Dangerous Dicta

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Abstract

In United States v. Heller, the Court held that individuals have a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms apart from their associations with state militias. Although that holding was and remains controversial, less attention has been paid to what the Heller Court had to say about the Fourth Amendment. Writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia asserts that the phrase “right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refers to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights or rights that may only be exercised through participation in some corporate body.” By any definition, this is dicta. It is also dangerous. That is because the security of the people guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment presently is imperiled by the rapidly expanding surveillance capacities of governments and their agents. Meeting challenges posed by these technologies will require a sustained investment in constitutional remedies capable of reclaiming and preserving that security. The Heller Court’s reading of the Fourth Amendment threatens the ability of courts to fashion and enforce those remedies, which leaves each of us and all of us more vulnerable to the kinds of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that are anathema to the Fourth Amendment.

This essay takes on the Court’s dangerous dicta in Heller. It does so on textualist grounds. By applying well-established canons of interpretation, and considering historical evidence, it argues that rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are fundamentally collective. This does not mean that individuals cannot seek Fourth Amendment protections or raise Fourth Amendment claims. Any right of the people must in some way devolve to protections for persons. Rather, the point is that the Fourth Amendment targets government practices, which, if left to the unfettered discretion of government agents, would leave all of us and each of us insecure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects. This is precisely what is at stake in governments’ use of modern surveillance technologies, which suggests a critical role for the Fourth Amendment in ongoing efforts to regulate the deployment and use of those technologies.

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Introduction

In United States v. Heller, the Court held that individuals have a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms apart from their associations with state militias. Although that holding was and remains controversial, less attention has been paid to what the Heller Court had to say about the Fourth Amendment, which provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia asserts that the phrase “right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refers to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights or rights that may only be exercised through participation in some corporate body.” The Court admits that “If we look to other founding-era documents, we find that some state constitutions used the term ‘the people’ to refer to the people collectively, in contrast to ‘citizen,’ which was used to invoke individual rights.” It nevertheless maintains “that usage was not remotely uniform. . . . And, most importantly, it was clearly not the terminology used in the Federal Constitution, given the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.”

By any definition, the Heller Court’s musings about the meaning of the Fourth Amendment are dicta. The question before the Court in Heller had only to do with the meaning and application of the Second Amendment. There were no Fourth Amendment questions presented and the facts did not implicate any Fourth Amendment issues. Not only were the Court’s comments about the Fourth Amendment in Heller dicta, they were irresponsible dicta. The Court neither asked for nor received briefing on the meaning of “the right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment. The Court certainly did not offer evidence in support of its reading of the Fourth Amendment or consider in any material way contrary evidence or the potential consequences of its interpretation. It resorted instead to the easy rhetoric of clarity. Thus, the Court’s broad claims about the Fourth Amendment in Heller exhibit more than just a lack of judicial restraint, they display a disturbingly casual association with basic rules of textual interpretation and legal argument.

This is a shame, particularly coming through the pen of the Court’s leading textualist. It is also dangerous. That is because the security of the people guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is imperiled at present by the rapidly expanding surveillance capacities

2 Id. at 579.
3 Id. at 580 n.6.
4 Id.
of governments and their agents. Meeting challenges to security and privacy posed by these technologies will require a sustained investment in constitutional remedies capable of reclaiming and preserving that security. As Justice Scalia recently pointed out, although “dicta, even calculated dicta, are nothing but dicta,” “[d]icta on legal points . . . can do harm, because though they are not binding they can mislead.” This is certainly true of the Heller Court’s reading of the Fourth Amendment, which threatens the ability of courts to fashion and enforce appropriate constitutional remedies, leaving each of us and all of us more vulnerable to the kind of broad and indiscriminate surveillance that is anathema to the Fourth Amendment.

This essay takes on the Court’s dangerous dicta in Heller. It does so on textualist grounds. By applying well-established canons of interpretation and considering historical evidence, it argues that rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are fundamentally collective rather than individual. This does not mean that individuals cannot seek Fourth Amendment protections or raise Fourth Amendment claims. Any right of the people must in some way devolve to protections for persons, after all. Rather, the point is that the Fourth Amendment targets government practices, which, if left to the unfettered discretion of government agents, would leave all of us and each of us insecure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects. This is precisely what is at stake in governments’ use of modern surveillance technologies.

I. The Canon of Plain Meaning

The first rule of textual interpretation is that words and phrases should be read for their plain meaning. Barring some evidence of technical usage, words and phrases are presumed to carry their common public meaning. When determining common public meaning, dictionaries provide a useful resource. Justice Scalia has identified several

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10 Gray, Warrant Requirement, supra note 8.

11 It is not entirely clear that the Court ultimately disagrees with this view. Just a few sentences after issuing its dangerous dicta, it adopts the more defensible view that “the people” “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).

12 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 7, at 102.

13 Id. at 106, 112–13.

dictionaries as authoritative sources for common public meaning during the founding era.\textsuperscript{15} Among them is Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, which the \textit{Heller} Court relies upon for founding-era definitions of “keep and bear arms,”\textsuperscript{16} and which Justice Scalia has hailed as among “the most useful and authoritative for the English Language generally and for the law.”\textsuperscript{17}

According to the tenth edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1792, “people” refers to “a nation” or “those who compose a community,” whereas “person” refers to an “Individual or particular man or woman.”\textsuperscript{18} As a matter of plain meaning, then, we should read the Fourth Amendment as referring to a right of “the nation” or “those who compose the community” rather than a discrete right of each “individual or particular man or woman.”

Pressed, the \textit{Heller} Court might argue that “people” is ambiguous, and may mean either “a nation” or “men or persons in general,”\textsuperscript{19} as in the phrase “when people say one thing, they do not mean something else.”\textsuperscript{20} Exploiting this ambiguity, the Court might contend that the best reading of the text is that it protects the rights of people, generally, which is to say “persons,” to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

This line of response is fatally flawed. The mere possibility of an ambiguity does not by itself compromise plain meaning.\textsuperscript{21} The ambiguity must be plausible in light of other intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. Moreover, even where there is a plausible alternative interpretation of a word or phrase, suggesting a real ambiguity, that raises questions rather than resolving them. Thus, the Court would be unwarranted in concluding that the text of the Fourth Amendment “clearly” does not refer to the nation as a whole or the people comprising the community collectively simply because it \textit{could} mean people in general. It would, instead, need to refer to some source of evidence to resolve the potential ambiguity. As subsequent sections show, all available evidence suggests that the text would have been read and understood in 1791 to mean what it says: that the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is a collective right of the people.

\section*{II. \textit{Noscitur a Sociis}}

Closely associated with plain meaning is the interpretive canon \textit{noscitur a sociis}, or “a word is known by the company it keeps.”\textsuperscript{22} This reflects the basic rule of all semantic systems that meaning is in part a function of context. “Lead” means one thing in the

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\item \textsuperscript{15} SCALIA \& GARNER, \textit{supra} note 14, at 419.
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Heller}, 554 U.S. at 581.
\item \textsuperscript{17} SCALIA \& GARNER, \textit{supra} note 14, at 419.
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textsc{Samuel Johnson}, \textsc{A Dictionary of the English Language} (10th ed. 1792) available at http://books.google.com/books?id=j-U1AAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textsc{Singer} \& \textsc{Singer}, \textit{supra} note 14, at 425-26.
\item \textsuperscript{21} SCALIA \& GARNER, \textit{supra} note 14, at 33-41.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Id.} at 195; SCALIA, \textit{supra} note 6, at 26.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
sentence “William Wallace will lead us to victory!” and something quite different in the sentence “Isaac Newton was obsessed with the possibility of turning lead into gold.” To the extent there is any ambiguity in the word “people,” we might therefore find some guidance by looking to semantic context.

In defense of its claim that the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refers to individual rights, not collective rights,” the Court might seek to exploit the fact that “people” may sometimes refer to a nation and sometimes to “men, or persons in general.” This effort might gain some traction if the text of the Fourth Amendment read “The right of people to be secure . . . .” It does not, however. It instead reads “The right of the people to be secure . . . .” Following the canon noscitur a sociis, we ought not to ignore the presence of that definite article or the modifying force it has on the meaning of “people.”

“The,” meant in 1792 what it means now. It is “The article noting a particular thing.” Modified by “the,” it makes neither semantic nor syntactic sense to read “people” in the Fourth Amendment as referring to unidentified persons generally. The better reading, as a matter of plain meaning and noscitur sociis, is that “the people” refers to a particular nation or community as a whole. In this case, that nation or community is the people of the United States of America. This has important implications. The Heller Court contends that “right of the people” in the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refers to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights or rights that may only be exercised through participation in some corporate body.” If the right to be secure under the Fourth Amendment was a right “of people” rather than a right “of the people,” then there might be good textualist grounds for this proposition. It is not, however. It therefore follows that, to claim Fourth Amendment protections a litigant must be a member of “the people” in good standing and can only exercise Fourth Amendment rights through and by virtue of that membership.

It is worth a moment of pause here to consider one potential objection to all this close semantic and syntactic analysis. One might argue that those who drafted the Fourth Amendment were not thinking about these matters and were in fact rather sloppy during the drafting process. Accordingly, the argument might go, it would be folly to read the text too closely because that close reading may either imagine intentions that are not there or

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23 JOHNSON, supra note 18.

24 Id.

25 Compare U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”).


27 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”). On this point, the Heller Court seems inclined to agree. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-81 (2008).

28 See STEPHEN Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-86 (2006) (suggesting that laws sometimes contain vague or ambiguous language for a range of reasons, including inattention).
ultimately defeat the intentions of the drafters by privileging technicalities.\footnote{William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602–1791, at 729 (2009); Breyer, supra note 28, at 98-101.} Perhaps based on extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, one might further argue that the drafters did not intend for the text to mean what it says, and that the interpretation more faithful to their purposes would read “the people” as referring to each individual person, subject, or citizen rather than the American nation or community as a whole. For at least two reasons, this argument must be rejected.

First, it requires a shift of interpretive theories from textualism to intentionalism.\footnote{Scalia, supra note 6, at 6, 23.} As Justice Scalia has argued quite persuasively, intentionalism is a highly suspect enterprise that sets few if any constraints on interpreters while compromising fundamental democratic principles.\footnote{Id. at 16-23.} The legislative record for any statute or constitution is bound to contain a range of often conflicting views reflecting the diversity of opinions among those who participated in the legislative process.\footnote{Id. at 29, 36.} Pursuit of legislative intent therefore presents judges with an opportunity to “choose their friends,” selectively highlighting legislators’ statements that favor the judge’s own views while discounting those which do not.\footnote{Id. at 36.} More fundamentally, the sources constituting a legislative record, such as floor debates, committee reports, testimony, and statements by legislators, are not subject to congressional vote, presidential signature, or, in this case, ratification by the states.\footnote{Id. at 32-36.} They therefore cannot claim anything like the democratic legitimacy necessary to rule a nation of free persons.\footnote{Id. at 9, 21-22.} For these and other reasons, Justice Scalia has argued that intentionalism is antidemocratic, and that judges who pursue legislative intent threaten to reduce us to the rule of men, not laws.\footnote{Id. at 22, 25.} Whether or not one agrees with Justice Scalia on this score, it would surely be odd to defend an opinion he wrote using methods anathema to his character as a scholar and jurist.

Second, to argue that those who read and wrote the Fourth Amendment in 1792 did not mean what they wrote, but rather meant the exact opposite, would require compelling extrinsic evidence. The \textit{Heller} Court does not offer any such evidence. Furthermore, as is set forth below, the historical context in which the Fourth Amendment was drafted and ratified supports the view that it means what it says, securing rights that are first and foremost held collectively by the people.

### III. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Another important canon of interpretation advises that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the alternative. As the editors of the leading treatise on statutory interpretation have put the point, “when people say one thing, they do not mean something
The Fourth Amendment describes a “right of the people” not a right of “people” or a right of “each person.” As an intrinsic matter, that expression, which secures a right for the people as a whole, excludes alternatives such as “persons,” “citizens,” or “subjects,” which would secure rights for individuals. Moreover, relevant extrinsic evidence reinforces this reading of the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment was neither drafted nor ratified in a vacuum. Rights against general warrants and other abuses of search and seizure powers were already guaranteed to the citizens of the states by their state constitutions. Among these, two are particularly important: the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which provided that “the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure,” and the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, which provided that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures.” As William Cuddihy reports, the final text of the Fourth Amendment reflects a decision to adopt the Pennsylvania language rather than the language from Massachusetts. As a matter of expressio unius, this choice should guide our understanding of the text.

Selection of “the people” rather than “every subject” in the final text of the Fourth Amendment is particularly important in light of the role that John Adams played in founding-era approaches to search and seizure rights. Adams is widely regarded as the intellectual architect of the Fourth Amendment. His work on search and seizure for the Massachusetts constitution later served as a blueprint for the Fourth Amendment. Despite his influence on the overall structure and content of the Fourth Amendment, the drafters ultimately chose to use “the people” rather than Adams’s “every subject.”

At the risk of piling on, there is one more source of historical data supporting the proposition that the phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment was chosen to the

37 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, at 426.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, at 561-73 (pointing out that drafters are presumed to know the relevant existing law). Although the Court does not acknowledge or address this evidence directly, Justice Scalia admits the relevance of evidence from founding-era constitutions to the project of interpreting the Constitution. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6 (2008).
40 PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. X (1776).
42 CUDDIHY, supra note 29, at 729.
43 See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, 25-26, 429, 446; Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990) (assigning significance to choices made by the drafters to use “the people,” “person,” and “accused”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 256 (acknowledging the canon of interpretation under which “If the legislature amends or reenacts a provision . . . a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.”).
46 See CUDDIHY, supra note 29, at 729.
exclusion of alternatives such as “every subject.” The Constitution sent to the states for ratification in 1787 did not include the Bill of Rights. This was a primary concern during the ratification debates, leading several states to issue reservations with their votes. Among these were New York, Virginia, and North Carolina, each of which recommended that the Constitution be amended to protect, inter alia, the right of “every freeman . . . to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” Despite these suggestions, the final text secures the right of “the people.”

Although the Heller Court does not acknowledge or address this evidence directly, the majority suggests a potential response in a footnote. There, it acknowledges that founding era state constitutions sometimes used “the people” to refer to collective entities and “citizens” or some similar term to “invoke individual rights,” but suggests that there was insufficient uniformity, thus barring any clear conclusions. This is a helpful point, so far as it goes. It just does not go very far—or at least does not go where the Court might hope.

The Heller Court’s reference to state constitutions is helpful insofar as it ratifies the use of founding era documents to inform our understanding of original public meaning attributed to words and phrases in the Constitution. It does not, however, provide any assistance in support of the Court’s claim that “the people” in the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously” refers to individual, not collective, rights. At best, such inconsistency would show ambiguity, not an absence of ambiguity. It is more likely, however, that these differences do not reflect any ambiguity at all but, instead, reflect differences of opinion.

The states may have had different views on whether, say, the right to trial by jury in suits regarding property was a right of “the parties” or “the people,” but that shows a substantive difference of opinion, not semantic inconsistency. One such difference in opinion was between states such as Pennsylvania and Vermont, which regarded search and seizure protections as rights “of the people,” and states like Massachusetts and New Hampshire, which viewed them as rights of “every subject.” The Fourth Amendment selects among these competing views. Far from showing ambiguity, that selection suggests clarity in terms of then-contemporary understanding of who held Fourth Amendment rights in the first instance: the people.

IV. The Whole Text & In Pari Materia

47 See A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (objecting to the federal constitution on the grounds that it contained no bill of rights, thereby denying citizens the ability to “plead and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as authority” in defense of “natural right”).


49 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6 (2008) (citing N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §XIV (1776); MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVIII (1776); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ch. 1, §XI (1777); PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §XII (1776)).

50 PA. CONST. art. XI (1776).

51 N.C. CONST. art. XIV(1776).
The “whole text” canon holds that texts should be read holistically, preserving consistency in overall meaning and in the use of particular words and phrases. The closely related rule of *in pari materia* provides that legal texts should be interpreted in ways that preserve consistency among closely related laws and constitutional provisions dealing with the same subject matter. Based on these canons, we might seek to resolve any ambiguity in the phrase “the people” as it is used in the Fourth Amendment by referring to how “the people” is used elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, and contemporary legal texts. As we shall see, this exercise leads to the same results produced by application of prior canons: an understanding of the Fourth Amendment as protecting collective rights of the people.

The word “people” appears nine times in the Constitution, and always as part of the phrase “the people”: in the Preamble (“We the People of the United States . . .”); Article I, Section 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . .”); Amendment I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”); Amendment II (“. . . the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); Amendment IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .”); Amendment IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); Amendment X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); Amendment XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election . . .”).

As the *Heller* Court admits, in all of these instances “the people” “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” It further allows that, as used in the Preamble, Article I, and Amendment X, “the people” “arguably refer[s] to ‘the people’ acting collectively.” Contrary to the canon of *in pari materia*, however, the Court maintains that all remaining instances of “the people” refer to “individual right[s]” not collective rights. The Court does so on grounds of a proposed distinction between constitutional provisions that “deal with the exercise or reservation of powers,” where “the people” means what it says, and provisions dealing with rights, where “the people” actually means individuals. For several reasons, this effort fails to persuade.

Foremost, there is no obvious distinction between powers and rights in the constitutional context. When the Constitution says that the people have the power to elect

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52 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, at 204; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 167–68.
53 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 14, at 234-38; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 252.
54 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580.
55 Id. at 579.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 579-80.
members of congress, it means that the people have the right to elect their representatives. Likewise, when it reserves to the people powers not delegated to the federal government, it means that the people have the exclusive right to legislate and regulate in those areas. Reciprocally, when the Constitution guarantees the right of the people to assemble, to keep and bear arms, or to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, it reserves to the people powers to act on those rights. Given this relationship between powers and rights in the Constitution, it is unclear what, if any, mileage the Heller Court can get from claiming that, as it appears in the Constitution, “the people” is used in reference to powers in the Preamble, Article I, and Amendments IX and XVII, but rights in Amendments I, II, and IV.

The Heller Court might seek to preserve its proposed distinction between rights and powers by suggesting that this alternative view indulges two fallacies: the naturalist’s fallacy and the moralist’s fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy maintains, falsely, that “is implies ought.” For example, the fact that many children live in poverty does not mean that they should live in poverty. So too, the Court might argue that when Article I says that the people have the power to elect their representatives this does not imply that they should have that power. The moralistic fallacy claims, again falsely, that “ought implies is.” For example, if one asserts that all people have a right to bodily security it does not follow that all persons are actually safe or that they have the ability to keep themselves safe from physical threats. So too, the Court might argue that when the First Amendment states that the people have a right to assemble this does not imply that they do, in fact, have the ability to assemble. On pains of either or both the naturalist fallacy and moralist fallacy, the Court might claim that we must recognize a real distinction between “powers” and “rights” granted to “the people” by the Constitution.

The problem with this line of argument is that it indulges a third fallacy: equivocation. The word “power” has multiple meanings. It can be used descriptively, as when we say that humans have the power or “ability” to reason. Alternatively, it can be used normatively, such as when we say that the state has the power or “right of governing.” The Heller Court is perfectly correct that when “power” is used descriptively, there is a sharp distinction between powers and rights. The naturalist and moralist fallacies capture that distinction. When “power” is used normatively, however, there is little, if any, distance, between powers and rights—powers assume rights and vice versa.

If the Constitution used “power” descriptively, then the Heller Court would have good grounds for maintaining a distinction between instances where “the people” is used in reference to powers versus instances where “the people” is used in reference to rights. That is just not how the Constitution uses “power.” The Constitution sets forth the de jure

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58 JOHNSON, supra note 18 (noting that “power” may mean “Government; right of governing.”).
59 JOHNSON, supra note 18 (noting that “right” means “power, prerogative, immunity, privilege”).
61 Id. at 894-95.
63 JOHNSON, supra note 18 (noting that “power” may mean “Ability, force, [or] reach.”).
64 JOHNSON, supra note 18 (noting that “power” may mean “Government; right of governing.”).
foundations of a republican democracy. As such, it does not describe and report; it prescribes and ascribes. When Article I vests “legislative Powers” in Congress, it does not merely observe the fact that Congress has the ability to pass laws, it is establishes Congress and grants to Congress the right to govern by legislation. When Article II vests the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons” with the President, it does not merely report the ability of presidents to draft and sign papers, it grants to presidents the right to grant pardons. Thus, on pains of equivocation, the Court does not appear to have good grounds for distinguishing between reservations of powers and ascriptions of rights to “the people” within the bounds of the Constitution.

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Absent some other grounds to distinguish amongst the Constitution’s use of “the people,” the canon of in pari materia provides further evidence that the Fourth Amendment should be read as protecting collective rights. Consider the use of “the people” in Article I, Section 2, which provides that “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .” It would be absurd to read “the people” in this context as meaning “individual persons.” Doing so would afford each of us the right and power to select our own representatives. The better interpretation recognizes a collective right to select representatives. That is, after all, the whole point of a representative democracy. This does not mean that Article I, Section II, has no bearing on individual rights. It surely does. The right of the people to select their representatives implies the rights of constituent members to participate in the selection process.

The Heller Court does not contest this reading of Article I. Neither does it contest the fact that “the people” in the Preamble and the Tenth Amendment refers to the people collectively. Given this, the canon of in pari materia demands that we also read “the people” in the Fourth Amendment as referring to the people collectively. As in the Article I context, this does not mean that the Fourth Amendment offers no succor or protection to individuals. The right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures implies the rights of constituent members to claim protection just as surely as the right of the people to select their representatives entails an individual right to vote.

The link suggested here between Article I, the First Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment may seem odd to the contemporary eye. For our founders, however, there was a clear conceptual connection among these rights that was reinforced by experience. The founding generation was influenced deeply by the political philosophy of John Locke. That influence is obvious in a number of founding era documents, including the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, which wrestle with fundamental and timeless political

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65 Breyer, supra note 28, at 21-34.
66 See Gray, Warrant Requirement, supra note 8.
67 Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 52, 59-66 (1985); see also The Proceedings Relative to Calling the Convention of 1776 and 1790: The Minutes of the Convention that Formed the Present Constitution of Pennsylvania 55 (1776) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Proceedings] (asserting that legitimate governmental authority is “derived from and founded on the authority of the people only”); A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (objecting to the federal constitution on the grounds that it contained no bill of rights, thereby denying citizens the ability to “plead and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as authority” in defense of “natural right”).

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challenges and in the process instantiate a people who claim some rights for themselves as “one Body Politick” and some rights for individual members of that whole.68

This pattern of allocating some rights to “the people” and other rights to individuals is evident in founding-era state constitutions. Take, for example, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which recognizes the critical role of both collective interests and individual rights in the establishment of a just government.70 In keeping with that view, the Pennsylvania Declaration allocates some rights to individuals71 and others to the people as a whole.72 There is a clear pattern to their choices.73 Rights assigned to individuals—such as the right to freedom of worship, the right to own property, and the right to fair criminal process—secure freedoms necessary to projects of ethical development and individual engagements with the state. By contrast, rights secured for the people—such as the right to hold elections, the right to free speech, and the right to assemble—comprise basic political

68 Doernberg, supra note 67, at 59-60 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT sec. 95 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1689); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-50 (1875) (“Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights. In the formation of a government, the people may confer upon it such powers as they choose. . . . The government thus established and defined is to some extent a government of the States in their political capacity. It is also, for certain purposes, a government of the people.”); Doernberg, supra note 67, at 62-66 (describing how the framers of the Constitution relied upon the work of John Locke in understanding the interrelationships between citizens, the citizenry, and the state and pointing out the primacy of “the people” as a “collective body” in both Locke’s political philosophy and the constitutional framework of government).

69 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (rights of those charged with treason); U.S. CONST. amend. III (quartering soldiers); U.S. CONST. amend. V (grand jury, due process); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (criminal trial rights).

70 See Pennsylvania Proceedings, supra note 67, at 55 (“[A]ll government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to enjoy their natural rights . . . .”).

71 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I (1776) (“[A]ll men are born equally free and independent . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. II (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty [God], according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. VIII (“[E]very member of society hat a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him or applied to public uses, without his own consent or that of his legal representatives . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. IX (“[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himself and his counsel . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. XI (“[I]n controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury . . . .”); PA. CONST. art. XV (“[A]ll men have a natural inherent right to emigrate from on state to another that will receive them . . . .”).

72 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. III (1776) (“[T]he people of this state have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same.”); PA. CONST. art. V (“[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government, in such manner as shall be by that community judges most conducive to the public weal.”); PA. CONST. art. VI (“[T]he people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular elections.”); PA. CONST. art. XIII (“. . . the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.”); PA. CONST. art. XVI (“[T]he people have a right to assemble together to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances by address, petition or remonstrance.”).

73 That this choice should be afforded significance when interpreting the text is a matter of in pari materia. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 252-55; TAYLOR, supra note 43, at 14, 15, 42.
rights essential to collective projects of self-governance. This reflects eighteenth-century understandings of fundamental political concepts such as “commonwealth,” “democracy,” and “republican,” as defined in relation to “the people.”

The United States Constitution follows this same pattern, resting Fourth Amendment rights with “the people” rather than “all men” or “every member of society.” This choice bespeaks an understanding that security from unreasonable search and seizure is linked to collective projects of governance and politics. This may seem counterintuitive to the modern mind. As the next section points out, however, this view accurately reflects eighteenth-century experiences with search and seizure.

V. The Mischief to Be Addressed

Although most textualists prefer intrinsic canons, which limit the range of relevant evidence to the text itself, courts often apply a limited range of extrinsic canons, which allow for the consideration of historical and contextual evidence. Among these is consideration of the mischief that a statute, regulation, or constitutional provision is meant to address. Evidence revealing the mischief addressed by the Fourth Amendment reinforces the view that it aims to protect collective rights.

Like many provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was motivated by our forebears’ experiences with abuses of power. The Fourth Amendment’s principal bête noir was the general warrant. By 1791, the common law had rejected general warrants. Among the primary reasons English courts gave for this common law prohibition was the effect of general warrants on collective security. These courts reasoned that nobody could...
feel secure in their persons, houses, papers, or effects if forced to live under a regime where executive agents had the authority to engage in programs of broad and indiscriminate search, limited only by their own unfettered discretion.\textsuperscript{84} Thus, in the General Warrant cases,\textsuperscript{85} which are widely recognized as a signal events in the history of the Fourth Amendment,\textsuperscript{86} Lord Camden notes that, if a government can grant “discretionary power . . . to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall . . . it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”\textsuperscript{87} Concerns for political liberty played a particularly important role in that assessment. After all, the plaintiffs in the General Warrants cases were dissident pamphleteers who were targeted by the King’s agents for their criticisms of George III and his policies.\textsuperscript{88}

Reflecting on this history, Tony Amsterdam has noted that the mischief targeted by the Fourth Amendment “was general, it was the creation of an administration of public justice that authorized and supported indiscriminate searching and seizing.”\textsuperscript{89} In light of this general threat, he concludes that “the phraseology of the amendment, akin to that of the first and second amendments and the ninth, [was not] accidental.”\textsuperscript{90} Bill Stuntz has reached a similar conclusion, pointing out that:

Indeed, the real harm [illegal] searches cause, the harm that matters most to society as a whole, is the diminished sense of security that neighbors and friends may feel when they learn of the police misconduct. Totalitarian

\textsuperscript{84} Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966) (The “indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and imposes a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures . . . ”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (“An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police state where they are the law.”); Gray & Citron, Fourth Amendment Remedies, \textit{supra} note 8, at 73-83.


\textsuperscript{87} Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489. \textit{See also}, Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765) (“we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society”); \textit{TAYLOR}, \textit{supra} note 45, at 33-35 (recounting how members of Parliament and other elites felt threatened by the use of general warrants in the Wilkes case); Doernberg, \textit{supra} note 67, at 57-58 (noting that “most eighteenth-century liberal doctrines can be traced to Locke and his concept that community power resides in the majority.”).

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{TAYLOR}, \textit{supra} note 45, at 29-30.

\textsuperscript{89} Amsterdam, \textit{supra} note 83, at 367.

\textsuperscript{90} Id.
governments do not cow their citizens by regularly ransacking all their homes; the threat is usually enough. At their worst, illegal searches can represent such threats, sending a signal to the community that people who displease the authorities, whether or not they commit crimes, can expect unpleasant treatment.91

So too has the Supreme Court, which noted in the Keith case that:

Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power. History abundantly documents the tendency of Government—however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies.92

Those founding-era concerns have carried through to the modern era.93 Thus, Justice Jackson advises in Johnson v. United States that “The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”94 More recently, Justice Sotomayor noted the close link between the Fourth Amendment and democratic liberty, pointing out that granting government agents unfettered access to contemporary surveillance technologies threatens to “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”95 Collective interests have also played an important role in the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence,96 which focuses on securing the general right of the people by deterring law enforcement officers from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures.97

93 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”).
94 Johnson v. United States, 333. U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (“Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty . . . So a search against Brinegar’s care must be regarded as a search of the care of Everyman.”); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (The Fourth Amendment’s protection “reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.”).
97 See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Amendment was directed only against the new and centralized government, and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the people can come only from this source. We must therefore look upon the exclusion of evidence in federal prosecutions, if obtained in violation of the Amendment, as a means of extending protection against the central government’s agencies.”); David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2013); David Gray, Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 7 (2012); Doernberg, supra note 67, at 105.
These historical and contemporary sources show that the intentions of those who wrote, passed, and ratified the Fourth Amendment reflect the scope and purpose of the text itself. The mischief they sought to combat was the licensing of practices and policies such as general warrants that posed a general threat to the security of the people. It is no surprise, then, that the final text guarantees a collective right of the people.

**Conclusion**

The majority in *United States v. Heller* asserts that “The phrase ‘right of the people’ in the [Fourth Amendment] unambiguously refers to individual rights, not collective rights.”98 As this essay has shown, this is simply false. By its language, and understood in its original context, the Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects rights held by “the people” against the government.100 This does prejudice the rights of individuals. As a conceptual matter, any right of the people is also a right of each person.101 All of us and each of us therefore have a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Whenever a member of “the people” challenges a governmental search or seizure, she therefore stands not only for herself, but for “the people” as a whole.102

Taking seriously the collective dimensions of Fourth Amendment rights has important implications for Fourth Amendment doctrine, including the warrant requirement, the exclusionary rule, and standing.103 It also suggests ways that the Fourth Amendment can meet twenty-first century challenges to privacy presented by the increasing use of surveillance and data aggregation technologies.104 The true danger in the *Heller* Court’s dicta is that it cuts off these conversations, threatening to hobble the Fourth Amendment when we, the people, need it most.

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100 Doernberg, supra note 96, at 260.
101 Scalia & Garner, supra note 14, at 129-31 (citing the canon of interpretation that the plural includes the singular); Pennsylvania Proceedings, supra note 67, at 54 (“all government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it . . . .”); cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 580-81 (concluding that “the people” as used in the Second Amendment describes rights “exercised individually and belonging to all Americans.”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the people” in the Second Amendment describes a collective right, but “Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.”).
103 See Gray, Age of Surveillance, supra note 8; Gray, Warrant Requirement, supra note 8; Gray & Citron, Fourth Amendment Remedies, supra note 8.
104 See Gray, Age of Surveillance, supra note 8; Gray & Citron, Fourth Amendment Remedies, supra note 8.