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Article
Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2011)
  • Alexander Elbittar, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
  • Andrei Gomberg, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
  • Laura Sour
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions. First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not show statistically significant variation across voting rules, implying that group decisions may be viewed as aggregations of independent individual decisions. Second, we observe that proposer behavior significantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple model) on the within-group decision rule in force among the responders and is generally different from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining.
Keywords
  • bargaining games,
  • group decision making,
  • experimental design
Publication Date
August 24, 2011
Citation Information
Alexander Elbittar, Andrei Gomberg and Laura Sour. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study" The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 11 Iss. 1 (2011)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/elbittar/2/