STATE ACTORS BEATING CHILDREN: A CALL FOR JUDICIAL RELIEF

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He told her to bend over a chair with her buttocks raised. The petite, attractive eighteen-year-old woman refused. The unusually large, strong young man then physically forced her to assume the position, and summoned two assistants to hold her down as she struggled to resist. He swung Ole Thunder mightily, striking her buttocks, leg, and hip with the four-foot long piece of wood. She momentarily broke a hand free and raised it to shield her body from the blows, and he struck her hand with Ole Thunder, causing her to cry out that he had broken her hand. His helpers then pulled her feet up, raising her buttocks off of the floor, and he continued to beat her with Ole Thunder. She was crying the whole time, humiliated and in a great deal of pain. When it was over, her buttocks were bleeding, her hand was too swollen and painful to use, and her face was stained with tears. Jessica Serafin was then ordered to return to her classroom and resume her studies.¹

This sounds like a nightmare, not a scene from a Texas public high school principal’s office. One would expect a federal judge to consider with diligence Jessica’s claims that her brutal beating violated the Constitution. After all, the judiciary is the self-appointed guardian of constitutional guarantees, a role that carries great responsibility to protect (especially vulnerable) citizens from other branches’ overreaching.² But the

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¹ Jessica Serafin was a student at the School of Excellence in Education in San Antonio Texas. On June 18, 2004, Jessica arrived on campus, then walked across the street to buy a breakfast taco, and returned to campus and arrived in class on time. A while later, she was summoned to Brett Wilkinson’s office, the interim principal for the school. After entering Brett’s office, the large (well over six feet) man in his early thirties told Jessica that he intended to paddle her because she had broken a closed-campus school rule by walking off campus to buy breakfast. Jessica refused to accept the punishment, and demanded to leave the school. Brett refused to let her leave his office, and called in Mary Sanchez and Adrian Gutierrez to restrain Jessica. Brett carried out the corporal punishment described. Jessica’s mother picked her up from school after the incident and took her to the hospital for emergency treatment. Jessica never returned to the School of Excellence in Education, and her high school graduation was delayed on account of the incident. Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition at 2, Serafin v. School of Excellence in Education and Brett Wilkinson, Case No. SA-05-CA-0062 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Telephone Interview with Dan Hargrove, attorney for Jessica Serafin (Dec. 14, 2005). On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court declined to hear Jessica’s appeal from the Fifth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s dismissal of Jessica’s claim that her beating constituted a deprivation of substantive due proceses. See Serafin v. School of Excellence in Education, 252 Fed.Appx. 684, 2007 WL 3226296 (5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion), cert. den. 2008 WL 672390, 76 USLW 3673 (2008). See also http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2008/06/supreme_court_declines_appeals.html.

² “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). The Court has repeatedly reiterated its role and “obligation” to protect individual autonomy from state action that cannot be justified sufficiently by legislative goals. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
judge yawned and dismissed the case, and on June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court looked
the other way, once again.³ This Article addresses the federal courts’ failure to
recognize that what happened to Jessica is repugnant to the constitutional guarantees of
liberty and equal protection of the laws prohibiting assault and battery.

In the early 1970’s, federal courts reviewed a variety of constitutional challenges to
school corporal punishment.⁴ A number of federal courts briefly considered the issue
of whether corporal punishment constitutes a legislative deprivation of substantive due
process, but no court ever engaged a meaningful and objective analysis of the nexus
between corporal punishment and the state’s educational goals in accordance with
Meyer v. Nebraska and its progeny. The Supreme Court’s refusal to review the
substantive due process issue in Ingraham v. Wright, and the Court’s rejection of Eight
Amendment and procedural due process protection for students in that case, left lower
courts to grapple with the issue of whether and when school corporal punishment
violates substantive due process. The Ingraham v. Wright Court’s reliance on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as the “relevant analogy” to determine the procedural due
process issue encouraged lower federal courts to invoke a police brutality analogy to
adjudicate substantive due process claims: an executive deprivation model was adopted,
and the legislative deprivation issue was never analyzed.

The intent-based executive deprivation model employed in school corporal punishment
cases for the past thirty years was rendered unconstitutional nearly two decades ago, but
remains the majority rule. The real issue – the nexus between school corporal
punishment and the states’ objectives – remains unexamined by the judiciary, despite a
wealth of social science research that demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that it
is an ineffective educational tool that creates unnecessary and very serious risks to
children. School corporal punishment continues to be administered routinely in nearly
half of the United States despite international declarations that it is a human rights
violation, and its nearly universal rejection in the industrialized world.

This Article examines existing school corporal punishment jurisprudence then revisits
the dormant legislative deprivation issue. The fundamental nature of the liberty
infringement inherent in corporal punishment is revealed by analyzing six elements of
liberty created by Supreme Court liberty jurisprudence in the past century, including:
history and precedent; current social science data on the efficacy and dangers of
corporal punishment; the nature of the painful, personal invasion; and social rejection
of corporal punishment, manifested by trends in American law, foreign law, and
international law. The elements of liberty mitigate in favor of finding that children’s
right to avoid corporal punishment is fundamental, warranting strict scrutiny under
either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless, the inefficacy
of corporal punishment and prejudice reflected by laws supporting it render it
unconstitutional even under less stringent judicial review.

Part I reveals how corporal punishment is used in American schools, and exposes the
gross racial disparity in its use. Part II explains existing school corporal punishment
jurisprudence. Part III argues that the issue of legislative deprivation has never been

³ See supra note 1; see infra Section II.A. Serafin’s tort claims were not dismissed.
⁴ See infra Section II.A.
analyzed adequately, and the prevailing test to establish an executive deprivation is unconstitutional. Part IV demonstrates that the nature of corporal punishment’s impact on children is profound, dangerous, and enduring, rendering it a very serious liberty violation worthy of heightened judicial review. Part V argues that corporal punishment’s inefficacy, coupled with its counterproductive and dangerous consequences for both children and society at large, render it an irrational and arbitrary practice that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, and that the prejudice and stereotypes about children reflected in state laws authorizing it also render it unconstitutional.

I. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A. PREVALENCE OF SCHOOL PADDLING

Twenty-one United States still authorize corporal punishment, often referred to as “paddling,” in public schools for the purpose of disciplining students. Children subjected to school corporal punishment are generally from less educated, poor regions of the United States in which public support of physical punishment and spanking in the home are prominent. The use of corporal punishment in American schools has declined drastically over the past twenty years, but hundreds of thousands of students continue to be paddled every year. In 1976, approximately 1,521,896 public students

5 These states largely occupy the southeastern portion of the United States, an area in which teachers have reported a lack of training regarding child abuse, and a lack of support by school administration to report child abuse. Maureen C. Kenny, Teachers’ Attitudes And Knowledge Of Child Maltreatment, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1311 (2000). For example, only 34% of teachers reported that child abuse was covered in their pre-service training, and 78% of that 34% felt that the training was minimal or inadequate. Id. at 1314. In addition, 76% reported that the school administration would not support them if they reported suspected child abuse. Id. at 1314. See also, e.g., Gordon B. Bauer, Richard Dubanski, Lois A. Yamauchi, & Kelly Ann M. Honbo, Corporal Punishment and the Schools, 22 EDUC. & URB. SOC. 285, 287-288 (1990). Teachers who use corporal punishment were often physically punished as children and “tend to be authoritarian, dogmatic, neurotic, and inexperienced compared to their peers.” Id. at 288. The following states have banned school paddling in all public schools, either by state regulation, state law rescinding authorization to paddle students, or by resolution by the state board of education or every school board in the state: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah (banned by state board of education; see http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/277/e277-608.htm), Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The following states still paddle students in public schools: Alabama (over 5% of students paddled in 2000; hereinafter percentages represent percent of students paddled where the data is available), Arizona, Arkansas (over 9%), Colorado, Florida, Georgia (nearly 2%), Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana (more than 2%), Mississippi (nearly 10%), Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, (nearly 3%), South Carolina, Tennessee (over 4%), Texas (nearly 2%), and Wyoming. U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2000 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Report. Data compiled by the National Coalition to Abolish Corporal Punishment in Schools, Columbus, Ohio, see www.stophitting.com. See also generally Human Rights Watch/ACLU, A Violent Education: Corporal Punishment of Children in U.S. Public Schools 42 (August, 2008).

6 See Bauer, et al., supra note 5 at 292. In general, adults who were physically punished as children are more supportive of child corporal punishment. See Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, Corporal Punishment in Schools, 32 J. ADOLES. HEALTH 385, 387 (2003).
were paddled according to school reports to the U.S. Department of Education. By 2006, the number of paddled students dropped to 223,190. Although on average less than 1% of students in paddling districts are paddled, over 9% of students (45,197 total) were hit in Mississippi during the 2002-3 school year, and 7.5% of students (38,131) were hit during the 2004-2005 school year. Texas public schools hit the largest total number of students. In the 2002-2003 school year, 57,817 students were paddled in Texas, and in the 2004-2005 school year, 49,197 students were paddled.

B. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT VERSUS USE OF FORCE TO SUBLIDE

Corporal punishment is defined by the American Academy of Pediatrics as the willful and deliberate infliction of physical pain on the person of another to modify undesirable behavior. This definition fails to distinguish between the use of force in exigent circumstances and the decision to inflict pain on students as routine punishment, a distinction that is critical to a proper constitutional analysis, but has been overlooked or conflated in many school corporal punishment cases. For analytic purposes, school

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7 U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Reports for years 1976, 1986, 1990, 2000, 2004 & 2006. The 2006 data is the most recent data available. See also www.stophitting.com for compilation of DOE data. The projected values (number of students hit per year) are based upon a stratified sample of approximately 6000 of the approximate 16,000 school districts in the United States. All DOE data is derived from self-reports submitted by schools to the DOE, which contain the number of students paddled, including race and gender of each student, but do not report the total number of paddling incidents. To the extent that the same students are paddled repeatedly, the projected values underestimate the number of incidents of school corporal punishment. Each school district superintendent must certify the data on school corporal punishment under penalty of law before submitting it to the DOE. However, school districts rely on reporting from each school, and there is no independent routine data verification process, so it is possible that some incidents are not reported, and underreporting could go unnoticed absent a compliance complaint and resulting investigation by the DOE. Telephone Interviews with Mary Shifferi, Program Analyst, Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Education (July 18, 2007 and July 23 & 24, 2008). Some researchers have found that the Office of Civil Rights data severely underestimates the extent of school corporal punishment, and that the true numbers may be twice as high as reported. See Bauer et al., supra note 5 at 287; Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 386 (citations omitted); Irwin A. Hyman, Eliminating corporal punishment in schools: Moving from advocacy research to policy implementation. Paper presented to the 96th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Atlanta, Georgia (August, 1988).

8 U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2002-2003 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Report, 2004 and 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection – Projected Values for the Nation. By 1986, the figure had dropped to 1,099,731; by 1990, it was 613,514; by 2000, it was 342,038; and by 2004, it was 272,028. Id. See also www.stophitting.com.


10 Id. These large number constitute a prevalence rate of only 1.4% and 1.1% respectively, because Texas has a large number of public school students.

11 Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, *Guidance for Effective Discipline*, 101 PEDIATRICS 723 (1998). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1976); Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal School District, 455 F.3d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Corporal punishment is defined as the act of inflicting or causing to be inflicted bodily pain as a penalty for the commission or omission of an act.”)

12 If a school official is attempting to apprehend or subdue a student with physical force, as opposed to punish a student, the official use of force should not be considered corporal punishment. See, e.g., London v. Directors of the DeWitt Public Schools, 194 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999). Some courts seem confused about the distinction between using force to prevent harm to
corporal punishment should be defined as the routine infliction of physical pain subsequent to misconduct, in the absence of a contemporaneous need to use force to subdue a student or to protect persons or property, for the purpose of punishing the student’s behavior after an opportunity to deliberate about the appropriate punishment. Anytime physical force is used in a manner or for reasons that do not fit this definition, the state action should not be analyzed as corporal punishment, but should be analyzed consistent with criminal and tort privileges, Fourth Amendment “seizure” analysis, or other executive “excessive force” analysis.

This Article focuses exclusively on corporal punishment as defined herein. Paddling a student for a prior fight with another student and for making rude comments to a principal, for using “abusive language” to a school bus driver, for continuing to play dodge ball after being instructing to stop, for disrupting class, for failing to turn in a homework assignment, or for humming in the boys’ bathroom typify school corporal punishment. Similarly, slapping a student for breaking an egg while attempting a technology class experiment, striking boys in the testicles for disciplinary reasons, 

persons or property and corporal punishment. For example, in Wise v. Pea Ridge School Dist., 675 F. Supp 1524, 1531 (1987), aff’d, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1988), the court stated that “some steps had to be taken to prevent the boys from inflicting harm on each other.” (Emphasis added). However, the boys had already sat out the remainder of the class in which they misbehaved, and the coach paddled them sometime later. The court correctly deemed the paddlings “corporal punishment” but incorrectly stated that it was necessary to prevent harm. Some states that have outlawed corporal punishment recognize school officials’ need to use physical force on students as necessary to protect persons or property, which is not considered corporal punishment. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 20-4-302(4)(1991); N.J. Stat. Ann. Sec. 18A:6-1 (West 1989); N.D. Cent. Code Sec. 15-47-47 (1989); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 16, sec. 1161a (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 118.31 (West Supp. 1988).

See, e.g., Widdoes v. Detroit Public Schools, 242 Mich.App. 403, 619 N.W.2d 12 (2000) (teacher’s use of force in grabbing student was not corporal punishment); Doria v. Stulting, 888 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1994) (physically escorting student to principal’s office did not constitute corporal punishment). See also, William H. Dame, Jr., Prison Conditions As Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111, Sec. 6[a] (1973) (explaining distinction between use of force to control a prisoner or to protect persons and “corporal punishment,” which is a “strictly punitive rather than arguably preventive” use of force, inflicted deliberately in the absence of a contemporaneous need for use of force). See also, e.g., O’Brien v. Olson, 32 Cal.App.2d 449 (1941) (distinguishing corporal punishment from preventive use of force). Similarly, if an educator’s use of force arises from malice toward the student, as opposed to disciplinary motive, it is not corporal punishment. See, e.g., Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (school official’s violence perpetrated against a student was not corporal punishment because there was no evidence in the record that the blows were disciplinary, but rather, appeared to arise out of malice.

See infra Section III.B.

Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 652-653 (10th Cir. 1987) (student held upside down by a teacher while the principal paddled the student so hard that student suffered deep bruises and a 2 inch cut that bled through student’s clothes, resulting in permanent scar; student had gotten into a fight with another student and told the principal that her father had stated that the principal should “shape up”); Saylor v. Board of Education of Harlan County, 118 F.3d 507, 508 (6th Cir. 1997).


Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976).


piercing a student’s arm with a straight pin as punishment, 23 “kicking the shit” out of a student for throwing a dodge ball towards the coach in response to the coach’s request to hand over the ball, 24 knocking a student’s eye out of its socket during the student’s fight with another student, 25 placing a student in a choke hold, resulting in the student’s loss of consciousness and resultant broken nose and teeth, 26 slamming a student to the floor and dragging the student to the principal’s office for being disruptive in class, 27 and forcing painful, excessive exercise for talking to another student during roll call resulting in death 29 may constitute corporal punishment, 30 but a factual determination regarding the need for use of force and the intent of the school official is necessary before constitutional analysis is possible.

C. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF SCHOOL PADDLING

Physical punishment in public schools has been justified as “reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child.” 31 Typically, corporal punishment is administered by a principal, teacher, coach, or other by striking students on the buttocks

24 Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 249 (2nd Cir. 2001) (coach dragged student across the floor, choked him, and slammed his head against the bleachers four times, inter alia, and stopped beating up the student only after another student threatened to intervene.)
25 Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, 229 F.3d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 2000).
26 Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 519-520 (3rd Cir. 1988).
27 Campbell v. McAlister, 162 F. 3d 94 (5th Cir. 1998).
30 See also, e.g., Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 385 (school corporal punishment has included shaking, choking, forcing painful body postures for extended periods (such as by confining students in closed spaces), electric shocks, and prevention of urination or defecation).
31 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657, 670 (1977). See also Baker v. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294, 297 (1975) (corporal punishment used for the purpose of “correcting” students and “maintaining order” and control of the school environment.) The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sets forth a privilege for a teacher to hit students if the teacher “reasonably believes [paddling] to be necessary for proper control, training, or education.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Sec. 147 (2) (1965) (herein after RESTATEMENT). The RESTATEMENT also sets forth considerations for corporal punishment in school, including the seriousness of the offense, the attitude and past behavior of the child, the nature and severity of the punishment, the age and strength of the child, and the availability of less severe but equally effective means of discipline. Id. at Sec. 150, Comments (c) – (e). Originally, the school authority’s use of corporal punishment was derived from the parent’s privilege based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. However, the justification is now an aspect of compulsory education laws, to maintain group discipline. Goldstein, The Scope And Source Of School Board Authority To Regulate Student Conduct And Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 384 (1969); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). See also Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 387 (advocates of school corporal punishment claim that it teaches students respect for authority, good social skills, and improved moral character, arguments rejected by the Society based on scientific research).
with a wooden paddle from one to twenty times.\textsuperscript{32} The paddles used by elementary schools are often about half as tall as the students being struck by the paddles.\textsuperscript{33} Large bruises – several inches wide and several inches long – are common, as are large blood blisters resulting from severe blows to the legs, buttocks, or chest.\textsuperscript{34}

\section*{D. RACIAL DISPARITY IN ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT}

There is a gross racial disparity in public school corporal punishment: black students are far more likely to get whacked. Although black students comprise approximately 16 percent of American public school students, they comprise between 34 and 39 percent of the students reportedly receiving corporal punishment at school.\textsuperscript{35} In southern states, the disparity is greater. For example, in Georgia in 2006, blacks comprised 39.76\% of the student population, yet 59.89\% of the students paddled were black; whites comprised 48.30\% of the student population and received only 37.68\% of the school paddlings.\textsuperscript{36} In South Carolina, blacks comprised 40.95\% of the student population in 2006, but received a whopping 73.17\% of school paddlings.\textsuperscript{37} Similar racial discrepancies existed in Mississippi and Texas in 2006.\textsuperscript{38} The 2004 data for Tennessee shows that, although blacks made up less than one-fourth of the student body, they

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\textsuperscript{32} See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 656 ("The authorized punishment consisted of paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick. The normal punishment was limited to one to five "licks" or blows with the paddle. . . .") Up to five licks were allowed for elementary students, while seven licks were allowed for junior and high school students, but the record revealed that students were sometimes whacked between 20 and 50 times. \textit{Id.} at 657, 688.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id}. The Pickens County Board of Education in western Alabama provides that paddles can be 24" long, 3' wide, and ½' thick and that physical punishment administered by such paddles “shall not include more than three (3) licks administered to the buttocks.” The Pickens County Board of Education Board Policy Manual p 258, available at \url{http://www.pickens.k12.al.us/Other%20Resources/Policy%20Manual.doc}. Given that elementary school children average 45 to 55 inches tall, a 24 inch long paddle can be half as tall as the child being hit with it. Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics, CDC Growth Charts: United States (2000), available at \url{http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhanes/growthcharts/charts.htm}.

\textsuperscript{34} For a view of representative photos of injuries caused by school paddling, see, \url{www.nospank.net/violan.htm}. See also, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 657 & nn. 9-10. See also Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, \textit{supra} note 6 at 389 (at least 10,000 to 20,000 students needed medical treatment as a result of school corporal punishment during the 1986-1987 school year for injuries such as whiplash, extensive hematomas, and "life-threatening fat hemmorage") (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{35} For example, in 1990, black students comprised 16\% of the student population yet received 34\% of the school paddlings; in 2004, they comprised 16.88\% of the student population yet received 38.46\% of the school paddlings; in 2006, blacks comprised about 17\% of the student population, yet received about 36\% of the paddlings. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 1990 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey, Adjusted National Estimated Data (1993) and 2004 & 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection Projected Values for the Nation.

\textsuperscript{36} Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection, Projected Values for the State of Georgia.

\textsuperscript{37} Whites comprised 52.96\% of students, and received 24.49\% of paddlings. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection, Projected Values for the State of North Carolina.

\textsuperscript{38} Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection, Projected Values for the States of Mississippi and Texas.}
received more than half (52%) of the paddlings, whereas whites comprised 71% of the student body and received only 46% of paddlings. Blacks are thus hit up to three times more frequently than whites in districts that paddle. This recent data is consistent with historical data on the racial disparity of school corporal punishment between black and white students in southern states. For example, in 1993, there were approximately three times as many white students as black students nationwide, yet the number of black students paddled was very close to the number of white students paddled. Males students are hit much more often than female students in general, but black females are hit disproportionately compared with white females. One study found that black males are 16 times more likely to be paddled than white females.

39 Remarkably, the reported figures showed substantial racial equalization for Tennessee in 2006. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2004 & 2006 Civil Rights Data Collection, Projected Values for the State of Tennessee (in 2006, blacks constituted 24.02% of the student population and 21.17% of students paddled were black; whites constituted 70.11% of the student population and 77.31% of students paddled were white).


41 For example, in 1992:
Texas – 22% of students were black, but blacks received 28% of paddlings;
South Carolina – 42% of students were black, but blacks received 65% of paddlings; Tennessee – 23% of students were black, but blacks received 39% of paddlings;
North Carolina – 28% of students were blacks, but blacks received 47% of paddlings; Mississippi – 48% of students were black, but blacks received 57% of paddlings; Louisiana – 44% of students were black, but blacks received 61% of paddlings;
Florida – 24% of students were black, but blacks received 36% of paddlings;
Georgia – 39% of students were black, but blacks received 55% of paddlings. Dept. of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 1992 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Report, Projected Values for the States of Texas, South Carolina, Tennessee, North Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia.

42 The total number of black students was about 5.3 million, compared to over 15 million white students. Total number of black students paddled was 127,103; the total number of white students paddled was 137,621. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 1992 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Report, Reported and Projected Enrollment Data for the Nation (Final File) (p. 3 of 16).

43 For example, in 1992 in South Carolina, of 11,660 students paddled, 1374 were black females but only 421 were white females, despite the fact that white females comprised 27% of the school population and black females comprised only 21% of the school population. Thus, white females received 4% of paddlings, but black females received 12% of school paddlings. Black males constituted 21% of the student body and received 53% of paddlings, and white males constituted 26% of the student body and received 30% of school paddlings. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 1992 Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Report, Projected values for State of South Carolina. Similarly, in Tennessee in 2004, white females comprised 34% of the student body and received less than 7% of the paddlings, whereas black females comprised less than 12% of the student body and received nearly 15% of the paddlings. During this same year in Tennessee, white males comprised 36.54% of the student body and received 37.64% of the paddlings, but black males comprised only 12.37% of the student body, yet received 37.31% of the paddlings. Id.

The available research has found that black children are not misbehaving more frequently than other students, but rather, are being struck more often regardless of the severity or chronicity of their alleged misbehavior.\textsuperscript{45} The disparate treatment of black students probably results from conscious or unconscious bias against blacks, considering that social science research demonstrates that most people have cognitive bias against black males in particular, consistent with implicit associations between black males and violence, rendering them vulnerable to others’ hostile attributions and punitive attitudes.\textsuperscript{46}

\section{Existent Jurisprudence: Executive Deprivation of Substantive Due Process Analysis Adopted}

\subsection{Early Federal Court Review of Challenges To School Corporal Punishment: Ingraham v. Wright}

Early federal court treatment of the constitutional issues presented by school corporal punishment was controversial and schizophrenic. In \textit{Ingraham v. Wright},\textsuperscript{47} Florida public students received severe beatings at Drew Junior High representative of the school’s pattern of cruel and severe student beatings, often with little or no proof of misconduct.\textsuperscript{48} A Florida district court dismissed Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges\textsuperscript{49} to the school’s corporal punishment practices, but a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that severe beatings could violate the Eighth Amendment, and may violate due process as well.\textsuperscript{50} Considering the age of the

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\textsuperscript{47} 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 525 F.2d 9097 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff’d, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). A few published federal district court cases predate \textit{Ingraham}, but \textit{Ingraham} is widely considered the seminal school corporal punishment case, in part because the Supreme Court ultimately issued a detailed opinion on the merits. See, e.g., Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff’d 458 F2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972); Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
\textsuperscript{48} 498 F.2d at 255-259. The beatings violated the school district’s own policy regarding corporal punishment, as excessive licks were imposed. \textit{Id.} Lemmie Deliford, the assistant principal in charge of administration, carried brass knuckles around the school with him, and Solomon Barnes, an assistant to the principal, carried a paddle when he walked around the school. \textit{Id.} at 257. Reginald Bloom was beaten with 50 licks of the paddle by Deliford on one occasion, and James Ingraham was beaten with 20 licks by Principal Willie Wright while Barnes and Deliford held him down, because he was “slow in leaving the stage of the auditorium when asked to do so by a teacher.” \textit{Id.} at 255-258. The injuries to Ingraham required medical care, including a week of home rest, pain pills, laxatives, sleeping pills, and ice packs. Another boy’s hand was broken when a school official hit him on the hand. \textit{Id.} at 256-258. \textit{See also Ingraham v. Wright}, 430 U.S. at 653-657 (describing injuries).
\textsuperscript{49} The plaintiffs raised procedural due process and substantive due process claims; the latter were based on the students’ and parents’ liberty rights.
\textsuperscript{50} 498 F.2d. 248 (1974). The opinion was written by Judge Rives, joined by Judge Wisdom. Judge Morgan dissented.
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students, the nature of the alleged misconduct, the severity of the beatings, the risks of physical and “substantial and lasting” psychological injuries, and the availability of alternate disciplinary measures, the court determined that the beatings were constitutionally “excessive,” and therefore established prima facie Eighth Amendment violations.\footnote{Id. at 263-265. The court found that corporal punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment per se, but the evidence showed that the corporal punishment at issue in \textit{Ingraham} was often severe, likely to cause serious physical harm and psychological harm, and could cause paddled students to become more aggressive and suffer other socially undesirable consequences. Id. at 260-264.} The court also concluded that some procedural due process was required to comport with “fundamental fairness,” such as an opportunity to respond to charges of misconduct, to call witnesses, and to respond to the school’s witnesses.\footnote{Id. at 267-268.}

Regarding the students’ substantive due process claims, the court acknowledged professional authority opposing corporal punishment based on its inefficacy and risks to children, but was unwilling to find that mild or moderate corporal punishment was unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose.\footnote{Id. at 269.} The court did not consider whether the students’ liberty rights were “fundamental” based on existing precedent,\footnote{See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).} but simply adopted rational basis review\footnote{The court stated that for corporal punishment to be declared unconstitutional, it must bear “no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state in its educational function.” 498 F.2d at 270, \textit{quoting Ware v. Estes}, 328 F. Supp. at 658-659.} for both the students’ liberty claims and the parents’ right to control their children’s upbringing. Based on the controversy regarding corporal punishment’s efficacy,\footnote{The weight of professional authority condemned corporal punishment at the time of this case, but the government produced some conflicting evidence in cross-examining the plaintiff’s expert witness, and other cases had also found conflicting evidence regarding the efficacy of corporal punishment. Id. at 268-269. \textit{See also Ware v. Estes}, 328 F. Supp. at 659; \textit{Glaser v. Marietta}, 351 F. Supp. at 557.} the court remanded the legislative deprivation claim for fact-finding.\footnote{Id. at 270. \textit{The court indicated that the school bore the burden of proving the efficacy of corporal punishment. Id. This burden appears to have been reversed in the Fifth Circuit en banc opinion. \textit{See infra} note 70.} The executive deprivation claim was sustained based on the “shocking disparity” between the students’ offenses and the punishment imposed.\footnote{498 F.2d at 269.} The government challenged the Fifth Circuit panel’s opinion and sought en banc reconsideration, which was granted.

Before the Fifth Circuit considered \textit{Ingraham v. Wright} en banc, a North Carolina District Court heard \textit{Baker v. Owen},\footnote{395 F.Supp. 294 (1975), aff’d, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).} a case in which a child and his mother challenged a teacher’s corporal punishment of the child over the mother’s objection on grounds that the punishment violated the mother’s parental right to control her child’s upbringing, procedural due process, and the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the parental right was not “fundamental,”\footnote{Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. at 299.} and that corporal punishment furthered the legitimate state end of correcting pupils and maintaining school order based primarily on the fact of its historical use.\footnote{“Mrs. Baker’s opposition to corporal punishment . . . bucks a settled tradition of countenancing such punishment when reasonable.” Id. at 300. \textit{See also} Bauer et al., \textit{supra} note 5} The court took note of the fact that corporal punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment per se, but the evidence showed that the corporal punishment at issue in \textit{Ingraham} was often severe, likely to cause serious physical harm and psychological harm, and could cause paddled students to become more aggressive and suffer other socially undesirable consequences.
punishment is “discouraged by the weight of professional opinion,” and that other options are available to correct students and maintain order, but deferred to school officials’ “professional judgment” without investigating the nexus between corporal punishment and the state’s educational objectives.

Regarding procedural due process, the Baker v. Owen court found a liberty interest in “personal security,” noting the demise of the husband’s privilege of physical chastisement of his wife, and that society had become intolerant of flogging sailors and physically punishing prisoners. The court agreed with Ingraham v. Wright that procedural due process required an opportunity for the student to be heard, the presence of a second school official during corporal punishment, and a written explanation of the reasons for the punishment upon parental request. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed Baker v. Owen.

The following year, the Fifth Circuit issued its ten-to-five en banc decision in Ingraham v. Wright, which reversed the three judge panel’s prior two-to-one decision and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the students’ and parents’ constitutional claims. First, the court found that the Eighth Amendment applies only to punishment imposed for crimes. Second, the court summarily dismissed the legislative deprivation claims: “the evidence has not shown that corporal punishment in concept . . . is arbitrary, capricious or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state purpose of determining educational policy,” considering that “paddling recalcitrant children has long been an accepted method of promoting good behavior and instilling notions of responsibility and decorum into the mischievous heads of school children.” Regarding executive deprivation, the Court stated that it would be a “misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child . . . or whether . . . five licks would have been a more appropriate

at 294 (“Clearly, cultural traditions have been more influential than research findings in determining public policy.”)

62 Id. at 300-301.
63 Id. at 300-301 (“opinion on the merits of the rod is far from unanimous.”) The mother argued that her parental right to control her child’s upbringing was fundamental, so strict scrutiny should apply, but the court applied rational basis review in reliance on Meyer v. Nebraska and its progeny. Id. at 298-301.
64 Id. at 301-302. See also infra notes 316-317 & accompanying text.
65 Id. at 302-303. The court did not decide whether the Eighth Amendment protects students from school corporal punishment, finding that the beating at hand was not severe enough to be labeled “cruel and unusual” in any event. Id. at 303.
67 Fifteen judges participated in the en banc hearing. Judge Wisdom, who joined Judge Rives to form the majority vote on the three judge panel, took no part in the en banc decision. 525 F.2d at 910. Five judges dissented from the en banc opinion. Id. at 920-927.
68 525 F. 2d 909.
69 Id. at 914.
70 Id. at 916. The Court’s language appears to shift the burden of proof onto the plaintiffs. See supra note 57. The court found that maintenance of discipline and order is a “proper subject” for state and school board regulation, and that disciplinary measures were necessary so that students who desired to learn would not be deprived of their right to an education by more disruptive members of their class. Id. at 916-917.
71 Id. at 917.
punishment than ten licks.” The court noted that excessive corporal punishment could warrant civil or criminal liability under state law.

Finally, in considering the procedural due process claim, the court found that corporal punishment has “value,” and “utility” without reference to any supporting evidence, and that procedural safeguards would “dilute” its utility. In distinguishing *Goss v. Lopez,* which the Supreme Court held two years prior that students’ liberty interest in reputation mandated procedural due process before school suspension or expulsion, the court simply stated that corporal punishment was “commonplace and trivial in the lives of most children,” and therefore cannot damage reputation or constitute a “grievous loss” sufficient to warrant procedural safeguards.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issues of cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process, but declined to consider the substantive due process claims, and affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion in a five-to-four decision. In determining the Eighth Amendment issue, the Court relied on the “tradition” of school corporal punishment, which dates back to the colonial period, and found that, although professional and public opinion is “sharply divided,” it could “discern no trend toward its elimination,” since only two states had outlawed school paddling at that time. Principally, the Court found that the Eighth Amendment applies only to persons convicted of crimes, and that schoolchildren do not need Eighth Amendment protection because of the “openness of the public school and its supervision by the community,” which afford “significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner.”

The Court determined that children’s liberty was at stake by focusing on the nature of the infringement, that is, the physical restraint and “appreciable physical pain” involved in corporal punishment. However, since corporal punishment is “rooted in history,”

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72 Id. at 917.
73 Id. at 917.
74 Id. at 919.
75 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
76 Id. at 919. The opinion drew a sharp dissent from Judge Rives: “The precedent to be set by the en banc majority is that school children have no federal constitutional rights which protect them from cruel and severe beatings administered under color of state law, without any kind of hearing, for the slightest offense or for no offense whatsoever.” Id. at 927 (Rives, J., dissenting).
77 Ironically, and possibly based on the Fifth Circuit’s dictum that a civil or criminal action could lie against a teacher who *excessively* punishes a child, the issue of a legislative deprivation of substantive due process was not squarely presented to the Supreme Court. The issue presented was: “Is the infliction of *severe* corporal punishment upon public school students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 659, n.12. (emphasis added). By qualifying corporal punishment by the word “severe,” the petitioners probably unknowingly confused the issue of *excessive* punishment/executive deprivation with any corporal punishment/legislative deprivation. See infra Section III.
78 Justice White wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 683 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 660-661. The two states were Massachusetts and New Jersey. Id. at 663.
80 Id. at 664-671.
81 Id. at 670-671.
82 Id. at 674.
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the children’s liberty interest was limited, rendering state law remedies sufficient to satisfy procedural due process: “there can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of the common-law privilege.”

The Court deemed Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis, in which a police officer’s conduct is reviewed for reasonableness only after the fact, the “relevant analogy.” The Court concluded that the “cost” of procedural safeguards prior to paddling a schoolchild outweighed any benefit, in part because the risk of a substantive rights deprivation at school “can only be regarded as minimal.” The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s and Fifth Circuit’s en banc decisions, contrary to its summary affirmation of Baker v. Owen.

B. HALL v. TAWNEY & ITS PROGENY

After the Supreme Court terminated Eighth Amendment and procedural due process challenges to school corporal punishment and declined to address the substantive due process issue in Ingraham v. Wright, lower federal courts were left to decide whether and under what circumstances school corporal punishment constitutes a deprivation of substantive due process. Hall v. Tawney is the leading case, and set the standard that most other federal courts followed. In Hall v. Tawney, the court determined that excessive corporal punishment could violate a student’s substantive due process rights. The court assumed, without analysis, that school corporal punishment is not a legislative deprivation of substantive due process, and therefore adopted an executive deprivation standard based on Fourth Amendment case law.

But rather than adopt the reasonableness standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright, the court relied on Johnson v. Glick to create a much more

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83 “Because it is rooted in history, the child’s liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment while in the care of public school authorities is subject to historical limitations.” Id. at 675.
84 Id. at 676. This is dictum, since the Court explicitly declined to consider the substantive due process issue: “We have no occasion . . . to decide whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.” 430 U.S. at 679, n. 47 (emphasis added). See also infra notes 96-97 & accompanying text.
85 “There is no more reason to depart from tradition and require advance procedural safeguards for intrusions on personal security to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.” Id. at 680.
86 Id. at 682.
87 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
88 Id. at 611.
89 The court started with the proposition that “disciplinary corporal punishment does not per se violate the public school child’s substantive due process rights.” Id. at 611. The court stated that the Supreme Court in Ingraham “implicitly” held that “the protectible liberty interest there recognized admits of some corporal punishment, which in turn is based upon a recognition that corporal punishment as such is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest in maintaining order in the schools. . . . “ Id. at 612. This is inaccurate: the Court denied certiorari on the substantive due process issue. Counsel for the plaintiff erred in “conceding” the legislative deprivation issue. Id. at 612. See also Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment In Public Schools: Jurisprudence That Is Literally Shocking To the Conscience,” 39 S.D. L. Rev. 276, 286-287 (1994) (arguing that lower courts’ interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ingraham has been “intellectually dishonest”).
90 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 679-680.
stringent “shocks the conscience” standard requiring “severe” injury and proof that the school official acted with “malice or sadness.” In 1989, the Supreme Court abrogated Johnson v. Glick in favor of a reasonableness standard in Fourth Amendment cases. Most other circuits followed Hall v. Tawney’s analytical paradigm in school corporal punishment cases, with a couple of circuits adopting a similar multi-factor test grounded in police brutality cases, and holding that the Fifth Circuit refusing to review cases alleging executive deprivations, and holding that and no legislative deprivation claim exists if adequate state law remedies exist—a position contrary to Supreme Court precedent.

92 “As in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.” Id. at 613, citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. The court also relied on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). Id. at 613.

93 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386. See infra Section II.B.

94 See, e.g., Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987); Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996); Saylor v. Board of Education, 118 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. den., 522 U.S. 1029 (1997); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987); Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands School District, 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3rd Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School District, 239 F.3d 246 (2nd Cir. 2001); Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We agree with Hall v. Tawney and join the vast majority of Circuits in confirming that excessive corporal punishment . . . may be actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking behavior”); Thrasher v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 732 F. Supp 966, 970 (W.D.Wisc. 1990) (noting that Seventh Circuit has not adopted a test, and following Tawney and its progeny).

95 Wise v. Pea Ridge School District, 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988) (adopting a four-factor variation of the Hall standard, based on police brutality cases). As in Hall v. Tawney, the Eighth Circuit assumed, without analysis, that corporal punishment did not per se violate substantive due process. See also Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3rd Cir. 1988) (employing a four-factor variation of Tawney’s standard, relying on Glick analysis). The Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted a standard consistent with “excessive force” analysis in P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302-1304 (9th Cir. 1996), relying on Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1408-1409 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), overruled in part by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Parkinson, supra note 89 at 285-302 (reviewing standards circuit courts have adopted for substantive due process challenges to school corporal punishment in the wake of Ingraham v. Wright); David T. Jones, Retooling Federal Court Analysis Of Students’ Substantive Due Process Challenges To Corporal Punishment In Light Of County Of Sacramento v. Lewis, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 893-904 (2002).

96 “If the state affords the student adequate post-punishment remedies to deter unjustified or excessive punishment and to redress that which may nevertheless occur, the student receives all the process that is constitutionally due.” Cunningham v. Beavers, 8598 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1988), citing Woodard v. Los Fresnos Independent School District, 732 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990); Moore v. Willis Independent Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2000). See, also, Jones, supra note 95 at 898-900.

III. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE

A. LEGISLATIVE DEPRIVATION CHALLENGES

The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether school corporal punishment constitutes a legislative deprivation of substantive due process under the authority of *Meyer v. Nebraska* and its progeny. Although a few federal courts found that corporal punishment does not constitute a legislative deprivation of substantive due process, no court has conducted a meaningful investigation of the nexus between corporal punishment and the state’s objectives by reference to the available scientific and professional evidence, although the Fifth Circuit panel had remanded that controversial issue for factual development in *Ingraham v. Wright* before its order was nullified by the court’s en banc opinion. The Supreme Court’s decision in *Ingraham v. Wright* exacerbated the poor analysis and apparent confusion regarding substantive due process jurisprudence by offering substantive due process dictum in its procedural due process analysis. The *Hall v. Tawney* court declared three years later that the Supreme Court had “implicitly” held that school corporal punishment is not a legislative deprivation of substantive due process, thereby avoiding a means-to-ends analysis in accordance with *Meyer v. Nebraska* and its progeny.

On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in *Serafin v. School of Excellence in Education*, a case that challenged existing Fifth Circuit substantive due process jurisprudence. Since the Court denied review, the Fifth Circuit’s precedent remains controlling in the states in which the greatest number of students are paddled, despite being contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The legislative deprivation issue has been avoided by federal courts for three decades now, during which over ten million American children have been beaten in public schools. The controversy surrounding the efficacy of corporal punishment in the 1970’s and public support for corporal punishment at that time render federal courts’ reluctance to entertain the issue at that time somewhat understandable. However, there is currently no credible professional support for school corporal punishment. The inefficacy and risks posed...
by corporal punishment have been clearly established since the 1970’s, and this
contemporary knowledge obligates federal courts to reconsider the legislative
deprivation issue as part of their “constitutional duty” to interpret and safeguard
constitutional rights.\footnote{See infra Section IV.B. for a summary of contemporary social science regarding child
corporal punishment. “In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances
may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of this Nation could accept each decision to
overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.” Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864. The Court stated that social advances required the Court to overrule
of Education, respectively. Id. at 861-864. A judicial declaration that school paddling is
unconstitutional could initiate “top down” changes, i.e., attitudes and practices that “cascade
down to principals, teachers, and parents.” Bauer et al, supra note 5 at 295. See also Cass R.
“norm cascades” that can occur as a result of publicizing risks of undesirable social behavior).
108 The court explained that “punishment” connotes deliberate action, whereas the abuse
alleged in this case resulted from spontaneous use of force to “maintain” order. Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d at 1032-1033.
109 430 U.S. at 680.
111 The Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), reversed a criminal conviction for
possession of morphine because the government’s method of obtaining the “chief evidence” –
unlawfully breaking and entering into the suspect’s bedroom, then hauling him off to a hospital in
handcuffs to pump his stomach against his will to obtain morphine capsules the police saw him
ingest upon breaking and entering – “shocked the conscience” of the Court and violated
substantive due process and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency. Id. at 174. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850, n. 9 (1998). The Court had previously
adopted a “shocks the conscience” standard in other contexts. See, e.g., Jencks v. Quidnick Co.,
135 U.S. 457, 459 (1890). The “shocks the conscience” standard was also being advocated for

B. EXECUTIVE DEPRIVATION CHALLENGES.

The \textit{Hall v. Tawney} court’s reliance on \textit{Johnson v. Glick} to create a test for school
paddling cases is troublesome. The prisoner’s claim in \textit{Johnson v. Glick} was analyzed
under substantive due process specifically because the alleged abuse of force was
deemed \textit{not} punishment,\footnote{Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1028. Since the prisoner had not yet been found “liable to
‘punishment’ of any sort,” Judge Friendly found that the Eighth Amendment, which applies only
after conviction and sentencing, was not applicable to the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1032. Judge
Friendly relied on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and did not address whether the
prison guard’s conduct constituted an unreasonable search or seizure. \textit{See id.} at 1032-1033. \textit{See
also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (discussing Judge Friendly’s analysis in \textit{Johnson v. Glick}).
\textit{The Hall v. Tawney} Court’s reliance on \textit{criminal cases} is also troubling considering that \textit{no}
corporal punishment is never constitutional when perpetrated against criminal suspects or even
convicts. \textit{See infra} notes 296-297.} but rather a spontaneous need for use of force, rendering
“norm cascades” that can occur as a result of publicizing risks of undesirable social behavior).} inapppropriate, and warranting greater deference
to official action by way of a more stringent burden to prove official misconduct.\footnote{The court explained that “punishment” connotes deliberate action, whereas the abuse
alleged in this case resulted from spontaneous use of force to “maintain” order. Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d at 1032-1033.}

Yet, the \textit{Hall v. Tawney} court adopted this stringent test to prove excessive force
relative to routine punishment of children. Under the reasoning of \textit{Johnson v. Glick}, the
\textit{Hall v. Tawney} court should have adopted a test consistent with Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence governing “punishment.” Or, the court could have adopted a
reasonableness test, as suggested by the Supreme Court in \textit{Ingraham v. Wright}.\footnote{430 U.S. at 680.}

Instead, the court chose the most stringent “shocks the conscience” test that was
employed sporadically in excessive force cases from 1952\footnote{The Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), reversed a criminal conviction for
possession of morphine because the government’s method of obtaining the “chief evidence” –
unlawfully breaking and entering into the suspect’s bedroom, then hauling him off to a hospital in
handcuffs to pump his stomach against his will to obtain morphine capsules the police saw him
ingest upon breaking and entering – “shocked the conscience” of the Court and violated
substantive due process and “the community’s sense of fair play and decency. Id. at 174. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850, n. 9 (1998). The Court had previously
adopted a “shocks the conscience” standard in other contexts. See, e.g., Jencks v. Quidnick Co.,
135 U.S. 457, 459 (1890). The “shocks the conscience” standard was also being advocated for

106 See infra Section IV.B. for a summary of contemporary social science regarding child
corporal punishment. “In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances
may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of this Nation could accept each decision to
overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.” Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864. The Court stated that social advances required the Court to overrule
of Education, respectively. Id. at 861-864. A judicial declaration that school paddling is
unconstitutional could initiate “top down” changes, i.e., attitudes and practices that “cascade
down to principals, teachers, and parents.” Bauer et al, supra note 5 at 295. See also Cass R.
“norm cascades” that can occur as a result of publicizing risks of undesirable social behavior).} until 1989, when the Court
made clear that Fourth Amendment claims must be analyzed under the more lenient “reasonableness” test.112

The Supreme Court’s decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis113 made clear that Hall v. Tawney’s “malice or sadism” intent requirement is unconstitutionally stringent in corporal punishment cases. In the context of a high speed police chase resulting in the accidental death of a suspect, the Court held that the definition of “arbitrary” or “conscience shocking” executive action to support a substantive due process violation depends on the circumstances surrounding the official action.114 In sudden, urgent circumstances where officials are “forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” proof of intent to harm is constitutionally required.115 To the contrary, in the ordinary custodial setting, deliberate indifference (i.e., “gross negligence or recklessness”) establishes a substantive due process violation: “When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.”116

School corporal punishment is inflicted on students routinely in custodial settings in the absence of exigent circumstances.117 County of Sacramento v. Lewis established that deliberate indifference is the proper level of culpability, not intent to harm. And yet, most federal courts continue to apply the Hall v. Tawney test post-County of Sacramento v. Lewis.118

8th amendment violations at the time Rochin was decided. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d. 583, 608 & n. 34 (2nd Cir. 1952).

112 In Graham v. Connor, the Court abrogated Johnson v. Glick, and clarified that courts must first consider whether excessive force claims implicate a specific constitutional right – such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendments – governed by specific constitutional standards before they may employ the “shocks the conscience” standard grounded in a “generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force. . . .” Id. at 393-395. Today, both Rochin v. California and Johnson v. Glick would be analyzed as Fourth Amendment violations. See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850, n. 9.


114 Id. at 845-7.

115 Id. at 853, quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397. The Court set forth three levels of culpability: negligence; deliberate indifference, which is something between negligence and intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence; and intent to cause harm. Id. at 849. Negligence can never support a due process claim, lest the Fourteenth Amendment become a “font of tort law.” Id. at 848, quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

116 Id. at 853, See also id. at 849, 851-854. “As the very term ‘deliberate indifference’ implies, the standard is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical.” Id. at 851. See also id. at 852, n. 12: “The combination of a patient’s involuntary commitment and his total dependence on his custodians obliges the government to take thought and make reasonable provision for the patient’s welfare.” See also Brad K. Thoenen, Stretching The Fourteenth Amendment And Substantive Due Process: Another “Close Call” For 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 529 (2006).

117 See supra Section I.B.

118 Six years after County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed Hall v. Tawney in Meeker v. Edmundson, 415 F.3d 317, 320-321 (4th Cir. 2005). Note, however, that in Meeker, the court referred to intent to harm as a “factor” to consider, although Tawney implied that it is an essential element: “the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism . . . that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.” Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d at 613 (emphasis added). See also Neal v. Fulton, 299 F.2d 1069, 1074-1075 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, but adopting an intent standard greater than deliberate
IV. CHILDREN HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY RIGHT TO AVOID SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

Federal courts are obligated to interpret the Constitution and uphold it against government abuses. 119 Considering that nearly half of the states have failed to modify their corporal punishment policies in light of contemporary scientific knowledge about its inefficacy and risks, it is incumbent upon federal courts to review these states’ policies for constitutional validity, particularly considering the vulnerability and powerlessness of children. 120

The Supreme Court has never articulated a consistent test for what constitutes a “fundamental” liberty right. However, over the past century, the Court has provided substantial guidance on what factors should be considered when characterizing the nature and breadth of liberty rights and the proper level of judicial scrutiny. These factors, or “elements of liberty” 121 are identified in the following subsections.

A. HISTORY AND TRADITION

The Court has often initiated its liberty analysis by looking to “history and tradition” to determine whether a claimed liberty right is “fundamental.” History and tradition has been defined to include civil liberties that are “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,” 122 but also includes “objective” criteria such as legal precedent and recorded history. 123 “History and tradition” thus includes the Court’s own precedent, 124 English common law, 125 the Framers’ intent, 126 the laws of the United States, 127 foreign indifference, relying on Tawney, inter alia); Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff “must prove that the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of power literally shocking to the conscience”) (emphasis added; citing Tawney, inter alia); Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 173 (3rd Cir. 2001) (listing “malice or sadism” as an element to establish a substantive due process claim grounded in school corporal punishment, stating, “Hall v. Tawney now provides the most commonly cited test for claims of excessive force in public schools.”) See also Brown v. Ramsey, 121 F.Supp 911 (E.D. Va. 2000) (malice or sadism is a proof “element” in school corporal punishment cases, citing Tawney); W.E.T. v. Mitchell, 2007 WL 2712924 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (assuming plaintiff must allege malice or sadism to support substantive due process claim based on Tawney analysis): Thomas v. Board of Education, 467 F.Supp.2d 483, 487-489 (W.D.Pa. 2006).

119 See supra note 2. See also, e.g., Deana Pollard-Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 S.M.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2008) (manuscript at 4-6, on file with the author) (discussing “judicial activism” and the Court’s repeated statements this it is obligated to scrutinize state action objectively to assure state conformity with constitutional guarantees).


121 For a more thorough analysis of the Court’s history in defining and analyzing liberty, see generally Pollard-Sacks, supra note 119.

122 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,161, (1968) where the Court stated that “the existing laws and practices of the Nation” constitute “objective criteria,” referring to the fact that 49 of 50 states do not require jury trials for some crimes. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 171 (history includes maxims and rules of traditional decisions).

123 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 564-568.


School corporal punishment is a part of this country’s longstanding history, as was slavery, overt race discrimination, and discrimination against homosexuals, the mentally retarded, and women until the Court determined that such discrimination did not comport with the contemporary meaning of liberty. The fact that a practice has historical roots is therefore not particularly compelling. A few years ago, the Court declared that the laws and traditions of recent history – the past half century – are the most relevant to liberty analysis, and recent history overwhelmingly supports banning school paddling. In addition, the right of personal security constitutes an “historic liberty interest,” so history on this issue is not entirely favorable to the practice of corporal punishment. Finally, several other elements of liberty analysis have emerged from Supreme Court precedent that are critical to understanding the nature of corporal punishment’s impact on children, discussed herein below.

B. **LEGISLATIVE FACTS: “REASONED JUDGMENT” BASED ON SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL FACTS, AND PROFESSIONAL OPINION**

The Court has repeatedly expressed its commitment to “reasoned judgment” and a rational and objective methodology both in defining liberty and in determining the mandates of due process. Reviewing scientific or other relevant facts as part of the liberty analysis furthers the Court’s obligation to check legislative action based on a “disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science,” particularly where the “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the [existing law] of significant application or justification.” Therefore, the Court has historically

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127 See infra Section IV.E.
128 See infra Section IV.F.
130 As stated by Justice Harlan, history and tradition involves “having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131 “[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 571-572.
133 See infra Section IV.E & F.
134 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673.
135 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. at 849.
136 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 542. “[D]ue process follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what is deemed reasonable and right... [i]t is to be applied... to facts and circumstances as they arise...” (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 760-763 (Court stated objective factors to consider in characterizing the liberty infringement and deciding whether due process was violated, including health risks and other medical evidence).
137 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172.
138 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-855. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578-579: “[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses... knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and property in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”
relied upon medical facts, social facts, and professional opinion to interpret liberty.\textsuperscript{139}

For example, the Court upheld the Filled Milk Act of 1923 based on an “extensive investigation” including congressional hearings in which “eminent scientists and health experts testified” regarding the injurious effects of filled milk on public health.\textsuperscript{140} The Court has relied on medical evidence to determine the degree of liberty infringement based on the level of health risk and pain to decide whether the state’s interest in procuring criminal evidence justified invasion of a suspect’s body.\textsuperscript{141} Similarly, in the abortion cases, the Court has relied extensively on available relevant medical facts, such as fetal development and viability,\textsuperscript{142} advances in neonatal medicine,\textsuperscript{143} and medical risks created by particular abortion procedures,\textsuperscript{144} relying on opinions of experts in obstetrics and prenatal medicine, such as the AMA.\textsuperscript{145} These “legislative facts,”\textsuperscript{146} though controversial,\textsuperscript{147} are a critical part of sound constitutional analysis because they are the best objective evidence of the efficacy of state action and its impact on individual freedom and social welfare, and help to avoid interpreting liberty based on the “predilections of those who happen to be Members of [the] Court.”\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{139} As early as 1905, the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), upheld mandatory smallpox vaccine against a due process challenge because, although the challenger offered proof of possible injurious effects of vaccine, including possible death, the Court found that the majority of medical professionals believed in the efficacy of the vaccine, which supported the state law. \textit{Id.} at 34-36. The Court also stated that it would be an improper invasion of the individual’s rights if the vaccine had “no real or substantial relation to [the state’s objectives of health, safety, or morals].” \textit{Id.} at 31.

\textsuperscript{140} United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 148-149 (1938). The Court summarized the congressional reports, finding that filled milk lacks important vitamins that whole milk contains. \textit{Id.} at 149, n. 2. The Court found: “There is now extensive literature indicating wide recognition by scientists and dieticians of the great importance to the public health of butter fat and whole milk as the prime source of vitamins, which are essential growth producing and disease preventing elements in the diet.” \textit{Id.} at 150, n. 3 (relying on various academic articles and books).


\textsuperscript{142} In \textit{Roe v. Wade}, the Court set legal standards concerning the right to obtain an abortion convergent with the trimesters of pregnancy. 410 U.S. at 141-147. The Court also found that imminent psychological harm and emotional distress may result from forced motherhood, although it did not cite social science data in making this finding. \textit{Id.} at 153. \textsuperscript{143} See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The Casey Court’s rejection of \textit{Roe v. Wade’s} trimester paradigm was based in part on advances in prenatal and neonatal care post \textit{Roe v. Wade}. The Court heard the testimony of numerous experts regarding the emotional and social impact on women if they were to be required to give their spouses notice prior to an abortion, including the A.M.A. \textit{Id.} at 887-895.

\textsuperscript{144} Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 924-929. The Stenberg Court deferred to medical experts’ testimony regarding increased risks to women created by Nebraska’s partial birth abortion law in striking down the law.

\textsuperscript{145} See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 144-147.

\textsuperscript{146} See Kenneth L. Karst, \textit{Legislative Facts In Constitutional Litigation}, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75.


Over the past forty years, the vast majority of psychology and pediatric studies analyzing the efficacy of corporal punishment have concluded that corporal punishment is not ultimately efficacious and can cause serious harm to children and to society at large.\textsuperscript{149} The scientific evidence clearly establishes that school corporal punishment is ineffective in the long-term, and counterproductive to the state’s goals of maximizing students’ cognitive and academic potential, and teaching children non-violence, appropriate social behavior, and self-discipline. In addition, school corporal punishment is associated and believed to cause a variety of emotional and psychological injuries resulting in depression and substance abuse, among other problems. School corporal punishment is thus uniformly rejected by professional health care organizations and professional educational associations, including The American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, The American Psychology Association, and The National Education Association.\textsuperscript{150} A summary of the research follows.

1. Corporal Punishment Is Counterproductive To Internalization of Social Values And Social Skills

Corporal punishment is counterproductive to the educational objective of socializing children to become self-disciplined, productive members of society, because it does not

\textsuperscript{149} See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, \textit{Consensus Statements}, 98 PEDIATRICS 853, 853 (1996) (hereinafter “\textit{Consensus Statements}”). In 1996, the AAP, along with several other pediatric and medical groups, convened an invitational conference to review the available scientific evidence and reach a consensus about whether corporal punishment should be banned. The 1996 conference produced a number of consensus statements. Some conference participants expressed concern over the distinction between correlation and causation of corporal punishment and aggression. However, since the 1996 Conference, research focusing on causation have consistently shown that physical punishment leads to increased aggression in the corporally punished person, controlling for initial levels of aggression. \textit{See also} Deana A. Pollard, \textit{Banning Child Corporal Punishment}, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 602-620 (2003).

positive reinforcement, such as praise or extra privileges, is more effective than any force in exigent circumstances, and is not the school’s purpose for administering corporal punishment to promote internalization of moral lessons. 

Although some studies have indicated that parental corporal punishment may effectively produce immediate compliance, this is akin to use of force in exigent circumstances, and is not the school’s purpose for administering corporal punishment as defined herein.

Positive reinforcement, such as praise or extra privileges, is more effective than any form of punishment in producing future good behavior in children. Power-assertive
methods of control – such as corporal punishment – promote external attributions for behavior and minimize attributions to internal motivations. Thus, most studies have found that physical punishment is associated with less moral internalization and less long-term compliance, and that the more children receive physical punishment, the less likely they are to feel remorse upon hurting others or to empathize with others.

Where reasons for good behavior are not internalized, the misbehavior is likely to recur when the threat of punishment is low, consistent with general deterrence theory. In addition, the use of physical force by adults models physical violence as an acceptable social behavior to be used by larger, stronger persons against smaller, less powerful persons, which is counterproductive to the goal of teaching socially acceptable conflict resolution and restraint of aggression.

Convergent research indicates that corporal punishment increases aggression in the corporally punished child, and it is a fact that students in schools that liberally permit corporal punishment commit more acts of violence against one another. Corporal punishment’s adverse impact on children’s social development is an invasion of children’s self-determination, and its inefficacy renders it arbitrary state action.

2. Corporal Punishment Is Associated With Increased Anger, Aggression, And Anti-Social Behavior

Social science research has established positive correlations between corporal punishment and subsequent antisocial, violent, and criminal behavior by children.

(1996); J. Burton Banks, How to Teach Good Behavior: Tips for Parents, 66 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1463, 1463 (2002) (reprinting a handout distributed by the American Academy of Family Physicians); Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388 (citations omitted).

155 Gershoff, supra note 151 at 541 (citations omitted).
156 Eighty-five percent, according to Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 234.
157 Gershoff, supra note 151 at 550 (citations omitted); Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 234. See also N. Lopez, J. Bonenberger & H. Schneider, Parental disciplinary history, current levels of empathy, and moral reasoning in young adults, 3 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 193 (2001).
158 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra n. 40 at 234 (citations omitted); Gershoff, supra note 151 at 541 (citations omitted).
159 See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 812-815 (2007) (discussing deterrence theory and the importance of a perception of high risk of punishment for deterrence to be effective).
161 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 234. See also L. D. ERON, L. O. WALDER & M. M. LEFKOWITZ, LEARNING OF AGGRESSION IN CHILDREN (1971).
162 See infra Section IV.B.2.
163 STRAUS, supra note 153 at 112-113 & Chart 7-7; D. Arcus, School Shooting Fatalities and School Corporal Punishment: A Look At The States, 28 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 173 (2002). Some may argue that school corporal punishment and student violence are correlations, and that school paddling does not cause student violence. See Gershoff, supra note 151 at 565-566 for a discussion regarding causation. However, numerous studies have found that parental corporal punishment causes increased aggression in children, and it is fair to assume that school corporal punishment similarly angers children and increases their levels of aggression. At the very least, the fact of high levels of student violence in schools that use corporal punishment indicates that corporal punishment is not effectively eradicating student violence.
subjected to it. Among the findings: the more children are corporally punished, the more they aggressed against others subsequently, controlling for baseline aggression levels, race, gender, and socioeconomic status of the family; aggressive and antisocial habits that are evident by age 8 are predictive of antisocial and violent behavior in late adolescence and young adulthood; use of corporal punishment against young males increases the likelihood that they will later be convicted of a serious crime; the more corporal punishment mothers received as children, the greater their current level of anger, which in turn predicted greater use of corporal punishment on their own children; child corporal punishment is associated with increased risks of child and adult depression and greater unresolved marital conflict later in life; and corporal punishment teaches children that it is acceptable to inflict physical pain on others in some circumstances. A 2002 meta-analysis of 27 studies found that in every study, physical punishment was associated with increased aggression. More recent studies conducted around the world associate physical punishment with increased physical aggression, verbal aggression, physical fighting and bullying, antisocial behavior, and behavior problems generally. The studies have
Longitudinal studies focused on cause and effect reveal that child corporal punishment causes increased aggression in children. The theory is that children who are subjected to harsh discipline become angry and learn to attribute hostile intentions to others, have less fully developed consciences, and have been taught that violence is an acceptable method of conflict resolution. Students subjected to corporal punishment can become rebellious as a result, and are more likely to demonstrate vindictive behavior, seeking retribution against school officials and others in society. The social problems created by child corporal punishment are often life-long, as children carry their attitudes and methods of dealing with conflict into adulthood. Children who are hit may show signs of “battered child syndrome,” resulting from anger, hurt, and loss of ability to bond as a result of physical punishment to their bodies. The propensity of individuals who were physically punished in childhood to become “authoritarian,” and to perpetrate violence against their own family members as adults has been found consistently in the research.


Robert E. Larzelere, A Review of the Outcomes of Parental Use of Nonabusive or Customary Physical Punishment, 98 PEDIATRICS 824, 824 (1996). Interestingly, this researcher, who supports corporal punishment of children, has narrowed the ages during which he believes that corporal punishment is appropriate to ages two to six only, the period during which the greatest cognitive damage occurs from corporal punishment. Id. at 824-27; see infra note 191. See also Mark H. Johnson, Into the Minds of Babes, SCIENCE, Oct. 8, 1999, at 247 (concluding that after age six, spanking leads to detrimental effects).

See STRAUS, supra note 152 at 171-172; Pollard, supra note 149 at 602-610. See STRAUS, supra note 152 at 110-116 (discussing data associating school corporal punishment, student violence, and state homicide rates based on the “cultural spillover theory,” which holds that the more a society “legitimizes” violence – such as by allowing corporal punishment in schools – the greater the tendency for those engaged in illegitimate behavior to resort to the use of force). See also Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 234-235; Gershoff, supra note 151 at 541; Pollard, supra note 149 at 602-620.

Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388 (citations omitted).

They also carry memories of being hit in school. One law professor friend of mine who was hit in a Colorado school in the 1970’s recalled that his principal told him that he needed a paddling because his “brain fell into his butt and needed to be paddled back up into his head.” See, e.g., Frederick E. John, Child Abuse – The Battered Child Syndrome, 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 365 (updated July, 2008). While some would like to draw a sharp line between “child abuse” and “corporal punishment,” the truth is that whether corporal punishment is considered “child abuse” is a matter of degree, and states draw the line between corporal punishment and “abuse” in different places. See Pollard, supra note 149 at 621-622. It is known that corporal punishment is a precursor to child abuse, because it is not effective and caregivers increase the physical punishment when it does not work, leading to abuse. Id.


Gershoff, supra note 151 at 541-542, 550-551; Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 240.
The highly convergent social science findings demonstrate that corporal punishment leads to higher levels of aggression and antisocial behavior in children, which is counterproductive to the school’s disciplinary goals and objective to instill respect for authority. States that continue to paddle students in school – a sign that violence is acceptable – consistently have the highest percent of their residents in state or federal prison. In a country with an unusually high rate of violence, state action should not exacerbate the problem. Arousing anger in children that contributes to aggressive and antisocial behavior is bad public policy.

3. Corporal Punishment Impedes Children’s Cognitive Development And Is Counterproductive To An Effective Educational Environment

Longitudinal studies have revealed a clear negative correlation between the frequency of corporal punishment and speed of cognitive development, measured by standardized intelligence tests such as the Stanford-Binet IQ test. In one study, children who were...
hit the most had the lowest increase in cognitive development one year later, while the children who were never hit had by far the greatest increase one year later; children exposed to intermediate levels of corporal punishment fell in between the other two groups in speed of cognitive development. This is consistent with other research showing that fright, stress, and other strong negative feelings can interfere with cognitive functioning and result in cognitive deficits such as erroneous or limited coding of events and diminished elaboration. It is clear that being slapped or spanked is frightening, painful, and arouses strong negative emotions, including humiliation and sadness, that produce neurological changes that interfere with optimal cognitive functioning. Research has shown that the use of corporal punishment is generally negatively correlated with educational achievement, including the likelihood of earning a college degree, which could relate to the syndrome of “learned helplessness.”

Childhood cognitive development is critical, considering that what a person learns in childhood provides the foundation for subsequent cognitive development. The more

Jeanne Brooks-Gunns, Correlates and Consequences of Harsh Discipline for Young Children, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 777, 781 (1997). Researchers examined the incidence, predictors, and consequences of harsh discipline in a sample of low-birth-weight (high-risk) children at one and three years of age. They independently measured the mothers' hitting and scolding of the children as disciplinary practices. They measured the children's I.Q. (Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale) at age three to determine whether harsh discipline had an impact on cognitive development. The most important finding was that the girls were more vulnerable to cognitive damage resulting from harsh discipline than the boys. On average, girls who experienced high levels of physical punishment between one and three years of age scored an average of eight I.Q. points lower at age three than girls who did not receive harsh punishment.

See Smith & Brooks-Gunns, supra note 186.


191 Mark H. Johnson, Into the Minds of Babes, SCIENCE 247 (Oct. 8, 1999). Cognitive learning theory is based on the concept that learning occurs in “layers,” such that early childhood experiences form the foundation for how the child perceives his environment thereafter and what environmental data will form subsequent cognitive associations. Violence experienced in childhood, including corporal punishment, or even the threat of violence, impacts frontal areas of the brain that are important to long term planning, thereby impacting developmental growth indefinitely. In addition, once a cognitive schema develops associating teachers, the classroom, or education generally with stress, fear, humiliation, or pain, the schema will likely operate to
children are exposed to violence such as corporal punishment, or even the threat of violence, the greater the adverse impact on children’s cognitive potential and ability to learn, which impacts children’s intellectual growth indefinitely.\textsuperscript{192}

School corporal punishment constructs an educational environment that is “unproductive, nullifying, and punitive,”\textsuperscript{193} and is favored in districts with low per pupil expenditures on educational and psychological services, and high use of parentalspanking and adult illiteracy,\textsuperscript{194} thus perpetuating the cycle of violence in children “already programmed to be aggressive” at home.\textsuperscript{195} It destabilizes the school environment by upsetting the corporally punished student,\textsuperscript{196} as well as other students and teachers who can hear the punishment being inflicted.\textsuperscript{197} This adversely impacts the students’ and teachers’ capacity to focus on academics.\textsuperscript{198} No credible evidence exists that school paddling leads to better control of the classroom,\textsuperscript{199} and the available research shows that eliminating corporal punishment has not resulted in an increase in student behavioral problems.\textsuperscript{200}

Children who are corporally punished generally resent being hit and feel anger toward the spanking authority.\textsuperscript{201} Predictably, school corporal punishment is associated with less respect for school authority and higher rates of suspension, drop out, and vandalism of school property.\textsuperscript{202} School corporal punishment causes anxiety in students that engenders negative feelings about education, and interferes with the learning process, thereby hindering educational achievement. Educational and intellectual achievement

impede future educational accomplishments, based on the fact once schemas are in place, they are very resistant to change. Telephone Interview with Theodore P. Beauchaine, Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Washington in Seattle, WA (July 17, 2008). See also, Pollard, supra note 46 at 917-925 (discussing the nature of stereotyping and cognitive bias, including creation and destruction of schemas).

\textsuperscript{192} Interview with Theodore P. Beauchaine, supra note 191.

\textsuperscript{193} Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{194} Bauer, et al., supra note 5 at 288.

\textsuperscript{195} Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388.

\textsuperscript{196} In one account, a child was paddled in a Texas elementary school and was so distressed that he could not think the rest of the day. When the school bell rang, he ran home to tell his mother what happened to him, but was so upset that he ran in front of a truck and was struck by the truck, causing injury to his head resulting in permanent scars. He arrived home covered with blood, which his mother and little sister witnessed. Interview with Amber Winborn (the little sister, who is now in her 40’s), Houston, Texas, April 17, 2008.


\textsuperscript{198} Interview with Theodore P. Beauchaine, supra note 191.

\textsuperscript{199} Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{200} Bauer, et. al., supra note 5 at 292 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{201} See, e.g., Murray A. Straus & Kimberly A. Hill, Corporal Punishment, Child-to-Parent Bonding, and Delinquency, Paper Presented at the Fifth International Family Violence Research Conference in Durham, NH (July 1, 1997) (study based on parental spanking; transcript available at the University of New Hampshire Family Research Laboratory).

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has long been recognized as fundamental aspects of liberty, deprivation of which is counterproductive to states’ legitimate educational goals.

4. Corporal Punishment Is Associated With Subsequent Psychological And Psychiatric Problems And Substance Abuse

Studies have consistently found that the frequency and severity with which children experience corporal punishment is positively correlated with mental health problems, including anxiety and depression, alcohol and drug abuse, Educationally-Induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and general psychological maladjustment. Elevated levels of the stress hormone cortisol have been detected in children as young as one year of age as a result of anxiety-provoking interactions with mothers who frequently use corporal punishment. Male adolescents exposed to violence are more likely to become violent, whereas females are more likely to become depressed. One recent study found that corporal punishment by a teacher was “the strongest past predictor for

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203 See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 589; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; infra Section IV.C.

204 This disorder is symptomatically analogous to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. See Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388.

205 Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 238-239 (citations omitted); Gershoff, supra note 151 at 541, 550-551 (citations omitted); C. M. Rodriguez, Parental discipline and abuse potential affects on child depression, anxiety, and attributions, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 809 (2003); T. F. Lau, J. H. Kin, H. Tsui, A. Cheung, M. Lau, & A. Yu, The relationship between physical maltreatment and substance abuse use among adolescents: A survey of 95,788 adolescents in Hong Kong, 37 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 110 (2005); A. C. Steely & R. P. Rohner, Relations among corporal punishment, perceived parental acceptance, and psychological adjustment in Jamaican youths, 40 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 268 (2006); Heather A. Turner & Paul A. Muller, Long-term effects of child corporal punishment on depressive symptoms in youth adults: Potential moderator and mediators, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 761 (2004); M. K. Eamon, Antecedents and socioemotional consequences of physical punishment on children in two-parent families, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 787 (2001). In 1999, Canadian researchers released the results of a study with nearly 10,000 participants ages 15 to 64, to determine whether there was a relationship between a history of slapping or spanking and the lifetime prevalence of four categories of psychiatric disorders. See Harriet L. MacMillan et al, Slapping and spanking in childhood and its association with lifetime prevalence of psychiatric disorders in a general population sample, 161 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 805 (1999). The researchers found a linear association between the frequency of being slapped or spanked as a child and anxiety disorders, alcohol abuse or dependence, and externalizing problems. The strongest associations were between slapping or spanking and alcohol abuse or dependence and one or more externalizing problems, such as drug abuse. Id. at 806-808. See also, e.g., Murray A. Straus & Glenda Kaufman Kantor, Corporal punishment of adolescents by parents: A risk factor in the epidemiology of depression, suicide, alcohol abuse, child abuse, and wife beating, 29 ADOLESCENCE 543 (1994); H. A. Turner & P. A. Muller, Long term effects of child corporal punishment on depressive symptoms in young adults: Potential moderators and mediators, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 761 (2004); S. J. Holmes & L.N. Robins, The influence of childhood disciplinary experience on the development of alcoholism and depression, 28 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 399, 413 (1987); Bauer et al., supra note 5 at 290 (10% of paddled students had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of school corporal punishment).


the child’s depression. Impaired mental health associated with corporal punishment, particularly depression, persists into adulthood. Corporal punishment causes lower self-esteem, which in turn may lead to self-destructive behavior. Mental health is “essential . . . to the pursuit of happiness.” Corporal punishment’s adverse impact on mental health renders it a serious liberty violation.

Based on the research summarized herein, the American Academy of Pediatrics issued this consensus statement in 1996: “[C]orporal punishment within the schools is not an effective technique for producing a sustained, desired behavioral change and is associated with the potential for harm including physical injury, psychological trauma, and inhibition of school participation.” The Society for Adolescent Medicine similarly concluded: “[C]orporal punishment is an ineffective method of discipline and has major deleterious effects on the physical and mental health of those inflicted . . . [it] has never been shown to enhance moral character development, [or] increase the students’ respect for authority . . . children are being physically and mentally abused [by school paddling].”

Kenneth Karst wrote a half century ago: “no rule of law should outlive its basis in legislative fact.” School corporal punishment has outlived its basis in legislative fact for decades, and the legal status of school corporal punishment is a quintessential “doctrinal anachronism discounted by [contemporary] society.” Children have a

210 See, e.g., Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 3 at 388 (citations omitted). Federal District Court Judge H. Franklin Waters wrote that corporal punishment may be “humiliating and demeaning,” but that this serves the purpose of a “deterrent effect on future conduct.” Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1524, 1531 & n. 1 (W.D. Ark. 1987), aff’d, 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1988).
211 See MacMillan, supra note 205 See also, e.g., STANLEY COOPERSMITH, THE ATECEDENTS OF SELF-ESTEEM, 178-179 (1967).
212 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 402.
213 See Consensus Statements, supra note 149.
214 Position Paper for the Society of Adolescent Medicine, supra note 6 at 388 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
215 Karst, supra note 146 at 108. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-862 (Court was “required” to reject Lochner era analysis based on “untruth” of social facts assumed in Lochner). Similarly, the Brown v. Board of Education Court concluded that the social facts upon which Plessy was decided were “so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but required.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 The Brown Court had found that “separate but equal” was a farce because segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority . . . that may affect [negro children’s] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone . . . [and creates] a sense of inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn . . . [and] has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n . 11 (1952). Brown was an equal protection case, but the Court’s focus was on the “right” of education and the effect of segregation on a Negro child’s psyche. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862-863.
216 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
fundamental right to avoid school corporal punishment because the social science is convergent and concludes that its adverse impact on students and education is multidimensional, profound, and enduring.

C. PERSONAL AUTONOMY, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AND INTIMACY

The core of liberty is the individual’s right to freedom from government interference with personal autonomy, including intellectual development, personal choices, and intimate associations, as means for controlling one’s destiny and defining the meaning of life. “Fundamental” liberty rights have therefore revolved around respect for private, personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, including educational decisions impacting intellectual development, bodily autonomy, abortion, sexual privacy, private spaces, and reputation or “stigma.”

The Court has repeatedly articulated that liberty includes freedom of thought. As early as 1897, the Court stated that liberty includes the “right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways...” In the seminal case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting teaching a foreign language to elementary schoolchildren, because fluency in a foreign language is rarely attained unless instruction begins at an early age, thus recognizing the lost educational opportunity imposed by the state law. The right to full use of one’s intellectual capacity is fundamental to personal development and free will; limiting human intellectual potential is contrary to the most basic meaning of liberty.

Protecting private spheres such as psychic well-being, self-concept, and relationships has always been a primary liberty concern. Liberty protects individuals’ ability to bond emotionally with others because human bonding powerfully influences human happiness. Protecting the parent-child relationship, extended family relationships, friendship, and sexual relationships are important because it is through these relationships that humans self-actualize and find security and support. Liberty also

220 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558.
222 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. at 589.
223 262 U.S. at 399-400.
224 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 567; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 767. For example, the Court has relied on the potential damage to a woman’s psyche if she could be forced to carry and bear an unwanted child to find that individual liberty is broad enough to encompass a woman’s abortion decision. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
226 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S at 503-504 (families serve to pass down moral and cultural values and provide economic support); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (protecting the parent-child relationship); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 572 (protecting relationship choices).
Scientific research indicates that hitting children to “teach” them desirable social behavior is counterproductive and adversely impacts children’s cognitive development and scholastic achievement. Paddling schoolchildren therefore constitutes an egregious invasion of intellectual freedom that impacts self-actualization and economic security. Child corporal punishment’s association with depression, drug abuse, lower self-esteem, and emotional problems may be irreversible and can shape forever the child’s future capacity to bond with others and to form stable, lasting relationships. School corporal punishment is a profound violation of liberty based on the indefinite potential sequelae of personal autonomy infringement.

D. **BODILY INTEGRITY: PHYSICAL RESTRAINT, PAIN, AND INVASION**

Physical autonomy, often referred to as “bodily integrity,” has consistently been protected as a liberty right integral to self-determination. The government is prohibited from physical invasion of an individual’s body absent very strong countervailing state needs. Health risks posed by physically intrusive state action, physical pain, and bodily restraint are historic elements of liberty analysis. Clearly, school paddling is physically invasive and intended to cause great bodily pain, and in fact has caused permanent injury and even death. It also creates a variety of emotional and physical health risks. The pain, restraint, and invasion inherent in corporal punishment render it a liberty deprivation worthy of strict judicial scrutiny.

E. **STATE LAWS**

State laws are the “most reliable” proof of a national consensus. State laws reflect norms, often contain relevant legislative findings, and create expectations of

**References**


228 As stated by Justice O’Connor: “Because our notions of liberty are inextricably intertwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” *Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health*, 479 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).


230 For example, the Court has reviewed the level of risk involved in forced immunization (*Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11), extracting a bullet from muscle tissue (*Winston v. Lee*, 470 U.S. 753), and forcing a woman to bear a child (*Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 505 U.S. at 896) (prohibiting abortion invades the “private sphere of the family [and] . . . bodily integrity of the pregnant woman”).

231 *See Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651.


233 See supra notes 15, 28-29.

234 See supra Section IV.B.2. & 4.

State Actors Beating Children: A Call For Judicial Relief

Where a majority of state laws support a claimed liberty right, they should be considered carefully to interpret liberty, particularly if there is a modern trend in the law. The right against double jeopardy, the right to abortion and the right to engage in private consensual homosexual activity were recognized in part based on a state law consensus or trend to recognize the rights. A legal trend that rejects traditional government action should be considered most compelling where the trend results from strong social or scientific data, or reflects progressive concepts of privacy and self-actualization, especially where the trend enhances protection of liberty.

In 1977, only two states had abolished school corporal punishment, which supported the Ingraham v. Wright Court’s decision that no process was due prior to paddling students. However, in the past 30 years, 27 additional states have banned school paddling. The state law trend reveals the progressive, contemporary view that
school paddling violates children’s basic rights. This is consistent with recent surveys demonstrating that 77% of Americans oppose school paddling. The state law trend and public opinion mitigate in favor of finding that children have a fundamental right to avoid corporal punishment.

F. INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW

The Court has traditionally considered foreign law to interpret liberty under the American Constitution. Recently, the Court relied on foreign law to define “cruel and unusual” punishment of juveniles and retarded persons based on global “evolving standards of decency,” and noted the United States’ failure to abide by international declarations concerning children’s right to avoid physical discipline. Despite criticisms about engaging foreign law to help interpret liberty and other human rights provisions of the Constitution, recent Supreme Court opinions accurately describe the long tradition of reviewing foreign and international law to help interpret the American Constitution.

Foreign law overwhelmingly supports a decision that school corporal punishment is unconstitutional. Virtually no other industrialized country hits children in public schools. Between 1783 and 2002, every industrialized country in the world has acted to prohibit school corporal punishment except the U.S., Canada and one province in

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249 See, e.g., Pollard-Sacks, supra note 119. For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court relied upon numerous European countries’ compulsory vaccination laws to uphold an early Massachusetts law requiring smallpox vaccinations. 197 U.S. at 31-33. The Washington v. Glucksberg Court upheld Washington’s law against assisted suicide, noting that a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is the norm in western democracies. 521 U.S. at 711, n. 8.
250 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) In Roper v. Simmons, the Court found that imposing the death penalty on juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment in part based on the “stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world” that sanctions the juvenile death penalty, and noted that the United States is one of only two countries that has failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child – the other country being Somalia. Id. at 575. See also Adkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 316, n. 21 (2002) (within the “world community,” imposing the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded persons is overwhelmingly disapproved, which supported the Court’s finding of a “national consensus”).
251 See infra note 298.
252 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. at 322-323 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law And The Denominator Problem, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 148 (2005). Professor Young argues that the Court factored foreign law into the denominator of the capital punishment equation to decrease the percentage of support for capital punishment in cases such as Roper v. Simmons, and that “counting noses” of countries opposed to capital punishment of certain individuals unjustifiably accords authoritative weight to worldwide numbers in interpreting the American constitution. Id. at 149-153.
253 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 604: “Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency.” (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
254 In 2004, the Canadian high court issued a decision that school paddling violates the Canadian Constitution. See Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General in Right of Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 257. On June 18, 2008, Canadian Senator Celine Hervieux-Payette’s bill, which removed a criminal defense to assault charges when the assault consists of corporal punishment of a child, passed the Senate and will come before the House of Commons in the Fall of 2008. If the House passes the bill, it will become the law of Canada, and
Australia. Indeed, there is a growing trend to prohibit parental spanking as well, in accordance with the United Nations deadline for all Member States to ban all violent forms of child discipline by 2009.

Consensus is growing in the international community that physical punishment of children will make physical punishment of children a crime by removing the exception for children. See http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=88e9ab59-fc84-4c68-94cd-e379b90f6ea3.

The following countries have banned school corporal punishment in the following years:
- 1783 Poland; 1820 Netherlands; 1860 Italy; 1867 Belgium; 1870 Austria; 1881 France; 1890 Finland; 1900 Japan; 1917 Russia; 1923 Turkey; 1936 Norway; 1949 China; 1950 Portugal; 1958 Sweden; 1967 Denmark; 1967 Cyprus; 1970 Germany; 1970 Switzerland; 1982 Ireland; 1983 Greece; 1986 United Kingdom (Includes: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland); 1990 New Zealand; 1990 Namibia; 1996 South Africa; 1998 England (This ban solidifies a ban imposed in 1986, extending the ban to ALL private schools); 1998 American Samoa; 1999 Zimbabwe; 2000 Zambia; 2000 Thailand; 2000 Trinidad and Tobago; 2001 Kenya; 2002 Fiji. Source: EPOCH-USA Website, see www.stophipping.com. By the year 2006, the following countries prohibit school paddling: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Falkland Islands, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of), Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Pitcairn Islands, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Helena, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Spitzbergen (Svalbard), Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia. See Elizabeth Gershoff & EPOCH-USA, Physical Punishment of Children in the U.S.: A Research Summery (Appendix D)(publication pending; on file with author), citing Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (2006a).

The UN Study on Violence Against Children set 2009 as the deadline for all Member States to ban all corporal punishment of children. See www.crin.org/violence/search/closeup.asp?infoID=13320. The following countries have banned all child corporal punishment of children (including parental spanking) in the years indicated:
- Sweden (1979); Finland (1983); Norway (1987); Austria (1989); Cyprus (1994); Croatia (1994); Denmark (1997); Latvia (1998); Bulgaria (2000); Germany (2000); Israel (2000); Iceland (2003); Romania (2004); Ukraine (2004); Hungary (2005); and Greece (2006), Netherlands (2007), New Zealand (2007), Portugal (2007), Spain (2007), Chile (2007), Uruguay (2007), Venezuela (2007), Costa Rica (2008). Elizabeth Gershoff & EPOCH-USA, Physical Punishment of Children in the U.S.: A Research Summery (Appendix C) (publication pending; on file with author). See www.stophipping.com; http://crin.org/email/crinmail_detail.asp?crinmailID=2831. See also Pollard, supra note 149 at 587-591. A few state corporal punishment bans of varying strength have been proposed in the United States but have thus far been unsuccessful. For example, Sally Lieber of California filed Assembly Bill 2943 in 2008, Kathleen Wolf of Massachusetts proposed House Bill 3922 in 2007, and James Marzilli of Massachusetts proposed the first anti-spanking bill in 2005, just two weeks after the first American town (Brookline, Massachusetts) approved an anti-spanking resolution. See, http://www.corpun.com/usd00505.htm#15863; http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/4582708/detail.html?subid=22100410&qs=1; or t:
children is a human rights violation. This principle is implicit in several multilateral human rights treaties, including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (ratified by all 194 Member Nations except the United States and Somalia), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). The United States stands in stark contrast to other industrialized nations not only by failing to discourage violent child discipline generally, but by actively engaging violent disciplinary practices through, official government action. Attempting to beat schoolchildren into compliance should be recognized as a fundamental liberty violation.

V. SCHOOL CORPOREAL PUNISHMENT IS PER SE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The most compelling and viable argument that school paddling is unconstitutional is based on its inefficacy and potential for counterproductive and harmful consequences, rendering this disciplinary choice ultra vires to state legislative authority under the Constitution. There are two constitutional bases for challenging state laws on account of a weak (or counterproductive) nexus between the state’s chosen means and its objectives: equal protection and substantive due process. These two constitutional bases for challenging state laws are “elementary limitation[s] on state power” and historically have been intertwined in liberty analysis, sometimes providing alternate bases for the same conclusion. The core constitutional issue under either clause is

259 Other treaties include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention), and the two European Social Charters. See BITENSKY, supra note 257 at 44-151. The United States has ratified and, therefore, is a party solely to the ICCPR and the Torture Convention. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 40 at 242. Both of these treaties have been interpreted as calling for an end to physical punishment of children in all forms. BITENSKY, supra note 257 at 44-151.
260 The Court has made clear that due process does not protect against private beatings in the absence of a custodial or other special relationship between the state and the victim. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The DeShaney Court implied that if the beatings had been perpetrated by state actors, a due process claim would be established. Yet, in the school corporal punishment context, the Court has failed to extend the reasoning of DeShaney where state actors perpetrate child-beating.
261 The Supreme Court’s decision that procedural due process and the Eighth Amendment do not provide children with constitutional protection from school paddling renders these constitutional bases non-viable. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651. The Ninth Amendment provides textual authority to protect non-textual rights, such as the right of privacy, dignity, and autonomy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-499 (Goldberg, J., concurring); David R. Hague, The Ninth Amendment: A Constitutional Challenge to Corporal Punishment in Public Schools, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2007). However, the Ninth Amendment has been largely ignored by the Court, so may also be non-viable as a practical reality.
262 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 213.
263 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 575: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” In Lawrence v. Texas, the basis for finding the state’s sodomy law invalid rested on substantive due process for Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, but on equal protection grounds for Justice O’Connor. See also, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Majority opinion
of common sense and respect for basic human dignity: states lack jurisdiction to
discriminate against some of its citizens arbitrarily or to deprive all of its citizens of
personal freedom arbitrarily. 264

Section IV argued that children have a fundamental liberty right not to be beaten by
state actors. Therefore, state laws authorizing school paddling should be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny of the nexus between the state action and the state’s objectives.
However, even if a child’s right to be free from school corporal punishment is not
deemed fundamental, state laws authorizing public school corporal punishment are
unconstitutional under less stringent constitutional tests because they are not
efficacious and therefore “arbitrary.” In addition, where a state law discriminates
against a disfavored class based on historical prejudice or hostility toward the class, it is
“arbitrary” under the Equal Protection Clause.

A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: EFFICACY-BASED ARBITRARINESS

The Supreme Court has created a variety of tests over the past century to test state laws
subject to substantive due process challenges, all of which require a nexus between the
state law and legitimate state objectives, the strength of the nexus dependent upon the
importance of the individual right at stake. The fundamental rights paradigm is often
the articulated test, whereby the Court first determines whether the right infringed is
“fundamental,” and if so, strict scrutiny applies, and if not, rational basis review
applies. 265 When state law deprives an individual of personal autonomy, the Court has
generally analyzed the government’s objective carefully, even under rational basis
review. 266 In protecting personal autonomy, sometimes the Court disregards
fundamental rights analysis and simply balances the privacy interest at stake against the
state’s objectives without articulating any standard of review. 267

found the right to marry an unenumerated right in the liberty clause, and Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion rested on equal protection grounds).

264 “The Equal Protection Clause . . . does essentially nothing that the Due Process Clause
cannot do on its own.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 n. 3 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring). See also, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–499 (1953) (although the Fifth
Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, discrimination by the federal
government may violate due process because the concepts of equal protection and due process
both stem from the “American ideal of fairness.”)

265 The Court first articulated the dual standard of review in a footnote in U.S. v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. at 152–4, n. 4 (the judiciary should review state laws protecting public health
with extreme deference, but should engage a “more exacting judicial scrutiny” where state laws
impinge on fundamental rights or prejudice politically powerless groups). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155 (“Where certain ‘fundamental
rights’ are involved, the Court has held that limiting those rights may be justified only by a
‘compelling state interest’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake.”)

266 To the contrary, economic regulation is given extreme deference under rational basis review.
Chemersinsky, supra note 97 at 625–628. Personal grooming regulations for police officers have
been given similar deference because of their close relationship to the state’s police power. See

267 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Younberg v.
Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 315–316 (1982). Some scholars have termed these cases involving an
intermediate level of scrutiny the “protected liberty” line of cases. See, e.g., Matthew Coles,
Lawrence v. Texas & The Refinement Of Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV., 23,
years, the Court has created additional levels of substantive due process review, sometimes articulated,\textsuperscript{268} sometimes not,\textsuperscript{269} in apparent recognition that personal autonomy deserves meaningful protection even where the Court is unwilling to declare the claimed right fundamental,\textsuperscript{270} or unwilling to employ strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{271}

The seminal case of \textit{Meyer v. Nebraska}\textsuperscript{272} explained that state laws infringing on personal choices must actually advance a legitimate state objective to meet due process demands. The Nebraska law prohibiting elementary students from learning German was an unconstitutional interference with the parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children, because the law was counterproductive to the state’s purported objective of a well-educated citizenry, rendering the law “arbitrary.”\textsuperscript{273} Similarly, in \textit{Pierce v. Society of Sisters},\textsuperscript{274} a statute that outlawed private schooling exceeded the state’s legislative power because private education is not harmful, rendering the law unrelated to the state’s police power. In \textit{Moore v. City of East Cleveland},\textsuperscript{275} the Court articulated its obligation to analyze laws infringing on personal autonomy critically: “when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.”\textsuperscript{276} The city’s legitimate goals of preventing overcrowding and minimizing traffic and parking congestion were served “marginally at best” by a city ordinance defining “families” in accordance with a white social construct, because the ordinance would not prevent a nuclear family with several licensed drivers to share a household, but would prevent an extended family with one licensed driver to share a household.\textsuperscript{277}

More recently, in \textit{Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health},\textsuperscript{278} the Court employed a balancing test to determine that the nexus between Missouri’s goal of avoiding erroneous termination of an incompetent’s life and its heightened “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden to prove the incompetent’s actual wishes (as opposed to the substituted consent of family members) was sufficient to outweigh any loss of

\textsuperscript{268} The Court explicitly rejected rational basis and strict scrutiny in \textit{Planned Parenthood v. Casey}, adopting instead an “undue burden” test in abortion cases. 505 U.S. at 874.\textsuperscript{269} In \textit{Troxel v. Granville}, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Court struck down a child visitation provision which allowed “any person” to obtain visitation rights with a minor child over a parent’s objection whenever a court found that such visitation served the “best interests” of the child. A majority of the Court recognized the “fundamental” right of parents to control their children’s upbringing, yet did not articulate a standard of review in declaring the Washington law unconstitutional. \textit{Id.} at 67, 72-73. The dual standard of review was disregarded again in \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}, where the Court held that the Texas sodomy law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” \textit{Id.} at 578.\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Lawrence v. Texas}, 539 U.S. at 558. See also, Laurence H. Tribe, \textit{Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name}, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1936 (2004).\textsuperscript{271} See, e.g., \textit{Planned Parenthood v. Casey}, 505 U.S. 833; \textit{Troxel v. Granville}, 530 U.S. 57.

\textsuperscript{272} 262 U.S. 390 (1923).\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Id} at 403. The Court also held that the teacher’s right to teach was infringed. \textit{Id.} at 400. The Court stated that “education and acquisition of knowledge [are] . . . matters of supreme importance” to the American people.” \textit{Id.} at 400.\textsuperscript{274} 268 U.S. 510 (1925).\textsuperscript{275} 431 U.S. 494 (1977).\textsuperscript{276} \textit{Id.} at 499, quoting \textit{Poe v. Ullman}, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).\textsuperscript{277} \textit{Moore v. City of East Cleveland}, 431 U.S. at 499-500. See also \textit{id.}. at 508-511 & nn. 6-9 (Brennan, J., concurring).\textsuperscript{278} 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
liberty resulting from the higher burden of proof.\textsuperscript{279} Despite no finding of a “fundamental” right, the Court analyzed the relationship between the state’s goals and its means before declaring the law constitutional.\textsuperscript{280}

Even when explicitly applying rational basis review in due process challenges to laws infringing personal autonomy, the Court has critically analyzed the law’s efficacy. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,\textsuperscript{281} the Court found no fundamental right to assisted suicide and upheld Washington’s prohibition of it under rational basis review. However, the Court did not summarily defer to Washington’s policy decision, but actually reviewed the state’s reasons, including protecting the vulnerable from coercion, and protecting disabled and terminally ill persons from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and “societal indifference.”\textsuperscript{282} The Court found that Washington’s fear that physician-assisted suicide could initiate a “path to voluntary and perhaps involuntary euthanasia,” and that such a path “could prove extremely difficult to police and contain” supported Washington’s decision to avoid that path.\textsuperscript{283} Still, the Court did not summarily defer to the state’s logic. The Court reviewed evidence from the Netherlands indicating that assisted suicide has in fact been misused and applied to patients without their explicit consent, rendering Washington’s policy decision about the risk of abuse “neither speculative nor distant.”\textsuperscript{284}

The Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas reaffirmed that meaningful judicial scrutiny of state laws is obligatory where personal autonomy is at stake. The Lawrence v. Texas Court carefully characterized the liberty interest at stake by analyzing the relevant elements of liberty: history and precedent;\textsuperscript{285} the nature of the infringement, such as stigma resulting from the law and the law’s impact on the human psyche, the emotional need to bond and to form intimate relationships,\textsuperscript{286} and self-actualization;\textsuperscript{287} the state law trend to de-criminalize sodomy;\textsuperscript{288} and the rejection of Bowers v. Hardwick in the world community.\textsuperscript{289} No fundamental right was identified, but the Court analyzed the

\textsuperscript{279} Id. at 280-284.
\textsuperscript{280} Id. See, also, e.g., Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. at 315-316.
\textsuperscript{281} 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
\textsuperscript{282} Id. at 732.
\textsuperscript{283} Id. at 732-733.
\textsuperscript{284} Id. at 734 (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald G., 478 U.S. 186 (1989). In Michael H., the Court found no fundamental right for a father to have a relationship with his biological daughter born into an extant marital relationship, but in determining whether the law was arbitrary under rational basis review, analyzed two state policies that the Court determined were actually promoted by the law presuming that a woman’s husband is the father of her baby, such as the policy of “promoting peace and tranquility of States and families,” a goal that is “obviously impaired by the facilitating of suits against husband and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate.” Id. at 125. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196, where the Court determined that no fundamental right to sodomy exists, then applied rational basis review in a perfunctory five-sentence analysis and upheld the law. See also Pollard-Sacks, supra note 119 at 35-39 (criticizing the Michael H. Court’s analysis of the nexus between the law and the state’s goals).
\textsuperscript{285} Id. at 564-573.
\textsuperscript{286} Id. at 575-576.
\textsuperscript{287} Id. at 578.
\textsuperscript{288} Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 572-573 (cataloging the states that criminalized sodomy in 1961 (all 50) to the time of Bowers (24 plus the District of Columbia in 1986) to the time of Lawrence (13 in 2003)).
\textsuperscript{289} Id. at 573. Criminalization of sodomy was rejected by the European Convention on Human Rights, binding on 21 nations at the time of Bowers and 45 nations at the time of Lawrence.
nature of the personal autonomy infringement created by the Texas law as part of its investigation into the nexus between the law and its objectives. The Court found that no legitimate state interest could support the Texas law’s intrusion into personal liberty because it was not rationally related to a valid police power, such as protecting minors or preventing public obscenity or prostitution.

Supreme Court precedent establishes that substantive due process requires state laws infringing on personal autonomy to be objectively rational and effectively to further a legitimate state objective to survive constitutional scrutiny. Laws authorizing or allowing state actors to beat children are irrational because they do not further the state’s objectives of producing a non-violent, well-educated, and productive citizenry, but to the contrary, increase anger and aggression among paddled students, impede cognitive development and interfere with a healthy learning environment, and may actually “produce” criminals. Federal courts have recognized the frustration of state objectives resulting from the use of corporal punishment in the prison environment, finding that corporal punishment is “easily subject to abuse in the hands of the sadistic or unscrupulous . . . [and] generates hate toward the keepers who punish and the system which permits it.” Corporal punishment has the same impact on children, and it similarly frustrates educational objectives.

Paddling students causes severe physical pain and emotional distress, and may interfere with personal relationships, thereby impacting children’s self-concept and personal development in a deep sense, repugnant to the American concept of liberty pronounced by the Court from Meyer v. Nebraska to Lawrence v. Texas. In sum, school corporal punishment causes an “inestimable . . . deprivation . . . [of] social economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and . . . poses [an obstacle] to individual achievement . . . ”. The potential personal damage caused by corporal punishment is profound and irreversible. Therefore, even if there were some efficacy to beating students (and this Article rejects this contention), the risks to the children and to the state itself is too high; a rational state would not choose corporal punishment as a disciplinary method. School corporal punishment cannot survive even rational basis review because it is counterproductive to the state’s educational objectives, and therefore arbitrary.

Engaging an objective analysis grounded the Lawrence Court in reality because the objective facts revealed a real life consensus that overwhelmingly mitigated in favor of recognizing Lawrence’s claimed liberty right, and the Court implied that, had the Bowers Court conducted a more complete review of the claimed liberty interest, it would have known that Hardwick’s privacy claim was supported by the American Law Institute and European law at the time Bowers was decided. See id. at 572-573.

The Court explicitly adopted Stevens’s dissent in Bowers to characterize the nature of the liberty at stake. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 577-578, quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578. The Court discussed the state objectives of instilling morality and respect for the traditional family that sufficed in Bowers v. Hardwick, but tacitly adopted Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion therein, which found a lack of rational nexus between the legislative facts and the “ill effects” the law sought to prevent. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 209, n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

See supra Section IV.B.

Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-580 (8th Cir. 1968).

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 222.
Public school students are the only class of Americans who are subject to corporal punishment at the hands of state actors.\textsuperscript{295} Even corporal punishment of minors in juvenile detention\textsuperscript{296} and convicted felons has been abandoned since the 1960’s: \textsuperscript{297} “if a prisoner is beaten mercilessly for a breach of discipline, he is entitled to . . . protection . . . while a schoolchild who commits the same breach of discipline and is similarly beaten is simply not covered.”\textsuperscript{298} Since minors as a group and public school children have not been declared a suspect class,\textsuperscript{299} in the absence of finding a fundamental right to avoid corporal punishment, the equal protection test presumably would be rational basis review.\textsuperscript{300}

However, as in substantive due process, the Court has engaged a variety of equal protection nexus tests,\textsuperscript{301} depending on the importance of the interest adversely affected

\textsuperscript{295} The discipline defense to torts and crimes allows a parent, guardian, or “other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor” to hit children. See Pollard, \textsuperscript{supra} note 149 at 635-644 & nn. 379-380, 396-397, 412, 425 & accompanying text. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, \textit{The Law of Torts} 52-54 & 155-256 (2000).

\textsuperscript{296} See \textit{H.C. v. Jarrard}, 786 F.2d 1080, 1085-1086 (11th Cir. 1986) (shoving 16 year old juvenile detainee violated due process; although school corporal punishment is routine in numerous states, “no state authorizes the routine corporal punishment of detainees, and such punishment would violate due process”).


\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Id. at 689 (White, J., dissenting).} A review of the leading 30 industrialized nations reveal that none allow corporal punishment of prisoners, and only 3 (including the United States) allow it in public schools. United Nations Children’s Fund, \textit{A League Table of Child Maltreatment Deaths in Rich Nations: Innocenti Report Card No. 5, at 26 & Figure 3}. Florence, Italy: Innocent Research Centre, available at http://www.unicef-icdc.org/publications/pdf/recard5e.pdf. \textit{See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe}, 457 U.S. 202, 223-4 (1982) (finding that minor students do not constitute a suspect class, despite recognizing that they cannot vote and “might be considered politically powerless to an extreme degree,” that equal protection analysis requires that a discriminatory statute further some “substantial goal of the state” in order to be considered “rational.”) The Court’s language arguably implied a “quasi-suspect” class and intermediate level of scrutiny. \textit{See id. at 216-218 & nn. 14-16. See also Chemerinsky, \textsuperscript{supra} note 97 at 714-717.}


\textsuperscript{300} \textit{See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 451 (“[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental cases to differing classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from “strict scrutiny” at one extreme to “rational basis” at the other.”) See also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“the level of scrutiny employed . . . should vary with the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected. . . .”) See also, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, \textit{Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny}, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161 (1984); Suzanne B. Goldberg, \textit{Equality Without Tiers}, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004).}
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and the vulnerability of the class members, and has required a truly rational nexus between the state’s ends and means in equal protection challenges to state laws infringing on personal autonomy: “[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.”

An efficacy-based equal protection challenge to state-authorized corporal punishment converges with the due process analysis herein.

In addition, even conservative justices agree that, at its core, the equal protection clause protects against “arbitrary and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility.” Laws that reflect legislative animus or prejudice toward a disfavored class are arbitrary under a prejudice-based equal protection analysis. The Court’s decisions in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center and Lawrence v. Texas rested in part on a determination that the laws smacked of hostility or prejudice toward the disfavored class.

In Romer v. Evans, the state argued that a state constitutional amendment that repealed local legislation protecting gays from discrimination was rationally related to the state’s legitimate purpose of securing freedom of association for all Colorado residents.

Public schoolchildren epitomize some characteristics of a suspect class. They cannot vote and are politically powerless, a predicament thought to “command extraordinary [judicial] protection from the majoritarian political process.” Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216, n. 14. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (concurring opinon) (“nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom the will apply [the law] and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.”) Children cannot escape their associations with adults who are vested with authority to control them, and their vulnerability is manifested by laws that except them as a class from general tort and criminal laws prohibiting intentional infliction of physical pain and suffering. These factors mitigate in favor of careful judicial scrutiny of laws that single out children for physically painful and injurious state action.

“We have been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). But note that equal protection challenges to classifications impacting monetary government benefits or other financial interests are similar to economic regulation under substantive due process; the judiciary defers to the government, and the challenger bears the burden of proving no legitimate state objective. See, e.g., U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (challenger bears the burden of negating every conceivable basis of support for a law under rational basis review).

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). See also, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (Court critically analyzed a state law requiring undocumented children to pay for public education despite finding no suspect classification and no fundamental right to education, ostensibly applying rational basis review); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Court critically analyzed zoning ordinance discriminating against the mentally retarded under rational basis review).

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 245 (Burger, J., dissenting). This concern about laws reflecting prejudice similarly animates the Court in due process analysis. See supra note 302 & accompanying text.

See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 450 (“[The zoning ordinance] requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. . . .”). In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice O’Connor employed an equal protection analysis, and discussed the animus and rejection of homosexuals generally and under Texas law. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 579-585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

The state asserted that the liberty of employers and landlords was violated if they were required to associate with gays in contradiction of their personal or religious views about homosexuality. The Colorado amendment effectively furthered the state’s objectives, but it was declared “a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense,” because it was “born of animosity” towards homosexuals, an illegitimate government objective.

Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that laws that “reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective” are per se unconstitutional. State laws authorizing student corporal punishment are unconstitutional because they do not further legitimate educational objectives and are grounded in obsolete, negative assumptions about children that subject them to hostility and abuse in the same way that mentally retarded persons and homosexuals have historically been subjected to prejudice. The Puritan concept that children are “born evil” and need to have “the devil beaten out of them,” based in part on biblical text, are entrenched in American and world history, but reflect a lack of understanding about developmental psychology and have justified subjecting children to violence, including murder, for centuries. State laws excepting children from assault and battery laws reflect this longstanding prejudice towards children and hostile attribution regarding their mindset and behavior. They are unconstitutional under a prejudice-based equal protection analysis because they reflect the view that children deserve corporal punishment because they are children.

C. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Other constitutional considerations warrant searching judicial scrutiny of school corporal punishment. State laws that infringe a variety of constitutional rights should

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308 Id. at 635.
309 Id. at 633.
310 Id. at 634. The breadth of the law revealed a desire to harm homosexuals. Id.
313 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 659, quoting the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion, 525 F.2d at 917.
314 The Puritans viewed children as “young vipers” and “hateful” persons who must have the devil literally beaten out of them to get them to conform. See Piele, Neither Corporal Punishment Cruel Nor Due Process Due: The United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Ingraham v. Wright, 7 J. L & Educ. 1, 9 (1978). STRAUS, supra note 152 at 3.
315 See, e.g., Proverbs, 23:13-14, 13:24. See also generally GREVEN, supra note 313.
316 See, e.g., STRAUS, supra n. at 52, 62-63 (children are naturally inclined not always to obey their parents, which is developmentally normal). See also IRWIN A. HYMAN, THE CASE AGAINST SPANKING 16 (1997) (children need to differentiate themselves from their parents to feel independent, which may produce disobedience).
317 See Pollard, supra note 149 at 579-580 (describing history of violence towards children, including capital punishment of children who swore under colonial law).
318 Research has shown that parents are more likely to hit their children if they attribute hostile behavior to their children, i.e., bad motive, as opposed to viewing their children’s behavior as developmentally normal and age-appropriate. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 149 at 610-611.
be reviewed with special care.\footnote{See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religious freedom and the right to control children’s upbringing were infringed by state law requiring two years of state compulsory education beyond that allowed by Amish religion; additional two years was not sufficiently tied to state goal of protecting children from ignorance).} For example, the Court has indicated that where both free exercise and the parental right to rear are infringed by a state law, the Court’s deference to the legislature may be less than in cases in which only one constitutional right is infringed.\footnote{See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.}

School corporal punishment infringes students’ liberty interest in bodily integrity, educational, and intellectual freedom, and may negatively impact intimate relationships. It also infringes parents’ liberty interest in controlling the upbringing of their children. Corporal punishment potentially infringes both the students’ and parents’ religious freedom, as some people find corporal punishment repugnant to their religious ideals.\footnote{For example, some Christians believe that corporal punishment of children is not consistent with Christianity based on New Testament text, because Christ never hit a child or instructed a parent to hit a child, and indeed, delighted in children and made statements about child-rearing that are conceptually irreconcilable with punitive, harsh childrearing. See Pollard, supra note 149 at 631-632, citing, inter alia, Ephesians 6:4, Colossians 3:21, and Matthew 18:1-6, 10-14 (Rev. Am. Standard).}

The variety of constitutional liberties potentially infringed by school corporal punishment should heighten the state’s burden to prove the law’s efficacy and reasonableness.

The fact that black children are consistently receiving more blows at the hands of school officials than children of other races warrants special protection of this politically powerless and historically oppressed group.\footnote{For a poignant exposition of the depth and breadth of American oppression of blacks by reference to the Tulsa riot of 1921, see Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland (2002).} Conscious and unconscious racial bias no doubt play a role in the disparate impact of corporal punishment on blacks.\footnote{Disparate impact is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Research has proven that blacks are subjected to assumptions that they are more violent than whites, and, inferentially, more deserving of harsh punishment. See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987); Pollard, supra note 46 at 913, 937-946 & 959-964 (discussing race-based stereotypes that are unconscious and/or inaccurate factually, but which give rise to attitudes and implicit bias about blacks).}

The gross racial disparity in the administration of corporal punishment warrants careful judicial scrutiny.

Finally, the fact that alternatives to corporal punishment are available is relevant under any level of scrutiny as a practical matter, because it bears on government motive.\footnote{See Restatement, supra note 31. Indeed, federal courts have considered the fact of alternatives to corporal punishment in addressing constitutional challenges to school corporal punishment, despite not applying strict scrutiny. See, supra notes 51, 62 & accompanying text.} Alternative disciplinary methods that do not carry the risks of corporal punishment include verbal reprimands, extra homework, detention, positive behavior support models and “token economies,” cleaning school premises, and exclusion from the classroom or from school events.\footnote{See N. Cuts & N. Moosey, Practical School Discipline and Mental Hygiene 78 (1941); E. Phillips, D. Weiner & N. Haring, Discipline, Achievement, and Mental Health} These options render corporal punishment...
unnecessary and support a determination that it is unconstitutional based on its inefficacy and risks of harm to students and to society.

CONCLUSION

Many people have been legally punished by way of corporal beatings throughout American history. Fortunately, the practice of government-executed corporal punishment has been declared unconstitutional. A glaring exception exists relative to some of America’s smallest and most vulnerable citizens – public schoolchildren.

A wealth of scientific research demonstrates that corporal punishment of children damages them cognitively, motivationally, physically, psychologically, and emotionally. The professional consensus that corporal punishment is an ineffective form of discipline and carries dangerous consequences for children and society at large renders this form of state action irrational. Most of the world and a majority of the United States have responded by banning school corporal punishment. Unfortunately, nearly half of the states have failed to respond appropriately to safeguard children from the dangerous consequences of corporal punishment.

The responsibility to create a kinder, gentler society resides with many people, including parents. But the government is uniquely positioned and particularly responsible for synthesizing scientific and other data to produce sound public policy. When state governments fail to recognize the unreasonableness of their own policies, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to uphold the Constitution in challenges to the government action. But the federal judiciary has been asleep at the wheel for more than thirty years when it comes to protecting children from beatings by state actors. The ultimate responsibility to safeguard citizens from liberty deprivations lies with the Supreme Court, but it, too, has chosen to ignore the plight of schoolchildren. The judiciary should act on this issue immediately and declare school corporal punishment unconstitutional. Until then, relatively innocent, quintessentially powerless, and strikingly black Americans will continue to pay the immediate price, with incalculable ultimate social costs.