Disintegration of the CFSP During The War in Iraq

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Introduction

The key motivation for the EU integration has been the economic cooperation and elimination of political conflict among the EU members rather than posing the EU as a global actor in international security. However, after a loose political cooperation period under the platform of Economic and Political Committee (EPC), the European leaders developed a serious Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992. Until that time the member states were heavily dependent on NATO on their security policies. Maastricht Treaty (1992), Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Franco-British Declaration at St. Malo (1998), Helsinki European Council (1999) and European Security Strategy (2003) were the milestones on the preparation of CSFP. However, despite the active participation of EU forces to the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Kosovo and several other missions, the foreign and security policy still remains an intergovernmental policy area. Within the unique complex system of policy making process the CFSP seems to be “learning by doing”. Especially, in the crisis terms EU could not respond collectively and national defense identities of the member states overruled the common approach. This lack of collective response brought suspicions to the EU as an emerging global actor. Even some of the pessimistic scholars considered the failure of EU as “death of the west”.

There are numerous the studies on the development process of the CSFP but scholars did not enough examine the factors of disintegration of the policy towards serious global threats. The CFSP literature covers the policy response of the Union to the Balkan wars of 1991-1995 but there is no extensive study analyzing the developments during the War in Iraq. This study intends to contribute the enlightening of unclear parts of the CFSP literature through emphasizing the roles of important actors within the policy sphere. Specifically the question of ‘why did the EU countries fall into discord over the war in Iraq and Franco-German alliance applied to “strategic non-cooperation” instead of pursuing a common foreign and security policy’ will be analyzed under the theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis (FPA). The theory

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of foreign policy analysis focuses on the behaviors of the actors. The actors could either be human decision makers or institutional executive bodies.

As well as the overview of factors related to the U.S. Government’s diplomatic failures and response of the Franco-German alliance, this study will look for the influence of three EU related variables to explain why the CFSP does not work in crisis terms: i) Intergovernmental structure of the policy making process, ii) different threat perceptions and attitudes towards use of force, iii) military and intelligence restrictions and dependence on US and NATO for national defense. The responses of French and German governments will be studied as case studies to understand the potential reasons of opposition to the War in Iraq.

Theoretical framework

The common foreign and security policy has been the most ambitious policy sphere within the EU for the proponents of European political cooperation. The role of EU as a global actor has been studied through the approaches of integration theories, comparative politics and IR theories particularly the by the institutionalism. The complexity and multidimensionality makes it difficult to comprehend the foreign policy of the EU with a single IR theory. This study has chosen the IR subfield Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as the theoretical framework to explain the actor specific cooperation or conflict towards the war on terrorism. The FPA has the ability of bridging different theories in a multi-disciplinary approach combining comparative politics, public policy and domestic constraints to the actor specific theory of international relations. The FPA framework also enables us to understand the relationship between policy process and policy outputs.

The neo-functionalists were interested with the role of commission and the High Representative for the CFSP the Intergovernmentalists were interested with the foreign policy perspectives of the member states. The scholars of comparative politics discuss whether the EU is a governance model of federation or confederation. While the well known EU scholars such as Paul Taylor and William Wallace defined the governance model of EU as a form of “Consociational Confederation” Ben Tonra argued that the CFSP could be explained as “foreign policy condominium”. According to William Wallace, The EU is “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: the Community as a Political System”, 3 however Tonra notes that the CFSP is “constructed from the joint sovereignty of the Union and the Member States. This condominium is a necessarily complex creation of political and bureaucratic structures.” 4

The international relations theorists tended to accept the EU as an independent global actor. Charles Bretherton and John Volger diverted from a nation-state centric foreign policy actor approach to the “existence” of collective non-state actor in the

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Bretherton and Volger were concerned to observe the influence of EU in the international politics. Hazel Smith also considers the EU as an “important” single global actor which is “complex but relatively cohesive.” A different approach comes from Ginsberg who argued that the EU is “neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime.”

According to Kenneth Waltz the structural realism explains the distribution of power in terms of the material resources and the self-interested behaviors of the superpowers may determine the international order. The domination of the U.S foreign and security policy perspectives in the international arena can be explained by the military and economic might of the country but the EU is not a significant figure in terms of supranational budget and military capability. The power of the EU depends on the regulatory regime among the member states and institutions instead of material resources. The situation arise the question of whether the EU can be a real global actor without substantial military and economic power to handle the international security problems.

The liberal theories such as the interdependence theory assume that the states are more likely to cooperate through transgovernmental contracts against emerging serious security threats. According to Ginsberg regional integration and integration are the two main logics of the common European foreign policy. While the regional integration logic relies on the demands of outside actors particularly over consolidation of the single market, the interdependence refers to the joint action of EU towards international political problems. The liberal interdependence theories are not clear enough to explain the roles/concerns of national foreign policy makers within the EU, who are still playing the major role in European foreign policy even after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The increasing levels of coordination of foreign policy through joint institutions require mutual concession from the national sovereignty. Moreover, the convergence of new interdependent organization and already existing international security/defense organizations (such as NATO, UNSC, OSCE) and former national defense alliances complicate the process of effective foreign policy making within the EU.

The realists focus on the external crisis and threats to enhance the common foreign and security policy but the war in Iraq clearly shown that the crisis and serious threats led to dissolution in the CFSP of EU rather than leading cooperation. Even if the EU seemed to be operating well enough to handle minor international security threats

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10 Ginsberg, Roy, H. “Foreign policy actions of the European Community: The politics of Scale” Boulder: Lynne Reinner. 1989
11 ibid
through the institutionalization under the framework of EPC and CFSP, the level of institutionalism seemed to be far from satisfactory to handle major threats. Instead of depending on the institutional power of EU, particularly the smaller EU states tended to lean towards more sophisticated and powerful military powers during the war in Iraq. The integration of CFSP and ESDP (including WEU) seems to be the next step for the ultimate institutionalization of the foreign policy of the EU but there are no overwhelming attempts even if these two policy spheres are headed by the same Person. The CFSP is still far from being supranational and national governments still has more influence than the High Representative, Commission, EP or ECJ. Moreover, mobilizing public support for a common foreign policy seems to be difficult than the fiscal and monetary issues of the first pillar which the EU citizens have acquainted with.

The neo-functionalists argue that the cooperation in one area of the EU develops in parallel with the cooperation in other policy spheres through “functional spillover” within/among the institutes of the EU. For example, the EPC was initially established to protect the economic policies of the EU but the organization involved into political and security related issues over the time. The interaction between the CFSP and ESDP has developed under the leadership of Javier Salona. However, it would be unrealistic for the neo-functionalists to expect further involvement of CFSP into economic policies of the EU and judicial conducts of the third pillar. Moreover, common foreign policy within the EU requires the commitment of the member states more than the institutional achievements.

Michael E. Smith applied to the theory of intuitionism to explain the enhancing cooperation and more positive policy outcomes after the inauguration of the CFSP. Smith argues that institutionalization enhances stability, increases complexity of policy making and implementation process, creates common behaviors in social spaces and decision making becomes more automatic and autonomous through common norms. The institutionalization also enables the development of institutional memory, expertise and analytical resources for the policy domain. The number of joint EPC actions increased from 8 between the years of 1970-74 to 94 under EPC/CFSP period within 1990-1995 period. However, Smith acknowledges that the institutionalization process and cooperation within the institutes still depends on the actors involved. The FPA explains the potential agreements and discord with the roles of the human decision makers in the EU institutes and national governments.

Since EU was founded on the purposes of economic integration the earlier EU institutions evolved on economic issues rather than political and security concerns. On the other hand the CFSP is apparently political and security oriented towards the non-EU states and organizations. There can be conflict between the economic and security policies of the EU which is undesirable especially in the crisis terms. Even if there would be unanimity over the foreign policy issues the institutional debate still incites the political controversy, turf battles and ideological conflicts. Sometimes the

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13 Ibid
14 Ibid
ideological concerns of the member states (i.e. Cyprus) hampered the development of common foreign policy in the Council of Ministers which requires unanimity for action.

Given the “uniqueness” of the EU as a governance model Roy Ginsberg reports that “A general theory of European foreign policy (EFP) cannot be deduced given the historical uniqueness and infinite complexity of EFP. An inductive exercise is preferred. It allows for an incremental building of conceptual knowledge, which must precede a fully blown analytical-conceptual approach. In the future, a middle range theory or middle range theories of EFP may be induced from what we know of explanatory concepts.” 15 Even if the institutionalization enhanced the dynamics of cooperation among the EU foreign policy actors, we cannot explain the disintegration of European foreign policy by the institutionalism theory and failure of foreign policy institutions. The war in Iraq once more reminded that the national foreign policies of the member states, particularly the national defense identities of the three big states subdued the CFSP initiatives. Thus, rather than examining the functions of the institutes we have to focus on the behaviors of the national leaders in national decision making process since all of the foreign policy actors had divergent preferences, threat assessments, concerns and interests. We have to take into account various interest groups, political parties and public opinion during the foreign policy making process.

The FPA is developed to counter the structural views focusing on the external elements in foreign policies of the states and unions. The FPA focuses on the behaviors, threat assessments and policy perspectives of the important national and supranational actors of EU. Structural and Institutional explanations are useful to understand the historical background and institutional development of the CFSP. On the other hand FPA helps to understand the roles of actors within a specific foreign policy arena such as the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover the theoretical framework of FPA enables us to comprehend the interactions among national, international and supranational actors over the decision making process and policy outcomes.

The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the primary determinants of state behavior: material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision makers…If our IR theories contain no human beings, they will erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion, no accountability…By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus, we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers.16

Herman, Kegley and Rosenau argues that FPA integrated the decision making process with the developments in the field of public policy, public administration,

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psychology and sociology through a pluralistic approach. The FPA proposed a behavioral change in the traditional approaches of Graham Allison, James Rosenau, Irving Janis and Richard Synder who focused on the role of international system to explain foreign policy. The foreign policy analysts focused on the “behavior” of internal actors in the foreign policy domain rather than external factors and developments. The FPA intended to study the individual, social, institutional, regulatory (formal and informal processes), interactional and cultural factors that are shaping the behaviors of the foreign policy makers.

The development of Common foreign and Security Policy

The founders of the European Coal and Steel Committee (ECSC) had no apparent intentions to create a new foreign policy for the organization. The committee was developed on economic and political purposes without any security concerns. However, the first attempt to create an intergovernmental foreign policy for the EEC was proposed by the Fouchet Plan of the French President De Gaulle in 1961-62 which required unanimity for foreign policy actions but provided extensive veto powers. The Fouchet Plan actually intended to create an alternative initiative against the dominant power of U.S and NATO in the international arena but other five members of the EEC rejected the plan. Moreover, the Fouchet plan for foreign policy coordination was subordinated by the increasing competition between the superpowers of West and East and there was certain “containments” towards secondary foreign policy coordination among the EEC members.

The motivation for a common foreign policy did not disappear with the rejection of the Fouchet Plan. The Foreign Ministers of EC established the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism with the agreement on the Luxemburg Report in 1970 but increasing tension between U.S and Soviet Union during the late 1970s kept the EC countries from developing independent foreign and security policy, which perpetuated the “containment” from the first cold war. However, the developments in Afghanistan, Poland, Iran, Iraq and the Middle East and the threats from the new...
nuclear age led the European powers to be more active in the foreign and security policy by the early 1980’s.24

EPC began to produce substantial foreign policy initiatives such as Venice Declaration for the rights of the Palestinians, Helsinki Final Act and Conference on European Security which significantly contributed to ending the cold war.25 Methodologically the EPC exerted diplomatic tools and declarations but they integrated to the EC over time by using economic tools for policy aims. 26 Being annoyed from compartmentalization of the economic and political affairs, increasing numbers of EC members supported the initiatives of the EPC, commission got more involved and the Single European Act in 1986 gave formal status to the organization. 27

The EPC did not have the substantial coordination mechanisms to face the major developments in Europe such as the fall of Berlin wall, collapse of Soviet Union and the war in Yugoslavia but stressed upon the necessity and pawed the way for a more powerful policy coordination mechanism.28 The quest for a more substantial organization led to the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 which raised the potential convergence between Western Union and EU on security policies.29 Besides the Franco German alliance, the government of U.K unexpectedly supported the development of Maastricht treaty and argued that Western Union should be the powerful European Branch of NATO. But France and Germany insisted on “Europeanization” of West European security to provide independence to the implementation of the security policies.30 The Maastricht Treaty, brought qualified majority voting, provided the core elements of CFSP and established it as the second pillar of the EU policy sphere.31

The foreign policy sphere in the EU moved from intergovernmental platform towards governance by the TEU. According to Michael E. Smith after the Maastricht the CFSP gained four major elements of governance i) “CFSP involved a much greater coherence of the policy sector and rationalization of the policy process” ii) “CFSP became legally binding on EU member states which included compliance mechanisms”

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28 ibid
iii) “CSFP included several authoritative decision making rules in the form of qualified majoriy voting and iv) “the TEU provides a greater degree of autonomy for the EC organizational factors in the EC”.

The article J 1.4 of the TEU urged the members to enhance the cooperation by asserting that the ‘The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” The article J 2 advised information exchange and consultation among the member states “Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.”

The Maastricht changed the situation of the EPC secretariat which was taken over by the rotating president. A permanent secretariat with increased numbers of employees was founded to serve the CFSP activities independent from the rotating presidency.

Although basics of the supranational governance were implied in the treaty, the cooperation in foreign policy did not go beyond a broader framework and were still overwhelmed with intergovernmental perspective. Particularly the opposition of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal against establishing alternative organizations to WEU, NATO and UN hampered the establishment of supranational institutions and decision makers in European foreign policy. Despite the critics and policy deficiencies, the core European leaders (especially French President Chirac, British Minister Tony Blair and Commission President Jacques Delors) were adamant in sustaining the development of the common foreign and security policy.

After the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP continued its evolution through the Treaty of Amsterdam, Franco-British Declaration at St. Malo (1998) and Helsinki European Council (1999). Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) introduced significant amendments to the CFSP such as creation of a High Representative for the CFSP (who would be the Secretary-General of the Council) and five fundamental objectives for the policy:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

34 Ibid
• to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those
on external borders
• to promote international co-operation;
• to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The former Secretary General of NATO Javier Saloña was appointed as the
High Representative of the CFSP to provide a single voice for the EU on foreign
policy. Saloña is also serving as the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and
the WEU and he was designated as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs for the EU if
the constitutional treaty was ratified. Over the time the passive and defensive nature
of the EPC has changed to proactive policy understanding after the inauguration of the
CFSP. The EU Security Strategy was prepared in 2003 with significant contributions of
Salaña through modeling the U.S National Security Strategy. The strategy mainly
focused on three issues threatening the security of European community: the terrorism,
proliferation of WMD and organized crime. The strategy also underlined the
importance of multilateralism in international security operations. Despite modeling
the U.S National Security Strategy the strategy of EU insisted on using multilateral
decision making, diplomacy and soft power instead of preemptive strikes and military
interventions.

The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was established in 2003 as the
initial practical implementation of CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP) with significant contributions of Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and United
Kingdom. The EU’s rapid reaction force is criticized to be to sluggish and incapable of
handling serious threats and it is called as a “paper tiger” by various critics in the U.S.
On the other hand the EU members particularly France insist that the ERRF will be
ready for major security operations after three phases of development: the “crawling”
period (1999-2004), “walking” period (2004-2010) and “running” period (2010-) which
resemble the biological development of human beings. The military experts in EU
expects launching fully fledged security operations after 2010.

The “crawling” period started in 1999 after the launching of Headline Goals and
Appointment of Javier Saloña as the High Representative for CFSP. Despite it was a

37 Peterson J. & Smith M. E, “The EU as a Global Actor” Chapter 10 in Bomberg, E, & Stubb, A, “The
York. 2003
Survival, vol. 45.no.3 Autumn 2003, pp.167-186
40 Everts, S., Keohane, D., “The European Convention and EU foreign policy: Learning from failure.”
Survival, vol. 45.no.3 Autumn 2003, pp.167-186
41 ibid
42 Schweiss, Christina M. Sharing Hegemony: The future of transatlantic security. Cooperation and
Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Association Vol.38 (3) 211-234)
symbolic process the peace keeping mission in Macedonia in March 2003 was an important development for the CFSP as already established European forces under the NATO framework switched to the EU initiative. \(^{43}\) The EU was expected to develop independent defense and security policy within this term, but the process was undermined by unexpected developments during the War in Iraq.

The “walking” period started in a crisis term for the European Foreign Policy. As well as the discord among EU countries the discord between Franco-German Alliance and U.S negatively affected the diplomatic efforts. During the walking period the EU countries are determined to increase their defense capabilities including creation of European Airgroup, overcome the divergences in the threat assessments and eliminate the duplications in military and diplomatic efforts \(^{44}\)

Within the “running” process the ERRF is expected to gain the full capacity for international security and peace keeping missions, which will require an annual budget between $24 and $56 billion. \(^{45}\) But the situation raises the question of whether the EU will be willing to spend that much money (almost 50 percent of current EU budget) for the operations of ERRF? Wolf and Zycher does not expect the EU to allocate great extend of its budget to implementation of CFSP and development of ERRF, because particularly the economies of the “big” EU countries are under recession. \(^{46}\) Even if the EU developed full operational capacity there will be questions in mind. Is this force being created to cooperate or compete with NATO to fight against terrorism? How will the international community resolve the conflicts in multipolar world? Will the development of full capacity lead the EU states to ultimate Common Foreign and Security Policy? How will the EU get rid of further multi-polarization among the 25 members of the Union?

**Cooperation over Afghanistan, discord over Iraq**

September 11 and successive terror attacks to Madrid, London and Istanbul once more reminded the necessity of unified approach against the international terrorism problem. The Solidarity between the EU and United States transformed the relations into a more positive platform and European contribution to peace and security of the world has increased after September 11. The U.S government pursued a multilateral perspective within the framework of consultation with European allies and U.N Security Council before the war. \(^{47}\) The cooperation among the EU members and U.S government lead to joint application to the 5th Article of the North Atlantic treaty which considers “an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all and consequently… each of them… shall assist the party or parties so attacked”. \(^{48}\)

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\(^{43}\) Ibid
\(^{46}\) Ibid
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom were the EU member states and Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania were the candidate countries providing support to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Europeans are not only keeping the peace in Kabul but also fighting alongside U.S. forces to eliminate al Qaeda and Taliban resistance. French aircraft are flying bombing missions, British soldiers are leading dangerous expeditions in the mountains, and other European special forces are supporting cave-hunting efforts. The ERRF started operations in 2003 but national defense identities of the European Countries came forward rather than a unified EU defense identity. The national defense identity continued on the peace keeping and economic development efforts in Afghanistan.

War in Iraq is a turning point from multilateralism to unilateralism for the U.S foreign policy. According to William Wallace during the cold war the United States utilized multilateral institutions to legitimize the military actions with the rhetoric of “common values shared by free world” however, the “rhetorical justification” has changed towards the statement of national interests during the war in Iraq. Bush Administration questioned the merits of NATO and United Nations, which behavior irritated many of the European allies. Multilateralism was perceived to be necessary only when it serves to the interests of the United States. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice declared that the American Foreign Policy would “proceed from the firm ground of national interests and not from the interests of the illusionary international community”. Some of the senior members of the Bush Cabinet believed that NATO and United Nations was nothing more than a “talking shop” which hampers the prompt response of the U.S to international security problems. Josef Joffe indicated that rather than being a transnational cooperation pact with mutual responsibilities, NATO became the pool of nations for the United States which they form ad hoc coalitions based on the unilateral threat perceptions. After the experiences of Kosovo, the international community and the United States did not take into account the EU as a serious platform for resolution of comprehensive security conflicts.

Contrary to the first gulf war U.S government could not provide a “will and commitment” from the international community. The U.N Security Council did not approve the military sanctions against Iraq in the first session, because the U.N Weapons inspectors reported that there was no WMD in Iraq. Moreover, there was no evidence or substantial intelligence that Saddam had connections to Al-Qaida. The war in Iraq divided the EU members in terms of the diplomatic and military support for the U.S. Government. The U.K, Italy, Spain, Poland and several Eastern European

49 http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure_structure.htm
52 Wallace, W., “Living with the hegemon: European dilemmas” www.ssrc.org/sep11/essays/wallace
54 ibid
Countries promised alliance with the United States. On the other hand Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium were adamant for resisting the war. Without legitimacy of the military intervention even the former allies of the U.S. didn’t want to participate in the “coalitions of the obedient” but they want to be in the multilateral “coalition of the willing”. Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg were partly isolated in terms of the foreign and security policy perspectives.

Javier Solana actively supported the Operation Enduring Freedom but the war in Iraq clearly displayed the perspective differences between the U.S. and European policy actors. The sidelining of former European allies, aggressive unilateralism and formulation of ad hoc coalitions by the U.S. Government undermined the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Salona was highly disturbed from the disintegration of the foreign and security policy of EU, divergence of the European powers and unilateral decision making process of the U.S. government during the war in Iraq. The disintegration of the European states were criticized by Javier Solana by noting that: “… the notion of ad hoc coalitions of docile followers to be chosen or discarded at will is neither attractive nor sustainable in the long run.” Responding to Donald Rumsfeld’s comments that “The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission” Solana commented that:

We must begin by reaffirming that we are partners and we are allies. Treat your friends like allies and they will behave like allies. Partnerships and alliances bind. They allow for and legitimate leadership by providing a forum for talking and for listening. … Most of us would prefer to be called an ‘ally’ or a ‘partner’ rather than a ‘tool’ in a box...

According to William Wallace “Disintegration of European common foreign policy over the invasion of Iraq, in the winter of 2002-3, demonstrated the fragility of the consensus established among EU governments.” The FPA could help to analyze the factors of disintegration of CFSP because the foreign policy analysts “adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis” and “have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society”. Rosenau notes that we have to study the motivations of the foreign policy

actors to understand why there is cooperation or conflict over the implementation of policy. The CFSP had failed to pass a serious practical exam for the policy implementation because of significantly different approaches of the actors in the European foreign policy. Contrary to the active participation of U.K to the coalition forces, France played a key role on the failure of UN Security Resolution in 2003 for the use of military power against Saddam regime. Chirac administration not only pushed forward EU frameworks as a multipolarism and multilateralism model, but he also negotiated with the other members of UNSC to hamper unilateral decision for military intervention. French President Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder formed a “strategic non-cooperation” platform against the far in Iraq.

i) The French response to the “War on Terrorism”

Franco American discord over the international security operations started by the 1950’s through the Gaullist challenge to the U.S Hegemony in NATO. French government withdrew from NATO opposing the U.S domination in transatlantic security when U.S refused to share its nuclear technology with France but armed the military forces of U.K. France has played key role in the in the integration of Europe and preparation of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union since the beginning of European Economic Committee (EEC) after Treaty of Rome in 1957. French governments pushed forward EU as a platform of multilateralism and multipolarism against the hegemony of the United States. During the preparation of the Treaty of Maastricht France intended to sideline NATO and push forward EU as a new international power on security.

The small group dynamics is one of concepts utilized by the foreign policy analysts to explain the behaviors of policy makers. Similar to the Bush cabinet the cabinet of the President Chirac has been in the core of political discussions over Afghanistan and Iraq. September 11 Attacks initially seemed to ease the tension between two historical competitors and provided an atmosphere of cooperation against the international terrorism threat. The French President Chirac visited the United States after 9/11 and supported the invocation of the NATO’s Article 5, but he was prudent about distancing the French foreign policy and not giving the Americans carte blanche for the war against terror. President Chirac committed for providing military support on the condition that the operation had to be “consulted in advance about the objectives and modalities an action, whose goal must be the elimination of terrorism”.

Nevertheless, Chirac refused using the terminology of “war on terror”, considering implications of “war” term on the futility of diplomatic efforts once the armed forces entered into combat.

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66 Kelley, J., “Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: why Iraq was not just Iraq”. International Politics, 2005.42 pp. 153-173
69 Philip H. Gordon, “France, the United States and the “War on Terrorism” U.S.-France Analysis, January 1, 2002” http://www.brook.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/terrorism.htm
70 Ibid
encounter began. Moreover, both Chirac and Vedrine were annoyed from the statements of the President Bush using the term “crusade” to describe the war on terror, because they believed that it would result in entrapment by Osama bin Laden who plots for “clash of civilizations”.71

The Chirac Administration played key role on the UNSC Resolution 1368 on September 12, which condemned the terrorist attacks to WTC and Pentagon and stressed upon the right of self defense for the United States.72 French government believed the importance of non-military precautions to confront the terrorism threat. The French Foreign Minister Vedrine stated that the measures must “not only be punitive but preventive… to fight against its sources: finances, fanatical and destructive ideologies, situations and crisis that provide militants to terrorist organizations.”73 French government also launched several initiatives to freeze the assets and curb the money laundering of terrorist organizations in parallel with the recommendations of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF).74 With the proposal of French government the FATF conducted a special meeting in Washington in October 2001 and the participants decided to establish a special task force to fight against the financing of terrorism.75 Apart from the diplomatic initiatives the French government deployed 4500-5000 personnel in Afghanistan for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance and security operations.76 Moreover, French air Forces conducted 31 air strikes but they avoided participating in some of the attacks because of the probability of killing civilians.77

After September 11, conformity to the UN Security Council Resolution and participation of Western European Countries to the operation “Enduring Freedom” and ISAF perpetuated the multilateralist security perspective. However, War in Iraq is a turning point from multilateralism to unilateralism for the U.S foreign policy. The President Bush believed that terrorist have gained access to WMD and “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”78 The unilateralism of the decision making process was not welcome by the other major powers of the world. Particularly France, Germany, Russia and China united against the invasion of Iraq. Despite the support for the War in Afghanistan, the French government opposed the war in Iraq and did its best to stop the military intervention. The public opinion and ethnic composition of the community in France was one of the key motivators of the opposing response of the French government. While 92 percent of the Muslims

73 Philip H. Gordon, “France, the United States and the "War on Terrorism" U.S.-France Analysis, January 1, 2002” http://www.brook.edu/lp/cuse/analysis/terrorism.htm
74 Chirac, Speech to the Future of Europe Regional Forum, Montpellier, 4 October, 2001
77 ibid
condemned the 9/11 attacks, 73 percent of the French people believed that the U.S was responsible for the rise of Islamic extremism.\(^7^9\)

The tensions between France and the United States peaked during the negotiations of the UNSC Resolution 1441 in 2002. The French president not only actively campaigned in the UNSC against the war in Iraq but he also negotiated with the other members of the UNSC to hamper unilateral decision for military intervention. After the initial unanimous adoption of the first draft resolution Chirac noted that “the message of the international community is clear. It is united in telling Iraq that it is not time to cooperate fully with the United Nations. The resolution offered a change in Iraq to disarm in Peace.”\(^8^0\) The final draft of the resolution became more stringent as it requested the inspections of WMD based on the permission of the Saddam Hussein, despite the co-drafters from the U.S and U.K wanted to provoke Saddam by inserting unacceptable terms by Saddam.\(^8^1\) Chirac demanded both resumptions of the inspections and second UNSC Resolution if Saddam do not comply with the terms of inspections.\(^8^2\) The conditionality for the use of force was interpreted differently by U.S and French governments. While Powell argued that the invasion of Iraq was warranted by the 678, 687 and 1441 numbered UNSC resolutions, the spokesperson of Chirac administration rejected the arguments of Powell: “we cannot accept an ultimatum or the automatic recourse to force…The inspectors must come back before the UNSC to make their report and it is up to the council to decide.”\(^8^3\) French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine stressed the need for Europeans to voice their disagreements with unilateralism of the U.S. Vedrine argued that the pillar of the French foreign policy was making the world to multipolar and multilateral instead of living under the hegemony of single hyperpower.\(^8^4\)

France is dedicated for pushing forward the multilateralism under the umbrella of international organizations such as EU, NATO and UNSC to maintain the legality of security operations.\(^8^5\) Development and implementation of independent foreign and Security Policy for the EU is a critical phase for France to break the influence of the United States. To consolidate a European stand France needs “to convince other Western European governments that they have reason and means to do more than follow placidly in the United States’ wake on those occasions when they venture beyond their home waters”\(^8^6\) They need the commitment of other EU members

\(^8^0\) The Acronym Institute for Disarmament diplomacy. Last Chance' for Peace as Inspectors Return to Iraq. Retrieved on December 10, 2006 from http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68nr01.htm,
\(^8^2\) Ibid
particularly a strong commitment from Germany. However, if the unilateralist and interventionist policies of the Bush Administration continue France may easily establish an opposition platform with other global powers against the U.S. Henry Kissinger realistically vouched the critical conditions in the U.S Foreign Security: “An explicit insistence on predominance would gradually unite the world against the United States”. Moreover, as the realists argued the increased tension of the EU countries in the future may enhance the development of CFSP to impose EU as the new world power against the U.S.

ii) The response of German Government

Germany was an important U.S ally under the NATO framework against the communist threat during the cold war era and German support to U.S Governments continued until the War in Iraq in 2003. German government provided political, law enforcement, intelligence and military support to the counter terrorism activities of the Unites States after 9/11. However, the Bundestag was divided on military contribution against Taliban. While the Christian Democrats and Free Democratic Party supported military action the Democratic Socialism party strongly rejected any military intervention. By the encouragement of Schroder the parliament discussions turned out to be positive towards supporting U.S forces but German support can be considered as symbolic in comparison with the British government’s commitments. The Bundestag committed to send 3900 soldiers and provide contributions to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on November 2001. The German-Dutch joint command took over the ISAF in March 2003

However, the positive atmosphere turned out to be opposition to the unilateralist military interventions of the United States before the war in Iraq. German politicians were uneasy with the statements of “crusade” by the Bush administration during the “war on terror”. Sherman and Sussex report that besides the unilateralism, the crusading spirit of the operations was the other main reason of German opposition against the War in Iraq. The declaration of the U.S National Security Advisor Condolleezza that the U.S government would “proceed from the firm ground of national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community” irritated the former European allies particularly Germany and France. Schroder expressed his resentment by stating that “Bush has or seems to have committed himself so strongly to

88 Parliament of Germany
92 Ibid
war that it is hard to imagine how he can climb down.”  

Even if there would be military intervention Germans demanded the use of force to be proportionate, limited and precise towards the actual threat. Some of the scholars saw the approach of Schroder Administration as a part of pacification process of German Foreign and Security Policy after the World War II. For example, Henry Kissinger commented that “Germany Seeks security in an abstract moralism veering towards pacifism, which enables it to feel superior to its powerful ally.”

Since Germany had been living an economic recession period Schroder wanted to avoid the extra economic burden of war. Throughout the ongoing election campaign Schroder became the most outspoken critic of the Bush’s unilateral decision on military intervention in Iraq, which he thought would result in destabilization of the region; “Under my leadership, this country won’t participate in any adventures.” Apart from Schroder, Joschka Fischer the Foreign Minister of Germany Publicly stated his resentment against the unilateralism of Bush Administration: “A world with six billion people will not be led into a peaceful future by the mightiest power alone...alliances between free democracies should not be reduced to following; Alliance partners are not satellites. In other words: we will not accept a decision-making paradigm where we are expected to make one-sided concessions.”

The relationship between U.S and Germany went through an “ice age” during the War in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and NSA Condoleezza Rice argued that U.S-German relations were poisoned. Klaus Larres reports that “mutual incomprehension” and “value gaps” were the two main reasons of crisis between two countries. The different threat perceptions of Germany and U.S may be considered as another factor beyond diplomatic crisis. German Chancellor Schröder saw Al-Qaida more serious threat than Saddam Regime. Schroder believed that waging war against Iraqi dictator will distract the international community from combating against terrorism and will increase the anti-western sentiments within the Middle East. Moreover Schroder suggested that resolution of Israeli-Palestinian threat will contribute to the peace and security of the Middle East much more than toppling the Saddam Regime. Ultimately, Germany wants to develop an independent Foreign and Security Policy. Rather than alliance with the U.S the shield of EU and Franco-German alliance is indispensable for Germans to get the independence in foreign policy.

100 Klaus Larres, “Mutual incomprehension U.S German value gaps beyond Iraq. Washington quarterly 26:2 pp 23-42
102 Ibid
Why the CFSP Doesn’t Work in Crisis?

The developments in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq remind us that the CFSP only works in uncomplicated and uncritical circumstances. Michael Smith notes that the “components of the European foreign policy can be evaluated in terms of successive layers or overlays, reflecting the evolution of the ideas institutions and policy. The drivers of European foreign policy can in turn be seen in terms of the three imperatives: the search for legitimacy, member state preferences and the desire for environmental stabilization.” Even some of the scholars argue that the future foreign policy of EU may never heal the wounds of the disintegration during the war in Iraq. Despite the efforts of France and Germany to provide independence to the European Foreign Policy, especially the smaller and newer members of the EU remain highly dependent on the United States. This study identified three factors to explain why the CFSP does not work in crisis terms: i) The intergovernamental structure of the policy making process, ii) Different threat perceptions and attitudes towards use of force, iii) military and intelligence restrictions and dependence on US and NATO for national defense.

i) The Intergovernmental structure of the policy making process and role of the EU institutes

The power the EU depends on regulations rather than military and economic might. Numerous regulations have been enacted during the ECSC, EC and EU to integrate the economic and administrative functions of the member states. Only the Treaty of Rome has been amended four times since its enactment in 1957 and each amendment made the treaty more complex and opaque. Even most of the EU citizens are confused about the complexity of the governance and policy making within the Union. The number of EU members became 25 in 2004 and reached to 27 by January 2007. The policy making system of the EU is “not unified or even centralized, and it operates according to different rationales depending on the circumstances…As long as the EU is based on international treaty law, its member states reserve the right to participate according to their own self-interests.” When each government proposes amendments in the legislations in accordance with their interests the policy making may be an insurmountable process within the community. Moreover, as the time goes on the EU governance have to deal with more policy areas such as environment, justice and home affairs, fisheries, biotechnology, employment and social policy. Foreign and Security Policy has been one of the most complex policy spaces within the EU since the Treaty of Maastricht. The European integration resolved many conflicts but it also created brought many controversial issues to the international community.

The FPA studies regarding the international actors traditionally analyzed the behaviors of the foreign policy makers in nation-states. Moreover with adaptation into

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the new environment, the FPA framework may help the scholars to understand the interactions among different layers of governance in the EU. The new governance type of the EU attracted researchers to analyze which actors are playing role in different levels of decision making and types of interactions among these actors. While the institutionalism emphasizes the diffusion of power among the EU institutes, FPA is additionally interested with the behaviors of the actors in nation states which are still important in EU foreign policy making process. The intergovernmentalists believe that EU is not a unitary actor but it is still under the process of formation. The position of the High Representative for the CFSP was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam but the CFSP still remains an intergovernmental domain. Apart from the High Representative the Commission (particularly the commissioner of external relations), the Council, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament are major institutional actors in foreign policy making process of EU. However, the leaders of the nation-states (particularly Germany, France and UK) are still the overwhelming actors in foreign policy domain. Moreover, national interests/initiatives of the member states may counterbalance the efforts of the policy makers in Brussels. The supranationalists campaign for establishing super policy makers and institutions above the national governments to get rid of the overwhelming discussions even for trivial issues. On the other hand the intergovernmentalists oppose creation of supranational policy makers because they don’t want to give up from the sovereignty of national decision makers.106

The mission of the High Representative was carried out by the foreign ministry of the country which was holding the rotating presidency before the treaty of the Amsterdam. When the Treaty created the post of High Representative for CFSP the member states worried about the restriction of the national sovereignty over foreign policy. The Santer Commission was also concerned about losing power over foreign policy, duplication of tasks and further institutional complexity. However, Salona was later given the authority to represent the ESDP and he was appointed as the Secretary General of the Council. According to Michael E. Smith High Representative of the CFSP and Commissioner Chris Pattern applied division of labour. While Pattern is engaged with the economic and EU related issues, Salona is dealing with more political and security related international affairs.107

Over the time, Salona has become a powerful figure in the EU, but the evolving incidents revealed that Salona cannot challenge the power of the nation-states, authority of the Council and presidency. Currently Salona’s power is dependent on the support of the Council and the member states particularly Germany, France and the U.K. After being appointed salona highlighted that “The High Representative operates within the framework of the Council, and over the last year much of my work has been determined by a number of specific mandates from the European Council. The post fills an institutional vacuum, and sets in motion policies and activities in areas where the EU

was previously either inactive, or irrelevant as an actor.”  

Currently the president of the council changes in every 6 months and this rotation is considered as a serious predicament for consistent foreign policy. Each country pushes forward their priorities into the EU agenda when they take over the presidency. As there is no well-established body within the EU for the implementation of the foreign policy the confusion of the member states remains unabated on the representation of the EU.

The EU is lack of legal personality to sign the international agreements and operations on behalf of the European community. Even the CFSP diplomats are regularly warned by the legal officials of the EU that they are not authorized to sign the agreements which provoke the uncertainty in foreign policy domain.\textsuperscript{109} Proper, timely and consistent implementation for the CFSP requires a supranational institutionalization as in the Federal Government system of the United States. Jean Monnet, the intellectual father of the EU stressed upon the importance of institutionalization “nothing is possible without individuals; nothing is lasting without institutions.”\textsuperscript{110} The development of CFSP and ESDP needs further concessions from the national sovereignty of the member states. The war in Iraq clearly indicated that it is extremely difficult to get simultaneous concessions from all the member states for a unified approach towards the complex international problems. Moreover, the institutional diversity and competition complicated the decision making process in foreign policy.

While the commission has more expertise on use of soft power, economic sanctions and humanitarian aid, the council has the power of being directly connected to the member states. The political leaders in Europe did not want the CFSP to function in an extremely different way from the EPC, thus they tried to increase the efficiency of the institution to be the locus of CFSP. The Commission’s role on external relations particularly focused on international trade negotiations, fisheries, environmental issues, developmental policy and enlargement of the EU. On the other hand the High Representative for the CFSP mainly focuses on handling the international security problems from an EU perspective. According to Garret and Tsebelis the members of the Commission and EP desired for empowerment of the supranational policy makers even though there was increasing competition between the organizations of the CFSP High Representative and Commissioner for external affairs.\textsuperscript{111}

Over the years, the role of commission over the foreign policy of the EU has evolved from an ousted unit to strategic policy actor. By the early 1970’s the Commission was kept aside from the activities of the EPC and only consulted for specific EC issues. “Only on rare occasions was the commission invited to meeting of the Middle East working group and newer to those of the working group on the UN

\textsuperscript{108} Solana, Javier, “Developments in CFSP Over the Past Year”, European Policy Center Commentary, October 12, 2000
\textsuperscript{109} Smith, Michael E, “The Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The institutional cooperation.” Cambridge University Press 2004
disarmament. It was excluded from all activities of the European Correspondents, including the all-important luncheon after the meetings of the Political Committee at which the draft conclusions are drafted.112 By the early 1980’s Commission’s participation, contribution and respectability in the EPC activities increased especially by the 1981 London Report and SEA113 The strategic position and resources of the commission enabled the institution to play a leading role in the external relations and foreign policy sphere until the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Michael E. Smith argues that while the larger EU member states tried to curb the involvement of Commission into the foreign policy domain, the smaller members desired the contributions and advise of the Commission during their presidency.114 On the other hand the proposed future president of the European Council is not welcomed by the commission members as it will restrict the power of commission on policy making.115 The more systematic institutional memory and source of information and expertise of the Commission were welcomed particularly for economic policies of the EPC. The commission was also facilitator of information exchange among the national foreign ministries and provided relevant information when the national institutes neglected disseminating the information regarding the negotiated issue.116 Simon Nuttal reports that the external network of commission became more comprehensive than most of the EU member states especially in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries which provided substantial information exchange mechanism for the EU. 117

The EP did not play a significant role in the external relations and/or foreign policy of the EU especially in the earlier years of the community. The SEA provided to powers to the institute to amend the decisions of the EPC despite the EP does not have the right to initiate a foreign policy. However, unlike most of the national parliaments the EP enjoyed having the budgetary authority, approval of political appointments (such as appointment of the President of the Commission) and treaty ratification besides the legislative power. The Maastricht empowered the European Parliament to approve the operational funds of the CPSP from the EC budget. The EP mostly shared the parallel views with the commission for foreign policy issues while both institutions inherently conflicted with the Council of Ministers which is responsible for executions of the legislations.118

114 ibid
The Corepers are more involved into the foreign policy making process of the EU after the Maastricht. The meetings of the Council of Ministers are currently prepared by the Corepers and they are entitled with making the amendments to provide the coherence between CFSP and EC affairs. Since the political committee meets less frequent than necessary to pursue the CFSP actively, the Corepers take over the mission of bridging the Brussels and National capitals. The intensive national agenda of the ministers leaves the ground for the Corepers in the policy making and implementation process. Gilles Andreani notes that “political directors (…) were entrusting it to the officials in charge of formulating national foreign policies, who therefore had less stake in developing a common foreign policy than, say, a group of ambassadors in residence in Brussels… (Corepers) tend to develop a collective ethos of their own, and often end up acting as representatives of their institution’s interests vis-à-vis their capitals.” However overwhelming role of the Corepers seems to be restricted with the everyday business of the CFSP and the national political leaders take over the control when there is a serious security threat or foreign policy challenge.

The unadopted constitutional treaty proposed several compromises between the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists to overcome the conflicts on foreign policy making process. Firstly, the missions of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Salona) and the External Relations Commissioner (Chris Pattern) would be merged under the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs and secondly, the drafters of the constitutional treaty intended to simplify the policy structures and close the gap between large and small members of the society. On the other hand the constitutional treaty did not intent to enlarge the powers of the commission on foreign policy and keeps the veto rights of member states. However, the rejection from the Netherlands and France and abstaining of the British government postponed the enactment of the Constitutional Treaty. The appointment of the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs would be a significant step for the unification of the EU’s response to international security conflicts. The establishment and evolution of the Ministry will take years before reaping positive benefits. Even if the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be appointed there will be further need for an institution to organize the bureaucratic activities of the institution which will pose extra burden on the EU.

ii) Different threat perceptions and attitudes towards use of force

The potential threats to the international community became multidimensional, complicated and more dynamic than those threats raised in the last century. Particularly after 9/11 the threat perceptions of the Unites States and the EU members diversified against the terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the “rogue states”. The FPA is particularly interested with the behaviors, mindsets and perceptions of the leaders. The

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119 ibid
120 ibid
threat perceptions of the European leaders have been one of the factors behind the foreign policy initiatives. The EU and US communities share the similar values such as democracy, human rights and individual freedoms but the administrative mindsets of the EU and U.S governments are significantly different from each other.\textsuperscript{124}

The United States became more lenient towards unilateralism, use of preemptive force and military intervention of the problematic countries to topple their rogue leaders. On the other hand, many of the European countries continually preferred multilateralism, containment strategies and diplomatic solutions rather than use of military force. Robert Kagan symbolized the differentiation of the American and European perspectives with the Mars/Venus analogy.\textsuperscript{125} The CFSP led to more proactive involvement into the international security problems but the soft approach of the EPC and Commission has been preserved. The declarations, demarches and other diplomatic initiatives remained as the main tool of the European foreign policy. Brian Write notes “conflict resolution requires a range of different instruments and the EU clearly has a contribution to make on the basis of its existing “civilian power” capabilities.”\textsuperscript{126}

The war in Iraq was not only a military war but also it was a diplomatic fight between the U.S allies and opposition groups mainly France, Germany, Russia, China. The Bush Administration shared the threat perception with Blair Administration which provided continual support to the U.S military and diplomatic efforts for the “Operation Enduring Freedom” and War in Iraq. Moreover the Eastern European countries and Spain displayed tendency to the threat assessment of Anglo-American alliance rather then the Franco-German alliance. U.S Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented “You are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. You look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They are not with France and Germany on this. They are with the United States.”\textsuperscript{127} When Blair participated to the President Bush’s address in the Congress after the 9/11, President Bush thanked him for sharing the similar threat perceptions and complimented that “America has no truer friend than Great Britain.”\textsuperscript{128} The strong coalition of Bush and Blair sidelined not only the NATO and UN but also major European allies, China and Russia. President Bush classified the resisting EU countries including Franco-German alliance as the “old Europe”, whereas he called the U.K and other supporting countries as the “new Europe”. Anthony King’s suggestion of Britain’s alienation from the Europe and its special relationship with the U.S. once more became apparent before the war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{129}

The totalitarian Baath regime in Iraq was considered as the major threat and center of middle eastern problems during the past two decades by the Bush Administration. The United States invaded Iraq again in 2003 upon the allegations of presence of WMD and connection of Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaida terrorist organization. On the other hand Franco-German alliance believed that Al-Qaida was more serious threat than Saddam Hussein and the resolution of Israeli-Palestinian threat was more important than toppling the Saddam Regime for the peace and security of the Middle East.  

Depending on their threat assessments and the IAEA inspector’s reports (which indicated that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq) the resistant EU countries believed that Saddam is not an imminent threat to the international security. Moreover, there was no substantial evidence that Saddam had connection to the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.

When it comes to security, many Europeans would still rather take pride in their softer power: their readiness to do the peacekeeping duties that America prefers to avoid; their experience, hard-won mostly in the Balkans, of crisis prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; their larger aid budgets. The world needs ‘smart development aid’ not just smart bombs, quipped one senior EU official during a recent transatlantic slanging match.

As well as the differences in the threat perceptions the attitudes towards the use of force can be cited as the other important reason to explain why the Europeans and Americans pursued different policies against the threat from Saddam Regime. While the Americans perceive the use of “coercive force” as a usual foreign policy tool, the Europeans use of force is last solution for the international security problems. Europe met with the terrorism threat long before the U.S. and it will be unfair to say Europeans are inexperienced against terrorism threat. Especially the IRA in the U.K, ETA in Spain, PKK in Turkey and some Chechen groups Russia were the well known terror organizations which the countries of the continent have been suffering and fighting for decades. However, the majority of the EU citizens believed that terrorism requires law enforcement and intelligence approach rather than a military occupation. Apart from the terrorism the tragic experiences of serious defeats and mass casualties in the both World Wars may explain the softer approaches of the Europeans against the threats of the 21st century.

The American supposition is that force works, if you are prepared to accept the risk and cost. The European supposition is that things are prone to go awry, often in ways that are unpredictable. Moreover, any use of force sets a precedent.

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that increases the chances that war – waged by others for other purposes in other places – becomes more probable. Quite different historical experiences of war have helped shape these attitudes. All continental Europeans have good reason to rue their habitual conflicts for the tragic experience of the weak is matched by the tragic experience of the strong.  

The Europeans have been using “leveling” and “strategic non-cooperation” strategies to balance the power of the superpowers and institutionalize the multilateral system in conflict resolution.  

A positive UN resolution for the use of military force could reduce the efforts to balance the power of U.S before the war in Iraq. Even after the lessons learned in Kosovo, the overall soft approach of European governments towards the use force is criticized to be insufficient for the resolution of chronic security conflicts in the world. Enforcement of international laws sometimes requires use of force instead of vicious circle of diplomatic efforts. When there is a serious threat from a humanitarian catastrophe, WMD and “rogue” states harboring terrorism the soft approach of EU may only result in loosing time as the problem gets more serious.

Ultimately, the differences of perspectives on the legitimacy of the military operations were another factor divided the U.S allies and opponents. When the European countries seek legitimacy on the decisions of the supranational institutions such as the UNSC, OSCE, EU and NATO, the Americans feels not obligated to pursue the path of getting permission from the international institutions. The comments of former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is meaningful to understand how Americans feel about multilateralism; “We recognize this area as vital to US national interests and we will behave, with others, multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must.”

A survey conducted by German Marshall Fund revealed that while the 47% of the Europeans justified “bypassing” U.N Security Council Resolutions 57% of the U.S citizens approved disregarding the resolutions. Before the War in Iraq, public opposition (over 90% in some countries), prevailing protests and tremendous media coverage is considered to be an important factor for the resistance of governments of France and Germany.

iii) Military and intelligence restrictions and dependence on U.S/NATO

Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout contributed to the field of foreign policy analysis by introducing the concept of “power capability” for countering the challenges of foreign policy undertakings. “Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an undertaking,"

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137 Kelley, J., “Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: why Iraq was not just Iraq”. International Politics, 2005.42 pp. 153-173
138 Middle East International (London), Oct. 21, 1994, p. 4
there can be no achievement and nothing to explain or estimate.” 139 The scholars have criticized the EU to be incompatible, clumsy and incapable to handle the Kosova Crisis. The RRF in Afghanistan was far from the expectations from a potential global actor. Thus the EU is not considered as a serious platform for the resolution of international conflicts. Even some of the rationalists argue that EU is not a security actor since the union does not have the military power and capacity to handle serious threats.

The war in Iraq revealed the fact that especially the smaller and eastern E.U. member countries were dependent on the protection of NATO and U.S in crisis terms. When the diplomatic efforts intensified in 2002 for the war in Iraq, the European Union Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten noted “Europeans get cross when we think America is throwing its weight around.”140 The New York Times reported another comment of a senior American Official “It’s pretty bad right now…The Europeans think that the United States is so powerful it can’t be constrained” 141 The realists believe that since EU does not have enough economic, military and intelligence capacities the union cannot be a serious global actor.142

The question of whether the capability can lead to common approach and commitment of the smaller states to the Common Foreign and Security Policy needs further analysis. Depending on the theory of FPA this study assumes that the “new” European states chosen to support U.S military intervention in Iraq instead of pushing forward EU as a conflict resolution platform because of the overwhelming power of the United States. Andreas Kintis argued that the incompetencies were the main reasons of the disintegration of the EU foreign policy towards the war in Iraq:

The fact remains that when these measures failed to resolve the crisis, the EU’s limited competence in security and defense matters and, more importantly, its member states’ disparate foreign policy objectives together ensured that the EU’s ambition to assert its presence as an international actor was impaired by its inability to maintain common positions… the inability to compose divergent views within its own ranks undermined its effectiveness.143

Particularly during the cold war the military and intelligence might of EU was overwhelmed by the power of the two superpowers and NATO. Starting from the Fouchet Plan establishment of an alternative European security organization was hampered by the international developments. The people questioned whether there is a need to establish an extra international security organization when there are powerful

pacts and when the US had committed to protect Europe from the communism threat. Several attempts to establish a European defense community led by the French governments failed (i.e. EDC in 1954, Fouchet Plan in 1962) but the British idea of establishing the Western European Union (WEU) succeeded in 1955 as a traditional military alliance among the Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{144} WEU involved in the military operations in the former Yugoslavian states and the gulf crisis but never became a major security actor in the international arena.

Western European Union (WEU) attempted to establish itself as the military branch of the EU particularly after the Birmingham Declaration in 1996 and the organization developed operational bodies such as Planning Cell, Situation Center, Satellite Center and Institute for Security Studies.\textsuperscript{145} The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU became an “integral part of the development of Union” which formed the basis of European Security and Defense policy.\textsuperscript{146} The appointment of Javier Salona as the head of Secretary General of the WEU provided a more integrated platform for the common foreign policy of the EU.

The European countries were unwilling to increase national military budgets and the CFSP and ESDP spendings of the EU. Germany went through an economic recession, low growth and unemployment process which hampered more investment into the defense of the country.\textsuperscript{147} Lisbeth Kirk suggests that the Stability and Growth Pack was adopted in 1997 to provide budgetary discipline to EU and the Pack prevents augmentation in the national defense budgets of the EU countries.\textsuperscript{148} The defense budgets of the European countries remain minimal in comparison with the defense Budget of the United States. The EU commissions report on European Defense-Industrial and Market Issues clarified the dimensions of the difference between the U.S and EU members defense budgets: “Apart from absolute levels of spending which are necessary a function of their objectives, Europe yield much less in terms of operational capabilities. The real military capability of EU Member States is estimated at about 10 per cent of that in the US.”\textsuperscript{149}

The article J.11 of the TEU seperated the expenditure on the “administrative” and “operational” funds to be allocated for the CFSP. While the administritive expenses would be covered by the EC, the operarationa buget was to be alloved by a unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers and monitored with the Political Committee which brought another actor for the implementation of the foreign policy initiatives. The EU budget only allocated 159 million Euros for the implementation of

\textsuperscript{145} Smith, Michael E, “The Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The institutional cooperation.” Cambridge University Press 2004 
\textsuperscript{146} ibid. p.232
\textsuperscript{147} Kirk, Lisbeth. ‘European Defence in the Future’, EU observer.com November 20, 2002).
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid
the Common Foreign and Security policy from its 128 billion total budgets in 2007, whereas the same budgetary plan proposes no significant spending on defense. Since EU does not have supranational decision the budgetary allocations for EU defense requires resolution of numerous actors within the EU.

Table 2: Top defense spendings in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Defense Budget 2005</th>
<th>Total Service Personnel</th>
<th>Cost per Serviceman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 USA</td>
<td>US$465 billion</td>
<td>1,473,000</td>
<td>US$315,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 UK</td>
<td>US$51.1 billion</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>US$255,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Japan</td>
<td>US$44.7 billion</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>US$187,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 France</td>
<td>US$41.6 billion</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>US$163,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Germany</td>
<td>US$30.2 billion</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>US$106,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 NATO members</td>
<td>US$676 Billion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 EU Members Total</td>
<td>US$ 190.7</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Source of data: http://wwwarmedforces.co.uk/mod/listings/l0012.html

As the first military operation the EU sent 350 soldiers to Macedonia and secondly EU deployed 1500 soldiers to Congo peace keeping mission in cooperation with the UN. EU members agreed to establish Rapid Reaction Force in 2003 with 60,000 soldiers, but the recent analysis indicate that the EU is far away from fulfilling the purposes and being operational. Even if the rapid reaction force will come to the fully operational capacity it will be difficult to avoid duplication of defense structures at national and supranational level. The coordination of the training, military industries, equipment, budget, transportation and recruitment will remain an overwhelming issue.

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“EU’s defense industries comprise too many firms developing too many similar weapons which are produced at too small a scale of output for each national market. Within Europe, there is duplication of costly R&D programs for combat aircraft, helicopters, missiles, tanks and warships.”  

The absence of substantial planning and analysis units and reactive perspective of the EPC delayed the formulation of unified security strategy until 2003. Moreover the resolution of the conflicts among the decision makers and coordination of efforts were hampered with the lack of proper intelligence planning mechanisms. A mature foreign policy unit requires substantial intelligence feedback from one or more well-established intelligence organizations. The information provided by the CIA has been an important component within the U.S foreign policy making process. Despite all of the European countries has their intelligence organizations, the EU does not have joint intelligence collection, coordination or analyzing mechanism. The big EU states have well-established intelligence organizations but they were reluctant to share raw and analyzed intelligence for the EU policies.

The Europeans consider terrorism and organized crime as a law enforcement issues therefore they established Europol under the third pillar of the EU policy sphere. But the Europol convention has not been ratified by all the member states and capability of the organization remains questionable among the law enforcement agencies of Europe, when there is already established bilateral/multilateral cooperation. Since the functions of Europol is restricted for law enforcement operations the EU needs supranational civilian and military intelligence agencies to support the decision making process of CFSP and ESDP. The current divergence in the EU members in threat assessment is partly lack of unified intelligence sources about the potential targets. The constitutional treaty highlighted the need for regular assessment of the threats against the European Union and there is a further need for powerful observation satellites to be used in military and intelligence operations. Charles Grant suggests establishment of a “European Intelligence Committee” to serve CFSP High Representative Salona which will bring together senior intelligence officers and coordinate the intelligence/information sharing among the member states.

Conclusions

The EU has been a civil power founded on economic and political concerns. However the global security threats lead the policy makers extend the EU policy spheres to

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Common Foreign and Security Policy to meet the challenges in a unified approach. Significant steps have been taken over the integration of CFSP since the Treaty of Maastricht. EU has established European Rapid Reaction Force and participated into peacekeeping missions in several countries, however it is observed that the EU is not ready to respond the complex international security problems. The EU is criticized to be having too many policy process and procedures but too little output and impact in foreign policy. Most of the union members are still dependent on NATO and U.S in terms of the national defense policies. The insufficiency was better observed in crisis terms especially in the war in Iraq. The intergovernmentalist structure of policy making, diverging threat assessment, military/intelligence incapabilities and dependence on U.S/NATO have been identified as some of the reasons beyond the disintegration of the CFSP.

This study intended to analyze the reasons of divergence over the war in Iraq with the theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis. The FPA is the actor oriented IR subfield which enables to analyze the interactions among the national, supranational and transnational policy actors and institutes. Moreover the FPA enables the scholars to examine the relationship between policy process and policy outcome. Under the guidance of the FPA this study tried to analyze the roles and behaviors of the European foreign policy makers and institutional interplay. While the earlier positive developments in the CFSP could be explained by the theoretical framework of institutionalism, the disintegration of the CFSP during the war in Iraq required further analysis of the behaviors of the foreign policy makers within the EU. What was the reason of unification over Afghanistan and divergence over Iraq under the rule of same national and institutional leaders?

As an external variable, the divergence of the Bush administration from multilateralism to unilateralism led to the resentment of the national leaders of Germany, France, Luxemburg, Belgium and the CFSP High representative Salona. In order to show they were not the “tool in the box” for ad hoc coalitions, the governments of France and Germany applied to “strategic non-cooperation” against the war in Iraq. Being a member of the UNSC France became the axis of opposition against the unilateral decision for military intervention in Iraq. For France and Germany the CFSP is the key policy area to exert the EU as a global power and to establish a multilateralism platform for military interventions. However the other states did not believe in the EU as a global security actor which directed them to take the side of more powerful global actor.

The internal variables were the intergovernmental policy making process, different threat perceptions and attitudes towards use of force and the military and intelligence incapabilities. Firstly, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam significantly contributed to the development of a common foreign and security policy for the EU including the establishment of the High Representative for CFSP. However the High representative remained dependent on the support of National foreign policy makers and the Council. The lack of consistent legal personality, rotating presidency and the distribution of powers among the institutions complicated the foreign policy making process. Secondly, the Europeans did not consider the Baath regime as a primary international security threat while they agreed over the dangerousness of Al-
Qaida. For German and French foreign policy makers the Arab-Israeli conflict was the core conflict to be solved to bring peace and security to the Middle East rather than toppling the Saddam Administration. While the some of the Europeans considered terrorism as a law enforcement and intelligence phenomenon, the U.S government and European allies opted for preemptive military interventions to topple the “rogue” regimes providing shelter for terrorist organizations. This approach have been criticized by French and German leaders to increase the terrorism threat through creating hatred instead of bringing peace and security to the world. Thirdly, the lack of military and intelligence capability hampered the EU to be a serious global security actor. The aggregate defense spendings of the EU remains less than 10 percent of the U.S government. The Economic and Stability Pact restricts the EU and member states to increase the defense spendings. The earlier failures in security operations discredited the image of the EU. Since the weaker member states did not consider EU as a global security power they participated into the alliance besides the most powerful security actor which might protect them from serious threats.

After the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam most important step for CFSP was planned with the ungratified Constitutional Treaty. The Treaty offers establishment of EU Foreign Minister which might eliminate the uncoordination and divergences among the member states however the survival of the treaty seems unlikely over the short term. Even if it was ratified the Constitutional Treaty may not solve the problems of within the framework of interplay among numerous national and institutional actors and interests in the EU. If the CFSP will survive it definitely needs institutionalizations and commitment from the member states.