La Experiencia Chilena Disuadiendo Ilícitos CorporativosRevista Derecho Público Iberoamericano (2012)
AbstractThis paper analyzes the investigations on potential misconducts conducted by the Chilean public enforcer (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, “SVS”) between 1990 and 2012. The evidence reveals two groups of problems: on the one hand, the SVS has leaved a substantial region of the market unmonitored; on the other hand, the level of specific deterrence is generally low and relies greatly on indirect mechanisms of punishment. Such results suggest that future reforms should facili- tate private enforcement on both the extensive and the intensive margin. Whereas improving the performance of the SVS on the extensive margin should mitigate its monitoring bias, the improvements on the intensive margin are meant to increase the punishment experienced by offenders.
- Corporate Governance,
- Fiduciary Duties,
Publication DateOctober, 2012
Citation InformationDiego G. Pardow. "La Experiencia Chilena Disuadiendo Ilícitos Corporativos" Revista Derecho Público Iberoamericano Vol. 1 (2012)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/dpardow/3/