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Article
Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
  • E. Kwan Choi, Iowa State University
  • Eli Feinerman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Published Version
Publication Date
1-1-1995
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen application. Some nitrogen fertilizer is applied ex ante before a random rainfall, but side dressed nitrogen may be applied ex post. First-best policy is a tax or a quota on ex ante application, because side dressed nitrogen is not leached. Since a risk-averse farmer uses more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral farmer, a higher tax must be imposed on the former. Action equivalent first-best taxes and quotas are also welfare equivalent. An empirical model for wheat in Israel was used to demonstrate the analytical
Comments

This is an article from Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 20 (1995): 122. Posted with permission.

Copyright Owner
Western Agricultural Economics Association
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Citation Information
E. Kwan Choi and Eli Feinerman. "Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas" Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1 (1995) p. 122 - 134
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ekwan-choi/13/