audiences are more receptive to implicit racial appeals than to explicit appeals (Domke, 2001; Mendelberg, 1997, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002).³

Theorizing Sexist Appeals

Although Mendelberg (2001) asserts that the logic of the implicit/explicit framework does not fully apply to the study of misogynistic messages, we argue that this theory can be applied fruitfully to the investigation of the consequences of sexist messages – or “sexist appeals” – on voter opinion in 2016 and beyond.⁴ We are not the first to see parallels between the origins and operation of sexism and racism in the United States (Hacker, 1951; Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995).⁵ Scholars have argued, given similarities in the relative disempowered status and treatment of women and African Americans historically (Hacker, 1951), as well as similar shifts in norms concerning the public expression of racist or sexist views (Swim et al., 1995; Tougas et al., 1995), that theories designed to explain and predict how race influences political behavior, attitude formation, and attitude expression may be of use in studies of gender and politics (see Klonis et al., 2005).

Scholars have demonstrated that political actors may deploy sexist messaging in attempts to discredit female candidates and that some voters respond positively to these messages (e.g., Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Cassese & Holman, 2019; Valentino et al., 2018). A significant, but context-specific, literature on the role of gendered attitudes, sex stereotypes, and gender role expectations in campaigns and elections has focused primarily on how bias against women candidates might (or might not) shape voter evaluations and electoral outcomes (e.g., Bauer, 2016; Dolan, 2014). The literature suggests that in many circumstances, voters hold male candidates to lower standards than they do women (Bauer, 2020; Ditonto, 2017; Ditonto et al., 2014; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993), particularly when sex stereotypes are activated in the campaign (Bauer, 2015). Women candidates commonly do not benefit from exhibiting gender-typical characteristics (e.g., compassion) for which men are rewarded (Schneider & Bos, 2014). While significant research argues against the notion that voters fundamentally prefer male candidates in a mixed-sex political contest, sexist stereotype activation can diminish support for women candidates (Bauer, 2015), and evidence of contextual biases which favor “masculine” traits (particularly when embodied by men) remains (Holman et al., 2016; Lawless, 2015; Windett, 2014). Although the literature has more recently focused on exploring the durability of these findings in a polarized partisan environment itself marked by biased patterns of gendered candidate emergence (see Lawless, 2015), few studies have focused on the conditions under which men are helped or hindered by deploying sexist appeals in campaigns (but see Cassese & Holman, 2019). In a world marked by movements toward gender equality, are there types of sexist statements that cross the line?

Thinking alongside these findings and in light of Mendelberg’s (2001) important contributions, we develop the term “sexist appeal” to refer to statements made by a political candidate which invoke hostile or threatening attitudes directed toward and/or about women.⁶ Here, we engage both psychological and philosophical understandings of “sexism” as the concept which reflects antipathy toward women as individuals and/or as a group (see Glick & Fiske, 1996; Manne, 2017; Swim & Cohen, 1997), and consider how such ideas, when expressed in political campaigns, may impact voter support for the candidate expressing them.⁷ Mendelberg’s work offers limited but fruitful insight on the potential impacts of sexist appeals but ensuing scholarly research (referenced above) suggests the need for a more robust theory and assessment.⁸ We theorize that sexist appeals are best understood as messages that specifically endorse male dominance,

promote gender hierarchies, and support negative female stereotypes, rather than merely those which portray women “as less able or deserving” (Mendelberg, 2001, p. 244). As Kate Manne (2017) argues, “sexism should be understood primarily as the ‘justificatory’ branch of a patriarchal order, which consists in ideology that has the overall function of rationalizing and justifying patriarchal social relations” (p. 74). Sexist appeals, in this light, can operate to promote the maintenance of a gendered order.

Read in tandem with the developing scholarship on the contemporary functions and contours of sexist ideologies (see Manne, 2017, Chapter 3; Swim & Hyers, 2009), Mendelberg’s framework for racist appeals provides a theoretical and empirical roadmap for understanding the potential impact of distinctive sexist appeals on candidates and campaigns (Mendelberg, 2001, 2008; Valentino et al., 2002). Just as racial messages may be divided for analytic purposes between implicit and explicit types based on the degree to which they clearly refer to racial groups, employ racial stereotypes, or endorse racial hierarchies, gendered messages may vary depending on the degree to which they contain overt references to gender groups, endorse gendered stereotypes, or celebrate gender hierarchies (see Swim & Campbell, 2008; Swim & Hyers, 2009).⁹ Thus, paralleling Mendelberg’s argument about race, we expect that when the norms of gender equality are relatively strong – as significant scholarly literature suggests they are in today’s United States (e.g., Scarborough et al., 2019) – explicitly sexist messages will be rejected by the electorate, and the candidate responsible for these messages will suffer electoral consequences at the ballot box.¹⁰ We expect this to occur because overt sexist appeals contradict the long developing trend toward greater acceptance of gender egalitarian views (e.g., Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Donnelly et al., 2016).

We propose that the AHT represents an instance of an explicitly sexist appeal.¹¹ Admittedly, there is a conceptual distinction between the release of the AHT and “appeals” of the type highlighted by Mendelberg. While the AHT was comprised of content generated by Trump, it was released by a private news organization, and was not a statement intentionally and strategically designed by the Trump campaign or his surrogates to win votes. In contrast, the explicit/implicit racial appeals described by Mendelberg are typically viewed as strategic messages crafted to maximize political support given the prevailing norms of the day. In spite of these differences in *intent*, however, we believe that the explicit/implicit framework is useful in terms of helping us both characterize the *content* of the tape and hypothesize about the likely *effect* of the release of the tape on public opinion.

The tape, released in the middle of the 2016 presidential campaign, contains *both* comments about specific women and Trump’s acts of sexual aggression toward them, *and* a general claim about his ability – indeed, perceived entitlement – to dominate women as a group. On the tape, Trump discusses at length his failed attempt to seduce Access Hollywood co-host Nancy O’Dell, and mentions his sexual interest in *Days of Our Lives* actress Arianne Zucker, whom he is about to meet. However, Trump then moves to a much more general statement about his behavior toward women:

You know, I’m automatically attracted to beautiful – I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. Grab ‘em by the pussy. You can do anything. (New York Times, 2016)

This statement is distinctive from the previous statements we have discussed in its generality – and, in particular, in its articulation of a sweeping perspective that men (particularly wealthy and famous men) have a right to physical possession and sexual domination of women’s bodies. This comparison is parallel to the implicit/explicit distinction in the racial appeals literature, which highlights the difference between implicit racial appeals, which subtly play on racial stereotypes without directly referring to them, and explicit statements about white racial superiority and/or nonwhite racial inferiority. Trump’s statement is akin to what Benokraitis and Feagin (1986) call “overt” sexism: “unequal and harmful treatment of women that is readily apparent, visible, and observable, and can be easily documented” (p. 30). We suggest the AHT’s inclusion of explicit declarations about male entitlement and predation distinguish it from Trump’s other chauvinistic statements and make the tape an example of an explicitly sexist appeal in the 2016 campaign.

We likewise suggest that the implicit/explicit framework is helpful in thinking about the likely effect of the release of the AHT. This framework suggests that, during a period in which the norm of racial equality prevails, implicit racial appeals should not adversely affect candidates’ support, but explicit appeals should. By the same token, we suggest that in the contemporary period, in which the norm of gender equality is increasingly prevalent (Scarborough et al., 2019), implicit sexist appeals should not negatively affect a candidate’s political support not only because these appeals are unlikely to be labeled as sexist by the mass public, but because the candidate in question can plausibly deny the sexist intent of an appeal if such questions arise (Mendelberg, 2001; Nteta et al., 2016; Tokeshi & Mendelberg, 2015). Implicit appeals are akin to “subtle sexism,” or the “unequal and unfair treatment of women that is not recognized by many people because it is perceived to be normative, and therefore does not appear unusual” (Swim et al., 2004, p. 117). In contrast, because explicit appeals are blatant and undeniable, candidates who express them can be readily admonished for their unequal or disdainful treatment of women, and thus may be negatively impacted among potential voters. This leads us to the following hypothesis as it relates to the impact of exposure to the AHT, an explicitly sexist appeal, on public opinion toward Donald Trump:

(H1): Respondents who evaluated Trump following the release of the Access Hollywood Tape (an explicit sexist appeal) will evaluate the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump less positively than respondents who assessed Trump’s candidacy prior to the release of the tape (i.e., those who were exposed to implicit sexist appeals only).

Data and Methods

To test this hypothesis, we use original representative survey data from the Common Content of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The CCES is a collaborative study of American adults on behalf of over 50 colleges and universities conducted online via an “opt-in” from a YouGov panel. Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) show that the CCES produces estimates similar to telephone and mail surveys. Its representativeness is ensured using data culled from the U.S. Census Bureau, voter registration databases, the Pew U.S Religious Landscape Survey, and the Current Population Survey (see

Ansolahehere & Schaffner, 2016). The 2016 CCES was conducted in English and was in the field from September 28 to November 7, 2016 (preelection). It yielded 64,600 respondents to the Common Content questions (Ansolahehere & Schaffner, 2016).

Natural Experiment Research Design

The CCES was in the field before, during, and after the release of the AHT; we leverage this fact to construct a natural experiment research design around exposure to the tape. In this design, individuals who completed the survey prior to the release of the AHT on October 7 are designated as being *unexposed* to the explicitly sexist message [i.e., the “untreated” (or control) group], and those completing the survey following release of the AHT are treated as being *exposed* to the explicitly sexist message (i.e., the “treated” group).

Our treatment of the AHT as an exogenous event providing the possible basis for a natural experiment design requires evidence of widespread exposure to the purported treatment (i.e., the AHT) among members of the American public in order to 1) differentiate between respondents in the untreated group and treated group, respectively, and 2) to ensure that differences in support for Trump between the two groups can be attributed to the presence or absence of exposure to the treatment (Dunning, 2012). Below, we provide this evidence from various sources.

To be clear, we are aware that our design is not a fully controlled experiment, and that selection into survey response prior to or following release of the AHT could be influenced by variables that are also correlated with support for Trump. As we explain in greater detail below, we use a variety of strategies, including pre-processing via exact matching and a regression discontinuity design, to attempt to address problems of selection bias and strengthen our inferences about the effect of exposure to the explicit sexist message in the tape on support for Trump.

Media Coverage of the AHT

The first step in establishing the plausibility of the natural experiment design is demonstrating that media coverage of the release of the tape was so widespread that virtually all individuals in the CCES surveyed after the release of the tape *could* have been exposed to the “treatment” (the explicit sexist appeal) in a way not possible for those surveyed before the AHT’s release. It is a fact that the controversy surrounding the AHT garnered massive media attention following publication of the October 7th *Washington Post* story. On October 8th, stories concerning the AHT appeared on the front page of America’s leading newspapers, including the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *Boston Globe*. Given the status of the *New York Times* as the nation’s “paper of record,” as well as its demonstrated agenda setting power in influencing news coverage (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Golan, 2006), we further investigate the amount of coverage of the AHT in the *New York Times* in 2016. As seen in Figure 1, a search of key terms associated with the AHT on the *New York Times* Archive yields a total of only five stories concerning “Access Hollywood” between January 1st and October 7th. However, with the release of the recording on October 7th, the number of stories referring to “Access Hollywood” balloons to nine on October 7th, ten on October 8th, and eleven on October 9th. In total, 2016 saw 108

Figure 1. Number of New York Times stories concerning terms and people related to Access Hollywood Tape controversy, January–December 2016.

distinct stories that referenced “Access Hollywood” in the *New York Times*, with 103 of these stories coming *after* the release of the tape on October 7th.

Media attention to this controversy was of course not limited to newspaper coverage. The AHT was the lead story on October 8th and 9th for the nightly televised network news broadcasts that included NBC, ABC, and CBS.¹² To gauge cable coverage of the controversy we use the Internet Archive Wayback Machine (<https://archive.org/web/>) to view archived versions of the online homepages of prominent news organizations. We find that the homepages of CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC all featured headline stories on their homepages concerning the recording on October 8th. These measures suggest that the aftermath of the AHT’s release is an example of a “media storm” (Boydston et al., 2014) when citizen attention to the issue was likely to be exceptionally high.

Mass Exposure to the AHT

The second step in establishing the plausibility of the natural experiment design is providing evidence that individuals surveyed in the CCES after the release of the AHT were indeed almost certainly exposed to information about the content of the tape. As we suggest, exposure to information about the tape was, in fact, almost universal among adults after the tape’s release. According to *Washington Post* reporter Paul Farhi, the *Post*’s original story and corresponding video “proved to be the most concurrently viewed article in the history of *The Post*’s website; more than 100,000 people read it simultaneously at one point on Friday. The interest was so heavy that it briefly crashed the servers of the newspaper’s internal tracking system” (Farhi, 2016). Surveys in the field in the days after the release of the recording demonstrate near-universal awareness of the tape. A Politico/ Morning Consult poll conducted on the morning after the release of the tape found that 79% of their representative sample of registered voters had heard “a lot” or “some” about the recording (Shepard et al., 2016). Even more importantly, NBC/Wall Street Journal

conducted a week after the release of the tape finds that fully 95% of respondents had seen, read, or heard about the video, ranking the AHT controversy as the fourth most recognized story in the history of the NBC/WSJ poll (Hook, 2016). Additionally, Google search data (presented in Figure 2) demonstrate a huge jump in attention to terms related to Access Hollywood and figures mentioned in the story after the release of the AHT.

In short, the massive media attention and virtually unanimous exposure to the AHT story suggests that the release of the tape provides a plausible basis for a natural experiment design involving a comparison of those who were not exposed to the tape before completing the CCES (i.e., the untreated group) and those who were (i.e., the treated group) (see Schaffner & Roche, 2017 for similar analyses of such natural experiments). Again, however, we do not naively assume that the natural experimental design holds; below, we introduce additional adjustments to our research design to further enhance the quality of our inferences.

Variables and Analysis Plan

Our dependent variable measures respondents' preelection preference for Donald Trump in the 2016 campaign. We code this variable so that preference for Trump is coded 1, preference for Clinton is coded 0, and preference for any other candidate is coded as missing.

Our main independent variable is whether respondents completed the CCES Common Content prior to or after release of the AHT. In our initial analysis, we code all individuals who completed the survey before or on October 6th as 0, and all individuals who completed the survey on or after October 8th as 1 (we exclude individuals who completed the survey on October 7th, the day of the release of the tape). As described in greater detail below, we provide finer grained coding of this variable in subsequent analyses to further

Figure 2. Frequency of Google searches for terms related to Access Hollywood Tape controversy, September–December 2016.

Note: Values of 100 for a term represent the high point of searches for the term/individual relative to any other point during the period featured in the figure.

strengthen our inferences about the effect of exposure to the explicit sexist message in the AHT on support for Trump.

In our models, we control for an array of factors likely to influence support for Trump, including respondents' sex, education, race, income, party identification, ideology, religiosity, racial attitudes, and mass media usage¹³ (see [Appendix B](#) for question wording). As we explain in greater detail in the Supplemental Appendix, with regard to racial attitudes we assess the degree to which respondents agree/disagree with the statement "White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin." While we would prefer to control for hostile sexist attitudes, which have been proven to be salient predictors of vote choice in 2016 (see, e.g., Bock et al., 2017; Cassese & Holman, 2019; Ratliff et al., 2017; Schaffner et al., 2018), this variable was not measured on the CCES Common Content. However, because we control for many variables that are correlated with hostile sexism, we believe that the amount of bias introduced into our analysis due to exclusion of this item should be limited.

We take additional steps to provide a consistent and rigorous analysis. We limit our analysis to respondents who were self-reported "definite voters" on the CCES pretest.¹⁴ Additionally, in our multivariate analyses, we cluster standard errors by state in order to control for local correlation in the error term (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009; Green & Vavreck, 2008).

Results: CCES Common Content

A Naïve Analysis of the Natural Experiment

As a first step in our analysis, we estimate a simple probit regression model of preelection preference for Trump, using the full CCES Common Content sample. The results of the model appear in [Table 1](#).

In line with the existing literature on vote preferences in the 2016 presidential election, the model suggests that men, whites, Republicans, conservatives, religious people, and those with more conservative racial views were more likely to support Trump; while those with more education were less likely to support Trump (Sides et al., 2018). Media use does not appear to be associated with support for Trump.

Importantly, however, even after controlling for these characteristics, we find empirical evidence that the release of the AHT adversely affected preelection support for Trump. The coefficient for the variable indicating when respondents completed the Common Content is negative and statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. According to this model, the effect of exposure to the AHT is 6 percentage points: respondents who completed the CCES Common Content before the release of the AHT have a predicted probability of expressing a preference for Trump of .46 holding the control variables at their mean values; while those who completed the Common Content following the release of the tape have a predicted probability of supporting Trump of just .40.

While this result is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that exposure to an explicitly sexist message from a candidate leads to a decline in support for the candidate, the magnitude of the estimated effect should induce some concern, especially given what we know about the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. The fact that the estimated effect size may be larger than what we would expect points to the possibility that this

Table 1. Probit regression model of support for Trump, sample from 2016 CCES.

	Support for Trump
Exposed to Access Hollywood Tape	−0.145*** (0.0428)
Male	0.241*** (0.0466)
Education	−0.0884*** (0.0162)
White	0.326*** (0.0582)
Income	−0.00792 (0.00623)
Republican	0.553*** (0.0125)
Conservative	0.411*** (0.0315)
Importance of Religion (1 = Not Imp)	0.111*** (0.0156)
Believes White People Have Advantages	0.474*** (0.0187)
Media Use	−0.000654 (0.0370)
Constant	−5.072*** (0.138)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.74
Observations	26,530

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$

estimate is contaminated by selection bias in the timing of survey completion. Putting the matter another way, it may be that our natural experiment design, though plausible, in fact fails to adequately control for characteristics that are correlated with the timing of survey completion and also influence the outcome, and thus yields a biased estimate of the effect of the tape. In fact, as we describe in more detail below, the two groups (the treated group exposed to the AHT, and the untreated group that was not exposed) are indeed distinctive on the control variables; therefore caution should be exercised in interpreting these initial results.

Estimation with Exact Matching

To address the possible problem of preexisting differences between the group which was surveyed about support for Trump after release of the AHT and the group that was surveyed before the release of the tape, we preprocessed our data via matching methods so that the treated group was as similar as possible to the untreated group on all of the control/pre-treatment variables in our naïve model (Ho et al., 2007). The purpose of this exercise is to break the relationship between the control variables and the timing of completion of the CCES so that we can estimate the effect of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump with less bias, hopefully resulting in a more realistic estimate. We used the coarsened exact matching (CEM) algorithm (Iacus et al., 2012) to preprocess our data, but required CEM to *exact match* treated units to untreated units with the same values on

the covariates without any coarsening.¹⁵ In this procedure, the CEM algorithm creates a stratum for each unique observation of values on the control variables; places each treated and untreated unit in a stratum; and then drops any stratum that does not contain at least one treated and one untreated unit (Blackwell et al., 2010). It is important to note that, because the CEM algorithm drops both treated and untreated units for which there is not an exact match, this preprocessing step changes the quantity of interest under study to the treatment effect on the treated in the post-matching sub-sample (that is, the local sample average treatment effect on the treated).

This process is only likely to improve the validity of our estimates if the exact matching results in a very high degree of similarity (or good “balance”) on the control variables between the treated and untreated groups while at the same time retaining a reasonable number of treated and untreated units (Ho et al., 2007). If the exact matching process does not yield excellent balance, estimates of the treatment effect will remain biased due to preexisting differences between the treated and untreated groups; while if it results in a sizable loss of observations, estimates will be inefficient, as well as very unrepresentative of the full sample. Fortunately, we can evaluate both of these criteria empirically. Iacus et al. (2011) developed the L1 norm to assess balance on control variables across treated and untreated units: this measure represents the distance between the multivariate empirical distributions of the treated and untreated units on the control variables. The measure varies between 0 and 1, with values closer to 0 indicating greater balance and values closer to 1 suggesting greater imbalance. Additionally, by default CEM reports the number of treated and untreated units retained (and discarded) as a result of the matching process. (Recall that the discarding of treated and untreated units that are very dissimilar on the control variables is an *intentional feature* of matching that reduces bias in the making of inferences.)

As Table 2, which reports the results of our exact matching procedure with CEM, shows, we were able to obtain a very high degree of balance across the treated and untreated groups, while also retaining a large number of observations in both groups. The multivariate L1 distance is 1.68×10^{-14} – a very small value approaching 0 – which indicates a high degree of balance on the pretreatment variables across the treated and untreated units in the exact matched sample. CEM also returns L1 values for each control variable, and these too are of vanishingly small magnitude. Meanwhile, despite our very stringent matching approach, we were able to retain 4,167 untreated and 5,199 treated units. These values compare extremely favorably with the multivariate L1 distance and the variable-specific L1 distances for the unmatched sample (also presented in Table 2), which are much larger and thus indicative of much greater imbalance between the treated and untreated groups. This suggests that the exact matching we performed dramatically reduced imbalance between the treated and untreated groups, providing a much stronger empirical foundation for inference about the effect of the AHT on support for Trump.

Because we used exact matching to preprocess our data, there is no need to further adjust for the pretreatment control variables in our statistical model, and we can estimate the effect of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump with a simple univariate probit regression model, while utilizing the special weights returned by the CEM algorithm in the model (Blackwell et al., 2010, p. 537). We present the results of this analysis in Table 3.

Table 2. Comparison of sample from 2016 CCES and exact matched sample from 2016 CCES.

	Unmatched Data	Exact Matched Data
Global L1	0.85	1.68×10^{-14}
Treated	32,850	5,199
Untreated	11,524	4,167
Unmatched Treated	NA	27,651
Unmatched Untreated	NA	7,357

	Unmatched Data	Exact Matched Data
	Univariate L1	Univariate L1
Male	0.01902308	1.80E-14
Education	0.13508224	1.90E-14
White	0.153929672	3.70E-15
Income	0.050031313	1.60E-14
Republican	0.059068473	1.80E-14
Ideology	0.007242533	1.90E-14
Importance of Religion (1 = Not Imp.)	0.037349686	2.00E-14
Believes White People Have Advantage	0.063284517	1.80E-14
Media Use	0.016203907	1.90E-14

Individuals who completed the CCES on the date of release of the Access Hollywood tape are excluded from these summary statistics.

Table 3. Probit regression model of support for Trump, exact matched sample from 2016 CCES.

	Support for Trump
Exposed to Access Hollywood Tape	-0.0577* (0.0281)
Constant	-0.173*** (0.0205)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0004
Observations	8,049

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$, * $p < 0.05$

The model suggests that exposure to the AHT had a negative effect on support for Trump, and that this effect is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. To obtain a substantive interpretation of the probit coefficient, we calculated the marginal effect of exposure to the AHT on the probability of expressing support for Trump. The model suggests that individuals who were not exposed to the AHT had a predicted probability of supporting Trump of .43; while those who were exposed to the AHT had a predicted probability of supporting Trump of .41 – a marginal effect of 2 percentage points. While not large, this effect is substantively meaningful – especially during a period of extreme partisan polarization in presidential voting – as well as much more plausible than the estimate from the naïve model.

This result suggests that the release of the AHT had a statistically and substantively significant negative effect on support for Trump, providing further – and arguably stronger – evidence that individuals do respond negatively to explicit sexist appeals, and punish candidates who make them.

Estimation with Regression Discontinuity Design and Exact Matching

The use of CEM reduces the threats to inference posed by selection bias. But the design remains subject to the criticism that the window of comparison is too wide. After all, many memorable events transpired during the 2016 presidential campaign – both before and after the release of the AHT – so a research design involving comparison of all (matched) respondents might be assigning to the AHT influence that is actually attributable to other events. If this is the case, then we may be over-estimating the negative impact of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump. Ideally, we would like to use a research design that largely eliminates the possibility that the influence on support for Trump that we attribute to release of the AHT is actually due to exposure to other events during the campaign.

Thus, to further substantiate our argument, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, supplemented with exact matching. This design treats the release of the AHT as a “break” in the respondents’ unfolding completion of the CCES Common Content, and asserts that individuals who completed the survey just prior to the break are likely most similar to those who completed it immediately afterward (with the exception of exposure to the tape, of course). By comparing only those who completed the CCES immediately before and immediately after the release of the AHT we substantially reduce the risk that other events, rather than the AHT, are responsible for any differences in support for Trump we observe across these groups.

In this supplemental design, we compare individuals who completed the Common Content in the week immediately prior to the release of the tape (September 30 to October 6) with those who completed the Common Content in the week immediately afterward (October 8 to October 14). All other observations are excluded from the analysis. Note that this design has the effect of again shifting the sample under analysis to that particular sub-group immediately banding the release of the AHT, so the results of this analysis are neither generalizable to the full sample nor directly comparable to the exact matched sample analyzed in the previous section.

We also implement exact matching on this sub-group, via the procedure described in the previous section, to further increase comparability between treated and untreated units and guard against selection bias. Note that, again, this procedure discards both treated and untreated units and therefore changes the quantity of estimation to the local sample average treatment effect on the treated. Again, we obtain excellent balance

Table 4. Probit regression model of support for Trump, exact matched sample with regression discontinuity design, 2016 CCES.

	Support for Trump
Exposed to Access Hollywood Tape	−0.0747* (0.0338)
Constant	−0.244*** (0.0240)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.0006
Observations	5,653

Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.001$, * $p < 0.05$

($L1 = 4.04 \times 10^{-15}$) while retaining a substantial number of untreated (3,074) and treated (3,387) units. We estimate a univariate probit regression model of support for Trump conditional on exposure to the AHT. The results of the analysis from this design are presented in [Table 4](#).

Once again, we find a negative, statistically negative effect ($p < .05$) on support for Trump among individuals who were exposed to the AHT, as compared to those who were not. Keeping in mind that we are once again estimating a local sample average treatment effect on the treated among individuals who completed the CCES Common Content in the week immediately before/after release of the AHT, we find a modest, but substantively important, negative effect of exposure to the tape. Individuals who completed the survey in the week prior to the release of the tape have a predicted probability of expressing a preference for Trump of .40, while those who completed the survey in the week following the release of the tape have a predicted probability of .38 (a difference of 2 percentage points). As this estimate is virtually identical to that found in the previous section, the results of this analysis provide further evidence in support of our view that exposure to explicitly sexist content from a candidate reduces support for that candidate.

Conditional Effects: Partisanship, Voter Sex, and Media Usage

So far, we have focused on assessing the average effect of exposure to the AHT among all respondents in the CCES or the local sample average treatment effect among specific exact matched subsamples from the CCES. However, it is a natural question whether the effect of exposure to the AHT varies among different groups. In the aftermath of the release of the AHT, some argued that given the misogynistic content of the recording that support for Trump among women voters would decrease (Hook, 2016). Others argued that given the power of partisanship that the release of the AHT would do little to sway Republican or Democratic support for Trump (Azari, 2016; Clement & Balz, 2016; Tesler, 2016). Finally, it is unclear whether the effect of the AHT is mediated by respondents' media usage patterns. In analyses contained in the Supplemental Appendix, we explore whether the effect of exposure to the AHT is conditioned by partisanship, sex, and media usage, respectively. We conduct this analysis with the full CCES 2016 sample and using a multivariate probit regression model with interaction terms.

In Supplemental Appendix Table 1, we estimate the same statistical model as in [Table 1](#) but include an interaction between exposure to the AHT and partisan identification. In this model, the coefficient estimate for exposure to the AHT is not statistically significant; however, the interaction term is negatively signed and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. This result implies that the negative effect of the AHT on support for Trump becomes stronger as one moves from a strong Democratic partisan to a strong Republican. The most likely explanation of this pattern is that Democratic partisans were already very unlikely to vote for Trump, so exposure to the tape had little influence on their support for the Republican nominee. In contrast, Republicans were, all things equal, very likely to vote for Trump; but became somewhat less so having been exposed to the tape. What is striking is that, in the midst of an extremely partisan and high-stakes campaign, Republicans did, despite their strong allegiance to their party's presidential

candidate, nonetheless become somewhat less supportive of Trump following exposure to the tape.

In Supplemental Appendix Table 2, we estimate virtually the same model, only this time including an interaction between exposure to the Access Hollywood Tape and the sex of the respondent. In this model, the coefficient for exposure to the Access Hollywood Tape is negative and statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level; but the interaction term, while positive, is not statistically distinguishable from 0. We conclude that the negative effect of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump does not vary by the sex of the respondent. This effect is notable because it suggests that, even though Trump's comments on the AHT were derogatory toward women as a group, women were no more likely than men to recoil from support from his candidacy as a result of exposure to the tape (see also Cassese & Barnes, 2019 for extended discussion about women's support for Trump in 2016).

Finally, in Supplemental Appendix Table 3, we estimate a model including an interaction between exposure to the AHT and media use, to assess whether and how the influence of the AHT was mediated by the intensity of respondents' media usage. In this model, exposure to the AHT remains a significant and negatively signed predictor of support for Trump, but the interaction term is not statistically significant. This result implies that the effect of exposure to the AHT on support for Trump was not moderated by respondents' media usage. The most likely explanation of this non-finding is that, because exposure to the tape was nearly universal following its release (as we have documented above), intensity of media usage played no role in shaping its effect on support for Trump.

Discussion

On the anniversary of the release of the Access Hollywood recording, Vox reporter Anna North, reflecting on the impact of the AHT declared that "in the year since the tape was released, we've seen several powerful men accused of the kind of behavior Trump described ... but before we tell ourselves our society is no longer safe for harassers, let's remember what happened to Donald Trump after he essentially bragged about assaulting women: almost nothing" (North, 2017). The view that Trump suffered no consequences in the wake of the release of the AHT, electoral or otherwise, has become conventional wisdom due in large part to the fact that Donald Trump went on to become the 45th president of the United States. However, the assertion made by North and others has largely been made without rigorous empirical evidence. Did the release of the Access Hollywood recording have any impact on Trump's electoral fortunes, and how does the answer to that question inform future research on sexism in campaigns?

In line with the predictions emanating from the work on racial priming, we find that Trump did indeed suffer electoral harm as a result of the release of the AHT. Using data from the 2016 Common Content of the CCES and employing a range of analytic approaches, we find clear and consistent evidence that respondents exposed to Trump's recording, relative to respondents who were not exposed to this recording, were less likely to express support for candidate Trump in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. We also found that this effect was conditioned by partisanship, with Republicans being

especially likely to reduce their support in response to exposure to the tape; we found no conditioning effect of voter sex or media usage.

Scholarly discussion suggests that the electoral competition between Trump and Clinton, the first woman major party nominee in American history, elicited gendered (and racialized, and classed) reactions among voters in many striking ways, bringing to the fore elements of political identity in ways that political scientists can no longer ignore (e.g., Sides et al., 2018; Strolovitch et al., 2017). Much research on 2016 has focused on isolating the impacts of sexist *attitudes* as correlates to vote choice (Bock et al., 2017; Bracic et al., 2019; Schaffner et al., 2018; Valentino et al., 2018), in response to gendered campaign events (Cassese & Holman, 2019), and among women as voters (Cassese & Barnes, 2019). Our research design and subsequent findings point with unique specificity to the electoral impact of an explicitly sexist campaign appeal, even within a campaign environment marked by “an extension – and perhaps the beginning of a consolidation – of enduring and intersecting configurations of racialized and gendered power, marginalization, and oppression” (Strolovitch et al., 2017, p. 354).

Our aim in this research is to contribute to the growing literature on the many specific impacts of gendered discourse and sexism in the 2016 presidential contest, but also to suggest future pathways for scholarship on sexism within American politics more generally. Currently, scholars lack a robust understanding about how sexist messaging discretely operates in our political environment. Historically, sexist statements from candidates have been more apt to take an implicit (in the form of sex stereotypes, gendered attitudes, and androcentric campaigns) rather than explicit form (Conroy, 2015; Dolan, 2014). To the extent that scholars have studied this phenomenon, it has largely been to identify the impact of sexist messaging in campaign attacks against women candidates (e.g., Kahn, 1996). Although previous research suggested that women candidates faced a hostile environment marked by a sexist electorate (Witt et al., 1995) and gender stereotyping (Sanbonmatsu, 2002b; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan, 2009), more recent scholarship is not unified in an understanding of whether or how the gendered campaign environment systematically disadvantages women through gender stereotypes, overtly sexist messaging, or sexist bias against women candidates in recent years (e.g., Bauer, 2020; Brooks, 2013; Cassese & Holman, 2019; Hayes & Lawless, 2015). Yet, while evolving in its conclusions, this body of research has yet to account for explicitly sexist campaign communications like that of the AHT. The result is that even as the two American political parties are polarizing on their approaches to gender-linked issues (Greenlee et al., 2018; Pearson, 2012; Sanbonmatsu, 2002a; Sharrow et al., 2016; Swers, 2002; Winter, 2008; Wolbrecht, 2000), we know very little about how to anticipate voter reactions to blatantly sexist messages.

Our results suggest that voters reacted negatively to the release of the Access Hollywood recordings in 2016 and in turn expressed somewhat less support for Trump’s candidacy. While we believe that our findings are a first step toward a better understanding of the ways that voters react to explicitly sexist campaign communications, there is still much work to be done. In line with the foundational work of Mendelberg (2001), future scholarship should 1) better define and catalog the incidence of both implicit and explicit sexist campaign messages in American politics, 2) further explore the ubiquity (and impacts) of the shifting norms around gender equality in American society for campaigns and political behavior, and 3) test whether adherence to these norms similarly precludes the use of explicitly sexist campaign appeals and leads candidates to more frequently use implicitly sexist messages. Additionally, scholars should

employ controlled experimental methods to uncover whether exposure to explicit sexist messages similarly influences candidate assessments and vote choice; and, if so, for which types of voters are these messages most resonant. Likewise, in light of the ongoing social and political conversation about sexual harassment, violence, and coercion, commonly referred to as “#metoo,” scholars should explore the many consequences of sexist and anti-sexist appeals in our modern political environment. Just as shifting norms around racial rhetoric can change the meaning behind the explicit/implicit racial appeal distinction (Valentino et al., 2017), so too might changing understandings of sex, gender, and sexist rhetoric alter the meaning of explicit versus implicit sexist appeals. And with President Trump running for reelection in 2020 – a deeper understanding of explicitly sexist appeals remains pressing.

Notes

1. Throughout, we follow recent scholarship by Bittner and Goodyear-Grant (2017) and carefully use the term “sex” to refer to our binary, gendered measure of male/female voters.
2. By naming this “implicitly sexist,” we mean to argue that Trump’s myriad statements about particular women (including Rosie O’Donnell, Megyn Kelly, Carly Fiorina, Elizabeth Warren, and Hillary Clinton) were specifically pointed at individuals, rather than assessing or maligning all women *as a group*. For much of the primary election campaign, Trump directed his ire at specific women who challenged his authority and refused to flatter him (Manne, 2016), thus enabling him to distance himself from claims that such statements revealed his general sexist bias. While such statements surely impacted many women in the general electorate, the nature of his pre-AHT sexist appeals did not overtly articulate his orientation toward *all* women. Similarly, by naming this an “appeal,” we mean to argue that the AHT is a message that communicates a set of beliefs held by Trump (which may be embraced by some members of the electorate, see also Cassese & Holman, 2019). However, we are not asserting that this was a calculated or strategic appeal on the part of the Trump campaign.
3. In recent years, however, this framework has been challenged (Huber & Lapinski, 2006, 2008; but see Mendelberg, 2008 for a rejoinder). Additionally, recent studies indicate that, at least in some contexts and with some groups, explicit appeals can be effective (Huber & Lapinski, 2008; Hutchings & Jardina, 2009; Schaffner, 2018). In the most sweeping study of this type, Valentino et al. (2017) offer evidence that white audiences are equally receptive to explicit racial appeals as they are to implicit racial appeals, at least in some policy areas.
4. Our approach differs from that of Cassese and Holman (2019), who note that the 2016 campaign contained “overt sexist appeals” (p. 55), but focus on the impact of “attacks” to a candidate’s gender on vote choice, mediated by sexist attitudes (e.g., Trump’s claims that Clinton played the “woman card”) in their analyses.
5. See also the extensive scholarship on how sexism and racism are co-constituted political phenomena (e.g., Collins, 2000; Strolovitch, 2007).
6. As scholars in the tradition of Glick and Fiske (1996, 2001) have fully elaborated, sexist attitudes are comprised of multiple, coexisting dimensions which may be either (or simultaneously) “hostile” or “benevolent.” They note that sexism can express either antipathy toward women (i.e., hostile sexism) or patriarchal assumptions about the need for women’s protection and adherence to traditional roles (i.e., benevolent sexism). This scholarship usefully illustrates the nuance in how sexism functions in society, and therefore in the form that sexist campaign messages may take.
7. This understanding of sexism engages the long history of feminist theory and activism around the goal of ending the oppression of women (Echols, 1989; Evans, 1979; Hawkesworth, 2006).

8. Mendelberg (2001) argues that political actors have limited incentive to appeal to voters' sexist predispositions because both parties seek support from women and that neither party aims to target women with "implicit campaign messages that portray them as less able or deserving" (p. 244).
9. See also social psychology literature on "overt," "covert," and "subtle" sexism (e.g., Swim & Cohen, 1997; Swim et al., 2004).
10. Importantly, we do *not* argue that sexist attitudes have been eradicated from the electorate, nor that gender egalitarian transformations are yet complete in American society (see England, 2010). Indeed, much scholarship on the 2016 electoral environment suggests that voters remain dispersed along the spectrum of both hostile and benevolent sexist attitudinal measures (Bracic et al., 2019; Cassese & Holman, 2019; Glick, 2019; Schaffner et al., 2018). However, scholars note that multidimensional gender egalitarian attitudes have, on balance, been on the rise in the U.S. (Scarborough et al., 2019), particularly with regard to gendered roles in the public sphere. These shifts illustrate that gender equality norms are ascendant even at the same time as sexist attitudes both endure and partially function to legitimize the persistence of elements of gender inequality (Glick & Raberg, 2017).
11. In 2016, implicitly sexist appeals were common in the campaign environment in which gender was fully salient, given Clinton's nomination as the first major party female candidate for president. For example, Trump denigrated Clinton's focus on gendered issues in campaign messaging, stating "the only card she has is the women's card" (Rappeport, 2016) – a statement which Cassese and Holman (2019) classify as a "gender-based campaign attack" (56). During his speeches on the campaign trail, Trump frequently referred to Clinton a "liar" who, Trump asserted, should be "jailed" for her activities while serving as Secretary of State (Roberts et al., 2016). Such statements are akin to what Swim and Cohen (1997) refer to as "subtle sexism" which "is characterized by openly unequal and harmful treatment of women that goes unnoticed because it is perceived to be customary or normal behavior" (p. 104) in campaigns defined by political attacks (Lau & Rovner, 2009).
12. Videos for CBS Evening News and NBC Nightly News for October 8th and 9th were accessed via the online archives of CBS News (https://archive.org/details/TVPROGRAM-CBS_Evening_News?&sort=-publicdate&page=2) and NBC News (<https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news-netcast/video/nightly-news-full-broadcast-october-8th-782059075769?v=railb>). Information concerning the ABC World News Tonight was garnered from a search of the transcripts of the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (<https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search>).
13. See Appendix B for full question wordings.
14. We define "definite voters" as all individuals who indicate that they "definitely" planned to vote in the 2016 elections (or indicated they had already done so).
15. We used all exact matches, rather than one-to-one exact matching, because this more lenient procedure further reduces variance without any increase in bias (Ho et al., 2007, p. 217).

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Laura A. van Assendelft, Nichole Bauer, Jennifer Lucas, Brian Schaffner, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions at various stages of this paper. This work was funded by the National Science Foundation under Grant #1559125 [to Stephen Ansolabehere].

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study was supported by the National Science Foundation [grant #1559125 to Stephen Ansolabehere], and the authors thank the co-PIs, Stephen Ansolabehere, Brian Schaffner, and Samantha Luks, for their support of this research.

ORCID

Elizabeth A. Sharrow <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5880-7905>

References

- Althaus, S. L., & Tewksbury, D. (2002). Agenda Setting and the “New” News: Patterns of issue importance among readers of the paper and online versions of the New York Times. *Communication Research*, 29(2), 180–207. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009365020209002004>
- Ansolabehere, S., & Schaffner, B. (2014). Does survey mode still matter? Findings from a 2010 multi-mode comparison. *Political Analysis*, 22(3), 285–303. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpt025>
- Ansolabehere, S., & Schaffner, B. (2016). *Cooperative congressional election study, 2016: Common content* [Computer File] Release 2: August 4, 2017. Harvard University [producer]. <http://cces.gov.harvard.edu>
- Arceneaux, K., & Nickerson, D. W. (2009). Modeling certainty with clustered data: A comparison of methods. *Political Analysis*, 17(2), 177–190. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpp004>
- Azari, J. (2016). *Will the Trump tape have a bigger effect on the race than past controversies?* *FiveThirtyEight*, October 8, 2016. Retrieved August 20, 2018, from <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/will-the-trump-tape-have-a-bigger-effect-on-the-race-than-past-controversies/>
- Bauer, N. M. (2015). Emotional, sensitive, and unfit for office? Gender stereotype activation and support female candidates. *Political Psychology*, 36(6), 691–708. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12186>
- Bauer, N. M. (2016). Gender stereotypes and voter evaluations of female candidates. In A. Bos & M. Schneider (Eds.), *The political psychology of women in U.S. politics* (pp. 167–183). Routledge.
- Bauer, N. M. (2017). The effects of counter stereotypic gender strategies on candidate evaluations. *Political Psychology*, 38(2), 279–295. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12351>
- Bauer, N. M. (2020). Shifting standards: How voters evaluate the qualifications of female and male candidates. *Journal of Politics*, 82(1), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1086/705817>
- Benokraitis, N., & Feagin, J. (1986). *Modern sexism*. Prentice-Hall.
- Bittner, A., & Goodyear-Grant, E. (2017). Sex isn’t gender: Reforming concepts and measurements in the study of public opinion. *Political Behavior*, 39(4), 1019–1041. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9391-y>
- Blackwell, M., Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2010). cem: Coarsened exact matching in stata. *Stata Journal*, 9(4), 524–546. <https://doi.org/10.1111/eco.12267/abstract>
- Bock, J., Byrd-Craven, J., & Burkley, M. (2017). The role of sexism in voting in the 2016 presidential election. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 119(1), 189–193. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.07.026>
- Bolzendahl, C. I., & Myers, D. J. (2004). Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. *Social Forces*, 83(2), 759–790. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2005.0005>
- Boydston, A., Hardy, A., & Walgrave, S. (2014). Two faces of media attention: Media storm versus non-storm coverage. *Political Communication*, 31(4), 509–531. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2013.875967>
- Bracic, A., Israel-Trummel, M., & Shortle, A. (2019). Is sexism for white people? Gender stereotypes, race, and the 2016 presidential election. *Political Behavior*, 41(2), 281–307. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9446-8>

- Brooks, C., & Bolzendahl, C. (2004). The transformation of US gender role attitudes: Cohort replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. *Social Science Research*, 33(1), 106–133. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0049-089X\(03\)00041-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0049-089X(03)00041-3)
- Brooks, D. (2013). *He runs, she runs: Why gender stereotypes do not harm women candidates*. Princeton University Press.
- Carlin, D. B., & Winfrey, K. L. (2009). Have you come a long way, baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Sexism in 2008 campaign coverage. *Communication Studies*, 60(4), 326–343. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10510970903109904>
- Cassese, E., & Barnes, T. (2019). Reconciling sexism and women's support for republican candidates: A look at gender, class, and whiteness in the 2012 and 2016 presidential races. *Political Behavior*, 41(3), 677–700. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9468-2>
- Cassese, E., & Holman, M. R. (2019). Playing the woman card: Ambivalent sexism in the 2016 U.S. presidential race. *Political Psychology*, 40(1), 55–74. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12492>
- Clement, S., & Balz, D. (2016). *Washington Post-ABC News poll: Clinton holds four-point lead in aftermath of Trump tape*. *Washington Post*, October 16, 2016. Retrieved June 13, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/washington-post-abc-news-poll-clinton-holds-four-point-lead-in-aftermath-of-trump-tape/2016/10/15/c31969a4-9231-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html
- Collins, P. H. (2000). *Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Conroy, M. (2015). *Masculinity, media, and the American presidency*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Davis, S., & Greenstein, T. (2009). Gender ideology: Components, predictors, and consequences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 87–105. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-1>
- Ditonto, T. (2017). A high bar or a double standard? Gender, competence, and information in political campaigns. *Political Behavior*, 39(2), 301–325. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9357-5>
- Ditonto, T., Hamilton, A., & Redlawsk, D. (2014). Gender stereotypes, information search, and voting behavior in political campaigns. *Political Behavior*, 36(2), 335–358. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9232-6>
- Dolan, K. (2010). The impact of gender stereotyped evaluations on support for women candidates. *Political Behavior*, 32(1), 69–88. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-009-9090-4>
- Dolan, K. (2014). *When does gender matter?: Women candidates and gender stereotypes in American elections*. Oxford University Press.
- Domke, D. (2001). Racial cues and political ideology: An examination of associative priming. *Communication Research*, 28(6), 772–801. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009365001028006003>
- Donnelly, K., Twenge, J. M., Clark, M. A., Shaikh, S. K., Beiler-May, A., & Carter, N. T. (2016). Attitudes toward women's work and family roles in the United States, 1976–2013. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 40(1), 41–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684315590774>
- Dunning, T. (2012). *Natural experiments in the social sciences: A design-based approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Echols, A. (1989). *Daring to be bad: Radical feminism in America, 1967–1975*. University of Minnesota Press.
- England, P. (2010). The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. *Gender & Society*, 24(2), 149–166. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243210361475>
- Evans, S. (1979). *Personal politics: The roots of women's liberation in the civil rights movement & the new left*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
- Farhi, P. (2016). *A caller had a lewd tape of Donald Trump. Then the race to break the story was on*. *Washington Post*, October 7, 2016. Retrieved August 23, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-caller-had-a-lewd-tape-of-donald-trump-then-the-race-was-on/2016/10/07/31d74714-8ce5-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html?utm_term=.ac76c9d5e082
- Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017). The nature and origins of misperceptions: Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics. *Political Psychology*, 38(Suppl. 1), 127–150. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12394>
- Glick, P., & Raberg, L. (2017). Benevolent sexism and the status of women. In C. B. Travis & J. W. White (Eds.), *Handbook of the psychology of women* (pp. 363–380). American Psychological Association.

- Glick, P. (2019). Gender, sexism, and the election: Did sexism help Trump more than it Hurt Clinton? *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 7(3), 713–723. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1633931>
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), 491–512. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491>
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance. Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality. *American Psychologist*, 56(2), 109–118. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.56.2.109>
- Golan, G. (2006). Inter-Media agenda setting and global news coverage: Assessing the influence of the New York Times on three network television evening news programs. *Journalism Studies*, 7(2), 323–333. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500533643>
- Green, D., & Vavreck, L. (2008). Analysis of cluster-randomized experiments: A comparison of alternative estimation approaches. *Political Analysis*, 16(2), 138–152. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm025>
- Greenlee, J., Nteta, T., Rhodes, J., & Sharrow, E. (2018). Helping to break the glass ceiling? Fathers, first daughters, and presidential vote choice in 2016. *Political Behavior*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9514-0>
- Hacker, H. M. (1951). Women as a minority group. *Social Forces*, 30(1), 60–69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2571742>
- Hawkesworth, M. (2006). *Feminist inquiry: From political conviction to methodological innovation*. Rutgers University Press.
- Hayes, D., & Lawless, J. L. (2015). A non-gendered lens? Media, voters, and female candidates in contemporary congressional elections. *Perspectives on Politics*, 13(1), 95–118. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714003156>
- Ho, D. E., Imai, K., King, G., & Stuart, E. A. (2007). Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing model dependence in parametric causal inference. *Political Analysis*, 15(3), 199–236. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj013>
- Holman, M., Merolla, J., & Zechmeister, E. (2016). Terrorist threat, male stereotypes, and candidate evaluations. *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(1), 134–147. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915624018>
- Hook, J. (2016). *Hillary Clinton picks up support from women, swing voters to build lead*. Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2016. Retrieved August 23, 2018, from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clinton-extends-lead-over-donald-trump-to-11-points-1476622801>
- Horowitz, J. M., Parker, K., & Stepler, R. (2017). *Wide partisan gaps in U.S. over how far the country has come on gender equality*. Pew Research Center, October 18, 2017. Retrieved October 18, 2017, from <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/10/18/wide-partisan-gaps-in-u-s-over-how-far-the-country-has-come-on-gender-equality/>
- Huber, G., & Lapinski, J. (2006). The “race card” revisited: Assessing racial priming in policy contests. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2), 421–440. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00192.x>
- Huber, G., & Lapinski, J. (2008). Testing the implicit-explicit model of racialized political communication. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(1), 125–134. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592708080109>
- Huddy, L., & Terkildsen, N. (1993). Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(1), 119–147. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111526>
- Hurwitz, J., & Peffley, M. (2005). Playing the race card in the Post-Willie Horton era: The impact of racialized code words on support for punitive crime policy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 69(1), 99–112. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi004>
- Hutchings, V., & Jardina, A. (2009). Experiments on racial priming in political campaigns. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1), 397–402. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.060107.154208>
- Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2011). Multivariate matching methods that are monotonic imbalance bounding. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 106(493), 345–361. <https://doi.org/10.1198/jasa.2011.tm09599>
- Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2012). Causal inference without balance checking : Coarsened exact matching. *Political Analysis*, 20(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr013>

- Kahn, K. F. (1996). *The political consequences of being a woman: How stereotypes influence the conduct and consequences of political campaigns*. Columbia University Press.
- Kam, C. D. (2018). Introduction: Using psychology to understand politics and elections. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(suppl_1), 209–212. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy008>
- Klonis, S., Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. (2005). Internal and external motivation to respond without sexism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(9), 1237–1249. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205275304>
- Konitzer, T., Corbett-Davies, S., & Rothschild, D. (2016). *Will Republican voters flee Trump, post-video? Here's what we found*. Washington Post, October 14, 2016. Retrieved June 14, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/14/will-republican-voters-flee-trump-post-video-heres-what-we-found/?utm_term=.76b9faafeef2
- Lau, R., & Rovner, I. B. (2009). Negative campaigning. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(1), 285–306. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071905.101448>
- Lawless, J. L. (2015). Female Candidates and Legislators. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18(1), 349–366. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-020614-094613>
- Manne, K. (2016). *The logic of misogyny*. Boston Review, July 11, 2016. Retrieved October 19, 2018, from <http://bostonreview.net/forum/kate-manne-logic-misogyny>
- Manne, K. (2017). *Down girl: The logic of misogyny*. Oxford University Press.
- Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without issues: The polarizing consequences of ideological identities. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(S1), 280–301. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy005>
- Mendelberg, T. (1997). Executing Hortons: Racial crime in the 1988 presidential campaign. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61(1), 134–157. <https://doi.org/10.1086/297790>
- Mendelberg, T. (2001). *The race card: Campaign strategy, implicit messages, and the norm of equality*. Princeton University Press.
- Mendelberg, T. (2008). Racial priming revived. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(1), 109–123. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592708080092>
- Mo, C. H. (2015). The consequences of explicit and implicit gender attitudes and candidate quality in the calculations of voters. *Political Behavior*, 37(2), 357–395. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9436-2>
- New York Times Editorial Board. (2016). New York Times, October 8, 2016. *The sleaziness of Donald Trump*. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/opinion/the-sleaziness-of-donald-trump.html>
- New York Times. (2016). *Transcript: Donald Trump's taped comments about women*. Retrieved August 22, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html>
- North, A. (2017). *What Trump's Access Hollywood tape reveals about Harvey Weinstein and men in power*. Vox, October 6, 2017. Retrieved October 25, 2018, from <https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/6/16430510/donald-trump-access-hollywood-tape-harvey-weinstein>
- Nteta, T. M., Lisi, R., & Tarsi, M. R. (2016). Rendering the implicit explicit: Political advertisements, partisan cues, race, and white public opinion in the 2012 presidential election. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 4(1), 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2015.1050407>
- Pearson, K. (2012). Congresswomen's pursuit of power in a partisan environment. In L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer (Eds.), *Congress reconsidered* (10th ed., pp. 59–89). CQ Press.
- Rappeport, A. (2016). *Donald Trump keeps playing "woman's card" against Hillary Clinton*. New York Times, April 27, 2016. Retrieved August 20, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/04/27/donald-trump-keeps-playing-womans-card-against-hillary-clinton/>
- Ratcliff, K. A., Redford, L., Conway, J., & Smith, C. T. (2017). Engendering support: Hostile sexism predicts voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 22(4), 578–593. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430217741203>
- Roberts, D., Jacobs, B., & Siddiqui, S. (2016). *Donald Trump threatens to jail Hillary Clinton in second presidential debate*. The Guardian, October 10, 2016. Retrieved August 20, 2018, from <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/10/debate-donald-trump-threatens-to-jail-hillary-clinton>
- Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002a). *Democrats, republicans, and the politics of women's place*. The University of Michigan Press.
- Sanbonmatsu, K. (2002b). Gender stereotypes and vote choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), 20–34. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3088412>

- Sanbonmatsu, K., & Dolan, K. (2009). Do gender stereotypes transcend party? *Political Research Quarterly*, 62(3), 485–494. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908322416>
- Scarborough, W. J., Sin, R., & Risman, B. (2019). Attitudes and the stalled gender revolution: Egalitarianism, traditionalism, and ambivalence from 1977 through 2016. *Gender & Society*, 33(2), 173–200. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243218809604>
- Schaffner, B., MacWilliams, M., & Nteta, T. (2018). Understanding white polarization in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism. *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(1), 9–34. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12737>
- Schaffner, B., & Roche, C. (2017). Misinformation and motivated reasoning: Responses to economic news in a politicized environment. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 81(1), 86–110. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw043>
- Schneider, M., & Bos, A. (2014). Measuring stereotypes of female politicians. *Political Psychology*, 35(2), 245–266. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12040>
- Sharrow, E., Strolovitch, D. Z., Heaney, M. T., Masket, S. E., & Miller, J. M. (2016). Gender attitudes, gendered partisanship: Feminism and support for Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton among party activists. *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy*, 37(4), 394–416. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477X.2016.1223444>
- Shepard, S., Sherman, J., & Palmer, A. (2016). *Exclusive poll: GOP voters want the party to stand by Trump*. Politico, October 9, 2016. Retrieved August 23, 2018, from <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/politico-morning-consult-poll-229394>
- Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). *Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America*. Princeton University Press.
- Strolovitch, D. Z. (2007). *Affirmative advocacy: Race, class, and gender in interest group politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Strolovitch, D. Z., Wong, J. S., & Proctor, A. (2017). A possessive investment in white heteropatriarchy? The 2016 election and the politics of race, gender, and sexuality. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 5(2), 353–363. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2017.1310659>
- Swers, M. (2002). *The difference women make: The policy impact of women in congress*. University of Chicago Press.
- Swim, J., & Campbell, B. (2008). Sexism: Attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup relations* (pp. 218–237). John Wiley & Sons.
- Swim, J., & Hyers, L. (2009). Sexism. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination* (pp. 407–430). Psychology Press.
- Swim, J., Aikin, K., Hall, W., & Hunter, B. (1995). Sexism and racism: Old-fashioned and modern prejudices. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(2), 199–214. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.68.2.199>
- Swim, J., & Cohen, L. L. (1997). Overt, covert, and subtle sexism: A comparison between the attitudes toward women and modern sexism scales. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21(1), 103–118. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1997.tb00103.x>
- Swim, J., Mallett, R., & Stangor, C. (2004). Understanding subtle sexism: Detection and use of sexist language. *Sex Roles*, 51(3–4), 117–128. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SERS.0000037757.73192.06>
- Tesler, M. (2016). *A striking poll shows that many Trump supporters already doubted women's claims of sexual harassment – Even before the infamous tape*. Washington Post, October 17, 2016. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/a-striking-poll-shows-that-many-trump-supporters-already-doubted-womens-claims-of-sexual-harassment-even-before-the-infamous-tape/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c1b508c26e28
- Tokeshi, M., & Mendelberg, T. (2015). Countering implicit appeals: Which strategies work? *Political Communication*, 32(4), 648–672. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.969463>
- Tougas, F., Brown, R., Beaton, A. M., & Joly, S. (1995). Neosexism: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21(8), 842–849. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167295218007>

- Traister, R. (2016). *Trump's one public service was exposing the misogyny of the GOP*. The Cut, October 10, 2016. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from <https://www.thecut.com/2016/10/trumps-one-service-was-exposing-the-misogyny-of-the-gop.html>
- Valentino, N., Hutchings, V., & White, I. (2002). Cues that matter: how political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns. *American Political Science Review*, 96(1), 75–90. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402004240>
- Valentino, N., Neuner, F., & Vandenbroek, L. M. (2017). The changing norms of racial political rhetoric and the end of racial priming. *Journal of Politics*, 80(3), 757–771. <https://doi.org/10.1086/694845>
- Valentino, N., Wayne, C., & Ocen, M. (2018). Mobilizing sexism: The interaction of emotion and gender attitudes in the 2016 US presidential election. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 82(suppl_1), 213–235. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy003>
- West, L. (2016). *Donald and Billy on the bus*. New York Times, October 9, 2016. Retrieved June 28, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/donald-and-billy-on-the-bus.html>
- Windett, J. (2014). Gendered campaign strategies in U.S. elections. *American Politics Research*, 42(4), 628–655. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X13507101>
- Winter, N. (2008). *Dangerous frames: How ideas about race and gender shape public opinion*. University of Chicago Press.
- Witt, L., Matthews, G., & Paget, K. (1995). *Running as a woman: Gender and power in American politics*. Free Press.
- Wolbrecht, C. (2000). *The politics of women's rights: Parties, positions, and change*. Princeton University Press.

Appendix A. Description of data and sampling

The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) was conducted online by YouGov (Redwood City, CA) and was supported by the National Science Foundation (#1559125). Stephen Ansolabehere served as the Principal Investigator of the project, working in conjunction with co-Principal Investigators Samantha Luks and Brian Schaffner. Sixty research teams and organizations participated in this collaborative effort. The CCES was conducted in English and included a preelection wave (in the field from September 28 to November 7) and a post-election wave (in the field from November 9 to December 14), and yielded 64,600 respondents to the Common Content questions (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2016). The analyses in this paper come from the Common Content questions.

Full description of the sampling strategy employed by the 2016 CCES can be found in Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2016, pp. 12–15). YouGov builds the matched random sample for the CCES through a multistep process designed to produce a dataset that is representative of the adult U.S. population. First, YouGov makes use of its ongoing Internet panels, which are comprised of internet users who are recruited to give feedback on consumer items. Respondents can then opt in to the Polling Point Panel, where they provide demographic and political information and indicate their interest to participate in future surveys. YouGov then constructs a data set with these demographic profiles and then matches these with respondents with a sample of respondents in the American Community Survey (ACS). Employing a two-stage sampling frame of American adults, YouGov first selects a target sample from the 2012 ACS; this is done through stratified sampling with selection within each strata by weighted sampling with replacements. Data on voter registration, turnout, and vote choice were matched from the 2012 Current Population survey and from national and state exit polls from 2012. Data on congressional districts were matched from the Census. In the second stage, YouGov selects a target sample from the 2010 ACS and matches this with voter registration and turnout data from the 2008 November Current Population Survey. Using the 2007 Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, data religious variables (religion, church attendance, evangelical status) along with party identification, ideology, and news interest are used to match to the target 2010 ACS. Stratifying on age, race, sex, education, and voter registration, the target sample was selected within each strata through simple random sampling. Each respondent drawn from the ACS is then matched with an active panelist for the Polling Point Panel. Our analyses all employ survey weights (see Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2016, p. 16).

AAPOR Outcome Rates for the 2016 CCES are reported in Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2016, p. 11), and replicated in Table A1..

Reference in Appendix:

Ansolabehere, S., & Schaffner, B. (2016). *COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2016: COMMON CONTENT*. [Computer File] Release 2: August 4, 2017. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University [producer]. <http://cces.gov.harvard.edu>.

Table A1. AAPOR outcome rates.

	Common (YouGov Sample)	Common (External Sample)	Common (Total)
Interview (Category 1)			
Complete	53939	52443	106382
Partial	7177	22692	29869
Eligible, non-interview (Category 2)			
Refusal	2519	5210	7729
Unknown eligibility, non-interview (Category 3)			
No answer	64997	557367	622364
Not eligible (Category 4)			
Out of sample – other strata than originally coded	982	43822	44804
Total email addresses used	129614	681534	811148
I=Complete Interviews (1.1)	53939	52443	106382
P=Partial Interviews (1.2)	7177	22692	29869
R=Refusal and breakoff (2.1)	2519	5210	7729
NC=Non Contact (2.2)	0	0	0
O=Other (2.0, 2.3)	0	0	0
Estimate of e is based on proportion of eligible households among all numbers for which a definitive determination of status was obtained (a very conservative estimate). This will be used if you do not enter a different estimate in line 62.	0.985	0.647	0.763
UH=Unknown household (3.1)	64997	557367	622364
UO=Unknown other (3.2, 3.9)	0	0	0
Response Rate 1			
$I/(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + (UH+UO)$	0.419	0.082	0.139
Response Rate 2			
$(I+P)/(I+P) + (R+NC+O) + (UH+UO)$	0.475	0.118	0.178
Response Rate 3			
$I/((I+P) + (R+NC+O) + e(UH+UO))$	0.423	0.119	0.172
Response Rate 4			
$(I+P)/((I+P) + (R+NC+O) + e(UH+UO))$	0.479	0.170	0.220
Cooperation Rate 1			
$I/(I+P)+R+O$	0.848	0.653	0.739
Cooperation Rate 2			
$(I+P)/((I+P)+R+O)$	0.960	0.935	0.946
Cooperation Rate 3			
$I/((I+P)+R)$	0.848	0.653	0.739
Cooperation Rate 4			
$(I+P)/((I+P)+R)$	0.960	0.935	0.946
Refusal Rate 1			
$R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O) + UH + UO))$	0.020	0.008	0.010
Refusal Rate 2			
$R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O) + e(UH + UO))$	0.020	0.012	0.012
Refusal Rate 3			
$R/((I+P)+(R+NC+O))$	0.040	0.065	0.054
Contact Rate 1			
$(I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC+ (UH + UO)$	0.495	0.126	0.188
Contact Rate 2			
$(I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC + e(UH+UO)$	0.499	0.182	0.233
Contact Rate 3			
$(I+P)+R+O / (I+P)+R+O+NC$	1.000	1.000	1.000

Appendix B. Survey questions from 2016 CCES

All questions appeared on the CCES Common Content preelection survey (in the field from September 28 to November 7, 2016).

2016 Presidential Preference (Preelection). Which candidate for President of the United States do you prefer? (1. Donald Trump; 2. Hillary Clinton; 3. Gary Johnson; 4. Jill Stein; 5. Other; 6. I Won't Vote in this Election; 7. I'm Not Sure)

Sex. Are you male or female? (1. Male; 2. Female)

Education. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (1. No HS; 2. High school graduate; 3. Some college; 4. 2-year; 5. 4-year; 6. Post-grad)

Race. What racial or ethnic group best describes you? (1. White; 2. Black; 3. Hispanic; 4. Asian; 5. Native American; 6. Mixed; 7. Other; 8. Middle Eastern)

Income. Thinking back over the past year, what was your family's annual income? (1. Less than \$10,000; 2. \$10,000-\$19,999; 3. \$20,000-\$29,999; 4. \$30,000-\$39,999; 5. \$40,000-\$49,999; 6. \$50,000-\$59,999; 7. \$60,000-\$69,999; 8. \$70,000-\$79,999; 9. \$80,000-\$99,999; 10. \$100,000-\$119,999; 11. \$120,000-\$149,999; 12. \$150,000-\$199,999; 13. \$200,000-\$249,999; 14. \$250,000-\$349,999; 15. \$350,000-\$499,999; 16. \$500,000 or more; 97. Prefer not to say)

Party Identification (7-point). Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ... ? (1. Strong Democrat; 2. Not very strong Democrat; 3. Lean Democrat; 4. Independent; 5. Lean Republican; 6. Not very strong Republican; 7. Strong Republican; 8. Not sure (NOTE: analyzed with Independents))

Ideology. Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? (1. Very liberal; 2. Liberal; 3. Moderate; 4. Conservative; 5. Very conservative; 6. Not sure (excluded))

Importance of religion. How important is religion in your life? (1. Very important; 2. Somewhat important; 3. Not too important; 4. Not at all important) (Reverse coded for analyses)

Racial Attitudes. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. (1. Strongly agree; 2. Somewhat agree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Somewhat disagree; 5. Strongly disagree)

2016 Intent to vote. Do you intend to vote in the 2016 general election? (1. Yes, definitely; 2. Probably; 3. I already voted (early or absentee); 4. No; 5. Undecided)

Media Usage. In the past 24 hours, have you ... ? [Used Blog, Used Television, Used Newspaper, Used Radio, Used Social Media] (1. Yes; 2. No). (Responses across 5 questions were summed, and dichotomous High Use/Low Use variable was created (0-2 = 1, 3/5 = 1)).