THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF THE TRANSGRESSIVE FAMILY: BINATIONAL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES
THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF THE TRANSGRESSIVE FAMILY: BINATIONAL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES [FN1]

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This Article reviews the relationship between U.S. policy after the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the legal mechanisms that have influenced the character of the binational Cuban-American family since then. Over the course of the last fifty years, the United States has used the rule of law to deny families fundamental customs of care-taking and comfort. Of course, the immigration regulations and attendant matters of travel and remittances are customarily linked to national policy and international concerns. However, in the case of U.S. laws governing the relationship of Cuban binational families, there is no normativity of impartiality that can be discerned, a condition that continues notwithstanding some recent changes announced by the Obama administration. These efforts have failed to achieve their goals. Cuban-American families have improvised—often extralegal—mechanisms of familial support. In doing so, they act as transgressors of laws and policies as a means to maintain family support systems.
Introduction

Geographical proximity has long facilitated travel between Cuba and the United States. Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth and twenty-first, Cubans have traveled north in search of political sanctuary and economic opportunity. [FN1] Immigration to the United States has developed
fully into a salient constant of the Cuban condition, one that has contributed to the emergence of a unique binational family system. Cuban migration has itself been a cause and consequence of U.S. policy. That Cuba was deemed vital to U.S. strategic interests meant that American foreign policy has often had as much an impact on migration patterns as Cuban domestic policy, with far-reaching consequences: some intended, others unintended.

The Cuban revolution of 1959 and the punitive U.S. response have provided the context for a vast continuing Cuban migration. [FN2] By the end of the twentieth century, more than one million Cubans--one-tenth of the total population--had emigrated, [FN3] mostly to *1883 the United States. [FN4] United States policy, relying principally on economic sanctions as the method to remove the Cuban government, has resulted in unrelieved hardship on the Cuban people, and in the process has profoundly transformed the nature of untold numbers of Cuban families.

Migration developed within two phases of specific global contexts, corresponding to Cuba’s changing international position and U.S. policy: the period after 1960, when Cuba aligned itself with the Soviet bloc in the final decades of the Cold War; and the years after 1990, when Cuba adapted to the global economy in the post-Cold War environment (“Special Period”). [FN5] In both instances, the vicissitudes of U.S. policies that purposefully politicized migration as part of the larger strategy of economic sanctions adversely affected Cuban families. Divided families have found themselves continually separated not only by the Florida Straits but also by U.S. laws and policies that have manipulated migration procedures, restricted travel authorization, and tightened remittance regulations, the very means by which families maintain connections. [FN6]

This Article examines the relationship between U.S. policy after 1960 and the legal mechanisms that have influenced the character of the binational Cuban-American family. The United States has used the rule of law to deny families the capacity to fulfill the fundamental custom of caretaking and comfort for the purpose of subverting the Cuban revolution. Of course, the regulation of migration and attendant matters of travel and remittances are customarily linked to national policy and international concerns. However, in the case of U.S. laws governing the relationship of Cuban-American binational families, a normativity of impartiality cannot be discerned.

Part I considers the amendments to travel and remittance restrictions imposed in June 2004 by the administration of George W. Bush. These regulatory changes were certainly not the first to impose significant limitations on the ability of families to maintain connections across the Florida Straits, but they were the harshest to date. Part II demonstrates the ways in which the 2004 restrictions served as a new means to an old end. It reviews prior policy and legal *1884 and covert strategies, which imposed sanctions, utilized fear mongering, or otherwise targeted families in the hopes that adversity and hardships would foster political discontent within Cuba and produce internal rebellion against the Cuban government. Part III argues that during the post-Cold War period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc when Cuba lost its trading partners, the United States renewed its efforts to politically and economically isolate Cuba to ensure that Cuba would fail in its efforts to reintegrate itself into the global political economy. During this period, after the United States recognized that binational family relations transacted through visits and financial support for families in Cuba had created a flow of foreign ex-
change and goods that had allowed many Cubans to survive the very sanctions designed to topple the Cuban government, U.S. policy began to increase its focus on restricting travel remittances. [FN7] Part III suggests that U.S. efforts to dislodge the Cuban government by way of inflicting hardship on Cuban families have failed. Cuban Americans improvised-- often extralegal--mechanisms of mutual familial assistance. In doing so, they often have been obliged to act as transgressors of laws and policies as a means to maintain family support systems.

United States-Cuba policies are presently under review and revision in Washington. [FN8] There is reason to hope for an end to the use of U.S. laws that create hardships for Cuban binational families in order to encourage the overthrow of the Cuban government. President Obama recently announced the liberalization of family travel and remittance laws. [FN9] However, the administration's rhetoric has not shifted, and the all-too-familiar pronouncements of what is best for Cuba--as determined by the United States-- persist. A bold transformation from Cold War rhetoric and hostilities to full engagement between the United States and Cuba is required to end the United States’ practice of using laws that create hardship for Cuban binational families in attempts to overthrow the Cuban government; such a transformation will allow full restoration of binational relationships and reconciliation on both sides of the Florida Straits.

*I885 I. 2004 Family Restrictions: New Means to Old Ends

In June 2004, the administration of George W. Bush announced new regulations restricting the rights of Cuban Americans to visit and support their families in Cuba. [FN10] Travelers previously allowed to visit relatives on the island once a year for up to ninety days, and perhaps more in the event of a family crisis, were limited to one trip every three years for a maximum of fourteen days [FN11]--no exceptions: not for an emergency visit to be with a dying parent, nor to attend a family funeral. [FN12] When questioned about the hardship imposed on families, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fisk responded, “So if they have a dying relative, they have to figure out when they want to travel.” [FN13]

The new regulations further redefined what constituted “family” and prohibited visits to anyone other than spouses, children, parents, grandparents, siblings, and grandchildren. [FN14] Aunts, uncles, cousins as well as individuals who, for example, may have previously functioned as parents or caretakers, were henceforth denied family status for purposes of visits. [FN15] Those without living relatives on the island were thus barred from returning to their homeland. The new regulations also limited the right of Cuban Americans to provide financial aid to families in Cuba. [FN16] A cap was set at $300 quarterly. [FN17] The maximum amount travelers were authorized to carry with them during their visits was reduced from $3,000 to $300. [FN18] In addition, families were prohibited from sending clothes and personal items. [FN19] Medicines and other critical necessities could not exceed $200 in value. [FN20] *I886 Notwithstanding the crisis suffered by Cubans after the devastating hurricanes of 2005, the new regulations forbade Cuban Americans from providing humanitarian assistance to their families and communities on the island. [FN21] Assistant Secretary of State, Roger Noriega, conveyed the mean-spirited purport of the new regulations:

“[W]hat are we supposed to say to them? We're going to continue to allow this money to be
shoveled into the coffers of a regime that's going to keep them in chains in-in-in under a dictator-
ship because we want to preserve the right of people to visit their aunts?” [FN22] Of course, as
Human Rights Watch noted in its report on Cuban families affected by the restrictions, visiting
aunts is not a trivial matter, especially for those whose aunts and uncles raised them. [FN23]
That the 2004 travel and remittance regulations played havoc with the circumstances of Cuban and
Cuban-American families was not a new phenomenon. For the past fifty years, family migration and
corollary issues of travel and remittances have been politicized by the U.S. government as part of a larger
U.S. strategy to effect “regime change” in Havana. [FN24] The Cuban alliance with the Soviet Uni-
on and the expansion of Cuban influence in Africa and Latin America were vital U.S. Cold War con-
cerns. Certainly, this is the conventional wisdom. But U.S. hostility continued unabated into the post-
Cold War period, suggesting that the sources of American attitudes toward Cuba were not based entirely
on matters of strategic considerations. [FN25] Since the early 1990s, U.S. policy has been designed to
thwart Cuban *1887 efforts to reintegrate into the global economy. [FN26] United States officials were
convinced of Cuban vulnerability in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and sought to cut
off Cuban access to support of any kind in their continued efforts to precipitate the collapse of the Cuban
government. [FN27]

Notwithstanding the long and antagonistic history of regulatory maneuvers related to Cuban migra-
tion, travel, and remittances, the 2004 regulations were the harshest and most contentious to date. [FN28]
The announcements of the new restrictions were timed with the release of a comprehensive
cabinet-level report, entitled Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. [FN29] Charged with the for-
mulation of policies to topple the Cuban government, the Commission provided a comprehensive pro-
gram to hasten Cuba’s “transition,” including specific recommendations on matters affecting Cuban and
Cuban-American families. [FN30] According to the Commission, families who continued to travel and
send funds for household support were barriers to the establishment of a “free Cuba.” [FN31] The report
offered instructions for supporting dissident groups, rebuilding the Cuban infrastructure, developing new
school curriculum, and procedures for achieving a top-to-bottom overhaul of the Cuban Government,
including the drafting of a new constitution and converting the Cuban economy to a free-market system.
[FN32] As one political scientist noted, the report “read like some antiquated colonial blueprint” and as
“a symbol of the Bush administration's arrogant unilateralism and *1888 penchant for intervention.”
[FN33] The Secretary General of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza, was equally
blunt in responding to the administration’s report: “‘There is no transition, and it's not your country.’”
[FN34]

With these new restrictions, President Bush, who had made “family values” the centerpiece of his
2000 presidential campaign and a central part of his speeches in Latin America with the oft-repeated
quote that “[f]amily values do not stop at the Rio Bravo,” [FN35] made clear that commitments to fam-
ily did stop at the shores of the Florida Straits. [FN36] The President often remarked on the importance
of family integrity and expressed an understanding for families who migrated to provide for their loved
ones. [FN37] He approved of remittances to enable migrants to “feed their families just like the citizens
of America can find work to feed their families.” [FN38] The new regulations made clear, however, that
Cubans and Cuban Americans were an exception, and they were expected to suffer differently than their
*1889 counterparts in other Latin American countries and elsewhere throughout the world.

II. Sanctions, Sabotage, and Subversion: Migration and the Cold War

The 2004 restrictions in many ways signified the culmination of nearly fifty years of policy designed to visit hardship on families as a way to topple the Cuban government. [FN39] Since the early 1960s, successive U.S. governments have adopted a policy of political isolation and economic sanctions as a cost-effective way to undermine the government of Cuba. [FN40] The vicissitudes of migration over the course of fifty years were consequences of a policy that itself often lacked both clarity of purpose and consistency of implementation, that sometimes was in contradiction with itself, but always caused untold hardships for families who were denied customary means of contact and mutual support with those who remained on the island.

A. Creating the Economic Context for Migration

The United States' approaches to migration occurred within the larger context of sanctions imposed against Cuba through both legal and irregular means. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy authorized a trade embargo premised on existing statutory powers within the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. [FN41] The Treasury Department subsequently promulgated the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”) to prohibit financial transactions and trade with Cuba. [FN42] The U.S. government also *1890 resorted to covert means that went beyond the boundaries of the embargo statutes and regulations. The CIA's covert program known as Operation Mongoose included objectives that were carried out through clandestine means, including one designed to “[h]arass the economy.” [FN43] The United States set in motion plans to sabotage export agricultural commodities, industries, public utilities, and transportation capabilities in order to “reduce available economic supplies and services,” and “cripple Cuban commerce vital to the regime's domestic economic program.” [FN44]

The American determination to politicize hunger was a key facet of U.S. efforts to bring down the Cuban government. President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged “quarantine[ing] Cuba,” stating that “if [the Cuban people] are hungry, they will throw Castro out.” [FN45] Eisenhower explained that U.S. policy had as a “primary objective . . . to establish conditions which will bring home to the Cuban people the cost of Castro's policies and of his Soviet orientation.” [FN46] Similarly, President Kennedy used economic sanctions as a means to hasten Fidel Castro's departure as a result of the “‘rising discomfort among hungry Cubans.’” [FN47] The State Department advocated that “‘every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba [in order to] bring about hunger, desperation and [the] overthrow of the government.’” [FN48]

*1891 The logic of political isolation and economic sanctions was based on an effort to create adversity and hardship within Cuba to foster political disaffection and popular discontent, and thus create optimal conditions to produce internal rebellion. In fact, economic hardship did not result in sustained political opposition at home, but instead produced migration abroad. [FN49] With the exception of the years from 1959 to 1965—when immigration consisted principally of Cubans associated with the Batista regime, upper-middle-class Cubans who were mostly white, and individuals who feared retribution be-
cause of their actions as informers or because of their collaboration with the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.-Cuban migration has followed discernable patterns that corresponded to U.S. policies. [FN50]

Between 1965 and 1980, migration consisted of Cubans who left principally because of the economic hardship and desires to reunite with family in the United States primarily in South Florida and New Jersey. [FN51] Scholars of this migration period described this cohort as “self-imposed exiles,” [FN52] and “migrants who resembled the traditional immigrants who came to the United States in search of better economic opportunities” [FN53] as a result of changing, and for many, *1892 worsening political and economic conditions in Cuba. As the next section will describe, the economic conditions from which Cubans were escaping during these years were often exacerbated, if not created, by U.S. policy.

B. Migration, Fear-Mongering, and the Propaganda of the Cold War

The U.S.-Cuba policy had a larger purpose. In the throes of the Cold War, the United States sought to use Cuban migration to demonstrate to Africa, Asia, and Latin America that socialist systems could not adequately provide for their people. [FN54] The spectacle of tens of thousands of Cubans in flight from their homeland made for good propaganda. The United States also used migration to weaken the Cuban government from within. Additionally, the United States encouraged the exodus of professional and skilled workers from Cuba to create a “brain drain” [FN55] that would sap Cuba of those individuals with knowledge and needed abilities while positioning the United States as a symbol of the “gateway to freedom.” [FN56] By promoting migration, the United States hoped to gain control of a cohort of exiles and put them to use in carrying out covert operations, sabotage, and sowing fear amongst Cubans in order to turn world opinion against Cuba.

United States documents declassified in 1996 reveal the importance of migration in service of efforts to bring down the Cuban government. [FN57] Plans were made to produce “Cuban refugees and *1893 defectors as dramatic witnesses against the Castro-Communist regime” in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere. [FN58] Other projects sought to produce an exile force that the United States could control for purposes of disseminating propaganda materials which would be delivered to them by the CIA in order to “disaffect the Cuban people.” [FN59] Once Cubans arrived in the United States, the CIA planned to cultivate certain groups for the purpose of creating dissent inside Cuba. [FN60] The State Department plotted to infiltrate Cuban migrant groups who would in turn encourage and engage in acts of sabotage, “creat[e] and nurtur [e]” political opposition, and “encourage resistance elements inside Cuba.” [FN61]

One of the most politicized efforts to encourage Cuban migration known as the “Pedro Pan Operación” (“Peter Pan Operation”), targeted families with young children. [FN62] In the fall of 1960, a CIA-sponsored radio station broadcasted reports alleging that the Cuban government planned to remove children from their parents for purposes of indoctrination and military training. [FN63] With *1894 deliberate intent to alarm parents with false information, the radio broadcasts announced that children would be removed according to newly enacted laws and instructed parents to take their children to churches to await further instructions. [FN64] Families were told that their children would receive
scholarships to study in the United States. [FN65] As a result, an estimated 14,000 Cuban children from mostly white and middle class families were relocated to camps, foster homes, orphanages, and other institutions throughout the United States. [FN66] Children were separated from siblings and were often cut off from families, who were denied permission to visit them. [FN67] Many endured abusive conditions. [FN68] One woman, who suffered from her interactions with terrified children who repeatedly called for their mothers who remained in Cuba, described the devastating effects of the operation. [FN69] From the perspective of the Cold War politics, however, the operation was a success. As María de los Angeles Torres, a Pedro Pan herself, writes: “[t]he image of helpless children fleeing the island captured the imagination of anti-Communists throughout the world,” adding that “[i]f the battle over the children’s minds in the 1960s had been a way to contest the country’s political future, interpreting the *1895 exodus became a way to control its history.” [FN70] Decades later, narratives revealing “The Dark Side of Pedro Pan” would reveal the role of the CIA in the operation. [FN71] These narratives illustrate the United States’ active effort to encourage Cuban migration, an effort that continued throughout the decade.

C. Open Door Policy: Migration and the Cuban Adjustment Act

Perhaps no measure set in such sharp relief the politics of migration as the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966. [FN72] The United States received the increasing Cuban migration by adopting an open-door policy best described as exceptional. Most of the 165,000 Cubans who came to the United States up to 1966 entered without immigrant visas, without prior security checks, and without proof of guaranteed employment in the United States. [FN73] To accommodate them, Congress adopted the Cuban Refugee Act (“Cuban Adjustment Act”). [FN74] The Cuban Adjustment Act allowed Cubans to apply for permanent residency one year after arrival without having to leave the country to apply-- a privilege, as noted by Ruth Wasem, that has been afforded to no other nationality. [FN75] The Act waived permanent resident application fees for Cuban refugees. [FN76] In addition to the privileged application of the immigration laws, federally funded centers and *1896 services--such as housing, counseling, education, training, and work opportunities--expanded in South Florida to assist specifically new Cuban residents. [FN77]

Legislators defended the exceptional treatment of Cubans, who were first paroled into the United States without visas and subsequently allowed to adjust status in an unusually short period of time, without regard to quotas, and with blanket fee waivers. [FN78] Some argued that there was no consulate post in Cuba to which the Cubans could apply for visas, although the decision to close the embassy was unilaterally made by the U.S. government. [FN79] Others argued that the normal residency adjustment process by which noncitizens without immigrant visas were required to leave and apply at a consulate outside of the United States would be “costly and inconvenient” for Cubans. [FN80]

Several legislators made efforts to extend the Act to similarly situated immigrants from other countries. Some legislators unsuccessfully attempted to include exiles from the Dominican Republic who were fleeing the political instability of the post-Trujillo years. [FN81] Others endeavored to add amendments that would grant similar adjustment benefits to immigrants from the Western Hemisphere in the United States and whose petitions for adjustment were pending on December 1, 1965. [FN82] These amendments were rejected. [FN83] Legislators argued, unsuccessfully, that the financial burden
of leaving the United States to apply for adjustment of status *1897 was equally onerous on many Latin Americans and sought to “[put] the people of Latin America on an equal footing” with people of the rest of the world. [FN84]

The legislative debates illuminated the degree to which the issue of Cuban migration served Cold War politics. Representative Feighan put it succinctly: “granting of permanent resident status would further American policy objectives: by further demonstrating the desire of the United States to play a full and sympathetic role as a country of asylum to refugees from communism.” [FN85] Representative Claude Pepper stated his support for the Act because Cubans showed opposition to the communist regime. [FN86] Similarly, Senator Philip Hart concluded that “we could find no more effective spokesmen to describe the destruction of freedom under Castro's brand of communism.” [FN87] Precisely because Cubans could serve larger ends, they were the “special favorites” in the realm of immigration laws and policies. [FN88] The Cuban Adjustment Act served its purpose and then some. By the end of 1979, over 670,000 Cubans had migrated to the United States. [FN89] Because they were easily able to obtain permanent residency, Cubans naturalized at a faster rate than other immigrant groups and thus obtained political power more rapidly. [FN90] But the Act was not without consequences. Many families were traumatized by the prospect of settling in the United States without contact with family, and close relationships were disrupted. [FN91] Parents were separated from children, brothers from sisters, and many were never to see grandparents, cousins, aunts, and uncles again. Additionally, families were not immune to the political conflicts occasioned by the nature of the Cuban revolution and the manipulation of the politics of exile engendered to facilitate U.S. Cold War interests.

D. From Open Door to Open Arms: Migration and the Mariel Boatlift

In addition to the Cuban Adjustment Act, there were other ways in which Cubans migrated to the United States. The Mariel exodus, *1898 which took place between April 1980 and October 1980, provides additional evidence of the politicization of migration by way of the continued efforts by the United States to manipulate conditions on the island and the favored treatment of Cuban immigrants once they reached U.S. soil. [FN92] During this period, over 125,000 Cubans entered the United States. [FN93] This large-scale migration occurred after a period in the late 1970s in which some Cubans on the island were hijacking boats, at times at gunpoint, in order to force boat captains to take them to Florida where they were immediately paroled into the United States. [FN94] A series of dangerous attempts by Cubans to storm Latin American embassies followed the hijackings. The most notable incident occurred on April 1, 1980, when six Cubans seeking asylum crashed their bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, killing a Cuban guard and setting off turmoil and violence on the embassy grounds. [FN95] Weary of the U.S. government's refusal to treat the embassy incidents and hijackings as illegal acts of violence--a policy that appeared to encourage such acts even though Cuba had prosecuted U.S. hijackers who had flown U.S. planes to Cuba--the Cuban government declared the Port of Mariel open, and invited exiles to come by boat to transport their relatives to the United States. [FN96]

The Mariel exodus must be further understood in its specific historical context. It followed a period of slow emigration and other important but momentary changes in U.S. policy. During the years of *1899 the Carter presidency (1977-1981), and for the first time since the Cuban revolution, the United
States had indicated a willingness to discuss normalization of relations with Cuba without preconditions. [FN97] Although the United States did not lift the embargo in 1977, the Carter administration ended restrictions on travel to Cuba, permitted limited remittances, and signed a number of bilateral agreements to signal possibilities for reconciliation. [FN98]

In 1978, the Cuban government welcomed exiled families previously barred from visiting Cuba. [FN99] At the invitation of the Cuban government, exiles entered into a series of talks, known as “the diálogo,” for the purpose of determining how best to accomplish family reunification. [FN100] Although many who entered into the dialogue were threatened with violence, and in some instances suffered extreme violence and even death by hard-line Cuban-American exiles opposed to any form of reconciliation, for many, the desire to reunite with families prevailed over fear and intimidation. [FN101] Cuban Americans quickly took advantage of the new opening, and within a year's period, over 100,000 families paid visits to their loved ones and communities. [FN102] Reunification efforts also led to the establishment of organizations whose goals were to continue to advocate for the needs of binational families. [FN103]

With the influx of Cuban-American visitors and the dollars and goods they introduced into the island, conditions for many families improved. [FN104] Relatives could not, however, sustain the Cuban economy, and indeed, economic sanctions continued to take their *1900 toll. [FN105] These were times of increasing tension in Cuba as a result of exposure to U.S. consumer goods (the “blue jean revolution”). [FN106] Cubans were introduced to the proposition, if not myth, of “material abundance” on the other side of the Florida Straits. [FN107] These factors, together with additional encouragement from the United States, set the stage for the Mariel phenomenon. [FN108]

Notwithstanding the changing forces that affected the Mariel migration, there were important consistencies with regard to the Marielitos [FN109] in the realm of U.S. policy and its treatment of Cuban migration. First, the U.S. government continued its strategy of manipulation of events in Cuba that encouraged the mass exodus. Following the tragic incident at the Peruvian embassy, the Carter administration not only failed to condemn the violence, on the contrary, it applauded it. In response to the Mariel exodus that ensued, Vice President Walter Mondale, echoing earlier sentiments on the propaganda value of Cuban migration, stated, “[t]here is no better proof of the failure of Castro's revolution than the dramatic exodus which is currently taking place.” [FN110] President Carter responded to the crisis by granting refugee status to all those who entered the Peruvian embassy and promising to “continue to 'provide an open heart and open arms for the tens of thousands of refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination’” and from economic deprivation, brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his government. [FN111]

*1901 Second, the United States granted Marielitos, like their predecessors, exceptional legal status. At the time of the exodus, the United States had passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which placed a quota on “refugees” from Cuba. [FN112] Cubans were no longer allowed blanket entrance as refugees. They were to be treated in a similar manner as any other arriving immigrants seeking asylum, that is, they were subject to individual case review according to asylum standards and procedures and subject to detention while awaiting determinations in their case. [FN113]
Though the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to reduce the arbitrary and political nature of the executive’s parole power, the President continued to grant such relief to Cubans, who continued to enter the United States notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. government had spurned the idea that the great majority of Cuban immigrants were eligible for asylum. [FN114] Moreover, a subsequent amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act extended the special privileges that encouraged migration from Cuba over all other countries. [FN115] These entrants were not only allowed to adjust their status to lawful permanent residents outside of regular legal processes but were also granted access to other federal statutory relief entitling them to social services and benefits not available to other immigrants. [FN116] The Mariel exodus episode illuminated the dilemma created by the United States’ politicized migration policies and laws that served U.S. Cold War politics.

*1902 E. Maintaining Pressure, United States-Cuba Policy, and the Cuban-American National Foundation

As hostilities between Havana and Washington continued unabated and ongoing efforts to use migration as a political means failed to achieve U.S. purposes, the United States sought additional ways to weaken Cuba. Once again, the government looked for ways to control, if not exploit, the Cuban-American community and the identity of exile for these purposes. [FN117] In 1981, Cuban Americans in Miami, encouraged and supported by the Reagan administration, created the Cuban-American National Foundation (“CANF”) to function as a Cuban-American political action committee modeled after the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the pro-Israel lobbying group. [FN118] The group was conceived in the context of larger global concerns, specifically regarding the Western Hemisphere and what U.S. policy makers perceived as growing threats to U.S. political and economic domination of the region. [FN119] The founding of CANF was linked to President Reagan, Republican Party operatives, and CIA veterans who came to appreciate the efficacy of a fiercely conservative Cuban-American lobby to provide domestic impetus to U.S. foreign policy and “popularize the Reagan administration’s policies.” [FN120]

CANF wielded significant influence in Congress through sizeable campaign donations targeted particularly at Senate candidates with influence in matters of foreign policy. [FN121] CANF members were appointed by the Reagan administration to United Nations committees as part of the government’s efforts to globalize the U.S. purpose of and means for isolating Cuba and fostering economic *1903 turmoil on the island. [FN122] In turn, CANF received government contracts, funding for projects related to migration, and support for its propaganda efforts through control of Radio Marti. [FN123]

CANF’s main purpose was to gain political influence over the Cuban-American community in service of U.S. policies. It opposed a continuation of “the diálogo” and attacked Cuban Americans who encouraged negotiations between the United States and Cuba. [FN124] Although it was not the most extreme of the exile groups, its privileged relationship to the Reagan administration gave it legitimacy and resources with which to impose its views. [FN125] Indeed, Human Rights Watch condemned the climate of fear, intimidation, and suppression of speech fostered by CANF. [FN126]
CANF functioned as “a product of the North American pathology . . . an instrument--not an instigator--of policy.” [FN127] By virtue of its ties to policy makers, CANF wielded power in an attempt to shape exile politics. It succeeded in obtaining prohibitions and restrictions on accords and agreements designed to facilitate family contact, claiming that these relationships served to support Castro. [FN128] It was with CANF support that in 1982, President Reagan reimposed travel restrictions that the Carter administration had lifted. [FN129] Families *1904 were now burdened with the requirement of a special license to travel to Cuba. [FN130]

The Cuban-American community, while associated with the politics of exile, has long lost its monolithic character, and its members have demonstrated divergent views on Cuba and U.S.-Cuba relations. [FN131] CANF set the stage for the post-Cold War struggle between the political economy of globalization and the transcendent desires of the binational Cuban-American family to maintain ties and support.

III. Sanctions and the Post-Cold War Global Economy, 1990-Present

A. Torricelli, Helms-Burton, and the Migration Crisis of the 1990s

In the early 1990s, a dramatic global shift occurred. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc signaled Cuba's loss of trading partners. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Cuba plunged into a deep economic crisis that threatened the survival of the Castro government. [FN132] Cuba responded by seeking to engage with other countries and establish and improve international relationships--including its relationship with the United States--in its efforts to seek new economic ties and foreign investors. [FN133] The government also introduced political reforms as well as domestic economic adaptations as a means to weather the crisis and fend off internal collapse. [FN134]

*1905 It was in this changing global setting that the United States seized new opportunities to further increase pressure on Cuba by enacting the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (“Torricelli Act”) [FN135] for the stated purpose of “wreak[ing] havoc on the island.” [FN136] In response to Cuban efforts to reintegrate itself into the global economy, the Torricelli Act sought to assume extraterritorial authority and prohibited third-country subsidiaries of U.S. companies from doing business with Cuba. [FN137] It authorized the President to impose sanctions, including cutting aid and debt relief on any country that traded with or assisted Cuba. [FN138]

During the next four years, Cuba continued to expand market-style economic reforms, establish trade relationships with countries outside of the former Soviet bloc, and open its markets to foreign investors. [FN139] Although the Clinton administration acknowledged the reforms, the administration nonetheless dismissed them as a sign of weakness--proof that the embargo was working and that more of the same would deliver the coup de grace to the struggling Cuban government. [FN140] Thus, in pursuit of never-ending hopes of accelerating the Cuban government's demise, and in response to further deteriorating relationships between the United States and Cuba, Congress enacted yet another embargo-related statute, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Helms-Burton Act”). [FN141]
The Helms-Burton Act expanded restrictions, added new sanctions, and codified all aspects of the embargo, thereby prohibiting the executive branch from easing the restrictions without an act of Congress. The new law expanded the extraterritorial reach of the embargo and prohibited the importation of any products, including goods “made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba.” Congress instructed the executive branch to exercise its authority to prevent Cuba's membership in international financial institutions and the Organization of the Americas. International financial institutions that engaged in financial transactions with Cuba would suffer a forfeit of payment by the United States. As a result, the lack of access to international financing severely limited Cuba's integration into the global economy.

After the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts, the embargo operated at full throttle, despite admissions by the U.S. government that the threat of communism in the region was nonexistent. The extraterritorial provisions were effective. Countries dependent on U.S. aid and corporations engaged in U.S. trade, fearful of reprisals, pulled out of Cuba. The logic of U.S. policy remained constant: to deepen economic hardship among Cubans who were now especially vulnerable in the post-Soviet environment, and thereby generate popular discontent inside Cuba and--the Americans hoped--uprisings against the Cuban government. The embargo laws and regulations were successful, particularly with regard to the impact on Cuban families. Families suffered nutritional deficits and limited access to medicines. The prohibition on trade and travel made the pain of family separation all the more difficult.

Many Cuban-American families objected strenuously to these laws. Alicia Torres, testifying before Congress on behalf of the Cuban-American Committee Research and Education Fund, argued that families should not be used as weapons in the U.S. war against Cuba. The “pressure cooker” theory, she noted, would have repercussions principally on “our relatives in Cuba” who would suffer “greater hardships.” Representative of the Cuban Democratic Party in Miami, the Coordinated Organizations of Human Rights in Cuba, and Cuban dissident groups testified about the wrong-headedness of the restrictions, including the travel restrictions, noting that in Cuba, “ordinary citizens are consumed by the daily struggle for survival.”

The burden, of course, fell primarily on Cubans who lived on the island. For example, a public health expert who visited Cuba following the Torricelli Act noted the detrimental effect of the new law on the health of Cuban citizens due to the U.S. domination of the pharmaceutical industry, the ban on subsidiary trade, and the newly imposed licensing requirement for sending medicines and medical supplies. A report by the American Association of World Health concluded that the embargo had resulted in a number of nutritional deficiency related illnesses, including the highly publicized eye disease (neuropathy) that has affected so many Cubans. Indeed, a Miami Herald poll in Cuba found that a majority of Cubans identified the U.S. embargo and not the Cuban government as the cause of economic turmoil and misery.

Predictably, the combination of the Soviet collapse, the ensuing loss of Soviet subsidies, and the consequences of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts resulted in a marked increase in the number of
Cubans who made desperate attempts to leave the island. In 1994, tens of thousands of Cubans left Cuba in unseaworthy boats and homemade rafts precipitating what has come to be known as the balsero (“rafters”) crisis. [FN157] Like the Marielitos before them, the balseros fit the prototype of economic refugees and garnered less sympathy than earlier émigrés who were more readily classified as political exiles. [FN158]

The response of the United States to the balsero crisis indicated a shift in U.S.-Cuba foreign policy. President Clinton initially prohibited “‘illegal refugees from Cuba’” from entering the United States and ordered their confinement at the Guantanamo Naval Base. [FN159] Though he allowed them entrance soon afterwards, the tide of migration did not subside. In response, the United States closed the “preferential open door” policy and introduced the “wet foot/dry foot” policy, which allowed those Cubans who reached land to avail themselves of the privileges of the Cuban Adjustment Act but required the Cubans intercepted at sea to return to Cuba. [FN160] These arrangements were based on new migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to further stem the tide of rafters. [FN161]

The policy of encouraging migration to the United States as a means to weaken Cuba had failed and was no longer considered an effective means to remove the Cuban government. United States sanctions had indeed contributed to weakening Cuba's economy. But as historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr., observed, “[t]he concept of sanctions . . . was deeply flawed” since pressures created by sanctions “were in large part relieved by Cuban emigration.” [FN162] Because Cuban families in the United States overwhelmingly desired to visit and support their families in Cuba, a flow of foreign exchange and goods allowed many Cubans to survive the very sanctions designed to topple the Cuban government. [FN163] As a result, U.S. policy began to increase its focus on restricting travel and remittances.

B. Shifting Strategies: Deterring Family Support

Cuban émigrés had been afforded privileges in the realm of entry into the United States. They gained admission according to laws that were exclusively created for and applied to Cubans. [FN164] They benefited from social services designed for Cubans only and achieved political enfranchisement with relative ease. [FN165] But these privileges were conceived in service of U.S. foreign policy--not as a matter of family sustenance--and could not be parlayed into the circumstances of the everyday practices of maintaining binational family relationships.

With some brief exceptions, families who wished to travel to Cuba and send funds to relatives on the island have always suffered *1910 the punishment of the U.S. economic war on Cuba. [FN166] Since 1959, U.S. laws and regulations affecting families have operated in a dialectical warp that has corresponded to weaknesses that continually burden the Cuban state, as well as global economic conditions, affronts, and perceived wrongs committed by the Cuban government. The pattern of restrictions alternating with relaxation of the rules by which Cuban-Americans must abide in order to support their families continues to the present, with little sign of normalization of relations.

Although the initial embargo and Treasury Department regulations did not specifically ban travel or remittances, the restrictions on financial transactions with Cuba ultimately did. [FN167] In 1977, Cuban
families benefited from a brief exception to the restrictions when the Carter administration permitted travel-related transactions under a general license for anyone wishing to travel to Cuba. [FN168] The Carter administration authorized limited remittances in 1978. [FN169] In 1982, the Reagan administration reinstated travel restrictions but continued to allow general licenses for families visiting close relatives. [FN170] Then, in 1988, the Reagan administration imposed new hardships on families wishing to travel or send remittances by creating a new licensing system for travel services and remittance forwarding businesses engaged in Cuba-related transactions. [FN171] These changes were made to discourage such businesses in order to “reduce the flow of hard currency to Cuba through transactions with persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” [FN172]

During the 1990s, global circumstances demonstrated the importance of travel and remittances. [FN173] Cuba undertook significant *1911 reforms to increase the flow of funds to families and endeavored to improve relations with émigrés. [FN174] In this period, the characteristics of Cuban migration resembled the migration patterns and consequences elsewhere in Latin America; the economies of which were based on a growing dependency on family remittances as an important source of national income. [FN175] Remittances from abroad, particularly from the Unites States, dramatically increased. [FN176] It was at this point that U.S. laws became increasingly punitive.

In addition to the provisions of the Torricelli Act that sought to halt all trade with Cuba, the Act authorized the President to impose restrictions on remittances to Cuba and thus limit the amount that could be spent on Cuban families wishing to travel to the United States to visit family. [FN177] In 1992, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) reduced the sum that families could send from $500 to $300 in any one quarter. [FN178] The Act authorized the Treasury Department to take enforcement action against families who violated the 1992 restrictions. [FN179] In an effort to avoid the more rigorous standards of proof necessary to proceed in criminal matters, OFAC amended its rules to enact civil penalties of up to fifty thousand dollars. [FN180]

From 1994 through 1998, the Clinton administration prohibited family remittances except “when extreme hardship is demonstrated in *1912 cases involving extreme humanitarian need.” [FN181] Cuban Americans were no longer permitted to travel under a general license to family; instead, they were required to submit to a case-by-case review for permission to engage in “travel-related transactions.” [FN182] Both travel and remittance rules were liberalized again in 1995, then tightened in 1996 as a consequence of the Helms-Burton Act, [FN183] and relaxed again in 1998. [FN184] However, in 1998, new regulations obliged Cuban Americans to sign a remittance affidavit that included data on households of both sender and recipient, a requirement that discouraged individuals from sending money through officially sanctioned channels. [FN185]

Between 2000 and 2004, the Bush administration again eased and tightened the regulations. In 2003, a notable regulatory amendment allowed visits of relatives within three degrees of relationship without having to demonstrate humanitarian need. [FN186] These amendments also increased the amount of money that could be carried to Cuba from $300 to $3,000, although the limit of $300 per quarter destined for each household did not change. [FN187] At the same time, OFAC enforcement capabilities were once more strengthened, and President Bush directed the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity to increase enforcement efforts related to travel and any item sent to Cuba. [FN188]

The ongoing changes and ever-tightening restrictions affecting migration, travel, and remittances raise persistent concerns about the nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The policy has relied primarily on statutory and regulatory schemes to deny Cuban families the ability to discharge fundamental commitments to loved ones. [FN189] Although as Adam Feibelman points out, remittances may “act as incentives for workers to migrate internationally, in some cases increasing their exposure to unfair business practices and imposing costs on family members who remain in the workers' home countries;” [FN190] in the case of Cuba, it is more complicated. The migration context of Cuban remittances is entwined with the economic turmoil caused by the embargo. On one side of the Florida Straits, the Cuban government readily encouraged remittances in an attempt to redress the effects of an economic war and a global capitalist economy. [FN191] On the other side, for most of the past fifty years, U.S. laws have restricted Cuban Americans from sending remittances. [FN192] Despite the refusal of the United States to depoliticize the practices of family sustenance, Cuban Americans have continued to find ways to meet their obligations to family notwithstanding obstacles posed by U.S. law. [FN193]

C. A Failed Policy: The Binational Family as Transgressor

While restrictions on remittances and travel have been a nearly constant feature of U.S. foreign policy, so too has the willingness of Cuban-American families to violate the law. Whether funds are sent to assist family members to migrate or to help with everyday necessities in Cuba, remittances have flowed continuously since Cubans first migrated to the United States. [FN194] Families have traveled illegally, typically through third countries. [FN195] They have also sought to bring their loved ones to the island through unauthorized and sometimes dangerous means. [FN196]

The determinants of transgressive behaviors are varied and complex. They include historic, political, and cultural forces, some unique to Cuba, others related to globalization factors, and still others that are characteristic of families generally. The history of Cuban immigration to the United States dates back to the nineteenth century and includes a sustained pattern of immigrants providing support to relatives on the island. [FN197] Notwithstanding the disruption to households occasioned by the constancy of migration flows, experts who have studied the sociology of the Cuban family have described families as “the most important social unit in the life of Cubans.” [FN198] “Familism” is the basic structure of Cuban society and includes not only nuclear and extended family, but friends, neighbors, and communities who represent fictive kin. [FN199] The strength of these relationships overrides laws that limit the ability of families to sustain relationships.

Professor Guillermo Bernal, who has studied Cuban migration, notes that “the degree of connectedness that Cuban families maintain to their birthplace, culture, and roots is an important element in the assessment of the Cuban families in the United States . . . [l]oyalty and legacy issues are particularly visible with Cuban families.” [FN200] Cubans have successfully established a society in accordance with historic ideals of self-sacrifice, collective duty, and civic participation and have cultivated a consciousness of being Cuban (“conciencia”). [FN201] As one Cuban scholar has noted, “nationalism constitutes a force for unifying people that is superior to any ideological or philosophical creed.” [FN202]
Scholars who have studied patterns of remittance have observed that Cuban Americans are less likely than other remitters to be *1915 motivated for self-interested purposes and more apt to send money to families primarily out of altruistic motives. [FN203] Unlike other remitters who send funds back to the home country where they may have some expectations of return, Cuban émigrés generally consider themselves to be in the United States permanently. [FN204] They have no assumptions of personally benefitting from funds sent to the island. [FN205] Moreover, they cannot expect their funds to be privately invested or yield profits given the nature of the Cuban political economy. [FN206]

It is these characteristics that provide the context for considering the variety of ways that Cubans confront the restrictions. Some are legal but many are illegal. Cuban Americans formed the Cuban-American Commission for Family Rights to counter the travel and remittance restrictions. [FN207] In 2004, as opinions moderated in the exile community, CANF reversed its support of travel restrictions and denounced the Bush administration restrictions. [FN208] More recently, CANF released a “White Paper” for the purposes of addressing U.S.-Cuba relations and encouraging the U.S. government to lift restrictions on all family travel and remittances. [FN209] Other groups have attempted to bring political pressure in an effort to lift the restrictions. [FN210]

*1916 However, many Cubans denied legal means to visit family have opted for extralegal means. [FN211] Families have resorted to obtaining licenses to travel on false pretenses, signing up with religious organizations as religious workers without any intentions of carrying out religious work, or traveling illegally through third countries. [FN212] Informal means of travel and remittance-sending include black market couriers, or mulas, to carry funds and transit through third counties. [FN213] The Cuban-American community in Miami facilitates networks to assist with the processes and practices of sending money with other travelers. [FN214] Anywhere from sixty to seventy-five percent of remittance dollars to Cuba are transmitted through covert means. [FN215]

Between 1994 and 1998, when remittances were fully banned, Cuba simultaneously enacted regulatory changes that liberalized the receipt and use of remittances. [FN216] Ironically, it was during this period that funds from Cuban Americans to their families actually increased. [FN217] Cuban Americans were responding not to U.S. laws, but rather to legal changes in Cuba that facilitated the use of dollars by their families. [FN218]

Sending remittances illegally is not uncommon among Cuban Americans. Early exiles contribute a significant portion of remittances, despite a perception that they have few relatives in Cuba, and are hostile to sending remittances. [FN219] In one recent study of attitudes toward remittances among Cuban Americans, political disincentives were found to have no major effect on the decision *1917 whether or not to send funds. [FN220] Additionally, over time, the flow of dollars to Cuba has steadily increased, even after migrants assimilate in the United States. [FN221] Cuban Americans who visit their homeland are additionally motivated to send money. [FN222] For most Cuban Americans, humanitarian concerns for family override political issues. [FN223]

Although it is difficult to measure remittances to Cuba because of the informal corridors through
which funds are transmitted, the existing data on the volume of funds remitted corroborates the resolve with which Cuban Americans support their families. Notwithstanding the remittance restrictions, from the early 1990s until 2004, dollars were the principal currency in Cuba as a result of funds sent by Cuban Americans. [FN224] Even as remittances have declined elsewhere as a result of the recent global economic crisis, the amount of remittances to Cuba has increased. [FN225] In short, the restrictions do not reduce the transmission of funds; rather, they only increase the informality by which they are sent.

Although families may be successful at times in circumventing the restrictions, they have nonetheless been devastated by their impact. In 2005, Jeanne Parr Lemkau and David L. Strug, concerned about the mental health effects on Cuban-American families as a result of the 2004 restrictions, conducted in-depth surveys with affected individuals. [FN226] The stories they captured led one commentator to conclude that “[s]eparating families by restricting travel is unjust; the suffering inflicted on families, unbearable.” [FN227] In their report, they document an unyielding commitment expressed by Cuban Americans for their loved ones in Cuba, a sentiment given clear expression by one woman who stated “‘[T]he family is more powerful than any law.’” [FN228] Such a sentiment serves as a convincing critique of legal mechanisms that facilitate U.S. hegemonic policies toward Cuba.

*1918* IV. Obama Year One: The Limits of Change

On April 13, 2009, days prior to attending the Summit of the Americas and after increasing pressure from Latin American countries for the United States to signal a change in relations with Cuba, President Obama announced the lifting of restrictions on family travel and remittances. [FN229] The new regulations continue to impose a limit on funds that can be used for travel (restored to the levels in effect before the 2004 changes) and continue to require families to complete affidavits in order to send remittances. [FN230] Travel restrictions for Americans of non-Cuban descent remain in effect. [FN231] However, families, now redefined to once again include aunts, uncles, cousins, and second cousins, are allowed unlimited visits. [FN232] Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the amount of remittances that can be sent. [FN233] New regulations also make it easier for families to send gift packages to Cuba. [FN234]

The news was, of course, welcomed not only in countless Cuban-American households and throughout Cuba but also among a broad range of policy makers, analysts, and international leaders long opposed to U.S. policies toward Cuba. [FN235] Travel agencies were immediately flooded with reservation requests. [FN236] On the same day of *1919* the President's announcement, remittance-sending providers issued their own media statements to report that they were ready for a new surge in business. [FN237]

But the recent modifications of U.S. regulations do not signal the end of the paradigm within which they function. In the realm of family travel, it merely restores the position of binational families to the circumstances prior to the 2004 restrictions. The lifting of the restrictions was encoded in an unchanging political jargon and captioned as an event to “[promote] democracy and human rights in Cuba,” the euphemism of choice for toppling the Cuban government. [FN238] Although President Obama hailed his announcement at the Summit as a “new beginning,” [FN239] and despite the fact that his administra-

tion acknowledged the failure of the fifty-year-old policy of hostility toward Cuba, he made clear that the United States would not lift the embargo. [FN240] Indeed, in September 2009 the President renewed the Trading with the Enemy Act against Cuba, stating that it was in the interest of the United States to do so--an act overwhelmingly condemned by the international community. [FN241] The Obama administration has continued to impose significant fines for embargo violations and has continued the ban on the exportation of medical *1920 equipment. [FN242] Moreover, the Obama administration decided to continue to keep Cuba on the list of terrorist states. [FN243]

As historian Louis Pérez has observed, “Obama's ‘new beginning’ possesses a wearisome familiarity.” [FN244] Since the Clinton administration, U.S. officials have noted a readiness to change policy toward Cuba, and a willingness to respond albeit “in a carefully calibrated way” to Cuban economic and political reforms. [FN245] But reforms in Cuba, when they are made, have been used in the United States as evidence of Cuban weakness, followed by U.S. demands for more reforms. Carlos Gutierrez, outgoing Commerce Secretary under the Bush administration, counseled then-President-elect Obama about the need to be cautious with regard to policy toward Cuba, describing it as “something between a game of chicken and a game of chess.” [FN246] Given President Obama's continuation of failed policies, one would assume that he has followed Gutierrez's advice and that binational family relations still remain subject to foreign policy manipulation.

Conclusion

There are good reasons to seek meaningful changes toward Cuba. What is required is no less than the normalization of relationships to foster dialogue, debate, and engagement in the pursuit of solutions to the various concerns of mutual interests to both Cuba and the United States. In a recent report issued by the Center for Democracy in the Americas, Cuba analysts from a broad range of disciplines have offered various proposals for shifting from a failed Cuba policy. [FN247] In addition to lifting all restrictions on trade and travel, the report's authors have endorsed “cooperation in military affairs and law enforcement, health research and hurricane preparedness, energy development and migration policy, commerce and academic exchange, and for reuniting Cuban families--to build *1921 trust back into the U.S.-Cuba relationship.” [FN248] Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, noted the importance of Cuba to U.S. relationships in the Western Hemisphere. “By [acting positively toward Cuba] . . . we open the door to our backyard, our hemisphere, to Canada, to Mexico, to all of Central and South America. We open the door in a way we have never done before.” [FN249] Certainly Cuba's close relationship with Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution, described as a “movement” that “has galvanised people, first across Venezuela and then across South America as a whole,” demonstrates Cuba's hemispheric importance. [FN250] Cuba has played a significant role in the formation of Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas Agreement (“ALBA”), which has given rise to a financial institution (“Banco del Sur”) designed to provide alternatives to the World Bank and the development of alternative structures to neoliberalism. [FN251] Recently, old Cold War rhetoric has re-emerged as former high-ranking officials have proclaimed post-coup Honduras “as the principal battleground in a proxy fight with Cuba and Venezuela.” [FN252] These actions challenge the paradigm of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Until the United States ceases to see itself as “the centre of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world,” a change of policy is
unlikely. [FN253]

United States laws that have facilitated these policies violate the very normative functions of law by their failure to operate as a *1922 “body of general principles, not a collection of special commands.”* [FN254] Using the law in this way is ironic, given U.S. demands of the Cuban government for change that include greater democratic freedoms for Cuban people and to respect basic human rights. [FN255] United States restrictions on family travel violate principles of family reunification that have served as the cornerstone of immigration law, as well as a number of human rights laws that guarantee the right to leave and return to one's country. [FN256] The prohibitions on remittances have served to interfere with the personal bonds, emotional ties, and basic family rights that such transactions represent. [FN257] The irony has not been lost on Cuban Americans who have suffered the restrictions and whose grief and anger are expressed by one woman who stated, “‘Some day it will seem preposterous to anyone that the U.S. government ever devised such restrictions.’” [FN258] It would seem that day is long overdue.

For now, the restrictions that most directly burden the Cuban binational family have been lifted. But the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Torricelli Act, and the Helms-Burton Act, which have functioned as a personal embargo against families who have borne the brunt of U.S. policies, remain in place. Binational families continue to suffer the consequences of these laws. The hope lies in the very words expressed by President Obama on the eve of the lifting of restrictions--that “the Cuban people's desire to freely determine their future and that of their country is in the national interest of the United States.” [FN259] Only time will tell if those words will be given meaning and whether fifty years of a loathsome policy can be reversed.

[FNa1]. © 2010 Deborah M. Weissman.

[FNaa1]. Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law. I am grateful to Louis A. Pérez, Jr., for informative conversation that helped shape this Article, and to Lars Schoultz for comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Caroline Smiley and Brandi Leigh Jones for excellent research assistance, as well as to Caroline Batchelor and the other editors at the North Carolina Law Review for their thoughtful editing.


[FN2]. See infra Part II.

[FN3]. Throughout this Article, the use of the terms “emigration” and “émigré” correspond to the concept of the movement of people away from their homes to live in different places, the terms “immigration” and “immigrant” correspond to the concept of the movement of people to a place to settle there, and “migration” refers to the movement of people from one place to another. See The American Heritage Dictionary 602, 903, 1143 (3d ed. 1992).
[FN4]. Lisandro Pérez, Migration from Socialist Cuba: A Critical Analysis of the Literature, in Cubans in the United States, supra note 1, at 12, 16.


[FN6]. See infra Part II.

[FN7]. See infra Part III.


[FN11]. Id.

[FN12]. Id.


[FN14]. 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,772 (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. §515.561(c) (2009)). The regulations also reversed prior regulations that authorized those who share a common dwelling as a family with the traveler to accompany the traveler, unless they are also immediate family members of the person to be visited. Id.

[FN15]. Id.


[FN17]. Id.


[FN22]. Human Rights Watch, supra note 20, at 58 (quoting then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega).


[FN24]. See Lemkau & Strug, supra note 23, at 1, 3.


[FN28]. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that unlike past restrictions, the 2004 regulations did not allow for any exceptions).

changes were made following its distribution. See generally Comm'n for Assistance to a Free Cuba, Report to the President (2006), available at http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf (outlining many of the same proposals as the 2004 report).

[FN30]. Comm’n for Assistance to a Free Cuba, 2004 Report, supra note 29, at 7-54.

[FN31]. Id. at 9.

[FN32]. Id. at 155, 201-51. The proposed overhaul called for U.S. “assistance” in drafting a new constitution based on the view that “initially, Cubans may not be ideally positioned to govern themselves.” Id. at 175.


[FN34]. LeoGrande, supra note 33, at 94 (quoting Secretary General of the Organization of American States José Miguel Insulza).

[FN35]. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Toledo in Toledo (Sept. 6, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64618.


[FN37]. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Interview with Latin American and American Spanish Language Journalists, supra note 36.
[FN38]. George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Toledo, supra note 35 (reminding the audience of parents' desires to support their children in pushing migration-related issues).

[FN39]. See Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution 143, 175, 192-200 (2009). In response to the nationalization of U.S. property, the Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union, and Cuban support for armed struggle in Latin America, the United States adopted a series of actions designed to overthrow the Cuban government, first through the ill-fated Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón) in 1961, and later through a program of covert operations. Id.

[FN40]. See infra notes 41-48, 135-46 and accompanying text.


[FN44]. Id. at 985, 988; see, e.g., id. at 928, 931, 984.


[FN46]. Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister MacMillan, Doc. 551 (July 11, 1960), in FRUS Vol VI, supra note 45, at 1000, 1003; see also Memorandum from the Assistant Sec’y of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Sec’y of State, Doc. 594 (Oct. 19, 1960), in FRUS Vol. VI, supra note 45, at 1091, 1091-92 (noting that economic pressure will contribute to “dissatisfaction and unrest”).


[FN48]. Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 34
J. Latin Am. Stud. 227, 242 (2002) (quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Lester D. Mallory); see also Memorandum from the Assistant Sec’y of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Sec’y of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Doc. 432 (Sept. 19, 1962), in FRUS Vol X, supra note 43, at 1068, 1068-69 [hereinafter Doc. 432] (predicting the peak of Cuban dissatisfaction with the Castro regime as a result of the weakened economy).


[FN50]. See Patrick Symmes, The Boys from Dolores: Fidel Castro’s Schoolmates from Revolution to Exile 207 (2007) (describing the initial flight of Cubans as being the wealthy and people implicated in the previous government); see also Guillermo Bernal, Cuban Families, in Ethnicity and Family Therapy (Monica Goldrick et al. eds., 1982), reprinted in Cubans in the United States, supra note 1, at 135, 137 (explaining the different phases and classes of Cuban migration to the United States); Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration, 19 Intl’l Migration Rev. 4, 9 (1985) (stating that the first wave of Cuban departures consisted of the elite and wealthy); Alejandro Portes, Naturalization and Voting Patterns of Cubans in the United States, in Cubans in the United States, supra note 1, at 1, 7 (describing the cause and scope of Cuban immigration to the United States).

[FN51]. Bernal, supra note 50, at 137. Throughout this period, many Cubans were allowed to migrate through a number of negotiated migration processes. Id. From 1965-1973, Cuba opened the Camarioca port to allow Cuban émigrés to arrive by boat to pick up their relatives. Id. From 1965-1971, the United States and Cuba negotiated airlifts ("Freedom Flights") from Havana to Miami to allow primarily family members but also those who were seeking economic opportunities, to migrate. Id.


[FN53]. Bernal, supra note 50, at 137; see also Robert L. Bach, Socialist Construction and Cuban Emigration: Explorations into Mariel, 15:2 Cuban Stud. 19, 25 (1985) (stating that the economy in Cuba created social pressures which resulted in emigration); Blue, supra note 26, at 67-68; Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 116, 118, 125 (reviewing testimony that described Cuban émigrés after the first two years following the revolution as neither poor nor political, but rather frustrated by the lack of easily accessible consumer goods).

[FN54]. See 2 The World Bank: Its First Half Century 207-08 (Devesh Kapur et al. eds., 1997) (noting foreign policy decisions formulated to concerns that third world countries would succumb to socialist influences); Pérez, supra note 48, at 239 (describing U.S. concerns about containing communism and maintaining influence in these areas).

[FN55]. Pérez, supra note 48, at 249.
White, How to Put Squeeze on Castro--United States Considering Economic Blockade, Permanent Re-
settlement of Refugees, Wash. Evening Star, Aug. 7, 1961, which Rep. Boggs had entered into the re-
cord); see, e.g., Felix Masud-Piloto, Cuba: Colonizers, Slaves, Exiles, and Refugees in Cuban History,
in Migration and Immigration: A Global View 53, 58 (Maura I. Toro-Morn & Marixsa Alicea eds.,
2004) (describing the scope and impact of the Cuban Refugee Program); Memorandum from the Chief
399] (encouraging the exodus of skilled labor).

[FN57]. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Dir. of the U.S. Info. Agency (Murrow) to Dir. of Cent. Intel-
ligence McCon, Doc. 240 (Dec. 10, 1962), in XI Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Cu-
ban Missile Crisis and Aftermath 605, 605 (David S. Patterson et al. eds., 1996), available at http://his-
tory.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d240 (discussing the use of radio broadcasts and
economic pressure as a means to turn the Cubans against their government); Priority Operations Sched-
[hereinafter Doc. 338] (noting the importance of controlling migration for the purpose of influencing
activities within Cuba).

[FN58]. Doc. 338, supra note 57, at 814. In this memorandum, the U.S. government candidly admits that
it is the “task” of the CIA to produce defectors. Id. The government also admits its plans to “[e]ncourage
and exploit the defection of Cuban diplomats,” to “expand the delivery of propaganda material into
Cuba,” and to “disaffect the Cuban people.” Doc. 399, supra note 56, at 978, 982. Additionally, the gov-
ernment planned to engage in “psychological propaganda” against Cuba. Doc. 338, supra note 57, at
813-14. The subversive nature of these plans was underscored by the very fact that the CIA was tasked
with producing the defectors. See id. at 814.

[FN59]. Doc. 399, supra note 56, at 982.

[FN60]. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.

[FN61]. Doc. 432, supra note 48, at 1070; Doc. 338, supra note 57, at 814.

[FN62]. María de los Angeles Torres, The Lost Apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban Children in the
eration Peter Pan as an ideological struggle to control children in Cuba as a means to influence the U.S.
battle against Cuban communism).

[FN63]. See id. at 67-69, 89 nn.8-10 (recounting the participation of Esso Standard and Shell Oil, the
Catholic Welfare Bureau, and the State Department); see also Sanford J. Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New
American Immigrants 201 (1998) (describing actions by the State Department and various charities that
assisted in getting children out of Cuba). A number of corporations, including those whose interests had
been nationalized in Cuba, participated in the initiative along with the Catholic Church and the U.S.
State Department. See, e.g., María de los Angeles Torres, Elián and the Tale of Pedro Pan, Nation, Mar.


[FN64]. See Torres, The Lost Apple, supra note 62, at 89, 91. The CIA coordinated its efforts with Special Operations in the Department of Defense to disseminate propaganda not only in Cuba, but throughout Latin America in hopes of creating political divisions within the Western Hemisphere. Id. at 90-91.

[FN65]. See id. at 88, 158-59 (stating that many Cubans were promised scholarships to study in the United States as a means to disguise Operation Pedro Pan from Cuban officials). Many teenagers who were anticipating scholarship opportunities were devastated to learn there were none and instead endured life in military barrack-type conditions. Id. at 159, 170-71, 180-82.

[FN66]. Mariana Ortega, Exiled Space, In Between Space: Existential Spatiality in Ana Mendieta's Siluetas Series, 7 Phil. & Geography 25, 29 n.14 (2004); cf. Emron Esplin, Cuban Types, Distorted Memory, and a Return to Cuba in Cristina Garcia's The Aguero Sisters, 20 Confluencia 83, 86 n.3 (2005) (investigating the effects of Operation Pedro Pan on Cuban youths in the United States and in Cuba). Some parents were further motivated to choose this course based on the assumption that they would then have an easier time migrating to rejoin their children. Torres, Elían and the Tale of Pedro Pan, supra note 63, at 21 (stating that half the Cuban children arriving in America lived with relatives and the other half were placed in the foster care system); see also Abreu, supra note 63, at 7 (describing how false information from the CIA and Cuban parents’ fear of the Cold War resulted in thousands of Cuban parents desperately sending their children to the United States without knowing where they would stay, who would care for them, or how long the separation would be).

[FN67]. See, e.g., Torres, The Lost Apple, supra note 62, at 157, 162.

[FN68]. See, e.g., id. at 170-71 (detailing poor living conditions, cruel working situations, and allegations of sexual abuse).

[FN69]. See id. at 157 (reporting the woman as saying that “her heart could not take it”).

[FN70]. Id. at 93, 228-29.

[FN71]. See Ungar, supra note 63, at 201 (“[T]he Miami Herald and other publications ... have begun only recently to write about ‘the dark side of Pedro Pan,’ raising questions about the morality of having encouraged the separation of children from parents for reasons dictated by U.S. foreign policy.”). Other U.S. offenses targeted at children were uncovered, including efforts to sabotage food distribution and taint milk delivered to school with cement powder. Abreu, supra note 63, at 52 (describing the revelations of Verne Lyon who had been recruited to work for the CIA in 1962).

[FN73] Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 118 (comparing the exceptional treatment afforded Cubans as compared with the Hungarians also fleeing a communist regime).

[FN74] See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

[FN75] See Wasem, supra note 72, at 2.


[FN78] See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.

[FN79] See Editorial Note, Doc. 2 (Jan. 3, 1961), in FRUS Vol X, supra note 43, at 2, 2, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/docs/frusX/01_15.html. On January 3, 1961, after receiving a request from the Cuban government to reduce the number of U.S. personnel in the embassy, President Eisenhower determined to completely break off diplomatic relations while simultaneously directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to intensify efforts to invade Cuba. Id. (documenting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordered to investigate ways to train Cuban refugees and expand the program to invade Cuba).


[FN90]. Portes, supra note 50, at 2.

[FN91]. See Bernal, supra note 50, at 148-50 (giving examples of how families were negatively affected by migration).


[FN93]. Id.

[FN94]. Schoultz, supra note 39, at 354.


[FN96]. Masud-Piloto, supra note 89, at 82-83 (describing the factors that led the Cuban government to open the Port of Mariel); Schoultz, supra note 39, at 354-56 (“The United States encourages illegal departures from Cuba, the hijacking of boats, and it receives the hijackers almost as if they were heroes.”) (quoting Fidel Castro)). The Immigration and Nationalization Service did the best that it could to prose-
cute boat owners who traveled to Cuba to bring Cubans to Florida. There were a few unsuccessful attempts, but the policy was to ignore these law breakers. Id. at 356; see, e.g., Pollgreen v. Morris, 770 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289, 289-90 (S.D. Fla. 1980).

[FN97] Masud-Piloto, supra note 89, at 71.


[FN100] Id.

[FN101] Id. at 49-52 (noting that this was particularly true for families of political prisoners, over four thousand of whom were released).


[FN103] U.S. Policy and the Future of Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and U.S. Travel to Cuba: J. Hearing Before the H. Subcoms. on Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment; Western Hemisphere Affairs; and International Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong. 56, 70 (1993) (statement of Alicia M. Torres, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Cuban-American Committee Research & Education Fund) (describing the creation of the Cuban-American Committee Research and Education Fund following the diálogo).


[FN105] Id. at 52-53.

[FN106] See id. at 53-54 (describing cultural changes in Cuba as a result of increased contact with Cuban émigrés); Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 135 (describing the impact of visits on Cubans who never left and who were impressed by the wealth and lifestyles of the visitors from the United States); see, e.g., Bach, supra note 53, at 37; Blue, supra note 26, at 69; Barberia, supra note 95, at 8-9.

[FN107] See Pérez, supra note 4, at 12, 14 (critiquing the U.S. manufactured “myth of abundance” used to lure Cubans to the United States).


[FN111]. Masud-Piloto, supra note 89, at 83 (quoting President Jimmy Carter). Carter was also facing re-election and was motivated by the concerns of the Cuban-American community who, despite some level of disdain for the Marielitos, would not accept a termination of the open-door immigration policy Cubans had enjoyed. Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 136.


[FN113]. Hughes, supra note 88, at 56.

[FN114]. See Masud-Piloto, supra note 89, at 84, 86. The President was forced to grant somewhat similar relief to a group of Haitians who had migrated because the discrepancy in treatment between the two nationalities was too great to continue. Boswell, supra note 112, at 689 n.3. A separate status termed “Cuban-Haitian Status” was enacted by executive order to deal with the admission of Cubans and Haitians during this period. Id.


[FN116]. The exception here was a short-lived category of Haitian entrants. See Wasem, supra note 72, at 5-6 (referencing the Immigration Reform and Control Act and Title V of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, §501, 94 Stat. 1799, 1809); Boswell, supra note 112, at 697-98.

[FN117]. See supra Parts II.A., II.B.


[FN119]. María de los Angeles Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States 114-15 (1999) (describing the directions from Roger Fontaine, a principal advisor to President Reagan on Latin America on the National Security Council, to create such a lobby based on a report that cited
concerns about Soviet and Cuban influence in the region).


[FN121]. See Haney & Vanderbush, supra note 120, at 87.


[FN123]. See, e.g., Haney & Vanderbush, supra note 120, at 40-42; Schoultz, supra note 39, at 370, 414; Torres, supra note 119, at 146; Fernández, supra note 118, at 126.


[FN125]. See Carlos Forment, Caribbean Geopolitics and Foreign State-Sponsored Social Movements: The Case of Cuban Exile Militancy 1959-1979, in Cubans in the United States, supra note 1, at 65, 84 (arguing that Cuban-American political consciousness was shaped primarily in the United States, not in Cuba).


[FN128]. Torres, supra note 119, at 143. CANF would change its position on this over time. See infra Part III.C.


[FN132]. See supra note 5 for a description of Cuba's “Special Period.”


[FN137]. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 §6003(a); see Gelbard, supranote 133, at 317 (noting concerns that the law demanded other countries similarly embargo Cuba).

[FN138]. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 §6003(b)(1). Any vessel known to be engaging in trade with Cuba was barred from loading or unloading freight at any place in the United States. §6005. The statute included U.S. territories and “possessions.” §6005(b)(4)(B).

[FN139]. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

[FN140]. See Cuba in the International System, supra note 134, at 5 (noting that the Clinton administration misread the developments in Cuba); Petras & Morley, supra note 133, at 275 (“Everything they've done recently are things we've been advocating. That's good, but our question is what's next?” (quoting a State Department official)).

[FN141]. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§6021, 6021-6091 (2006)). Among other provisions, the Act required the ouster of the Castro brothers as a condition precedent to normalization of relations. §6065 (a)(7). It also included provisions known as “Track Two,”

[FN142]. Helms-Burton Act §§6021, 6032(h).

[FN143]. §6040.

[FN144]. §§6034, 6035.


[FN147]. See Petras & Morley, supra note 133, at 269, 271.


[FN151]. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992; And Withdrawal of MFN Status from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 141, at 79-86. Torres also noted that the provisions of the Act that were hailed as benefits to Cuban families, such as improved telephone communication, were of no use because the embargo prohibited improvement to the lines and payment to Cuba for their share of telecommunications revenues. Id. at 80, 85.

[FN152]. Id. at 87.

[FN153]. Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 107, 110 (1992) (statement of Dr. Enrique Baloyra, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, and President, Coordinadora Social Demócrata de Cuba); id. at 138 (testimony of Alfredo Duran, Representative of Cuban Dissidents); see id. at 138, 147 (testimony of Ramon Cernuda, Representative of Coordinated Organizations for Human Rights in Cuba).


[FN158]. Yolanda Prieto, The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community 13 (2009) (noting that the balseros were also caught up in race and anti-immigration issues).


[FN161]. See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 49. Per the 1994 migration accords, the United States agreed to accept 20,000 Cubans, not including immediate relatives, and agreed to discontinue the policy of granting parole to all Cubans who reached land. Id. Cuba agreed to take measures to stop unsafe departures from Cuba. Id. Pursuant to a second accord in 1995, the United States paroled in some 30,000 Cubans in Guantanamo but thereafter would intercept and return them to Cuba. Id. Cuba agreed to provide information about legal immigration processes and agreed that it would take no adverse action against those who attempted the trip. Id.

[FN162]. Pérez, supra note 48, at 249.

[FN163]. Id.

[FN164]. See supra notes 74-77 and 115 and accompanying text.

[FN165]. See supra notes 77 and 116 and accompanying text.

[FN166]. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.


[FN168]. Id. at 2-3.

[FN169]. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 1336, 1336 (Jan. 9, 1978) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. §515.561 (2009)) (permitting a maximum of $500 in any three month period and a one time remittance of $500 for the purposes of facilitating immigration to the United States to “close relatives” defined as a “spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, nephew, niece, or spouse, and widows or widowers of the foregoing”).


[FN171]. Id.

[FN172]. Id.

[FN173]. See Enrique V. Iglesias, Foreword to Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant Remittances Count, at ix, ix-x (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005) (relating the increased movement of people who leave their homes to obtain jobs and remit funds back to their families as a feature of the circumstances of globalization).

[FN174]. Barberia, supra note 95, at 10-13, 24 (noting the legalization of the dollar, banking reforms, augmenting consumer spending and investment options in the economy, and the establishment of a spe-
cial office dedicated to émigrés relations).

[FN175]. Manuel Orozco, Globalization and Migration: The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin America, Latin Am. Pol. & Soc., Summer 2002, at 41, 46. Remittances also serve an additional purpose of demonstrating broader global economic relations—an important consideration for Cuba. See id. at 62. In recent years, Cubans have migrated to Canada, Spain, Germany, Pakistan, Venezuela, and Kuwait from where they have been sending remittances. Joel Millman, Cuba Receives More Cash from Workers Abroad, Wall St. J., Mar 5, 2009, at A12.

[FN176]. Barberia, supra note 95, at 25.


[FN184]. Id.; Sullivan, supra note 129, at 3-4.

[FN185]. Barberia, supra note 95, at 30 (noting that OFAC licensing requirements served to deter remittances).


Sullivan, supra note 167, at 13-14. Ironically, in 2004, the same year that Cuban-American families suffered the most severe Bush administration prohibitions, a report on the Treasury Department's allocation of resources disclosed that only four employees were investigating Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein's money, while twenty-four agents were working on the Cuba embargo. See John Solomon, More Agents Track Castro than Bin Laden, Associated Press, Apr. 29, 2004, http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/cuba/1803.html (noting that the Treasury had 93 enforcement investigations open related to terrorism and 10,683 cases relating to embargo violations in the same period).


Eckstein, supra note 189, at 12.

See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 98, at 27.

See infra Part III.C.

See Barberia, supra note 95, at 26.

See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 98, at 28 (noting that the U.S. government cracked down on religious organizations that facilitated unauthorized trips to Cuba).


See Poyo, supra note 1, at 45-48 (describing the forces of Cuban nationalism in the exile community that led to the raising of funds to support leaders on the island).

Bernal, supra note 50, at 140; see also Lisandro Pérez, The Household Structure of Second-Generation Children: An Exploratory Study of Extended Family Arrangements, 28 Int'l. Migration Rev. 736, 741 (1994) (describing how Cuban families in the United States often consist of three generations, a structure that is consistent with traditional, Cuban values).

Bernal, supra note 50, at 140; see also Lemkau & Strug, supra note 23, at 2-3 (noting the tendency of Cuban families to maintain close ties and extended family and community relationships).
[FN200]. Bernal, supra note 50, at 151.


[FN203]. Blue, supra note 26, at 64 (concluding that, given the social and structural factors that influence remittances, Cuban Americans remit for altruistic purposes as opposed to self-interest); see Jórgen Carling, The Determinants of Migration Remittances, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y 581, 583 (2008) (reviewing the economic literature on migrant remittances and the motivational models as determinants for sending remittances).

[FN204]. Portes, supra note 50, at 4.

[FN205]. Cf. Barberia, supra note 95, at 30-31 (noting that despite the fact that remittance restrictions were lessened, many Cuban Americans were deterred from sending them because of attitudes that doing so was treasonous).


[FN208]. Id. (“It divides our base .... It's not in [President Bush's] political best interest to divide a community whose support for President Bush makes Crawford, Texas, look like enemy territory.”) (quoting the former CANF head and then-board member).


[FN211]. Peter Slevin, Policy Met Politics in Cuba Rules, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 2004, at A7 (“I get very offended with someone telling me how to engage with my family .... I don't want to go illegally, but if I need to go see my family because my uncle's not doing well or somebody's dying, I'll figure out a way to get there.”’ (quoting a Cuban American)).

[FN212]. Human Rights Watch, supra note 20, at 52, 60; see Sullivan, supra note 98, at 28 (noting that the U.S. government cracked down on religious organizations that facilitated unauthorized trips to Cuba); Weinmann, supra note 196, at 26.


[FN214]. Decker, supra note 213, at A3 (reporting that the Cuban-American community transmits information about who is traveling back to Cuba and when they are going).

[FN215]. Eckstein, supra note 189, at 15. Moreover, even today, only a small number of Cubans enter the United States according to the legal procedures set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Wasem, supra note 72, at 9.

[FN216]. Barberia, supra note 95, at 25, 32 (noting Cuba's legalization of the bank accounts and investments for émigrés and legalization of the dollar).

[FN217]. Id. at 31-32.

[FN218]. Blue, supra note 26, at 65 (observing that since the embargo, remittance flows correspond to Cuban government policies and initiatives).

[FN219]. Id. at 75.

[FN220]. Id. at 63.

[FN221]. Id. at 69, 74.

[FN222]. Id. at 76 (noting that increased visits to Cuba result in more remittances).

[FN223]. See Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2008) (arguing that remittances are a demonstration of love by and for transnational families and should not be politicized).

[FN224]. Frank, supra note 145.

[FN225]. Millman, supra note 175 (noting also that Cuba has sent migrant workers abroad beyond the United States in search of jobs).

[FN227]. Id. at iii.

[FN228]. Id. at 28 (quoting a Cuban American distraught about her inability to visit her sister).


[FN230]. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, supra note 9; Barberia, supra note 95, at 30, 33.


[FN232]. Id. at 9.

[FN233]. Id. at 12.


[FN242]. MacFarquhar, supra note 241.


[FN244]. Pérez, supra note 238.

[FN245]. Petras & Morley, supra note 133, at 274 (quoting Secretary of State Warren Christopher).


[FN251]. Id. at 1, 9, 10, 13 (describing, for example, Cuba's efforts to rescue Bolivia's soybean crop and its role in thwarting U.S. efforts to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas).

[FN252]. Ginger Thompson & Ron Nixon, Leader Ousted, Honduras Hires U.S. Lobbyists, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2009, at A1 (identifying former officials who have characterized the efforts to restore Manuel Zelaya, President of Honduras ousted after a coup, by using rationale and language approximating Cold War rhetoric).


[FN257]. Rosser, supra note 223, at 11, 17, 43.


[FN259]. See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the Cuban People (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-
Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people.

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