This essay explores the factors that drive merger outcomes under China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). While there are currently only a small number of published merger decisions, this paper overcomes that obstacle by utilizing a unique practitioner survey of antitrust lawyers across multiple jurisdictions. This survey captures transactions contemplated, but never undertaken (deterred by the merger regime), as well as mergers notified for approval under the AML. The survey allows for broader inferences to be drawn about the development of Chinese antitrust law, including: the welfare standard used in merger analysis, what industrial policy and other political factors may impact merger enforcement, and issues of institutional design, transparency, and delay. The survey has implications for antitrust, institutional design, intellectual property rights, and business law more generally.
Merger Control under China's Anti-Monopoly LawUF Law Faculty Publications
Citation InformationD. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/545