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UNDERWRITING SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP:
THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION AND THE
LOW DOWN PAYMENT LOAN

David Reiss*

The United States Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. The FHA was created in large part to inject liquidity into a moribund mortgage market. It succeeded wonderfully, with rapid growth during the late 1930s. The federal government repositioned it a number of times over the following decades to achieve a variety of additional social goals. These goals included supporting civilian mobilization during World War II; helping veterans returning from the War; stabilizing urban housing markets during the 1960s; and expanding minority homeownership rates during the 1990s. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record with others. More recently, the FHA is in the worst financial shape it has ever been in.

Today’s FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other lenders during the 2000s. It has also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government recently announced the first bailout of the FHA in its history. At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop using the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics rely on a couple of examples of programs

* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. The author would like to thank Michele Cotton and Mark Willis and the attendees of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 2013 Policy Summit on Housing, Human Capital, and Inequality; the 2013 AALS Workshop on Poverty, Immigration and Property, the 2012 AALS Sections on Real Estate Transactions and Property Annual Meeting; the 74th International Atlantic Economic Society Conference; and a Brooklyn Law School Summer Brown Bag session for helpful comments. The author also acknowledges the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program. Thanks to Jason Gang, Adnan Mirza, Marc Shavitz, Arthur Torkiver, Cameron Weil, Clarissa Wertman and Dominika Wilk for excellent research assistance.
that were clearly failures but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

In order to demonstrate this, the article first sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on often overlooked primary sources, it then sets forth a history of the FHA and charts its constantly changing roles in the housing finance sector. In order to give a more detailed picture of the federal government’s role in housing finance, the article also incorporates the scholarly literature regarding (i) the intersection of race and housing policy and (ii) the economics and finance literature regarding the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mortgages for low- and moderate-income households. The article concludes that the FHA can responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity to the residential mortgage market. It further proposes that FHA homeownership programs for low- and moderate-income families should be required to balance access to credit with households’ ability to make their mortgage payments over the long term. Such a proposal will ensure that the FHA extends credit responsibly to low- and moderate-income households while minimizing the likelihood of future bailouts.
INTRODUCTION

The secondary mortgage market stands on three legs. The first leg, created in the early 1930s, is made up of government instrumentalities like the Federal Housing Administration (the “FHA”) and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”). The second leg, created in the 1930s, but taking off in the 1970s, is made up of public/private hybrids like the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). The third leg, created in the 1970s, but taking off in the 1990s, is the “private-label” market which is made up of private companies that package mortgage-backed securities that have no guarantee, explicit or implicit, from the federal government. Each of these legs buckled during the Great Recession. ¹ This article primarily addresses the buckling of the government leg, but in broad historical context.

Today’s FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other lenders during the 2000s. It has also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government announced in 2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in its history. At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop employing the FHA to do anything other than providing liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critic’s arguments rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures but they fail to address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

This article first provides a basic introduction to the FHA. Part I then sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on often overlooked primary sources, Part II provides a textured history of the FHA and charts its ever-changing roles in the housing finance sector. Part III concludes that the FHA can responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity to the residential mortgage market.

The article brings together the scholarly literature regarding the history of race and housing policy as well as the economics literature regarding the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mortgages in order to give a more detailed picture of the federal government’s role in housing finance for low and moderate-income households. It ultimately proposes that FHA homeownership goals should be more explicitly tied to a rational underwriting process,

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2. “Underwriting” refers to the process of evaluating the likelihood that the principal and interest due on a loan will be repaid. Mortgage lenders typically consider the three “C”s when underwriting: Credit Reputation; Capacity; and Collateral. Credit Reputation is often summarized by a credit score. Capacity evaluates the borrower’s existing debt as a proportion of her income, as well as accounting for other factors such as savings. Collateral evaluates the property to determine whether the lender can recoup what it is owed if the borrower fails to pay back the loan. See FREDDIE MAC, The 3 Cs of Underwriting Factors Used in Loan Prospector’s Assessment, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/au-works/factors.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
one that is designed to make sure that people can afford their mortgages over the long-term. This would both protect the financial health of the FHA and ensure that new homeowners are able to afford their homes for the long term – that is, become sustainable homeowners.

The FHA has a storied history, notwithstanding its many problems. The New York Times noted in 1934, the year that the FHA started up, that there “is no New Deal agency which is being more widely discussed behind the scenes in Washington these days than the Federal Housing Administration. It is no secret that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt holds the highest hopes for this housing program . . .”3 Nearly fifty years later, a Commission on Housing appointed by small-government-proponent President Ronald Reagan, praised the FHA even while calling for extensive reforms:

Few pieces of social invention from the 1930s have reverberated so loudly through the corridors of time as the FHA-insured, level-payment, self-amortizing, long-term mortgage. Supplemented by VA [Veterans Administration] mortgage guarantees after the war, this piece of paper and its acceptance-first by homebuyers and banks, later by insurance companies and an organized secondary market-made homeownership possible for tens of millions of Americans who would otherwise have lived out their days in rented quarters.4

Mortgage insurance is a product that is paid for by the homeowner but that protects the lender if the homeowner were to default on the

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3. Frank L. Kluckhohn, Housing Programs Give High Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1934, at E6; see also Thomas W. Phelps, Cheap Housing Is Broadest Socialistic Step New Deal Has Proposed – Amount Undecided, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1934, at 1.

4. President’s Commission on Housing, The Report of the President’s Commission on Housing, (1982), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-2460.pdf. Indeed, one recent unpublished study, Matthew Chambers et al., Did Housing Policies Cause the Postwar Boom in Homeownership, NBER Working Paper 18821, 5-7 (April 23, 2012), found that the 30 year fixed rate mortgage popularized by the FHA accounted for a significant portion of the increase in homeownership in the United States during the middle of the 20th century. But see John L. Goodman, Jr. & Joseph B. Nichols, Does FHA Increase Home Ownership or Just Accelerate It?, 6 J. HOUS. ECON. 184, 184 (1997) (concluding, in a relatively short-term longitudinal study, that “to the extent that FHA has any influence on homeownership, it is mostly to accelerate home purchase, not to enable it among households that otherwise would never be able to buy.”).
mortgage. The insurer pays the lender for the losses that it suffers from any default and foreclosure by the homeowner.

The FHA provides mortgage insurance on mortgage loans on single family and multifamily homes, and “is the largest government insurer of mortgages in the world.”5 Like much of the federal housing infrastructure, the FHA has its roots in the Great Depression.6 The private mortgage insurance (PMI) industry, like many others, was decimated in the early 1930s.7 Its companies began to fail as almost half of all of the mortgages in the nation defaulted.8 The PMI industry did not revive until the 1950s.9 The idea for a government alternative to private mortgage insurance came from the National Emergency Council as part of its proposal to address a broad array of problems in the real estate sector.10

One of the key programs to arise from this proposal was a system of federally financed mortgage insurance, the FHA.11 The FHA proposal was incorporated into the National Housing Act. The FHA was charged with the duty of encouraging improvement in housing standards and conditions by making improved credit


6. The Federal Home Loan Bank System was authorized under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was established by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Act of 1933. The Federal National Mortgage Association (now known as Fannie Mae), which was initially created to establish a secondary market for FHA-insured loans, was established in 1938 by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab 42 GEORGIA L. REV., 1019, 1029 n.30 (2007). There were some antecedents that predated the Great Depression. Congress established the Federal Farm Loan System in 1916 which offered “relatively long-term, amortized mortgages with equal payments throughout the loan term. No parallel system was set up for nonfarm residential loans, however.” PRICE FISHBACK ET AL., WELL WORTH SAVING: HOW THE NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED HOME OWNERSHIP 13 (2013); see also Kenneth A. Snowden, The Anatomy of a Residential Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s (NBER Working Paper 16244 July 2010) (discussing federal housing finance infrastructure of the early 20th century).

7. See infra Part II.B.1.

8. See id.

9. See infra Part II.B.3.


11. Id.
facilities available to the owners and prospective owners of homes and other property. In accordance with the National Housing Act, it extends Government support by means of credit insurance covering private credit transactions. Hence, in achieving the desired results, chief reliance is placed upon private capital and initiative.\textsuperscript{12}

The FHA’s first full year of operation was 1935.\textsuperscript{13} The FHA initially insured mortgages originated by private lenders that were (1) short-term repair loans; (2) long-term mortgages for single family home loans (which actually covered buildings with one to four units),\textsuperscript{14} and (3) mortgages for large multi-family projects.\textsuperscript{15} The FHA’s goals for insuring residential mortgages were to make “a sounder investment for the lender” and to extend “the practicable range of borrowers and of home-mortgage loans.”\textsuperscript{16} Over time, Congress gave the FHA a variety of additional policy mandates that were intended to help the federal government achieve other policy goals. These goals ranged from supporting the war effort during World War II to increasing the number of minority homeowners during the early 2000s.

While conventional wisdom says that the FHA had one mission during the Great Depression – increasing liquidity – it actually had many missions.\textsuperscript{17} After its second full year of operation, the FHA set forth the following nine:

1. To expedite recovery in the building and allied industries.

\textsuperscript{12} FHA ADM’R., FIRST ANN. REP. FED. HOUSING ADMIN. 3 (1935).
\textsuperscript{13} FHA ADM’R., SECOND ANN. REP. FED. HOUSING ADMIN. 1 (1936). FHA began insuring a small number of loans in August of 1934 and its rate of growth was exponential through the end of 1935. Id. at 2, Chart 1.
\textsuperscript{14} For a discussion of the meaning of “single family,” see infra note 56.
\textsuperscript{15} FHA ADM’R, supra note 13, at 1.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 3.
\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 93, 95 (Fall 2005) (“The combination of HOLC [Home Owners’ Loan Corporation] and the FHA represented a piece of early ‘financial engineering’ that allowed illiquid financial institutions to become liquid again.”); Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. HOUS. RES. 357, 358 (2000) (“The original purpose of FHA as part of the economic recovery program was to restore mortgage lending and fill the gap created by the failure of private mortgage insurance.”).
2. To aid and encourage private capital investments in the home-mortgage field.
3. To secure a more uniform flow and wider distribution of home-mortgage funds.
4. To secure a lower and more uniform interest rate on home-mortgage securities.
5. To improve mortgage-lending practices.
6. To raise building standards.
7. To protect the owners of small homes.
8. To encourage the creation of private limited-dividend companies to finance housing developments for person[s] of low income.
9. To develop essential statistical and economic data on real estate and housing.

These goals ranged broadly from the oft-cited liquidity rationale, to supporting industries relating to housing, to consumer protection. The FHA’s role in reducing systemic risk was also explicitly acknowledged early in its history. In the FHA’s second annual report, the Administrator notes that it was initially designed to “help stabilize the whole real-estate market; to give warning of the periods of inflated prices when many families are apt to purchase homes with small equities; and to help maintain an orderly home real estate market during periods of depression.”

Over its lifetime, the FHA has insured over 40 million mortgages, helping to make home ownership available to a broad swath of American households. The overwhelming portion of its

18. FHA ADM’R, supra note 13, at 1.
19. Id. at 6.
resources is devoted to one to four unit houses. And indeed, the FHA mortgage was central to America’s transformation from a nation of renters to homeowners. The early FHA really created the modern American housing finance system, as well as the look and feel of post-War suburban communities.

The FHA has also had many other missions over the course of its existence and a varied legacy to match. Beginning in the 1950s, the FHA’s role changed from serving the entire mortgage market to focusing on certain segments of it. This changed mission had a major impact on everything the FHA did, including how it underwrote mortgage insurance and for whom it did so.

In recent years, the FHA has come under attack for its poor execution of some of its attempts to expand homeownership and leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop assigning such mandates to the FHA. They argue that the FHA should just focus on providing liquidity for the portion of the mortgage market that serves low- and moderate-income households. These critics rely on a few examples of programs that were clearly failures but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking similar initiatives. These critiques sometimes seem to reflect an anti-government ideology more than a particularized critique of the FHA itself because the arguments are so broad that they would apply to many other government programs as well. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a parallel history of successfully undertaking new mandates. At the same time, it identifies operational failures that should be addressed in the design of future initiatives. In particular, it proposes that the FHA

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21. U.S. Fed. Hous. Admin, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that such loans account for 86.3% of its insurance-in-force).
23. Id.
24. Some acknowledged this early on, see, e.g., Miles L. CoLean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States 150-51 (1950) (“housing finance policy was used to accomplish ends not strictly germane to the credit transaction, such as the improvement of housing standards, the influencing of land planning, and the regulation of wages paid to construction workers.”).
25. See infra Part II.B.3.
26. See President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at 162 (“FHA has performed an important role as an innovator over the years, successfully gaining market acceptance for new types of home mortgage instruments.”).
27. Make no mistake, the FHA has been dogged by complaints of every day operational incompetence and venality for much of its existence, but this article does not focus on these more
undertake a rulemaking that requires it to balance the goal of broad access to credit with the need for households to be able to make their mortgage payments over the long term. It needs to achieve this balance in order to protect the financial health of the FHA and its borrowers alike.

I. THE FAILURES OF THE FHA

The FHA is an understudied topic despite having a massive impact on the built environment of the United States. This is particularly unfortunate because it has had some serious failures that mar its long history of success as a provider of liquidity for, stability in and access to the residential mortgage market. Because of these failures, the leading commentators on the FHA have indicted its initiatives to encourage homeownership. The absence of a vibrant scholarly exchange regarding the FHA stands in the way of responsibly charting its future course.

Robert Van Order and Anthony Yezer, the authors of the FHA ASSESSMENT REPORT, write that “the lesson that we should take away from” the FHA’s recent history of looser underwriting standards is that pedestrian problems faced by nearly every government instrumentality at one time or another. See, e.g., FHA Indicts Eight for Fund Misuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1939, at n.p.; George E. Cruikshank, Housing Report Calls FHA Activities in 1946-’50 Full of “Corruption;” Ousted Aide is Main Target, WALL ST. J., Sept 13, 1954, at 2; Staff Reporter, FHA Concedes Officer Can’t Keep up with Mortgage Requests, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1954, at 8; Emanuel Perlmutter, 18 Arrested Here in 5-Million Fraud in Housing Loans N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1961, at 1; Richard F. Janssen, FHA Reappraisal Housing Agency Strives to Curb Criticism of Some of Its Operations, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1963, at 1; no author, Six Concerns Charged with Fake Applications for U.S. Home Loans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1965, at 9; Staff Reporter, Former FHA Chief in Philadelphia Named in 2 U.S. Indictments, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1972, at 2; Edward Foldessy and Timothy Shellhardt, Lenders Sharply Cut Writing of FHA Loans as Red Tape Mounts, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1973, at 1. There have also been a number of studies about operation deficiencies at the FHA. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-542, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVING DISPOSITION AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES MAY INCREASE RETURNS ON FORECLOSED PROPERTY SALES (June 2013); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-15, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN RISK ASSESSMENT AND HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Nov. 2011); I REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE OPERATION OF FEDERALLY INSURED OR FINANCED HOUSING PROGRAMS 3-26 (1972).

the “FHA, as currently organized, should not be used as an experimental program to encourage homeownership.”

They argue that this is nonetheless unavoidable because “there are powerful political forces willing to push FHA to allow very unsound lending practices.”

Given that Yezer is the co-author of one of the handful of comprehensive studies of the FHA, this is a damning assessment indeed.

The few policy analysts who make a close study of the FHA agree in the main with Yezer and the other scholars who have given the FHA their sustained attention. The American Enterprise Institute’s Edward Pinto, the author of the FHA WATCH writes that, “Government insurance programs suffer from three fundamental flaws: (1) the government cannot successfully price for risk; (2) government backing distorts prices, resource allocation, and competition; and (3) political pressure and congressional demands for a quid pro quo inevitably arise, politicizing the programs.”

Housing Economist Joseph Gyourko is more succinct, but equally pessimistic: the FHA “has failed by any reasonable metric.”


30. Id.

31. See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 28, at 357-358. To be clear, Pennington-Cross is also a leading scholar of the housing finance sector.

32. Edward J. Pinto, Truth in Government Lending Is Long Overdue, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST., Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/housing-finance/truth-in-government-lending-is-long-overdue/ (last visited August 9, 2012). See generally Mark Calabria, Fixing Mortgage Finance: What to do with the Federal Housing Administration? (Cato Institute Briefing Paper Series, Briefing Paper No. 123, Feb. 6, 2012) available at http://www.cato.org/publications/briefing-paper/fixing-mortgage-finance-what-to-do-with-federal-housing-administration (arguing the FHA has no net benefit and should be “eliminated.”) See also Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 17, at 370 (“Since the 1940s, FHA has had programs targeted to housing finance needs of specific groups: veterans, residents of urban renewal areas, service personnel, residents impacted by military bases, and residents of rehabilitation projects. The sheer number of programs enacted suggests that the ability to support such efforts appears to be a politically attractive feature of FHA.”). David Min, recently of the Center for American Progress and consistently at odds with Pinto on housing finance policy, also agrees that the FHA needs major reform although he has not yet set forth why. See David Min, What Should Replace Fannie and Freddie?, (PowerPoint presentation given at the American Enterprise Institute, Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/01/25/Min.pdf.

33. Joseph Gyourko, Rethinking the FHA, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INST., at iii (June 2013) (“Not only is its main mortgage insurance guarantee fund insolvent in the sense that it does not have sufficient capital resources to over expected losses, but it is also failing far too many of its intended program beneficiaries in helping the achieve sustainable homeownership.”).
There is much to support these characterizations of the FHA, but I will demonstrate that they cherry pick from the historical record to make their case, focusing on disastrous policies in the early 1970s and the 2000s. By failing to address the FHA’s other initiatives over its eighty years of operation, these commentators fail to make a convincing case that the FHA’s history is a history of failed government action.

Commentators are greatly concerned that the FHA will face high losses because of its supposed divergence from its original mission. These losses look like they will be measured in the billions of dollars in the medium term. Robert Van Order and Anthony Yezer’s policy prescription for the FHA is “that over time the FHA should revert to its previous role: helping first-time and low- to moderate-income homebuyers purchase homes, allowing the private sector to shoulder more of the risk associated with insuring larger loans.” Van Order and Yezer, like many other commentators, tend to focus on just one aspect of the FHA’s original mission – providing liquidity to a frozen market – and bestow it with an essential quality: this is what the FHA truly is about. But the historical record is much more complicated, both at the FHA’s origin and over the course of its long history. This is not to say that concerns about the FHA are unfounded: there is great reason to be concerned for the financial health of the FHA.

Empirical studies bear this out. Housing economist Joseph Gyourko demonstrates that the FHA’s reserves became precarious soon after the Great Recession. In 2011, Gyourko wrote:

For the past two years, it has been in violation of its most important capital reserve guideline, under which it is supposed to hold sufficient reserves against unexpected future losses on its existing insurance in-force. To be barely compliant with this rule would have required just over a $12 billion capital infusion in fiscal year 2010, and that presumes that future losses are not being underestimated by FHA. This report suggests that they are by many tens of billions of

34. See text accompanying notes 41-45.
35. ROBERT VAN ORDER & ANTHONY YEZER, supra note 29, at 2.
dollars, so that the recapitalization required will be at least $50 billion, and likely much more, even if housing markets do not deteriorate unexpectedly.37

Another study by Diego Aragon and others was consistent with Gyourko’s findings. It found that the Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund’s rapid growth since 2007 has led to major losses, with its reserves dropping from $15.8 billion to $2.73 billion from 2008 to 2009.38 The same study estimated that absent “new revenues from future books of business, the recent annual audit estimates that the [FHA’s] capital ratio is down to 0.53 percent, below its required 2 percent level.”39 The Aragon study identified various warning signals that indicated that funding will in fact be necessary.40

While the FHA denied that it would need additional funding after the Gyourko study was released, the critics turned out to be right.41 The FHA received a nearly $1.7 billion infusion from Treasury in 2013.42 Also, the FHA’s single-family mortgage guarantees made between 1992

37. Id. at 1. But see Sarah Wartell and John Griffin, Too Early to Sound the FHA Alarm, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 12, 2011) (arguing that Gyourko and others have exaggerated FHA’s losses), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/report/2011/12/12/10787/too-early-to-sound-the-fha-alarm/.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 2-3. The warning signs were: 1. Many FHA-insured borrowers owe more than their house is worth; 2. FHA-insured homes are worth significantly less than the FHA believes them to be; 3. FHA ignores negative information about currently delinquent mortgages and improperly underwrites its streamline refinanced mortgages; and 4. Many FHA-insured borrowers were able to effectively put down no money for their purchase because they can finance FHA’s up-front premium and because first time homebuyers were eligible for a tax credit that offset the expenditures made to purchase the house. Id.
42. U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 20 (noting in the unpaginated Message from the Commissioner that “FHA was required to take a mandatory appropriation of $1.68 billion from the U.S. Treasury to close its FY [fiscal year] 2013 books”). Note that the FHA has also sent billions of dollars to the Treasury’s general fund pursuant to the Federal Credit Reform Act and, furthermore, accounting for the FHA’s budgetary impact is not so straightforward. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAM FOR 2015 TO 2024 (May 2014); CHAD CHIRICO & SUSANNE MEHLMAN, FHA’S SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE GUARANTEE PROGRAM: BUDGETARY COST OR SAVINGS?, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Oct. 21, 2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44628; JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42632, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES (July 27, 2012).
and 2012 will have “a net federal budgetary cost of about $15 billion . . .”43 Indeed, actuaries have estimated the economic value of the main FHA program to be negative $13.5 billion in 2012.44 This estimate was expected to improve over time, and in fact it has, but this was a financial low for the FHA.45 There is no question that these policy critiques and budgetary concerns must be addressed to chart a responsible course for the FHA going forward.

II. THE ROLE OF THE FHA IN THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET

The FHA’s role in the mortgage market can best be understood as “a specialized insurance company that guarantees the payment of mortgages made by private lenders (banks and other mortgage lenders) who provide loans to developers and homebuyers.”46 The FHA was created in 1934, at a time when the mortgage market for one to four family homes was split among individuals and other non-institutional lenders; commercial banks; mutual savings banks; savings and loan associations; and life insurance companies.47 While savings and loans had a significant share of the market and pretty attractive terms, other types of lenders offered much less consumer-friendly products.48

43. CHRICO & MEHLMAN, supra note 42.
44. INTEGRATED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, INC., ACTUARIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 i (report prepared for FHA, Nov. 5, 2012) (excluding FHA reverse mortgages). Since 1990, the MMI Fund’s financial health “has been assessed by measuring the Fund’s economic value -- its capital resources plus the net present value of future cash flows – and the related capital ratio . . .” GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-671T, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION’S MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 2 (April 24, 2002).
45. The MMI Fund had an estimated negative value of $7.9 billion in 2013. Id. (excluding FHA reverse mortgages). The MMI Fund had an estimated positive value of $5.93 billion in 2014. INTEGRATED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, INC., ACTUARIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND FORWARD LOANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 at i (report prepared for HUD, Nov. 17, 2014) (excluding FHA reverse mortgages).
47. LEO GREBLER ET AL., CAPITAL FORMATION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 207, Table 55 (1956). For a good review of the literature about the housing market preceding the Great Depression, see Chambers et al., supra note 4, at 6.
48. Id. at Table 66. More than 90% of savings and loan (“S&L”) mortgages were amortized and many of those were fully amortized. Id. Fixed terms were, however, significantly shorter than those of FHA mortgages. See COMMITTEES ON FINANCE AND TAXATION, HOME FINANCE AND TAXATION 26 (1932) (report of The President’s [Hoover] Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership); B.H. McCormack, FHA Has Shown Banks Amortization Practice Is Best Policy for Home Owners’ Mortgages: Several Federal Requirements Are Criticized, WALL ST. J., at 5 (June 30, 1938). S&Ls had a 39% of the market for one to four family homes from 1925-1930. Id. at 207, Table 55. One
Commercial lenders, for instance, typically required a LTV ratio of 50 to 60 percent of the property’s market value, with a term of three to five years. These mortgages typically required a large balloon payment at the end of the term, a payment that almost always required the borrower to refinance. But even savings and loans required relatively low loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios and relatively short terms.

The housing markets faced problems in the Great Depression that were similar in kind to those faced in the late 2000s. These problems include rapidly falling housing prices; widespread unemployment and underemployment; rapid tightening of credit; and, as a result of all of

commentator noted that there “had been a trend toward a gradual liberalization of mortgage credit terms (interest rates on loans, length of contract maturities, and loan-to-value ratios) from 1920 to 1934, but in 1935 [the FHA’s first full year of operation] the change was greatly accelerated.” R.J. SAULNIER, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING BY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 43 (1950). Before the 1930s, S&Ls were often referred to as building & loan (“B&L”) associations. Jonathan Rose & Kenneth A. Snowden, The New Deal the Origins of the Modern American Real Estate Loan Contract 1 n.2 (NBER WORKING PAPER 18388 2012). Rose and Snowden describe innovations in the building and loan industry from the 1880s through the 1930s. For a contemporary view of the real estate finance industry in the 1920s, see Chapter XI (Land Credit) of Richard T. Ely and Edward W. Morehouse, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOMICS 207-33 (1924).

49. FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 27. Life insurance mortgages were similar. A large, albeit not representative study, of single-family mortgages originated by life insurance companies, found that the LTV was typically between 40-65%. R.J. SAULNIER, supra note 48, at n.6. To be sure, savings and loan associations were much more likely to originate fully amortizing loans than commercial banks before the FHA was created. See GREBLER ET AL., supra note 47, at Table 66. Mortgages from thrifts could differ in some meaningful ways from the modern standard mortgage. PRICE FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 6, at 101 (describing how traditional B&L loans “did not truly pay off the principal each month, instead allowing borrowers to buy equity shares in the B&L.”). See generally Chambers et al., supra note 4, at 5-7 (reviewing mid-20th century market share and contract terms of various types of lenders).

50. See Dwight M. Jaffee & John M. Quigley, Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, and the Federal Housing Administration, in MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 97, 104 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010). The FHA was created pursuant to the National Housing Act. Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934). See also FHA ADM’R., supra note 12, at 3. (“A large proportion of the institutions, representing millions of small savings depositors, were not able because of law or tradition, or both, to make mortgage loans of more than 50 or 60 percent of the appraised value, whereas the most urgent demand is for first mortgages of from 60 to 80 percent of the appraised value of the property.”); GREBLER ET AL., supra note 47, at Table 55 (noting that commercial banks had a 14% market share from 1925-1930 and individuals and other non-institutional lenders had a 26% share).

51. COMMITTEES ON FINANCE AND TAXATION, supra note 48, at 25-26 (noting that savings institutions limited their mortgages to 40 to 60% of the appraised value and that long term mortgages typically had terms of 11 to 15 years). Many borrowers ended up getting second mortgages with much less attractive terms to make up the difference if they were short of equity. Id. at 9-11. The report noted that “Experienced mortgage men . . . indicate that the greatest deterrent to sound home ownership may be found in the second mortgage field.” Id. at 28.
those trends, much higher rates of default and foreclosure.\footnote{52} The FHA noted in its second annual report that the “shortcomings of the old system need no recital. It financed extensive overselling of houses at inflated values, to borrowers unable to pay for them . . .”\footnote{53} Needless to say, the same could be said of our most recent housing bust.

The FHA had an explicit mission of providing “a thorough reform in the home financing structure.”\footnote{54} In fulfilling that mission, it helped to make a consumer-friendly single-family mortgage mainstream during the Great Depression.\footnote{55} This type of mortgage combined a small down payment with a long-term and a fully amortized payment schedule – and this type is now dominant in the residential mortgage market.\footnote{56} The FHA was following the lead of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, the first of the New Deal initiatives designed to address the crisis in the housing markets.\footnote{57}
The FHA touted many other benefits for lenders and homeowners. The FHA believed that lenders also benefited from its mortgage insurance system because (1) it protected them from credit risk, the risk that borrowers would not repay their loans; (2) it made illiquid mortgages very liquid such that they could be sold or used as collateral; and (3) it standardized due diligence for mortgages because the FHA itself vetted them before agreeing to issue insurance. The first benefit is quite dramatic, as credit risk is historically the most important of all risks that lenders face.

The second benefit of mortgage insurance for lenders was that it allowed lenders to sell their mortgages to secondary mortgage market investors. To advance this even further, the federal government created Fannie Mae in 1938 to create a secondary market for FHA mortgages. Fannie Mae spun off Ginnie Mae in 1968 to securitize FHA mortgages while Fannie securitized mortgages that were not insured by the federal government. Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned government corporation that is situated within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Ginnie Mae insures mortgage-backed securities that are secured by FHA and other government-insured or guaranteed mortgages like those of the VA. Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities (MBS) can also include mortgages guaranteed or issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae).

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58. FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 23.
60. Reiss, supra note 6, at 1028-29.
61. Id. at 1029.
securities are the only mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") that are explicitly backed by the federal government’s full faith and credit.64

The federal government’s guaranty makes Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities very attractive to investors who are willing to pay a premium over comparable mortgage-backed securities from other issuers.65 This premium thus reduces the interest rates paid by homeowners on the mortgages underlying Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities.66 The attractiveness of the guaranty to investors also creates an extraordinarily liquid market for Ginnie Mae securities.67 Thus, because of the federal government’s guaranty, Ginnie Mae can continue to provide liquidity even when credit is drying up elsewhere in the credit markets. This has been readily apparent during the Great Recession.68

At the same time that the FHA touted its benefits to lenders, it also promoted itself as a protector of consumers. For instance, it heralded standardization as “essential in the first real major offensive in the history of our people against an impracticable mortgage lending system unsuited to actual conditions and too often unsafe for the inexperienced borrower who merits security and protection in his dealings.”69

Homeowners would benefit from a standard mortgage form, one that would protect “the borrower against ambiguous or ‘trick’ clauses . . .”70 The FHA designed its procedures to “prevent borrowers from
attempting to buy beyond their means. In the past, many persons have lost their savings because they lacked knowledge of the expenses involved in home ownership, if they had been better informed they could have succeeded in owning more modest homes."71 Thus, the FHA was designed from the outset with consumer protection, along with liquidity, stability and standardization, as core values. The FHA’s original underwriting requirements also mandated that borrowers’ ability to repay be documented notwithstanding the fact that the home provided sufficient security to ensure that the loan would be repaid, thereby barring equity-based lending.72

Early on, the FHA took credit for a qualitative change in the housing market that resulted from its policies and practices: “In view of the low monthly payments required to amortize a long-term mortgage, it appears that the single-mortgage system has brought new homes within reach of many families previously unable to acquire them.”73 While the FHA’s assessment of its own performance is not always merited, it was in this case.74

In order to move away from the unsustainable practices that preceded it, the FHA initially set the maximum term for a mortgage that it would insure at 20 years and the maximum LTV ratio at 80 percent.75 At its creation, the FHA served a broad swath of the residential mortgage market, given that it could insure mortgages with principal amounts as high as $16,000 (meaning that a home could be valued as high as $20,000 with a maximum LTV of 80%) when the median price for a house in the United States was a bit more than $5,000.76 Interest rates

71. FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 6. See also U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 318 (1936) (“Ability to Pay is the most heavily weighted feature in the Rating of Borrower category because, in the final analysis, the satisfactory payment of the mortgage loan is largely dependent on the borrower’s financial ability to meet the prescribed monthly installments. . . . It is obvious that default is inevitable if the borrower’s resources will not enable him to comply with all the contractual obligations created by the mortgage and mortgage notes which he signs”).
73. FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 21.
74. See supra note 55.
76. See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 105. Only 3.4% of homes in 1930 were valued at more than $20,000. FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 6, at 37. That proportion surely sank by the time the FHA was authorized in 1934. The VA uses slightly different nomenclature. Instead of calling itself a mortgage insurer, it calls itself a mortgage guarantor.
were capped in order to equalize rates among local markets and to limit the effects of restricted capital.77

A. MORTGAGE INSURANCE EXPLAINED

Mortgage insurance is typically required for borrowers with limited funds for down payments.78 Lenders, not borrowers, are the direct beneficiaries of mortgage insurance. Depending on the insurer, mortgage insurance will pay some or all of a lender’s loss upon default or foreclosure of the loan. The FHA has long been the dominant mortgage insurer. Other significant providers are the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)79 and private companies, known as private mortgage insurers (PMIs).80

Mortgage insurance works as follows. When a borrower purchases a home with a small down payment, the lender may require that she purchase mortgage insurance at the same time to protect the lender, not the borrower, from a default. The lender may do this to

77. FHA ADM’R., supra note 12, at 4. The capped interest rate changed over time in response to market pressures and was circumvented by the charging of points at origination to compensate the lender for a below market capped interest rate. See, e.g., I REPORT, supra note 27, at 12-13.

78. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 59, at 16. Substitutes for mortgage insurance do exist. Portfolio lenders can self-insure against higher losses from loan down payment loans. Another alternative is for the borrower to take out two mortgages at the time of purchase. The first mortgage would have an 80% LTV while the second mortgage, known as a piggyback mortgage, would cover 10% to 20% of the remainder. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, STATE OF THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MORTGAGE MARKETS AND THE ENTERPRISES 2 (Aug. 20, 2009) (Mortgage Market Note 09-4).

79. Until 1988, the VA was known as the Veterans Administration. See Department of Veterans Affairs Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-527).

transfer some of the risk of loss to the insurer but also to make the loan eligible for purchase by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. These entities can then securitize pools of mortgages and insure the owners of the securities against late payments and nonpayments. If the borrower does default and the property is foreclosed upon, the lender can look to the insurer to make up some or all of the difference between the foreclosure sale price and the outstanding amount due on the loan (consisting of unpaid principal and interest as well as all of the other costs that may be due under the mortgage, such as those relating to the foreclosure itself). By doing this, the lender has offloaded some or all of the risk of default to the insurer. If there were no mortgage insurance, that entire credit risk would remain with the lender or its successor.

Mortgage insurers charge a premium to the borrower for the insurance. PMIs generally charge an annual premium. The VA guarantee fee is an up-front charge but it can be financed as part of the mortgage. FHA charges an up-front premium that can be financed as part of the mortgage in addition to an annual premium. These premiums allow the FHA to be self-funded; that is, it requires no funds from the federal government to maintain its operations.

Mortgage insurance products from the various insurers differ from each other as to the

1. maximum mortgage amounts and LTV ratios allowed;
2. underwriting standards for borrowers, such as the income-to-expense qualifying ratio requirement;
3. funds required at loan closing for such items as down payment and closing costs; and

81. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 59, at 18. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have their own statutory requirements relating to loan to value ratios that they must comply with. These requirements may be waived if there is mortgage insurance in place. See David Reiss, supra note 6, at 1032.
82. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 59, at 17.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 36.
86. Id. at 35.
87. The recent bailout discussed below in Part II.B.9 broke this long string of self-sufficiency.
4. dollar amount or percent of loss that each organization will pay lenders to cover the losses associated with foreclosed loans.\textsuperscript{88}

The FHA generally insures a lower maximum principal amount than other insurers.\textsuperscript{89} FHA insurance stands out from other forms of mortgage insurance for protecting the lender from nearly all of the losses from a loan that has gone through foreclosure whereas other insurers, both government and private, only insure a portion of the potential losses.\textsuperscript{90}

The amount insured by the VA has been changed by Congress over time but has never been as high as that of the FHA.\textsuperscript{91} PMIs usually insure a much smaller proportion of the losses, from 20 to 35 percent.\textsuperscript{92} While the FHA and the VA insure or guarantee “loans with effective loan-to-value ratios that exceed 100 percent (due to the financing of closing costs or other fees),” PMIs typically required at least a three percent down payment\textsuperscript{93} although that loosened up during the Subprime Boom of the early 2000s.\textsuperscript{94}

Homeowners choose FHA over PMI mortgages for one or more of the following reasons:

1. they cannot or prefer not to make the minimum down payment required by private mortgage insurers;
2. their credit scores are weak;
3. their employment histories are short or spotty or they are self-employed; or

\textsuperscript{88} U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 59, at 26.
\textsuperscript{89} See, e.g., id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 36. FHA mortgage insurance has differed from the other types because “it allows closing costs to be financed in the mortgage” and “provides nearly full insurance coverage to lenders.” Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{91} See id. at 36; see id. at 5 (noting the “VA covers only 25 to 50 percent of the mortgage balance, even if a loss exceeds that amount.”).
\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 36.
\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{94} See infra Part II.B.8.
4. their total debt-to-income ratios are higher than what a private mortgage insurer would accept.\footnote{95. See \textit{Foote \& Hairston}, supra note 56, at 23.}

Thus, the FHA effectively extends credit to borrowers whom other lenders reject, at least on the terms desired by the borrowers. The existence of private PMI is explained in large part because of the FHA’s cross-subsidization model by which low-risk borrowers pay the same premium as high-risk borrowers.\footnote{96. See \textit{President’s Commission on Housing}, supra note 4, at 162.} A private PMI company can typically offer a better deal to the low-risk borrower and often has additional competitive advantages, such as easier paperwork and faster approval times.\footnote{97. \textit{See Id.}}

The FHA does most of its work through the operation of five insurance funds: Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI); General Insurance (GI); Special Risk Insurance (SRI); Hope for Homeowners (H4H); and the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance Fund (CMHI).\footnote{98. \textit{U.S. Fed. Hous. Admin., Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 Financial Statements Audit} 27 (Dec. 13, 2013). Section 203(b) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1709 (b), (i)), authorized the creation of the single-family mortgage insurance program. Program regulations are in 24 CFR Part 203. The MMI Fund supports the 203(b) program. The fund is called a "mutual insurance" fund because it was designed to act like other types of mutual insurance with policyholders sharing in the risk of default as well as a share of any excess monies that the fund generated. \textit{See L. E. Cooper, \textit{Prepare To Insure Home Mortgages}, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1934, at RE1 ("When the amount accumulated in the fund equals the unpaid balances of the outstanding insured mortgages the excess will be applied for the benefit of the homeowner by paying off the mortgage balances, before maturity."). \textit{See also Federal Housing Administration, Revised Circular No. 1, Mutual Mortgage Insurance: Amended Administrative Rules and Regulations Under Title II of the National Housing Act 5 (1935) ("The mortgage insurance system will operate on the mutual principle, which may be described as follows: The premium for insurance, ultimately payable by the mortgagor, represents a charge adequately in excess of any amount which might be necessary to cover any possible losses. Out of the fund built up from such premiums actual losses and costs of administration will first be paid, and then the remainder of the fund will be redistributed to the mortgagors to apply toward extinguishing the mortgage debt for the benefit of the mortgagors."). The "mutual" aspect of FHA insurance has diminished over time. \textit{See Integrated Financial Engineering, Inc., Actuarial Review of the Federal Housing Administration Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Forward Loans for Fiscal Year 2013 2 (report prepared for FHA, Dec. 11, 2013) ("To further strengthen the capital position of the Fund, the NAHA [National Affordable Housing Act] legislation linked FHA’s ability to pay distributive shares to the actuarial soundness of the entire MMI Fund (as defined in the legislation), rather than solely considering the performance of the loans endorsed during a particular year, as had been done in years prior to 1990. This amendment allowed distributive share payments only if the Fund achieved the capital standard established by the legislation, and then at the discretion of the Secretary of HUD. No distributive shares have been paid since the passage of NAHA.").}}
single family programs. The MMI Fund covers $1.173 trillion of insured mortgages. Indeed, even before the financial crisis, the massive MMI Fund amounted to 43 percent of all types of loans and guarantees made by the federal government. The MMI’s programs are “unique among federal direct loan and guarantee programs as they are required to be self-supporting.” In contrast, the VA mortgage guaranty program is subsidized by the federal government.

At the outset, the MMI Fund was operated very conservatively. But the FHA changed in many ways over its eighty year history, as will be seen in the following section. It faced competitive pressures from a resurgent private mortgage insurance industry. It responded to great social and economic upheavals and shed some of those responses as times changed. And most importantly for this article, it loosened its underwriting to achieve various social goals to good and ill effect.

B. A HISTORY OF THE FHA’S CHANGING MISSIONS

Congress added and discontinued various missions of the FHA since its creation during the Great Depression. Depending on the political winds, it targeted different types of buyers and different types of residences at different times. Some programs were very successful and some were abject failures. These initiatives, and other important FHA developments, are reviewed below.

1. The 1930s: Creation and Execution

Compared to contemporary housing finance reforms, the FHA was set up fast, efficiently and with a broad base of support throughout the country, the very model of a New Deal program.

100. INTEGRATED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, INC., supra note 98, at 68. In 2006, the MMI Fund accounted for about 90% of the FHA’s entire portfolio. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 99, at 1.
102. Id. As noted above, the federal government had to provide a cash infusion to the FHA for the first time in its history in 2013. See supra note 42.
103. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 59, at 18.
104. The FHA’s second annual report states that the “sound operation of the mutual mortgage insurance system requires that only sound mortgages be accepted for insurance.” FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 25.
The FHA was meant to replace the private mortgage insurance industry that predated it. The first mortgage insurance company was incorporated in 1887, with a few more incorporating through the early 1900s. The industry first took off after New York State legalized it in 1904 and then boomed during World War I. There were twelve companies in New York in 1921 and at least fifty by 1930. For many years, the industry had “practically no losses” until it was wiped out in the early 1930s. Its companies began to fail as almost half of all of the

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105. GEORGE W. ALGER, REPORT TO HIS EXCELLENCY HERBERT H. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY GEORGE W. ALGER, APPOINTED UNDER THE EXECUTIVE LAW TO EXAMINE AND INVESTIGATE THE MANAGEMENT AND AFFAIRS OF THE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OPERATION, CONDUCT, AND MANAGEMENT OF TITLE AND MORTGAGE GUARANTEE CORPORATIONS UNDER ITS SUPERVISION 8 (1934). According to one source, “a poorly worded stretch of the New York State 1885 Statutes in regard to title insurance was misinterpreted to permit the guaranty of mortgages against loss for reasons other than title defect.” James Graaskamp, Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan Guaranty Insurance in the United States, 34 J. RISK & INS. 47, 49 (Mar. 1967).

106. N.Y. L. 1904, c. 543 permitted title insurers to “guarantee or insure the payment of bonds and mortgages.” The early PMI industry shared characteristics with modern title insurers, mortgage bankers and bond insurers. See ALGER, supra note 105, at 93. Thirteen other states had statutes governing mortgage insurance in 1933. Id. at 141.

107. ALGER, supra note 105, at 8.


109. ALGER, supra note 105, at 12.

110. Eugene N. White, Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s 30 (NBER WORKING PAPER 15573 Dec. 2009), available at https://www.clevelandfed.org/research/seminars/2010/white.pdf. In the 1920s, “the real estate aspects of the mortgage guaranty conformed to the general practice of inept appraisal, high leverage, and, in at least one case, over-certification of a mortgage portfolio. However, integrity of management did not actually break down until 1932 and 1933, when desperate executives found hope of continued liquidity in reselling at par, for cash, their own securities to the uninformed small investor, securities purchased in the money markets at great discount.” James Graaskamp, Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan Guaranty Insurance in the United States, 34 J. RISK & INS. 51 (Mar. 1967). In New York, the home to the most private mortgage insurers, eighteen companies were taken over by the New York Insurance Department. ALGER, supra note 105, at 2. The companies taken over had well over two thirds of the mortgage guarantee market in New York. See MORELAND COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE PLAN FOR THE RELIEF AND PROTECTION OF HOLDERS OF GUARANTEED MORTGAGE CERTIFICATES 1 (undated) (appended to Alger report).
mortgages in the nation defaulted.111 Indeed, New York State banned
PMI in 1938112 and the PMI industry did not return until the 1950s.113

The FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund was the
federal government’s main alternative to PMI. It was initially “designed
to make generally available, to owners of homes, mortgage loans that
embrace the following features:”

1. Long term credit, not exceeding 20 years;

2. Complete amortization which provides for (a)
   steady reduction of principal, (b) no renewals,
   and consequently no renewal charges, and (c)
   ultimate debt-free home ownership;

3. A single first mortgage for a higher percentage
   of the value than has been customary, but not
   exceeding 80 percent of the appraised value;

4. Low interest rate.114

The FHA Administrator noted after its first full year of operation that in
“most districts of the country, mortgage money frozen almost solid a
year ago, is now generally available to home owners on the most
attractive terms in the history of the Nation.”115

The following year, the FHA Administrator ascribed the
following developments in the residential mortgage market to the
introduction of the MMI Fund:

111. Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 17, at 358.
112. PROMONTORY FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, supra note 108, at 31.
113. MARSHALL A. DENNIS & THOMAS J. PINKOWISH, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 154 (5th ed. 2004).
114. FHA ADM’R., supra note 13, at 17. For a limited time, Congress authorized FHA to insure
certain mortgages with 25 year terms with loan-to-value ratios of as high as 90 percent. National
Housing Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-424, 52 Stat. 8, 10 (amending section 203(b) of the
National Housing Act of 1938). Only mortgages secured by newly constructed, owner-occupied
homes with (i) a principal amount of less than $5,400 where the owner had paid a ten percent down
payment or (ii) a principal amount of less than $8,600 where the owner had paid a down payment of
between ten and twenty percent were eligible for this particular type of mortgage insurance. Id. at 10-
11. The FHA clearly laid out the elements of the original program in a consumer guide, HOW TO HAVE
THE HOME YOU WANT (1936).
115. FHA ADM’R., supra note 75, at vii.
The firm establishment of the long-term monthly amortized mortgage in the home mortgage lending practice of the Nation.

The free flow of mortgage money from centers of supply into communities where funds are normally scarce.

The reduction in mortgage financing charges for large sections of the country, due to the uniform interest rate established by the [FHA].

Improvement in construction practices, influenced by standardized appraisal methods, based on minimum property standards.

Increased safety to both the home buyer and the mortgage lender throughout the life of the mortgagee as a result of insurance protection and the safeguards attending it.116

In sum, the FHA helped American housing markets to rise from their bottom by providing more easily accessible credit on terms that were more attractive than those offered by the private sector. The FHA largely replaced the private mortgage insurance companies that had failed in the early 1930s, but it went way beyond their role in many, many ways.117

As told by Kenneth Jackson in his classic book, CRABGRASS FRONTIER, from its very beginning the FHA had a major negative impact on central cities and minority communities.118 Its impact on the former

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116. Id. at vi.
117. Green & Wachter, supra note 17, at 95.
118. KENNETH JACKSON, supra note 22, at 203-18; see Robert C. Weaver, Housing Discrimination: An Overview in A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES (Presentations at a consultation sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil Rights) 1, 3 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 26-27, 1983) (“Exclusion of blacks from suburbs inflicted a high level of discrimination upon them.”); ROBERT C. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948) (“Not only were the vast majority of Negroes financially unable to participate in the FHA program, but even those who could afford to build new homes were stymied by their relegation to the Black Belt.”). The FHA was not the only or first federal agency to have such an impact. See Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, J. URBAN HIST. 394 (2003) (arguing that HOLC redlining institutionalized industry practices); ERNEST FISHER & HOMER HOYT, THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 28 (1939) (noting, in this FHA report, that the federal government began tracking the “percentage of the total number of persons living in the block...
was unintentional. Because the FHA made financing available for so much new housing, white working class families fled the cities to the newly built suburbs in massive numbers.119

But the impact on minority households was quite intentional: the FHA reflected the widely-held prejudices and discriminatory practices already endemic in the all-white housing and mortgage-lending industries.120 One of the main such practices was the imposition of restrictive covenants that excluded blacks and other minorities.121 The FHA also drew red lines on its underwriting maps to cordon off blocks in which even a single non-white family lived.122 Such “redlined” blocks were not eligible for FHA-insured mortgages.123 The end result of such redlining was a massive disinvestment in cities with large black populations.124 Older cities of the Northeast, like Camden, N.J., were particularly hard hit.125 The link between bureaucratic redlining and the

that are of a race other than white” in 1934 as part of the real property surveys conducted by the Works Progress Administration).

119. KENNETH JACKSON, supra note 22, at 203-18.
120. See RICHARD BROOKS & CAROL ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 109 (2013) (stating that FHA’s “Underwriting Manual reflected private developers’ and brokers’ views of the kinds of features that made housing values stable and secure. Those features clearly included racial segregation.”). See generally Amanda Tillotson, Race, Risk and Real Estate: The Federal Housing Administration and Black Homeownership in the Post-World War II Home Ownership State, 8 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 25 (Winter 2014) (arguing that the FHA was not the first to implement discriminatory practices like restrictive covenants).
121. U.S. FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 980(3)g. (1938) (stating that restrictive covenants should prohibit “the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended”); See Charles M. Lamb & Adam W. Nye, Do Presidents Control Bureaucracy? The Federal Housing Administration during the Truman-Eisenhower Era, 127 POL. SCI. Q. 445 (2012) (documenting similar history); See also U.S. FED. HOUSING ADMIN, supra note 71, at para. 233 (1936) (stating that areas surrounding home should be investigated “to determine whether or not incompatible racial and social groups are present, to the end that an intelligent prediction may be made regarding the possibility or probability of the location being invaded by such groups. If a neighborhood is to retain stability it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy generally leads to instability and a reduction in values.”).
122. KENNETH JACKSON, supra note 22, at 203-18. An official 1939 FHA report states that in “wholly white areas, the gradual filtration of other than white races tends slowly to change the character of neighborhoods. The presence of even one nonwhite person in a block otherwise populated by whites may initiate a period of transition.” ERNEST FISHER & HOMER HOYT, THE STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS IN AMERICAN CITIES 54 (1939).
123. KENNETH JACKSON, supra note 22, at 203-18.
124. Id.
125. Id.
decline of cities was not fully made until the 1960s at which point many of the affected cities had become shadows of their former selves.\footnote{126}

One contemporaneous estimate found that FHA insured 16% of all new single-family non-farm residences in 1935 and 23% in 1936.\footnote{127} By 1937, FHA "participated in 45% of all housing starts in the United States. From 1935 to 1939, FHA-insured loans accounted for 23% of all single-family mortgage lending, including refinance loans."\footnote{128} Conservative underwriting meant that in 1940, lenders had foreclosed on less than four tenths of one percent of those FHA insured mortgages originated in the 1930s.\footnote{129} The FHA’s first few years seemed to be an unvarnished success as government response to the liquidity crisis in the mortgage market brought about by the Great Depression. By 1939, the FHA was financially self-sustaining, with its insurance premiums and other fees covering its operating expenses.\footnote{130}

2. The 1940s: War Housing

The FHA, as with the rest of the nation, transitioned from responding to the Great Depression to responding to the exigencies imposed by World War II. For the FHA, this meant helping to house defense industry workers and their families.\footnote{131} At the same time, the

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\footnote{126}{Id. John Kimble, and others, have argued that African Americans were intentionally contained in older urban areas by the FHA. \textit{Insuring Inequality: The Role of Federal Housing Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans}, 32 L. & Soc. Inq. 399 (2007). Whether it was intentional or not, the FHA’s policies certainly had that effect.}
\footnote{127}{Weimer, \textit{supra} note 10, at 477.}
\footnote{128}{Dan Immergluck, \textit{From Minor To Major Player: The Geography Of FHA Lending During The U.S. Mortgage Crisis}, 33 J. URB. AFF. 1, 4 (2011).}
\footnote{130}{M ILES L. COLEAN, \textit{AMERICAN HOUSING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS} 267 (1944). Previously, the FHA’s operating expenses had been paid by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. \textit{Losses Are Small on FHA Mortgages}, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1938, at 1. The FHA was initially capitalized with an initial fund of $10 million to cover its losses. MILES L. COLEAN, \textit{AMERICAN HOUSING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS} 267 (1944).}
\footnote{131}{U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., \textit{EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION} 3 (1942). \url{http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005860161}; see no author, \textit{Gain in Home Building Attributed Largely to Defense Area Growth}, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1942, at 63 ("In the past 17 months, a major portion of the American residential construction industry has been devoted to the production of new housing to meet the acute need for additional living accommodations in defense production centers where employment has been increasing rapidly"). This housing was referred to as Section 603 housing, built pursuant to the War Housing Program. \textit{See} ERNEST M. FISHER, \textit{URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS: CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCING} 80, Table 23 (1951). In 1945, for instance, the bulk of new homes were financed by Section 603. \textit{Id}.}
FHA sought to “encourage production of new homes for families in income classifications which were not considered as feasible markets for new homes under the previous systems of home financing.”\(^\text{132}\) FHA market share increased to 45% by 1944.\(^\text{133}\) As World War II ended, the FHA turned its attention from war mobilization to the needs of returning veterans and their families.\(^\text{134}\) One effect of this was that FHA borrowers skewed younger as a result.\(^\text{135}\)

The VA mortgage guarantee program was created in 1944 as part of the “GI Bill.”\(^\text{136}\) The VA did not require down payments “on the theory that soldiers weren’t paid enough to accumulate savings.”\(^\text{137}\) The VA market share peaked in 1947 at almost 28%\(^\text{138}\) and this was matched by a decline in the FHA market share.\(^\text{139}\)

In 1948, the FHA made an important change that is now integral to our notion of the American mortgage: it increased the maximum term for an FHA mortgage to 30 years.\(^\text{140}\) Extraordinarily, nearly one third of “new nonfarm residential construction (including rental housing as well as small homes)” received financing through the FHA’s war housing insurance program by 1948.\(^\text{141}\) Continuing with one of its original mandates to protect the consumer of housing, the FHA sought to improve the quality of construction: “The revised FHA regulations contemplate the construction of a basic house, sound and livable,


\(^{133}\) Immergluck, supra note 128, at 4.


\(^{135}\) U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION 77 (1947), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015082064752&page=root;view=1up;size=100;orient=0;17;num=117.

\(^{136}\) The GI Bill is formally known as the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, P.L. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284m. The mortgage guarantee program is found in Title III of the Act.

\(^{137}\) Michael S. Carliner, supra note 57, at 308. The VA’s no-down-payment requirement changed at times. HOME MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURE 7-11 (John P. Herzog and James S. Earley eds. 1970).

\(^{138}\) See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 106.

\(^{139}\) Immergluck, supra note 128, at 4.

\(^{140}\) Green & Wachter, supra note 17, at 96.

\(^{141}\) U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., supra note 135, at 11.
stripped of nonessential features but embodying complete living facilities and conforming to local standards for comparable dwellings.”

Prior to 1948, explicit restrictions based on race, ethnicity and religion were common among private property owners. Even more, the federal government actively encouraged such restrictions through a variety of methods, including underwriting decisions of the FHA. The Supreme Court rejected this form of discrimination in the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer. Soon after Shelley, the FHA amended its rules to bar insurance for homes for which covenants “restricting the use or occupancy of the property on the basis of race, creed or color” were to be recorded prior to the recordation of the FHA-insured mortgage.” But notwithstanding this clear statement of the law, the FHA continued to informally support the use of racially restrictive covenants for years after Shelley was decided. This was true even though the Truman Administration revised the FHA’s Underwriting Manual in 1949 to include equal opportunity standards as very little actually changed in practice.

142. Id. at 14; see MILES L. COLEAN, supra note 24, at 22-23 (“Through the construction requirements and housing standards of the Federal Housing Administration, the government has imposed a sort of super-code in so far as the operations of that agency are concerned.”).

143. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

144. U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION 3 (1949) (stating that ban applied to covenants recorded after February 15, 1950), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=647;id=mdp.39015082064752;page=root;view=1up;size=100;orientation=0;num=11.

145. Lamb & Nye, supra note 121, at 449; see David M.P. Freund, Marketing the Free Market in THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 11, 31 (Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds. 2006) (noting that Eisenhower’s nominee to run the Housing and Home Finance Agency, which included the FHA, “announced during his 1953 confirmation hearing that he would not stop local authorities from maintaining racial segregation in federally funded programs.”); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 5 (Clearinghouse Publication 42, Feb. 1973) (noting that 18 months after Shelley was decided the, “new FHA policy of refusing to insure mortgages on properties carrying a racial covenant applied only to covenants filed after February 1950. This left the accumulation of the first 15 years of FHA-insured mortgage protected by the covenants on thousands of homes untouched.”).

146. See U.S. FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL para. 242 (1955) (including 1949 revisions which states “Underwriting considerations shall recognize the right to equality of opportunity to receive the benefits of the mortgage insurance system in obtaining adequate housing accommodations irrespective of race, color, creed or national origin.”). Despite these revisions most FHA staff turned a blind eye to these equality of opportunity provisions. See WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, ROBERT CLIFTON WEAVER AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN URBAN REFORMER 155 (2008) (“The Shelley decision in particular created intense concern for many builders, realtors, and their supporters in the government. In response, federal housing administrator Raymond Foley asked for a review of agency policies to see if they would have to be changed in light of the decision. The
The FHA continued in its role as a mainstay in the single family housing market. The FHA had more than a third of the mortgage market at the beginning of the 1950s and the VA had an additional 13%. Its underwriting remained conservative: foreclosures in process for FHA’s primary one-to-four family program (the Section 203 program) in 1950 were 0.04% of mortgages in force.

3. The 1950s: The Maturation of the American Mortgage

Like an episode of MAD MEN, the FHA offered a glittery, new world to whites and a gritty and impoverished one to blacks. The quality of housing for white households improved dramatically in the 1950s. Black households, however, continued to suffer from a variety of discriminatory policies, including redlining by the FHA.

FHA mortgages in the 1950s began to look very much like FHA mortgages offered in the 2000s. For instance, in 1950, Congress allowed some loans to have lower down payments than previously authorized, as conclusion of his staff was that the agency could continue business as usual. They would no longer recommend restrictive covenants (a change Truman had ordered a year before), but they would do nothing to prevent them or other forms of discrimination. According to the FHA commissioner Franklin Richards, it was not the place of the government ‘to require private individuals to give up their right to dispose of their property as they see fit.’

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147. Immergluck, supra note 128, at 4. (noting that FHA had 35% market share in 1950); see J.E. Morton, URBAN MORTGAGE LENDING: COMPARATIVE MARKETS AND EXPERIENCE 25, Table 6 (1956) (providing total FHA/VA market share from 1935-1953).
149. President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at xix.
150. Id. Even the positive steps taken by the FHA appeared to be a drop in the bucket. John Kimble, Insuring Inequality: The Role of Federal Housing Administration in the Urban Ghettoization of African Americans, 32 L. & Soc. Inq. 399, 428-29 (2007) (“In 1947, following the creation of the Minority Group Housing Program, the agency did increase its acceptance of minority housing projects, insuring 205 new developments for minority occupancy between 1947 and 1954 with an additional 146 small projects in the process of being completed. Yet in aggregate this amounted to a total of only 29,386 dwelling units, 15 percent of which were open to white occupants as well. To provide some perspective on the proportion of this effort relative to the FHA’s broader operations, by 1955 the FHA had provided $33 billion of insurance on nearly 3,500,000 homes and 650,000 rental and cooperative units, the vast majority of which were new dwellings outside of central cities.”). Between 1934 and 1960, just two percent of FHA mortgages were made to African Americans. Robert C. Weaver, supra note 118, at 3.
little as five percent. In 1957, the minimum down payment was lowered to three percent in some cases.

The 1950s also brought another significant change to the housing sector. States, with the memory of the failures of the Great Depression growing dim, began passing laws to allow private mortgage insurance companies to form. In 1957, the private mortgage insurer, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation, became the first to operate since the Great Depression. Such private mortgage insurance allowed borrowers to make just five or ten percent down payments and the insurer covered a lender’s first twenty to twenty-five percent of any potential loss on an insured loan. However, this private alternative remained a small competitor to the FHA until the 1980s.

The FHA began to loosen underwriting requirements in the middle of the ‘50s and defaults increased as well. This loosening was reflected in part by the amendment to the Housing Act of 1954 which replaced "economic soundness" as the guideline for the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund to "acceptable risk." This amendment was a harbinger of even looser underwriting standards to come. These loser

151. Housing Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-475, § 104(a), 64 Stat. 48, 51-52 (amended 1950). This amendment also allowed for larger loans for 3 and 4 family homes. See id.
152. Housing Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-104, §101, 71 Stat. 294, 295 (amending section 203(b) of the National Housing Act of 1934) (also setting higher maximum loan amounts for three and four family homes).
154. FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 56, at 2.
155. See id. at 3.
156. CARTER M. McFARLAND, FHA EXPERIENCE WITH MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES AND PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS 4 (1963). Carter M. McFarland was Assistant Commissioner of FHA at the time of this report.
157. See U.S. FED. HOUSING ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL, at para. 101 (1936) (noting that the National Housing Act provided “that no mortgage shall be accepted for insurance unless it is economically sound.”). The Housing Act of 1954 introduced the concept of “acceptable risk.” Pub. L. 83–560, 68 Stat. 590 § 110 (amending section 203 of the National Housing Act such that if the FHA Commissioner “finds that the project with respect to which the mortgage is executed is an acceptable risk, giving consideration to the need for providing adequate housing for families of low and moderate income particularly in suburban and outlying areas or small communities,” the Commissioner may insure mortgages that otherwise comply with the FHA requirements”). The “economic soundness” standard had already been weakened somewhat by the provisions of the Housing Act of 1948. MILES L. COLEAN, supra note 24, at 123-26.
158. See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 17, at 360.
standards would have an outsized impact on the housing stock in older cities.159

The FHA’s performance reflected the changes in its underwriting policies. Default rates for the primary single-family insurance program, Section 203, were 0.83% of the mortgages in force in 1960. Foreclosure rates for the Section 203 program by 1960 were 0.13% of mortgages in force, roughly triple the previous decade.160 Change was afoot.

4. The 1960s: Housing in the Urban Core

Over its first thirty years of operation, the FHA helped to finance about a fifth of all newly constructed housing, most of it in the suburbs.161 However, as of 1967, only 3% of all new homes were sold to African Americans.162 But as with the rest of the nation, the ferment over segregation, civil rights and economic inequality were the major historical themes of the 1960s for the FHA. Each of these themes were clearly reflected in the FHA and its role in the housing markets, for both good and ill.163

Beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s, Congress added a number of innovative insurance programs to the FHA’s stable.164 They included insurance programs for urban renewal; new forms of homeownership like condominiums and cooperatives; and housing for seniors and the disabled.165 In 1962, President Kennedy reversed the FHA’s redlining policy that had been in effect since its inception and the FHA began to embark on a change of focus to supporting low and moderate-income homeownership as well as

159. See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 17, at 360.
162. WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, supra note 145, at 312.
163. See U.S. COMM’N CIV. RIGHTS, HOUSING 79 (1961 Rep. 4) (FHA and VA did not have “effective policy to insure that the fruits of these benefits (an increased housing supply) reach home buyers on an equal opportunity basis.”).
164. As early as 1961 the Housing Act of 1961 began to loosen underwriting standards. Milton P. Semer et al., Evolution of Federal Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 69, 96 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985) (“Important relaxation in FHA mortgage terms was made by the Housing Act of 1961 as one of the efforts of the Kennedy Administration to fight the recession beginning in 1960.”).
165. See Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 17, at 360.
minority homeownership. In 1965, the FHA became a part of the HUD Office of Housing.

Notwithstanding the addition of these new programs, FHA market share declined in the 1960s. By 1964, PMI provider Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation had 11 competitors. As PMI was growing, the FHA was also acknowledging significant operating difficulties, such as delays in processing applications.

In response to the civil unrest of the mid-1960s, President Johnson appointed the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission. The Kerner Commission found that residential segregation and unequal housing opportunities were a major cause of civil unrest in cities. In particular, it found that federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year history of subsidized federal housing, only about 800,000 units have been constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units a year. By comparison, over a period only three years longer, FHA insurance guarantees have made possible the construction of over ten million middle and upper income units.

In response to this historical inequity, Congress ensured that many of the FHA’s new programs had a very different underwriting model than the traditional one. These newer programs typically targeted

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166. See Carliner, supra note 57, at 311. This reversal also applied to the VA. Id. “Part of the interest in proposals to subsidize low-income homeownership was stimulated by the wave of urban riots that began in 1963.” Id.; see Staff Reporter, FHA Will Not Do Business with Anyone Violating Pennsylvania Anti-Bias Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1962, at 6. The order “applied only to FHA and VA housing insured or guaranteed after the date of the order’s issuance (November 20, 1962). It left hundreds of thousands of existing housing units receiving FHA and VA assistance immune from the requirement of the nondiscrimination mandate.” U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 6 (Clearinghouse Publication 42, Feb. 1973).


168. PROMONTORY FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, supra note 108, at 35.

169. CARTER M. MCFARLAND, supra note 156, at 2.

170. See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).

171. Id. at 13.

172. In addition to new underwriting models, the FHA also attempted to promote innovative housing design, for instance by promoting mini-houses on mini-lots. ELsie EAVES, THE NATIONAL
“underserved borrowers” such as households of color and were subsidized by the federal government. The FHA’s core single-family Section 203(b) program, in contrast, had low-risk homeowners cross-subsidize high-risk homeowners.

One such initiative that Congress enacted in 1968, the Section 235 homeownership program, was seen as giving the FHA “an opportunity to overcome its image as an antipoor, antiminority Government agency.” The program was seen as having great potential by a wide variety of groups, including those representing “business as well as social welfare concerns.” This move away from conservative underwriting led to rapidly increasing foreclosure rates and ultimately wreaked much havoc in the early 1970s. This havoc is embodied in the poorly executed Section 235 program, described below.

Defaults and foreclosures rose again during the 1960s. Total defaults for Section 203 in 1970 were 1.69% of mortgages in force.
Foreclosures in process for Section 203 in 1970 were 0.34% of mortgages in force, more than doubling the rate of the previous decade.¹⁷⁹ These were significant increases from the 1930s and 1940s.

5. The 1970s: Spectacular Failure

By the early 1970s, the dreams of the 60’s were replaced with the hangovers induced by war, inflation, recession, and continuous civil rights struggles. By this time, the FHA “acquired a deserved reputation for confining its service mostly to white, middle class, suburban home buyers.”¹⁸⁰ Notwithstanding this failing, the American homeownership rate increased from roughly 44 percent in 1940 to about 63 percent in 1970 and the FHA was partially responsible for this increase.¹⁸¹ The FHA’s mortgage origination share (by dollar volume) reached a new high in 1970, at about a quarter of the market.¹⁸² This accounted for nearly 30% of all single-family loans.¹⁸³ This was due to a variety of factors. They included the ramping up of the new Section 235 program with its subsidized interest rates, at the same time that unsubsidized interest rate were reaching new highs.¹⁸⁴ In its first four years, the Section 235 program helped to finance homes for about 400,000 low-and moderate-income families.¹⁸⁵ Section 235 home buyers had to make only tiny down payments.¹⁸⁶

In 1973, the Section 235 program was terminated because so many of its mortgages ended up in default and foreclosure.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, many of the homes sold through the program were sold by predators who covered up structural problems with sheet rock and paint and sold them to unsophisticated low- and moderate-income buyers. Once the structural problems surfaced, many of these households could not afford

¹⁸⁰. U.S. COMM’N CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 175, at 77.
¹⁸¹. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, supra note 4.
¹⁸². See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 106.
¹⁸³. Immergluck, supra note 128, at 4.
¹⁸⁴. FOOTE & HAIRSTON, supra note 56, at 2. Section 235 “reduced the effective interest rate for homebuyers, depending on their income, to as low as one percent with HUD paying the remaining interest directly to the bank.” LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HUD 3 (2006).
¹⁸⁵. Carliner, supra note 57, at 313.
¹⁸⁶. Id. Down payments could be as low as $200, which was about two weeks’ pay for the median Section 235 purchaser. LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 226 (2011).
to repair them and the homes went into default.\textsuperscript{188} Entire blocks in some cities were lined with boarded-up homes that had been financed pursuant to Section 235.\textsuperscript{189}

Section 235 represented a low-point for the FHA with more than two hundred people convicted for abuses arising from the program.\textsuperscript{190} The federal government lost over two billion dollars on mortgages that ended up in foreclosure during this period.\textsuperscript{191} The Section 235 fiasco “was one of the major reasons for the moratorium on subsidized housing programs declared in 1973.”\textsuperscript{192}

If the broader dreams of equality of the 1960s were dashed in the 1970s, so were the dreams of an effective FHA.\textsuperscript{193} At the same time the Section 235 fiasco was unfolding, the FHA was rocked by a series of scandals.\textsuperscript{194} Indeed, HUD Secretary George Romney called for the FHA to be privatized in 1972, in part because of problems in the agency and in part because of the growth of PMI industry.\textsuperscript{195}

During the early 1970s, the mortgage insurance sector was subject to big swings in market share between the FHA and private

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See \textit{George Washington University Center For Real Estate And Urban Analysis, supra} note 29, at 7.
\item \textit{Lawrence L. Thompson, supra} note 184, at 3.
\item \textit{Brent D. Ryan, supra} note 187, at 93.
\item \textit{Id. See generally National Center for Housing Management, Inc., Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of Federally Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Volume 1: Single-Family Housing} (1972) (report prepared for HUD arguing that despite declines the FHA is still integral in the provision of single-family mortgage insurance).
\item \textit{George Washington University Center For Real Estate And Urban Analysis, supra} note 29, at 7.
\item See, e.g., \textit{Civil Rights Unit Says Housing Bias Study Shows HUD Has Failed to Change Pattern}, \textit{Wall St. J.}, June 11, 1971, at 10 (“Traditionally attuned to serving the housing needs of white, middle-class families, the [U.S. Civil Rights Commission] report said, the FHA ‘has been poorly prepared to serve a different racial and ethnic group of home seekers and has done little to develop affirmative procedures and mechanisms to assure that lower-income buyers are treated fairly.’”).
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mortgage insurers. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set the stage for a revival of the PMI industry in the early 1970s as they sought to purchase high LTV mortgages. Because their charters required that the high-LTV mortgages have mortgage insurance, private mortgage insurers had a steady stream of business.

Underwriting stabilized toward the end of the 1970s. In 1978, default rates for the Section 203 program had lowered to 0.89% of mortgages in force, from 1.69% of mortgages in force in 1970. Foreclosures in process by 1978 for the Section 203 program were 0.30% of mortgages in force, a slight decline from the rate at the end of the previous decade.

6. The 1980s: PMI Is Back!

Before Gordon Gekko pronounced that greed is good, skepticism for that government instrumentality, the FHA, blossomed during the Reagan years. At the beginning of the decade, the FHA and VA had about 20 percent of the market (by dollar amount) for new

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197. President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at 162-163; See also Stephen L. Ross & John Yinger, The Color of Credit: Mortgage Discrimination, Research Methodology, and Fair-Lending Enforcement 17 (2002) (“In the early 1970s, Fannie Mae’s charter was changed to allow it to buy conventional mortgages, and two new secondary mortgage market institutions appeared. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, or Ginnie Mae) was established to purchase FHA and VA mortgages from any source, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was established to purchase conventional mortgages from savings and loans. These institutional developments, along with tremendous growth in the popularity of MBSs as an investment, have made it possible for mortgage bankers to move into the conventional market, as well.”).
198. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717(b)(5)(C) (Fannie Mae); 1454(a)(2) (Freddie Mac).
199. See Promontory Financial Group, LLC, supra note 108, at 3. Unlike the FHA, Fannie and Freddie, private mortgage insurers are regulated by state insurance regulators. President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at 162-163. The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-35, required that mortgages purchased by Fannie and Freddie with less than a 20 percent down payment have mortgage insurance. For a technical overview of modern private mortgage insurance, see Promontory Financial Group, LLC, supra note 108.
201. Id. at 113.
202. Wall Street (20th Century Fox 1987) (“The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge has marked the upward surge of mankind. And greed, you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning corporation called the USA.”).
mortgages and the PMI industry had about the same market share. The FHA’s express mission also changed from its original one of serving a broad swath of homeowners to one of particularly serving lower-income households. This transition was not untroubled, as FHA loans continued to be at the root of big problems in urban communities.

While the FHA had turned away from its history of racial discrimination, its record of success in communities of color was decidedly mixed. In many ways, this was a problem of underwriting. FHA underwriting went from being prejudicially restrictive for households of color in its early years to being irrationally loose in its later years. The FHA had still not come up with any sort of approach to its underwriting that balanced access to credit and sustainability of credit. This failure continued to haunt the FHA and the communities it served decades after it rejected its early discriminatory practices.

The FHA faced something of an identity crisis in the early 1980s. President Reagan created a Commission on Housing to study the FHA and other aspects of the housing sector. The Commission believed that the FHA should cede much of its market to the PMI industry, which had recovered by then. By 1980, the PMI industry had grown to fourteen firms which had insured 31% of the entire mortgage market. The industry was arguing that FHA had become unnecessary. Indeed, the Reagan Administration even bandied around

203. President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4.
204. See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 108.
205. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 195.
207. President’s Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at xxiv (“Like so much else that is 50 years old, FHA has become a prisoner of its own habits, and the Commission recommends that more agile private mortgage insurance institutions take over many FHA functions relating to single-family homes. But there are still pioneering tasks ahead for FHA in the Commission’s scenario, in the testing of new mortgage instruments and in assistance to homeowners for whom private insurers are unwilling or unable to supply insurance.”).  
208. Promontory Financial Group, LLC, supra note 108, at 32.
209. Foote & Hairston, supra note 56, at 7.
210. Id.
a proposal to privatize it.211 At the same time, the FHA’s market share began falling to very low levels, as low as 5% by the mid-1980s.212

The late 1980s told a completely different story, as the PMI industry faced heavy losses from riskier products such as adjustable-rate mortgages (‘‘ARMs’’) and from depressed housing prices in the Farm Belt and the Southwest.213 Some PMI companies merged with better-capitalized ones.214 One of the 14 was not able to fully repay its policyholders.215 By the late 1980s, the FHA (as well as the VA) came roaring back, with a roughly 60 percent market share of insured loans, leaving the PMI industry with 40 percent.216 But the private mortgage insurance industry, like the Reagan-era Arnold Schwarzenegger, was already prepared to say, ‘‘I’ll be back!’’

During the late 1980s, the FHA’s delinquency and foreclosure rates were about twice those for conventional loans.217 Reflecting its changed mission, the FHA began keeping statistics on the number of mortgages going to first-time homebuyers. By 1991, 58% of FHA single family insured mortgages went to first-time homebuyers.218

7. The 1990s: The FHA Goes out with a Whimper

As the Soviet Union collapsed in the face of triumphant capitalism, the FHA looked as if it would collapse in the face of a resurgent PMI industry. The FHA arrived in the 1990s with the legacy of high default rates and a variety of other problems.219 The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 implemented more
conservative underwriting standards for mortgages and the FHA’s insurance funds.\textsuperscript{220} The FHA’s share of the mortgage market continued to face serious competition from the PMI industry. Over much of the decade, the FHA and the PMI industry each had a share of the total mortgage market that was measured in the teens.\textsuperscript{221}

By the late 1990s, the nine remaining private mortgage insurers\textsuperscript{222} insured about the same number of mortgages as the FHA and the VA combined and more than twice the dollar amount of mortgage debt than the FHA and the other government insurance programs combined.\textsuperscript{223} And it looked like the PMI industry had nowhere to go but up: the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) found that a third of the FHA’s 1995 portfolio would have been eligible for PMI.\textsuperscript{224}

During the late 1990s, the FHA’s delinquency and foreclosure rates were often more, and sometimes much more, than three times as high as those for conventional loans.\textsuperscript{225} In 2000, FHA mortgages were about three-fourths the size of PMI mortgages.\textsuperscript{226} This reflected the market segmentation of the two, with the FHA having a bigger share of low- and moderate-income households.

8. The 2000s: The FHA Goes Boom!

Good times in the booming financial markets of the early 2000s meant lean times for the FHA.\textsuperscript{227} While the mortgage market was heating up overall, the FHA’s share of mortgage originations by dollar volume fell from its 1970 peak of roughly 25 percent to its 2006 trough of less than two percent.\textsuperscript{228} This long-term decline had begun in earnest in 1996 and was most pronounced among minority borrowers who were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{221} Immergluck, supra note 128, at 4 (noting FHA market share); Foote & Hairston, supra note 56, at 7 (noting PMI market share).
  \item \textsuperscript{222} Promontory Financial Group, LLC, supra note 108, at 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{223} Dennis & Pinkowish, supra note 113, at 174, Table 9-1.
  \item \textsuperscript{224} U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 59, at 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{225} Dennis & Pinkowish, supra note 113, at 154 Table 8-1.
  \item \textsuperscript{226} Id. at 177, Table 9-2 (5th rd. 2004) (FHA average loan amount, $100,344, PMI $131,964 and VA $118,953).
  \item \textsuperscript{227} Sarah Rosen Wartell, Single-Family Risksharing: An Evaluation of its Potential as a Tool for FHA 1 (Prepared for the Millenial Housing Commission, June 2002) (detailing the “significant challenges FHA faces.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{228} See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 106. Not as dramatically, but still shockingly, the VA’s market share (by dollar volume) in 2006 fell to less than one percent. Id.
moving over to the private-label subprime market which was dramatically loosening its underwriting standards and offering extremely attractive teaser rates as well.\(^\text{229}\) Before this subprime boom, the FHA’s low-down-payment mortgages and less stringent credit score requirements had meant that the FHA had a larger market share in those communities that had been underrepresented among homeowners.\(^\text{230}\) During this same period, the FHA decided to originate loans with down payments funded by sellers which were channeled through various not-for-profit organizations.\(^\text{231}\) Such loans were no-down-payment loans by another name, as the third party paid the down payment, leaving the borrower with no skin in the game. These loans, unsurprisingly, defaulted at very high rates.\(^\text{232}\)

The national homeownership rate peaked in the mid-2000s at about 69 percent.\(^\text{233}\) The FHA was part of that dramatic expansion. For instance, 79.8% of FHA-insured purchases were first-time homebuyers

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\(^{230}\) See Jaffee & Quigley, supra note 50, at 108 (“The academic literature has documented these specific attributes of the FHA clientele. For example, Ambrose and Pennington-Cross (2000) found that FHA market shares are higher in cities with higher economic risk characteristics, while Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2002) found that as local economic conditions deteriorate, conventional lenders tend to withdraw mortgage finance, in effect making the government programs the only source of credit.”); (the overwhelming fraction of FHA-insured borrowers have obtained mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 95 to 98 percent or more, including a large number of borrowers with “nontraditional” credit histories or with imperfect credit records.”).

\(^{231}\) U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund 11 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/actr/2009actr_subltr.pdf. With a typical seller-funded down payment transaction, the seller gives a third party an amount equal to the buyer’s down payment. The third party then gives the funds to the buyer who uses it for a down payment. This structure allowed the parties to avoid legal limitations on seller-paid down payments. See generally GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-24, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ADDITIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO MANAGE RISKS OF FHA-INSURED LOANS WITH DOWN PAYMENT ASSISTANCE 3-6 (Nov. 2005). Unsurprisingly, the purchase price typically accounted for the seller-funded down payment by selling for 2 to 3 percent more than similar homes sold without seller-funded down payments. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MORTGAGE FINANCING: SELLER-FUNDED DOWN-PAYMENT ASSISTANCE CHANGES THE STRUCTURE OF THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTS LOAN PERFORMANCE 3 (June 22, 2007).

\(^{232}\) U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 231, at 11. They were also very popular: “The proportion of FHA-insured purchase loans that were financed in part by down-payment assistance from various sources increased from 35 percent to nearly 50 percent from 2000 through 2004.” GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1033T, supra note 231, at 2.

\(^{233}\) LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, supra note 184.
in 2001. But the FHA’s success with communities of color, since its rejection of its explicitly discriminatory practices, remained decidedly mixed. While African American homeownership had increased significantly since the FHA’s creation, it was a full twenty percentage points behind the national rate, as was the rate for Hispanic households.

The FHA’s competitors were themselves lowering down payment requirements to as little as zero; the FHA responded by in some cases offering insurance for financing of nearly 100% of the sales price. PMI had 62 percent of the mortgage insurance market by the mid-2000s. Subprime lenders pushed the envelope, offering mortgages with flexible payment and variable interest options that were particularly attractive to purchasers in areas with rapidly rising prices. Some mortgage insurers were going so far as to underwrite loans with LTVs of 100 percent and even 103 percent.

In response to changes in the industry, and to further expand homeownership, Congress enacted the American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003. This new program gave first-time homeowners up to

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234. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., FHA Annual Management Report Fiscal Year 2001 7 (2001). A typical first-time homebuyer “is at the beginning of his or her income-earning years, does not have substantial accumulated wealth and retirement funds, and has other consumer debt.” DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 175.


236. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-708, FED. HOUSING ADMIN.: MODERNIZATION PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE PROGRAM AND BUDGET IMPLICATIONS AND REQUIRE CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN RISK MANAGEMENT 20-21 (June 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07708.pdf (“Some mortgage industry officials also pointed to other product restrictions as a reason why FHA loans have been less competitive than conventional loans. Many borrowers either cannot or do not want to make a downpayment, and in recent years members of the conventional mortgage market (such as private mortgage insurers, the housing GSEs [government-sponsored enterprises], and large private lenders) have been increasingly active in supporting low and no-down-payment mortgages. For example, the GSEs introduced no-down-payment mortgage products in 2000. In contrast, FHA does not offer a zero-down-payment product, which some lenders and industry observers have cited as a major factor underlying the decline in FHA’s market share. (However, as previously noted, FHA allows borrowers to finance their up-front insurance premium and some closing costs; as a result, an FHA-insured loan could equal nearly 100 percent of the property’s value or sales price.”).

237. DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 178.


239. DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 178.

$10,000 as a down payment.\textsuperscript{241} This program, like the 1970s’ Section 235 program was an unmitigated failure for homeowners and a financial catastrophe for the FHA.\textsuperscript{242} Once again, a no-down-payment loan program failed. That being said, “with the exception of the years during the subprime boom,” the 203(b) program, the FHA’s primary mortgage insurance program for single family homes, “served as the major source of mortgage financing for first-time, low-income and minority homebuyers.”\textsuperscript{243}

HUD continued to scramble to respond to the changes in the market, proposing to Congress a variety of long-due reforms in 2006.\textsuperscript{244} Echoing the FHA’s consumer protection goals from the Great Depression, Congress passed The Expanding Homeownership Act of 2007 to help FHA modernize, “to make government-insured loan products competitive with the private sector and make available affordable housing to more Americans . . . .”\textsuperscript{245} In particular, this modernized FHA was intended to “provide a safe, fair, and affordable FHA alternative to the subprime market.”\textsuperscript{246} Not incidentally, the legislation also allowed the FHA to reduce the minimum 3 percent down payment requirement.\textsuperscript{247} These efforts to compete with the private sector on its terms turned out to be a big mistake.

Events soon overtook Congress as the FHA’s dramatic loss of market share was soon to be matched by an equally dramatic rise. Once the Subprime Crisis hit, government-insured mortgages absorbed an

\textsuperscript{241} George Washington University Center For Real Estate And Urban Analysis, supra note 29, at 8.
\textsuperscript{242} See Id.
\textsuperscript{244} U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 229, at 1 (noting that HUD proposed to “raise FHA’s loan limits, give the agency flexibility to set insurance premiums based on the credit risk of borrowers, and reduce down-payment requirements from the current 3 percent to potentially zero.”).
\textsuperscript{245} Ginnie Mae, supra note 64, at 11.
\textsuperscript{246} Id.
\textsuperscript{247} Id.; see Fed. Housing Admin, supra note 46, at 3 (“The FHA’s Annual Management Report for FY2007 states that its key policy objectives include 1. Increasing FHA loan limits and enhancing “downpayment flexibility requirements.”).
extraordinary level of demand for mortgages as the private-label (non-conforming subprime and jumbo) sector shrank to next to nothing.\textsuperscript{248}

By 2008, the FHA and the VA had a market share of all mortgage originations of more than twenty percent.\textsuperscript{249} Congress significantly raised the loan limits that the FHA could insure to provide liquidity to a wider swath of the mortgage market.\textsuperscript{250} The FHA’s market share continued to explode as capital from other sources in the residential mortgage market dried up.\textsuperscript{251} By 2010 it was 30\% overall\textsuperscript{252} and nearly 40\% for home purchases.\textsuperscript{253} FHA’s role in home purchases for minorities during this period was even greater: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data indicates that 60\% of all African American and Latino purchasers had FHA-insured mortgages.\textsuperscript{254} This was nearly an exponential increase from 2005 and 2006 where ten percent of African American and just six percent of Hispanic purchasers had FHA loans.\textsuperscript{255} More broadly, the FHA had “become the primary

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  \item \textsuperscript{248} See Viral V. Acharya et al., Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance 9-10 (2011) (“As of the first half of 2010, Fannie and Freddie plus the FHA were buying or guaranteeing more than 90\% of all residential mortgages that were originated.”). By 2013, that number has shrunk a bit to 80\%, with the FHA and VA accounting for twenty percentage points between them. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., The State of the Nation’s Housing 11 (2013). “Non-conforming loans” are those that do not conform to Fannie and Freddie purchase guidelines; “jumbo” mortgages are non-conforming loans that do not comply with the limitations on the size of the mortgages that Fannie and Freddie can purchase. See Reiss, supra note 6, at 1032-33.
  \item \textsuperscript{249} See Jaffe & Quigley, supra note 50, at 106.
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Private-label MBS issuance was $930 billion in FY 2007, the year the credit crisis began, and had fallen to $58 billion in FY 2010. Ginnie Mae, supra note 64, at 12. Ginnie Mae, Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2008 10, available at http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/ann_ren/ReportToCongress08.pdf (“The evaporation of the private-label securitization market has resulted in virtually no capital for nonconforming loans.”). During the same time, the government-supported MBS insurers (Ginnie, Fannie and Freddie) saw their issuance grow to $1.3 trillion in FY 2010 from $1.1 trillion in FY 2007. Ginnie Mae, supra note 64, at 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{252} Mike Ferullo & Stephen Joyce, HAMP Changes, Revamped GSE Plan Expected as Housing Woes Continue Outlook 2010, Banking Daily, Jan. 25, 2010; see U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note 231, at 1 (“FHA was largely shut-out of the mortgage market during the boom years of 2003-2007, but has now emerged as a primary source of credit guarantees both for home buyers and for homeowners seeking to refinance into lower-cost and safer mortgage products.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{254} Id. at 6. HMDA requires certain lenders to report information about home loan applicants and the loans that they apply for. See generally 12 C.F.R. part 203 (2014) (Regulation C).
  \item \textsuperscript{255} U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note 253, at 6.
\end{itemize}
lender to borrowers with down payments of less than 20 percent, lifting its share of mortgage originations to nearly 20 percent” in 2010.\(^{256}\)

This dramatic increase in market share was soon followed by an equally dramatic increase in defaults and foreclosures on FHA mortgages.\(^{257}\) This poor performance resulted from bad programs, such as the American Dream Downpayment initiative, as well as from the general meltdown of the housing markets in the late 2000s. As a result, it was expected that the FHA’s massive MMI fund was “unlikely to meet its statutory capital requirements by the end of” the 2009 fiscal year.\(^{258}\) It soon appeared that the MMI Fund was in great distress, “[a]ll of the annual books-of-business from 2000 through 2008 are expected to result in net losses over the life of the loan guarantees, but the largest losses will be from the 2004-2008 books.”\(^{259}\) The Gyourko and Aragon studies discussed above offer detailed, depressing prognoses for the MMI Fund.\(^{260}\)

While the FHA was riding this rollercoaster, the PMI industry was on one of its own. The industry peaked in 2003, and then shrank dramatically as a result of the Subprime Crisis.\(^{261}\) Some firms went into bankruptcy because of mounting claims on defaulting mortgages and


\(^{257}\) Ferullo & Joyce, supra note 252.


\(^{260}\) See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.

some were barred by their regulators from selling new policies.262 Indeed, the industry was considered to be “crippled” by the crisis, being hit by the financial equivalent of a hurricane.263 As the housing markets recovered, so did the industry,264 but they were not able to support the housing market during the crisis in the way that the government-backed FHA was able to.

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 barred the FHA from insuring mortgages in transactions involving seller-financed down payment assistance which was at the root of so much of the FHA’s massive losses in the 2000s.265 It also increased the minimum down payment to 3.5 percent.266 And it began tightening its underwriting.267 Finally, Congress authorized the FHA in 2010 to raise its premiums, which also helped to stabilize its financial health.268

For the years 2006-2012, the FHA’s losses as a percent of its total debt outstanding was 17.3%, much higher than Fannie and Freddie’s 3.9% but a bit lower than the private-label MBS sector’s 20.3%.269 The FHA continued to serve first-time and lower-income homebuyers, consistent with its change of focus in its later years. In fiscal year 2011, 75% of FHA purchase-loan endorsements were first-time homebuyers, which was a 5% decline from 2010.270 And in 2011,

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263. Kathleen Pender, supra note 261. For a more nuanced discussion of the effect of the financial crisis on the private mortgage insurance industry, see PROMONTORY FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, supra note 108, at 41-42.

264. Clea Benson & Zachary Tracer, supra note 262.


266. Id.

267. INTEGRATED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, INC., supra note 98, at 3.


59.2% of its insured borrowers were classified as low/moderate income, again reflecting the mission of the modern FHA.  

9. The 2010s: The Reckoning

As the Financial Crisis recedes from memory, the FHA is hailed in heroic terms for expanding so rapidly in the face of the retreat of private capital from the mortgage market. It is also pilloried so mightily for the massive losses it suffered because of its loose underwriting in the early 2000s. These losses resulted in the FHA’s first bailout in its eighty year history.

The FHA began to tighten its underwriting standards after its defaults began to rise.272 Because of its poor financial position, the FHA also raised its premiums.273 The MMI Fund’s financial condition had been poor since 2009, when it failed to meet its required two percent minimum capital ratio; it has not met that requirement since then.274

PMI began to make a comeback in 2010 when it insured 4.3% of all new mortgages.275 By 2013, its market share grew to 11.3%.276 The FHA continued to focus on first-time homebuyers. In 2012, about 78 percent of its loans went to that population and about 32 percent were households of color.277

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This history of the FHA accomplishes a number of goals. First, it demonstrates, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the FHA’s mission was actually many missions from its very start. Second, it demonstrates, again contrary to conventional wisdom, that the FHA added and shed missions over the years, some of which were big successes while others were big failures. Third, it demonstrates the FHA’s ability to rapidly respond to systemic failure in the housing finance market, particularly

271. Id.
274. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 7, Fig. 2.
276. Mike Ferullo, supra note 275.
when compared with the PMI industry. Fourth, it documents the FHA’s very troubled history of discrimination as well as misguided attempts to remedy past discrimination. Finally, and most importantly to this article, it demonstrates the importance of responsible underwriting to the FHA’s success, however one chooses to measure it.

The FHA has an important part to play in the mortgage market but that part is not so clear, given its history. It is clear, at least, that the PMI industry is not capable of taking on all of the roles played by the FHA. The next section addresses a central component of the FHA’s mission: making home ownership available to a broader swath of households. It identifies the flaws that have developed in the FHA’s underwriting of single-family mortgages and how those flaws can be addressed, with the goal of charting a course forward for the FHA as it leaves the Great Recession behind.
III. UNDERWRITING SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP

The modern FHA states that its mission is to serve borrowers that the conventional mortgage market does not serve effectively: “first-time homebuyers, minorities, low-income families and residents of underserved communities.” More concretely, in the midst of the Great Recession, it set performance goals of increasing homeownership opportunities and strengthening communities. For instance, to achieve these goals, the FHA set and exceeded a goal of insuring over 1.4 million single family mortgages in the fiscal year (“FY”) of 2009; set and exceeded a goal of having 73 percent of its single family mortgages go to first-time homebuyers; set and almost achieved its goal of having 33 percent of its single family mortgages go to minority households; set and achieved a goal of having 35 percent of its single family mortgages be in underserved communities.

 Sadly, it does not seem that the FHA gets it. By having homeownership goals drive its underwriting, it is bound to repeat the fiscal calamities of the past. What is needed – what all of the commentators agree upon – is for appropriate underwriting to drive the FHA. This is not to say that promoting homeownership for various groups is not a legitimate goal. It is just to say that if it is not done in a way that avoids frequent default and foreclosure, it can do more harm than good to the FHA itself and the homeowners it serves.

A key element of appropriate underwriting is the down payment requirement, as expressed in the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Indeed, as seen above, there is a strong correlation between low LTV and low default rates over the FHA’s eighty year history. From an underwriting perspective, a twenty percent down payment is great. Down payments have a signaling effect in addition to providing an equity cushion. See DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 132 (stating that down payment “from accumulated savings, investments, retirement funds, or equity in another home sold is generally earned over time” and it “provides a good indication of the applicants’ ability to handle debt and manage their income.”).
very low. But it is very hard for low- and moderate-income families to save enough money in a reasonable amount of time to put together a twenty percent down payment. The median household income in 2013 was $51,939.282 The median house price in 2013 was about $198,000 at the end of 2013.283 It would take quite some time for that median household to save the $33,000 necessary to have a twenty percent down payment on that median house. Also high down payment requirements would have a disproportionate effect on communities of color, which tend to have lower income and less wealth than white households.284 As seen above, there have been periodic pushes to decrease down payment requirements in order to increase homeownership rates, but those pushes have not been accompanied by an evaluation of the sustainability of that increase.

Advocates for low-income communities, lenders and advocates of an “ownership society” have all pushed for much lower down payment requirements, particularly for first time homeowners. This has occurred, most notably, in the late 1960s and late 1990s, but also as veterans returned from World War II. Some of these pushes are accompanied by little thought as to the impact that low down payments have on the likelihood that a household will keep its home over the long term. Others are more thoughtful, and are based on empirical research. Let us dismiss the first set out of hand for there have been a number of low- or no-down-payment initiatives that have been unmitigated failures.285

Let us begin by addressing the criticisms of low-down-payment initiatives. The flaws with the FHA that commentators such as Van

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285. See, e.g. Part II.B.
Order & Yezer and Pinto have identified are almost completely flaws of ultra-low or no-down payment initiatives. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater, their prescription is to end innovative homeownership programs. Instead, the focus should be on the predictors of default, and in particular, the scholarly literature regarding the relationship between low down payments and default. It is clear that the FHA (and the VA) has had success with relatively small down payments at times as have other entities such as the Self-Help Credit Union.  

Much of the down payment literature is focused on how lowering down payment requirements increases homeownership rates. But there is also a substantial body of literature that indicates that no down payment and low down payment mortgages are much more likely to default than mortgages with larger down payments. One article by Austin Kelly stands out for studying mortgage default rates where the borrower has made no down payment. It confirms what seems intuitive: “borrowers who provide even modest down payments from their own resources have substantially lower default propensities than do borrowers whose down payments come from relatives, government agencies, or nonprofits.” This finding – that “skin in the game” reduces defaults – implies that the borrower will assess the risk of purchasing a home more carefully if their own capital is at risk and will fight harder to keep her house in order to protect that capital. Otherwise a home purchase looks more like a long-term lease with an option to purchase should prices rise.

286. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 150 (noting that Congress lowered down payment to three percent in some cases in 1950s); UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON HOMEOWNERSHIP (Policy Brief, undated), available at http://ccc.sites.unc.edu/files/2013/02/Setting-Record-StraightHO.pdf (studying Self Help Credit Union Community Advantage Program portfolio of 46,000 home-purchase mortgages over ten year period); ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., REGAINING THE DREAM: HOW TO RENEW THE PROMISE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES (2011).  


288. For a somewhat dated survey of the literature, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-194, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP FHA MANAGE RISKS FROM NEW MORTGAGE LOAN PRODUCTS 4 (2005). The GAO found that FHA mortgages with LTVs of 97 to 100% had default rates that were “about 1.75 times the average FHA default rate.” Id. at 29.  

The question, of course, is what is the socially optimal level for down payments? No one has answered this question in the context of the FHA, but a body of research about down payments has recently sprung up as various parties have attempted to influence the rulemakings that define “Qualified Mortgages” (“QM”) and “Qualified Residential Mortgages” (“QRM”) pursuant to Dodd-Frank.

The Center for Responsible Lending, an advocate for low- and moderate-income borrowers that also engages in serious research on lending issues, has looked at the question of whether very low down payments are unacceptably risky. It starts out by noting that “it would take the typical family 22 years to save for a 10% down payment and 14 years for a 5% down payment.” In a study of its affiliate-lender’s record of borrower defaults, researchers found that “72% of borrowers made a down payment of less than 5 percent” but they were delinquent less than a quarter the rate of subprime ARM borrowers.

There is some evidence that there is a down payment sweet spot of around five percent at which default rates are within an acceptable range. The Coalition for a Sensible Housing Policy, a coalition of lenders and consumer advocates, argues that:

once you apply the strong underwriting standards in the sample QRM definition, moving from a 5 percent to a 10 percent down payment requirement reduces the overall default experience by an average of only two- to three-tenths

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290. The socially optimal level of down payments may vary, of course, based upon different conditions. For instance, it might be lower during a recession. That is a better issue for an economist, and not this lawyer, to address.


292. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 284, at 1 (emphasis omitted). See DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 132 (“As a general rule, the secondary mortgage market is interested in establishing that an applicant either saved or obtained through housing price appreciation at least 5 percent of the down payment for the mortgage loan.”).

293. UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, supra note 287, at 1; see ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 286 (reviewing experience of Self-Help Credit Union in providing sustainable mortgages for low-income households).

of one percent for each cohort year. However, the increase in the minimum down payment from 5 percent to 10 percent would eliminate from 4 to 7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower rate QRM loan.\textsuperscript{295} The higher requirements would also have a strongly disproportionate effect on communities of color.

Quercia \textit{et al.} have looked at the trade-offs between safe underwriting and access to credit in the context of the QRM rules.\textsuperscript{296} They have also developed a useful metric, which they refer to as a “benefit ratio.” The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to QRM mortgages.” A metric of this sort would go a long way to ensuring that there is transparency for both homeowners and policymakers as to the likelihood that homeowners can pay their mortgages and keep their homes.

Quercia \textit{et al.} would push the optimal down payment size even lower, arguing that “LTVs of 97 percent result in a better benefit ratio, suggesting that a small down payment requirement may have an important protective effect against default risk while still providing broad access to mortgage credit.” They conclude that “restricting the

\textsuperscript{295} Id. at 6; see also Roberto G. Quercia \textit{et al.}, supra note 243 (“we find that imposing a 10 percent downpayment requirement would eliminate 38 percent of performing loans from the QRM market, and that at the 20 percent downpayment threshold, 61 percent would be excluded. . . . imposing a 20 percent downpayment requirement on QM loans would prevent three-quarters of African Americans and 70 percent of Latinos from qualifying for a QRM mortgage, compared with 60 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 51 percent of Asians. Our analysis shows that these borrowers would be excluded from the QRM market even though they could be successful homeowners”).

\textsuperscript{296} Roberto G. Quercia \textit{et al.}, supra note 243.

\textsuperscript{297} Id.

\textsuperscript{298} Id. at 33. They reached this result after examining “the impacts of various proposed QRM underwriting standards on access to credit.” Id. at 4. The authors acknowledge the limits of their study: “this analysis does not model the dynamic nature of mortgage and housing markets, so it is necessarily an incomplete accounting of what may happen under various QRM guidelines. As the recent period taught us, changes in the cost and terms of credit can have a significant impact on mortgage demand and consumer behavior. For some borrowers, the difference in cost between a QRM and non-QRM loan may not limit access to homeownership; instead, it may change their housing cost calculus and either lead them to take out the more expensive, non-QRM mortgage or buy a less expensive house, or it may simply delay their decision to buy a house. For other borrowers, the inability to obtain a QRM-loan may exclude them from the homeownership market entirely. We also don’t model the impact of QRM on housing demand; restrictive thresholds could reduce housing demand, which in turn could reduce house prices further (thereby limiting the ability of current owners to sell their house) and prompt additional foreclosures.” Id. at 5.
origination of risky loan features and underwriting a loan with a consideration of a borrower’s ability to repay has the largest benefit in terms of reducing default risk without limiting access to credit.\textsuperscript{299}

We need to ask some questions before applying this research to the FHA mortgage. The first question is – what are we trying to achieve with FHA underwriting? The second is – what is the best technical way to achieve that goal? And the final question is – what political realities can interfere with that approach? Let us take the three questions in turn.

C. Goals of FHA Underwriting

There are three generally agreed upon goals for FHA underwriting: (a) FHA insurance should not require support from the public fisc; (b) the FHA should use lower-risk eligible borrowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk eligible borrowers; and (c) the class of eligible borrowers should be limited to those with a reasonable likelihood of not defaulting on their loan. These three goals, taken together, reflect a view that the FHA’s long term health depends on it navigating longstanding political debates over the “ownership society,”\textsuperscript{300} wealth redistribution and consumer protection regulation. The debate over the appropriate role of the FHA is often driven by broader ideological agendas, so it would be helpful for those commenting on it to make clear whether they agree or disagree with these three goals. To be clear: I think all three goals are appropriate and politically feasible for the FHA.

The first goal, that FHA insurance should not require support from the public fisc, has been part of the FHA’s mission since it was created.\textsuperscript{301} The FHA’s current financial difficulties have not been sympathetically received in the Capitol. Moreover, the current political environment is one in which there are frequent calls to end Fannie and Freddie resounding in the Capitol after the two companies needed extraordinary support from taxpayers during the Subprime Crisis.\textsuperscript{302} It is

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\textsuperscript{299} Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{300} David Reiss, First Principles for an Effective Federal Housing Policy, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 795 (2010).
\textsuperscript{301} See supra Part II.B.1.
\textsuperscript{302} See, e.g., Jonathan R. Laing, supra note 269, at 21.
\end{flushleft}
hard, in this environment, to imagine a politically feasible alternative to a self-supporting FHA.303

The second goal, that the FHA should use lower-risk eligible borrowers to cross-subsidize higher-risk eligible borrowers, has also been integral to the FHA since its founding.304 Indeed, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund was designed, per its name, to be a form of mutual insurance where policyholders spread the risk of default among themselves. This second goal has also been a relatively non-controversial one, although one could imagine alternatives to it.305

Surprisingly, the third goal – ensuring that borrowers do not default in high numbers – is less of a constant than one might suppose.306 The policy of the FHA was surely to err on the side of low defaults from the 1930s through the 1950s.307 But starting in the 1960s, this approach was loosened up and at times it was implicitly rejected or ignored.308 This was seen with the Section 235 fiasco of the 1970s as well as the American Dream Downpayment Act debacle the 2000s. It appears that households and communities of color are most harmed by such thoughtlessly loose underwriting criteria as they were disproportionately represented among homeowners impacted by the defaults and foreclosures from those failed programs.

History teaches us that the goal of sustainable homeownership should not have been ignored. It should be closely hewed to for the sake

303. Indeed, the FHA’s recent financial troubles, see notes 42-43, make it even less likely that Congress would want to provide for a permanent subsidy for the FHA in the current political environment. See generally STANDARD & POOR’S, U.S. Mortgage Finance Reform Efforts and The Potential Credit Implications (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Events_US/US_FI_Event_Webcast111313_Article4.pdf.  
304. See supra Part II.B.1.  
305. For instance, the FHA could cream only the best credit risks among eligible borrowers and lower their cost of credit even further by lowering the FHA insurance premium that they pay. See Edward Pinto, The FHA Is a Predatory Lender, AEI website (Nov. 20, 2013), available at http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/housing-finance/the-fha-is-a-predatory-lender/ (characterizing original mutual insurance program as something other than cross-subsidization).  
307. See supra II.B.1-3.  
308. See supra II.B.4 et seq.
of the FHA’s viability. It should also be closely hewed to for the sake of FHA-insured borrowers who should be able to rely on FHA underwriting as a signal that they will likely be able to afford their housing payments and keep their homes.

There will always be some percentage of FHA mortgagors who will default on their loans. The key policy question is what the acceptable range of default is over the long term. If the rate is too low, it would imply that some were not given the opportunity to benefit from homeownership. If the rate is too high, it would likely imply that an FHA mortgage was reducing household net worth and having too many negative social impacts on households as families deal with the effects of default, foreclosure and eviction.

There is no objective way to identify the most ideal default rate for FHA mortgages. One might, however, look at the alternatives available to households. Because FHA-eligible households have the option of renting, the benefits and drawbacks of an FHA mortgage to a household should be compared to renting as well as to other mortgage products that might be available to them. Researchers at the UNC Center for Community Capital argue that homeownership beats renting in a number of ways, although their study is drawn from a very limited number of homeowners with mortgages from a particular loan program, Community Advantage Program (“CAP”).309

The UNC researchers find that ownership provides a greater financial cushion than renting for low-income families. Most important for my purposes, they find that the loans in their study “are notable for their high loan-to-value ratios: 97 percent is the typical maximum loan-

309. UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, supra note 286 (studying Community Advantage Program portfolio of 46,000 home-purchase mortgages over ten year period). Having earlier reviewed the relevant literature about the social benefits of homeownership, David Reiss, First Principles for an Effective Federal Housing Policy, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 795 (2010), I am skeptical of such one-sided claims about the value of homeownership, although some studies support a finding that homeownership does have positive financial impacts on households. See, e.g., Christopher E. Herbert et al., Is Homeownership Still an Effective Mans of Building Wealth for Low-Income and Minority Households, in HOMEOWNERSHIP BUILT TO LAST 50-51 (ERIC S. BELSKY et al. eds. 2014) (“there continues to be strong support for the association between owning a home and accumulating wealth.”); ROBERTO G. QUERCIA et al., supra note 243, at 4 (“studies have shown that, over time, homeowners do accumulate more wealth than their renter counterparts”).
to-value ratio, though some programs issue loans all the way up to 103 percent of house value.”310

They conclude that “having received assistance toward one’s down payment and closing costs has no significant effect whatsoever on CAP homeowners’ mortgage performance.”311 The authors of the study note some “important caveats” in their findings that severely limit their generalizability.312

I am cautious of assuming that the FHA’s results with low down payments would be the same as CAP’s given the significant differences between the two programs. But CAP’s results do, at least, suggest that we do not yet know how low down payments can go and still have a socially acceptable level of mortgage defaults.

Combining the UNC study with Quercia et al.’s (also affiliated to UNC) benefit ratio discussed above, we can reasonably identify a range of three to five percent down payments as a starting point for FHA underwriting, and assume that future performance data could push that range lower over time. We can also imagine that a more sophisticated underwriting process could allow for trade-offs among LTV, credit score

310. UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, supra note 286, at 3. Even more striking, “a substantial portion of CAP’s borrowers had help meeting their modest down payment requirements and closing costs: some 38 percent of CAP owners relied on some form of assistance beyond their own savings and assets to buy their homes. Sellers and real estate agents were the source of assistance most frequently cited, followed by family and friends, then grants from community groups, government agencies or other organizations. Two percent of owners used a second mortgage, while another 2 percent used help from a different source altogether. Community grants and loans were particularly important for African American borrowers.” Id.

311. Id. at 4. See generally Allison Freeman, The Continuing Importance of Homeownership: Evidence from the Community Advantage Program, 26 COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS 7, 7-9 (2014) (“CAP is an affordable-loan secondary market program that was created in 1998 in a partnership between Self-Help, Fannie Mae, and the Ford Foundation. The loans in the CAP portfolio are purchase money, 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages. These loans were originated not by brokers, but by banks earning Community Reinvestment Act credit for such investments. The vast majority of loan sin the CAP portfolio were made to lower-income and minority borrowers.”).

312. UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, supra note 286, at 4 (“First, not all owners fared equally well. Some owners who bought late in the cycle in more volatile markets have lost wealth. Second, the experience of the CAP homeowners cannot be generalized to all lower-income borrowers over this same period because the type of financing used is a key determinant of the financial trajectory of investing in a home. All of the owners in the CAP portfolio received fixed-rate, fixed-payment, standardized, competitively priced, long-term mortgages. It is largely due to the durability of their affordable mortgages that CAP’s owners have enjoyed the benefits traditionally associated with homeownership, even against a backdrop of economic upheaval. Borrowers who used costlier, riskier products were not as fortunate and many have lost their homes as a result.”).
and debt-to-income ("DTI") that could push that range even lower for select borrowers.\footnote{High DTI ratios, for instance, may be justified by a variety of mitigating factors, such as a high net worth. \textsc{Dennis} \& \textsc{Pinkowish}, supra note 113, at 136 (listing mitigating factors).}

D. \textbf{THE TECHNICAL APPROACH}

There are two approaches that the FHA could take to achieve its three goals. It could propose a simple, conservative underwriting model that will reduce the likelihood that the FHA would ever need a bailout. Such a model would likely have hard cut offs for down payment size, LTV ratio and credit scores. The problem with this approach is that it is likely to exclude some borrowers who have a reasonable likelihood of not defaulting on their loan. This approach would be consistent with the FHA’s behavior during its early years but it would require a firmer commitment to conservative underwriting criteria than the FHA has shown over the last fifty years.

Alternatively, it could attempt to construct a dynamic default model like those used in the rest of the modern lending industry that attempts to expand access to credit to its reasonable limits. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for instance, both use automated underwriting software to pre-screen loans for eligibility for purchase by the companies.\footnote{David Reiss, \textit{supra} note 1, at 939.} Such an approach risks exposing the FHA to insolvency – and the federal government to liability for another bailout – if the model is pushed too far or if market conditions make the model outdated. It has certainly been a two-edged sword for other lenders that have relied upon it.

This choice between clear and simple rules on the one hand and a flexible set of guidelines on the other is, of course, just a particular example of the classic choice between rules and standards that are at the heart of many policy decisions.\footnote{See generally Isaac Ehrlich \& Richard Posner, \textit{An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking}, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974).} Nonetheless, it poses a hard choice in the specific case. The clear and simple rules may be easy to understand and comply with, but they may be under- and over-inclusive in their application.\footnote{See Colin S. Diver, \textit{The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules}, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 68 (1985) (identifying "transparency, accessibility, and congruence" as aspects of "precise" rules).} The dynamic model would, like a vague standard, be more costly to create and to get buy-in from the regulated parties (the
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A technocrat would favor the latter as it would appear to maximize the social utility of the FHA. A cynical observer of the political scene might not be so sure that such a textured approach could survive for long amid the jockeying of special interests.

E. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

The commentators who have lost faith in the FHA’s ability to stay the course of responsible underwriting have had good reason. Congress has shown itself to put politics ahead of responsible underwriting to disastrous effect. But given the long history of the FHA, it seems the commentators are, perhaps, too pessimistic. Indeed, their aversion to policy experimentation by the FHA is consistent with a broader aversion to government social policy expenditures, an aversion that reverberates in just about every federal election throughout the country in recent years. All social policy can be done irresponsibly. All of it can lose or waste money, have unintended consequences. To my eyes, there is nothing about the FHA that is particularly flawed as an instrument of government action. It is just that it can be abused and is, in fact, occasionally abused – sometimes by Congressional mandate.

This is not to say that we have nothing to learn from the FHA’s critics. The FHA should be constrained from repeating the errors of its past. Odysseus tied himself to the mast of his ship when passing the isle of the Sirens so as to both hear their beautiful song and keep himself from jumping into the wine-dark sea. At the same time he made his sailors plug up their ears with beeswax so that they would not feel the pull of the Sirens’ song and throw themselves into that wine-dark sea. And so Congress could tie itself to a strong underwriting standard by returning to the “economic soundness” standard of the pre-1950s FHA.

It could also mandate that the FHA implement an appropriate benefit ratio through a rulemaking process. The rulemaking would protect the FHA from loose underwriting as the beeswax protected Odysseus’ men. There is, of course, always the risk that Congress would

317. See id. at 73-74.
318. See supra Part I.
319. See supra Part II.B.5.
320. I would contrast my position here with the one I take on the fatally flawed public/private hybrids, Fannie and Freddie. See generally David Reiss, supra note 1 (arguing that they should be terminated).
reverse itself, but – hey – that’s democracy. If Odysseus refuses to bind himself to the mast, there is no one to save him from himself.

And if Congress finds that there are categories of households which are still not adequately accessing the mortgage markets, it would need to increase the cross-subsidy elements of the FHA insurance premium or allocate funds to directly subsidize them. While increasing direct subsidies through Congressional action may be infeasible in the current political environment, increasing cross-subsidies may be done administratively.

The more sophisticated approach to underwriting which looks at the layering of risks like credit score, loan to value ratio, debt to income ratio and other factors may in theory result in a more socially optimal level of lending. Our worries do not disappear, however, just because we undertake a rulemaking that implements a dynamic underwriting standard.

Notwithstanding all of the benefits of a dynamic approach, a measured political analysis might suggest that there is good reason to stick with an easy-to-understand heuristic like a mandatory five percent down payment requirement. Such a requirement is harder for homeowners, lenders and politicians seeking to be “pro-homeowner” to game, in contrast to the dynamic rule. That dynamic rule is always going to be subject to pressures from lenders looking to increase market share and politicians who put pressure on regulated financial institutions to expand access to credit for a variety of politically expedient reasons.

CONCLUSION

The FHA has been a versatile tool of government since it was created in the 1930s, achieving a variety of social purposes through its mortgage insurance programs. But, it can fail when the goals to which it is put are muddled. There is no doubt that today’s FHA is suffering from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many subprime lenders, as well as Fannie and Freddie. They have

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321. Default risk “rises exponentially with each additional high-risk factor in” a loan. DENNIS & PINKOWISH, supra note 113, at 127 (emphasis in the original). This is referred to as “risk stacking” or “risk layering.” See id. Risk-based pricing can also account for compensating factors that reduce risk, such as a demonstrated “ability to accumulate savings.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62.
also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression.

Commentators on the FHA have rightly brought attention to the risks of FHA programs that fail to appropriately underwrite its products. They are right that the FHA needs to be bailed out because of this. These commentators have therefore concluded that the FHA is not particularly good at achieving its social policy objectives. They call for a more limited role for the FHA, one that focuses on liquidity and stability, and leave innovative approaches to expanding homeownership behind.

These commentators do not, however, fully appreciate the extent to which modest down payment requirements and responsible underwriting can drive the success of new FHA initiatives. Central to any analysis of the FHA’s role is an understanding of its policies relating to down payment size. Much of the FHA’s performance is driven by its down payment requirements, which have trended ever downward so that homeowners were able to get loans for 100% of the value of the house in recent years. But as is obvious to all, the larger the down payment, the safer the loan, if everything else is equal.

What has been less obvious to policy makers is that tiny or nonexistent down payments are unacceptably risky. Given that the FHA insures 100% of the losses on its mortgages, the down payment requirement is a key driver of its performance. Empirical researchers should continue to study how low down payment requirements can go while still maintaining an acceptable benefit ratio for FHA mortgages. At this point, a down payment in the range of 3 to 5 percent seems appropriate, but one could contemplate that number being responsibly pushed lower over time, within a rulemaking context. One could also contemplate a sophisticated approach that might allow for lower down payments for those with stronger credit histories or other strengths in their underwriting profiles. This approach would require, however, an underwriting system that was relatively insulated from politics.

It seems too simple to conclude by saying that while it is important to make residential credit broadly available, the FHA will not be doing borrowers any favors if their loans are not sustainable and they end up in default or foreclosure. But simply put, in the past the FHA has not always balanced the goal of access to credit with the goal of
sustainable credit. It should, however, plan on always keeping that balance in mind. In that way, it can make homeownership available to households who could reasonably expect to maintain it over the long term.