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Child Laundering As Exploitation: Applying Anti-Trafficking Norms to Intercountry Adoption Under the Coming Hague Regime

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David M. Smolin*

I.  INTRODUCTION

As the United States government continues its slow and long-delayed march toward ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption,¹ the goals and rationale of that process remain obscure. The preamble to the Hague Convention indicates that the signatory nations are:

AConvinced of the necessity to take measures to ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children,²

The substantive provisions of the Treaty reaffirm these concerns by stating that the Aobjects@ of the Convention are:

a) to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law;

b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States to ensure that those
safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children;

c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance with the Convention.³

: The Hague Convention=s concern that adoptions not subvert the best interests and rights of children through the illicit practices of abducting, selling, and trafficking in children has found much resistance in the United States. The United States State Department, poised to play the key role under the treaty as the Central Authority overseeing intercountry adoption, has declared that buying children for adoption is not child trafficking, since children are not exploited by such practices.⁴ Prominent advocates of intercountry adoption perceive that buying or abducting children is so rare as to be virtually irrelevant, and hence that regulations aimed at eliminating such practices would needlessly slow adoptions, doing more harm than good.⁵ Although not often stated openly, many in the adoption community perceive little harm in providing economic incentives for birth parents to place children for adoption, based on the viewpoint that the children anyway will be better off in a developed Western society.⁶ Thus, on the eve of Hague implementation, the combined voices of government, adoptive parents, and adoption agencies remain skeptical of the central premises and purposes of the Hague Convention.

The central matter of dispute is whether the evils against which the Hague Convention is aimed are harmful. This question of harm breaks down into two major issues: (1) What is the incidence of practices such as abduction and child selling in the intercountry adoption system? (2) Whether such practices, even when they occur, are in fact significantly harmful?
This author’s prior article, AChild Laundering@ provided evidence that buying and abducting children for purposes of intercountry adoption was a serious and recurrent problem within the intercountry adoption system. Further, the article identified Achild laundering@ as the characteristic form of such illicit behaviors, and one in which the intercountry adoption system itself provided the motivation and means for kidnapping and buying children. Child laundering characteristically involves obtaining children illicitly through purchase or abduction, falsifying the child’s paperwork to hide both the illicit conduct and the child’s history and origins, and then processing the child through the intercountry adoption system as an Aorphan@ and then adoptee. Child Laundering gathered evidence indicating that a significant percentage of children from some sending countries, and a significant number of children overall, had been impacted by such practices.8

Even those who accept the evidence of substantial child laundering within the intercountry adoption system may doubt that such conduct causes substantial harm. This article therefore concentrates on the question of whether abducting, buying, or selling children for purposes of adoption is harmful. The positive perspectives on adoption in the culture of the United States, both within and beyond the adoption community, makes it difficult for many to perceive that adoption could be harmful. The Aadoption myth@ in which virtuous adoptive parents bond with needy and loving orphans makes it difficult to imagine that adoption could harm a child. The virtually absence of the voices of birth families, particularly in intercountry adoption, makes it difficult for readers to take seriously harms against the birth family. Contemplating adoption as potentially harmful therefore requires a re-visioning of adoption, and hence is in part an act of imagination. This article employs narratives to help the reader come to
grips with the counter-cultural notion that adoption could harm or exploit children and families. At the same time, the article employs more conventional forms of argument on this delicate subject.

This question of whether adoption can be a harm bears upon the legal question of whether the abduction, purchase, or sale of a child for purposes of adoption is a form of child trafficking. Legally speaking, the definition of “child trafficking” sometimes requires exploitation. This article supports the implicit claim of the Hague Convention, that buying or selling children for purposes of adoption is a form of child trafficking. The article therefore seeks to explain how even adoption into a loving adoptive family can be a form of exploitation where the child’s path into that family involves abduction or sale.

Implementation of the Hague Convention will remain unsuccessful until and unless those involved embrace the fundamental goals of the Convention, particularly the goal of preventing the abduction and sale of children for purposes of adoption. Although few would advocate for child abduction or child selling, the purported support for abolishing those practices dissipates as soon as any kind of cost, effort, or sacrifice is involved. Viewing child selling and abduction for adoption as a kind of victimless crime, technical regulatory breach, or mere malum prohibitum, undermines support for the Convention. To many, the Hague Convention is a regulatory nuisance that slows the heroic work of rescuing children through adoption. Successful implementation of the Hague Convention will require a shared understanding that the evils it is designed to combat—principally abduction, purchase, and sale of children for adoption—are profoundly exploitative and harmful to children and families.
II. ADOPTION AND THE EXPLOITATION OF THE BIRTH FAMILY

The fundamental ethical premise of this article is that adoption should be conducted in a manner which respects the human dignity and human rights of all concerned.\textsuperscript{10} The term adoption triad\textsuperscript{11} refers to the three groups affected: the birth family, child, and adoptive family. The child=s relationships to the birth and adoptive families are in some ways analogous to a child=s relationship to never-married or divorced parents. The child in both instances is a bridge between adults who otherwise may have no interest in having any ongoing relationship. In the context of children of never-married or divorced parents, the child=s relationships to both parents (and sets of grandparents and other relatives) can create the occasion for competitive claims over the child.\textsuperscript{12} In the context of adoption, the potentially conflicting claims of birth and adoptive families to a child make it difficult to sustain an adoption system that respects all involved. Indeed, law and custom concerning adoption unfortunately have built the legitimacy of the adoptive family relationship largely upon the denigration of the birth family, perhaps because the birth parents are viewed as a threat to the adoptive family.\textsuperscript{13}

Adoptive parents and adoption workers understandably are advocates for the positive significance, worth, and Areal\textsuperscript{14} of adoptive family relationships. From this perspective, few things are more infuriating than being asked about an adoptive child=s Areal parents.\textsuperscript{14} We are real parents\textsuperscript{13} is an adoptive parents= common and automatic response. There is a palpable resentment in the adoption community to a rhetoric which makes biological parents into a child=s Areal parents, with its implicit denigration of adoptive parents to something less than Areal parents.\textsuperscript{14}
The need of adoptive parents to defend and justify their own relationship to their adoptive children occurs in the shadow of an implicit comparison to the biological parent-child relationship. Adoptive relationships are often implicitly modeled after birth or blood relationships, and hence adoptive relationships may seek legitimacy by seeking to appear as much as possible like a birth relationship. Unfortunately, since adoptive relationships are unlike birth relationships in certain ways, this path to legitimacy causes several problems.

Adoptive parents are unlike birth relationships in the following ways: (1) Birth parents who have custody of their children are not inherently competitive or comparative with another set of parents; they therefore benefit from a kind of natural exclusivity as parents, at least under current societal conditions, and so long as both parents live with one another and their joint children. By comparison, adoptive parents are implicitly viewed as only one of two sets of parents, and therefore lack any natural exclusivity as parents. (2) Birth parents have a set of hereditary and genetic links with their children, including racial, ethnic, and familial continuities that are often obvious merely from observing parents and children together. By contrast, adoptive parents lack hereditary links, a lack which is sometimes obvious simply from observing the family. The two differences between adoptive and birth families are therefore linked. For example, when a white father and white mother are with their Asian child, both the lack of hereditary links and the existence of birth parents are evident.

Given these differences between adoptive and birth families, and the tendency to try to model the adoptive family after the birth family, several tendencies emerge. For this article, the most significant is the attempt to make adoptive families as exclusivist as birth families. The exclusivism of the adoptive parent is won largely through the denigration and denial of the birth
family. The law has cooperated in this venture through the legal fiction in which an adoptive child has no relationship to their birth parents. This legal fiction is embodied in what might be termed officially falsified documents, such as birth certificates showing adoptive parents as birth parents. Sealed birth records reinforce the law’s determined destruction of any relationship between adopted children and their birth families. The clear message is that adoptees have only one set of parents and one family. Multi-generational genetic inheritance and family lineage, and the contribution of the birth mother in carrying the child and giving birth, are by law rendered meaningless.

The legal regimen of domestic adoption developed in the twentieth century has asked birth mothers to give up all interest to the child, and to forever remain ignorant as to the name, whereabouts, and fate of their child. For all practical purposes, it was to be as though the mother had never conceived, carried, or given birth. The cruelty of this arrangement for birth mothers was apparently not evident to the social workers or others involved in the creation of the closed-record, exclusivist adoption system. The theory was apparently that closed-record adoption was a good deal for a woman who would be saved from the shame of single motherhood. Adoption was a way of hiding this shame from the world, of pretending it had never occurred, and allowing the woman to go on to a marriage and a normal family life.

There is substantial evidence that many birth mothers in the United States who officially consented to relinquish their children for adoption were pressured or coerced into the arrangement. Both published books and internet sites contain harrowing stories of pressure, coercion, and inhumanity in procuring consents. Fundamentally, there seems to have been a denial that the single mother and child could represent a valid family, as represented by this
quotation representing a social work perspective from the mid-twentieth century:

An agency has a responsibility of pointing out to the unmarried mother the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, if she remains unmarried, of raising her child successfully in our culture without damage to the child and to herself...The concept that the unmarried mother and her child constitute a family is to me unsupportable. There is no family in any real sense of the word. @ 25

From this context, it may have been viewed as the best thing to virtually force single women to relinquish their children for adoption. If the mother and child unit was not a family, then removing the child was not perceived as the destruction of a family, nor as interference with a family relationship. The denial of the birth event was apparently seen as necessary to the rehabilitation of both the single mother and the child, rescuing the former from shame and sin and the latter from the stigma of being an illegitimate or bastard child. 26

From our perspective today, the cruelty of virtually demanding a permanent severing of the parent child relationship based on the marital status of the parents is only slowly emerging. The haunted and pained voices of the mothers who relinquished their children under such circumstances exist in the narratives collected in books and web-sites. 27 The adoption communities in the United States, however, have not really absorbed the significance of such voices. Further, it is difficult to establish whether the pain and regret that fills these narratives are representative, given the self-selected nature of most of these sources. This lack of controlled empirical verification creates the possibility of deniability: maybe the women who complain of
coercion and speak of regret are only a small minority, maybe the twentieth century adoption system worked well for most relinquishing birth mothers?\textsuperscript{28}

The impetus to deny any significance to the birth parent-\textsuperscript{2} child relationship also has its roots in a fundamental lack of imagination. United States popular and literary culture has great difficulty in portraying (and hence imagining) a child with parental allegiance to two mothers or two fathers. Thus, in the famous Andy Griffith show the young boy Opie almost never refers to his deceased mother. Similarly, the classic show about a blended family, the Brady Bunch, portrays a half-dozen children who apparently never even think about their respective deceased parents. This tendency is reinforced in many classic portrayals of adoption and adoption-like situations, which portray children forgetful of their birth parents and eager for the love of new parents or parental substitutes.

This lack of imagination unfortunately has included a lack of moral imagination, particularly by those social conservatives and family traditionalists who view themselves as specialists in family morality. Social conservatives have emphasized the importance of marriage and the two-parent family as providing the best environment for child-raising.\textsuperscript{29} From this perspective, adoption perhaps seemed like the perfect solution to the problem of single motherhood. The child would be transferred from a sub-standard single parent home to the normative two parent family. The mother would be relieved from the negative social consequences of bearing a child out of wedlock, even while the norm of marriage as the sole legitimate locus for sex and procreation would be reinforced. The mother's sacrifice of her parental rights could perhaps even be seen as a redeeming act of self-sacrifice. By this act of self-sacrifice the birth mother saved all concern: she saved herself from shame and poverty,
her family of origin from embarrassment, her child from stigma and the lack of an involved
father, and the adoptive family from childlessness.\textsuperscript{30}

Ironically, however, the social conservative moral vision undergirding twentieth century
domestic adoption required a denial of what might be called the\textsuperscript{Anatural law\textsuperscript{a}} of mother-child
relationships.  Ironically, those who most embraced motherhood failed to understand how
\textsuperscript{Aunnatural\textsuperscript{a}} and disabling it can be for a woman to bear and birth a child and then try to pretend
that the event never occurred and that she has no tie to the child.  Indeed, from a traditionalist
family perspective the horrific narratives of women who regret losing their children to adoption
read like the narratives of women who regret their abortions.  There is the same sense of being
pressured by difficult circumstances and manipulative intimates and strangers into an
irredeemably painful \textsuperscript{Achoice\textsuperscript{a}}.  There is the same denial of one\textsuperscript{'s} nature as a woman and a
mother, and of one\textsuperscript{'s} relationship to a child.  The question of whether these anti-abortion ways
of narrating and reconstructing the impact of abortion on women are accurate or balanced is
beyond the scope of this article.\textsuperscript{31}  The present irony, however, is that social traditionalists
embraced the motherhood of pregnant women facing the abortion decision while tending to deny
the motherhood of those same women, in relationship to the adoption decision.

The pressing issue for the future of adoption is whether the legitimacy of adoptive
relationships can be maintained without a denigration and denial of birth family relationships.
To accomplish such a shift, it would be necessary first of all to acknowledge that adoptive family
relationships can be positive and legitimate even when they are different in substantial ways from
birth family relationships.  So long as adoptive family relationships are conceptualized and
narrated as a mere copy of birth family relationships, they will be viewed as a complete
replacement for the birth family, with adoption therefore built upon the denial of the birth family.

This reconceptualization has begun in fitful and incomplete ways, through movements toward open adoption and open records. An examination of those movements is beyond the scope of this article, except to note that their development is thus far inadequate. Birth parents who rely on the nascent and vague label of open adoption to protect and honor their identity and role as parents are often disappointed to find that they lack enforceable legal rights and remain at the mercy of adoptive parents who may choose to cut them off from their children. Thus, even in “open adoption” the birth parent becomes legally a non-parent in relationship to her child. The open records movement has similarly had real yet limited success, and in terms of identifying information usually applies only after the adoptee attains adulthood. In domestic adoption, it is still usually the case that a birth parent who relinquishes a child for adoption is legally relinquishing her parental relationship and identity. One result is that single pregnant women in the United States continue to vote against adoption with their actions, as less than two percent of such women choose adoption.

The question of whether an adoption system not built upon denigration of the birth family can be built, is closely related to another inquiry critical to this paper: When does adoption constitute an exploitation of the birth family? Exploitation has been defined in Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as an unjust or improper use of another person for one=s own profit or advantage. Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines exploitation as taking unjust advantage of another for one=s own advantage or benefit. These definitions can be broken into three elements: (1) unjust or improper; (2) use or advantage of a person; (3) for the benefit, profit, or advantage of another. The difficulty with the definition, and indeed
with the legal and ethical concept of exploitation, is that it depends on a substantive definition of unjust or improper to distinguish between exploitative and non-exploitative uses of others.

A second difficulty with the definition is that the concept of using or taking advantage of a person conveys a negative implication as in the charge that you were just using me, again without clarifying as to when an interaction constitutes a use or taking advantage of another in this negative sense.

The definition of exploitation is therefore helpful and yet, in itself, incomplete, requiring supplemental standards of justice, propriety, and relationship. Under these circumstances, comparing adoption to other circumstances commonly considered exploitative may be helpful.

The legal definitions of exploitation relevant to human trafficking clearly include the sale of a human being for purposes of labor or sex. Thus, the sale of a human being for labor or sex is considered clearly exploitative even when labor and sex are not, in themselves, considered inherently exploitative. Why? The answer is that when labor and sex are accompanied by the commodification of the human person, they become unjust uses of a person for the benefit of another. The commodification of the human person involved in the sale of persons therefore transforms work and sexuality, which under other conditions can be acts expressive and supportive of human dignity, into acts which are demeaning and exploitative.

By comparison, within contemporary market economies the sale of labor or services by a free person is not in itself considered inherently exploitative. The exchange of labor for money is not considered inherently unjust nor a use of a person, at least in the negative sense, even when it does confer profit, benefit, or advantage on another. However, where either market conditions or other circumstances induce workers to work for less than necessary for subsistence,
or for far less than the labor advantages the employer or purchaser of services, then some would attach the term exploitation to an exchange of money for labour or services. Even if market conditions or difficult circumstances induce human beings to sell their labor or services for a pittance, and for a tiny percentage of the advantage they convey to the purchaser, the exchange can be exploitative. Thus, mere adult consent and market conditions cannot in themselves immunize a transaction from the label of being exploitative. To put the matter another way: market exchanges of money for labour or services can be so unjust as to be exploitative.

The matter of consensual sale of adult sexuality is controversial. Some consider adult prostitution inherently exploitative, while others consider it just another form of labor exchange. The underlying question is whether it is inherently harmful or dehumanizing to exchange sex acts for money in the social and relational context of prostitution.

The question of labor and children is more complex than most realize. Almost all would agree that there are some forms of formal employment for minors that are not exploitative, and that there are some which are exploitative. Legally speaking, this is the line between legally permissible employment of minors, and illicit child labor. The international community has even created a separate treaty to condemn the most exploitative forms of child labor, the Worst Forms of Child Labor convention. These three categories of legal child work, illegal child labor, and the Worst Forms of Child Labor are apparently differentiated based on whether and to what degree the arrangement is harmful to the developing child. The underlying concept thus seems to be, in relationship to children, that labor arrangements harmful to the development and education of the child are exploitative and hence illicit, regardless of whether or not the child or
her parents consent.43

Under the Achild labor@ mode of analysis, sexual exploitation of the child in prostitution or pornography is one of the Aworst forms of child labor.@44 These Auses@ of children are viewed as so inherently harmful to children as to be exploitative, once again regardless of any consent or permission that might be given by the child, parents, or anyone else. In broader terms, adults engaging in sexual acts with children especially children much younger than the adult are generally viewed as exploitation, even in the absence of any commercial or monetary transaction.45 Such an act is considered an unjust Ause@ of a person in the negative sense, because the act is considered inherently harmful to the child and the child too young to give effective consent, particularly to an inherently harmful act. The mere sex act is considered the Aadvantage@ or Abenefit@ even in the absence of money.

This brief comparative review of Aexploitation@ in the contexts of labor and sexuality illustrates the term=s dependence on complex intuitions regarding market transactions, human dignity, commodification, childhood, and sexuality. The reason it is difficult to consider adoption a form of exploitation is that our intuitions have been conditioned to considering adoption an inherently good, rather than harmful, act.46 Even to consider that some adoptions might be Aexploitative@ seems self-contradictory, since adoption is itself considered in its essence a Agood@ and helpful act. These intuitions, however, are apparently mis-guided, at least from the perspective of the birth family. To the degree that adoptions are Band they often areB built upon the destructive and denigration of birth family relationships, then adoption is not an inherent or essential good, but at best is a tragic good. Once one perceives adoption through the lens of the birth family, and the child as an initial member of a birth family, then adoption
comes into focus as a deeply difficult, problematic act, inherently steeped in loss. From this perspective, the question of when adoption is exploitative naturally follows.

Under what circumstances, then, would taking a child from a birth family for purposes of adoption be considered an exploitation of the birth family? Most obviously, if an individual literally kidnaps a child, taking the child without any consent whatsoever, and then sells the child for profit to an organization that will place the child for adoption, this constitutes an exploitative adoption. Such an act would certainly be unjust and done for profit, so the only issue is whether it constitutes the use of a person. Viewing the birth family members individually, it is clear that the child is being used in this situation. If there is, for example, a particular desire of adoptive parents to adopt healthy young girls, and a healthy young girl is then snatched from a family, the child has been used in both the literal and negative sense. Literally speaking, the child’s characteristics as young, female, and desirable as an adoptee have been exploited, much as a child’s supposedly nimble fingers are exploited in bonded child labor in the carpet industry. This is also a use in the negative sense, in that a child with a family has been treated as though they had none, and hence the child has been used in the sense of being harmed: stripped of their identity, history, and initial family ties. Even if one gives the child another family, harm remains, because of the profound loss involved in loss of one’s birth family. Replacing the child’s birth parents with adoptive parents does not remove the fact of loss: an emotional fact fundamental to understanding adoption.

Where a child is kidnapped for adoption it is obvious that the birth parents have also been deeply harmed. This harm is also a form of exploitation, in that a use is made of their fertility by others seeking profits. The fertility of the birth parents can be said to be exploited in a manner
similar to that of a bonded or enslaved sex worker, in the sense that a deeply personal aspect of their being was used by others without any choice on their own part.51

Viewing the question of exploitation and harm from the perspective of the birth family as a family, rather than a mere collection of individuals, is also helpful. When profit-motivated individuals take children from a family and place the child for adoption, they are clearly exploiting the birth family as a unit. The capacity of the birth family to procreate and nurture their young is being exploited. The birth family is treated in effect as breeders, as was done historically with slavery in the United States, when a slave’s capacity to produce and raise more slaves was a part of their value.52

Suppose, however, that instead of being kidnapped, the child is purchased from the birth parents.53 Is this a form of exploitation? Is a market transaction for a child exploitative? In the United States this question has been shaped by the famous proposal of Judge Richard Posner to create market mechanisms to facilitate adoptions. Judge Posner argued that pregnant women should be able to sell their parental rights to qualified adoptive parents, thereby creating a market mechanism favoring adoption.54 Judge Posner argued that the women would be selling her custodial rights, rather than the child, and hence that such a transaction would not constitute baby-selling.55

Neither the American legal system, nor most commentators outside of the law and economics movement, have been persuaded by Posner’s distinction between selling a child and selling parental rights. That is to say, putting your child up for the highest bidder, even if bidders are required to have qualified as proper adoptive parents, would constitute illicit child selling in the United States. Thus, the explicit sale of parental rights, in the context of adoption,
is viewed as the illicit sale of a child in the United States.56

Is a child sold in such a manner exploited? Some would argue that if such a sale places a child in a good home, the child has been sold but not exploited. However, it seems more plausible to view the sold child, like the kidnaped child, as having been exploited. In both instances the child=s characteristics as young and adoptable have been used, and in both cases the child has been harmed through the loss of their original family. The harm of inducing parents to sell their child adds an additional harm to the child. It is bad enough for a human being to be commodified, or treated as an article of commerce, but to have one=s own parents do so can be particularly painful. To induce parents to sell their child is to induce a kind of betrayal which can be painful to the one betrayed.57

In at least some circumstances, purchasing children from birth parents would also be an exploitation of the birth parent. To sell one=s own children is in some ways worse than to sell one=s own sexuality. Therefore, those who view buying sexual services from even a consenting prostitute as exploitative should tend to view buying children from even consenting parents as even more exploitative. In order to be fully applicable, however, such comparisons should include the extreme poverty that envelopes many birth families in developing nations. In countries like Cambodia, Guatemala, India, and Vietnam many birth parents live under or barely above the international standard of poverty of one dollar per day. Many such families lack or struggle to obtain the bare necessities of food, clean water, adequate sanitation, and housing, and become burdened with debts beyond their means when they face illness, crop failure, or periods of unemployment.58 If someone of ample means told a hungry, impoverished woman with malnourished children that he would not help her or her children, but
he would pay her for engaging in sexual relations, who could fail to see this as a form of exploitation regardless of whether the woman consented? Yet, when a comparable bargain is struck with birth families to obtain children for adoption, many adoptive parents and agencies perceive the act as laudable rather than exploitative. Thus, when deeply impoverished women in developing countries are offered financial assistance conditioned on relinquishing their children for adoption, but not one penny if they keep their children, most in the adoption community fail to even perceive this as a sale, let alone an exploitative sale. When adoptive parents spend thirty thousand dollars to bring a child to the United States for adoption, where perhaps fifty dollars would have been enough to keep the family intact, the law smiles on the transaction as a good deed. It is only when the adoption intermediaries make clear that they are systematically in the business of purchasing babies that the adoption community becomes squeamish, but even then there is a tendency to perceive the transaction as a mere technical violation of the rules, rather than as an exploitative act.

It would be helpful for the reader at this point of the article to imagine themselves in a situation of such deep poverty, where they are struggling to provide for themselves and their children, but find themselves in a crisis, temporarily short of the bare means of subsistence. If someone of ample means came to you, refusing to provide even the pittance it would take to help you keep your child but willing to buy your child from you would you consider this an act of mercy or an act of exploitation?

The expectation in the United States has been that such birth parents should be so overwhelmed with gratitude for giving the child a better life that they would indeed feel gratitude rather than resentment. It may be that some birth parents in such situations do indeed
feel and express these sentiments. The concern for the child, the hope that the child will have so much greater opportunities than the parent, and the crushing sense of hopelessness that such poverty can bring, may indeed come into play. Victims of exploitation sometimes are so oppressed as to feel grateful even for those who exploit them. Objectively speaking, however, the decision to intervene in such situations by spending thirty thousand dollars for a Guatemalan adoption, rather than $50 for a one-time humanitarian project or $240 per year per family for a long term economic development project, is clearly driven primarily by the desire of the adoptive parents for children and the intermediaries for profits. In a very real sense, the combined poverty and fecundity of the birth family are being exploited for the benefit of others, to the harm of the birth family. The fact that the birth family makes a choice in some such situations is overshadowed by the choice of interventions made by those who select a much more expensive adoption over a much less expensive intervention that would have kept the birth family intact.

In the real world contexts of a child laundering as practiced in sending countries, the line between kidnapping and buying children is fluid and sometimes difficult to discern. Buyers or scouts go out among the poor and vulnerable scouring for children, and use various combinations of kidnapping, false promises, and financial inducement to obtain children. Birth parents accept a little food and cash, but are told some kind of inducing lie. Perhaps they are told that the child is only going to the orphanage for temporary care and can be retrieved at will; perhaps they are told about the adoption but are also told that the entire family will be able to relocate to the United States when the child is grown. Whatever combination of force, fraud, and funds are employed, the coordinated resources of those seeking children (first world would-be parents, U.S. placement agencies, and educated intermediaries operating in developing countries), often
overwhelm the very limited resources and circumstances of poor and illiterate families. It takes blinders not to see such systematic and lucrative efforts to obtain the children of the poor and vulnerable for adoption as an act of exploitation. Those blinders have existed thus far in the deeply held moral intuition that adoption is an overriding good; those blinders can be removed only by an act of moral imagination which perceives the birth family as a unit of worth and dignity and the child as a part of that family.

III. ADOPTION AS CHILD EXPLOITATION

a. The Masha Allen Case: Adoption as Child Laundering, Child Trafficking, and Child Exploitation

Adoption rhetorically centers on the child, and virtually everyone concerned with adoption claims to be doing it for the children. This rhetoric is so ubiquitous that even those who make illicit profits from systematically purchasing children for adoption claim to be doing it for the children. The understanding of adoption as an inherent good is so ingrained that many in the adoption community have defended as virtual saints even those who face government sanction for obtaining children illegally for adoption. Prospective adoptive parents are understandably upset about adoption scams in which criminals take the money and run, without making any real efforts to place children, for in these instances no adoption occurs. Adoptive parents, however, seem to have great difficulty in viewing anyone who actually places children for adoption as harming children, no matter how much they profiteer, break the law, or
place trafficked children.\textsuperscript{64}

The concept of adoption as a form of child exploitation is therefore counter-intuitive to many. In order to explore this topic, therefore, it may be helpful to begin with an instance where adoption was clearly a form of child exploitation. Although the case in question is clearly not typical of adoptions, it nonetheless will serve as a starting point for exploring the topic of when adoption becomes a form of child exploitation.

The case in question is the painful saga of Masha, a child from Russia adopted by a pedophile for purposes of sexual exploitation, including nearly five years of nightly rapes and the creation and dissemination of large numbers of pornographic images.\textsuperscript{65} Before recounting Masha’s traumatic history, it is important to place Masha’s case in the broader context of this article, that of child laundering and exploitation. The classic and apparently more common form of child laundering involves illegal conduct in obtaining children from birth families. In this form of child laundering, children are obtained by kidnapping, purchase, and/or fraud from birth parents, and then with the use of falsified documents are laundered through the adoption system as orphans and then adoptees. The motive for this activity is usually the large fees and donations available in intercountry adoption, although ideological motivations may also come into play.\textsuperscript{66} In most of these instances, the children are placed into reasonably good homes. Later in this section we will ask whether such laundered children have been exploited.

Masha, however, was laundered in a different way. In her case, the fraud occurred in the United States, in the paperwork describing the character, intentions, behavior, and background of Mathew Mancuso, her adoptive father.\textsuperscript{67} To understand the fraudulent nature of this paperwork, it is important to understand that Masha’s case is not simply an instance of an
adoptive parent who abuses his child. Matthew Mancuso never intended what would be considered a normal parent-child relationship when he obtained Masha. Rather, Mathew Mancuso clearly intended to use the intercountry adoption system to obtain the equivalent of a child sex slave. Thus, the Judge who presided over his criminal trial stated at Mancuso’s sentencing: “You chose to adopt this girl only so you could sexually abuse her.” The underlying concept of laundering applies because Mancuso obtained and hid an entirely illicit result (transporting and obtaining a child sex slave across international borders) under the guise of a lawful and licit transaction, the adoption of a child. The fact that Mancuso succeeded in this brazen and horrific act of child laundering speaks volumes about the vulnerability of the intercountry adoption system to illicit conduct.

Mancuso=s act of child laundering was also a form of child trafficking. If Mancuso had gone to Russia, obtained a child by force, fraud, or purchase, and illegally sneaked the child into the United States, for purposes of sexual exploitation, his acts would have met applicable definitions of child trafficking. When Mancuso obtained Masha by child laundering through the creation of fraudulent adoption documents and the payment of adoption fees, he was obtaining her by fraud for purposes of exploitation, and hence was engaged in a form of child trafficking. In addition, Mancuso threatened Masha in order to silence and control her, indicating that force was used to maintain his exploitation and control over her. Masha was a trafficked child, as that term is generally used, although Mancuso=s use of the adoption system has obscured that point for many.

Both the exploitation of Masha, and the involvement of the adoption system in that exploitation, become clearer in light of a more detailed summary of her tragic history. Masha
was born as Maria Yashenkova on August 25th, 1992, in Novochakhtinsk, a small town in Southern Russia. When Masha was four years old, her mother, while drunk, stabbed her in the back of the neck. Masha was removed to a Russian orphanage. Her mother visited Masha, at least initially, and promised to return to retrieve her. For whatever reasons, this retrieval never occurred, and Masha was eventually told she would be adopted. Masha says she initially thought her family members might be adopting her. However, Masha instead was made eligible for international adoption.

Matthew Mancuso went through a largely conventional intercountry adoption process to obtain Masha. The agency personnel involved in Masha=s adoption included social workers and agency workers with many years of experience in intercountry adoption, some of whom have continued to practice in the field of adoption. According to this process, it is the task of a United States adoption agency to connect prospective adoptive parents with children in Russia eligible for adoption. United States agencies playing this role of a placement agency have contacts, themselves or through facilitators or intermediaries, with Russian orphanages that place children internationally. Several of the individuals/agencies involved in the placement agency role in Masha=s case appear to have been mainstream and experienced participants in the field of intercountry adoption, as represented by their involvement in the Joint Council on International Children=s Services (JCICS), a provider organization which describes itself as Aone of the oldest and largest child welfare organizations, and Athe lead voice on intercountry children=s services. JCICS promotes ethical child welfare practices and Astrrengthens professional standards. JCICS member agencies serve Aapproximately 80% of all international adoptions in the United States.
Matthew Mancuso was approximately 39 years old and divorced when he initiated the process to adopt. He specifically requested a girl between the ages of five and six of the Caucasian race. The placement agency sent Mancuso videos of various children and he chose Masha. (Masha herself later complained that in some of the pictures they showed him of me from the orphanage I was naked.)

Mancuso was legally required to be approved for adoption through a home study process. Since the placement agencies involved were located outside of Pennsylvania, a separate, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania agency conducted the home study. The home study was conducted by an experienced social worker who noted in the home study that she had a Master’s degree in Social Work and over fourteen years experience doing adoptions. The home study document favorably recommended Mancuso to adopt through a very thorough home study process. The process included a written application, a medical statement from his physician, child abuse and criminal record checks, three reference letters, financial and income tax statements and intensive interviews with Mr. Mancuso.

The home study described Mancuso’s loss of his relationship with his birth daughter, Rachelle, as a primary motivation to adopt. The home study states: Mr. Mancuso has very strong memories about being a father to Rachelle and enjoyed his role....He and Rachelle appreciated the rural setting [of the family home] while Mrs. Mancuso did not participate in the various adventures they would take such as walking in the woods behind their home or visiting the neighbor’s horses. Mancuso and his wife were divorced in the same month that Rachelle turned ten. The home study described a gradual process in which weekend visits with Rachelle became fewer and fewer, leading to a lack of relationship. Thus, Mancuso
wants to adopt a child as he strongly misses the parenting role that he had with his daughter.\(^8^5\)

Neither Rachelle, who was twenty at the time, nor Mancuso=s ex-wife, were contacted for the home study. After Masha=s case was publicized, Rachelle revealed that Mancuso had sexually abused her over an extended period of her childhood.\(^8^6\) Mancuso=s wish to replicate his supposedly close parental relationship with his daughter thus in actuality was a desire to have a sexual relationship with a pre-pubescent child. Rachelle may have provided information sufficient to block the adoption if she had been interviewed as a part of the home-study---particularly if she had been told that her father was adopting a girl.\(^8^7\) Given the central role of the prior father-daughter relationship in the home study, and the sensitivity of placing a young girl with a single male, the failure to contact the adult daughter is a glaring oversight—although an oversight defended by some as standard practice in the field.\(^8^8\)

The home study summary combined the missing daughter\(^@\) motivation with a glowing recommendation of Mancuso:

\[A\text{He is a caring, loving man who misses the parenting role that he had with his daughter. He is a highly moral individual and will provide not just a financially stable home but the ability to parent a child with values.}\]\(^8^9\)

Mancuso completed the adoption in Russia and returned to the United States with Masha in July 1998.\(^9^0\) Although Mancuso had promised to fix up a bedroom in his home with appropriate furnishings for a young girl,\(^9^1\) Mancuso never gave Masha her own bed, let alone bedroom. Instead, Masha was required from day one to sleep with Mancuso. Mancuso
immediately commenced his planned sexual exploitation of Masha.\textsuperscript{92}

Although multiple post-placement reports were required under Russian law, and the home study agency agreed \textit{Ato} provide post-placement reports for a period of three (3) years,\textsuperscript{93} not a single post-placement visit occurred. No one associated with the adoption came to check on Masha. Two post-placement reports were translated and submitted to the Russian government. The first report is apparently fraudulent, as the entity and individual purporting to perform it apparently never existed. The second post-placement report was based on a telephone interview conducted by the placement agency, which was located in a different state from the one where Mancuso and Masha resided. The home study agency which had promised to perform post-placement visits was never informed by the placement agency or Mancuso that the child had been adopted and was living with Mancuso.\textsuperscript{94}

By the time Masha started school, Mancuso had terrorized her into keeping his sexual exploitation of her secret. As time went on Mancuso severely restricted her diet, apparently for the purpose of slowing her growth and stopping her from entering puberty.\textsuperscript{95}

Mancuso did not stop at exploiting Masha through his constant rapes, but expanded into pornographic exploitation. He started by taking photographs of Masha dressed, transitioned into photographs of her naked, and then finally took photographs of her engaged in sex acts. Mancuso distributed these photographs on the internet. Law enforcement tracking child pornography became very concerned with Masha as they watched her grow up on the internet, subject to a constant stream of photographed sexual exploitation. In order to find her, law enforcement removed Masha’s image from photographs and publicized some of them, hoping that someone would be able to identify her location through the background. She became
known as the Disney World girl, after a hotel room there was identified from one of the photographs.\textsuperscript{96}

Mancuso=s photographs of Masha became a ubiquitous form of internet child pornography; with half of those involved in child pornography found to possess an image of Masha. Law enforcement eventually tracked Mancuso through his internet trading in child pornography. When the FBI agents arrived to execute a search warrant for child pornography, they were surprised to find a child with Mancuso. When the agents interviewed her separately from Mancuso (who was shouting at her to say nothing), Masha revealed her exploitation.\textsuperscript{97}

Masha Allen indicated in her Congressional testimony that she was A more upset about the pictures on the internet than I am about what Mathew did to me physically.@\textsuperscript{98} Indeed, from Masha=s perspective her exploitation did not end with her rescue:

A....I got much more upset when I found out about the pictures of me that he put on the Internet. I had no idea he had done that. When I found out about it I asked our lawyer to get them back. He told me we couldn=t do that. Then I found out that they would be there forever. That=s when I got mad and decided to go public with my story. Usually, when a kid is hurt and the abuser goes to prison, the abuse is over. But because Matthew put my pictures on the Internet the abuse is still going on. Anyone can see them. People are still downloading them....@\textsuperscript{99}

The reaction of the adoption community to Masha=s case has been typically defensive. As Masha=s Congressional testimony notes: AWhen I told my story in public for the first time all the adoption agencies, not just Matthew=s tried to cover up my story.@\textsuperscript{100} Adoption-orientated
web sites contained pleas for the adoption community to complain about the negative tone of press coverage of Masha’s case, and the potential negative impact on international adoption.\textsuperscript{101}

The defensive attitude of the adoption community to the Masha Allen case has been accompanied by an unwillingness to learn lessons from the event. The general response has been to focus on Mancuso as someone who defrauded the adoption system, rather than enquiring into how the adoption system could be safeguarded against such fraud.\textsuperscript{102} This defensiveness has several roots: first, the need of adoptive parents and agencies to justify their own roles in adoption through maintenance of a positive view of adoption; and second, a broader cultural mindset which identifies adoption as an essential and inherent good. According to this mindset, adoption by definition is a saving and good act; hence, the concept of an exploitative adoption is seen as self-contradictory.\textsuperscript{103}

In Masha’s case, this defensiveness is illustrated by a tendency to mentally separate Masha’s exploitation from adoption. Mancuso, after all, had also exploited his biological daughter, goes the argument: therefore the fact that Masha was exploited by her adoptive father is viewed as irrelevant to adoption itself.

This refusal to connect Masha’s exploitation to adoption is an impediment to needed reforms of the adoption system. While Masha’s case is certainly unusual, it is not unique: according to her Congressional testimony two other children are known to have been internationally adopted by pedophiles.\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, the harms to Russian adoptees from poorly arranged adoptions is much more extensive than the unusual circumstance of pedophiles adopting. Approximately fourteen Russian adoptees have been killed by their adoptive parents.\textsuperscript{105}

A significant number of Russian adoptees have had serious enough problems to require
extensive psychiatric or psychological treatment, sometimes to the point of causing adoptive parents to consider either disrupting the adoption or some form of specialized residential situation. These difficulties are usually linked to the poor conditions in some Russian orphanages. The intercountry adoption system commonly fails to identify, diagnose, and describe the special needs of post-institutionalized children, thereby failing to match those children with adoptive parents capable and prepared to handle their needs. The results of placing special needs children in adoptive homes that are unprepared to parent them has sometimes been lethal, more often been tragic, but certainly cannot be defended as facilitating the best interests of such children. Masha’s case therefore is symptomatic of an intercountry adoption system that frequently fails to facilitate the best interests of children precisely because it believes so strongly in the inherent goodness of adoption.

Indeed, it is the tendency to perceive adoption as an inherent and essential good that always saves, and can never harm, that itself harms children. This mindset perceives careful and accurate assessments of children and prospective adoptive homes as far less important than getting as many children as possible adopted. This mindset is comfortable with cutting all kinds of legal and ethical corners in pursuit of the higher good of placing children in adoptive homes. This mindset is hostile to adoption regulations, since regulations slow adoptions and adoption is equated with a kind of salvation. It is this mindset within the adoption world that leads to children being placed with pedophiles, or in homes ill-equipped to provide for their needs.

The truth is that Masha’s exploitation by Mancuso does have special significance for adoption. Mancuso is not simply an adoptive parent who abused, but rather is a pedophile who deliberately employed the intercountry adoption system to launder, traffic, and exploit a child.
The vulnerability of the adoption system to child laundering, child trafficking, and child exploitation, is highly significant to adoption.

A rough analogy to the history of the juvenile delinquency system in the United States may be useful. During much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries interventions in the lives of children occurred without any substantial constitutional or procedural protections for either children’s liberty interests or parent’s custodial rights. The prevailing theory was that children did not need lawyers or rights. Indeed, providing formal procedural protections to children was seen as detrimental, since it interfered with laudable efforts to save children. Based on this child-saving premise various persons and institutions intervened in a broad range of situations, including juveniles who commit crimes, runaways, truants, street children, children of poor or indigent parents, and children viewed as victims of abuse or neglect. Children were separated from their parents, sent out of state, placed in homes, and institutionalized, all in the name of saving children.108

The Supreme Court in the 1966 In re Gault decision took a dim view of this historical approach, at least as applied to juvenile delinquents: those who had committed criminal acts.109 The Supreme Court was not willing to presume that the interventions provided for juvenile delinquents in the juvenile courts were inherently and essentially good. Instead, the Court presumed that the juvenile system was capable of harming, as well as helping, children. The Court therefore mandated that juvenile delinquents be provided many of the protections, rights, and formal procedures provided to adult criminal defendants. The Court apparently believed that providing such protections to children in the juvenile system could improve outcomes for children.110
Intercountry adoption is currently analogous to the pre-Gault regimen, although in a somewhat paradoxical way. The paradox consists of the gap between a system which appears highly regulated and weighed down with endless paperwork, and yet simultaneously appears to lack substantive regulations, safeguards, and protections. The reality is that the endless paperwork and multiple levels of government involved in intercountry adoption currently do little to protect either birth families, children, or adoptive families against corruption, fraud, child laundering, child trafficking, and incompetence. The system thrives on what a student would call *busywork*—the meaningless filling out of forms. Child study forms, relinquishment documents, and death certificates in many sending countries are frequently grossly inaccurate or fraudulent, and home studies provided by United States adoption agencies are often as meaningless and vacuous as Mancuso’s (although fortunately there usually are not such horrors to hide). Under these circumstances both those who claim the system is over-regulated and those who view it as under-regulated can make a plausible case. Yet, the over-riding truth is that the system lacks appropriate and meaningful regulation, making intercountry adoption open season for a broad range of misconduct. And one reason that this failure to appropriately regulate exists is the cultural tendency to equate adoption with child saving. So long as adoption is viewed as an essential and inherent good, rather than a sensitive intervention that can (like back or brain surgery) do either good or harm, then rules, procedures, and forms will be viewed as meaningless exercises and commonly evaded. The various rules broken in Masha Allen’s adoption—such as Russian rules against single men adopting and the requirement of post placement reports—are symptomatic of a system uncommitted to rules it views as largely meaningless hindrances to an essentially good act. Only when we understand that the
intervention of adoption can exploit a child will we regulate it as we should.

b. Kidnaped, Stolen and Purchased Children as Exploited Children

Thousands of children have been stolen, kidnapped or purchased for purposes of intercountry adoption. Yet, some do not perceive the incidence of such acts as much more than a transient or insubstantial harm. Almost inevitably, one hears that such children are better off, sometimes with a subtext that the acts of stealing, kidnapping, and purchasing them were therefore either justified, or only insubstantial wrongs.

The State Department, while not considering baby selling for adoption justified or legal, does make a sharp differentiation between baby selling for adoption and human trafficking, as indicated in the following excerpt from their 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report:

ILLEGAL ADOPTION, BABY SELLING, AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

1. Legitimate intercountry adoption provides a permanent family placement for a child unable to find one in his or her country of origin, absent any irregularities by the adoptive parents, the birth parents, or any parties involved in facilitating the relationship.

Appropriate and legitimate intercountry adoption does not imply baby selling or human trafficking. Unless adoption occurs for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation or forced labor, adoption does not fall under the scope of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Baby selling, which is sometimes used as a means to circumvent legal adoption requirements, involves coerced or induced removal of a child, or situations where
deception or undue compensation is used to induce relinquishment of a child.

Baby selling is not an acceptable route to adoption and can include many attributes in common with human trafficking. Though baby selling is illegal, it would not necessarily constitute human trafficking where it occurs for adoption, based on the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, the UN Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and the Sale of Children, the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, and definitions of adoption established by U.S. jurisdictions.

The purposes of baby selling and human trafficking are not necessarily the same. Some individuals assume that baby selling for adoption is a form of human trafficking because trafficking and baby selling both involve making a profit by selling another person. However, illegally selling a child for adoption would not constitute trafficking where the child itself is not to be exploited. Baby selling generally results in a situation that is nonexploitative with respect to the child. Trafficking, on the other hand, implies exploitation of the victims. If an adopted child is subjected to coerced labor or sexual exploitation, then it constitutes a case of human trafficking.111

The fundamental premise of the State Department analysis of United States and international law pertaining to trafficking is that illegally obtaining a child for adoption does not constitute human trafficking, because the situation...is nonexploitative with respect to the child.112 From this premise a host of results follow, including the non-applicability of national
and international laws pertaining to trafficking.

The State Department is likely correct that currently applicable federal criminal laws concerning human and child trafficking do not cover most cases of illegally obtaining children for purposes of adoption. Federal laws concerning human trafficking generally apply only to labor or sexual exploitation, and thus are inapplicable to any other forms of exploitation.113 Thus, when the federal government prosecuted Americans operating in Cambodia for systematically obtaining babies for adoption through purchase and fraud, prosecutors had to rely on statutes criminalizing visa fraud and money laundering.114 While the prosecutions in the Cambodian adoption scandal secured convictions, the inability to charge the defendants for any form of human trafficking allowed the principal defendant, Lauren Galindo, to characterize her actions as mere regulatory or technical violations. Galindo specifically denied that she had trafficked children, despite ample evidence that she had systematically sent out paid agents to buy children, and despite evidence that she had pocketed millions of dollars from this scheme, including diverting orphanage donations to her personal benefit. It was only after a fuller version of what happened in Cambodia became available to the public that the adoption community began to consider that large-scale trafficking had occurred—a realization that the lack of a human trafficking conviction hinders to this day.115

The State Department’s view that, under international law, baby selling for adoption is not human trafficking, depends on the definition of exploitation found in those instruments. Unlike United States statutes specifically drafted to include only labor and sex exploitation, relevant international law documents defining trafficking are deliberately open-ended, including, but not limited to, labor and sex exploitation.116 The State Department presumes that such
open-ended definitions of exploitation do not apply to coerced or induced removal of a child, or situations where deception or undue compensation is used to induce relinquishment of a child, so long as the child is not subject to labor or sex exploitation in their adoptive home. This approach reflects a lack of understanding of the exploitative nature of such adoptions.

Section One of this article argued that such adoptions are exploitative in relationship to the birth family. When a birth family=s child is lost to the family through coercion, deception or undue compensation, the family=s capacity to produce and nurture a child has been unjustly exploited for the benefit of others. Those benefiting include both those who benefit financially from the adoption, and also the adoptive family who benefits from having their desire for a child fulfilled. Further, the birth family includes the child, who is initially a part of that family: hence the exploitation of the birth family includes exploitation of the child in her role as a member of the birth family.

Viewing the matter from the perspective of a child who has been separated from the birth family, one can say first that any act that exploits the birth parents and birth family also exploits the child as an individual. One of the fundamental emotional truths of adoption is that the adoptee=s tie to their birth parents and family are not severed by adoption. This is true even in infant adoption, where the child has no knowledge or contact with the birth family. Even in infant adoptions, it is common for adoptees, as they grow into teenagers and adults, to be seriously concerned with questions concerning their birth family. Many such adoptees eventually wish to obtain information and/or contact with their birth family, and they can be deeply affected by what they discover in such birth searches. The permanent link between adoptees and their birth families should not surprise us, given the significance of origin, history,
and heredity to fundamental human issues of identity, family, and community. Once this permanent connection between adoptees and birth families is understood, the principal that harming the birth family harms the adoptee is a simple application of the broader principle that harming an individual also harms those to whom they are intimately connected, whether spouses, children, parents, siblings, extended family, or even friends.

When the exploitation of the birth family specifically involves the illicit removal of the child from the family, the harm to the child is particularly poignant. In such instances, the exploitation of the birth family is directly tied to one of the fundamental questions adoptees ask: why didn’t my family keep me? An adoptee, learning that the answer to this question is that they were taken from their family illegally, may justifiably experience a sense of grievance, even if they were loved and well cared for by the adoptive family. This sense of grievance is connected to another fundamental emotional truth of adoption: adoption involves loss, not only for the birth family but also for the adoptee. This loss can be extremely painful, even when it was necessary, justified, or unavoidable. When the loss of the birth family was unjustified or avoidable, however, then it is appropriate for the adoptee to demand an accounting for those who unjustifiably caused this pain. Further, when the adoptee’s loss of their birth family was illicit, unnecessary and unjustified, and occurred to benefit others financially or emotionally, then the loss becomes a form of exploitation. What could be more exploitative than to harm a child through unnecessarily ripping them from their birth family, for purposes of financial or emotional gain for others?

This point may become clearer by reference to the well-known scenarios in child laundering scandals. In countries like Cambodia and India, such scandals have usually involved
individuals who intentionally profited from obtaining children from birth families through kidnapping and buying children. In India, for example, an orphanage director named Sanjeeva Rao would systematically obtain children from scouts, intermediaries who were paid for each child they brought to the orphanage. The scouts would obtain the children through a combination of fraud, force, and financial inducement. In Cambodia, Lauryn Galindo systematically sent out intermediaries to obtain children from poor, struggling birth parents, again through a combination of fraud, force, and financial inducement. Rao and Galindo profited handsomely from these transactions, as the adoption fees and donations they received for each adoption dwarfed the costs and expenses involved in paying the intermediaries, caring for the children, and facilitating the adoptions. The intermediaries profited more modestly, but apparently enough to make the task worth their while. Rao and Galindo were clearly exploiting the characteristics of the children that made them particularly adoptable, such as their age, health, gender, and physical attractiveness, for purposes of financial profit.

Rao and Galindo would doubtless argue that they did not exploit children, since in their view the children involved were far better off with middle-class families in the United States than growing up impoverished in a developing nation. Their argument would also be embraced by many in the adoption community, who cannot understand how it could be child exploitation to take children from a poor family in the developing world to a middle-class family in a rich country.

Answering this question requires reasoning by analogy, because otherwise it is impossible to overcome the grip that the adoption myth has on our thinking. Consider a situation where a wealthy and childless United States couple traveling in India comes across a mother, father, and
baby drowning in a river. The couple are traveling in a substantial boat being guided by locals, and could easily command that the locals rescue the entire family. The couple, however, consider this their opportunity to finally have a child of our own, and instruct their local guides to rescue the infant while leaving the parents to drown. Assume that the couple adopts the “orphan” and returns to the United States, where the child is loved and given all of the opportunities that wealth, family, and education can provide. When the child grows up, however, she visits her native country, tracks down those involved in her adoption, and there learns the truth of her origins. The adoptee then returns to the United States to confront her adoptive parents. What do you think this adoptee would say to her adoptive parents? Would it be enough for the parents to argue that her birth parents were poor and her life would have been worse if they had rescued the entire family? Would the argument that this child is better off because of her adoption be sufficient to assuage the horror, grief, and anger of this adoptee? Moreover, could not this adoptee consider that her adoptive parents had exploited her, using her very infancy and capacity to bond and love to fulfill their own desires for a child? Could not she argue that this was an unjust use of her and her birth parents, for the benefit of themselves? Could not the adoptee cry out something like this to her adoptive parents: You took advantage of my need to have someone love and care for me. You made me an orphan, and then exploited my need for a family. You put me in a position where I could not help but love you, when I really should have hated you as people who murdered my parents. You made me betray my own flesh and blood....

The argument that it becomes permissible, or an insubstantial harm, to rip children from their parents merely because they would be better off in a different home, and a better cultural
and economic milieu, has a painful history. This Abetter off@ theory was the basis of the removal of aboriginal children from their families in Australia, and of native American children from their families in the United States. Such policies have since been repudiated in both Australia and the United States, in relationship to native or aboriginal peoples. It is ironic that these ways of thinking nevertheless live on in the realm of intercountry adoption. To the degree that this Anon-exploitation@ or Abetter off@ viewpoint continues, it is a sign that intercountry adoption remains rooted in a kind of neo-colonialist mindset.

The viewpoint that it is permissible to take children from their original families and give them to new families, so long as the children are Abetter off@ in some cultural, economic, or educational, sense, has enormous breadth, and is counter to the law. Such arguments could be used to justify taking virtually any child from a family, so long as a family who could offer the child Abetter@ opportunities wanted the child. For example, under this theory a wealthy European could feel justified in taking any child from an unemployed American couple, because the child would be raised in a more cultured environment and receive a superior education. Under this theory the children of the poor are essentially open season for the taking by anyone with the means to do so and the position to claim that the child is thereby Abetter off.@ Indeed, this theory could be distorted to the point of justifying genocide, whereby the children of a disfavored group were systematically removed in order to destroy, in whole or part, that group.

It should not be presumed that adoptees will never ask the kinds of hard questions raised in this section. Indeed, such questions are already evident in some cases of intercountry adoption. For example, consider the story of Camryn. Camryn=s parents were dead, but she
was living with her married sister and family, all of whom lived within a broader, extended family setting. Camryn describes her own story as follows:

Just over 5 years ago, I was a 9 year old girl named Song Kea living in a small house at Slorgram Commune, in Siem Reap, Cambodia, with my older sister Le and her husband Sayha who was a chef at a big restaurant, and their baby son, Vitbol. Our older brother Muot also lived with us.

A short walk from our house lived my aunts—all of them were my mother’s sisters. They lived with their husband & children. We were all close. I loved to play with all of my cousins.

Everyday I went to school—my family was very proud of me because I was such a good student. I also used to go to Cambodian dance lessons at the dance center.

On the weekend, I used to take care of Vitbol, while my sister cooked food to sell at the market. I also used to help with the farm that we had where we grew vegetables & rice.

We did not have much money, but we all helped each other. We always had food & clothes. We were happy and loved each other.

One day, a man stopped me, and told me to go and ask my family if I could live in America....

Suddenly they told me I would go to Phnom Penh that day and meet my new mother. I didn’t say goodbye to my sister, or anyone else. Did my sister know where to find me? When would I see them again? I was scared.

I met my new Mom—she was pretty. I told her that I wanted to go back to Siem Reap, but she did not understand Khmer. I asked the lady who worked in the hotel to ask her.
The day we …went to Siem Reap---maybe my Mom DID understand Khmer! I was very excited, and told the taxi driver the directions to my house. We arrived there and my sister came down the steps smiling & crying. My new Mom was very confused and went to find someone who could speak Khmer & English. We spent the next two days with my sister, and then we said goodbye. My Mom made sure Le had had our address, paper, envelopes, & stamps. When we left my sister was very sad & cried a lot. But at least we got the chance to say goodbye.

In America for the first few months I would cry a lot, especially at bedtime. I tried to be brave for my new family, but I missed my Cambodian family so much. I missed my country, my friends, the smell at night of the fire and the food. I missed my sister singing Vitbol to sleep. I used to think a lot about when I was a flower girl for my sister when my sister got married. My new Mom used to hold me and stroke my head—she used to cry too. One night, she asked me if I would like to go back to Cambodia to live, as I seemed so unhappy. I was very mixed up. My Mom promised to take me for a visit to Cambodia.

As the months & years passed, I still miss Cambodia, but it didn’t hurt so much. I have my Cambodian family in my heart, and will always love them. I hardly speak any Khmer any more. My sister gave birth to another baby boy---I would like to meet him. I used to be Vitbol=s favorite person=now he would not even remember me, which makes me very sad. I still remember him so well, but he is a big boy now.

I may not have had a fancy house in Cambodia, but I did have a home.

I may not have a big soft bed in Cambodia, but I had a place where I slept safely & peacefully each night.

I may not have had a big car in Cambodia, but I had an ox & cart.
I may not have had parents in Cambodia who could give me all the fine things in life, but I had a family who loved me.

I may not have had private education in Cambodia, but I went to school and studied very hard.\textsuperscript{134}

Camryn’s adoption was facilitated by Lauren Galindo, the United States citizen at the center of the Cambodian adoption scandal.\textsuperscript{135} Her adoption took a different turn from most instances of child laundering because she was old enough to communicate her desire to see her Cambodian family, and her adoptive mother responded positively. Her adoptive mother was able to reduce the trauma of the situation by giving young Song Kea a choice regarding the adoption, and by immediately placing the adoption question within the context of continued contact with her Cambodian family. In addition, although Song Kea did have a loving extended family raising her, the fact that her parents were dead perhaps lessened the potential loyalty conflict involved in adapting to adoptive parents.\textsuperscript{136} Most child laundering situations, however, involve babies and infants who, through their false paperwork, are taken from living parents and forever stripped of the truth of their origins. Even where older children are involved, few are given a real choice or able to maintain continued contact with their birth families. Thus, however difficult the loss and pain experienced by Song Kea, the loss and pain involved in most instances of child laundering are much greater.

The exploitative nature of child laundering is made even clearer in another Cambodian adoption facilitated by Lauren Galindo, where an older child of approximately six or seven years of age was literally torn, screaming and crying, from her birth mother’s arms. As the adoptive
mother (Martha Jacobus) explains, the result has been a severely disturbed adopted child:

We first met our child as she screamed and desperately clung to her nanny. With the driver acting as interpreter, we learned that the nanny was in fact her birthmother. When asked by the American adoption professional why she was there, the birthmother replied, >I was just walking by and stopped in, when asked what she wanted she replied >Some money for me and my family. Instructed by the adoption professional, we gave her the $50 customarily given to a nanny as a thank you gift....

The adoption professional followed us and told us that yes, we could walk away >but if you don’t adopt her, someone else will= and >if you don’t adopt her, she’ll probably end up in the sex industry. Not feeling like we had another choice, but not feeling comfortable with our decision either, we took our daughter with us....

....our daughter states that she never lived at the Orphan Center or spent any time there at all, rather lived with her birthmother and 5 siblings at home until the day she met us. This was confirmed in a letter from her birthmother. Our daughter also told us that she never knew anything about what was going to happen to her until she saw us arrive at the Orphan Center that day.

In May of 1999, almost a year after the adoption, we received an unsolicited letter from our daughter’s birthmother and have corresponded with her since. We have learned that she was approached by ....Americans...to have her daughter and also a niece adopted. She was offered money and enticed by promises of ongoing support and money from the adoptive family.

She has also said that she was told to lie about our daughter’s age to make her seem
Our family has had a very difficult adjustment period. We were all severely traumatized and still experience symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. For the first 1 to 2 years we were in a sort of *desperate survival mode*, just making it through the day intact was a great achievement. Our child was hyperactive, angry, anxious, controlling, unhappy to the core of her being about being here and spent every waking moment letting us, particularly me, know it...

However I want to state very clearly that we have a child with an Attachment Disorder, significant and persistent anxiety and underlying anger. Attachment Disorders do not go away...

Sometimes, at the end of a long day when our daughter has spent all of her energy trying to get out of the intimacy of our family and has created so much chaos and unpleasantness that we are exhausted, every nerve is raw and our hearts are twisted inside, there is sadness, regret and guilt...."\(^\text{137}\)"

An interview with Ms. Jacobus elaborated on the emotional trauma suffered by her daughter:"

"According to Ms. Jacobus, her daughter went mute, pulled her hair out of her head, spit and bit, fought physically, and had meltdowns every day. Only at night when Ms. Jacobus put her daughter to bed would her daughter speak to her. When she spoke, it was in Cambodian. By using a Cambodian dictionary, Ms. Jacobus figured out that her daughter was telling her the names of her brothers and sisters and of a friend in Cambodia."\(^\text{139}\)"
Unlike Camryn, who was emotionally whole enough to articulate her own loss in a way accessible to the legal system, Ms. Jacobus’ daughter’s loss comes to us only through the descriptions of her understandably distraught adoptive mother. This is one difficulty with truly accessing the exploitation of laundered children: the more traumatized they are, the less accessible their perspective is to us. Moreover, the manner in which the adoption community and adult world express and interpret the trauma of laundered children can be subject to question. For example, consider Ms. Jacobus’ description of her adoptive daughter as suffering from an Attachment Disorder. From the adoptive parent’s perspective the term appears apt, as her adoptive child is clearly resisting bonding and attachment to her adoptive mother. Moreover, professionals the mother may have consulted, or information she may have gleaned from her own research, presumably informed the mother of the existence of reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Viewed from the adoptee’s perspective, however, labeling the child as having an attachment disorder seems absurd. There is arguably nothing wrong with the child, and everything wrong with the child’s situation. How should we expect a six or seven year old child, normally attached and bonded to her family, to react to a situation where she is, in a single unexpected moment, torn from her mother’s arms and sold to a stranger, who suddenly purports to be her mother? Moreover, this mother looks and smells completely different from everyone in her family and community, does not speak her language, and takes her half-way around the world to a community where almost nobody speaks her language. Would we expect a normally bonded and attached child to envelope with love and affection a stranger who in her presence bought her from her mother? Would it not be a sign of sanity and normal psychology to resist, with every fibre of her being, this new arrangement? And how should such a child,
overwhelmed emotionally, feeling betrayed by the mother who sold her, in culture-shock, and unable to communicate in words to those around her due to a language barrier, express her feelings?

To understand the reactions of Ms. Jacobus= adoptive daughter, therefore, we have to realize that from her perspective she is a trafficked child, and that it is natural for a trafficked child aware of her situation to resist it. It is absurd to buy children from their mothers and then expect the children to react to those who bought her as though they were beloved family members. To label the child with a *disorder* is to fail to diagnose the disorder in the child=s situation.

Technically speaking, Reactive Attachment Disorder is applicable where a child, due to significant abuse or neglect ("grossly pathologically care") in the first few years of life, is unable to bond normally with non-abusive care-givers or parents. The problem is often seen in children whose first years were spent in poor institutional care, as well as situations where children suffered severe neglect or abuse in their first home. Beyond the strict official definition of RAD, there is a broader, sometimes controversial world of attachment experts and therapists. Such experts associate various kinds of attachment disorders with dangerous or erratic behaviors, such as sadistic treatment of animals and children, fire-starting, stealing, head-banging, etc. In addition, some attachment disordered children are described as superficially charming and manipulative, and as exhibiting their most severe behaviors only within their adoptive or foster homes. Both the official definition of RAD, and the broader body of concerns over attachment disorders and attachment, share common roots in the work of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth regarding the significance of attachment relationships in infancy and childhood to
human development. It is deeply ironic to label Ms. Jacobus’ adoptive daughter with any form of RAD or attachment disorder, as she displayed precisely the kind of bond to her family of origin which attachment theory posits as foundational to normal human development. Ms. Jacobus’ adoptive daughter most likely had precisely the opposite problems of RAD, or attachment disordered, children. Her problem was not an inability to trust due to neglect or abuse in early childhood, but rather that she was in fact quite strongly attached and bonded to a family that had, when subject to severe poverty, false promises, and financial inducement, sold her. While it is true that this child did not easily attach to her adoptive mother, this refusal to attach to an adoptive family was most based on a pre-existing and developmentally appropriate attachment to her family of origin.

Scattered cases from several countries indicate that older children aware of having been bought or stolen from their birth families frequently react in ways similar to that of Ms. Jacobus’ daughter. Yet, these children typically are treated as though they were somehow at fault or sick, due to their failure to easily adjust and adapt to their adoptive homes. It is, once again, the failure to recognize that adoption can be harmful and exploitative that has led these cases to be mislabeled and hence mis-handled. Once we label these children clearly as trafficked and laundered children, it may be possible to be helpful to them. So long as we hide, even from ourselves, their reality, then even efforts to help them can be harmful. Moreover, it is not enough for adoptive parents alone to come to a clear realization of the situation, for adoptive parents necessarily rely on others for advice and assistance. When adoption agencies, adoption workers, mental health professionals, and even government officials fail to acknowledge the phenomenon of child laundering and child trafficking within the adoption system, they make it
difficult for even the best-intentioned adoptive parents to assist these children.\textsuperscript{145}

Most laundered and trafficked adoptees were removed from their birth families as infants, and their development is therefore different. These children may lack conscious memories of their birth families and generally lack any awareness of the reasons or manner in which they were removed. Most of these children will have bonded normally with their adoptive families. For these adoptees, their initial set of issues would commonly include questions of identity, race, and origins. As such adoptees become teenagers and then young adults, some percentage, particularly in cross-racial adoptions, will become intensely concerned with such issues.\textsuperscript{146} Even then, however, unless there is some information suggesting that they had been trafficked or laundered, they may never even consider the possibility. Most laundered or trafficked children presumably never discover this fact, given the difficulty of uncovering such hidden truths, and the fact that their interest in information and birth searches usually do not occur until more than a decade after their adoption. If information suggesting that they were illicitly obtained for adoption were to arise, such adoptees might have some of the same reasons for reacting defensively as their adoptive parents. Given their bonding to their adoptive parents, it would be difficult for such adoptees to contemplate that their adoption had been fundamentally illicit. Such a truth would be like learning as a teenager or young adult that one was conceived in a rape. Unless the exact facts can be accurately obtained—a daunting task—excruciating questions may remain, as the adoptee struggles to discern the degree of fault or complicity of various birth family and adoptive family members in wrongful acts. Did their first parents sell them, or were they tricked? Did their adoptive family know they were stolen? It is understandable if a bonded adoptee does not want to explore this quagmire, particularly given the lack of context in which to
place these concerns and the extraordinary difficulties in discovering the truth.

One can ask whether a laundered or trafficked infant who never learns of these facts and is placed into a loving adoptive family, has been exploited or harmed. Certainly that would be the perspective of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that the child has the right to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations. Further, the child has the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. These are objective rights, and the fact that an individual is unaware that they have been deprived of such rights does not alter the fundamental wrong involved. Hypothetically, if an adult were kidnapped and removed from their family, home, and nation, and replanted elsewhere in a new family, home, and nation, and somehow all knowledge of this change was removed from them, would not the wrong remain?

It is important to remember that there is a fundamental human drive or desire to reproduce and nurture. These drives are related to fundamental human needs to love and be loved, have loving, personal care in old age, and to see one’s own values and ways of life reproduced. Of course these human drives, desires and needs are normally good and necessary to the tasks of human and cultural reproduction fundamental to human survival. Adoption is often used, particularly by the infertile, as a means for satisfying these fundamental human drives, and when the child truly is an orphan lacking in family and nurture adoption can be consistent with the good of the child, family, and society. Adoption becomes exploitative, however, when the children were not orphans and were taken illicitly from their birth families. In those circumstances, the adoptive parents had no right to satisfy their needs to love, be loved, and pass on their values and ways of life, with someone else’s children. One might term this a kind of
IV. CONCLUSION: APPLYING ANTI-TAFFICKING NORMS TO INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION UNDER THE COMING HAGUE REGIME

The Hague Convention, it turns out, is correct: abducting or selling children for purposes of adoption is a form of child trafficking. These acts exploit families and children, and create harms serious enough to be subsumed within the term “child trafficking.”

Therefore, the State Department is wrong to exclude abducting or kidnapping children for purposes of adoption from the definition of child trafficking. To the degree that the State Department is depending on an interpretation of international law, the State Department is mistaken: the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption clearly considers abducting or kidnapping children for purposes of adoption to be a form of child trafficking. In addition, once the exploitative nature of such acts are understood, most anti-trafficking international law norms become clearly applicable. Abducting, buying, or selling a child for purposes of adoption is an illicit form of child trafficking under international law, because such acts are deeply exploitative.

Currently, the State Department’s approaches to the issues of intercountry adoption, child trafficking, and parental abduction are strangely contradictory. The “Bureau of
Consular Affairs established the Office of Children’s Issues in 1994 to handle international parental child abductions and intercountry adoptions.”

The Office of Children’s Issues therefore plays a special role, on behalf of the State Department, in implementing the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, which is explicitly an anti-trafficking treaty designed to “prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children.”

Despite the Treaty’s presupposition that abducting or selling children for purposes of adoption is a form of trafficking, the Office of Children’s Issues pays only sporadic or episodic attention to child trafficking or child laundering issues.

The primary concerns of the federal government in relationship to intercountry adoption have apparently been that of assisting United States citizens who wish to adopt foreign children, leading to the corollary task of facilitating the work of United States adoption agencies which make such adoptions possible. The risks of child trafficking appear to be relegated to secondary concern. There is little evidence that the Office of Children’s Issues has engaged in a systematic analysis of the incidence, causes, or risk factors for child trafficking or “child laundering” within the intercountry adoption system.

This lack of systematic analysis has led to inadequate and merely reactionary efforts to reduce the incidence of child trafficking in the intercountry adoption system. Similarly, Congress seems to have done little or nothing to investigate these problems, and its implementing Act, the Intercountry Adoption Act, largely ignores the Hague Convention’s emphasis on preventing trafficking in the intercountry adoption system.

Both the Congress and the State Department are implementing an anti-trafficking treaty without systematically addressing the problem of trafficking.

Ironically, the Office of Children’s Issues also has chief responsibility for international parental kidnapping. The key treaty in this respect is the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. For purposes of this Convention, the United States government seeks to assist birth and adoptive parents whose children are abducted and taken overseas. This charge of the Office of Children’s Issues to assist parents whose children have been abducted apparently has not been applied to birth parents in sending countries whose children have been abducted, and then laundered through the intercountry adoption system as “orphans” and then adoptees. While international child laundering and international parental abduction may be technically distinct issues, the irony is palpable: Despite the existence of an entire program devoted to assist parents whose children have been lost to international child abduction, the Office of Children’s Issues has no coordinated approach to assisting birth parents in cases where the United States government has itself facilitated the loss of the children by issuing orphan visas to abducted and purchased children.

The contradictions within the State Department concerning child trafficking is made even clearer by the State Department’s official response to trafficking in persons, which occur in a different division of the State Department: the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, under the Office of the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs. Indicating the administration’s emphasis on anti-trafficking efforts, in 2004 President Bush appointed the then-Director, John R. Miller, to the rank of Ambassador at Large. The extensive activities of this office include the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, and Interim Reports, which involve the ranking of countries based on their conformity to standards for combating trafficking. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons engages in extensive analysis of the incidence, causes, and risk factors of trafficking, demands enactment and enforcement of strong criminal laws against trafficking, and provides encouragement and
funding for programs to assist the victims of trafficking.\textsuperscript{165} Congress has mandated these efforts through the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000,\textsuperscript{166} the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,\textsuperscript{167} and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005.\textsuperscript{168}

It is, unfortunately, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons that declared, in its 2005 Trafficking in Persons report, that the sale of children for purposes of adoption was not exploitation and hence was not a form of trafficking.\textsuperscript{169} This office also fails to list the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption among its listing of anti-trafficking treaties.\textsuperscript{170} While this exclusion of adoption from the definition of trafficking is not mandated by Congress, the legislation underlying the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons does encourage this neglect of adoption issues. The trilogy of Trafficking Victims Protection Acts fail to provide any definition of trafficking in persons, but creates a definition of “severe forms of trafficking in persons” limited to trafficking for purposes of labor or sex.\textsuperscript{171} The legislation then focuses its mandated activities on this limited definition of “severe” forms of trafficking.\textsuperscript{172} Thus, while Congress does not mandate the conclusion that the sale of children for purposes is not a form of trafficking, Congress has largely limited the activities of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons to sexual and labor exploitation, thereby excluding the vast majority of adoptions from the Office’s mandate.

I would concede that sex and labor trafficking are a bigger problem, in numbers and severity of harm, than trafficking in persons for purposes of adoption. The determination of Congress to focus on sex and labor trafficking, in combating trafficking in persons, can be seen as an effort to prioritize efforts toward the most important and worst forms of the problem.
However, such prioritization judgments cannot excuse the failure of the United States to fulfill its obligations to address the problem of trafficking within the intercountry adoption system. These obligations stem from both international and national law, as follows:

(1) Both the Hague Convention, and other anti-trafficking international instruments to which the United States is a party, extend and apply to abducting, buying, or selling children for purposes of adoption. Thus, the United States has international obligations to address trafficking within the adoption system as a part of its anti-trafficking efforts.\(^{173}\)

(2) The United States government has particular obligations, under both international and national law, to not act as a facilitator of trafficking. Child laundering, the characteristic form of child trafficking within the intercountry adoption system, makes the governments of both sending and receiving countries into witting or unwitting facilitators and enablers of child trafficking. The United States government has in fact facilitated the trafficking of at least hundreds of children into the United States, as it has allowed its consular and immigration offices to be used to “launder” abducted and purchased children into the United States under the guise of “orphans” and adoptees.\(^{174}\) Any rationale prioritization of anti-trafficking efforts must include ensuring that the United States government not provide the mechanisms and channels through which children are systematically trafficked.

(3) The role of the United States government as a facilitator of child trafficking undermines the role of the United States as a leader internationally in anti-
trafficking efforts. The United States has made itself into a self-appointed monitor and judge of the anti-trafficking efforts of the rest of the world.175 While this role is based on idealism, it puts the United States in the position of judging other countries based on whether they have sufficiently prioritized the task of combating trafficking. This monitor role leads the United States government to evaluate other countries for decisions that are in large measure the sovereign prerogative of other countries: the allocation of limited prosecutorial, governmental, legal, and financial resources, and the resolution of competing political and policy considerations. Yet, in the area of trafficking and adoption, it appears that the United States government has, over many years, given an exceedingly low priority to combating trafficking within the intercountry adoption system, and therefore allowed itself, as the primary recipient country for intercountry adoption, to create a demand often fulfilled by child trafficking rather than by legitimate adoptions. The United States has, for internal political reasons, as well as ideological and policy reasons, prioritized other goals over anti-trafficking efforts in relationship to adoption. Indeed, the United States has, like so many countries it criticizes, chosen to minimize and deny its own trafficking problems, particularly in relationship to its own role in facilitating the trafficking of children through the intercountry adoption system. This minimization and denial has become particularly evident as the United States has moved toward ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, while
largely ignoring the anti-trafficking concerns of the Convention.

It is clearly unproductive to have one arm of the United States government actively engaged in combating trafficking on a worldwide basis, while another part of the government provides the mechanisms and channels by which large numbers of children are trafficked into the United States. Combating child trafficking in one part of the State Department, while another part of the State Department facilitates the laundering of abducted and purchased children into orphans and adoptees, is absurd. Thus, prioritizing efforts against trafficking involving sexual and labor exploitation is not an adequate reason to for the State Department to fail in its obligations to safeguard the intercountry adoption system against child trafficking.

There are several different ways in which the United States government, including the State Department, could overcome its contradictory approach to child trafficking. Congress could extend the mandate of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking to include forms of trafficking beyond labor and sex, including trafficking for purposes of adoption. Even if the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking does not have its mandate extended, it should refrain from counter-productive efforts to claim that buying children for purposes of adoption is not a form of trafficking. At a minimum, the Congress, and the Office of Children’s Issues within the State Department, must implement the Hague Convention according to its fundamental purpose as an anti-trafficking Treaty. This will require the United States government to rigorously analyze the incidence and causes of child trafficking within the intercountry adoption system, and based on this analysis to provide the regulatory safeguards necessary to prevent the United States consular and immigration processes from being used as a child laundering mechanism. This will
also require the United States government to provide for comprehensive criminal and civil prohibitions and remedies for various forms of child trafficking and child laundering within the intercountry adoption system. Finally, the United States government should, as it does in other areas of trafficking, concern itself with the aftermath of such trafficking, in terms of services to members of the adoption triad victimized by such conduct.

Thus, both Congress and the State Department should, in their roles implementing the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, create procedures which minimize the risks of child laundering and child trafficking. Currently, both Congress and the State Department have systematically created intercountry adoption procedures which leave the system vulnerable to child laundering and child trafficking. These vulnerabilities stem in part from the tendency of Congress and the State Department to defer to the pre-existing practices and standards of adoption agencies. Unfortunately, adoption agencies have consistently acted in ways that not only make the adoption system vulnerable to child trafficking, but indeed that create incentives for such illicit conduct. Thus, United States adoption agencies often engage in the following practices:

(1) Charge adoptive parents unreasonably high foreign fees and “donations” which are channeled to individuals and organizations in sending countries, creating incentives for persons in sending countries to illicitly obtain child with high-demand characteristics, and to improperly favor intercountry over in-country adoption.

(2) Enter into bidding wars with other United States agencies, in which United States agencies try to outbid one another in their efforts to guarantee access to children—these bidding wars contribute to the unreasonably high fees and “donations” mentioned above.
(3) Entrust most of the critical functions of foreign programs to persons of dubious background/ethics, making the agency a kind of legitimating cover for the often illicit methods of unscrupulous intermediaries/facilitators.

(4) Violate the laws of sending nations as to limitations on fees and donations, the exchange of high fees and donations in exchange for receiving guaranteed access to children, or the practice of operating without a license in sending countries under the cover of other agencies with licenses (umbrella practices).

(5) Network with orphanages in sending countries that fail to provide any services or assistance to assist birth families in keeping their children, or which provide assistance and services only to those who agree to relinquish their children.

(6) Network with orphanages whose primary purpose is to supply children for intercountry adoption, and which are not organically involved, or connected to, broader child welfare efforts. Such orphanages are focused primarily on intercountry adoption, and dependent financially on intercountry adoption, and hence have incentives to make international placements even when other interventions would be more appropriate.

(7) Network with orphanages which source children illegally through fraud, force, and financial inducement, while maintaining an attitude of willful blindness to evidence of such illicit activities. Even when adoption shutdowns or criminal convictions ensue, agencies commonly refuse to assist their clients with the aftermath and consequences of having adopted through channels tainted by child trafficking and child laundering.

(8) Operate programs in sending countries despite a lack of agency personnel with cultural and language expertise relevant to the sending country. Under these circumstances, the
agency necessarily is overly dependent on foreign partner orphanages and/or independent facilitators/intermediaries, and lacks the capacity to properly oversee the work of those upon whom they are reliant.

(9) Structure adoption programs in which most critical functions are performed by partner agencies in sending countries, or independent facilitators/intermediaries, and then disclaim legal and ethical responsibility when those critical functions are performed in illegal, unethical or incompetent fashion.\textsuperscript{179}

Given the above practices, which officially or unofficially have been common among mainstream adoption agencies, it can hardly be surprising that the intercountry adoption system has been vulnerable to child laundering. Thus, so long as the implementation of the Hague Convention is based principally on pre-existing standards of practices, then child laundering will continue to find a safe haven within the intercountry adoption system.

Indeed, in some ways a Hague-based intercountry adoption system could be even more vulnerable to child laundering schemes, than the pre-Hague system. The Hague regime can appear to allocate the tasks of ensuring that children are truly orphans eligible for adoption to the sending country, despite the fact that many sending countries have significant problems with corruption, large-scale document fraud, and inadequate legal, administrative, or governmental processes.\textsuperscript{180} If receiving countries thereby loosen their own mechanisms for reviewing the validity of a child’s claimed status as an orphan eligible for adoption and immigration, but instead give automatic, un-reviewed credence to such determinations within sending countries, the Hague regime can actually lessen the safeguards against child laundering and child
trafficking. Thus, there is a significant danger that the Hague regime, despite its purpose as an anti-trafficking effort, could itself facilitate child laundering, providing in effect an easier target for those who seek to use the intercountry adoption system as a channel for trafficking children.

The United States, as the largest recipient nation, is particularly responsible to approach the Hague Convention according to its fundamental purpose as an anti-trafficking Convention. Thus, while granting proper respect to the determinations of sending countries, the United States under its Hague implementation must increase, rather than reduce, its vigilance in reviewing whether children have been obtained properly and are legitimately eligible for intercountry adoption. The combined responsibility of the United States government to implement the Hague Convention according to its fundamental anti-trafficking purposes, and its responsibilities to ensure that its own consular and immigration laws and processes are not turned into channels for fraud and child trafficking, are compelling reasons for increased, rather than relaxed, vigilance.

Ultimately, the required vigilance by the United States government will require the combined efforts of many parts of the federal government. Congress must alter its approaches to intercountry adoption and trafficking in persons by requiring the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption to be implemented according to its fundamental purpose as an anti-trafficking Convention, and should incorporate trafficking children for purposes of adoption into the State Department’s anti-trafficking mandates. The State Department has multiple roles to play: (1) As the Central Authority of the United States for Hague Convention purposes, the State Department has significant regulatory, oversight, and enforcement roles; (2) In its Consular role, the State Department has a significant role to play as it issues visas to children and participates in investigations of whether such children are truly eligible for intercountry adoption; (3) In its
multiple roles in relationship to Trafficking in Persons, the State Department should eventually expand its overall anti-trafficking efforts to encompass child trafficking within the intercountry adoption system. The Department of Homeland Security, which has absorbed both immigration and related investigative functions, shares regulatory, enforcement, and investigative functions in determining whether children in sending countries are eligible for adoption by United States citizens. A complete examination all of the governmental roles and processes involved, and how they can be made less vulnerable to child laundering and child trafficking, is beyond the scope of this article. However, the initial, and thus far elusive, step, is for the national government, beginning with the Congress, and including all relevant parts of the government, to recognize abducting, buying, or selling children for purposes of adoption as an exploitative and harmful form of child trafficking against which constant vigilance is required.

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2 Id (preamble).

3 Id. (article 1).


6 See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Guatemala System is Scrutinized as Americans Rush In to Adopt, New York Times, Nov. 5, 2006. The article quotes a prominent adoption attorney in Guatemala as stating: “Here, we don’t live—we survive….Which would a child prefer, to grow up in misery or to go to the United States, where there is everything?” The article further states that “American couples say that if they go are going to pay $25,000 to $30,000 for an adopted child….shouldn’t the birth mother get something?” Id.


8 See id.

11 See id. at ix.
13 See Triad, supra note 10, at 13, 124, 163.
14 See Triad, supra note 10, at 122 (quoting L. Melina & S.K. Roszia, The Open Adoption Experience 41 (1993)). See also Melosh, supra note 20, at 220.
15 See supra note 17 (pgs. 118-28, 130-36, 155-68.)
17 For a summary and survey of state laws, see http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/infoaccessapall.pdf.
20 For a summary and survey of state laws, see http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/infoaccessapall.pdf.
21 See supra note 17 (pgs. 118-28, 130-36, 155-68.)
22 Cf. Triad, supra note 10, at 63-128.
24 For a summary and survey of state laws, see http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/general/legal/statutes/infoaccessapall.pdf.

“Where prostitution flourishes, so does an environment that fuels trafficking in persons. Furthermore, field research from nine countries shows the great harm suffered by people used in prostitution: 89 percent of people being used in prostitution want to escape. Sixty to 75 percent of women in prostitution have been raped, 70 to 95 percent have been physically assaulted, and 68 percent met the clinical criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder.” Cf. Susan E. Thompson, Prostitution—A Choice Ignored, 21 Women’s Rights L. Rep. 217 (2000).

42 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, (ILO No. 182), adopted 17 June 1999 [hereinafter Worst Form of Child Labour Convention].
43 For analysis of international norms concerning child labor, see generally, David M. Smolin, Strategic Choices in the International Campaign Against Child Labour, 22 Human Rights Quarterly 942 (2000).
44 See Worst Form of Child Labour Convention, supra note, at art. 3(b).
45 See, e.g., http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/01/3/gr010305.html (Alan Guttmacher Institute, while critical of some uses of statutory rape laws, states: “Few would disagree that minors, especially very young teenagers, who are in sexual relationships with much older adult men are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.”) Instances involving older teenagers and little or no age gap, however, do create disagreements as to the existence or extent of “exploitation.” See id.
46 Cf. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services, Chafee 2001 – 2004 Multi-Year Plan, available at http://www.state.il.us/DCFS/docs/chafee.pdf (“it is inherently a good thing for an older ward to move to adoption, guardianship, or reunification.”) The context of this statement is a policy in favor of permanency and families for even older children. I would agree families and permanency are generally good things for children, but adoption of an older child under current law involves the destruction of the birth family for the child, and therefore can be either good or bad, and is a tragic good even when it is the best option available.
47 See Triad, supra note 10, at 63-128 (discussing impact of adoption on birth parents). Indeed, the theme of loss is also a significant one for adoptees. Id. at 20-28.
48 Such cases have allegedly occurred, among other places, in Tamil Nadu, India. See David M. Smolin, Child Laundering, 52 Wayne Law Review 113, 157-58 (2006).

49 See Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, supra note , at art. 3(a) (bonded child labor as worst form of child labor). On bonded labor as a contemporary form of slavery, see Kevin Bales, Disposable People, New Slavery in the Global Economy (2004).
50 See Triad, supra note 10, at 20-28 (surveying emphasis on loss as primary theme in literature about adoptees.)
51 On modern forms of sex slavery, see Bales, supra note .
53 For documentation and analysis of the role of child purchases in intercountry adoption, and how purchase interacts with other illicit ways of obtaining children, see generally Child Laundering, supra note .
57 See infra notes and accompanying text (describing the emotionally-troubled behavior of a child who witnessed their adoptive mother pay her birth mother).
58 See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty (2005)(describing absolute or extreme poverty).
60 See Child Laundering, supra note , at 135-46, 191 (describing role of sisters Lauryn Galindo & Lynn Devin in Cambodian adoption scandal); Whose Kids are They?, People January 19, 2004, at 74, 76 (noting adoptive parents who defended and praised Galindo and Devin even after Devin pled guilty and Galindo faced federal charges).
61 See generally, Child Laundering, supra note , at 115-70 (analyzing and describing child laundering methodologies).
See Child Laundering, supra note , at 191 (convicted felon Galindo claimed “my motivation was pure in helping these children.”)

See Whose Kids Are They?, People, January 19, 2004, at 74, 76.

See id.


See generally Child Laundering, supra note .

See, e.g., Home Study – Matthew Alan Mancuso, available in Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 106 [hereinafter cited as Mancuso Home Study]. The nature of the fraud involved in the adoption of Masha by Mancuso vary. One of the most critical documents, the home study, was a genuine document which was based upon intentional misrepresentations by Mancuso. By contrast, one of the post-placement reports, and perhaps some of the recommendations, appear to have been fabricated documents. See general Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note

See sources cited supra, note 45; see also David Conti, Child Abuse ‘monster’ gets 35-70 years, Pittsburgh Tribune Review, November 18, 2005, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_395759.html (judge sentencing Mancuso states “You chose to adopt this girl only so you could sexually abuse her.”).


See, e.g., sources cited note 37.

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note , at 2; ABC News, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; Reaching Out thru International Adoptions is happy to present to Matthew A. Mancuso, Masha Yashenkova, born August 25, 1992, document in Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 131.

See id.

See Mashal Allen Testimony, supra note ; Mashal Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note .

See Prepared Statement of Jared Roksky, Board Member, Joint Council on International Children’s Services, in Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 77, 78. See also Masha Allen Hearings, supra note (listing persons and agencies involvement in placement of Masha Allen); http://www.focusonadoption.com/about.shtml#c (listing involvement of individual with JCICS); http://www.jcics.org/Membership_Directory.htm

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note 67.

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note 67, at 109; see also Application for Adoption, available in Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 89, 90 (requesting 5 year old female).

See ABC News Allen Report.

Masha Allen Testimony, supra note .

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note .

See id.

See id.
See id.

See id.

See id.

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; ABC News Allen Report, supra note ; Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 28, 41 (President and CEO of home study agency confirms that neither ex-wife nor daughter were contacted as a part of the Mancuso home study).

Mancuso provided a letter of recommendation from his daughter, apparently after being asked for additional recommendations. It is unclear from the public record whether this letter was forged by Mancuso, or was genuine. See Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 115, 120. Even if the letter was genuine, press reports indicate that the daughter for years believed her father had adopted a boy, and only much later became aware that her father had adopted a girl. See http://www2.oprah.com/tows/slide/200601/20060117/slide_20060117_284_206.jhtml (pg. 6).

See Prepared Statement of Richard Baird, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Adiago Health, Inc., in Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 22, 28.

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 136.

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; ABC News Allen Report, supra note .

See Mancuso Home Study, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 5, 28-29, 37-40. The President and CEO of the home study agency stated that Pennsylvania law requires that “post-placement supervisory visits be conducted by a social worker in the home.” Masha Allen Adoption Hearings, supra note , at 40. The submission to the Russian government of a fraudulent document and a document based merely on an out-of-state telephone interview obviously do not constitute compliance with Russia’s requirements for post-placement supervision.

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note ; ABC News Allen Report, supra note .


See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note .

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note .


See David Conti, Child Abuse ‘monster’ gets 35-70 years, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (November 18, 2005), available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_395759.html (adoption agency president states that Mancuso “figured out how to beat the system;” while President of the National Council for Adoption says “One perspective is that there’s no fail-safe way to prevent child abuse.”)

See supra notes and accompanying text. See also Statement of Ranking Member Bart Stupak, Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 6: “What we will hear is that international adoption is a very loosely controlled international business based on the premise that poor children from poor countries are better off in the United States with adoptive families than they are growing up in poverty or bleak institutions or on the streets of their own countries. The people who work for adoption agencies believe that they are saving these thousands of children.”

See Masha Allen Testimony, supra note . Wikipedia reports on two other cases as cases similar to Masha’s. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masha_Allen


107 See supra note 48.


110 See id.


112 Id.


114 See Child Laundering, supra note , at 135-46, 191.

115 See id.; see also Whose Kids are They?, People January 19, 2004, at 74, 76.


117 See supra note 111.

118 As is apparent from this article, I have changed my mind regarding whether a claim that adoptions can be exploitative—even of the child---can be sustained. Cf. David M. Smolin Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 Valparaiso Law Review 281, 295-97 (2005).

119 See supra notes and accompanying text.

120 See Triad, supra note 10, at 19-61.

121 On adoptees and identity issues, see Triad, supra note 10, at 35-61.


123 See Triad, supra note 10, at 21 (adopter researchers and clinicians understood adoptees to experience significance loss).

124 See supra notes and accompanying text (discussing definitions of exploitation).


126 See Child Laundering, supra note , at 135-146.

127 See Indian Adoption Scandals, supra note , at 446-61; Child Laundering, supra note , at 135-46.

128 On Galindo’s defense of herself, see Child Laundering, supra note , at 191.

129 See Statement of Ranking Member Bart Stupak, Masha Allen Adoption Hearing, supra note , at 6 (quoted at note 103).


131 The United States Supreme Court has rejected such a broad premise, even in circumstances where the child has lived for several years with non-related persons. See Deboer v. Deboer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993): “Neither Iowa law, nor Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future and her education. As the Iowa Supreme Court stated: ‘[C]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.’ In Re B.G.C., 496 N.W. 2d 239, 241 (1992).”

132 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 (1948), at art. II (definition of genocide includes “Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” “with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.


See Camryn Victim Impact, supra note 133; Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 133, at 10-12.

See sources cited supra note 133.

See id.

See Galindo Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 133, at 12-14.

See American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders –IV-TR code 313.89 127-30 (describing reactive attachment disorder)[hereinafter DSM Attachment Disorder].

See, e.g., DSM Attachment Disorder, supra note .

The works of Nancy Thomas exemplify this approach. See http://www.attachment.org/ (Nancy Thomas web site). However, there is a broad world of attachment experts and attachment therapists. See, e.g., http://www.attachmentdisorder.net/Treatment.htm; Elizabeth M. Randolph, Broken Hearts, Wounded Minds (2001).

See, e.g., John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss ; Mary Ainsworth, Infancy in Urganda (1967); Robert Karen, Becoming Attached (1998).


Early reports from the Samoan child laundering scandal suggest that the government officials involved are giving some credence to the claims of birth parents to the children, rather than assuming, as in past scandals, that laundered children inevitably belong to the adoptive families. It is possible that the resistance of some older Samoan children to their placements may be playing some role in this. See, e.g., Geoffrey Fattah, Utahns ran baby scam, feds say, Deseret Morning News, March 2, 2007; Annie Cutler & Susan Wood, Wellsville couple accused of operating baby-selling ring, March 2, 2007; Feds: UT Company Orchestrated Fraudulent Adoptions, March 1, 2007.

See generally Triad, supra note , at 19-61; Madelyn Freundlich, The Role of Race, Culture, and National Origin in Adoption (2000).

See CRC, supra note , at art. 8.

Id. at art. 7.

See General Triad, supra note 10, at 129-68.

See Hague Convention, supra note .

See supra notes and accompanying text.

See Hague Convention, supra note .

See supra notes and accompanying text

United States Government Accounting Office, Agencies Have Improved the Intercountry Adoption Process, but Further Enhancements are Needed, GAO 06-133, October 2005, at 49 (Department of State Comments)[hereinafter GAO Adoption Report]

See Hague Convention, supra note


See id.


See GAO Adoption Report, supra note , at 49.


So far as I can determine, no one has ever attempted to apply the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to a case of child laundering within the intercountry adoption system, nor has the State Department ever considered whether that treaty might be applicable to such cases.

See http://www.state.gov/g/tip/.

See http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr685.html

See http://www.state.gov/g/tip/; Trafficking in Persons Report (June 2006) available at
See supra note 166.

See supra note 166; see also Section 207, 2005 Act, supra note 168.

See supra notes 166, 167, 168.

See supra notes and accompanying text. See also Child Laundering, supra note 166, at 187-90.

See Child Laundering, supra note 166, at 135-174; see also supra note 174 (articles on indictments relating to Samoan adoptions).

See, e.g., 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report, supra note 166 (evaluating anti-trafficking efforts of other countries).

I have previously made proposals on the kinds of steps which would make Hague implementation more effective against child laundering. See Child Laundering, supra note 166, at 171-200.

See generally, Child Laundering, supra note 166.

See Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Hearings on H.R. 2909 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 106th Cong., (1999)(Statements of Representative Tom Delahunt); Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 8065 (“we have also sought to reflect current norms in adoption practice, as made known to us during the development of the rule.”)

It is these kinds of practices that have led to the child laundering scandals documented in Child Laundering, supra note 166, as well as others in Viet Nam, Samoa, and other countries.

See Child Laundering, supra note 166, at 198; Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2003