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Article
The Non-Robustness of the Nash-Stackelberg-Hybrid Equilibrium
Australian Economic Papers (1988)
  • David Prentice, La Trobe University
  • Hugh Sibly, University of Tasmania
Abstract
In a simple, standard sequential search model, the Nash-Stackelberg-Hybrid equilibrium is shown, in general, to be non-robust when the assumption that all firms are constrained to operate one outlet is dropped. Unless the firms are constrained from increasing the number of outlets or the price, they will open additional outlets to increase their market power. In a standard duopoly model an equilibrium featuring both firms operating multiple outlets is shown to exist.
Keywords
  • Nash-Stackelberg Equilibrium,
  • search
Publication Date
1988
Citation Information
David Prentice and Hugh Sibly. "The Non-Robustness of the Nash-Stackelberg-Hybrid Equilibrium" Australian Economic Papers Vol. 37 Iss. 4 (1988)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_prentice/12/