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Article
An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers
Rivista Italiana degli Economisti ‒ The Journal of the Italian Economic Association (2012)
  • Paolo Polidori, University of Urbino
  • Désirée Teobaldelli, University of Urbino
  • Davide Ticchi, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze from an economic perspective the effects of the judicial careers arrangement on the trials’ outcome. The institutional organization of judicial careers follows two distinct ideal systems. One is characterized by the fact that public prosecutor and judge belong to the same professional body, as magistrates, while the other one is characterized by the separation of the judiciary from prosecutors. We model this feature of the judicial system as a continuum variable and explain why this choice can be appropriate. We obtain that a more unified system of judicial careers leads to fewer distortions in the process preceding the trial, while it introduces more distortions during the trial. We find the optimal degree of separation of judicial careers and provide some comparative statics results.
Keywords
  • Legal System,
  • Judicial Careers
Disciplines
Publication Date
Winter November 16, 2012
DOI
10.1427/38534
Citation Information
Polidori, Paolo, Teobaldelli, Désirée and Ticchi, Davide. “An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers.” Rivista Italiana degli Economisti ‒ The Journal of the Italian Economic Association, December 2012, 27(3), 481–508.