In contemporary American politics, partisanship is frequently characterized as excessive, even if some aspects of partisanship may fundamentally characterize the U.S. political system. To reduce partisanship in the process of drawing political districts, independent redistricting commissions and related forms of de-politicized systems for redistricting have been implemented in some states. This paper analyzes whether the presence of relatively independent redistricting also reduces partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional representatives elected from the relevant redefined districts. Contrary to the initial expectations of the authors, the evidence reviewed here suggests that politically independent redistricting seems to reduce partisanship in the voting behavior of congressional delegations from affected states in statistically significant ways. The authors conclude with notes about the study’s implications for further research into redistricting and partisanship.
- independent redistricting
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_oedel/1/