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Persistence of Civil Wars
Journal of the European Economic Association (2010)
  • Daron Acemoglu, MIT
  • Davide Ticchi, University of Urbino
  • Andrea Vindigni, Princeton University
A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.
  • civil wars,
  • commitment,
  • coups,
  • military,
  • political transitions,
  • political economy
Publication Date
Summer April 30, 2010
Citation Information
Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. "Persistence of Civil Wars." Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, 8(2–3), 664–676.