Viewing the "Same Case or Controversy" of Supplemental Jurisdiction Through the Lens of the "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" of Pendent Jurisdiction

Douglas D. McFarland, Hamline University School of Law
VIEWING THE “SAME CASE OR CONTROVERSY” OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION THROUGH THE LENS OF THE “COMMON NUCLEUS OF OPERATIVE FACT” OF PENDENT JURISDICTION

By [INSERT AUTHOR]*

I. INTRODUCTION

When a federal court has jurisdiction of a claim, supplemental jurisdiction allows the court to adjudicate all parts “of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”¹ How should that phrase be defined and delimited? How broad is a Constitutional case or controversy? When it created supplemental jurisdiction in 1990, Congress provided no formal guidance by way of a definition of terms section in the statute.² Even had Congress done so, courts would have to struggle with the scope of “same case or controversy” in § 1367(a) because the expansiveness of supplemental jurisdiction is in tension with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.

This article plumbs the meaning and scope of “same case or controversy under Article III” in § 1367(a) by examining its lineal ancestor pendent jurisdiction. It examines the major

¹28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2010) reads as follows:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

cases defining pendent jurisdiction. It examines the language of § 1367(a), and the intent of Congress, in creating supplemental jurisdiction. It examines judicial interpretations of pendent jurisdiction. It employs this historical context to identify the attitude a court should have toward an assertion of supplemental jurisdiction. Finally, it proposes a sound approach for a court to follow in deciding the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in an individual case.

II. CREATION OF PENDENT JURISDICTION

When Congress passed § 1367 to create supplemental jurisdiction in 1990, it formed an amalgam of the two common law doctrines of pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction allowed a federal court to adjudicate a state law theory when it arose from a “common nucleus of operative fact” with a federal question theory. Ancillary jurisdiction allowed a federal court to adjudicate a state law claim when it was part of the same “transaction or occurrence” as a federal claim.

---

3 See infra Part II.

4 See infra Part III.

5 See infra Part IV.

6 See infra Part V.A.

7 See infra Part V.B.

8 See infra Part III. For the history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, see generally 16 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 106.04; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS 3d § 3523.

9 The test was created in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Typically, a plaintiff added one or more state law theories of recovery to a federal theory of recovery arising from the same set of facts. See infra Part II.A.2.

10 The language of the test traced back to Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (“transaction”) and the adoption of “transaction or occurrence” as the test for several of the joinder provisions of the FED. R. CIV. P. as promulgated in 1938. Typically, a defendant asserted
For guidance in determining the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in cases today, we naturally look to the history of these two constituent doctrines. While the contribution of the “transaction or occurrence” of ancillary jurisdiction should not be ignored, this article examines the much more direct lineage of the “common nucleus of operative fact” of pendent jurisdiction to the “same case or controversy under Article III” of supplemental jurisdiction.

A. The Major Cases in Pendent Jurisdiction

The lineage of pendent jurisdiction traces back two centuries to two foundational cases that established the power of the federal courts to hear and determine all parts, federal and state, of a “case.” \(^{11}\) The Supreme Court first recognized that Congress had the authority to extend federal jurisdiction over non-federal parts of a case in \textit{Osborn v. Bank of the U.S.}\(^{12}\) A century later, in \textit{Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.},\(^{13}\) the Court asserted its own authority “to decide all the questions” when a federal question gave the federal court jurisdiction over a case.\(^{14}\) While


\(^{12}\)22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). In this foundational case, the Court recognized that “there is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” in entirety. \textit{Id.} at 823. Accordingly, the Court concluded, Congress could extend federal jurisdiction over all parts, both federal and state, of a “case” when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it. \textit{Id.}

\(^{13}\)213 U.S. 175 (1909).

\(^{14}\) The Federal questions as to the invalidity of the state statute because, as alleged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the circuit court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all the questions in

---

\(^{11}\) \textit{See} Moore et al., \textit{ supra} note 8, § 106.04; \textit{Wright et al., supra} note 8, § 3523.
these two cases established the authority of the federal courts, they did not offer much guidance as to the contours or limits of what the lower courts came to call “pendent jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{15}

The Supreme Court later attempted to offer that guidance in the two primary cases interpreting pendent jurisdiction. The first unsuccessful attempt was \textit{Hurn v. Oursler} in 1933.\textsuperscript{16} Thirty-three years later, the Court recognized the failure of its first attempt, repudiated \textit{Hurn}, and successfully replaced it with \textit{United Mine Workers v. Gibbs}.\textsuperscript{17} Both the failure of \textit{Hurn} and the success of \textit{Gibbs} provide substantial guidance as to the proper interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction today, so each case will be discussed in some detail

1. \textit{Hurn v. Oursler}

Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendants from producing a play titled “The Spider” because they claimed it infringed their copyrighted play “The Evil Hour;” plaintiffs alleged 1) federal law copyright violation and 2) state law unfair competition.\textsuperscript{18} The trial court decided on the merits that the defendants’ play did not infringe the federal copyright and then dismissed the state law tort for want of federal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{19} The Supreme Court affirmed because the trial court’s

\begin{quote}
the case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} at 191.

\textsuperscript{15}See \textsc{Wright et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, § 3523. Not surprisingly, the lower courts struggled with the definition of pendent jurisdiction. So, too, did the Supreme Court; it returned to the subject several times in the years following \textit{Siler}. These efforts were summarized in \textit{Hurn v. Oursler}, 289 U.S. 238, 241-44 (1933).


\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Hurn v. Oursler}, 289 U.S. 238, 239 (1933).

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Id.} at 239-40. The court of appeals affirmed. \textit{Id.} at 240.
finding of no infringement contained “every essential element necessary to justify the conclusion that there was likewise no unfair competition,” and thus the state law tort should also have been dismissed on the merits. Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court discoursed at length on why the federal court had pendent jurisdiction over the state law tort and should not have dismissed it for want of jurisdiction.

_Hurn_ was decided near the end of the golden era of code pleading. The language of _Hurn_ was the language of code pleading. The centerpiece of code pleading was the “cause of action,” a term of art that entered civil practice as a modernizing reform and devolved over the years into a source of confusion and debate. Using this term of art from code pleading, the Court in _Hurn_ stated the test for pendent jurisdiction as follows:

The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the nonfederal cause of action.

Consequently, when the state law tort was part of the same cause of action, federal jurisdiction encompassed it; when the state law tort was a separate cause of action, it was outside federal jurisdiction.

---

20Id. at 247-48.

21_Hurn_ was decided in 1933. The golden era of code pleading can be said to begin with enactment of the Field Code in New York in 1848 and end as early as 1934 with Congressional authorization to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure. Rules Enabling Act, Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2010)).


23289 U.S. at 246.
The Court’s discourse on pendent jurisdiction was flawed because it looked backward instead of forward. In those years of code pleading, one school of thought equated the cause of action to the right of action, which tied it back to common law pleading. The other school of thought equated the cause of action to a grouping of facts, which tied it to what in the future would become rules pleading. The Court aligned itself with the former school of thought when it concluded “The bill alleges the violation of a single right; namely, the right to protection of the copyrighted play. And it is this violation which constitutes the cause of action.”

24This school of thought was shown in the following quotation from a leading treatise of the day: Every judicial action must therefore involve the following elements: a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant, which consisted in a breach of such primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself. Every action, however complicated or however simple, must contain these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute the cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as used in the codes of the several states.

JOHN N. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 347 (4th ed. 1904) (emphasis added). See also O. W. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 638 (1925) (“It is that group of operative facts which, standing alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties whose right was invaded.”).

25The thought was that a cause of action was “such a group of facts . . . limited as a lay onlooker would to a single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the resulting legal right or rights.” CLARK, supra note 22, at 143. In other words, the cause of action was bounded by a grouping of facts, not by a legal theory:

The cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons. The size of such aggregate should be worked out in each case pragmatically with an idea of securing convenient and efficient dispatch of trial business.


26289 U.S. at 246. The Court reinforced this choice later in the same paragraph by quoting the following language: “A cause of action does not consist of facts . . . but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result . . . is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong.” Id., quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927). After deciding Baltimore S.S., the Court later backed away from this definition and in United
backward-looking choice was made even clearer later in the opinion. The plaintiffs had sued for both infringement of copyright and unfair competition based on the copyrighted play; during the pendency of the action, plaintiffs “amended their bill so as to make its allegations apply to the uncopyrighted version of their play . . .” The Court in dictum noted “that claim . . . was wholly independent of the claim of copyright infringement,” and therefore the bill alleged “two distinct rights, namely the right to the protection of the copyrighted play, and the right to the protection of the uncopyrighted play. From these averments two separate and distinct causes of action resulted . . .” In other words, even though the entire action arose from one and only one play, it included separate causes of action. This dictum could not have made clearer that the Hurn Court was choosing the right of action school and not the grouping of facts school.

The choice of the Court in Hurn to adopt the primary right school of thought on cause of action was questionable, and it became unworkable only five years later when the Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The primary drafter of the Federal Rules was Charles E. Clark. Of course, he was also the primary proponent of the grouping of facts school.

27 289 U.S. at 248.

28 Id.

29 Professor Charles E. Clark of Yale University was appointed reporter of the 14-member committee that drafted the rules. Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774-75 (1935). Various writers have called Clark the primary drafter of the Fed. R. Civ. P. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions
definition of cause of action. Clark seized the opportunity to write his philosophy of civil procedure, including the grouping of facts theory of a cause of action, into the Federal Rules: he did so in parts by substituting “claim” for “cause of action” and by providing generous joinder rules through the “transaction or occurrence.” What this meant was that lower federal courts deciding questions of pendent jurisdiction were forced to attempt to synthesize two antithetical guidelines: the grouping of facts approach of the Federal Rules and the primary right approach of Hurn. One commentator said the lower courts “struggled,” and another said the result was “havoc.” Predictably, the lower courts followed the narrow approach of the controlling precedent Hurn. Even the Second Circuit followed Hurn over the objections of Judge Charles

---

30 See supra note 25.

31 Clark himself later stated clearly the intent he drafted into the rules for a claim: “These rules make the extent of the claim involved depend not upon legal rights, but upon the facts, that is, upon a lay view of the past events which have given rise to the litigation.” CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 658-59 (2d ed. 1940). Similarly, 20 years after broadening the code “transaction” into the rules “transaction or occurrence,” Clark argued for a similarly broad interpretation in the remaining code states of transaction: “Conceivably, ‘transaction’ might include all those facts which a layman would naturally associate with, or consider as being a part of the affair, altercation, or course of dealings between the parties.” CLARK, supra note 22, § 102, at 654-55.

32 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3523, at 160.

33 Matasar, supra note 11, at 1451. The Court itself said the Hurn test was “the source of considerable confusion.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

34 See, e.g., Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 365 F.2d 448, 456 (8th Cir. 1966); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530, 539 (4th Cir. 1964); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 319 F.2d 65, 67-68 (5th Cir. 1963); Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild, 317
E. Clark, who after serving as reporter of the rules drafting committee had been appointed a court of appeals judge.\textsuperscript{35}

For our purpose of interpreting the proper meaning of “case or controversy under Article III” in § 1367, \textit{Hurn} is important as a demonstration of what not to do. The approach of \textit{Hurn} and its progeny—looking backwards to primary rights and legal theories and requiring identical facts—was thoroughly rejected in \textit{United Mine Workers v. Gibbs}.\textsuperscript{36} Therefore, the approach of \textit{Hurn} should be just as thoroughly rejected today.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35}In \textit{Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc.}, 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1940), plaintiff sued for infringement of a patent for a bag and for unfair competition with “bags not embodying the patented design.” \textit{Id.} at 17. The majority of the panel dismissed the state law claim on the authority of \textit{Hurn} as raising a separate and distinct cause of action with no independent federal jurisdiction. Judge Clark attempted unsuccessfully to interpose his own interpretation of cause of action when he argued “that the test of a single cause of action indicated by \textit{[Hurn]} is a practical one based on the extent of identity of the operative facts.” \textit{Id.} at 19 (Clark, J., dissenting). Two years later, in \textit{Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co.}, 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942), plaintiff alleged patent infringement and added state law unfair competition for infringement of a common law trademark in defendant’s use of certain terms of art in its advertising. The majority could see “no substantial identity between the proof” showing infringement of the patents and infringement of the common law trademark because the two were separate causes of action. \textit{Id.} at 10. Again, Judge Clark attempted unsuccessfully to induce his colleagues to adopt a practical view of \textit{Hurn}. Pointing out “the core of the plaintiff’s grievance is the same,” Clark argued that core should determine jurisdiction because “[a] converse view, requiring identity of facts, practically excludes the possibility of a single cause, since state and federal rights are hardly ever—if ever—complete equivalents, and differing rights depend on differing facts.” \textit{Id.} at 11-12 (Clark, J., dissenting).


\textsuperscript{37}\textit{See infra} Parts V.A-B.
2. **UMW v. Gibbs**

Following three decades of struggle with *Hurn*, the Supreme Court recognized its failure and in 1966 repudiated the *Hurn* test in *United Mine Workers v. Gibbs*. While the *Gibbs* decision has been widely celebrated and accepted, for many reasons it perhaps deserves even more attention than it has received. The Court was unanimous in its discussion of pendent jurisdiction. *Gibbs* clearly abandoned the common law and code pleading systems in favor of the fact-based transactional approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the proper litigation unit. The language of *Gibbs* resulted directly in Congressional creation of supplemental jurisdiction, and the legislative history of § 1367 indicated the statute was largely an attempt to codify *Gibbs*. Courts and commentators generally have agreed that *Gibbs* established the limit of federal jurisdiction under Article III; because of this, courts have used the *Gibbs* standard for pendent jurisdiction in their attempts to bound the limits of the “case or

---


controversy under Article III” test of § 1367(a) for supplemental jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{41} Accordingly, we profit by close reading and understanding of \textit{Gibbs}.

The backdrop of \textit{United Mine Workers v. Gibbs} was a dispute between the UMW and another union over the representation of workers in southern Appalachian coal fields in Tennessee.\textsuperscript{42} Plaintiff Paul Gibbs secured a job as a mine superintendent and also obtained a contract to haul the mine’s coal to a railroad loading point. Because of union activities relating to the representation dispute, the mine did not operate, and Gibbs lost both his job and the haulage contract. He also lost other trucking contracts and mine leases.\textsuperscript{43} Gibbs sued defendant international union in federal court of Tennessee in two counts: count one was for violation of federal labor law; count two was for tortious interference with his contracts of employment and haulage, which was brought to federal court on pendent jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{44} Plaintiff obtained a verdict on both counts. The trial court then decided the federal labor law theory did not state a claim, but retained jurisdiction over the pendent state law tort and entered judgment for plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.\textsuperscript{45}

The Opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice William J. Brennan, first discussed pendent jurisdiction at length. It concluded the district court properly asserted pendent jurisdiction over the state law tort and opined on situations in which the district court could have

\textsuperscript{41}See, e.g., \textsc{Wright et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, §§ 3523, 3567.1. \textit{See infra} Parts III-IV.

\textsuperscript{42}383 U.S. 715, 718 (1966).

\textsuperscript{43}Id. at 719-20.

\textsuperscript{44}Id. at 720.

\textsuperscript{45}Id. at 720-21.
exercised its discretion to decline pendent jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{46} While this specific and general discussion of pendent jurisdiction was technically an extended dictum since the Court later reversed and held the state law tort should have fallen on the merits with the federal labor law theory, the Court’s discussion of the power of the district court to assert pendent jurisdiction has remained the core of \textit{Gibbs} and the accepted guide to pendent jurisdiction.

The 33-year-old precedent of \textit{Hurn} was the necessary starting place of the discussion of pendent jurisdiction. \textit{Gibbs} lightly parsed the precedent for more than two pages. It recognized that for pendent jurisdiction \textit{Hurn} required “two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action” as opposed to “two separate and distinct causes of action,”\textsuperscript{47} and that the \textit{Hurn} Court had chosen the “single wrongful invasion of a single primary right” theory rather than the grouping of facts theory to define cause of action.\textsuperscript{48}

The \textit{Gibbs} opinion next suggested clearly that \textit{Hurn} had become a non-viable relic following promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. \textit{Gibbs} recognized the rules not only abated controversy over “cause of action” (by omitting the phrase entirely) but also “strongly encouraged” joinder of claims, parties, and remedies.\textsuperscript{49} Blocking this new system of

\textsuperscript{46}Id. at 721-29.

\textsuperscript{47}Id. at 722, 723. The Court was quoting from \textit{Hurn}, 289 U.S. at 246.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Gibbs}, 383 U.S. at 723. \textit{See supra} notes 24-28 and accompanying text. One reason the Court recognized that \textit{Hurn} chose the primary rights theory was because the \textit{Hurn} opinion quoted at length from Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). \textit{See supra} note 26. Interestingly, \textit{Gibbs} quoted at even greater length from \textit{Baltimore S.S.} than had \textit{Hurn}, apparently to highlight even more clearly \textit{Hurn}’s choice of the primary rights theory.

\textsuperscript{49}383 U.S. at 724.
fact pleading and broad joinder stood *Hurn* and its progeny. The “limited approach” of *Hurn*, said the Court, was “unnecessarily grudging.”

Having rejected *Hurn*, the Court announced its new test for pendent jurisdiction:

Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim ‘arising under (the) Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority * * *,’ U.S.Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’ The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.

This single, dense paragraph provided the entire guidance from the Court of the scope of pendent jurisdiction.

What guidance did it provide? The Court said the federal claim must be substantial, but that non-controversial threshold requirement was established in other cases. The Court said that the Constitution allowed jurisdiction over an entire “case,” but that also was a threshold requirement established in other cases. The guidance that was new in *Gibbs* consisted of two parallel tests for the extent of a Constitutional “case.” First, the Court said a case must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” Second, the Court said a case could be identified

---

50*Id.* at 725.

51*Id.* [footnotes and citation omitted]. After this statement of the scope of federal jurisdictional power, the opinion then proceeded to recognize the discretion of the district court to decline pendent jurisdiction and even offered several examples of when it likely should be declined. *Id.* at 726-29. These discretionary guides are not of relevance to this article.

52See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.

53*Gibbs*, 383 U.S. at 725.
when a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try [it] all in one judicial proceeding.” The Court complicated the task by connecting the two tests with “but if,” suggesting to some that the second test was either an exception to the first or an inconsistent requirement. Our task then in the next two subsections is to determine both what these two guides mean and whether they are in any way inconsistent.

a. Common Nucleus of Operative Fact

The outer limits of a Constitutional “case” were said to be bounded by a “common nucleus of operative fact.” This test was apparently a creation of Gibbs, as it did not appear in any earlier decision. It did not appear in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Gibbs opinion did provide some helpful assistance as to the proper interpretation of the new “common nucleus of operative fact” test. First, the new test clearly was intended to reject and broaden the “grudging” approach of Hurn, which required factual identity for pendent

\[54\] Id.

\[55\] Id. at 725. That this test was intended to bound the outer limits of a Constitutional “case” was suggested strongly in the central paragraph of Gibbs itself:

Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim ‘arising under (the) Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority * * *,’ U.S.Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’ . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact . . . [T]here is power in federal courts to hear the whole.

Id. Many lower courts and commentators recognized that Gibbs established the constitutional test for pendent jurisdiction. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 1414-15 notes 57-58 (collecting authorities). The Court later confirmed its intent in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 when it said that Gibbs “delineated the constitutional limits” of both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.” After Kroger, additional lower courts and commentators repeated the same conclusion. See Matasar, supra note 11, at 1414-15 notes 57-58 (collecting authorities). See also Moore et al., supra note 8, § 106.21 (asserting that Gibbs “was no doubt drawing on Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.”); C. Douglas Floyd, Three Faces of Supplemental Jurisdiction After the Demise of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 60 FLA L. REV. 277, 307 (2008). But see Wright et al., supra note 8, § 3567.1, at 337-38 n. 10 (collecting authorities asserting Article III broader than Gibbs test).
jurisdiction. Second, the new test was intended to be tongue in groove with the strong encouragement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure toward joinder of claims, parties, and remedies based on factual relatedness. Third, and most importantly, the Court turned away from the legal rights-based past of common law and code pleading toward the fact-based future of rules pleading.

We know from the words of the “common nucleus of operative fact” test itself that it is fact-based. It requires fact relatedness as the outer boundary of a Constitutional case. At the same time, the proper focus should be on the “common nucleus” of facts of the case, not on the “operative fact[s]” of the case. This is so because focus on “operative” facts orients the view of


57 “With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. “[T]he underlying theme of the Gibbs opinion was to offer parallel jurisdictional support, within constitutional limits, to complement the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 873.

58 After Hurn and before Gibbs, Judge Charles E. Clark, primary drafter of the rules and proponent of a fact-based scope of a civil action, unsuccessfully argued to his colleagues on the Second Circuit in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1940) for a generous, practical interpretation of a cause of action “based on the extent of identity of the operative facts.” Id. at 17 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Two years later, in Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942), Clark argued the court should look to “the core of the plaintiff’s grievance” even though “differing rights depend on differing facts.” Id. at 11-12 (Clark, J., dissenting). See supra note 35. While Clark never called his grouping of facts theory a “common nucleus” of facts, he did write of a grouping of “operative facts.” His procedural philosophy, and these words, traced directly to Gibbs’ creation of the “common nucleus of operative fact” test. One commentator stated that Clark’s views “clearly influenced the Supreme Court” and that Gibbs “embrace[d] Clark’s ‘operative facts’ formulation.” Matasar, supra note 11, at 1452-53.
a court to the discredited primary-right past of *Hurn* and code pleading instead of the intended fact-based future of rules pleading of *Gibbs*.

Recognition of the background and origin of “common nucleus of operative fact” provides solid guidance toward proper interpretation of the § 1367(a) test. So too does understanding the intent of the *Gibbs* Court. Yet the Court has more to say about pendent jurisdiction than this five-word guide.

b. “But if”

Recall that the entire crux of *Gibbs* is placed into a single paragraph of four sentences. The first sentence notes that the federal and state law theories must comprise one “case,” and the second sentence notes that the federal theory must be “substantial.” Laying those sentences aside as foundational, we find the touchstone of pendent jurisdiction, the requirement of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” in the third sentence. Ambiguity is created because the paragraph does not end there. It continues with a fourth sentence: “But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.” The question is whether this fourth sentence in the same paragraph adds, subtracts, or clarifies the third sentence. The troublesome part of sentence four is its introductory “but if.” Despite that unfortunate choice of words, I believe the final sentence is entirely consistent with, and adds clarity to, the third sentence, as this section will demonstrate.

---

59 *See infra* Part V.

60 383 U.S. at 725. *See supra* note 51 and accompanying text.

61 *Gibbs*, 383 U.S. at 725.
Six possibilities come to mind for interpretation of the third and fourth sentences of the paragraph. Four possibilities seem clearly inadequate; they will be considered and dismissed first. That leaves two possible, plausible interpretations of the fit of the two sentences connected by “but if.”

One possibility is that the final sentence in the paragraph adds an additional requirement for pendent jurisdiction. Some commentators and courts suggest that the two sentences create separate, cumulative tests for pendent jurisdiction. This position has never been developed beyond bare statement, which is recognized even by commentators who have proposed it. It finds no support in Gibbs beyond the two words “but if.” It is not a satisfactory explanation of the Court’s words or intent.

A second possibility also adds to the “common nucleus of operative fact” language. The “ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding” language can be read as the Court’s attempt to tie the “common nucleus of operative fact” to the scope of claim preclusion in the case. This position finds no support in the language of Gibbs. The opinion at no point

---

62 See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 8, § 3567.1, at 341; McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 871; Matasar, supra note 11, at 1454-63. Expressions of this position, early and late, can be found in Aschinger v. Columbus Showcase Co., 934 F.2d 14-2, 1412 (6th Cir. 1991) (identifying three prerequisites for supplemental jurisdiction) and in an interlocutory appeal opinion, Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 150 Fed. Appx. 12, 14-15 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting federal and state theories must, in addition to arising from “common nucleus of operative fact,” also “be such that ‘he would ordinarily be expected to try them all’ together), but this dual requirement is not found in the final disposition of the case on appeal, Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 334-36 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing only common nucleus of operative fact).

63 See Wright et al., supra note 8, § 3567.1, at 341; Matasar, supra note 11, at 1455 n. 262.

64 See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.

65 See Wright et al., supra note 8, § 3567.1, at 341 n. 16 (“In context, the sentence seems clearly to be referring to claim preclusion, or res judicata. A claim will invoke pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs if it is so closely related to the jurisdiction-invoking claim that principles of claim preclusion or res judicata would require the plaintiff to join them in one
discusses, or even mentions, res judicata. It is not a satisfactory explanation of the Court’s words or intent.\footnote{66}{See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.}

A third possibility is that the fourth sentence of the paragraph subtracts from the third sentence test of “common nucleus of operative fact.” The “ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding” sentence can be read independently as spreading pendent jurisdiction over any state law claim that can properly be joined under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\footnote{67}{See Joan Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 759, 765 (1972) ("concept of ‘case’ embodied in the Rules . . . is far broader and more flexible than is the phrase ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’"); Matasar, supra note 11, at 1458 n. 278.} This possibility finds no support in the language of Gibbs,\footnote{68}{Indeed, after raising the possibility, one commentator recognizes “this ‘refinement’ of Gibbs’ test makes Gibbs’ language virtually unrecognizable.” Matasar, supra note 11, at 1458.} and appears to attempt to use the Federal Rules to expand federal jurisdiction despite the fact that the rules cannot have any substantive effect. It is not a satisfactory explanation of the Court’s words or intent.\footnote{69}{See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.}

Another possibility subtracts in that it posits courts should ignore the fourth sentence as mere surplusage.\footnote{70}{Some have argued directly to ignore the fourth sentence. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 247, 251-52, 274 n. 131. Cf. Schenker, supra note 26, at 268. Others have pointed to the same result by failing to regard the sentence. The Federal Courts Study Committee proposed that the new supplemental jurisdiction be based solely on the “transaction or occurrence.” See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 47 (April 2, 1990). See supra note 8.} This position is undoubtedly inadequate. We cannot conveniently ignore the
Court’s language in the fourth sentence of the paragraph; the language must mean something.\textsuperscript{71}

Indeed, the sentence is quite helpful to our understanding, and so this possibility is not a satisfactory explanation of the Court’s words or intent.\textsuperscript{72}

This brings us to the fifth possibility, which is the first one of plausible substance. This possibility is that the fourth sentence is meant to be read together with the third sentence. The connection should have been the conjunction “and.” The use of “but if” is a simple mistake in the cutting and pasting of the opinion editing process. This suggests that both sentences are intended to be read together. “According to this view, any redundancy made by equating ‘ordinarily be expected to try’ with ‘common nucleus’ was intentional, and the ‘but if’ was merely an unfortunate grammatical slip.”\textsuperscript{73} A leading commentary on federal practice states “[t]he words ‘[b]ut if’ are curious. That sentence would make far more sense if it started with ‘and if.’ Indeed, the courts forged an early consensus in reading it as conjunctive.”\textsuperscript{74}

Some writers effectively substitute “and” for “but if” by conveniently quoting around the problem. The American Law Institute does this only two years after Gibbs.\textsuperscript{75} Several other courts and commentators follow that lead.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{71}See Matasar, \textit{supra} note 11, at 1460 n. 286.

\textsuperscript{72}See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{73}Matasar, \textit{supra} note 11, at 1462. While raising this possible interpretation, Matasar does not subscribe to it because “turning ‘but if’ into ‘and’ requires verbal acrobatics of the highest order.” \textit{Id.} at 1460. Verbal acrobatics may be required if one assumes these two sentences were the only sentences in an earlier draft, but if one assumes other language may have been deleted, the possibility seems more likely than fanciful.

\textsuperscript{74}Wright ET AL., \textit{supra} note 8, § 3523, at 164 n. 36 (collecting cases). The same statement, in slightly edited language, is made in Wright ET AL., \textit{supra} note 8, § 3567.1, at 341 n. 17 (collecting cases).

\textsuperscript{75}The ALI proposed a new jurisdiction statute:
The possibility that the words “but if” were an editing mistake is quite plausible. Substitution of the word “and” aligns the two sentences perfectly as parts of a whole. The problem is that this re-writes the opinion. That is not what the Court said. Even though this interpretation states the Court’s intent, it is not a satisfactory explanation of the Court’s words in *Gibbs*.\(^77\)

The sixth possible interpretation of the connection between the two sentences is similar to the fifth. The two sentences are parallel, consistent, and mutually supportive statements. The *Gibbs* test for pendent jurisdiction is unitary. When a litigation unit is composed of a “common nucleus of operative fact” then a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”\(^78\) Such an interpretation accomplishes the purpose of *Gibbs*, which is to

---

The approach taken in this subsection is consistent with the holding in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs . . . that pendent jurisdiction can exist under Article III if the state and federal claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact’ and are such that a plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . ..’ ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Commentary 210 (1969).

\(76\) The Supreme Court itself does this in City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997) (“[T]his Court has long adhered to principles of pendent . . . jurisdiction . . . over state law claims that ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,’ such that ‘the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional “case.”’ *See also* ABF Freight System, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011) (common nucleus if expected to try together); Cicio v. Does 1-8, 321 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (beginning the sentence with “[i]f”); Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000) (connecting the two sentences with “such that”); WRIGHT ET AL., *supra* note 8, § 3523 (“common nucleus of operative fact so that a plaintiff ordinarily would be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding”); Mengler, *supra* note 70, at 253 (replacing “but if” with “so that” and citing to *Gibbs*); Michelle S. Simon, *Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims*, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 295, 299 (2005) (connecting separate quotations of the two sentences with “such that”).

\(77\) *See infra* notes 78-86 and accompanying text.

\(78\) 383 U.S. at 725.
abandon the backward-looking, code-based interpretation of *Hurn* in favor of the forward-looking, rules-based philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The difference from the fifth interpretation is that this interpretation does not treat the words “but if” as a mistake.

As stated previously, the Court in *Gibbs* accepts both the strong encouragement of joiner of claims, parties, and remedies embodied in the Federal Rules and the procedural philosophy of the primary drafter of the Federal Rules, Charles E. Clark. The key to Clark’s philosophy of procedure is that pleading and joinder are packaged by facts, not law. Just as importantly, he groups facts based on a lay concept of what would be expected to be tried together. The “common nucleus of operative fact” traces directly to Clark. So too does the “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” The two sentences are complementary. Instead of replacing “but if” with “and,” or creatively editing around the words, the proper interpretation of “but if” should be akin to “in other words.” That ties the entire test together as part of the transactional view of Clark, the Federal Rules, and *Gibbs*.

---

79 See supra Part II.A.2.

80 383 U.S. at 724.

81 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

82 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, § 102, at 654 (“group of operative facts which give ground for judicial action”); Clark, supra note 25, at 837 (“cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts”).

83 Clark, supra note 22, § 38, at 130 (“group of facts . . . limited as a lay onlooker would to a single occurrence or affair”) Clark, supra note 31, at 659 (“extent of the claim involved depend[s] upon the facts, that is upon a lay view of the past events”).

84 See Floyd, supra note 55, at 303 (“As a matter of ordinary usage, Justice Brennan’s subsequent ‘ordinarily be expected to try’ description . . . was intended merely as a restatement of his earlier definition of the Article III case in terms of a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’”). E.g., Montefiori Med. Center v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 332 (2d Cir. 2011).

85 See Schenkier, supra note 26, at 267.
The apparent barrier to this interpretation is the words “but if,” which appear to place the two sentences into opposition. This barrier is illusory. The two sentences can be read together as complementary. A strong analogy for this reading can be found in an unexpected source. As part of the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus says the following to those gathered:

You have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if any one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; and if any one forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles.\(^{86}\)

The message contains an admonition not to resist one who is evil followed by examples. The examples are connected to the admonition with the words “but if.” Clearly the examples are intended to be consistent with the admonition. They are intended to illustrate the admonition. “But if” is the connection between the teaching and the illustrations. Gibbs can be read in the same fashion. The “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding” is an illustration or exposition on how to recognize a “common nucleus of operative fact.”

This interpretation is superior to the other possibilities as it gives full meaning to all the sentences of the paragraph. The fourth sentence cannot be read alone as the measure of a Constitutional case because the policies of efficiency and economy are well and good, but not the measure of the Constitutional grant. The “common nucleus of operative fact” announces the outer limits of the Constitutional case, and the “would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding” provides an illustration to assist understanding of the wide scope of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” and hence of a “case.” The “but if” does not create ambiguity; it provides clarity.

\(^{86}\)Matthew 5: 38-41 (Revised Standard Version) (emphasis added).
III. CONGRESS CREATES SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Following a century of court-made law on pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, of which *Gibbs* was the centerpiece, Congress decided to act.\(^8^7\) It authorized a Federal Courts Study Committee, the committee recommended action, and Congress in 1990 created supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367.\(^8^8\) Instead of measuring the reach of federal courts to draw in additional state law matters by a “common nucleus of operative fact” or as part of the “same transaction or occurrence,” henceforth the reach would be tested by the “same case or controversy under Article III.”\(^8^9\)

The relevance of the legislative history of the statute for present purposes is that it shows clearly that interpretation of “same case or controversy under Article III” is to be guided by the same considerations that enlightened both “common nucleus of operative fact” and “same transaction or occurrence.” So thought the drafters of the statute.\(^9^0\)

---

\(^{8^7}\)See *Wright et al.*, *supra* note 8, § 3523. Various reasons supported Congressional action. Both pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction were court-created. As such, they stood in possible derogation of Congressional control of the allocation of jurisdiction between federal and state courts. Also, they were in tension with the primary principle of limited federal jurisdiction. The actual impetus for Congress to act may have been an opposite concern: the Supreme Court in a series of cases culminating in *Finley v. United States*, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) had refused to recognize pendent party jurisdiction. *See, e.g.*, *id.*; *McLaughlin, supra* note 53, at 885-89.

\(^{8^8}\)The history of the statute has been widely examined and will not be recounted here. *See, e.g.*, *Moore et al.*, *supra* note 8, § 106.04; *Wright et al.*, *supra* note 8, § 3523.

\(^{8^9}\)The two obsolete tests governed pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction. *See supra* notes 8-10 and accompanying text. The new test was the core of § 1367(a).

Congressional sponsors, who viewed § 1367 as a noncontroversial measure intended merely to codify the area, i.e., to codify the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{91} The Supreme Court agreed.\textsuperscript{92} Commentators also agreed the statute codified \textit{Gibbs’} common nucleus of operative fact.\textsuperscript{93} What all of this means is that the cases and materials interpreting the “common nucleus of operative fact” remain vital and highly relevant in interpretation of § 1367 today.


\textsuperscript{92}In City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1997), the Court said the following:

\begin{quote}
[T]his Court has long adhered to principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction by which the federal courts’ original jurisdiction over federal questions carries with it jurisdiction over state law claims that ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,’ such that ‘the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional “case.” . . . Congress has codified those principles in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which combines the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under a common heading. Many other courts have naturally followed. \textit{See Wright et al., supra} note 8, § 3567.1, at 337 n. 9 (collecting cases).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{93}\textit{See Moore et al., supra} note 8, § 106.20 (“Congress intended to codify the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by [\textit{Gibbs}], which suggests that the test is to be the ‘common nucleus of operative fact’”); \textit{Wright et al., supra} note 8, § 3567, at 321-22 (recognizing that intent was non-controversial reform but asserting statute was attempt to “codify the whole of supplemental jurisdiction”); Floyd, \textit{supra} note 55, at 299 n. 123 (“Far from repudiating the ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ standard . . . derived from \textit{Gibbs}, the supplemental-jurisdiction statute’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended to codify the \textit{Gibbs} standard.”).
IV.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF COMMON NUCLEUS OF OPERATIVE FACT

In the years following *Gibbs*, the lower courts were called on to interpret “common nucleus of operative fact” in the context of cases. Two primary schools of thought developed.

Some courts coalesced into what has been called a substantial evidentiary overlap approach.94 Two examples show the thinking of this group of courts. One court concluded that a federal age discrimination claim did not spread pendent jurisdiction over state law theories of breach of contract and breach of duty of fair dealing for the same actions because “[n]ot only must the facts be at the *nucleus* of both State and federal claims, the facts common to each case must be the *operative* facts.”95 A second court refused to find a federal fair credit reporting claim arose from a “common set of facts” with state law contract and tort theories involving the identical debt because the “claims do not share any of the same ‘operative facts.’”96

The error of the substantial evidentiary overlap approach seems quite clear: it is the discredited *Hurn* approach. Focus on operative facts looks backwards through *Hurn* to code pleading instead of forward through *Gibbs* to rules pleading.97 Requiring common “operative facts” or a “substantial evidentiary overlap” is inconsistent with *Gibbs* and therefore with the “same case or controversy” standard of § 1367(a).

Many more courts concluded that a common nucleus of operative fact extended over a state law theory that had a “logical relationship,” sometimes expressed as a “loose factual

---

94See Moore et al., *supra* note 8, § 106.22.


97See *supra* Part II.A.
connection,” with the federal law theory.98 “Through the years, courts concluded that a loose factual connection between the jurisdiction-invoking claim and the supplemental claim would satisfy Gibbs.”99

While this latter approach is consistent with Gibbs, both “logical relationship” and “loose factual connection” are unneeded, and perhaps therefore harmful, glosses. They add nothing to “common nucleus of operative fact,” the Gibbs test itself. The common nucleus of operative fact is based on a transactional view of the litigation unit.100 A transaction is composed of facts; a transaction is bounded by the set of facts that a lay person would expect to be tried together.101 The choice of the fact-based transaction as the litigation unit is in substantial part based on

---

98See MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, § 106.22; Matasar, supra note 11, at 1453.
99WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3523, at 165 n. 38 (collecting cases).
100See Miller v. Carson, 515 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (“transactional analysis test provided the basis for the decision in [Gibbs]”; William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive Set-Off: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 175 (1998) (“common nucleus” test of Gibbs is, of course, a transactional test”); Freer Emory, supra note 39, at 450 (“the Gibbs Court defined the constitutional ‘case’ in transactional terms”); Schenkier, supra note 26, at 279 (“little doubt that Gibbs intended to apply the ‘transactional’ test for ancillary jurisdiction used in Moore to the context of pendent jurisdiction”). See supra Part II.A.2.a.

Long before Gibbs, one commentator recognized “the framers of the Constitution did not use ‘case’ in a metaphorical sense but were speaking of the unit of litigation which the law of procedure in the normal course of events, allows to be disposed of at one trial. Thus, the Constitution deals with a case as a whole …” Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 NW. L. REV. 271, 293-94 (1953).

101This aligns Gibbs with the procedural philosophy of Charles E. Clark and thus the entire procedural philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra notes 58, 81-83. An early commentator on Gibbs recognizes “Evidentiary overlap no longer should be required to establish pendent jurisdiction. Instead, power should be acknowledged when the claims arise from the same transaction or course of dealing between the parties or, put another way, when the claims are ‘part of the basic dispute between the parties.’” Schenkier, supra note 26, at 275, quoting Student Note,UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662 (1968).
efficiency.\textsuperscript{102} When both federal and state theories arise from a common set of facts, the default position is intended to be, and should be, that they form a “common nucleus of operative fact.”\textsuperscript{103}

V. A PROPER JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARD INTERPRETATION OF “CASE OR CONTROVERSY UNDER ARTICLE III” OF § 1367(a)

A. Historical Guidance to Interpretation

What principles can we find from this history that will guide a court in interpreting “same case or controversy under Article III”? The historical context of the “common nucleus of operative fact” test for pendant jurisdiction from \textit{Gibbs} outlined in the previous parts of this article provides clear guidance to a court today faced with an interpretation of the “same case or controversy under Article III” test in § 1367(a) for supplemental jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{104} After all, the §

\textsuperscript{102}Efficiency is, of course, one of the primary goals of the procedural philosophy of Charles E. Clark. \textit{See, e.g.}, Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., dissenting). \textit{See also} MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, § 106.23; INSERT CLR 701-03; Smith, supra note 29, at 916 (“Clark implicitly urged two of the cardinal virtues of this concept of procedure: cases would be decided on their merits rather than by procedural rulings, and this would occur with an economy of time and resources.”). \textit{See infra} note 116.

\textsuperscript{103}Two courts of appeals strongly endorse this position in the language of \textit{Gibbs} and pendant jurisdiction, even though both write after the advent of § 1367(a). The Second Circuit states “the exercise of pendant jurisdiction ‘is a favored and normal course of action’” that should be “routinely upheld” when the facts “substantially overlapped” or presentation of the federal facts “necessarily brought” the state facts before the court. Lyndonville Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000), \textit{quoting} Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit states even more explicitly “‘the default assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims.’” Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 861 (6th Cir. 2002), \textit{quoting} Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit in \textit{Blakely} relies in part on the Fourth Circuit’s recognition that a common nucleus of operative fact exists when the federal and state theories “‘revolve around a central fact pattern.’” \textit{Blakely}, 276 F.3d at 861, \textit{quoting} White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993).

\textsuperscript{104}See supra Parts II.A.2.a; IV.
1367(a) test is intended to be merely a codification of the “common nucleus of operative fact” test. 105

We can say with near certainty that the “same case or controversy” test does extend supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of the Article III Constitutional grant of power to the federal courts. This is apparent from the very language of the statute, which explicitly defines the scope of supplemental jurisdiction by reference to Article III of the Constitution. 106 While this assertion could perhaps be challenged, given the history of differing interpretations of the same words “arising under” in Article III and in § 1331, no court or commentator has shown an inclination to contest that § 1367(a) extends to the limits of Article III.

More controversially and more importantly for the day-to-day work of the federal courts, we can say with assurance that the “same case or controversy under Article III” test of § 1367(a) is substantively indistinguishable from its constituent parts, i.e., both the “common nucleus of operative fact” from *Gibbs* and the “same transaction or occurrence” from various joinder devices. The accuracy of this assertion is supported in many ways. First, that is the intent of the Federal Courts Study Committee, the drafters of § 1367(a), and Congress. 107 Second, *Gibbs*

105 *See supra* notes 91-92 and accompanying text.

106 “[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2010). *See, e.g.*, Fletcher, *supra* note 100, at 171 (“With the passage of [§ 1367(a)], supplemental jurisdiction for all federal question and some diversity suits became as broad as Article III permits”); Floyd, *supra* note 55, at 300 (“Nevertheless, the text of the statute is clear: It extends the scope of supplemental jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by Article III); Rowe Emory, *supra* note 90, at 994 (“the statute extends supplemental jurisdiction to its constitutional limits”). * Cf.* Simon, *supra* note 76, at 308 (“language must be interpreted the same way it is interpreted in Article III”).

107 The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended codifying the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under the test of “same transaction or occurrence.” *See supra* note 88. The drafters thought they were proposing a straightforward codification of the doctrine. *See supra*
itself treats both the Constitutional case and the common nucleus of operative fact in synonymous terms.\textsuperscript{108} Some commentators suggest a debate exists on the question whether “case or controversy” extends beyond “common nucleus of operative fact” and “transaction or occurrence,” but that debate exists only based on a narrow misunderstanding of the prior tests.\textsuperscript{109}

Since the \textit{Gibbs} test is recognized to extend to the limits of Article III,\textsuperscript{110} another test can hardly

\footnote{Congress believed it was codifying the doctrines under the test of “same case or controversy under Article III.” \textit{See supra} note 91. The direct lineage of \textit{Gibbs} with its “common nucleus of operative fact” test to \S\ 1367 has been well-documented.}

\footnote{Jurisdiction exists when “the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’ . . . The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. [If] plaintiff’s claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then . . . there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.” \textit{Gibbs}, 383 U.S. at 725. While courts and commentators have rightfully fastened on the common nucleus of operative fact language, we should also note that Justice Brennan, the primary author of \textit{Gibbs}, later also writes “the question of Art. III power in the federal judiciary to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction concerns whether the claims asserted are such as ‘would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.’” \textit{Aldinger v. Howard}, 427 U.S. 1, 20 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).}

\footnote{One example will suffice. After asserting that a debate exists whether the test of \S\ 1367(a) is broader than the prior tests, \textit{see Wright et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, \S\ 3567.1, the authors proceed to create a sort of stepping-stone approach, asserting the transaction or occurrence test is encompassed within the broader common nucleus of operative fact test that in turn is encompassed within the broader same case or controversy test, \textit{see id.}. The foundation of this hierarchy seems to be a Seventh Circuit misunderstanding that only a “loose factual connection” is required for supplemental claims, while earlier tests required something more. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc.}, 72 F.3d 1294 (7th Cir. 1995) (making otherwise unremarkable decision that award of attorney fees is supplemental to Title VII action); \textit{Ammerman v. Sween}, 54 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 1995) (making standard holding that assault and battery theory is supplemental to Title VII theory for same acts). The misunderstanding is that all three of these tests require only a “loose factual connection” [emphasis added], and this “loose factual connection” itself is merely an unneeded gloss on the three tests themselves. \textit{See supra} notes 98-103 and accompanying text. To the extent that gloss can be used in such a fashion to distinguish among these tests, the gloss Escalates from unneeded to pernicious.}

\footnote{\textit{Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger}, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978); \textit{Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux}, 24 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“In \textit{Gibbs}, the Court delineated the constitutional limits of a federal court’s authority to hear pendent non-federal claims.”). \textit{See also Wright et al.}, \textit{supra} note 8, \S\ 3567.1, at 339-40 n. 11 (collecting cases). The drafters of \S\ 1367
be broader. Third, most courts have recognized that the three tests are in their essence synonymous.\textsuperscript{111} Fourth, most commentators agree.\textsuperscript{112} Fifth, this understanding ties supplemental jurisdiction in tightly with other areas of federal practice.\textsuperscript{113}

B. Today’s Attitude

Of course, the important concept today is not whether the test of § 1367(a) should be interpreted co-extensively with its ancestors. The important concept is that “same case or controversy under Article III” should be interpreted both as intended and as consistent with other areas of federal practice. Interpretation should be broad, not grudging. \textit{Gibbs} makes this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111}See, \textit{e.g.}, Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006): Turning to the terms of the statute, we have held that disputes are part of the ‘same case or controversy’ within § 1367 when they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’ . . . When both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction were codified in 1990 as § 1367, however, the ‘common nucleus’ test was retained by nearly all the Circuits to interpret the statute’s ‘case or controversy’ language. \textit{See, \textit{e.g.}}, 16 Moore & Pratt, \textit{Moore's Federal Practice} § 106.21[1] (3d ed. 1998) (collecting cases).
\item \textsuperscript{112}See, \textit{e.g.}, McLaughlin, \textit{supra} note 56, at 896 n. 275 (collecting authorities); Joan Steinman, \textit{Section 1367–Another Party Heard From}, 41 \textit{EMORY L.J.} 85, 90 (1992) (suggesting three tests may be interpreted as synonyms).
\item \textsuperscript{113}This is well summarized in Freer Emory, \textit{supra} note 39, at 450 (“[M]odern procedure generally bases proper joinder on transactional relatedness. Reflecting this evolution, the \textit{Gibbs} Court defined the constitutional ‘case’ in transactional terms. It upheld supplemental jurisdiction over claims that shared a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’.”). One opinion found a strong, and highly appropriate, analogy in removal jurisdiction over a separate and independent claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2010). \textit{See} Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Where, as here, there is a single wrong alleged by a plaintiff arising out of an interlocked series of transactions and giving rise to the relief that is sought, the Court should find that the claims against all of the defendants form part of the ‘same case or controversy.’ \textit{Cf.} American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S. Ct. 534, 95 L. Ed. 762 (1951).”)
\end{itemize}
admonition clear.\textsuperscript{114} Courts should look for a related set of facts, whether those facts are called a “common nucleus of operative fact,” the same “transaction or occurrence,” overlapping facts, related facts, facts giving rise to other facts, but-for facts, facts in a logical relationship, or any similar designation. Just as importantly, in deciding whether the fact pattern presented in a litigation coalesces into a “case or controversy,” courts should make that decision largely by deciding whether the “claims are such that [a court] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.”\textsuperscript{115} Supplemental jurisdiction is not only about factual relatedness but also about economy, efficiency, and fairness.\textsuperscript{116} When the facts of the litigation present a natural grouping that a lay person would expect to be tried together in one proceeding, “then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.”\textsuperscript{117} The court has identified a “case or controversy under Article III.” Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) exists.

Attempts to gloss the statute’s “same case or controversy” are fruitless and often detrimental. Courts should abandon the misleading quest for a more specific test stated in terms of law and simply focus on the facts of the litigation before them, as does one court in this

\textsuperscript{114}UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.

\textsuperscript{115}Id. at 725.

\textsuperscript{116}See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 798 F. Supp. 2d 186, 209 (D.D.C. 2011) (“courts should be guided by considerations of judicial economy as well as convenience and fairness to the parties”); Chalusian v. Simsmetal E. LLC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (retaining state law claim for bonus and vacation pay as supplemental to FLSA overtime claim as all relate to compensation and “principles of judicial economy dictate” avoidance of duplication of efforts in federal and state courts). See supra note 102.

\textsuperscript{117}Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. A strong example is Montefiori Med. Center v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2011), in which the court approves the amalgamation of five years of facts in a single “case” with the sensible recognition “that all of the claims asserted by Montefiori involve the Fund’s alleged failure to reimburse Montefiori for medical services provided to Plan beneficiaries between May 2003 and August 2008.” Id. at 332.
strong, simple, sufficient statement: “the claims against all defendants arose from the same facts.” Several related questions will usually guide decision. Do the facts all arise out of a single event or related series of events? Will the state law theory bring many of the same witnesses and other evidence before the court as will the federal law theory? Would dividing the litigation into federal and state parts, thereby requiring a separate state law trial be duplicative and inefficient? Would a lay person expect this set of facts to be tried together? Failure to ask these questions leads to narrow, grudging rejections of supplemental jurisdiction by courts that misunderstand the fact-based and economy-driven nature of the doctrine. Yes answers to

118ABF Freight System, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011). Another court states this principle in common-sense terms: “[a]s a logical matter, both the words and the important analytical question are essentially the same no matter whether one consults Gibbs, Rule 13, or section 1367(a): Are the main claims . . . sufficiently related to be considered one dispute.” Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass’n, 952 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Nebr. 1997). Despite this recognition, the court then proceeds to plod through no fewer than four glosses to reach the notable decision that a federal claim for improperly registering bulls as full-blooded is not sufficiently factually related to a state counterclaim for false statements that the bulls were improperly registered to allow supplemental jurisdiction.

119An excellent example is Diversified Carting, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 423 F. Supp. 2d 85 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court has no difficulty spreading supplemental jurisdiction over an entire case presenting three plaintiffs, 16 defendants, and a welter of federal and state theories. “The common nucleus is the search, excavation, and clean-up efforts at the World Trade Center site.” Id. at 99.

In contrast is Bradley v. N.C. Dep’t of Trans., 286 F. Supp. 2d 697 (W.D.N.C. 2003). Even though the governing Fourth Circuit in White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) instructs “[t]he claims need only revolve around a central fact pattern,” the district court proceeds to compartmentalize the “operative facts” narrowly into seemingly separate incidents even though all involve a running dispute among the parties.

A strong, albeit sub silentio, rejection of compartmentalizing facts is Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). The Supreme Court finds supplemental jurisdiction extends to class members failing to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement individually even though every class member necessarily presents facts separated in time and detail.

120See supra Part II.A.2.b.

121See, e.g., Serrano-Moran v. Grau-Gaztambide, 195 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs sued under federal civil rights law for beating by police and under state law for medical malpractice
these questions lead to assertions of supplemental jurisdiction over clearly fact-related state law claims or theories—even though motions to dismiss are pursued by attorneys who can most charitably be called overzealous advocates.\textsuperscript{122}

by hospital and doctors who treated resulting injuries, but court found no supplemental jurisdiction over single event of son’s death since “facts and witnesses as to the two sets of claims are essentially different”); Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1995) (plaintiff’s additional state law theories surrounding nonpayment of bonus not supplemental to federal law theory of nonpayment of overtime as federal facts were “very narrow, well-defined” and state facts arising out of nonpayment to same employee for same job “were quite distinct”); Taylor v. District of Columbia, 626 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting supplemental jurisdiction over federal and state claims involving one house as “completely separate: Hicks’ liability stems from an alleged failure to remedy the lead-based paint hazard, whereas the District’s liability stems from its alleged failure to compel Hicks to remedy the lead-based paint hazard”); Singh v. The George Washington Univ., 368 F. Supp. 2d 58, 72 (D.D.C. 2005) (plaintiff sued under federal disability law for dismissal from school by dean but court could perceive “almost no factual or legal overlap” with the dean’s counterclaim for defamation for bringing the suit); Roberts v. Lakeview Community Hosp., 985 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (plaintiff sued hospital under Title VII for demotion and replacement for her reaction to battery by surgeon but no supplemental jurisdiction over state law battery theory against surgeon).

\textsuperscript{122}Most of these cases involve exercise of what would undoubtedly have been pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995) (when defendant pursued his objection as far as appeal of plaintiff’s adding state law theories to her federal claim for same acts of sex discrimination, court commented defendant’s “argument is rather incredible”); White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs sued under both federal and state law theories for same acts of polluting same well); Martinez-Rosado v. Instituto Medico Del Norte, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (D.P.R. 2001) (plaintiffs sued under both federal and state law theories for same acts of defendants leading to same death); Sigon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiff sued under federal Title VII and equal pay statute plus state law theories for same acts of sex discrimination); Yeager v. Norwest Multifamily, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (plaintiff sued under federal Title VII and state law theories for same acts of sex discrimination including a battery); Ellis v. Bankhead, 828 F. Supp. 45, 46 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (when plaintiffs sued under both federal and state theories for same acts of arrest and physical abuse, court commented ‘[e]ven a brief analysis discloses that [defendant] is wrong in attacking those counts.”).

VI. CONCLUSION

Pendent jurisdiction, the primary ingredient of supplemental jurisdiction, allowed the federal court to spread its jurisdictional reach over the entire case or controversy, as the litigative unit was identified as the “common nucleus of operative fact.”\(^{123}\) This common nucleus was properly viewed as the broad grouping of facts, without regard to legal theories or categories, that a lay person would expect to be tried together.\(^ {124}\) The clearly implied instruction from the Supreme Court to lower federal courts was that in identifying the grouping of facts constituting the same case or controversy, they should not be “grudging.”\(^ {125}\)

Perhaps prior to 1990, under the regime of *Gibbs*, a federal court might rightly be chary of extending federal jurisdiction beyond Congressional authorization by the court-made doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. That should no longer be a concern. In 1990, Congress expressly authorized federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all parts of the “same case or controversy under Article III.”\(^ {126}\)

Given the history of pendent jurisdiction, what “same case or controversy” means for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction is the broad grouping of facts, without regard to legal theories or categories, that a lay person would expect to be tried together. And in limning the boundaries of that grouping of facts, the court should not be grudging. The statement that

---


\(^{124}\) *See supra* Part II.A.2. The other building block of supplemental jurisdiction, ancillary jurisdiction, was based on recognition of the litigative unit arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. This was largely synonymous with the common nucleus of operative fact. *See supra* Part V.

\(^{125}\) *Gibbs*, 383 U.S. at 725.

assertion of federal jurisdiction over all related facts should be the default position in identifying a “case or controversy under Article III” seems at first blush to be inconsistent with the nature of limited federal jurisdiction, yet it is the proper judicial attitude to assertions of supplemental jurisdiction.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ See supra note 103 and accompanying text.