International trade in genetically modified productsInternational Review of Economics and Finance
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AbstractThis paper investigates competition between two markets that sell close substitutes: a traditional product and a genetically modified (GM) product. Tightening an import quota on the GM product raises the prices of both goods and hurts consumers. Two scenarios are considered under free trade: Cournot–Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. A Stackelberg type monopolist produces more, and the competitive traditional firms produce less, than in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In the long run, an import ban on the GM product does not help competitive producers of the genetically modified organism (GMO)-free products but benefits only the landowners in Europe.
Copyright OwnerElsevier Inc.
Citation InformationE. Kwan Choi. "International trade in genetically modified products" International Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 19 Iss. 3 (2010) p. 383 - 391
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ekwan-choi/17/