STATE, ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE AND CONFLICTS IN TAFAWA-BALEWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF BAUCHI STATE

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By

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INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian federation is a highly heterogeneous state in which major political issues are vigorously contested along the complex ethnic, religious and regional divisions of the country (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Indeed, with over 400 ethnic groups spread across several religious sects in the country, a context for conflicts appears to be in place, especially given the fierce competition and contestations over the control of state power and resources. While in the southern part of Nigeria, major internal conflicts tend to be ethno-regional; with the dominant ethnic groups in the region acting as regional hegemons confronting other groups of the federation and the state in general, some of the most devastating conflicts in the northern part of Nigeria have particularly been ethno-religious; with the state and the ethno-religious divide of the region at the centre of these crises. Indeed, due to the tendency of ethno-religious conflicts to spillover from their initial theatres into other localities, states or even regions of the federation, this type of conflicts have proved to be the most violent instances of intergroup conflicts in Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). They have occurred mainly in the Middle belt and Muslim north, where Muslim Hausa-Fulani and Christian groups have pitted against each other in a dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Notable examples includes the Kafanchan crises of 1987, Kastina 1991, Kano 1991, Kaduna polytechnic 1992, Kasuwar Magani (Kaduna) 2001, Jos 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009-2011 and Tafawa Balewa 1991, 1995 and 2001. Although these conflicts continue to exhibit ethnic and religious colorations, a number of works (Mustapha, 2000; Abdu, 2006; Egwu, 2001) focusing on the major flash points of Kaduna, Kano and Plateau states suggests that these conflicts are not unconnected to the actions and inactions of the state. This view is generally based on the assumption that the forms of consciousness at the core of ethno-religious conflicts
in Nigeria are not in themselves a dangerous feature of plural states; they become problematic when they become or are perceived as objects around which discriminatory practices and unjustified use of violence are organized (Ibrahim, 2000).

With particular reference to the 1991, 1995 and 2001 ethno religious crises in Tafawa Balewa this paper investigates the validity of the foregoing assumption. In essence, in what way(s) does the state and the ethno-religious divide of Tafawa Balewa local government area of Bauchi state intersect to create conflict in the region? What implications do the conflicts have for Nigeria’s federation? And how best can the problem be minimized? To find answers to the foregoing questions some of the witnesses and victims of the conflicts under investigation were identified and interviewed. Questions asked in the course of the interview were structured towards identifying the motives of the conflicts; particularly, in relation to the actions and inactions of the state.

It should also be noted that the particular conflicts under investigation have been chosen because they have been the most devastating conflicts in the area. The paper is divided into six parts. Following this introduction is an examination of the concepts of state and ethno-religious conflicts. Some of the explanations advanced for the spread of ethno-religious conflicts are also examined. The third part of the work is a general background of Bauchi state and Tafawa Balewa local government area. The fourth part examines how the state and ethno-religious divide of Tafawa Balewa local government area intersect to create conflicts in the region. Part five examines the implications of the conflicts for Nigeria’s federal system and lastly, the sixth part is the conclusion.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE STUDY

During the colonial era; up to independence, Bauchi state formed part of the Bauchi-Plateau of the then Northern Region. With the 1967 state creation exercise, Bauchi, Borno, and Adamawa provinces constituted the former North-Eastern State; and in 1976, Bauchi state was created as one of the states in northern Nigeria following the breakup of the north eastern state. With the creation of Bauchi state in 1976; then comprising present Bauchi and Gombe states, it included 16 Local Government Areas. The number of Local Government Areas in the then Bauchi state was increased to 20 and later to 23. However, in 1997 when Gombe state was created out of Bauchi and additional local governments were created in the country, Bauchi state was left with 20 Local Government Areas as shown below.
### TABLE ONE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS OF BAUCHI STATE AS AT 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>AREA (KM²)</th>
<th>POPULATION (2006 CENSUS)</th>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN REGION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>493,810</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafawa Balewa</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>219,988</td>
<td>Tafawa Balewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dass</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>89,943</td>
<td>Dass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toro</td>
<td>6,932</td>
<td>350,404</td>
<td>Toro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogoro</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>84,215</td>
<td>Bogoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningi</td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>387,192</td>
<td>Ningi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warji</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>114,720</td>
<td>Warji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganjuwa</td>
<td>5059</td>
<td>280,468</td>
<td>Kafin Madaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alkaleri</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>329,424</td>
<td>Alkaleri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirfi</td>
<td>3,774</td>
<td>366,221</td>
<td>Kirfi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORTHERN REGION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darazo</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>251,597</td>
<td>Darazo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misau</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>263,487</td>
<td>Misau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giade</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>156,969</td>
<td>Giade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shira</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>234,014</td>
<td>Yana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’are</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>117,883</td>
<td>Jama’are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katagum</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>295,970</td>
<td>Azare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itas/ Gadau</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>229,996</td>
<td>Itas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaki</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>191,457</td>
<td>Katagum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamawa</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>286,388</td>
<td>Gamawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damban</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>150,922</td>
<td>Damban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Bauchi state occupies a total land area of 49,119 km² representing about 5.3% of Nigeria’s total land mass and is located between latitudes 9° 3’ and 12° 3’ north of the equator. Longitudinally, the state lies between 8° 50’ and 11° east of the Greenwich meridian. The state is bordered by seven states, Kano and Jigawa to the north, Taraba and Plateau to the south, Gombe and Yobe to the east and Kaduna to the west. The state also spans two distinctive vegetation zones, namely, the Sudan savannah and the Sahel savannah. The Sudan savannah type of vegetation covers the southern part of the state. Here, the vegetation gets richer and richer.
towards the south, especially along water sources or rivers, but generally the vegetation is less uniform and grasses are shorter than what grows even farther south, that is, in the forest zone of the middle belt. The Sahel type of the savannah, which is also known as the semi-desert vegetation, becomes manifest from the middle of the state as one moves from the state's south to its north. This type of vegetation comprises isolated stands of thorny shrubs. On the other hand, the southwestern part of the state is mountainous as a result of the continuation of the Jos Plateau, while the northern part is generally sandy.

The vegetation types as described above are conditioned by the climatic factors, which in turn determine the amount of rainfall received in the area. For instance, the rainfall in Bauchi state ranges between 1300 mm per annum in the south and only 700 mm per annum in the extreme north. This pattern is due to the fact that in the West Africa sub-region, rains generally come from the south as they are carried by the southwesterly. There is therefore a progressive dryness towards the north, culminating in the desert condition in the far north. So also is the case in Bauchi state. Consequently, rains start earlier in the southern part of the state, where rain is heaviest and lasts longer. Here the rains start in April with the highest record amount of 1300 mm per annum. In contrast, the northern part of the state receives the rains late, usually around June or July, and records the highest amount of 700 mm per annum. In the same vein, the weather experienced in the south and the north varies considerably. While it is humidly hot during the early part of the rainy season in the south, the hot, dry and dusty weather lingers up north. In addition to rainfall, Bauchi state is watered by a number of rivers. They include the Gongola and Jama'are rivers. The Gongola River crosses Bauchi state in Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in the south and in Kirfi and Alkaleri Local Government Areas in the eastern part of the state, while the Jama'are River cuts across a number of Local Government Areas in
the northern part of the state. Moreover, a substantial part of the Hadeja-Jama'are River basin lies in Bauchi state, which along with various fadama (floodplain) areas in the state provides suitable land for agricultural activities. These are further supported by the number of dams meant for irrigation and other purposes. These include the Gubi and Tilde-Fulani dams. There are also lakes such as the Maladumba Lake in Misau Local Government Area that further provide the necessary conditions to support agriculture.

Bauchi State has about 55 tribal groups in which Hausa, Fulani, Gerawa, Sayawa, Jarawa, Bolewa, Karekare, Kanuri, Fa'awa, Butawa, Warjawa, Zulawa, and Badawa are the main tribes. There are cultural similarities in the people's language, occupational practices, festivals, dress and there is a high degree of ethnic interaction especially in marriage and economic existence. Yet, in recent years the ethno-religious divide of the state has evolved along two general lines: the Hausa-Fulani: which constitute the major Muslim category in the state, and the non Muslim minority ethnic groups. Indeed, it is along this lines that clashes have occurred between the Sayawa who constitute the dominant non-Muslim ethnic group in the state and the Hausa-Fulani.

THE STATE AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CLARIFICATION

A state is an organized political community within a definite territory that possesses sovereignty. In this context, the state possesses such attributes as: a government, population, a defined territory and sovereignty, and is recognized in international law as a legal entity. However, a state may also refer to a political organization comprising the individuals and institutions authorized to formulate public policies and conduct the affairs of a country. Within this context, the state is seen as a system comprising the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, military and other key institutions that co-ordinate the daily affairs of a country. Thus, while the
former describes a fixed and somewhat permanent entity, the latter conception of the state is one that is particularly fluid and dynamic. For the purposes of this paper, the state is particularly seen from the latter perspective due to the fact that it is in this context that theories seek to explain the complicity of the state in the spread of conflicts.

By virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, the Nigerian state has been described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa. From its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced a perennial crisis of territorial or state legitimacy, which has often challenged its effort at national cohesion, democratic stability and economic transformation (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The issues that generate the fiercest contestation in the Nigerian state include those that are considered fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, over which competing groups tend to adopt exclusionary, winner takes all strategies. These include the control of state power, resource allocation and citizenship (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Conflicts generally constitute inevitable aspects of human interaction. Indeed, socio-political interactions involve two contradictory tendencies: conflict and cooperation. As human beings interact and seek to promote their material well being and survival amidst scarce resources, they either cooperate for the purpose of mutual benefits or disagree over the usage of factors and processes of production (Dunmoye, 2010). Thus, devising effective strategies aimed at managing the inevitability of social conflicts has always been one of the major characteristics of a vibrant polity. While the state has a major role in the management of conflicts, this paper argues that in the Nigerian case, the state at various times has also been at the centre of conflicts. It is further argued that the origin of most of the inter-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria in general; and the northern region in particular, cannot be disconnected from the nature of the colonial and post-
colonial state. While it would be an oversimplification to locate the causes of conflicts in colonialism alone, the contemporary manifestations of most conflicts are no doubt pre-configured by colonialism and specifically by the reproduction of its form in the post colonial period.

Ethno-religious conflicts on the other hand have been used to describe conflicts that involve the intersection of ethnic and religious identities; particularly since the early 1980’s when the Maitatisine riots ushered in a regime of religious conflicts in the northern part of Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). This type of conflict emerges where ethnic/geographical and religious distinctions coincide. These distinctions in Nigeria’s pluralistic society have been heightened by economic or labor migration, especially by Christian Southerners moving to the core Muslim areas in the North (Salawu 2010). The ethno-religious identity at the core of this kind of conflicts owed its origin to regional formations under colonial administration. These identities have been useful for differentiating the predominantly Muslim north from the predominantly Christian south. It has also helped in differentiating the dominant Muslim group in the north from the non-Muslim minorities in the region. Indeed, unlike in the southern part of Nigeria where “majority ethnic groups” are distinguished from “minority ethnic groups” on the basis of ethnicity, majority-minority distinctions in the north have been more religious than ethnic (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Since religious differences play a major part in ethnic differentiation in northern Nigeria conflicts between the Hausa - Fulani and minority ethno-religious groups are described as ethno-religious (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

Various theories and explanations have been offered for the spread of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. One of such explanations attempts to link the diverse nature of the country to conflict. Yet, it has been established that while diversity is a necessary condition for conflict,
it is not a sufficient one (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Indeed, experiences indicate that even homogeneous countries can be devastated by conflict, as in the case of Sudan and Somalia. Thus, conflicts have been associated with conditions that favour insurgency including poverty, which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states (Fearson and Laitin, 2003: 75). Other factors that intervene between diversity and conflict include the role of formal and informal institutions for conflict regulation, the different sizes of groups relative to the national arena and the extent to which different identities (ethnic, religious, regional, class etc) overlap with or crosscut each other. Indeed, there is a set of intervening variables between diversity and conflicts that needs to be interrogated to unravel the nature of the connection between them and in particular, to discern the dynamics of how identities get mobilized and politicized (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). In the light of the foregoing, other explanations have been advanced in order to analyze the complicity of the state in the occurrence and prevalence of ethno-religious conflicts in plural states like Nigeria. An example is the informal repression theory.

The concept of informal repression was first used in South Africa in the late 1980s. It was used to describe the use of “covert and surrogate” means of repressing opposition. Network for Independent Monitors, a Durban, South African based Human Rights group defined informal Repression as “those forms of repression which lies outside the controls of the formal security legislation and which are exercised by state structures at one end of the scale and by persons unknown at other end of the scale”. It entails “stimulating ethnic violence; either favoring one faction against another in long standing and latent rivalries or inciting conflicts between communities that had previously lived together in harmony” (Article 19, 2000: 3).

Cases of informal repression are popular in societies in transition, where the formal repressive activities of the state cannot be directly carried out as a result of (re)democratization
process. The state therefore engages in covert activities in which its hands are either hidden or disguised and portray these violent activities as communal, religious or ethnic. The essence is to “conceal their real nature and imply that everyone bears equal responsibility for resolving them” (Article 19, 2000:3). Issues of informal repression were made popular in South Africa and Kenya during the transition to democracy. In Kenya, during the 1990s the Kenyan Government under Moi resorted to strategies of informal repression to harass and intimidate political opponents. There were periodic outbreaks of state-sponsored violence in the Rift valley during 1997-1998. These violence have often been portrayed as ethnic or communal violence. In South Africa, the apartheid government in many instances used various vigilante groups whose state links were disguised and hit squads composed of unknown persons to terrorize opposition forces. Nigeria since the mid 1980s, is supposedly, seen to have experienced growing cases of ethno-religious violence whose occurrences cannot be completely divorced from the open and disguised activities of the government (Abdu, 2006, Ibrahim, 2000, Mustapha 2000). Indeed, as Abdu (2006) notes:

While ethnicity and religion have continued to be manipulated to serve the interest of the ruling class, the state has often tried to present itself as a neutral arbiter, but through some of its actions and inactions, before, during and after the crisis, the unseen-hands of the state could be made visible.

CONFLICTS IN TAFAWA BALEWA: THE STATE AND THE SAYAWA- HAUSA FULANI DIVIDE

As was noted earlier the character of the state right from the colonial period cannot be disconnected from the spread of ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. A critical pillar of colonial domination was the fragmentation of the indigenous people and their projection as discrete, separate and self-contained peoples governed by a native rationality on one hand, and their centralization as colonized peoples sharing a common colonial nationality on the other.
Indeed, the contradictions of the divide and rule policy under colonialism produced stress and competitive situations in which actual or imagined fear eroded harmonious and mutual confidence amongst the various ethno-religious groups. In such circumstances ethnic and religious identities came to be deployed as weapons in the structural conflicts and contest for public positions following the end of colonial rule.

Against the foregoing, one dominant attitude which has emerged around the ethno-religious divide of most parts of northern Nigeria; including, the Hausa-Fulani and the Sayawa divide of Tafawa Balewa is what Ashafa (2005) refers to as attitudes favoring autonomy and integration. The autonomists (who are mostly the minority ethno-religious groups in the north) accuse the integrationists (mostly the Hausa-Fulani at the helm of affairs) of wanting to dominate, deprive or marginalize other groups in the region. As a result, the intension and activities of the state are viewed with great suspicion.

With the Jihad of Uthman Danfodio, the Sayawas who were yet to establish centralized systems of administration were brought under the Bauchi emirate council and by implication under the Sokoto Caliphate. Yet, the Sayawa people have always insisted on their right to organize and govern themselves through an indigenous traditional institution. Over the years, access to land was a major factor that generated conflicts amongst the Hausa-Fulani and the Sayawa. However, in 1991, 1995 and 2000; conflicts in Tafawa Balewa local government of Bauchi state; resulting in the destruction of property worth millions of naira and hundreds of lives was spawned directly and indirectly by the activities of the state.

In 1991, ethno-religious crises between the Sayawa and the Hausa-Fulani in Tafawa Balewa claimed at least 300 lives and property worth millions of naira were destroyed (Bukata,
1991: 4). While the immediate cause of the crisis could not be precisely given, some believed that it erupted following an attempt by a Christian to slaughter pigs in the Muslim section of the town’s only abattoir. It was also suggested that the conflict was ignited consequent upon roasted meat (Suya) made of pork and sold to a Muslim. However, the major issue being contested during the crises, as gathered in the course of this study, was the leadership of Lere District, an area, the Sayawa people wanted to be governed by the native people and not the Fulani. In pursuant of this demand, the Sayawa had clashed with the District Head of Lere who is always an appointee of the Emir of Bauchi. Because of lack of positive response to their demands for a separate chiefdom the people of the area had vowed to operate on the opposing camp to the Bauchi authority (Bukata, 1991: 4). Following the April 22\textsuperscript{nd} 1991 civil disturbance in Tafawa Balewa local government, the then Federal Military Government of Babangida set up a commission of inquiry (Babalakin commission) to investigate the causes of the crises. Accordingly, the commission made some recommendations which included the creation of Sayawa chiefdom. Yet, while all the other recommendations were implemented the chiefdom was not.

In a related development, the 1995 crises in Tafawa Balewa local government area was triggered by the then local government chairman of Tafawa Balewa who insisted on organizing a party in Tafawa Balewa to celebrate the appointment of a Hausa-Fulani as the commissioner of special duties. To this effect the salary of local government staff consisting of a large population of Sayawa was deducted at source to finance the party (Bala, 2000). The opposition of the Sayawa to this development led to the crisis of 1995 which claimed about 200 lives and destroyed property worth millions of naira. With regards to the 2001 crises, the intension of the Bauchi state government to introduce Sharia penal code in the state was a major factor in the
crises. The imposition of the Sharia penal code had been rationalized by some of the northern states of Nigeria on the need to curb issues of moral decadence, the need to return to faith and as a backlash against growing corruption and erosion of communal solidarity. In Tafawa Balewa local government area of Bauchi state which consists of a large population of Christians, the Sharia penal code fuelled already existing animosities between the Sayawa’s and the Hausa Fulani.

The complicity of the state is also reflected in the way the post conflict situation was handled by the Bauchi state government. Following the 1991 crises for example where so many lives were lost it was alleged that the Bauchi state government under the leadership of Conel Abu Ali openly threatened to not to pay the April 1991 salary of civil servants whom had taken refuge in camps in neighboring states after losing their loved ones in the crises. The government insisted that until they returned to work under the tensed atmosphere, their salary would not be paid. Given that the Sayawa people constituted a substantial part of the displaced people following the crises, this move was interpreted as a direct attack against them (Bukata 1991).

In addition to the foregoing, representation in government is another issue that was very central in the 1991, 1995 and the 2001 conflicts amongst the Sayawa and the Hausa Fulani. Tension leading the conflicts was heightened by the feelings of marginalization. The Sayawa alleged that since the creation of Bauchi state federal appointments coming to the state have always been dominated by the Hausa-Fulani. Whether this has been the case is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, such feelings of marginalization; real or imagined has consistently placed the state and the ethno-religious divide at the centre of conflicts in Tafawa Balewa local government area.
IMPLICATIONS OF ACTS OF INFORMAL REPRESSION FOR NIGERIA'S FEDERAL SYSTEM

Federalism is a system of government intended to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of state rights. Hamilton (in Mahajan, 2000) defines a federal system as an association of states to form a new state. According to Montesquieu, a federal system of government is a convention by which several similar states agree to be members of a larger one; while K.C Wheare (1964) refers to the federal system as a method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a sphere coordinate and independent.

The Nigerian federation is composed of an extremely diverse population of over 140 million people divided into at least 250 ethnic groups with diverse culture and customs. The country is also divided between Muslims, mainly resident in the north and some parts of the south west and Christians who populate the other parts of the south. There is also a significant class division based on income level creating a high degree of inequality. These various plural characteristics interact in different ways and are usually exploited to engineer conflicts. Issues bordering on marginalization and neglect have often led to large scale conflicts as typified in the conflicts examined earlier.

Federalism is generally believed to be a system of government that could better take care of the problems of pluralism among the people of a state. The United States of America which is considered the foremost modern federal state for instance adopted it to accommodate the imminent pluralism of a group of independent states agreed to come together into one country merging most of their pre-existing sovereignty, but protecting themselves by reserving under their own control certain powers which they had enjoyed in the past. This was the case for Switzerland when the separate cantons in the neighboring alpine valleys decided to join forces to
secure their continued joint independence, and also in Australia, when the separately administered British colonies around the coast of the vast island continent decided to pool their resources. In a differing circumstance, some modern federations like Canada, Belgium, India and Nigeria are countries which at a certain stage of their historical development opted for federalism to accommodate the obvious plural configurations among the people. Federalism in the latter case rather than being purposely for achieving the benefits of unity to the separate existing units, was as a result of the recognition of the fact that their peoples were so diverse in culture, language and interests that it would be impossible for them to be harmoniously administered by one central government (Price, 1975:59). In essence, one of the central motives of the federal system in Nigeria is the preservation of all ethnic and religious identities. Acts of informal repression is therefore a direct contradiction to the federal imperative in Nigeria. Indeed, where the activities of the state are perceived as a direct attack against a particular group; conflicts become inevitable and the federal system is exposed to stress.

CONCLUSION

The ethno-religious diversity of the Nigerian state is manifest in most of the states in the federation including Bauchi state. Yet, while this diversity is a condition for conflict it is not a sufficient one. By focusing on Tafawa Balewa local government area of Bauchi state this chapter attempted to examine what makes the ethno-religious divide of the state become a source of conflict. While the Nigerian state has a major role to play in minimizing the negative effects of conflicts in the country, it has in recent years been at the center of most of the conflicts in the country. Indeed, given the heterogeneous composition of Bauchi state; as is generally the case in Nigeria, the tendency for conflicts in the country is determined largely by the actions and
inactions of the state. Unless the state rises above ethno-religious differences and is also seen as such the ethno-religious divide of the state will continue to engender conflicts.
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