APPRECIATING THE WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DOING SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract

Advocates of Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) and the liberal arts share the same goal: cultivation of “agile, adaptive, and innovative” people. Yet, the Army does not have an implementation plan for cultivating these attributes, and its Professional Military Education (PME) institutions do not offer an expansive liberal arts education. Given the contemporary operational environment, any plan to develop critical and creative thinkers must include an appreciation of complex socio-political dynamics. I propose a course of study that moves the Army closer to ALDS’s and liberal-arts advocates’ aims. I develop a framework comprising nine International Relations (IR) concepts that is applicable not only to “geo-political” analysis, but to understanding local dynamics as well.

Introduction

The last 12 years of conflict has given the military a tremendous appreciation for the concept of complexity and its effect on the operational environment.1 This appreciation for complexity influences doctrine, training, and has spurred an ongoing debate over how to best prepare commanders, leaders, and soldiers to operate within uncertainty.2 Doctrinally, the Army embraced design methodology as a centerpiece of its planning and operations to provide commanders and staffs a tool to grasp, understand and operate within complex environments.3 It also pushed commanders and staffs to no longer treat planning and execution as a linear process driven solely by the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), but rather an iterative process driven by the commander through the concepts of: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.4

The Army’s desire to develop better approaches to handle the strains of complexity affects the Army’s education system, with the creation of new courses and the addition of curriculum into existing courses focused on preparing soldiers to better operate in complex environments.5 The establishment of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Red Team School and the increased number of officers admitted to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) are two examples of a recognized need to develop officers’ creative and critical thinking skills in response to the complex operational environment.6 These schools are widely regarded for their work in developing officers intellectually, and the value its graduates bring back to their units is widely recognized.7 By updating its doctrine and increasing enrollment at specialized schools, the Army has made advancements in preparing for complex operational environments. Although important additions, only a small portion of the officer population will attend these institutions, and while valuable, the acknowledgement and inclusion of complexity in doctrine is insufficient to prepare officers to face the operational environment.

Recognizing a need to educate Army leaders and provide them with the intellectual skills necessary to succeed in the operational environment, the Army published The Leader Development Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (ALDS). The document states the Army must “raise the bar” on education in order to prepare leaders for complexities in the operational environment that arise from ethnic and societal differences.8 The strategy “seeks to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders” who are prepared to operate at the national level, “across the spectrum of conflict,”9 within the interagency arena, and among peoples and cultures that are drastically different than their own.9 Regarding mid-grade leaders, ALDS states they must continue their personal development, while

3The Design Methodology has a chapter in FM 5-0, The Operations Process, and is included in FM 3-0, Operations, and APD 3-0, Unified Land Operations. These are just a handful of the prominent doctrine in which it is included.
9Ibid., 8.
also “developing subordinates in geo-political and cultural awareness.”10 Most notably, the document says the responsibility for individual leader development resides with both the institution and the individual.11

The document clearly lays out the importance of leaders being creative and critical thinkers who possess the ability to operate in ambiguous and complex environments, but the strategy speaks in broad terms and does not layout a more nuanced approach in tackling this endeavor. Although the Army is highly proficient at creating technically and tactically competent leaders, the strategy’s call to develop mid-grade officers who can educate themselves and their subordinates in “geo-politics” and “cultural awareness” requires the Army and the individual to look beyond the Army’s cloistered environment.12 The nature of critical thinking, creative thinking, and complexity make the topics difficult to instruct, particularly in a military culture that prides itself on processes, simple models and formulaic approaches. The idea of following a simple step-by-step flowchart or multiple step process seems antithetical to developing leaders who are not cognitively bound to pre-established barriers.13 Although flowcharts, processes, and checklists are important for the technical or procedural aspects of the military profession, the overdependence on these devices does not lend well to critical and creative thinking.14

While it is easy to critique some methods that have been embraced to teach mid-careerists to deal with complexity, developing an effective alternative approach is not as simple. How does an institution built on discipline and “dress right dress” approaches instill in its leaders an appreciation for diverse and alternative ways of thinking in order to deal with complexity? One possible resource the Army can leverage to help develop leaders’ cognitive abilities to face complexity is the liberal arts.

The liberal arts have long been valued for their ability to enhance individual cognitive skills that are in line with attributes ALDS is looking to develop in its leaders. Arthur Holmes argues that a liberal arts education provides the individual with attributes similar to ALDS when he posits that liberal arts enables the individual to reflect on past experiences, understand how vastly different views shape the world, and helps them become more comfortable with ambiguity.15

The value of a liberal arts education has also been cited by prestigious military leaders as a valuable asset for soldiers. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower opined on the benefits of leveraging liberal arts in 1948 when he argued that “no one could emerge from the experience of the last war without a most profound respect for the contribution to victory made by men trained in the liberal arts.” Eisenhower argued that soldiers trained in the liberal arts have a better grasp of forces shaping the world and a leader’s responsibility was not only to perfect his technical military skills, but to develop those skills which give him a better understanding of the forces that shape where he implements those skills.16 More recently, General David Petraeus recalled how he reflected on his liberal arts education at Princeton while serving as the 101st Airborne Commander in Mosul, Iraq. According to General Petraeus, his international relations and economics education allowed him to not only better understand the operational environment, but use his knowledge to improve the environment and convey his understanding to others.17

Although ALDS identifies specific attributes soldiers must possess, and liberal arts education has been shown to instill these attributes, the question remains: How do we provide this education to the broad mid-careerist population? Current fiscal constraints and the time required to provide all officers a liberal arts education is cost prohibitive. Recognizing these limitations, the Army must look at other approaches to distill the richness of liberal arts into essential elements mid-careerists can use to better appreciate socio-political dynamics within the operational environment. It is my contention that international relations theory provides one such avenue.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a framework consisting of concepts drawn from international relations theory that can be leveraged by mid-careerists to better appreciate the complex operational environment. The framework complements existing doctrinal concepts and serves as a starting point for mid-careerists to explore the operational environment’s socio-political dynamics. The framework’s concepts expose surface area for further exploration, thus enabling a collaborative discussion amongst staff officers and commanders.

I propose leveraging the current Intermediate Level Education (ILE) international relations curriculum as a platform to introduce this framework. The framework complements existing curriculum, but enhances its value by demonstrating how

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10Ibid., 13.
11Ibid., 10.
12Department of the Army, “ALDS,” 12.
14Ibid.
16Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Vandergrift, 34-38.
17Petraeus.
international relations concepts have applicability beyond the traditional nation-state context. This enables instructors to link concepts taught within the international relations theory block to other blocks of instruction such as design or practical application exercises. Introducing the framework and its concepts can increase a mid-careerist’s understanding of political dynamics present in the operational environment and move closer to instilling the attributes the ALDS seeks.18

This education is important to supplement changes in doctrine. Although Army design doctrine now provides leaders a methodology to help deal with complex problems, it does not provide all the tools necessary for the individual to explore and better understand complexity. Appreciating the operational environment requires a soldier to understand structures, institutions, and narratives, the same political dynamics that are discussed in international relations theory. International relations theories might be focused at the state level, but their explanatory value can shed light on local dynamics within the operational environment. The case study in Section 4 is intended as a demonstration of how the concepts can be applied by the mid-careerist to understand the complex operational environment, while supplementing current doctrinal concepts. It is also intended as an easily accessible primer for the mid-careerist to understand and explore these important concepts.

The paper encourages mid-careerists to individually pursue international relations and other relevant liberal arts subjects to develop a greater appreciation for the local dynamics they encounter. The ALDS clearly states that life-long education is the responsibility of the institution and the individual.19 It is my hope that by demonstrating how concepts and theories drawn from one field of liberal arts can shed light on the complex operational environment, other soldiers will be encouraged to seek out tools within this rich academic tradition.

International Relations theory is a particularly valuable discipline because it is influenced by other liberal arts disciplines such as history, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy.20 The diversity and richness of international relations theory makes it an exceptional platform to introduce mid-careerists to concepts that explain the socio-political dynamics within the operational environment. Although traditionally applied to international affairs, its explanatory concepts can be used to better understand socio-political dynamics at any level. A collaborative application of the three primary international relations theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) provides an appreciation of the complexity of the world and the role narratives, structures, individuals, and ideas play in shaping reality.21

International relations theory, individually pursued or institutionally provided, goes a long way in developing critical and creative thinkers who have a better appreciation for complexity, a richer understanding of local dynamics, and are knowledgeable about America’s effect on the operational environment. The richness of international relations theory and the manner in which it lends itself to cross-discipline exploration can help develop thinkers who appreciate the nuances and diversity of the world around them.

Considering the fiscal constraints of further expanding specialized schools, the Army has to look for creative ways it can leverage its current educational curriculum to prepare the broader mid-career officer population for complexity.22 One possible avenue to develop mid-careerists’ attributes focused on understanding socio-political dynamics is through ILE’s international relations curriculum. The ILE program educates nearly 100 percent of mid-career officers and has a mission to “educate and train intermediate officers prepared to operate in full spectrum Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments as field grade commanders and staff officers.”23 An officer normally has 10 years of military service and a broad range of duty positions when they attend ILE, giving them a solid appreciation for the institutional Army and its culture. More importantly, upon graduation, the ILE student will enter positions of greater responsibility, positions that require an application of critical and creative thinking skills in order to grasp the complex operational environment and enable them to capably lead soldiers.24

At first glance, the academic reader might perceive the paper to be a simple regurgitation of international relations theory and not putting forth some unique new perspective or argument. Although I am “standing on the shoulder of giants” and exploiting existing theories to provide tools military officers can leverage to better understand the complex operational environment, the level of application and the collaborative approach parts ways with most international relations theorists. The paper takes concepts normally

18Intelllect is one of the three attributes the Army says all leaders should have. See http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5663450 (accessed 24 April 2012).
19Department of the Army, “ALDS,” 10.
20For example, constructivism is based on some sociology principles; realism and constructivism have a psychological bent within their paradigm, political philosophy has influenced all three, and history is regularly used by IR theorists to apply their theories. Also, a review of diplomatic history provides a rich understanding of how these different theories shaped each other and help create an American narrative. Constructivism’s discussion on narratives is also related to anthropology.
21James Der Derian, Critical Practices of International Theory Selected Essays (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008). Der Derian takes an interdisciplinary approach mixing international relations with other disciplines and theories (such as critical theory) to gain a better appreciation of the world’s complexity.
24Department of the Army, “ALDS,” 13. The leadership strategy lays out what type of experience and capabilities the mid-career officer should strive for.
applied to interactions among states and applies them to the socio-political dynamics of the operational environment. This shows the broad applicability of international relations concepts and the exploratory value they provide the mid-careerist.

Despite a handful of academics calling for the collapse of “paradigmatic castles” and doing away with the “isms,” the preponderance of international relations theorists continue to approach the topic in a parochial manner. While there are a variety of reasons why it behooves some academics to take this approach, it is unnecessary and counterproductive for the military officer to get drawn into this debate. Instead of choosing sides in these squabbles, the military officer can use the rigorous work done by all three schools to develop a better understanding of the operational environment through the collaborative application of all their theories.

This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2, “Literature Review,” begins with a review of complexity and complexity science, focusing on its recent influence on military doctrine. The review is important for the reader to gain an understanding of how prevalent the concept of complexity and its perceived effect on the operational environment has become within military doctrine. The literature review then considers the role of education in preparing the officer to face complexity in the operational environment and what type of officer the Army wants to develop to navigate the complex environment. After considering the type of officer the military wants to develop, the paper considers literature on the value of a liberal arts education for mankind and then a narrower focus on how it benefits the military professional. The literature review section ends with a review of voices in academia calling for a more collaborative approach to understand the world. Since a key element of the paper’s liberal arts definition includes a broad education, it is informative to hear those within academia who are arguing for greater interdisciplinary approaches. It is also relevant since an underlying theme in the paper is to encourage an unrestricted and heterogeneous approach to international relations theory in hope of understanding a complicated world unthethered by any paradigmatic biases.

Section 3, “Methodology,” lays out the rationale behind the conceptual framework and the case study. Section 4, “Application,” establishes the conceptual framework that will be applied to the case study. The case study uses concepts from three international relations theories to develop a better appreciation for the dynamics at play during the Gaza settlement removal in summer 2005. The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate how concepts drawn from international relations can illuminate socio-political dynamics at play in the operational environment below the traditional nation-state level where the theories are normally applied. The paper ends with Section 5, Conclusion and Recommendations. This section summarizes the findings, recommends future possible research areas, and offers further insight on how mid-careerists can benefit from the framework and international relations concepts.

**Literature Review**

The influence of complex systems science on military doctrine is a relatively new phenomenon that is largely a result of the last 11 years of conflict. Although most mid-careerists have a general appreciation for Webster’s definition of complexity, it is useful to review how the discipline gained prominence and a few key concepts. The broader study of complex systems research is rich and diverse. Many cite the origination of the field of study, or more accurately the emergence of like-minded professionals, as the establishment of the Santa Fe Institute in 1984. At Santa Fe, an eclectic group of academics come together to apply a “transdisciplinary” approach to gain a greater appreciation for the dynamic problems that face “society and science” today. In their 2007 book, *Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life*, Scott Page and John Miller argue the field of complex systems “challenges the notion that by perfectly understanding behavior of each component part of a system we will then understand the system as a whole.” Page and Miller attack the seeming contradiction between acknowledging a complex and indeterminate world and the pursuit of scientific principles to “make the complex understandable.” Realizing their current limitations, the two authors strive to gain a better appreciation of the world even if it is never complete. This highlights a relevant and important concept for the mid-careerist to remember. Even if the operational environment cannot be completely understood or conquered, it behooves the soldier to develop as vast an appreciation as possible.

The authors’ key concept on the “spaces that lie between what we currently know and what we need to know,” is of particular importance to the soldier (political actor). The authors speak of a middle space that is unknown and will “represent substantial deviations” from our assumptions. This space is often neglected or taken for granted, but if we are to understand and successfully

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28 *Page and Miller, 167.
29 Ibid., 171.
30 Ibid., 3700-3704.
navigate complexity, we must begin to explore this space. For the military professional, this space can be conceptualized as the area between current conditions (state of affairs) and the desired end-state. Instead of viewing the space between as merely a linear path to the end-state, the soldier should “engage” this space and “begin to explore it.” This mindset will prepare the soldier for the dynamism within all complex systems, while also developing a greater appreciation for the operational environment.

Alex Ryan’s 2009 article titled “The Foundation for an Adaptive Approach: Insights from the Science of Complex Systems,” provides the soldier an excellent primer on complex systems science and its value for appreciating the operational environment. Ryan introduces the American military professional to the Australian Army’s concept of Adaptive Campaigning and their four steps of act, sense, decide, and adapt to depict how the military should not merely act within the environment, but also listen and adapt to changes in the environment. The key takeaway from Ryan’s article is for military professionals to adopt an adaptive mind-set, meaning they should stay attuned to the changes and influences on the system, and not bullheadedly force change without appreciating what their actions could cause.

Within doctrine, the Army has embraced the belief that the operational environment is complex and dynamic. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, focuses much attention on the complex operational environment that today’s soldier operates within and the iterative learning process that is necessary to understand its dynamic nature. Two central themes in Field Manual 5-0, Operation Process, and Field Manual 3-0, Operations, are about the “complex and continuously changing” nature of the operational environment and how soldiers need to strive to understand this complexity to accomplish their mission. Trying to describe and develop a better understanding of the operational environment is not limited to Army doctrine. Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, and Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, describe the operational environment as “complex,” “fluid” and “constantly changing” and argues the U.S. military must strive to understand the environment and continually reassess this understanding.

Beyond merely mentioning the complex nature of the operational environment, the Army implemented methodologies and processes to come to grips with the challenges it poses. In February 2011, the Army introduced Change 1 to FM 3-0, Operations, and changed the traditional “Command and Control” War fighting Function to “Mission Command” to better depict the role of the commander in a complex operational environment. As part of this change, the Army also introduced the commander’s responsibility to “understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess,” in order for the commander and his staff to collectively develop a better appreciation of the complex operational environment.

In 2008, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command published the Commander’s Appreciation for Campaign Design, a document focused on providing commanders and staffs a method to frame complex problems in order to develop a common appreciation and the tools to “design a broad approach for problem resolution.” In 2010, design methodology was firmly entrenched in the Army’s lexicon when an entire chapter of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, was devoted to design methodology. Despite currently revamping Army doctrine in order to better leverage the information age, the characterization of the operational environment as complex and the value of design methodology in better understanding this complexity, remains an integral element.

The Army is also cognizant that soldierly understanding of the complex operational environment requires more than just doctrine, it requires education. ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, states that education and personal study must be consistently sought by Army leaders, and that understanding and learning in combat requires life-long education. Field Manual 6-22, Leadership, highlights the leader’s need for education and lifelong learning to prepare for an environment that is volatile, complex, and ambiguous.

In 2009 the Army published A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army (ALDS), a document focused on building leaders capable of facing complex environments. The document once again highlights the need for “multi-skilled leaders who can thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments.” The document states the Army must develop leaders who are

31Ibid., 3699-4868.  
32Ryan, 86.  
33Ibid., 85-88. 
34Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December, 2006), 2-1. 
35Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Change 1, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2011), 5-1. 
36Ibid. v. 
37TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 January 2008), i. 
38Department of the Army, ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 10 October 2011), 2-8. 
39Ibid. 8. 
40Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 10 October 2006), 8-7. 
42Department of the Army, “ALDS,” 3.
adaptive and innovative.\textsuperscript{43} The strategy places the responsibility for educating these leaders on both the institution through professional military education and broadening opportunities, and the individual through life-long learning pursuits.\textsuperscript{44}

The definition of what constitutes liberal arts is contestable. During the middle ages, liberal arts were traditionally broken down into the art of language (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) and the art of reasoning (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy).\textsuperscript{45} Over time this definition morphed as new disciplines were established and as disagreements over what exactly constituted a liberal arts education increased.\textsuperscript{46} In his seminal book, \textit{The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated}, Cardinal John Henry Newman contrasted the “liberal arts” with “useful arts,” with the former being those which humans pursue for the purpose of making life richer and the latter those pursued for some more practical value.\textsuperscript{47} Although this definition is straightforward and understandable on its surface, it becomes confusing when you consider that any education provided the military officer is intended for a practical purpose, to prepare them for the complex operational environment.\textsuperscript{48}

Another view of a liberal arts education, which is often referred to as a liberal education, is composed of a wide variety of subjects that impart a diversity of thought on the student and enables a student to be more well-rounded. From this perspective, a clear cut definition of what subjects comprise a liberal arts education is not as important as what a liberal arts education is looking to instill in the individual. This same view posits that the purpose of a liberal arts education is to “emphasize citizenship and leadership.”\textsuperscript{49} The historical antecedents for this opinion are strong, as Cicero argued that a liberal education is the exercise of free men as opposed to slaves.\textsuperscript{50}

Kurt Raaflaub touches on this topic in his paper “Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Concept of the Free Citizen,” where he discusses and contrasts the “minimal school training” that slaves received in Athens compared to the “education” of the “free man.” Raaflaub posits that training enabled a person to earn a living, while education enabled a person to live a rich life and “promote political skills and a career of political leadership.”\textsuperscript{51} Interestingly, this is similar to a debate often heard at ILE. Is the purpose of ILE to further train mid-careerists in the technical and tactical skills required for their profession or is it to educate the individual to prepare them for future operational challenges?

In her book \textit{Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense in Reform of Liberal Education}, Martha Nussbaum discusses the friction between supporters of a “Socratic education” who believe that education is to “teach students to think for themselves” with those who believe education is about “acculturation to the time honored values of western civilization.”\textsuperscript{52} Although not the intent of her book, Dr. Nussbaum raises an important question for the military education system. Is mid-careerist education to develop officers’ critical and creative thinking abilities, or is it to further inculcate them into the military institution?

The value of a liberal arts education has been lauded by many throughout history. Cardinal Newman argued that a liberal education is an “exercises of mind, of reason, of reflection” and this education is important to “bring the mind into form.”\textsuperscript{53} Arthur F. Holmes argues in his book, \textit{The Idea of a Christian College}, that what is important to ask regarding education is not “what can I do with all this stuff,” but “what will all this stuff do to me.”\textsuperscript{54} Holmes then argues that a liberal arts education deepens the passion to learn and strengthens the ability to imagine. It creates a passionate and reflective person who thirsts for knowledge and understanding.\textsuperscript{55}

In \textit{A Student’s Guide to Liberal Learning}, James V. Schall encourages individuals to embrace a self-directed liberal education to enhance the mind and enrich their life.\textsuperscript{56} His argument is that a liberal education to broaden the mind does not have to be

\textsuperscript{43}Department of the Army, “ALDS,” 3.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{45}Holmes, 249.
\textsuperscript{47}Holmes, 296.
\textsuperscript{48}Department of the Army, “ALDS.” Although the leadership strategy speaks about developing the individual, it is for the purpose of enabling the organization to respond to the complex operational environment.
\textsuperscript{49}Connor, 6.
\textsuperscript{50}Holmes, 263.
\textsuperscript{54}Holmes, 229-231.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 307-309.
\textsuperscript{56}James V. Schall, \textit{A Student’s Guide to Liberal Learning} (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2000), 46.
attained at a university, but can be attained through individual pursuit. Schall encourages the inquisitive mind to seek out knowledge by voraciously reading, by questioning, and most importantly, by seeking truth and understanding. 57

A common theme regarding the value of liberal arts is the value a diverse education provides the individual. This theme is very similar to another ongoing discussion regarding the practical benefits of having a broad expance of knowledge versus a narrow but deep knowledge pool. In Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It, How Can We Know, author Philip Tetlock compares foxes (those who know a little about a lot) to hedgehogs (those who know a lot about a little) in the area of political forecasting. Interestingly, Tetlock found that foxes often out forecast hedgehogs because of their style, self-deprecating humor, and ability to embrace uncertainty among other attributes. 58

The argument for a liberal arts education has been posited by military professionals and those who write about the profession of arms. In 1946, General Dwight Eisenhower, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and General A. A. Vandegrift spoke about the value of a liberal arts education for the military professional. General Eisenhower argued that “the value of a good soldier is increased many fold if he possesses, in addition to his knowledge of military matters, competency in one or more of the humanities and thinks about the contributions these subjects can make to the defense of his country.” 59 In the same article, General Vandegrift added that a liberal arts education allows the officer’s mind to grow during war time and peace time, thus preparing the individual to face any difficulty. 60

After Vietnam, one of the many criticisms directed toward the military leadership was their failure to understand the American political process and their role within the process. Traditionally, the U.S. military viewed their role as separate from the political process and focused solely on waging battles and campaigns to secure victory in war. 61 The Vietnam experience showed many of these leaders they could not separate the war from the policy objectives or the politicians that initiated the conflict. In order to adequately fulfill their professional responsibilities, they had to develop a better understanding of the military’s role in the political process and within society at large. In response to this need, came a variety of literature arguing how military leaders could best obtain this skillset. Jerome Slater’s, A Political Warrior or Soldier Statesman, argues that “political sophistication could be partly attained through education in international politics and the foreign policy process.” Slater posited that a political education for the military would not only educate them about America’s own system of governance and prepare them for participation in the policy process, but educate them on international relations issues the military would respond to in years to come. 62

While Jerome Slater took a very pragmatic view of the value of a liberal arts education for military officers, Josiah Bunting argued that a liberal arts education could have a more profound effect on military officers. Bunting believed a liberal arts education would inculcate within the officer an appreciation of the values and principles they had sworn to protect, while instilling an appreciation for the foreign cultures they would be called to operate among. He did not merely want the officer to be a tactically proficient killing machine in pursuit of American objectives, but a servant of America’s foreign policy that understood the importance of “tolerance and charity” and above all to understand “military victory must not be purchased in ways that utterly defeat the purpose for which campaigns are undertaken.” 63

More recently, the uncertainty brought about with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the last decade of war has led to a third call for leveraging liberal arts education to prepare soldiers for the operational environment. In Athens vs. Sparta, former military officer and historian Adam Wolfe calls for the U.S. military to transition away from its “tecnofunctionary” nature and embrace liberal arts to “create a new intellectual culture in the military.” 64 Similarly, political scientist and military officer Robert A. Vitase argues in a June 1999 Military Review article that a liberal arts education best prepares officers to deal with complex operational environments, particularly those involving peacekeeping. 65

An ongoing and contentious debate among international relations scholars is whether or not the different theoretical schools can work together to provide a better understanding of the world or if the different theories are at such great odds that the acceptance of one necessarily denies the validity of the others. David Lake argues in a 2011 International Studies Quarterly that international relations disciplines err by separating themselves into “academic sects” whose only interest is to produce self-affirming research that strengthens their “academic religion” and allows them to wage “theological debates” against non-believers. Lake believes there are a

57 Ibid., 48.
59 Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Vandegrift, 34-38.
60 Ibid., 36-38.
62 Slater, 103
number of correct “paths” one could follow to better understand the complex world and encourages international relation scholars to exercise the “isms” and work together.

In a corresponding *International Studies Quarterly* article, Henry Nau of George Washington University agrees with Lake’s premise that international relations scholars should work together to better understand the world, but argues this can best be achieved by “recognizing that isms are inevitable, given the nature of social knowledge, and to encourage them to address one another more directly and jointly.”

Although Lake and Nau have some fundamental disagreements on the value of retaining separate theoretical camps, they both agree that differing viewpoints and theories create a better understanding of how the world operates. Their call to leverage multiple theories and approaches to better understand the world echoes a previous argument put forward by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein in a June 2010 *Perspectives on Politics* article. Like Nau’s article, Sil and Katzenstein argue that differing theoretical schools debating over the explanatory value of their theories provides important contributions to the study of international relations. Through an approach they coined “Analytic Eclecticism,” the two authors argue that a better understanding of world politics can be achieved by “selectively” choosing from an array of “complementary” theories “embedded in contending research traditions.” Sil’s and Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism is especially valuable for the practitioner because its fundamental pursuit is to develop a better understanding of “complex real world” problems in order to develop pragmatic scholarship that can be applied to real situations.

Sil’s and Katzenstein’s article unearths a fundamental argument within international relations and other social science related fields: Is the purpose of theory to “reveal truth” or to aide individuals in developing a better understanding of the world? Will Moore argues in his paper titled “Observing the Political World: Ontology, Truth, and Science,” that theory plays a heuristic role, and while it helps us better understand the world, it does not reveal absolute truths. Moore also encourages political scientists to undertake a dialogue on the role of theory in their discipline in order to “invest some thought in these issues and make conscious decisions about our ontological beliefs and our position on the search for truth versus the search for more useful theories.”

Alexander Wendt, arguably the most recognized constructivist international relations theorist, takes a slightly different stance when he posits that international relations “scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works . . . what matters for international relations is ontology, not epistemology.” Although both Moore and Wendt appear to accept the limits of theorists, Wendt argues that international relations scholars should not concern themselves with debates over “truth,” while Moore believes it is important for political scientists to discuss these issues in order to collectively determine if theory is for understanding or for revealing truth.

Ole Holst’s essay, simply entitled “International Relations,” posits that interdisciplinary scholarship needs to be encouraged. He critiques the current structure of professional associations and universities that “tend to separate scholars in adjoining disciplines and perhaps even to promote stereotypes of each other and their scholarly endeavors.” Holst argues that universities and professional associations should look to encourage partnership between disciplines that are closely linked and share interest in common research and scholarship.

A few academics have moved beyond the broad call for cooperation and developed arguments regarding the complementary nature of the different disciplines. In a 2003 article and a subsequent book published in 2011, Samuel Barkin argues that realism and constructivism have elements within each of the theoretical schools that are mutually complementary. Barkin also shares Lake’s, Nau’s, Sil’s, and Katzenstein’s fundamental belief that international relations discipline is too often separated into parochial camps. These camps go to battle with opposing camps in order to defeat theories they believe make their own theories less relevant. Barkin refers to these separate camps as “paradigmatic castles” with “scientists as knights” and the “assumptions” as “liege-lords the knights/scientists are sworn to defend.”

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68Ibid.
70Ibid.
72Moore, 8.
74Barkin, 1.
In an article building on the anti-paradigm narrative, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon take a different perspective on the application of Kuhn’s paradigms to international relations arguing that it is inappropriate to apply Kuhn’s model to their discipline. Jackson and Nexon believe that international relations theory would be better served if “isms” were thought of as theoretical research buckets where certain theories which have a preponderance of one of the main theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism for example) could reside. This would allow theorists to pull from a broad range of relevant theories, from often opposing buckets without threatening their status as a realist, constructivist, or liberalist. They argue this type of approach would allow for “genuine analytic eclecticism” that would encourage free thought by theorists unencumbered by any parochial interests.

The literature does a good job establishing the concept of complexity, its effect on the Army, and the need to develop leaders who can operate effectively in the complex operational environment. The literature clearly establishes the value of a diverse liberal arts education in developing leaders with attributes the Army has identified as essential and shows that previous military professionals have recognized this value. The literature also covers the Army’s general concept on how to remedy the problem and identifies key attributes it desires in leaders to prepare them for complexity. Missing from the literature are practical implementation recommendations that take the Army’s ideas from conception to reality. My intent is for the paper to help fill this gap by proposing a framework, providing an implementation recommendation and offering a case study example that demonstrates the value of international relations theories for the mid-careerist.

Methodology

Some argue that a purpose behind political science research is to “produce valid inferences about social and political life.” These inferences are usually developed through a scientific empirical process that seeks to develop models and theories that provide broad generalizable explanations for political phenomenon. In this regard, political scientists are not as concerned with individual events per say, but are more concerned with how a number of similar events might tell us something about the world at large.

Although there is great utility in these models for the military officer, the military officer is usually more concerned with understanding one particular event or environment (e.g. Iraq or Afghanistan) and not an entire field of political phenomenon (e.g. civil war or terrorism). With this in mind, the framework of this paper is not intended as a framework or process for action, but can better be viewed as a framework for understanding. Although merely understanding might not wholly satisfy those who are attempting to uncover some panacea that can be broadly applied, the author posits that it is of utmost importance that we first understand the environment before we attempt to act. The author’s goal is not to devise a framework that can be applied to solve any problem, but instead to show how certain concepts can be pulled from international relations theory to explore and better understand the operational environment. Finally, my desire is not for military officers to seize on one set model, but to develop an appreciation and “fox” like knowledge of a variety of disciplines and use them to gain a greater appreciation of the socio-political dynamics within the complex operational environment.

In his recent book on combining realism and constructivism to develop a richer understanding of international relations, Dr. Samuel Barkin, highlights the difficulty with trying to blend multiple theoretical approaches due to the lack of a “conceptual framework for communication among practitioners.” Barkin highlights the paradoxical conflict between not having a framework as a common reference for practitioners being confusing, and how frameworks can often oversimplify or create rigid categorization that detracts from important dialogue between the varying schools. Barkin takes the middle ground between a rigid framework that leaves little flexibility to add and remove concepts when the lack of explanatory value limits their utility in understanding, and the other side of the spectrum where you have no conceptual framework. Instead, Barkin suggests an informal matrix that lays out the compatibility and incompatibility of different paradigms that can be leveraged by academics to encourage collaboration. Although Barkin is speaking to academia, his push for a collaborative approach can inform the practitioner. But, unlike the academic, the mid-careerist need not worry about keeping the theories separated in a matrix, but can draw unabashedly from them all without concern for maintaining theoretical purity. The mid-careerist should think of these theories and concepts as residing in a toolkit and collaboratively draw from them to improve understanding of the operational environment.

[75]Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Kindle-73. Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” is “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.” Kuhn’s concepts have become very influential throughout the sciences, to include the social sciences.


[80]Ibid.
Analysis

The framework applied to the case study consists of concepts taken from three principle international relations theories; Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. The three theories are initially separated to provide the reader a fundamental understanding of international relations and to associate the concepts with their parent theory. After describing the theories, the strict paradigmatic walls were torn down and the concepts were placed in a “toolkit” which will be drawn from to better understand the dynamics of the case study. The intent is for the reader to grasp the fundamental theories and collaboratively apply them to better understand socio-political dynamics within the complex operational environment.

Liberalism

Liberalism originated as an international relations theory in the early twentieth century just prior to World War I and comprises three “strands” of theory. The first strand argues that economic interconnectivity between states will limit war because conflict negatively affects their own prosperity. A contemporary example of this strand is Aaron Friedberg’s argument that war between the U.S. and China is unlikely because of economic interests. The second strand argues that democracies are unlikely to go to war because they share similar fundamental values and their leaders’ actions are hindered by a voting population. The second strand can be further broken down into a pragmatic argument and an idealistic argument. The pragmatist argues that states spread democracy and democratic principles to primarily protect their own interests. Although the pragmatic liberalists believe democracy for the world is a good thing, their primary concern is their nation’s interests. Rights and freedoms for other states and people are a beneficial byproduct, but not the main objective. The idealistic argument supports the spread of democracy because they believe it is the right moral and ethical action. These two sub-strands are often difficult to parse out in debates, but they are important to remember. The third and final strand argues that international institutions, laws, and protocols help states overcome their selfish behavior and encourages them to work towards common interests for the collective good. This interdependence between states makes war less likely because it runs counter to the interests of all involved.

In 1977, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane wrote their influential book, Power and Interdependence, in which they contrasted the “traditionalist” view (realist) that states were still the dominant actor in international affairs with the “modernist” view that corporations and other non-government entities were becoming the dominant players. Nye and Keohane argued that both state and non-state actors were important players in the international arena because they influence each other and develop an interdependent relationship. With the increase in communications and the development of what they refer to as “globalism”, this interdependence only increases. Nye and Keohane’s argument about the interdependent relationship between state and non-state entities and the increasing technology that strengthens this interdependence helps account for gaps not necessarily considered focusing on structure alone.

One way to look at liberalism is as the pursuit of a more peaceful natural order within the structure. Where realism speaks of how things are, liberalism offers hope and prescriptions to nudge reality towards a more ideal version. Whether or not mankind is capable of manipulating the “realist reality” and progressing to a better state, liberalist efforts to improve the structure through laws, institutions, and other mechanisms influence the environment and the effect of their ideals must be appreciated. Three key concepts can be identified from this basic understanding of liberalism:

Progress: The human endeavor is about progress and moving forward. At the individual level people are influenced by a desire to see life improve. At the state level, people want an increase in rights provided to them by the state and then protected by the

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82 Walt. Norman Angell’s 1910 book The Great Illusion (Seattle, WA: Kindle Digital Services, 2012), 103, argued that intertwined European economic interests meant war would not occur.
83 Friedberg, 12.
84Democratic Peace is a descendent of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace where he lays out a blueprint for peace among states. See http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/ka nt1.htm). Sociologist Dean Babst wrote about democratic peace in a 1964 article for the Wisconsin Sociologist in which he argues that elected governments are less likely to go to war with each other because of pressures from the electorate. See http://miles.oppidi.ne/1Babst1964.pdf). See the book by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. Debuting the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) for more information on the ongoing debate.
85Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points was based off both these premises. He believed colonialism should end and nations should have self-determination because it was morally the right thing, but he also believed that by doing so the world would avoid wars in the future.
86Walt, 32.
88Ibid, 225. Keohane and Nye define globalism “as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances, linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens).”
89Craig Parsons, How to Map Arguments in Political Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Kindle:497-498. For the purposes of this paper, I use Parsons definition of structure “as a sort of obstacle course that is treated analytically as an intersubjectively present, given environment.” I interpret this to mean that structures are relatively constant and difficult to change in the short-term.
state. At the intra-state level, progress speaks to the spreading of democratic principles, human rights, and away from conflict and war. 90

Interdependence: Developing dependent links between people through interests and common identity can be one way to connect people together to achieve common objectives within the structure. 91 At the state level, nations look to develop interdependence in order to limit conflict, progress towards a more stable peace and achieve common objectives. 92 At the local level, individuals look to develop interdependence to achieve common objectives that benefit mutual interests.

Institutions: Institutions can moderate or inflame conflict at all levels. 93 Although the structure is firmly entrenched, institutions and the laws they develop can make conditions within the structure more mutually beneficial or unintentionally worse. A key aspect with institutions is that the “setting-up of certain intersubjectively present institutions channels people unintentionally in certain directions at some later point.” Humans form institutions in order to change behavior within the structure or to further their interests. Sometimes institutions and/or rules that are developed by the institution result in unintended consequences. 94

Concepts from liberalism can be applied to most human interaction to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved. Think of a small non-governmental special interest organization that seeks to end ivory poaching in Africa. The group is focused on improving a condition they view negatively, thus progressing to a better state of affairs. They intuitively understand the structure will result in some individuals poaching elephants for personal gain and know that selfish interest can drive individual action. Although they accept the structure, they look for ways to pass laws and establish institutions that will cause the poachers to reevaluate their interests. Understanding there is power in numbers, they develop links with people who hold similar beliefs. The links result in greater interdependence between people from different groups, thus strengthening their ability to influence action and obtain results.

Realism

Realism in international relations theory developed largely in response to what some perceived as naïve but dangerous liberal arguments. 95 Realism can be broken down into two primary strands, classical realism and neo-classical realism. 96 Classical realists argue that “states, like humans, have a natural desire to dominate each other.” 97 The desire for domination means nations seek power in order to pursue their own self-interest. Neo-classical realists switched the focus from the biological nature of man, to the structure of the international system. They argued there was no “sovereign” to restrict state actions, limit their interests or protect them from other states. This “anarchic” condition causes states to pursue their self-interest, by “balancing” and “bandwagoning” against other states whenever it suits their need. 98 For the mid-careerist, this anarchic environment can exist not just at the state level, but also where laws and institutions have broken down or between individuals who have no “sovereign” above them to limit their actions.

Concepts from realism can be used to understand the socio-political dynamics at any level of human interaction. Consider the structure of an organized crime family. There is a structure with set positions (don, capo, consigliore) and individuals operate and behave according to their position within the structure. Less powerful individuals might join forces to balance against the stronger individuals or bandwagon with the most powerful to increase personal power and further their interest. Although there are both formal and informal rules that guide behavior, what really affects behavior is their relative power against the others in the gang.
Realism, at its core, is about dealing with the world “as it is and not how you wish it to be.” 99 For a realist, this means dealing with the anarchic structure of the system and understanding that organizations and people pursue self-interest first and foremost. From this basic understanding of realism, three concepts are identified:

Structure: Structure is important at the local, intra-state, and state levels, but for slightly different reasons. At the local level, structure is important in regards to tribal, family, religious, and other social structures because people naturally fall into certain structural roles (parent, employee, cleric, son, husband, etc.) Although all these structures are slightly different, they still affect the individuals involved in the structure. At the intrastate level, there are governing and bureaucratic structures that influence the behavior of people and organizations that are part of the structure. At the state level there are structures that are not as rigorously or formally governed as structures are at other levels. 100 It is important to remember that structure is relatively constant and difficult to manipulate in the short-term. 101

Interest: Individuals, groups, and states (any organization that has a shared identity) primarily pursue their interest. 102 Success for individuals, groups, or states is defined as preserving current capabilities while strengthening others. 103 Jeffrey Isaac’s paper “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique” is used to differentiate between three types of interest: (1) Subjective interest: What the individual believes is in his interest or is good for him; (2) Objective interest: “What really is in the interests, or good, of an agent whether he thinks so or not;” 104 (3) Real interest: The effect on function of identities, “roles,” or “social norms,” on interests in enduring relationships. “Interests are real because they are causally effective in practice in a sense objective interests are not.” 105 As an example of these three interests, consider the decision making process many ILE students might go through on a Friday. An ILE student has a subjective interest in leaving class early on Friday to play golf. The same ILE student has an objective interest as a professional officer in attending Friday’s professional development seminar. The same ILE student has a real interest in spending his Friday afternoon working on a tactics paper due Monday morning. 106

Power: Once again, Isaac’s paper, “The Three Faces of Power” is leveraged to define the concept of power. Power is “the capacity to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relationship in which they participate.” 107 There are two types of power; “power to” and “power over.” 108 When most people think of power, they probably think of “power over.” “Power over” speaks of a person or organization possessing the strength or capacity that provides the ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own objectives. 109 On the other hand, “power to” is not necessarily about strength in the traditional sense of strong vs. weak, but about the positional power an individual has within a structure and as part of a relationship. 110 An example is the relationship between a coach and his athletes. The coach has the “power to” schedule practices, build the roster, assign positions, and decide amount of playing time. The players have the “power to” decide whether or not to show up to practices or games. The success of the team depends on both coach and players exercising their “power to” in a manner that benefits the team (players and coach). 111

Constructivism

The term constructivism in international relations theory was first coined by Nicholas Onuf in the late 1980s. 112 Arguably, the most well-known constructivist article was written by Alexander Wendt and entitled Anarchy is what States Make of It. The article was a counter to realist arguments that the anarchic world forces states into a self-help mentality. Wendt argues that while the concept of anarchy might be true, the notion that all states naturally seek power over other states is incorrect. He argues that all nations react to

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99 This is a major concept of Niebuhr’s in his book Moral Man & Immoral Society.

100 Anarchy is a realist concept that argues there is no sovereign over states and this leads to nations pursuing their own self-interest. In Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1954), 160, he argues “In anarchy there is no automatic harmony” he continues “A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness.” Liberalism and constructivism do not necessarily deny anarchy, but believe that anarchy is “what we make of it” (constructivism) or that institutions and structures can be put into place to ensure anarchy is dealt with in a peaceful and common interest (liberalism).

101 Parsons, 796. FM 3-24 discusses social structures in a similar fashion to the way I discuss them above.

102 Liberalism does not deny self-interest, but believes that mutual self-interest can be developed to ensure conflict will not rise again. This mutual self-interest can also be enforced through international institutions and laws. A constructivist would argue that interests are socially constructed and trying to determine what exactly one nation would identify as an “interest” is difficult.


105 Ibid., 26.

106 FM 3-24 discusses interests, but focuses more on soldiers understanding population’s interests and does not specify different types of interests involved.

107 Ibid., 22.

108 Ibid., 5.

109 O’Callaghan and Griffiths, 253.

110 Isaac, 23.

111 FM 3-24 discusses power, but only in a narrow “power over” context.

Constructivism can easily be applied to the group (local) or individual level. A good example of constructivism is the relationship a parent has with their child. The relationship might begin as one of caregiver/protector (parent) over the young fragile infant. Both the parent and child are defined and shaped by their roles, but these roles are not stagnant, they change through time and intersubjective meaning. The parent, who was once viewed as the protector, evolves into a disciplinarian figure and then later in life a friend. Through the years, this relationship changes through interaction and is constantly intersubjectively redefined.\textsuperscript{114}

From this basic understanding of constructivism, we can identify key concepts, which unlike our realist and liberalist, are concerned with the unique identity of the actors involved instead of the structure of the system. The constructivism concepts are:

Narratives: Individuals and collective groups of people all have a narrative informed by a shared history and a common identity that affects the way they perceive interests and how they navigate the social world.\textsuperscript{115} Narratives are important because they form the lenses through which individuals and groups see and experience the world. Narratives are not static tales or stories. They are dynamic and ongoing “stories of peoplehood” whose final chapter is neither known nor determined.\textsuperscript{116}

Social Construction: Individuals and groups of people “define their interests in the process of interpreting the social situations in which they are participants.”\textsuperscript{117} New knowledge or experience can alter how entities (individuals, groups, states) perceive their interests and can change how they view others in the system. “Intersubjective” reality between two entities is framed and reframed through continual interaction.\textsuperscript{118} A close ally can become an enemy or an enemy can become a close ally due to the two intersubjectively redefining their relationship.\textsuperscript{119}

Contingency: Narratives and conditions are shaped by contingent human actions that could have turned out differently if other “unanticipated and novel” elements gained prominence.\textsuperscript{120} Take Iran for example. Iran’s collective narrative is very much influenced by its 33 year theocracy. If during the 1979 revolution other movements came to prominence (e.g. democracy advocates or communists) instead of Ayatollah Khomeini, then Iran’s narrative would be different today. Rogers Smith succinctly captures the concept in his book \textit{Stories of Peoplehood}, when he posits “all stories of peoplehood (narratives) are always contingent things that human beings create collectively, through both conflictual and cooperative processes, with some elements that are patterned and predictable, but others that may be novel and unanticipated.”\textsuperscript{121}

Now that the framework has been established, it will be applied to a case study to demonstrate its value for the mid-careerist. The framework, and concepts within, go beyond surface deep analysis of the operational environment and allow exploration of the richness of the agents, structures, institutions, and interests involved. The framework provides a common reference during staff group discussions, but its concepts are rich enough to enhance collaborative dialogue and encourage exploration. The framework is complimentary to Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, Time (PMESII-PT) and Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE), but its concepts take exploration further than either of these models can individually. This framework can be leveraged during mission analysis and as part of the design methodology as metaphoric tools to mine the operational environment.

\textsuperscript{113}J. Martin Rochester, \textit{Fundamental Principals of International Relations} (Boulder: Westview Press), Kindle Location 630.


\textsuperscript{115}Rogers M. Smith, \textit{Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership} (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. I believe that Smith’s book and constructivist theory both speak about how socially constructed narratives shape and influence people and governments. These narratives are important because (like Smith says) they are how we see ourselves and help shape the lens through which we view others.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid. “Stories of peoplehood” is taken from the title of Rogers Smith’s book. FM 3-24 mentions narratives, and describes them as “means through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed by members of a society.” The narrative description above encompasses this, but also speaks about individual narratives and counter-narratives. I am concerned with how narratives are framed and reframed through social interaction.

\textsuperscript{117}O’Callaghan and Griffiths, 51.

\textsuperscript{118}Ferrero.

\textsuperscript{119}Realists might argue that a state (can be applied to person or group) changes their alliances because it suits their interests within the structure and it allows them to garner more power.

\textsuperscript{120}Smith, 212.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid.
The case study leverages a 2005 documentary entitled, *Gaza: The Fight for Israel*, which covers a 96 hour period during which Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and police forces removed Israeli citizens from Gaza settlements in accordance with the government’s disengagement plan. The case study uses the framework to explore the socio-political factors involved during the removal of Jewish settlers from the Gush Katif settlement to develop a greater appreciation of the operational environment. The case study focuses largely on BG Hacohen, the IDF operational commander responsible for closing the settlement and his interaction with settlers. Three key events that occurred during the four day ordeal will be investigated: (1) IDF entrance into the settlement; (2) BG Hacohen’s meeting with a religious IDF officer; and (3) “Synagogue Crisis.” BG Hacohen negotiating with the elder Rabbis.

Although the documentary serves as the foundation for the case study, other available information on the settlement issue will be leveraged and the diversity of views regarding this issue. The resources are drawn from an array of sources to include books, academic journals, newspaper articles, government websites, and policy papers. The Israeli settlement issue has a rich and complex history, and it is not the purpose of this case study to go into the complex nuances of the broader settlement debate. It is necessary to review some of the background to gain a better appreciation of the narratives and varied interests involved. The first section provides background on the broader settlement issue and the Israeli government’s decision to enact the disengagement plan. The second section focuses on three events that occurred in Gush Katif during a four day period in June 2005.

The name “Gaza Strip” was first used during the 1948 Israeli-Arab War and gained wide recognition in the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian Armistice agreement to denote a separate piece of terrain under Egyptian authority. The area that would later become the Gush Katif Settlement in the Gaza Strip was “seized from Egypt” and occupied by Israeli Forces during the Six Days War. Starting in the 1970s, the Israeli government allowed settlers to develop Gush Katif settlements as a means to establish a barrier between the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Although many in the Israeli government supported the occupation of the territory for security purposes, most settlers moved into the area for religious ideological reasons. Believing the area to be Jewish holy land, Zionists established settlements in the area that were not meant for short-term security gains, but focused on the long-term incorporation into the Jewish state.

In December 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed a disengagement plan for the removal of 11 Israeli settlements in Gaza and Northern Samaria. The stated intent of the plan was to “break the current deadlock by removing the too-often lethal friction between Israelis and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank, thereby improving the situation.” Although this was the official position, others have argued that the cost of securing the territory was not worth the money spent and the Israeli government could strengthen their international position by removing the settlements. Removal would ease the international pressure for concessions they viewed as more painful to the Israeli state. The plan passed the Israeli cabinet in late summer of 2004, the Knesset in the fall of 2004, and implementation of the plan began in the summer of 2005.

BG Gershon Hacohen, a 37 year veteran of the IDF was assigned the task of commanding a 12,000 member force responsible for overseeing and removing (by force if necessary) the 8,500 Gush Katif settlers. BG Hacohen was an interesting selection to lead the removal operation. His parents were founders within the settler movement and some of his siblings lived in West Bank settlements. Hacohen’s background and empathetic nature, led him to pursue a non-confrontational approach, quietly listening to complaints and offering emotional support. Although focused on the mission, he tried to be as accommodating and sympathetic as possible.

When the IDF and police forces arrived, more than half of the 1,550 registered families had left the settlements in the Gaza Strip. Of the 832 families that remained in the Gaza settlements, approximately 700 were in the Gush Katif settlements. These remaining families were joined by scores of external groups and individuals that came to Gaza to show support for the settlers and to make the government’s task more difficult. The settlers were given 48 hours to leave Gush Katif. If they remained after the 48 hour period, the military would physically remove the settlers. The government provided transportation to move belongings and offered

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125Gazit, 1516, 1634.
126Efrat, 3984. Efrat writes, “despite the high importance which right-wing politicians attached to the Qatif block, that regions was characterized by features which it really did not have: it had no Jewish history behind it, and it was not a parsimony, even most Israelis had no special emotional relationship with this corner.”
128Efrat, 4093.
129Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5.
130Efrat, 4302.
131Garney.
compensation money to relocate somewhere else in Israel. Sixty percent of the settlers rejected the Israeli governments monetary and relocation offers.\textsuperscript{132}

The confrontation between Hacohen’s forces and the settlers began when settlers blocked the entrance to the settlement, impeding the movement of forces and transportation into the area. The environment was tense, with angry protestors intermixed with wailing settlers, creating a potentially combustive situation. The emotional toil was not limited to the settlers. The police and military forces, many who came from settlements, internally struggled between their loyalty to the state and their support for their fellow countrymen and religious brethren. The forces were constantly under barrage from settlers and protestors who often questioned their compatriots’ humanity by comparing them to Nazis, Hitler, and Stalin. Forty-eight hours into the operation, 2,000 individuals remained in the settlement and Hacohen’s forces had to transition from urging and “persuasion” to removing people by force.

The most potentially violent confrontation between troops, settlers, and protestors was at one of the settlement’s synagogues. Approximately 1,000 individuals occupied the synagogue and refused to leave, forcing Hacohen to reach out to some of the rabbilical leadership to call on the protestors to stand-down. Hacohen and the Rabbis came to an agreement that protestors would not turn violent if forces entered the synagogue. But, the protestors insisted on being physically removed by the units to publically demonstrate their ire over being compelled to leave the settlement.

Gush Katif was eventually evacuated and the structures torn down (all but the synagogues). Although the operation was successful, it opened a rift between the secular Israeli government and many of its religious citizens. Below we explore the rift and further unpack the different socio-political dynamics at play in August 2005 by focusing on three key events that occurred during the operation and applying the concepts to achieve better understanding.

Event #1: Entrance into the Settlement

The concepts progress, narrative, contingent, social construction, power, and interest help explore the socio-political dynamics at play during the IDF’s entrance into Gush Katif. The concept of progress provides an important starting point for our exploration of the socio-political dynamics within the operational environment. Although both the settlers and the Israeli government wanted progress, they each defined progress differently. The Israeli government defined progress as either getting closer to an Israeli/Palestinian agreement or creating enough space to alleviate international pressure. The Israeli leadership believed returning Gaza would either move the Israelis and Palestinians closer to an agreement, or provide some space for Israel absent international pressure. The settlers’ concept of progress was to retain and attain land they believed was Jewish holy land. In the settlers’ view, the return of Gaza was retrogression not progression.

When the IDF arrived at the settlement, they were accompanied by a positive narrative as the “holy” protector of the Jewish state and its population. This narrative was especially strong within the Gaza settlements because of the heightened threat of conflict and the IDF’s 30 year role as protector of settlers on the Israeli frontier. When the forces arrived to evacuate the settlers, this narrative was reframed through social construction. Nadia Matar, an Israeli settler, exemplified the reframing of the IDF image when she stated “we were all educated that the Army was holy. They were holy as long as they carry out what it is meant to do . . . protect the Israeli people and fight the terrorists.” The settlers no longer viewed the forces as legitimate protectors of the Jews, but as a powerful military force uprooting them from their rightful land. The ongoing reframing of the social narrative is heard in the documentary when the settlement population compares the IDF to Hitler’s Nazis. The IDF actions reinforced the overarching narrative among the settlers of the Jews as an “uprooted” people, continuously victimized by non-Jews. The interesting aspect of the narrative reaffirmation is the fact the victimizers were now fellow Jews who only a short-time prior were viewed as protectors of the faithful.

It is important to remember this narrative was contingent on past “conflictual and cooperative processes.” The Israeli government’s promotion of settlements and their use of settlers as a policy tool created a narrative of a pro-settlement state whose interests were nearly identical to Zionist interests. If the decision was made in the 1970s to turn over Gaza and the West Bank before settlements were built, the narrative of an Israeli government supporting religious settlements might never have surfaced. The idea of a “settler” might not have the same meaning today (or any relevance at all), within the Israeli narrative.

The IDF arrived with a large force, expecting the massive “scale of the operation” to show the population that resistance was “futile.” The use of power over to compel the settlers played toward the military’s strength and their image as a powerful entity capable of exerting its authority. IDF leadership embraced the concept of power over and many believed that negotiating with the settlers only displayed weakness and irresoluteness. For example, when the protestors complained that black-clad police forces reminded them of Nazi SS troopers and requested their removal, MG Dan Harel (Hacohen’s commanding officer) told Hacohen not to negotiate with the settlers. Harel believed the government had the power and negotiating would only strengthen the settlers’ resolve.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
The comparison of Israeli police to Nazi SS troopers highlighted the strength of the Jewish narrative and the inability of the population to separate from it.

The population also asserted power towards the government. The population had the power to peacefully depart Gush Katif or the power to blockade and delay the government’s disengagement plan. Although the government maintained the power over the population, its ability to assert that power was restrained by its own real interests not to take actions that would escalate the situation towards violence and risk weakening the Israeli state.

The population’s objective interest was to stand down and peacefully evacuate the settlement. BG Hacohen’s statement about the train travelling down the track and settlers had to choose to step aside or get run over, speaks directly to objective interest. The settlers’ subjective interest was to push back against the government and gain enough external support to force the government to postpone or cancel the disengagement plan. The settlers’ real interest was a balance between their objective and subjective interests and is related to their split identity.

The settlers’ have two identities. They are Israeli citizens within a secular, but predominately Jewish, state that is part of the international order. This identity is concerned with the strength of the state and its ability to operate. Any action that weakens the state runs counter to the settlers’ secular Israeli identity. The second identity is one of a Zionist Jew who believes it is God’s will that they occupy all of the holy land. Any action that cedes land, goes against God’s will and runs counter to this Zionist identity. These two complimentary, yet competing identities created a paradox for the settlers. If they resisted too hard or resorted to violence, they could severely weaken the Israeli state, and possibly ignite a civil conflict. Weakening the Israeli state could derail some of their Zionist objectives. This derailment could be more severe than the damage done by turning over Gaza. The settlers’ real interest was to display a level of civil disobedience that remained true to their Zionist identity, but not severe enough to irreparably damage both identities.

The use of the framework to explore Event #1 demonstrates the role narratives play in creating and shaping identities. All people have narratives, and as demonstrated above, many people have competing narratives that are often at odds with other narratives. It is important to remember that narratives are not stagnant, but constantly morphing as new experiences socially (re)construct identities. The people who were once viewed as your protector could quickly become your enemy as new experiences intersubjectively redefine the narrative. It is also important to remember that narratives are contingent on previous “conflictual and cooperative processes.” If another group or agent gained prominence, or other unforeseen events evolved, then the narrative would have developed differently. 

The framework also shows that power relationships are not only about the “strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Although “power over” is an important element of power, so is the “power to.” If “power over” was the only form of power, we could easily calculate outcomes by comparing relative strength. As we see from the case study and know from experience, relatively stronger agents do not always achieve their objectives.

Event #2: BG Hacohen’s Meeting with an Israeli Officer/Settler

The concepts interdependence, narrative, structure, interest, and social construction help explore the socio-political dynamics at play during BG Hacohen’s meeting with an Israeli officer/settler. Towards the end of the operation, a young “religious” IDF officer requested a meeting with BG Hacohen to read a letter he composed about the emotional turmoil he was experiencing. The officer was not only a soldier, but a resident of the Gush Katif settlement who was removed days earlier by fellow soldiers. His identity as a soldier and a settler symbolized the interdependence between the military and the settler movement. The settlers depended on soldiers for over 30 years to provide the protection they needed to occupy and expand the settlement. Many of the religious soldiers looked towards the settlers as keeping the idea of Zionism alive, while others in the Israeli state embraced secularism.

The story of the soldier/settler confronting BG Hacohen also depicts the degree to which the narrative of the settler and the narrative of the soldier were intertwined before the settlement removal. The soldier’s distress was caused by what he saw as a contradiction within his own narrative(s). Until the day he was ordered to remove his fellow settlers, his roles as a soldier and settler were mutually reinforcing. As a soldier he viewed himself as protecting his fellow countrymen and helping pursue Israeli interests. As a settler occupying what he believed was Jewish holy land, he viewed himself as pursuing not only Israel’s interests, but God’s will. The government’s decision to remove settlers and his split identity caused him to socially reconstruct his own narrative. His inability to balance the once supportive, but now distinct, narratives resulted in a personal contradiction that he had to come to terms with.

133Smith, 212.
The concept of structure can be leveraged to help explain the soldier’s turmoil. The soldier was a leader within the military structure, a structure that is relatively permanent. He understood that he had certain responsibilities within the structure to include a duty to obey orders and an obligation to serve the nation of Israel. Although his identity as a soldier can explain some of his emotional turmoil, it is focused on the particular individual and not the demands the structure places on him as a military officer. The demands and responsibilities placed on any officer within the structure will be similar, but the fashion and manner each officer emotionally handles the demands can differ greatly.

The soldier provides a unique opportunity to explore the impact of interests on individual decision making. The soldier’s split identity meant he had a variety of different interests that were often contradicting. As an officer, the soldier’s objective interest was to enforce the laws of Israel and remove the settlers. As a settler, his objective interest was to stand down and allow the government to enforce the disengagement plan. The soldier’s subjective interest was for the state to overturn the disengagement plan and end the resettlement operations. Determining his real interest is slightly more difficult because his two identities come into confrontation and his real interest probably shifted during the four day period. Initially, when there existed hope that the government would change course, his real interest was to stand with his fellow settlers to force change (his settler identity was dominant). As the resettlement operation progressed, his real interest was influenced more by his officer identity than his settler identity. When hope receded and despair set in, he realized his real interest was with the military to ensure his own preservation and the security of the state.

The use of the framework to explore Event #2 allowed exploration of the interdependence between the settlers and the IDF. This interdependence was not only present within institutions or groups of people, but within individuals also. The religious IDF officer had two separate identities that melded together to form his personal narrative. These two identities were dependent on each other to maintain balance within his narrative. Once these two identities became unbalanced, the officer was forced to reconstruct his narrative based on the introduction of new information/experience.

The framework also showed that identifying interests is not a simple objective process, but is difficult and complex. The officer’s turmoil shows that defining personal interests is difficult enough, an outside observer trying to determine others’ interest is even more complex. Similar to narratives, interests are dynamic and can change due to obvious external causes or unobservable internal assessments.

Event #3: “Synagogue Crisis” - Negotiations between BG Hacohen and the Rabbis

The concepts institution, interest, structure, narrative, power, and interdependence help explore the socio-political dynamics at play during the synagogue crisis. On day three of the operation, the IDF faced the unpalatable task of removing 1,000 protestors from a local synagogue. The idea of Israeli forces entering a synagogue, dragging out fellow countrymen, and possibly igniting a violent conflict was not in the interest of the government or the settlement’s rabbinical leadership. To avoid a violent confrontation, Hacohen and the senior Rabbis negotiated an interesting compromise. The protestors agreed to refrain from violence, but insisted on being physically carried out by IDF soldiers as a show of civil disobedience. This seemingly irrelevant show of civil disobedience was of utmost psychological importance if the protestors were to maintain their narrative of struggle and sacrifice for Jewish holy land.\(^{135}\)

There were multiple narratives being socially constructed and reframed within the synagogue. The IDF forces and the protestors embraced, cried on each other’s shoulders, and prayed together. The collective Jewish narrative, which suffered damage throughout the four day ordeal, once again came together. Despite all their differences over settler removal, the IDF and the protestors identified a common interest to see the preservation of the Israeli state. The protestors realized the degree of interdependence between them and the IDF. The protestors needed the IDF to ensure future security and the maintenance of the state, without which the state would cease to exist.

The concept of institution is valuable in deciphering the dynamics at play during the synagogue crisis. The elder rabbis were part of a respected institution in the settlement and their word and actions probably held more weight than any other settlement constituent. Their status within the structure gave them the power to negotiate and establish informal rules that would be abided by. The protestors in the synagogue also had the power to continue with civil disobedience, resort to violence, or capitulate. What is interesting about the rabbis using their institutional position within the structure to quell violence is that it was BG Hacohen who requested their involvement.

BG Hacohen had the power to go into the synagogue with armed troops and violently remove the settlers or the power to find a more amenable alternative. BG Hacohen turned to an outside institution (elder rabbis) when his institution’s (military/government) laws and actions had failed to end the protests. This decision served his real interest to achieve an end to the disorder without creating

\(^{135}\)BG Hacohen acknowledged the protestors’ psychological need to maintain their identity of fighting against removal and perceived injustices. BG Hacohen said “what is important is the story of the struggle and not the results of the struggle . . . a way which a human being can keep his obligations without losing his honor.”
conditions for a more violent civil uprising. Although BG Hacohen eloquently described a possible violent conflict when he spoke of a train bearing down on settlers, he realized that his real interest resided in exhausting all possible means to avoid violence. His pursuit of this course allowed him to balance his internal narrative(s) as a son of settlers and a soldier of Israel.

Using the framework to examine Case #3 allowed us to explore the role institutions can play on increasing and decreasing violence. It allowed us to further explore the power dynamics and interests at play during the synagogue standoff and most importantly, it allowed us to better appreciate the interdependence between the protesters and the IDF. Although the tension between the two groups were volatile, the protesters realized that preserving their individual group identity meant they could not sever the interdependence between the secular state and the Zionist cause. The Zionist cause is dependent on the strength of the secular state and in return the secular state finds strength in the Zionist cause.

The Gush Katif case study demonstrates the value international relations concepts can provide the mid-careerist in better understanding the operational environment’s complexity. It can be used in conjunction with other doctrinal concepts such as PMESII-PT and ASCOPE to assist in design methodology and/or the planning process. The socio-political framework provides mid-careerists greater depth to explore complexity within the operational environment. The concepts within the framework serve as launching points to stimulate discussions within ILE seminars and planning groups. The mid-careerist can use the framework during “white-board sessions” to explore socio-political dynamics present at all levels within the environment. These nine concepts can serve as a starting point to initiate discussion in pursuit of understanding. This framework becomes even more powerful if it is supported by an inquisitive mind that seeks out a diverse education to enable greater exploration of socio-political dynamics.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

The doctrinal characterization of the operational environment as complex and dynamic, and the realization that Army leaders require life-long education to intellectually prepare for these challenges inspires me to ask: What attributes do these officers need? The Army Leader Development Strategy helps answer this question by identifying “critical and creative thinking,” “ability to reason,” “geo-political,” and “cultural” skills as desirable attributes. Interestingly, the attributes identified in ALDS as essential for officers to operate in the complex operational environment are the same attributes a liberal arts education is credited for providing. A Liberal Arts education has been lauded by such august military leaders as General Eisenhower and General Petraeus for providing soldiers valuable skills necessary during war time.

Although a graduate liberal arts education for all mid-careerists would be valuable, fiscal and time constraints makes this unachievable. Even though a graduate liberal arts education for all mid-careerists is not feasible, we can still selectively leverage specific liberal arts disciplines to advance our understanding of the complex and dynamic operational environment. International relations theory is one discipline that can provide a practical approach to instilling attributes ALDS identifies, while introducing concepts the mid-careerist can use to explore socio-political dynamics.

This paper proposes a framework consisting of nine concepts a mid-careerist can use to increase his understanding of socio-political dynamics. To demonstrate the value of this framework, it was applied to a case study focused on the socio-political dynamics of the 2005 Gaza settlement disengagement. The case study demonstrates how theories and concepts drawn from international relations theory can provide a better understanding of socio-political dynamics within the complex operational environment.

The ILE international relations curriculum offers an excellent platform to introduce this framework, since the concepts that comprise the framework are all found within the three principle international relations theories. Introducing the framework during the international relations block of instruction will not only allow students to better grasp the geo-political environment, but enable them to take these concepts and apply them at levels that are more relevant to their current grade and position. It also allows the instructor to connect blocks of instruction that might seem disparate and unrelated to the student. The instructor can introduce the framework during the international relations block and carry it over into the planning and design blocks. The framework complements other doctrinal concepts such as PMESII-PT and ASCOPE, but its rich theoretical origin can increase understanding and lead the mid-careerist into a deeper exploration of casual mechanisms.

Although the framework enables discussions, it is not a formulaic recipe for understanding. Success in understanding the socio-political dynamics within the operational environment requires engaged and inquisitive mid-careerists who are constantly seeking out new approaches to understanding. It is not sufficient enough for a mid-careerist to only memorize procedural steps or rely on surface deep statistics. The mid-careerist must immerse himself in academic literature and subjects that have relevance in understanding complex socio-political interactions. While the framework can encourage critical and creative thinking, it cannot force the mid-careerist to undertake these activities.
The similarity in attributes ALDS seeks to instill in its leaders and the attributes a liberal education is credited for instilling makes liberal arts an indispensable resource for the mid-careerist. Liberal Arts subjects like international relations, politics, philosophy, history, psychology, or sociology provide concepts that can exercise the mid-careerist’s mind and enrich his understanding of socio-political dynamics. As clearly stated in ALDS, the individual shares a responsibility to educate himself on “geo-politics” and culture. This aspect of his professional education cannot be found in technical manuals or within military doctrine; it must be pursued through other avenues. Liberal Arts offer one such avenue.

The Army’s ILE program educates the majority of the mid-career officer population. Introducing curriculum into ILE ensures the majority of mid-careerists benefit from its inclusion, while working around some of the fiscal constraints adding additional educational opportunities necessarily imposes. Beyond the practical and fiscal benefits of introducing more international relations and liberal arts concepts to ILE students, are the reasons clearly identified in the Army’s leader development strategy. Developing “agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders” who are prepared to operate at the national level, “across the spectrum of conflict,” within the interagency arena, and among peoples and cultures that are drastically different than their own, does not simply occur by focusing solely on technical and tactical skillsets or by sending officers to a preparatory school in the twilight of their career. The attributes the ALDS seeks to instill in its leaders must be introduced early and then constantly reinforced through future institutional education and self-development pursuits.

The Army effectively prepares its officers to be technically and tactically proficient in their officer specialties, in addition to preparing them to assume key leadership positions within the parochial institution. What the Army does not effectively do is prepare its broad mid-career officer population to assume future leadership positions within the broader national security profession. While today’s captains and majors must understand battalion and brigade operations, they must also begin to understand the role of the military within the U.S. government and society. Part of this understanding includes an appreciation for the role the military plays in the policy process and in achieving policy objectives.

Beyond America’s shores, the mid-careerist must appreciate how views, identities, and narratives shape other peoples’ attitudes towards America’s foreign policy and military forces. To effectively operate within these complex operational environments, mid-careerists must be introduced to a broad range of concepts and ideas that often run counter to an American narrative that is imbued with patriotic ideals of exceptionalism and manifest destiny. Although patriotic pride is an essential characteristic to build a community, the leader who cannot step outside his cloistered shell and appreciate diverse opinions or empathize with people wholly different than himself, is of limited value beyond the mid-career ranks.

The Army has made important and valuable initial steps in preparing its leaders for the complex operational environment. The addition of complexity to the Army doctrine, coupled with the development of design methodology, provides soldiers with valuable tools. The call for focusing leader education on developing soldiers who are intellectually prepared for the demands posed by the operational environment is also an important step in the right direction. Despite identifying the intellectual attributes it desires in its leaders, the Army has yet to develop an action plan to educate its broad mid-career officer population. With the fiscal realities bearing down on the Army, any education plan targeted at the general mid-careerists must be financially feasible and capable of reaching the vast population.

Mid-career Army officers are rather fond of quoting Clausewitz, because of the salience and longevity of his ideas. Embracing the inner Prussian causes reflection on Clausewitz’s most notable pronouncement that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” If we accept this claim, would it not make sense to educate those individuals who will implement policy (soldiers) on politics and their role as political instruments? If war is a personal endeavor that involves interacting with, among, and against individuals from disparate backgrounds with largely different and often incongruent perspectives of the world, is it not reasonable and appropriate to prepare leaders’ minds for these environments?

Introducing a framework consisting of international relations concepts, coupled with familiarizing mid-careerists with liberal arts subjects that can help them better understand socio-political dynamics, will increase their understanding of the complex operational environment. Although it is only a slight adjustment to current curriculum and cannot be the only solution to develop America’s future national security leaders, it is an essential step in intellectually preparing the mid-careerist for the challenges ahead.