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Temple, Towers, Shifting Sands: "Greater Truth" in Historical Writing

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Abstract
This paper states two important points, which are combined into one argument. First, it identifies that notions of truth can be found in two seemingly conflicting literatures—“true” historiography and “false” historical fiction. I call this variant of truth a “greater truth,” or historical “truth beyond epistemology” (Kansteiner 47). I argue that such greater truth guides readers toward a much deeper and more complete understanding of history. Additionally, and related to the above, I will examine a fusion of fictional and factual historical writing. I argue that fictional and non-fictional varieties of historical writing are transacting modes in a single patterning. I maintain that “falsity” can complement “fact” in this negotiation, and that traditional historical research is in fact complementary of discursive/composed historical fiction. In this fashion historical fictions can be construed as credible, newly imagined representations of the past that was experienced.

And they will ask, is this the truth? I reply in advance: No, this is not the truth, this is only a small part, a tiny fraction of the truth…. Even the mightiest pen could not depict the whole, real, essential truth.

Stefan Ernest, “The Warsaw Ghetto”

Introduction
In this paper I will examine an intricate, complex topic that might frustrate some readers and intrigue others. My examination argues that the notion of a given brand of truth can be found in two seemingly contrasting literatures—“true” history and “false” historical fiction. I call this variant of truth a “greater truth,” or historical “truth beyond epistemology.” As we study this topic, we will discern a possible fusion of the fictional and the factual in historical writing, which are, in effect, transacting modes in a single paradigm. A full examination of this particular concept would require a book-length study, yet I will endeavor to delineate important parameters. At the highest level, I maintain that we are going to find that, historical fictions, are not some sorts of counterfeit cut-outs portraying whimsical (and of course false) views onto what is not in fact the past, but are in fact credible, newly imagined representations of the past that was experienced, authentically effecting enlarged historical apprehension through a rich fund of psychic and aesthetic relevancies and affiliations that cross over into the writing of actual history.

Truth and Falsity
My analysis in the following will reveal truthful information conveyed in historical novels, which is more perceived and subjective than the rational and objective truth found in traditional historical research. I am espying two brands of truth, the one I will call, to repeat, “greater truth” and the other, to coin a phrase, the historian’s “true truth” (in essence absolute truth, objective
views onto reality). We will find that the two truths, fictional and non-fictional, have the same aim—to relate history—and at their best and most concise may simultaneously yield…*sublime historical experience.*

E.H. Carr once wrote that “The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy,” and even Frank Ankersmit asserted that, “it is in historical writing where an exclusive insistence on truth may result in the ultimate stultification of the discipline and in the answering of questions that no sensible person would bother to ask.” Ankersmit comes closer to describing a range of credible alternatives for truthful apprehension when he writes that “is a variant of experience preceding and transcending questions of truth and falsity,” such that in the end historical experiences are neither true nor false, they “just are.” He continues to broaden this view and adds that once limiting definitions of truth are cast aside, variants of history can lead into a “fluid and uncertain” virtuality that “define[s] the territory in which history and historical writing can thrive.” We thus find ourselves in “the [veritable] territory of historical experience.”

**Historical Objectivity**

Related to the above, the concept of “objectivity” has been at the center of historical inquiry for more than a century. It was through the writings of Leopold von Ranke that the absolute focus on truth and a strict impartiality became the stringent requirement for all historical writing. This idea has proved surprisingly resilient. The disruption of WWI created “a period of negativity and doubt” among historians, who had to scrutinize their cheerleading during the war and associated questions of fairness; associated with this was the rise of a given relativism in historical understanding, and the allowance of greater latitude in the telling of history, in part the result of the fact that “certainties in every realm of thought and culture” (in mathematics, logic, physics, medicine etc.) were subject to newfound doubts. In the post-WW II age, however, relativism was seen as a weak response to totalitarianism, and a move toward uniformity and fundamental values (we could say a return to objectivity) resulted. In the modern age since the 1960s—skeptical, revolutionary, and progressive—the historical field has at times been turned on its head, signaling the end of objectivity proper, leaving the field wide open, with any given approach to historical understanding allowable. Leftist/radical notions have at times dominated, varieties of “new” histories (indigenous groups, minorities, women, groups of workers—“every group is own historian”) have appeared, and quirky notions of postmodern analysis (“textual,” most assuredly anti-objective, and in opposition to the very idea of “universal” history that is true for all times) that called into question “distinctions between fact and value and between theory and observation” were rife. Paul Cohen has written that “Historians…are trapped in a present marked by indeterminacy, and this affects every phase of the process of historical reconstruction in which we are engaged, including what we choose to focus on and emphasize in our assertions about past events.” Novick has called this age a “many-sided crisis,” but surprisingly, the objectivist belief never quite died away, and maintains a relatively strong hold in the field.

**Greater Truth**

I now turn to my main focus, an analysis of “greater truth” as told in historical writing, which embraces conceptions of the “fictional story as an extension of our existing knowledge.” Historical narratives arising from “a different place from the phenomena that actually occurred,” and various “equally plausible versions” of history. First let me turn to Marie-Laure Ryan, who has said of “greater truth:”
There is also a higher truth of fiction, a truth that concerns not statements about particulars (like: Prince Andre fought against Napoleon), but a truth inherent to general statements (all x). When both the fictional world and the real world have entities of type x, these statements apply (and can be either true or false) in both worlds. This is why Tolstoy’s considerations about history in War and Peace may convey some truth for the real world, as would similar considerations by a historian.\textsuperscript{19}

These greater truths rise above the level of surface detail, for though such detail is important in the telling of history, at its most profound, narrated history is much more than catalogs, schedules, annals, lists or gazetteers, divorced from context. J.H. Hexter put it nicely when he wrote, “the exploration of truth values in historical discourse requires the examination of large historical texts and contexts and not just of minute fragments.”\textsuperscript{20} These larger (greater) texts and contexts achieve a higher (greater) significance and “give us insight into, […] reveal or disclose, something of importance about what human life, or therefore reality as it is humanly experienced, is ‘really like.’”\textsuperscript{21} Such insights were also reflected by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche when he wrote that “[History’s] real value lies in inventing ingenious variations on a probably commonplace theme, in raising the popular melody to the universal symbol and showing what a world of depth, power and beauty exists in it.”\textsuperscript{22} Interestingly, though this effort depends on “the loving study of the data of experience”\textsuperscript{23} it also entails a greater aesthetic vim and vigor and requires “above all a great artistic faculty, a creative vision from a height, […] the free elaborating of a given type-objectivity.”\textsuperscript{24}

To examine one given “greater truth” in the telling of history, I propose to examine the idea of the “spirit of the age” (zeitgeist, or weltanschauung) of a historical era. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, in Hitler’s Willing Executioners, argues that a spirit of the age, constructed and disseminated in German culture for decades prior to WWII, literally determined German thought and attitudes during this time. The spirit of the age of a society, Goldhagen writes, is conditioned by way of “cognitive models” and a combined overall view of the “macro, the meso, and the micro” constituents of understanding and behavior, which “serve to structure every society’s conversation.”\textsuperscript{25} These world-views are such that “a society’s members automatically incorporate [their] features into the organization of their minds, into the fundamental axioms that they use (consciously or unconsciously) in perceiving, understanding, analyzing and responding to all social phenomena.”\textsuperscript{26} Animated by this “common guide to action,”\textsuperscript{27} peoples and nations become what they are, believe what they believe, do what they do, say what they say.

Fictionalized history, we will find, is in a particularly good position to evoke such “spirit” and speak to other more specific greater truths about historical conditions, actions and figures. Pause here to consider how it is both this “larger” take on a society’s complexion, and the smaller details about historical personages (every sensory detail about them down to the flick of an eye, their manner of speaking and the words they uttered, their interaction with others, their beliefs and thoughts, their emotions and veritable awareness) that give us a complete picture of history.

Take one example from Gore Vidal’s Lincoln: A Novel. Through Vidal we enter into the mind of Secretary of State William Seward, with these more personal moves perfectly poised alongside a historical expert’s empirical knowledge and interpretation. The combination here yields an ideal of the merger of the fictional and the factual in historical writing. Seward ponders in amazement Lincoln’s adept dismissal of a group of senators who had brashly attempted to argue against the president’s position on the recently passed 1863 Conscription Act. The consideration of Lincoln’s towering political genius within the “irony of the moment”\textsuperscript{28} in this passage evokes Lukács’s “derivation of the individuality of characters from the historical peculiarity of their age,”\textsuperscript{29} and becomes something greater indeed in historical narration:
Seward felt an involuntary shudder in his limbs. He was also ravished by the irony of the moment. For nearly three years, a thousand voices, including his own, had called for a Cromwell, a dictator, a despot; and in all that time, no one had suspected that there had been from the beginning, a single-minded dictator in the White House a Lord Protector of the Union by whose will alone the war had been prosecuted. For the first time Seward understood the nature of Lincoln’s political genius. He had been able to make himself absolute dictator without ever letting anyone suspect that he was anything more than a joking, timid backwoods lawyer, given to fits of humility in the presence of all the strutting military and political peacocks that flocked about him.30

In a more traditionally focused way, James McPherson wrote of Lincoln’s brilliance in articulating Union war aims, which were issued in effectively “pithy prose.”31 Skillfully reaching high and low, Lincoln could speak like both that “backwoods lawyer” referred to above, and a near-progressive statesman, expressing that the war was “essentially a people’s contest...a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men...to afford all an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life.”32 To be sure Lincoln was seen in the U.S. as a self-made man “who by dint of ‘industry, prudence, perseverance, and good economy’” had made his mark, as Seward had seen in Lincoln in above.33

I believe Hans Gadamer’s analysis in Truth and Method will provide insight here. “Art is knowledge and experiencing an artwork means sharing in that knowledge” wrote Gadamer.34 This unique knowledge becomes no less than artistic (or aesthetic) truth, which prompted Gadamer to ask “Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior to it?”.35 In Gadamer’s richly realized world of aesthetic experience and verity the answer was a resounding “yes,” and such truth “go[es] beyond the range of methodical [scientific/historical] knowledge,”36 and we find this actuality “rising to the universal, distancing from the particularity of immediate acceptance or rejection, respecting what does not correspond to one’s own expectation or preference.”37 These aestheticized conditions may initially have a touch of the indefinite about them—“all encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an unfinished event” wrote Gadamer—but in their consummation (in historical writing) they take on a decidedly concrete new reality, veritably supplementing, bolstering and ultimately perfecting original reality.38 Ankersmit distills Gadamer’s thought to its essence, and highlights how this process results in something “greater” than that originally encountered. We find that representation “has, from an ontological point of view, the same status as what is represented by it,” and with this substantial bedrock of existence in place, historical writings can “express a truth about the world, that is, about what the work of art represents, that would not be available to us in the absence of the work of art.”39

Problems History

But what of problematic historical thinking and writing, such as that of revisionist historians, authors of false holocaust accounts and the likes of The Turner Diaries by William Luther Pierce? These works are far from “great,” and we may need a method that will allow us to distinguish the credible from the misleading. This point takes on added complexity when we consider how and whether any given author is conveying true history, or something else—perhaps that which is subjectively tainted (perhaps not outwardly false, but subject to undue interference by the author). And what are the differences between primary-source novelists (Erich Maria Remarque) and secondary-source novelists (Gore Vidal)? I warrant that rational, decent people are able to depend on themselves to determine the value of the history they read. To be sure, most people can discern the difference between James McPherson and William Luther Pierce.
Revisionist holocaust histories claim to be *actual histories*, while historical novels in the main are written as *virtual fictions*, and on this basis we may reject the one and accept the other—with charges of credibility or incredibility based on how we interpret these two narrative formats and their content. In this sense, the revisionist history is *not in fact history*, as it claims, and is dismissed. The historical novel is just what it says it is, and can be accepted on its own terms. Here our two terms, fiction and non-fiction, which I have attempted to bring closer together, seem to be diverging. There are definite standards of material truth and falsity that apply to all works, but particularly to non-fiction histories, which if they fail to meet will result in their dismissal. And we can say the same for historical novels. These baseline standards of truth and factuality generally have to be met (and virtually any skilled historical novelist will append to his or her work a statement about the truth and accuracy of his or her research and composition). Once these standards are met there is room for interpretation, and we will find different works presenting somewhat different, sometimes radically different “versions” of history. And what of these versions? James M. McPherson writes “revision is the lifeblood of historical scholarship” and “a legitimate and essential activity of historians.”40 “The unending quest of historians for understanding the past,” he continues, “is ‘revisionism,’ and that is what makes history vital and meaningful.”41 I would venture that few readers are likely to give much credence to demonstrably false histories, but with McPherson’s words in mind we again see the sliding scale of truthfulness, with its varying contours, making our decisions about truth in history yet more complicated. In these lights we are more likely to label the revisionist Holocaust histories “fiction” then we would, say, Elie Weisel’s *Night*. In a work like Weisel’s we find that we cannot easily shore truth away, leaving us with something that is “only fiction,” and therefore wholly different from historiography. From here we recognize again that the truths in historical novels are taken up *as truthful* by readers, and that high-quality fictional and non-fictional histories are back on even ground. Again, the demonstrably false have been dismissed, but what of that breed of historical writing that is somewhat true (in the various ways that it is possible to be true), but which we denounce and reject, based on its message or interpretations? In all of this we may be espying a difference or a shifting relationship between *fact* and *truth*. Both Holocaust deniers and historical novelists may present a good number of *facts* in their writing. As well, they may both claim to be conveying *truth*. When we examine their works, we may make a judgment on the value of both of these claims—are their facts actual, generally agreed upon, and obtained by valid research? Or are they manipulated or distorted (or perhaps not facts at all)? And based on the (actual) facts in a work, are the situational and/or greater truths conveyed by the works *really true* (as Truman Capote asked in his *Music for Chameleons*)?32 Are the interpretations valid? Any historical novelist, as much as any historian, could compose a work that is revisionist and distasteful, and we could dismiss such a work as “just a novel” (and thus untrue) and wash our hands of the matter (the distasteful revisionist history would be subject to a good bit more detailed analysis and attack, and cannot be lightly dismissed, because it claims to be true history). But, in terms of the historical novel, I do not think this would be a wholly effective reply—not least in terms of the claims I have made in this study about the content of truth and its subsequent apprehension, which as noted the negative and unethical revisionists might latch onto and apply in their works. It appears that rather than judgments based on these values, we must make determinations on moral and ethical grounds. Such determinations the majority of sane, sound readers of history do indeed make—rejecting negative historical revisionism and biased and bigoted histories as failures on just these grounds, whatever factuality and/or truth they may contain. This matter is made more complex when a distasteful work is judged to *in fact be true* (or perhaps largely true)—and then we would find that we have to accept it in some ways, however unwillingly. Our values of truth and our ethical lives could be in conflict here, and truth might well force us to modify our ethics, if no doubt hesitantly. I
suspect that cases like this are relatively rare, however, and it appears that the bulk of judgments we make are going to stem less from our judgments about truth, falsity and factuality, and more from conditions of a community ethic, conditions that will require us to make judgments based on community mores and ethical values, such that they become the chief standards by way of which we judge the value of a work, and whether we will banish, forbid or simply dismiss certain historical communication, interpretations and claims. In sum, we would banish a vile, corrupt or harmful fiction based on moral and ethical standards, even though it is only fiction, and should conceivably then be harmless (but of course it is not harmless, and could carry any manner of weight and substance for different readers). Along these lines, and as noted, to be sure we dismiss corrupt, biased or vilely revisionist histories—even if much in them is true—and in fact we doubly dismiss them, on both moral/ethical grounds, and in that they are “mere fictions” (though they claim to be true).

These are complicated issues, but in short, we have standards, we are not entirely relativistic, and we do not welcome all comers to our historical universe, some such comers who threaten to bleed history white, or worse, stain it with blood. Yes, there will be different standards in these areas, perhaps widely different standards all around the world—I cannot consider all the cultural, moral and ethical possibilities here, and for my part will limit my determinations to liberal, humane values. I hope I have given some insight into the questions raised above, and now return to my principal analysis.

Greater Truths Redux

I have emphasized truths of genuine importance in human life, evinced and expounded by historical agents in realistic settings based on actual and interpreted historical knowledge, with the aim of credibly augmenting historical apprehension. Marie-Laure Ryan has broadly labeled this conception of truth as “literary truth,” which “typically invoke[s] the general, the abstract, the spiritual, and the existential. Suitable subject matters are Love, Death, the Meaning of Life, the Struggle of Good against Evil in the Human Soul, Moral Responsibility, […] the Nature of Language, Truth, Knowledge, and Art.”43 For Ryan, literary truth is transportable to the real world,44 indicating how truths evinced in fictions have actuality and applicability. The knowledge we obtain from historical novels goes beyond the empirical and toward the figurative, the abstract, enabling historical fiction writers to “rearrange[e] experience in artful ways,” and endeavor “to tell us in small ways the symbolic significance of what actually happened.” Here the opportunity arises for fiction to step in and take up the slack and fill in the lost details and “address the really important moral and political questions that generally escape social-scientific scrutiny,”45 Note here, for example, that much of the power and value of Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels stems from how it “managed to capture the essence of the [American Civil War], the divided friendships, the madness and the heroism of fratricidal conflict.”46 Shaara himself shaped some of these conceptions, by way of the thoughts and words of the brothers Tom and Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, on the Gettysburg battlefield:

Tom said, “When you ask them prisoners, they never talk about slavery. But, Lawrence, how do you explain that? What else is the war about?”

Out in the field they were laying out bodies, row after row, the feet all even and the toes pointing upward like rows of black leaves on the border of a garden. He saw again the bitter face of Kilrain, but Chamberlain did not hate the gentlemen, could not think of them as gentlemen. He felt instead an extraordinary admiration. It was as if they were his own men who had come up the hill and he had been with them as they came, and he had made it across the stone wall to victory, but they had died. He felt a violent pity. He said slowly, in memory of Kilrain, “Well, they’re all equal now.”47
Erich Maria Remarque’s *All Quiet on the Western Front* contains many poetic reflections on war’s greater meaning and impact, and they are no doubt a principal source of the book’s greatness. Passages like the following evince “greater” reflections on the hateful war violence that destroyed youthful lives, the agonizing ambiguities that haunted soldiers, and the demolition of values that during and after the war “belong to another world that is gone from us.”

The sum of Remarque’s experience, as we all know, was the “annihilation of all human feelings,” and that “life is at an end.”

The following also evinces *All Quiet on the Western Front’s* greater humanitarian understanding and valuable historical truth. As Paul Bäumer gazes at groups of forlorn Russian prisoners in Germany, he contemplates:

> I see their dark forms, their beards move in the wind. I know nothing of them except that they are prisoners, and that is exactly what troubles me. Their life is obscure and guiltless;—if I know more of them, what their names are, how they live, what they are waiting for, what are their burdens, then my emotion would have an object and might become sympathy. But as it is I perceive behind them only the suffering of the creature, the awful melancholy of life and the pitilessness of men.

Shaara’s *The Killer Angels*, like *All Quiet on the Western Front*, is firmly anti-war through the “greater truths” it seeks to excavate. Shaara at one point writes how Robert E. Lee sadly pondered death during wartime, and how “We are never prepared for so many to die.” Lee continues even more philosophically and metaphorically “We expect an occasional empty chair, a toast to dear departed comrades. Victory celebrations for most of us, a hallowed death for a few. But the war goes on. And the men die. The price gets ever higher.”

James McPherson’s work, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, may be somewhat more impartial in this respect, but the book nevertheless leans in such a direction. McPherson frequently comments on the devastating consequences of the conflict. McPherson subtly censured that warrior of warriors, Robert E. Lee, who though he may have been “the very model of a Christian gentleman,” also effected “great cost” with his “daring, aggressive” attacks. McPherson also wrote of one of the war’s other grim manifestations that “the uncounted deaths of white and black civilians from disease and malnutrition […] must be included in any reckoning of the war’s human cost.” McPherson writes that Americans who lived through the Civil war had “lived through an experience in which time and consciousness took on new dimensions.”

> György Lukács posited fictionalized “historical social types” that could become the “embodiment” of “the most important stages” (we might also say “spirits of the age”) of history, capturing history “superbly, straightforwardly” and “pregnantly.” He continued that,

> What matters therefore in the historical novel is not the re-telling of great historical events, but the poetic awakening of the people who figured in those events. What matters is that we should re-experience the social and human motives which led men to think, feel and act just as they did in historical reality.

Readers of history might discover that “credible historical representations”—in which I include fictionalized representations, with their own brands of credibility—“offer defensible (though not of course univocal or unimpeachable) answers to the question ‘What then have we done?’” We ask, what then have we done, indeed? and Smith answers: We have lived “this general kind of life, our kind.” We find here a greater (though Smith said simply “general”) interpretation that, I posit, comprises the greater truths in historical writing that I have been discussing. What will ultimately emerge through the pens of historical writers is an “appearance of absoluteness” with such “absoluteness,” I again posit, pointing toward the greater truths that historical fiction discovers, fashions and then contributes into the historical dialog.
Historical fictions in this way can literally “lay claim to a ‘higher’ objectivity,” and the imagined circumstances in carefully researched and constructed historical novels are able to expose the “Truth of passions, verisimilitude of feelings,” and “the great collisions, the great crises and turning points in history.” William Styron, commenting in a different forum, wrote that in order to “reproduce the spirit of an age faithfully and authentically […] the necessities of always-questionable ‘fact’ often become subsumed into a larger truth.” Lukács wrote in an exactly similar fashion that the historical fiction writer—by way of “deep and genuine knowledge”—will be able to “freely” “move about inside his subject” and in turn be “less tied” to “individual historical data.” Such a disposition enables writers to be “closely bound to the specifically historical, individual moments of a period,” and by treating historical fact with a given “freedom” novelists can capture “historical faithfulness.”

Conclusion

My aim in this work has been to examine a sourcing and alignment of historical truth claims that does not always strictly “correspond” to positivistic existence, but rather “coheres” apprehension and understanding in certain “greater,” encompassing and elevated ways. In a word, we find that our intersubjective apprehension and associated validity claims in historical writing are comprised “not only of descriptions that make claims about the world (the data), but also of statements that interpret or generalize these claims” into larger realms, such that in terms of our discrimination and interpretation among these discourses and views onto experience, “the former [claims about data] are evaluated in terms of their accuracy with respect to the facts, the latter [interpretations, generalizations] on the basis of their coherence with respect to the data.” The correspondent and the coherent exist in conjunction, and we will find that they often transact, align, condition, support and even “interrogate” one another on their road toward greater truth told in historical writing.

I have as well examined an overall imaginative and cognitive dialog, a hybrid heteroglot and wealth of ideas, beliefs and points of view, a veritable “multiplicity of […] voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships.” This multiplicity, of course, is found in fictional and non-fictional historical writings, which transact in all the ways I have described throughout this paper. And yet again I say: we see here greater truths, which are in effect what truly matter in the telling of history. These truths take us beyond the specific and particular, the minute fragments, the explicit details, toward a deeper and broader understanding of experience, of its impact and importance. Here we encounter meaning that reaches a higher plane, in which we find ourselves transacting with what we have been and are, reaching across time and intercalating our past into our present and anticipated future, allowing that which was greater to constitute (narrate, we would say in terms of historical writing) what will be greater.

In closing, and to extend our view outward just a touch, Peter Munz has written that, “there is neither complete fiction nor complete reality in any narrative. […] Total fiction is as inconceivable as total realism. […] All narratives have actuality; the difference between them is a difference in the kind of actuality they have and that difference, as we have seen, is only a matter of degree.” My analysis points to a greater “degree” in historical writings—both historical fiction and historiography, proper—leading us to a greater view onto, a greater association with, a greater embodiment in, a greater feeling for, and a greater experience of our history.

Short Biography

David Russell Pendery grew up in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He received his BA in International Relations from San Francisco State University and his MS in Journalism from Boston.
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Notes

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1 Kansteiner 47.
2 From Frank Ankersmit.
3 Carr 12.
4 Ankersmit 313.
5 Ankersmit 9.
6 Ankersmit 233, emphasis in original.
7 Ankersmit 262.
8 Ankersmit 262.
9 This is not to say that history was not sometimes considered a form of literature since the 1900s, an art form with associated freedom to maneuver, but in the spirit of that age also linked back to strict objectivity. In this respect, “gentleman historians” produced (not always) well-regarded works, while the likes of Flaubert wrote fictions that he described as modeled on scientific objectivity, and to be sure “history as narrative” began its long and mostly approved of life.

10 Novick 281.
11 Novick 134.
12 Novick 469.
13 Novick 523.
14 Cohen 10.
15 621–622.
16 Searle 79.
17 Jenkins 116.
18 Jenkins 118.
19 Ryan, personal communication with author.
20 Hexter 275.
21 Falck 108. I have slightly reworded Falck’s quote, in no way changing his meaning.
22 Nietzsche 39.
23 Nietzsche 29.
24 Nietzsche 39.
25 Goldhagen 33, 399, 33.
26 Goldhagen 33–34.
27 Goldhagen 400.
28 From Vidal, just below in text.
29 Lukács19.
30 Lukács 460.
31 McPherson 309.
32 McPherson 549.
33 McPherson 28.
34 Gadamer 84.
35 Gadamer 84.
36 Gadamer xxii.
37 Gadamer 73.
38 Gadamer 85, emphasis in original.
Both Ankersmit 204. I warrant that we can class both traditional historical research and historical fiction as “works of art,” per Ankersmit.

McPherson, “Revisionist Historians” para. 2, 5.

McPherson, “Revisionist Historians” para. 2; this quote has been very slightly reworded.

Capote xvii.

Ryan 825.

Ryan 825.

Kansteiner 48.

Historian Stephen B. Oates, from the inner cover of The Killer Angels, indicating a given spirit of the age.

Shaara 343–344.

Remarque 121.

Remarque 196.

Remarque 135.

Remarque 195.

Shaara 192.

Shaara 191–192.

Both McPherson 472.

McPherson 619.

McPherson viii.

Lukács 35.

Lukács 42.

Smith 11, emphasis in original.

10, emphasis in original.

Munz 35.

Munz 103.

György Lukács, quoting Alexander Pushkin, in The Historical Novel, 166.

William Styron in Ellison 151.

Styron, “Defending Nat Turner” para. 6, 5.

Lukács 167.

Lukács 167 and passim.

Ryan 823.

From Ryan 823.

I borrow liberally from Bakhtin 263 and passim.

Munz 147.

Bibliography


