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Article
Seniority and Productivity in the Academic Labor Market
Economics Research Institute Study Paper
  • Christopher B. Barrett, Utah State University
  • DeeVon Bailey, Utah State University
Document Type
Article
Publisher
Utah State University Department of Economics
Publication Date
1-1-1997
Rights
Copyright for this work is held by the author. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owners. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. For more information contact the Institutional Repository Librarian at digitalcommons@usu.edu.
Abstract

Following the recent exchange between Ransom and Hallock, we examine the determinants of faculty salaries and find that once one controls for productivity indicators, seniority appears to have a significant effect on faculty salaries. Simply put, productivity pays and there is no evidence of university monopsony power. Faculty salaries are almost solely determined by academic discipline, rank, and productivity, as manifest by grantsmanship activity and the elicitation of competing offers from other universities. Perhaps surprisingly, once one controls for grants won and rank, both of which appear to be influenced by a faculty member's publication rate, published research appears to offer little or no salary returns.

Citation Information
Christopher B. Barrett and DeeVon Bailey. "Seniority and Productivity in the Academic Labor Market" Economics Research Institute Study Paper Vol. 3 (1997) p. 1 - 20
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/deevon_bailey/181/