A Mission of Mediation: Dalmatia’s Multi-National Regionalism, 1830s-1860s

Dominique K Reill, University of Miami

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/dominique_reill/4/
1

A Mission of Mediation: Dalmatia’s Multi-national Regionalism from the 1830s–60s

Dominique Reill

On 3 April 1848 an announcement was published in Venice and distributed throughout the northern Adriatic, specifically addressed to the ‘valorous of the Venetian and Dalmatian navies’. Signed ‘your brothers in Venice’, the leaflet begged sailors to come join the battle against Austrian troops eager to re-conquer the city. To make sure that the message hit home, Dalmatians from the eastern Adriatic were urged to flock to their former metropolis with the pitiful words that, ‘mother is calling her children to her’.¹ Within days of this announcement, Nicolò Tommaseo, one of the leading figures in the Italian Risorgimento and Minister of Education and Religion in the revolutionary Venetian government, contacted Dalmatians insisting that they stay put.² ‘Remain calm’, the Dalmatian-born Tommaseo insisted, ‘stay far away from either side [of the war] . . . and concentrate . . . on keeping the peace’.³ Though he himself went into debt, lost his eyesight, and was exiled from both Venice and Dalmatia as a result of his participation in Venice’s battle for independence, Tommaseo repeatedly discouraged Dalmatian naval officers, students, soldiers, and community leaders from getting involved, insisting that they concentrate their efforts on their homeland’s own destiny. He assured them, as one Slav to another, that their fortune lay elsewhere.

Tommaseo’s refusal to enlist the help of Dalmatians in Venice’s battle for independence aroused much anger from Italian contemporaries and later historians alike. Some even accused Tommaseo of being partially responsible for Venice’s defeat, citing the strong Italian presence in Dalmatia and countless examples from prior centuries of Dalmatians’ willingness to bear arms to protect their rulers.⁴ On the other hand, Croatian historians have taken this instance as evidence that, at heart, Tommaseo was a true (but inconsistent) Slavic nationalist, determined
to liberate the majority Slavic-speaking Dalmatian community from a centuries-long Italian hegemony.⁵

Contemporary Dalmatians, however, saw little discrepancy in their land's favourite son dedicating his life to a war for Italian national independence, while proclaiming himself a Slav and averring that Dalmatia's future was not in the Italian camp. Stipan Ivičević (1801–78), businessman, local community leader, journalist and amateur linguist, declared that it was just such a stance that proved Tommaseo 'a true patriot!'⁶ For in mid-century Dalmatia, the idea of supporting both the Italian and Slavic national movements, while consistently emphasizing the exceptional status of Dalmatia, was not just common, it was representative of a widespread political and cultural outlook.

Until recently, historians have attributed Dalmatians' insistence on identifying with both the Italian and Slavic national movements as indicative of a general cultural and political confusion. According to many historians in Italy and the former Yugoslavia, Dalmatians were caught between two sides.⁷ However, recent studies have offered a more convincing explanation, maintaining that early to mid-century Dalmatians acted upon regional loyalties as much, if not more, than national ones. Konrad Clewing has demonstrated that Dalmatians could – and regularly did – choose between identities as varied as Dalmatian, Slavo-Dalmatian, Italo-Dalmatian, Italo-Austrian, Illyrian, Slav, Serb, Italian and Croatian.⁸ Josip Vrandečić supports these findings, emphasizing that, until the second half of the nineteenth century, most educated Dalmatians identified themselves regionally as well as – if not instead of – nationally.⁹ Both authors concur that, while the importance of the national was appreciated and increasingly emphasized, Dalmatians strongly nourished a regionalist identity incorporating different national orientations.

What remains unclear, however, is how Dalmatia's regionalism could contain its seemingly contradictory, and ostensibly incompatible, Italian and Slavic national components. To evaluate how Dalmatian regionalism and competing nationalisms could mutually sustain each other, this article examines a recurrent theme in mid-nineteenth-century Dalmatian writings: that of Dalmatia's mission. For just as France by the eighteenth century had developed a guiding principle of a mission civilisatrice, in the nineteenth century Dalmatians, too, declared that their land performed a special role in Europe.¹⁰ Unsurprisingly, Dalmatia's mission was uniquely suited for a borderland – one of social, intellectual, and national mediation. A close analysis of this mission rhetoric, with the scope of understanding its development and function in the mindset
of its adherents, promises to shed more light on how regionalism and multi-nationalism were interconnected.

"The sadness of the province drives most away, and favours only the few"

Before looking at what early nineteenth-century Dalmatians saw as their destined place in the world order, it is necessary to recall that Dalmatia had been ruled by the Venetian Republic until 1797. A narrow expanse of land extending over 300 kilometres and comprising over 300 islands, Dalmatia was bordered to the south by the Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), to the east by the Dinaric mountains and the Ottoman Empire's holdings of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and to the north by Hungary's Croatian territories. Under the Venetian metropole, Dalmatia functioned as a mercantilist colony. In exchange for military support, the financing of public works, and commercial and educational links with the Republic of Saint Mark, Dalmatia supplied raw materials, taxes and a labour force.

Like Venice itself, Dalmatia was an oligarchic society, where urban centres enjoyed a large amount of municipal autonomy. In the outlying rural areas, landowners held complete authority. Absentee landlords controlled their holdings through the administration of local agents and panduri (a local militia force financed by landowners). Agicultural relations, called the colon system, followed the basic sharecropper pattern common throughout most of the northern Adriatic. Although Catholicism was the official religion of state, non-Catholic inhabitants were free to live in the cities and outlying areas, with census figures showing that 20 per cent of Dalmatia's population in the 1840s was non-Catholic.11 Also, while Italian was the official language of government and trade, inhabitants regularly communicated in the South Slavic dialects predominant in the area.12 On the whole, the rural populations tended to speak one of Dalmatia's many South Slavic dialects, while city-dwellers also spoke Italian. Italian-speaking Dalmatians were mostly limited to the coastal regions and included those involved in trade, administration, and the Church, or those lucky enough to have received a formal education.

Before Napoleon entered Venice, the Republic's administration of Dalmatia had deteriorated significantly. A ruling class more intent on collecting taxes than administering, economic vulnerability caused by the new American markets, and unwise political alliances had placed the Venetian Republic in dire political and economic straits. Dalmatia
was the first to suffer the consequences. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was one of the poorest regions of Europe, fraught with corruption, illiteracy, a dying maritime commercial culture and a stagnant agricultural system.

After the dissolution of the Republic of Saint Mark in 1797, Dalmatia found itself handed back and forth between France and Austria. Educated Dalmatians, seeing a change in regime as an opportunity to reform their ‘poor Dalmatia’, began publishing works of *storia patria* (local history) specifically addressed to their new ‘wise legislators’. Gentleman scholars such as Gian Luca Garagnin and Giovanni Kreglianović Albinoni explained how their once glorious land of plenty had degraded into an abandoned province suffering from ‘a centuries-long sleep’ with its ‘nations debased by barbarism, misery, and false politics’. Their histories begged the new rulers of Dalmatia to ‘first immerse yourselves in the laws appertaining to this vast province, distancing yourself for a moment from the enjoyments of sophisticated Europe, . . . come to observe this region of unhappy men, who have gulped down the cup of suffering in the heart of the harshest of miseries; examine their traditions, their abuses, their pragmatics, their condition’, in order to secure ‘*il nostro risorgimento*’ (our resurgence).

Again and again, Garagnin and Kreglianović Albinoni emphasized that, with the proper administration, Dalmatia could be a land of great wealth and prosperity. Proclaiming the physiocratic ideals of agricultural reform, free trade and enlightened government, these authors saw Dalmatia as a land where ‘in every direction that I set my gaze, I can observe the sources for wealth’. Dalmatia’s backwardness in education and industry was offset by its bilingualism, untapped agricultural possibilities, coastline and its inhabitants’ firmly engrained feelings of civic patriotism. Kreglianović Albinoni assured his readers that if Dalmatia was allowed to open a tax-free port, along the lines of the economically thriving port-city of Trieste, it ‘would become the marketplace for all of the manufactures and of all of the productions of Italy, Europe, and finally of the two worlds’. Garagnin concurred wholeheartedly, stressing that ‘the opportunity of its seas . . . its numerous and ample ports . . . canals for communication useful for transportation inland, its borders with the Ottoman empire, the opportunity of the most natural outlet of its products within the vast regions between the Danube and the Adriatic, and finally the facility with which one can reach Italy from any point of the coast . . . all of this . . . provides Dalmatia with favorable means of navigation and commerce’. By the end of the Napoleonic wars, local elites had come to the conclusion that Dalmatia
was a land awaiting its own 'risorgimento', as the marketplace between East and West.\textsuperscript{23}

With the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Dalmatia was officially named a Kingdom of the Habsburg Empire. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the new Habsburg rulers of Dalmatia paid little attention to local suggestions for reform.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, little was changed from the pre-existing Venetian system: Italian was kept as the official language, regardless of the fact that that over 90 per cent of the local population was Slavic-speaking and the Habsburg monarchy's administrative language was German. Though the tax system was only marginally modernized, the colon sharecropper system was not reformed, and the panduri were not replaced by a state police force until the 1850s.

The few changes made to Dalmatia's administrative and economic organization proved particularly unfortunate. The administration of Dalmatia was centered on a military-run imperial office, which wrested almost all municipal control from local hands.\textsuperscript{25} Dalmatia, unlike other areas in the Habsburg Empire, had no form of representative assembly until after the constitutional reforms of the monarchy in 1848–49 and the early 1860s. Although joined to the Austrian royal house politically, economically Dalmatia was declared a separate tariff zone. As such, merchants and consumers paid taxes on any and all goods travelling to or from Dalmatia, even from within the Habsburg Empire. In return for these impositions, the province was made exempt from military service (however, as a regular, compulsory military service had never been implemented in Dalmatia before, this was arguably not much of a change). Censorship rules (though difficult to enforce) were toughened, severely limiting the type of books that were allowed publication or open distribution in the province. Censors and police also increased their efforts to monitor the private correspondence of citizens whose political or cultural activities were considered 'suspicious'. Finally, two new territories with different cultural and political heritages – the Republic of Dubrovnik and the gulf of Kotor (Cattaro) – were annexed to Habsburg Dalmatia, thus dissipating what cohesiveness the province had previously enjoyed.

These changes further isolated already stagnant and unindustrialized Dalmatia. Economically, some went as far as to argue that, without any special trade agreements, 'for thirty years the administration of our State has studied every way to deviate ... trade from Dalmatia, and direct it to the centre of the Empire'.\textsuperscript{26} Intellectually, the new censorship laws and decreased trade made some Dalmatians feel justified in complaining that they were 'isolated even more than they would be by
the Great Wall of China,’ restricting all contact with the ‘events of the world’.27

By the 1840s, after more than two decades of Habsburg administration, Dalmatia’s position was unquestionably bleak. According to 1851 statistics, Dalmatia was the second poorest region, with the second lowest percentage of school-age children receiving an education in the Habsburg Empire.28 Devastated by earthquakes, plagues, and drought, Dalmatia consumed twice as much money in relief efforts and administrative expenses as it paid in taxes.29 Even outside of Dalmatia, people despaired of the province’s miserable state. Explaining why migrating to Dalmatia would be a foolish professional move, one young Istrian wrote that Dalmatia was a land ‘where the sadness of the province drives most away, and favours only the few’.30

Without any opportunities for influencing government reforms, languishing in economic and social squalor, Dalmatians’ publications and personal writings echoed the earlier claims of Kregličanovič Albinoni and Garagnini that Dalmatia was not a hopeless case for economic and social progress; that with proper administration Dalmatia could procure great wealth for itself and its Habsburg monarch. But unlike the earlier physiocrats, mid-century Dalmatians no longer hypothesized about future possibilities; instead, they firmly declared that Dalmatia had a ‘destiny’, ‘providential role’, and ‘mission’ of social, intellectual and economic mediation to be fulfilled.

‘A noble mission it has ... as interpreter and mediator’

Educated Dalmatians believed that each ‘people’ had a providential role to fulfil. In line with the ideas of some of their favorite authors (such as Giambattista Vico, Vincenzo Gioberti, and Alessandro Manzoni), they believed a people’s character and circumstances, in line with God’s plan, determined its mission on the world stage. As the writer, local historian and Dubrovnik bureaucrat Bartolomeo Prospero Bettera (1770–1852) explained, ‘... in the grand, universal plan of divine Providence every people is supplied with a task, a mission to complete. This task is conditioned by the character of a people, the limits imposed on it by nature and its own talents. The manner in which a people goes about completing its task determines its prosperity’.31

Within mid-nineteenth-century writings, the exact ‘character of the people’ in Dalmatia was not defined by one language group or one religion, but by its heterogeneity. As Dalmatia’s famous native son, Nicolò Tommaseo maintained, ‘no-one born in Dalmatia can call himself
a pure Italian, and a large number of those who speak Slavic have Italian ancestors or living relatives.\textsuperscript{32} Francesco Carrara (1812–54), a Catholic clergyman and Dalmatia’s most prominent archaeologist, expanded further on the mixed ethnic character of his homeland, stating that, ‘determining the origin of our people is a subject of long and serious meditation, and, despite appearances to the contrary, difficult… In the succession of the Frankish, Croatian, Bosnian, Hungarian, Genovese, Neapolitan, Venetian, French and German occupations, how many foreign origins, how many new families! Dalmatia, for its geographic position, was always coveted and contested, barrier against the storming furies from the east and north, safeguard to the progresses of Italian civilization, safe-harbour for the victims of Europe’s political upheavals’.\textsuperscript{33} In these and other writings, the presence of Dalmatia’s Slavic-speaking majority was recognized, but emphasis was continually given to the effects of centuries of foreign occupation, Mediterranean trade, Italian administration, and eastern immigration. The character of Dalmatia’s people, formative of its providential mission, was one of a Slavic-speaking majority profoundly influenced by its Italian-speaking minority. To local elites, Dalmatia was, in a sense, one patria with two leading national heritages.

‘Dalmatia is one of those countries destined by Providence to serve as a link between people of different stocks (stirpe),’ declared an anonymous Dalmatian journalist. And because of Dalmatia’s ‘geographic position… double language, double culture,’ Dalmatia had a ‘nobile missione’ (noble mission), where its two national heritages would ‘serve as interpreter and mediator’ between the Latin and Slavic worlds.\textsuperscript{34} In countless publications and personal writings, Dalmatians continually echoed these arguments, referring to themselves and their province as a ‘bridge between East and West’, the ‘chain (anello) that keeps two worlds together’, or, as a land ‘destined by God to act as mediator between one people and another’.\textsuperscript{35}

Particularly interesting is how Dalmatians’ understanding of their mediatory mission assigned each national group a special purpose in their divine destiny. With its dual language and culture, locals deemed that both Italian and Slavic performed special and complementary functions for the fulfillment of Dalmatia’s providential role as bridge between East and West, Slavic and Latin.

In the mental framework of mid-century Dalmatians, Italian language and culture provided a means for westernization and economic expansion in the East. In the words of Francesco Borelli (1810–84), a large landholder from Zadar/Zara, politician and later deputy to the Austrian
parliament in the 1850s–60s, ‘no agricultural improvements, no rays of progress can penetrate Dalmatia through its land borders ... it is necessary that the enlightened section of Dalmatia's inhabitants fly with their intelligence beyond the seas and mountains, and, like busy and assiduous bees, collect as much of other nations' science, wealth, and repeated experimentation that can prove useful and advantageous for enriching Dalmatia’. This conception of the civilizing function of Italian culture went back a long way. As Larry Wolff has observed, in the eighteenth century Dalmatian elites already identified themselves as agents for the transmission of enlightenment ideas to the uneducated Slavic-speaking peasantry. With their fluency in Italian and their close ties to the Italian peninsula's economic and intellectual networks, Dalmatian elites, 'like busy bees', believed that they could pollinate the backward fields of the Slavic world with the teachings of the western Enlightenment. Dalmatia, as a crossroads with the East, could serve as the inroad for a larger westernization process in the Slavic-speaking communities.

On a smaller scale, fluency in Italian was also seen as an important economic tool for trade and commercial expansion. Tommaseo went so far as to argue that, 'if on the (Dalmatian) coast the language of Italy was not already in use, it would be prudent to introduce it'. Many believed that only through Mediterranean trade could Dalmatia hope to pull itself out of its economic slump. In an article on the necessity of educational reforms, Stipan Ivičević wrote that, 'geography will teach and remind the Dalmatian of the natural and elect situation of his patria, between the Mediterranean and the Danube. In technical, industrial, and commercial relations, Dalmatia is not a province circumscribed and limited to a half a million inhabitants. Dalmatia is a seashore, head of a large territory – from the Mediterranean to the Danube: outpost to four million inhabitants'.

Luigi Serragli (1816–80), a Dubrovnik businessman and bureaucrat, who—with Francesco Borelli—was a leading member of the autonomist party in the 1860s–70s, expressed his view of Dalmatia's place in the world more directly. To Serragli, the Italian language and continued links to its maritime trading partners were of unqualified importance because 'Dalmatians are born for the sea'. Representative of the diffusiveness of this idea would be the 1861 National Dalmatian Committee's list of political objectives for the province. Number three on the list was the 'elevated education in the Italian language, indispensable to Dalmatia in regards to its intellectual and scientific needs, not less than its maritime interests'.

In this vein, Dalmatian intellectuals subscribed to the idea that fluency in Italian would promise not just economic prosperity for Dalmatia
itself, but that it would serve as an essential element in realizing the province’s mission to act as a channel between different worlds. Always intent on focusing on the larger issues at stake, Tommaseo applauded local initiatives for commercial societies, arguing that they worked not just toward economic gain, but that ‘the traffic of materials is destined to ease the exchange of ideas. Commerce . . . is destined with time to conquer ignorance’.  

While all these ideas about the utility of Italian culture already existed in the eighteenth century, new in nineteenth-century Dalmatia was the rising belief that Italian language and culture could promote the Slavic revival movement at home and abroad. Well-versed in the latest Romantic passion for the exotic and natural, Dalmatians hoped to utilize Italian to encourage greater understanding and sympathy for Slavs in the western world. Without a doubt, Tommaseo was the forerunner in this project. Resident in Italy, contributor to many prominent Italian journals, author of countless volumes, Tommaseo saw it as his patriotic duty to promote Slavic (and specifically Slavo-Dalmatian) culture in western Europe. Saddened by the fact that his work in Slavic was not up to par with his control of the Italian language, Tommaseo consoled himself by stating: ‘I will have done something if I succeed in my Italian writings to render the Slavic world less unknown and more respectable to some in old Europe’. One of the many examples of local Dalmatians who followed Tommaseo’s lead was the Dubrovnik writer, historian, journalist and physician, Ivan August Kaznačić (1817–83). In the introduction to his new journal, entitled L’Avvenire di Ragusa (‘The Future of Dubrovnik’), Kaznačić announced that ‘to reconcile with love the Slavic literary element with the Italian seems to me the principal mission that this paper should aspire to’, and expressed his hope that, ‘this journal will fulfil the proposed mission; that it will be a bond of love between all Dalmatians’.  

Dalmatians also viewed their province’s bilingualism as particularly conducive to standardizing and modernizing a Slavic literary culture. Paying close attention to the experience of the Italian peninsula’s disparate regions in forming one standardized Italian literary and spoken language from its many dialects, many Dalmatian elites believed Italy’s Risorgimento could serve as a model for the Slavic revival and language standardization movement within the Habsburg Empire. Stipan Ivičević, in a private letter to a young colleague, explained the similarities and differences to the Italian case, indicating what Dalmatians and South Slavs should consider in modernizing their own language: ‘Two are our [Slavs’] creeds, the Western (Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox).
Therefore: no single religion. If you take away unity in language, what common ground is left? – Aren’t we already politically dismembered enough? Hence, now is not the time for literary arguments about form. Let us focus instead on the subject at hand... Haven’t you seen the old and new Italian orthography? All agree that the Dalmatians speak the best Illyrian. So why can’t we, in exchange, concede the form of four letters? Ivčević here argues that Dalmatians and other South Slavs must follow the Italian example; to form a nation they must compromise and construct a common South Slavic/Illyrian language, especially as they had no common religion to bind them.

Prevalent among locals was the belief that Dalmatians’ familiarity with Italian would serve as a guide to strengthening their own Slavic revival movement. They also maintained that, because their dialect ‘distinguished itself among the other southern (dialects) for its gentleness and flexibility’, it was more than likely that the Dalmatian dialect would become the Tuscan of the South Slav world. Just as the works of Tuscan writers Dante Alighieri and Giovanni Boccaccio served as the foundation for modern, standardized Italian, Dalmatians insisted that the rich literary heritage of such local authors as Ivan Gundulić, Ignazio Giorgi and Andrija Kačić Miošić would insure that their dialect would be the foundation for a standardized Slavic language. The lawyer, writer, historian and politician Konstantin Vojnović (1832–1903), who was one of the leading political voices in the 1860s–70s in favour of annexing Dalmatia to Croatia, summed up this common conviction, noting that Croatian compared to Dalmatian was ‘like Piedmontese versus Tuscan’. Though Croatia and Piedmont were states with prominent military traditions, and strove to launch political unification efforts for their declared nations, Vojnović saw that it was the Dalmatian and Tuscan literary heritages which promised to command cultural unification within their respective spheres. The example of Tuscany in Italy’s Risorgimento seemed to promise Dalmatians a similar key position in their own Slavic revival movement.

Dalmatia’s Italian culture was not the only element that determined its destiny to mediate between East and West. At the core of Dalmatians’ vision of their role to bridge two worlds lay the certainty that Dalmatia’s Slavic identity had much to offer both Eastern and Western Europe. Dalmatia’s linguistic ties to its Slavic brethren in the East promised economic benefits. Francesco Borelli emphasized that Dalmatia represented the ideal European marketplace, exulting in the fact that ‘our common languages are the Italian and the Slavic; the one allows us to pick in the garden of Italy all of the flowers of knowledge and
experience...; the other renders our words intelligible not only to our farmers, but also from this Adriatic coast to the most remote coasts of Kamchatka.\textsuperscript{48} United by a common language and the quickly growing Pan-Slavic spirit, Dalmatia’s Slavdom constituted millions of potential consumers and labourers, who could connect the East to the West’s industrial revolution.

Borelli also pointed out that with the West’s voracious industrialization, in Western Europe ‘there is almost no more source for wealth... And for that the gaze, studies, and impulse of the (Western) calculators by necessity has to pass to the Orient, to this still virgin field of the richest of hopes’.\textsuperscript{49} Enterprising Dalmatians hoped that their land could serve as interpreter and agent for this boon of manpower and raw materials represented by the Slavic world. With Italian spoken along the Adriatic coast and Slavic spoken along the caravan routes into Croatia and Bosnia, Dalmatia promised to be the perfect intermediary for continental commerce and industrialization.

Dalmatians felt assured that they could hold a leading role in western capitalism’s move eastward because they considered their local dialects, traditions, and literary heritage as exceptionally rich and developed compared to other Slavic peoples. The writings of other leading European thinkers, such as Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Ján Kollár, Adam Mickiewicz, Ljudevit Gaj, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, and Johann Gottfried Herder seemed to confirm this form of Dalmatian chauvinism. For throughout the Slavic and German literary worlds, the ballads of Dalmatia, especially Andrija Kačić Miošić’s folk songs and Ivan Gundulić’s epic poem \textit{Osman}, were consistently cited and studied in order to illustrate the moral purity of Slavic language and culture.\textsuperscript{50}

Spurred on by these world-renowned authors, locals reassessed their own peasant lore and dialects. Tommaseo, a great admirer of Karadžić, encouraged Dalmatians to participate actively in the new literary interest in Dalmatia’s folk ballads. In 1847 he addressed his fellow Dalmatians: ‘I warmly recommend those who love their \textit{patria}... [to] collect ballads, proverbs, traditions, habits and manners of speech. Before disdaining the poor people, let us get to know them...’.\textsuperscript{51}

To many, incorporating Slavic folk ballads and traditions into the Dalmatian canon seemed a promising way of breaking down class boundaries within Dalmatia itself. Further, to ensure that the development of a standardized South Slavic language incorporated these democratizing trends, Tommaseo and many others urged that Dalmatian peasant ballads be used as the primary point of reference for developing a Slavic lexicon and grammar. For ‘up to now the popular ballads are
almost the only texts of the language, from which we can study the
elegant character, the splendid brevity and the agile simplicity of its
construction'.

Convinced that the desperate social condition of Slavic-speaking peas-
ants was a result of a general alienation from public life, many Dalmatians embraced the message of Tommaseo, Karadžić, Mickiewicz, and Gaj. Consequently, thousands of poems, articles and monographs were published in the early to mid-nineteenth century extolling local Slavic songs, traditions and morals. Several Slavic periodicals were founded, dedicated to providing literature and learning to the 'people'. With these new outlets for 'Dalmatians and all our dear Slavic brothers', a common, modern written language would act as a means for Slavic speakers 'to support each other and come to hold each other by the
hand'. Throughout, there was a genuine attempt to elevate popular
culture and language into the public sphere. And at the heart of these
efforts dwelled a desire among locals to leave a strong imprint on the
nineteenth-century Slavic revival movement, where Dalmatia would be
one of the 'centres of civilization for the future Slav world'. In short,
intrinsic to Dalmatians' mission to act as bridge between East and West
was the conviction that Dalmatia's strong Slavic identity was seminal in the
Slavic revival movement gaining steam throughout Europe.

At the same time, Dalmatia's peasant culture was seen not just as
an invaluable resource for the progress of the Slavic movement in the
East. Dalmatians also trusted that the strong moral character of folk
traditions and beliefs could relieve Western Europe of its spiritual woes.
Dalmatia's Slavic peasants were seen by archaeologist Francesco Carrara
as having a 'virgin character', living 'in a state of nature', untainted by
the 'progressive civilizations of Europe'. Instead of the immoral cosmo-
politanism of Paris, Milan, and London, Slavic-speaking peasants' char-
acter was seen as profoundly devout. For Dalmatia's Slavs, the 'supreme
law of every one of their actions is the will of God, revealed in the
commandments of the ancient pact, in the precepts of the Church, and
in the instructions of the parish'. Dalmatians' propensity for friend-
ship, generosity and goodness was seen as unrivalled by the citizens of
the 'provinces of Europe, with its gas, railroad lines and sulfuric ether'.
Nicolò Tommaseo explained that the heightened religiosity of both
Dalmatia's Catholic and Serb Orthodox Slavs was a result of the fact that
they were 'the last to see the Christian light'. For Tommaseo, Carrara,
and many others, Dalmatia's Slavic identity was a model of Christian
virtue and purity to be emulated. Slavic culture, in many respects, should
replace the 'decrepit civilization of the West'.
In a sense, therefore, Dalmatia’s location between two worlds represented a mission to mediate the inequities and losses of Europe’s industrial revolution. Dalmatia – through its Italian networks – promised to spread the wealth of the West’s enlightenment and industrial revolution to the backward lands of the East. Links to Dalmatia’s Slavic world served as the key to reinstating the lost moral purity and simple Christian faith in the now ‘decrepit’ West.

Religion was also a fundamental feature in forming Dalmatia’s particular brand of mid-nineteenth-century regionalism. For it would be unwise to discount as purely rhetorical Dalmatians’ arguments that their province’s geographical and linguistic position reveals God’s will. Overall, as most historians agree, nineteenth-century Dalmatians proved exceptionally devout. Francesco Borelli’s instructions to his son – ‘to observe the whole world, every animal, every plant, as the perfect production of a Supreme Mind’ – was typical for the time and place in both Serb Orthodox and Catholic circles. But the significance of the religious tones of Dalmatia’s multi-national regionalism goes beyond a simple conviction that, so to speak, ‘God must want Dalmatia to be a mixed region because he made it that way.’ Instead, it appears that Dalmatians looked to religion to act as a harmonizing force within their own region’s multi-ethnicity. Bartolomeo Prospero Bettera admitted that in areas where nations overlapped, ‘oppression’ and ‘violence’ were possible. To avoid these ‘misdeeds against the order desired by God’, the ‘Church of Christ’ was the only force capable of ‘reconnecting the multitude of people in a unity consecrated to God, to cultivate between them a relationship of mutual brotherhood and to create in this way a great family of peoples’. Tommaso agreed with Bettera, and in contemplating the myriad differences within Dalmatia’s populace he wrote: ‘Only religion can make these various innocuous and mighty, assembling out of them a worthy end’.

In this context, it is clear that Dalmatians did not merely trust in God’s will to insure that their mediatory mission would serve Europe; they saw their entire region’s survival and prosperity as being dependent on a divine plan for different nations to live together.

‘Our province under the constitutional government of the double-headed Eagle... is called for a great destiny’

Dalmatia’s mission of mediation reveals much about how locals believed a multi-national region could function. Political initiatives tried to insure that Dalmatia’s destiny could be realized by focusing on
several different issues, foremost of which were: 1. attempts to change Dalmatia’s tariff status to accommodate its role as trade bridge between East and West; 2. education reforms to ensure that locals were fluent in both Italian and Slavic languages; 3. improved infrastructure (railways, better roads, more steamboats to augment communications between Dalmatia and the inner core of Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, and the Habsburg crown lands; 4. greater participation in political questions by Dalmatia’s community leaders (landowners, merchants, civil servants, middle-class professionals, peasant chiefs and clergy); and 5. administrative reforms to lessen the divide between Dalmatia’s indigent peasant class and its town-dwelling elite.

To push forward these reforms, the demand for partial sovereignty was paramount for mid-century regionalists. As Kaznačić argued, Dalmatia was a ‘province of traditions, language and climate totally different from the rest …’, and as such ‘needs special (political) applications …’ because ‘the spirit of administrative centralism is of no use at all in assimilating nations’.62 During moments of intense political activity, primarily the revolutions of 1848–49, and the years surrounding the unification of Italy from 1859 to 1862, many echoed the chant that not only would centralist and homogenizing efforts fail, they would be to Dalmatia’s detriment. Dalmatia’s heterogeneity was regarded as a necessary attribute to mediate between her many nationalities’ differences. And to guard her heterogeneity, she needed to have a larger say in her administration. In other words, Dalmatia’s multi-ethnicity proved the raison d’être of Dalmatia’s regionalism.

Though the central Habsburg administration frowned upon arguments for increased autonomy (and effectively hindered it until at least the late 1860s), it is hard to imagine that Dalmatians were oblivious to the overlapping goals of a multi-national empire and a multi-national province. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the continual emphasis on the region’s multi-nationalism was also intended to reassure the imperial authorities of a common political goal as faithful servants of the empire. An example of just such a strategy can be seen by a public letter from the Town Council of Obrovac (Obrovazzo) in 1848, which declared: ‘Our province under the constitutional government of the double-headed Eagle, which respects the different languages and customs of its people, is called for a great destiny’.63 If given increased sovereignty and constitutional government, Dalmatians sought to assure their imperial administrators, not only would their mission be realized, but that of the monarchy as well.
Compared to Dalmatian regionalism before and after the period under study, peculiar to the mid-nineteenth-century is the idea that progress, preservation and self-realization could be achieved without too much transformation. While mid-nineteenth-century Dalmatians insisted on the region’s distinctiveness from its Italian and South Slav neighbors, eighteenth-century leaders had hoped to weld Dalmatia to the enlightenment projects of western Europe. This regional focus, too, proved quite different from Slavic nationalist (whether Yugoslav, Croatian or Serb) and Italian irredentist creeds of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which completely subsumed the regional element under the national.

‘The word brotherhood ... is no longer on the lips of men’

Seminal to Dalmatia’s self-proclaimed mission of mediation was a firm belief that it needed to preserve its borderland status. In discussing Dalmatia’s providential role, locals explained that the heterogeneous character of their population was not just a relic of its past, but an essential element of its future. The cornerstone of this idea was the conviction that Dalmatia was necessarily and inexorably a dynamic borderland area. Yet, it was ultimately the evident fallacy of this notion of dynamism that proved to be the cause for the disintegration of the region’s multi-nationalism.

Before 1797, Dalmatia had served as a geographical borderland between two economically interdependent, but sovereign, empires (the Venetian and the Ottoman). After the Napoleonic wars, the province found itself marginalized. Bordering to the north and west by the Habsburg-controlled regions of Lombardy–Venetia, Trieste, Istria, Rijeka (Fiume) and Croatia, and to the east by the increasingly Habsburg-influenced regions of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the only territorial frontier it shared with a region outside the Habsburg sphere of influence consisted of the small, impoverished, Russian-satellite principedom of Montenegro. As such, Dalmatia’s mission of ‘mediation’ quickly became an attempt to reconcile different national groups all within the same state system. As the Habsburgs’ succeeded in consolidating their rule over the Adriatic region, Dalmatia increasingly became a periphery on the edge of different Habsburg lands instead of being a borderland between sovereign states. And when the surrounding national groups to the west and east of Dalmatia became ever more intent on breaking the ties that bound them together within the Habsburg Empire, the difficulty in preserving and promoting a mediatory mission proved overwhelming.
By the 1860s, with the Italian wars for unification to the west and the increasingly aggressive national claims of Croats and Serbs in the east, Dalmatia’s multi-national regionalists were limited to mediating within their own populace instead of serving as a conduit between neighbours. Quickly, Dalmatians, like most Europeans, abandoned their dreams of multi-national brotherhood. As an anonymous author despaired, ‘the word brotherhood (fratellanza) . . . is no longer on the lips of men; and a utopia of humanitarianism has fallen in disfavour among the politically inexperienced of the cafés. A dispatch announces: 9,000 dead, and no one even murmurs a requiem.’

After only a few years of parliamentary self-government within the constitutional Habsburg system of the 1860s, believers in Dalmatia’s mission for national mediation opted either for an a-national regionalism (which was particularly hostile to the Slavic revival movement) or for a national movement geared toward joining a federal Slavic state. Those, like Stipan Ivičević, who still dreamed of a multi-national future, were accused of being ‘two-sided’, and their national loyalties were called into question. Others retreated to their studies and memoirs, as Ivan August Kaznačić so movingly described: ‘The complications of this incredibly interesting epoch in which we find ourselves has underscored the mediocrity of my intellectual forces in a way to disturb their habitual equilibrium. I live in a constant state of morose anxiety . . . and the shadows every day become denser. In this situation my literary activity is limited to copying documents from our ancient Archive, which perhaps will offer me, in calmer times, the material for a volume not lacking in interest.’ Without states to mediate between, the idea of sustaining a multi-national regionalism seemed hopeless.

The significance of a borderland’s mission of mediation

Dalmatia’s period of multi-national regionalism and its accompanying mission of mediation prove fascinating for several reasons. First and foremost, it serves as a reminder that Dalmatia, and the Balkans in general, do not represent some sort of intrinsically intolerant, extreme nationalist cultural sphere – a lesson that Maria Todorova has rightly insisted still needs to be learned. In the mid-nineteenth century, the majority of educated Dalmatians attempted to promote their region’s mixed cultural heritage. An examination of this experience is crucial to understanding the vehemence of both the anti-national and national movements of late nineteenth-century Dalmatia.
Secondly, attempts by elites to promote a regionalism that would cultivate two national revival movements reveals much about what contemporaries believed were the socio-political possibilities in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Clearly, local actors appreciated the political weight and potential for social reform held within the doctrines of modern nationalism. Yet, at this point, the 'need' for homogenizing a heterogeneous population was not yet accepted. Early nineteenth-century Dalmatians – perhaps still recovering from the shock of the Napoleonic wars – viewed the fostering of a national movement as a means to preserve their region's multi-ethnic character against centralization and 'westernization'. Nationalism was not conceived as a process of complete assimilation. By cultivating two national traditions, locals believed that they could bolster Dalmatia's self-proclaimed raison d'être as a separate and special region without eradicating the roots of its multi-ethnic social fabric.

Finally, the fascinating case of Dalmatia serves not just as an example of a borderland's multi-national regionalism, but suggests also the reasons for the precariousness of such a concept. As Dalmatia ceased to be a borderland, so its regionalism ceased to be multi-national. A stable Habsburg dominion over the Adriatic, in essence, changed Dalmatia's status. With trade directed through Trieste and the intellectual and cultural ties with the new Kingdom of Italy stringently filtered through Habsburg administrative offices, Dalmatia in the latter half of the nineteenth-century was no longer a borderland between East and West, between Slavic and Latin. Instead, it was simply another Habsburg backwater containing many nationalities, its heterogeneity no longer dynamic, but a legacy from a bygone era. Increasingly consolidated within one state system, Dalmatia's mission for mediation could no longer look without, and was forced to look within. Those eager to avoid Dalmatia's integration into another nationally-organized state discounted differences and pushed for an assimilative regional identity.

In recent studies focusing on multi-ethnic communities, borderlands have taken centre stage, representing self-regenerating, mixed cultural spaces often (though not always) unresponsive to the nationalising initiatives of Europe's new nation-states. It is this aspect that renders borderlands special sites of study. For whether admitted or not, many see borderlands' resilience as a potential model for understanding how our own multi-ethnic future can be better managed. The example of Dalmatia, however, points to the fragility of borderlands and their apparent promises, for the difference between once having been a borderland and actually being one was crucial. The downfall
of Dalmatia's multi-national regionalism did not have its seed either in the birth of modern nationalism (that process had already begun) or in nationalizing efforts by a nation-state. The transformation began with Dalmatia's full incorporation into an empire. No longer left on the border, Dalmatians scrambled for new destinies to realize.

Notes

2. Nicolò Tommaseo, b. 1802 Sibenik–d. 1874 Florence, was the most famous and influential Dalmatian of the nineteenth century and is also regarded as one of the leaders of the liberal-Catholic-republican wing of Italy's Risorgimento. Most of Tommaseo's publications deal with literary criticism, moral and religious questions, folk ballads, poetry, and educational reform. He was also the author of one of the most acclaimed dictionaries of the Italian language in the nineteenth century. The best biography is still: R. Ciampini, Vita di Nicolò Tommaseo (Florence, 1945). The most effective discussion of Tommaseo's links with the Slavic National Movement is: J. Pirjevec, Niccolò Tommaseo tra Italia e Slavia (Venice, 1977). I have chosen to spell Tommaseo's first name with one 'c' instead of two, as he commonly did when publishing texts on Dalmatia (in Dalmatian Italian dialect, it was written as such). He spelled it with two 'c's usually when publishing on Italian matters.
4. Ibid., pp. 412–18.
7. A few examples of this stance are the classic studies by the Croatian historian Grga Novak such as, 'Maninova vlada. Nacionlani komitet i Garibaldinci u odnosu na Dalmaciju', Zbornik Historijskog instituta Jugoslavenske Akademije 3 (1960), 23–58; Prošlost Dalmacije (Zagreb, 1944). See also most of the regular contributors to the Rivista Dalmatica Journal.
8. K. Clewing, Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung: Dalmatien in Vormärz und Revolution (Munich, 2001). Illyrianism was a cultural and political movement founded by Ljudevit Gaj and predominant within Croatia and Slavonia during the 1830s–40s. Illyrianism advocated the formation of a standardized south Slavic language and literary culture, regardless of religion and in line with other Slavic national movements within Europe.
9. J. Vrandević, Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret v XIX. stoljeću (Zagreb, 2002).
10. It remains to be investigated how much Dalmatia's Napoleonic experience stimulated the use of a missionary ideology to sustain patriotism. Compare:


12. The main dialects of Dalmatia all belonged to the language family of Serbo-Croatian. Today, most Dalmatians speak standardized Croatian. I will refer to the various non-standardized dialects spoken in Dalmatia during the early to mid-nineteenth century as ‘Slavic’, as was common at the time.


14. Count Gianluca Garagnin, b. 1764 Trogir–d. 1841 Trogir, a Freemason and supporter of the French Revolution, spent much of his life in Venice and was in close correspondence with the Italian intelligentsia. He focused his studies on political economy, the sciences, archeology and animal husbandry. He served in both the Habsburg and French administrations during the Napoleonic wars, but retired to private life thereafter.

15. Count Ivan Krešanović Albinoni, b. 1777 Kaštel Stari–d. 1838 Zadar, worked as a lawyer in Venice until the fall of the Republic. An ardent sympathizer for Napoléon, he returned to Dalmatia where he served as a judge and chief administrator during the revolutionary period. With the entry of the Austrians in 1814, he was made Provincial Inspector of Education, but retired in 1816. He also worked as a journalist, historian, playwright, and translator.


24. On the whole, this is similar to what David Laven describes in his analysis of the transformation from the Napoleonic to the Habsburg administration of Venice in the immediate postwar period. However, Venetians had a larger chance to present their plans for provincial reorganization as they possessed a *congregazione centrale* with noble and non-noble representatives, greater communal autonomy in local administration, and a separation between military and administrative offices under the Habsburg state structure, all of which were lacking in Dalmatia. See: D. Laven, *Venice and Venetia under the Habsburgs, 1815–1835* (Oxford, 2002).

25. For a particularly well-informed analysis of Dalmatia’s administration in the pre-1848 period see: Clewing, *Staatlichkeit*.

27. Ivan August Kaznačić, ‘Letter from I. A. Kaznačić to his son, Antun Kaznačić, Dubrovnik, September 8, 1869,’ (Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku: RO-170/7: CXCIII/78, 1869).
33. F. Carrara, La Dalmazia descritta (Zadar, 1846), pp. 121–2.
34. Anon, ‘Degli’intentii del giornalismo in Dalmazia,’ Annuario Dalmatico II (1859), 17.
36. Ghetaldi and Borelli, Discorsi, p. 34.
38. Tommaso, Ai Dalmati, p. 21.
40. L. Serragli, Sulla Riforma doganale della Dalmazia (Dubrovnik, 1851), p. 15.
41. Comitato Nazionale Dalmato, ‘Untitled: Political platform for 1861’ (Državni Arhiv u Zadru: Spisi Obitelji- Borelli: sv. 102, Borelli V. sv.3 br. 177, 1861).
45. S. Ivčičević, ‘Letter to Luigi Pavissich, Macarska May 28, 1844,’ in: Pavissich, Memorie, pp. 22–3. In this quote, Ivčičević’s reference to the ‘form of four letters’ points to Croatians’ introduction of the č, Ć, ž, and š into South Slavic orthography to mirror similar orthographic forms in Czech and Polish.
46. S. Pavlović-Lučić, ‘Intorno all’insufficienza ed ai bisogni delle scuole popolari in Dalmazia,’ La Voce Dalmatica: Giornale Economico-Letterario I (1860), 153. Stipan Pavlović-Lučić was a priest and member of the National Party (Narodna stranka) in 1860s–70s Dalmatia. He published many works on the religious and Slavic history of Dalmatia.
47. K. Vojnović, Un voto per l’Unione (Split, 1861), p. 13.
50. Herder, Goethe, Karadžić, Gaj and Mickiewicz all published and analyzed sections of Kačić Miošić’s anthology of Slavic folk songs, Razgovora Ugodnoga.
Different Paths to the Nation

Naroda Slovinskoga (1756) or of Gundulić’s work (1626), which describes the Ottoman sultan Osman II’s defeat by the Poles at Khotin in Bessarabia.


52. Ibid., pp. 37-8.

53. S. Margetich, Riči na slogu k Dalmatinskoj Zori, in: Zora dalmatinska I (1844), 3. The Zora dalmatinska (Dalmatian Dawn) was the most important Slavic language journal in early nineteenth-century Dalmatia.


55. Carrara, La Dalmazia descritta, pp. 150, 153, 168, 171.

56. Ibid.


58. Ibid.

59. ‘Letter from Francesco Borelli to his son, Andrea Borelli, Zadar, August 13, 1858,’ (Državni Arhiv u Zadru: Spisi Obitelji- Borelli: sv. 53, Borelli III sv. 2, br. 193, 1858). It is not possible here to go into the differences in Serb Orthodox and Catholic conceptions of a Dalmatian mission. As a general rule, followers of the Serb Orthodox faith tended to have a more developed sense of a specifically national identity. However, this did not preclude them from supporting the multi-national regionalism discussed here.

60. Bettera, Untitled draft beginning with ‘Le nazionalità non sono nè parto del caso nè aborto di cleca forza naturale’.

61. Tommaseo, ‘Parte Prima: Dalmazia. 12. D’alguni studi fatti intorno alle case dalmatiche da stranieri e da nostri. – Lettere due, A N. N. ’, p. 122. Tommaseo and many others believed it was both the Catholic and Serb Orthodox clergies’ responsibility to mend relations between the two Christian churches in the region.


63. Comune d’Obbrovazzo, ‘Letter from the Comune d’Obbrovazzo to Francesco Borelli, Obrovac, April 20, 1848’, (Državni Arhiv u Zadru: Spisi Obitelji: sv. 103, Borelli V sv. 4 br. 188, 1848).

64. Though Bosnia-Hercegovina was only occupied by the Habsburg Empire in 1878, already by the mid-nineteenth century economic and political relations between the region and Istanbul were significantly weakened.

65. ‘Varietà’, La Voce Dalmatica: Giornale Economico-Letterario 1 (1860), 240. It is most likely that this death toll is referring to either the Italian wars or the Schleswig-Holstein war.

66. ‘Letter from Mihovil Pavlinović to Stipan Ivičević, Podgora, October 12, 1868’ (Državni Arhiv u Zagrebu: Spisi Obitelji- Stijepan Ivičević: 802-1-1b-5, 1868).
