Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement

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96 B.U. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2016)

Abstract

The constitutional status of the warrant requirement is hotly debated. Critics argue that neither the text nor history of the Fourth Amendment support a warrant requirement. Also questioned is the warrant requirement’s ability to protect Fourth Amendment interests. Perhaps in response to these concerns, the Court has steadily degraded the warrant requirement through a series of widening exceptions. The result is an unsatisfying jurisprudence that fails on both conceptual and practical grounds.

These debates have gained new salience with the emergence of modern surveillance technologies such as stingrays, GPS tracking, drones, and Big Data. Although a majority of the Court appears sympathetic to the view that these technologies raise Fourth Amendment concerns, it has been wary about imposing a warrant requirement. As was made clear last term during oral argument in California v. Riley, part of that reserve reflects doubts among the justices about the warrant requirement’s status and constitutional pedigree.

This article takes a novel approach, using a conventional Fifth Amendment story to tell an unconventional Fourth Amendment story. In its landmark Miranda decision, the Court held that prospective remedial measures were necessary to resolve pervasive threats to Fifth Amendment rights posed by the “inherently coercive atmosphere” of custodial interrogations. The Court held that Miranda warnings provide an effective, enforceable, and parsimonious means to resolve those constitutional concerns. In the intervening years, the Court has maintained the constitutional status of Miranda warnings even though they are not dictated by the text of the Fifth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is a prospective constitutional remedy akin to the Miranda prophylaxis. According to its text, and as it would have been understood in 1791, the Fourth Amendment establishes a collective right to remedies sufficient to guarantee the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against threats posed by unconstrained governmental searches and seizures. The warrant requirement is just such a remedy, guaranteeing the security of the people against unreasonable search and seizure by interposing courts between citizens and law enforcement officers engaged in the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights, Part I:
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Word Count: 24,954

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* Professor of Law, University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School of Law. My thanks to Judge Stephen Smith and
Susan Freiwald, who were exceedingly generous with their time, expertise, and comments during a dedicated session at
the 2014 Privacy Law Scholars Conference. In addition, I would like to thank Miriam Baer, Danielle Citron, Jennifer
Daskal, Joshua Fairfield, Stephen Henderson, Orin Kerr, Richard Myers, Brian Owsley, Margaret Hu, Christopher
Slobogin, and Stephen Vladeck, each of whom provided invaluable feedback. I am also in debt to those who
commented on this work during presentations at Georgetown, the Law and Economics Center at George Mason
University, the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, New England Law, Washington &
Lee, and the annual Criminal Law Symposium at Texas Tech University.
Introduction

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\(^1\)

In its most robust form, the warrant requirement holds that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”\(^2\) Several sitting justices expressed doubts recently as to whether this presumption in favor of warrants actually does or should exist.\(^3\) Their doubts reflect long-standing debates about the constitutional status and practical value of the warrant requirement.\(^4\)

The conventional understanding of the warrant requirement holds that it is implied by the warrant clause.\(^5\) Critics such as Antonin Scalia, Akhil Amar, and Tedford Taylor have long criticized this view, pointing out that neither the text of the Fourth Amendment nor its history support a broad warrant requirement.\(^6\) Critics also question the utility of the warrant requirement as a tool for protecting and vindicating Fourth Amendment rights.\(^7\) They contend that our eighteenth century forebears were skeptical of warrants because warrants immunized officers from common law

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\(^1\) Const., Amend. IV.


\(^4\) See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721-23 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing tensions in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence between justices and opinions that maintain faith with the warrant requirement and those who would maintain “that the Fourth Amendment requires only that seizures be reasonable.”); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 19-50 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761-81 (1994); William Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1991).


\(^6\) See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 545, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 21, 23; Amar, supra note 4, at 761-81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, 573 U.S. (No. 13-212) (Justice Kennedy contending that “The—the question is whether [the search] is an unreasonable search, and the warrant clause follows much later . . . .”).

\(^7\) See generally Amar, supra note 4; Stuntz, supra note 4.
remedies, including tort actions. In their view, the Fourth Amendment reflects that skepticism, setting strict limits on when and in what circumstances warrants may issue. Reading a warrant requirement out of the warrant clause therefore appears to turn the Amendment on its head, preferring what the founding generation sought to restrain.

Perhaps in response to these concerns, the Court has degraded the warrant requirement by recognizing and amplifying a series of exceptions. These exceptions threaten to swallow the rule, leaving most searches and seizures to the discretion of law enforcement officers in the first instance. At the same time, the Court has expanded the immunity function of warrants, realizing our founders’ fears by barring civil actions where officers violate the Fourth Amendment in “good faith.” The result is a wholly unsatisfying body of doctrine that fails on both conceptual and practical grounds.

 Debates about the warrant requirement, its extension, and its effects have gained new salience as law enforcement increases its reliance on modern surveillance and data aggregation technologies such as stingrays, GPS devices, cell site tracking, RFID tags, “Big Data,”

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8 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 41; Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1178-81 (1991).

9 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 3 S.CT. REV. 49, 72 (1981); Amar, supra note 4, at 771–72, 782, 785. See also See also Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 57 (2010).

10 TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 23, 44-46; Amar, supra note 4, at 771–72; Posner, supra note 9, at 73.


12 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Silas Wasserstrom & Louis Seidman, The Fourth Amendment As Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 (1988); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1985).


15 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582–84 (Scalia, J., concurring); Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1610-11 (2012); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 263 (1998); Stuntz, supra note 4, at 885; Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 12 at 34.

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to modify Fourth Amendment doctrine\textsuperscript{25}—including the “third party”\textsuperscript{26} and “public observation”\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963–64 (Alito, J. concurring).


\textsuperscript{27} See, \textit{e.g.,} FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2014); Gray & Citron, \textit{supra} note 3, at 112-24; Gray, Citron & Rinehart \textit{supra} note 16, at 765–70.


\textsuperscript{31} Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 956–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring; id. at 958, 962–64 (Alito, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{32} The third party doctrine holds that, if a citizen shares information with a third party, then he has no Fourth Amendment complaint if that third party subsequently shares that information with the government. \textit{See} Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).

\textsuperscript{33} The public observation doctrine holds that law enforcement officers can freely make observations from any place where they lawfully have a right to be. \textit{See} Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989); Dow Chemical Co. v. United

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doctrines—in order to bring these programs and technologies within the compass of Fourth Amendment regulation, none have indicated whether, why, or how warrants might play a role.  

This article seeks both to resolve persistent debates about the warrant clause and to set the stage for a productive, organized, coherent, and doctrinally responsible conversation about the role of warrants and other remedial measures in an era of technologically enhanced surveillance. It does so by novel means, using a conventional Fifth Amendment story to tell an unconventional Fourth Amendment story.

In *Miranda v. Arizona*, and again in *United States v. Dickerson*, the Court held that, in order to resolve Fifth Amendment concerns about the “inherently coercive atmosphere” endemic to custodial interrogations, officers must inform suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them in subsequent proceedings, that they have the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that, if they cannot afford an attorney, then an attorney will be provided. Although the Court has admitted that these prophylactic measures cannot be derived directly from the text of the Fifth Amendment, it nevertheless maintains that the *Miranda* warnings are constitutional because they prescribe a prospective remedial structure that is

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28 As these debates raged, the Court decided *Riley v. California*, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014). Tracking a technology-centered approach, see Gray & Citron, supra note 3, the Court held that searches of “smartphones” do not fall within the scope of one important exception to the warrant requirement: the search incident to arrest rule. *Id.* 2495. The Court did little to settle or resolve debates about the warrant requirement or its application to contemporary surveillance technologies, however. Despite skepticism expressed by several justices, the *Riley* Court simply assumed the warrant requirement’s status as the Fourth Amendment default. *Id.* at 2482. More importantly, however, the technology at issue in *Riley* was a consumer-owned smartphone, not government-operated surveillance technology. Although smartphones are novel containers unforeseen by our eighteenth-century forebears, they are containers nonetheless, and therefore do not tax Fourth Amendment imagination or doctrine. *See United States v. Flores-Lopez*, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012). By contrast, law enforcement’s use of GPS tracking, drones, networked surveillance systems, and Big Data technologies raises serious questions about Fourth Amendment rights and remedies not readily answered by appeals to familiar forms. *See Jones*, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). Some state courts have filled in the gap. *See, e.g.*, Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) (holding that Massachusetts citizens have a right under the Massachusetts constitution not to be tracked using cell-site location information.).

29 As used here, “remedy” and “remedial” mean “the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong.” *MERRIAM-WEBSTER*. On this definition, remedies may act prospectively to secure rights or retrospectively to address violations.

30 384 U.S. 436 (1966). *See infra* Part II.


effective in addressing constitutional concerns, readily enforceable by courts and law enforcement agencies, and parsimonious with respect to its impact on the legitimate law enforcement pursuits.\footnote{Critics vigorously contest the Court’s views on the effectiveness of the prophylaxis. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 965 (2012).}

As is argued below, the warrant requirement is best understood as a constitutional remedy akin to the \textit{Miranda} prophylaxis. Developed in response to emerging threats posed by the rise of professional, paramilitary police forces during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the warrant requirement helps guarantee the right of the people to security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects by imposing prospective constraints on law enforcement’s ability to conduct physical searches of constitutionally protected areas. The argument proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview of conventional debates about the sources and constitutional status of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. It concludes by suggesting that these debates are misguided because they proceed on the assumption that, to claim constitutional status, the warrant requirement must be grounded in the warrant clause. Part II sets the stage for an alternative view of the warrant requirement as a constitutional remedy by revisiting the historical context of the Court’s decision in \textit{Miranda} and the standards elaborated by the Court there for enforcing constitutional remedies. Part III engages in a close reading of the text and historical context of the Fourth Amendment. It concludes that the Fourth Amendment requires the enforcement of general remedies sufficient to preserve the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from threats posed by the otherwise unconstrained authority or unlimited discretion of government agents to conduct searches and seizures. Part IV argues that the warrant requirement emerged as just such a remedy, responding to threats against the security of the people posed by the rise of professional, paramilitary police forces. Part V concludes by suggesting some of the ways this account can help guide courts and policy-makers as they contend with emerging surveillance and data aggregation technologies.\footnote{For a fuller account of how legislatures, executives, and courts might structure and enforce remedies capable of meeting constitutional demands in the twenty-first century, see David Gray & Danielle Citron, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights, Part II: Remedies and the Right to Quantitative Privacy (March 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).}

\textbf{Part I: The Warrant Requirement and its Critics}

The Supreme Court’s first explicit acknowledgement of the warrant requirement was in \textit{Agnello v. United States}, decided in 1921.\footnote{269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).} Writing for the Court, Justice Butler did not offer a textual
or historical foundation for the warrant requirement. Rather, he suggested that “it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.”\textsuperscript{36} It does not appear that this assumption met with much challenge or controversy at the time. That all started to change in the last quarter of the twentieth century with the rise of originalism.\textsuperscript{37}

The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been a frequent target for originalists.\textsuperscript{38} These critics have been particularly hard on Fourth Amendment remedies, including the warrant requirement.\textsuperscript{39} Among them, Akhil Amar has been perhaps the most influential. According to Professor Amar, the warrant requirement stakes its constitutional bona fides in the warrant clause and “an implicit third [command] that no searches and seizures may take place except pursuant to a warrant.”\textsuperscript{40} Amar contends that this broad rule has no foundation in either the text or history of the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{41} For example, he points out that late eighteenth century common law allowed for warrantless arrests in public, warrantless searches incident to arrest, and warrantless seizures of contraband.\textsuperscript{42} From this historical evidence, he concludes that the Fourth Amendment would not have been read in 1791 as imposing a warrant requirement.\textsuperscript{43} Amar also highlights laws passed by the early congresses authorizing naval inspectors to search ships and seize contraband without warrants, which, he concludes, shows that the founders did not embed a warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, he scrolls through various “exceptions” to the warrant requirement, including exigency, consent, airport security, special needs searches, border searches, and “plain

\textsuperscript{36} Id. The Court later withdrew from the exception identified by Justice Butler in \textit{Agnello}. See \textit{Payton v. New York}, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that law enforcement must have an arrest warrant in order to conduct a search incident to arrest of a suspect’s home).


\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., \textit{TAYLOR}, supra note 4; Amar, supra note 4.

\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., \textit{TAYLOR}, supra note 4, at 23–49; Amar, supra note 4, at 761–81.

\textsuperscript{40} Amar, supra note 4, at 762.

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 763–68.

\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 763–68.

\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 764–68.

\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 766–67. Most of these laws were repealed—some as early as the very next congress after their passage. See, id., at 766 n.27–29. Amar does not explain the impact of these rapid changes of heart for his interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
view” searches, which demonstrate that “it makes no sense to say that all warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.”

Unfortunately, Amar has an interlocutor problem. Nobody, or, at least, nobody he can cite, argues for the kind of broad, general warrant requirement targeted by his critique. To the contrary, the warrant requirement has always been much narrower, applying only to homes and similar highly protected areas. Amar rightly points out that even this more modest version of the warrant requirement finds no support in the warrant clause. Here again, however, he has an interlocutor problem. Nobody who advocates for the warrant requirement, or at least nobody he can cite, purports to derive it from the warrant clause. To be sure, Professor Amar is not entirely to blame for this lack of argumentative clash. That is because both the literature and the case law are virtually devoid of robust textual, historical, or practical defenses of the warrant requirement. Following Justice Butler in *Agnello*, courts and scholars simply assume the constitutional status of the warrant requirement. The result is a rather dimly-lit area of constitutional law. This article seeks to cast some light into those shadows, defending the warrant requirement as a constitutional remedy grounded in the reasonableness clause.

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45 Id. at 768–70. This strategy for undermining constitutional rules was considered and roundly rejected in *Dickerson v. United States*. 530 U.S. 428, 438, 441 (2000) (“No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.”).

46 Amar, *supra* note 4, at 770. The cases Amar cites, *Mincey v. Arizona*, 537 U.S. 385 (1978), *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), and *Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), entail searches of homes or their constitutional equivalent. The fact that officers intruded upon closes traditionally granted the highest degrees of Fourth Amendment protection played a critical role in all these cases. It would therefore be wrong to conclude that any of them relied upon a broad, general, per se warrant rule. It is true that *Mincey* and *Coolidge* repeat a line of purple prose from *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 357 (1967), reading “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” In context, however, that quote looks like a throw-away line from Justice Stewart. In that portion of the opinion, he is responding to the government’s argument that its agents could have secured a warrant if they had tried, and, therefore, no prejudice should befall the prosecution simply because the officers did not get a warrant. As Justice Stewart points out, that rule would fail to protect the security of the people. 389 U.S. at 556–57.


49 Id. at 770.

50 TAYLOR, *supra* note 4, at 44.

51 Id. at 23.
Part II: *Miranda* and the Concept of Constitutional Remedies

The warrant requirement did not emerge in isolation. *Agnello* and its progeny were decided during an era when the Court was confronting a range of law enforcement excesses and working to develop responsive constitutional remedies.\(^52\) Examining these parallel efforts offers valuable insight into the genesis and constitutional status of the warrant requirement. The Court’s struggles to guarantee Fifth Amendment rights are particularly illuminating.

When it was ratified in 1791, the Fifth Amendment prohibition on compelled self-incrimination was understood as a trial right.\(^53\) There is no evidence in the text or history of the Fifth Amendment suggesting constraints on extra-judicial interrogations much less a general right to remain silent or to have an attorney present during police questioning. In a series of early twentieth century cases, the Court nevertheless guaranteed those subjected to custodial interrogation the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, the right to terminate an interrogation, and the right to be apprised of these rights.\(^54\) Despite the absence of clear textual or historical foundation, the Court was quite clear that these rights are constitutional, and therefore cannot be abrogated by legislative or executive action.\(^55\) The Court bridged the apparent gap by focusing on the changing nature of law enforcement and law enforcement practices during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the practical effects of those changes on the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

Professional police forces and custodial interrogations were largely unknown to Americans in 1791.\(^56\) Private citizens investigated criminal offenses and witnesses were questioned under oath in open court by grand juries or magistrates.\(^57\) Experiences with inquisitions and the Star Chamber provided ample demonstrations of opportunities to abuse procedural and substantive rights in these forums.\(^58\) The Fifth Amendment responded to those known dangers by constitutionalizing the common law rule *nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare* (“no man is bound to accuse himself”), which was well-

\(^{52}\) See infra Part IV.


\(^{55}\) See *Dickerson*, 530 U.S. at 432; *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 490–91.


established by the late eighteenth century. By its text, and according to then-contemporary understandings, the Fifth Amendment did not and could not guard against unknown unknowns, however. Its compass and meaning were constrained by experience and imagination. It therefore did not reach into the sphere of custodial interrogations conducted by professional police officers because neither the practice nor the practitioners existed.

The law enforcement landscape had changed dramatically by the early years of the twentieth century. Professional paramilitary police forces had become the norm. Officers trained and experienced in the art of interrogation took over criminal investigations. Either in the form of written and signed statements or through the testimony of officers, the fruits of their labors routinely were admitted at trial. In the process, concerns about self-accusation migrated from the historically familiar territory of formal magisterial proceedings to the dark backrooms of police stations, where officers routinely used “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

By the early twentieth century, violence and intimidation had become familiar features of custodial police interrogations. According to the famous Wickersham report, commissioned by President Hoover and submitted to Congress in 1931, “police violence and the ‘third degree’ flourished” in the early decades of the twentieth century. Despite these widespread abuses, the political branches took little or no action. It therefore fell to the courts to impose constitutional constraints.

Starting in 1936 with Brown v. Mississippi, the Court began to exercise supervisory authority over custodial interrogations through the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In these cases, the Court held that “involuntary” confessions, along with any

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60 384 U.S. at 445–46.
61 Oliver, supra note 56, at 447–55.
62 Id. at 483.
63 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (describing law enforcement officers’ use of isolation, sleep deprivation, severe beatings, whipping, hanging, and threats of castration to extract a confession).
64 Oliver, supra note 56, at 483-85.
66 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463.
investigative fruits, must be excluded at trial. By enforcing this ex post rule, the Court hoped to exert prospective force on officers, thereby preventing the use of coercive techniques and intimidation during law enforcement interrogations. Unfortunately, that experiment failed.

As the Court reports in *Miranda v. Arizona*, decided in 1967, the use of coercive techniques and intimidation during custodial interrogations was still widespread well into the middle of the twentieth century. Although many officers had moved away from physical violence; cases, training manuals, and unapologetic self-reportage documented the ubiquitous use of threats, sleep deprivation, humiliation, psychological manipulation, and trickery. Interrogators also made a habit of continuing interrogations after subjects stated their desires to remain silent or asked for attorneys. Law enforcement thus appeared to have acknowledged the letter of *Brown* and its progeny, but missed the spiritual message. They adjusted their practices only as much as was necessary “to avoid a charge of duress that [could] be technically substantiated.”

Confronted with widespread use of custodial interrogations dominated by professional police interrogators, the Court could not ignore the obvious: the Fifth Amendment prohibition on compelled self-incrimination was being circumnavigated on a daily basis in police stations around the country. The only reasonable response, according to the Court, was to extend the Fifth Amendment into the interrogation room by imposing prospective remedial measures sufficient to “dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” The Court’s reasoning to this result is both illuminating and instructive in the context of our present effort to understand the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

The *Miranda* Court denied that extending the Fifth Amendment outside the courtroom marked any “innovation in [the Court’s] jurisprudence.” Rather, the Court characterized its holding as “an explication of basic rights enshrined in the Constitution.” It nevertheless adverted

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69 *Dickerson*, 530 U.S. at 432–34.
70 *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 446–47.
71 *Id.* at 448–53.
72 *Id.* at 454. *See also* Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
74 *Dickerson*, 530 U.S. at 442; *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 445, 457–58.
75 *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 467.
76 *Id.* at 450, 458.
77 *Id.* at 442.
78 *Id.* at 442.
to Chief Justice Marshall’s frequently cited command that the Constitution must be read and applied in order that it shall “approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.”\textsuperscript{79} For the \textit{Miranda} Court, this required not only extending the reach of the Fifth Amendment, but also imposing prospective remedies capable of curbing “broad . . . mischief”\textsuperscript{80} and adapting to “what may be.”\textsuperscript{81} Absent such measures, the Court worried that the rights themselves would be little more than “impotent and lifeless formulas . . . declared in words [but] lost in reality”\textsuperscript{82} through the operation of “subtle encroachments on individual liberty.”\textsuperscript{83}

As the Court noted in \textit{Brown v. Walker}, and confirmed in \textit{Miranda}, “subtle encroachments” on Fifth Amendment rights, occasioned by the rise of professional police forces and their expanding reliance on custodial interrogations, had reached a tipping point by the first half of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{84} These “deviations from legal modes of procedure”\textsuperscript{85} where not caused by widespread malice or malfeasance. To the contrary, the Court regarded temptations to escalate questioning with undue pressure, browbeating, psychological trickery, and even violence, as inherent to the enterprise of custodial interrogations.\textsuperscript{86} Even where officers were able to recognize and resist these temptations, the fact that interrogations were conducted incommunicado by trained police agents produced an “inherently compelling atmosphere” that “worked to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”\textsuperscript{87} In the Court’s view, the Fifth Amendment mandated measures sufficient to address and curb these “overzealous police practices.”\textsuperscript{88} As final guardians of constitutional rights, it was the Court’s duty to “insure that

\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 442 (quoting \textit{Cohens v. Virginia}, 19 U.S. 387 (1821)).

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 459-60, 490–91.

\textsuperscript{81} Id. at 443-444.

\textsuperscript{82} Id. (quoting and commenting on \textit{Weems v. United States}, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), and \textit{Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States}, 251U.S. 385, 391 (1920)).

\textsuperscript{83} Id. at 459.


\textsuperscript{85} Id. at 459.

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 442-43 (quoting and commenting on \textit{Brown v. Walker}, 161 U.S. at 596-97).

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Dickerson}, 500 U.S. at 428; \textit{Miranda}, 384 U.S. at 467.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Miranda}, 384 U.S. at 444. \textit{See also Dickerson}, 530 U.S. at 428 (“We concluded [in \textit{Miranda}] that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation . . . heightens the risk that an individual will not be ‘accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . . Accordingly, we laid down ‘concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.’”).
what was proclaimed in the Constitution [did] not become but a ‘form of mere words’ in the hands of government officials.”

The result was the Miranda prophylaxis. The Miranda prophylaxis is familiar to any consumer of televised police procedurals: [A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

There are several characteristics of the Miranda prophylaxis that are important to highlight in the context of our archeological exploration of the warrant requirement. First, the Court regarded the prophylaxis as an effective measure closely tailored to meet its specific constitutional concerns. As the Court pointed out, apprising a defendant of his rights is a “threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to [their] exercise.” It also “overcome[s] the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.” “Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.” Informing a suspect of the consequences should he choose to speak further provides an “assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege.” Finally, “the right to have counsel assure[s] that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.”

Second, the prophylaxis is relatively easy to enforce in a reliable, predictable, and regular manner. The alternative considered and rejected by the Court was a totality of the circumstances test, which would have required courts to determine, based on the facts in any given case, whether

89 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 479, 480–81 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920)); Taylor, supra note 4, at 5.
90 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
91 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
92 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
93 Id. at 467.
94 Id. at 468.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 469.
98 Id.
the suspect was aware of his rights and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to give a statement.[^99] As the Court noted, rules based on these kinds of fact-intensive inquiries are difficult to apply consistently.[^100] They also offer very little guidance to law enforcement officers.[^101] By contrast, “the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege is . . . simple . . . [and] clear-cut,”[^102] offering officers in the field “concrete constitutional guidelines.”[^103] The prophylaxis is also easier for courts to enforce than complicated, subjective assessments of defendants’ “knowledge . . . age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,” which often reduce to little “more than speculation.”[^104]

Third, the Court regarded the prophylaxis as parsimonious in that it struck a conservative balance between the constitutional rights of suspects and the legitimate interests of law enforcement. On this point, the Court described the warnings as “absolute prerequisites” and “indispensable” to preserving Fifth Amendment rights.[^105] By contrast, the burdens imposed on law enforcement are minimal and preserved the opportunity to pursue voluntary confessions through lawful means.[^106] By way of evidence, the Court cited the experience of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had “compiled an exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may be used against him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice, and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to pay.”[^107] The experiences of courts and law enforcement in the decades following *Miranda* have proved that the prophylaxis does not unreasonably interfere with law enforcement.[^108] To the contrary, officers often use the warnings to establish rapport and trust with suspects.[^109] To further emphasize the

[^99]: Id. at 468–69.
[^100]: 384 U.S. at 441–42.
[^101]: Id.
[^102]: Id. at 468–69.
[^103]: Id. at 441–42.
[^104]: Id. at 468–69.
[^105]: Id. at 467-69, 471–72, 473.
[^106]: Id. at 477–79, 481.
[^107]: Id. at 483–86.
[^108]: Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443–44.
The Court’s reasoning in *Miranda* provides valuable insights into the warrant requirement, describing a framework for the development and enforcement of constitutional remedies. Specifically, the Court in *Miranda* took note of broad changes in the nature of state power, terms of engagement between citizens and state officials, and the relationships between law enforcement regimes and their subjects. Principal among these was the advent of professional police forces engaged in investigating and prosecuting crime; their use of custodial interrogations designed to secure incriminating statements; and a pattern of abuses. In the Court’s view, these developments posed a general and pervasive threat to rights against compelled self-incrimination. According to the Court, the only way to resolve these constitutional concerns was to implement a prospective remedy that would be effective in vindicating constitutional concerns, enforceable by executive agents and courts, and parsimonious with respect to their impact on law enforcement’s efforts to combat crime. According to the Court, the *Miranda* prophylaxis meets these requirements, and is therefore a constitutional remedy to which each of us and all of us has a right under the Fifth Amendment. As Part III shows, there is a parallel story to be told about the warrant requirement.

**Part III: Fourth Amendment Rights to Constitutional Remedies**

As Part I recounts, debates about the warrant requirement traditionally focus on whether it can be read from the text of the Fourth Amendment or divined from its original semantic context. These conversations are just as irrelevant to understanding the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as they are to understanding the Fifth Amendment *Miranda* prophylaxis. While the text does not prescribe a warrant requirement, this part argues that the Fourth Amendment guarantees a collective right to effective constitutional remedies. It does, after all, guarantee that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

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110 *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 444, 467. See also *Dickerson*, 530 U.S. at 440 (“Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is found in the Miranda Court’s invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination.”).

111 *Dickerson*, 530 U.S. at 440, 443–44.

112 *Id.* at 427–28.

seizures, shall not be violated . . .”). As Part IV will argue, the warrant requirement is just such a constitutional remedy.

A. “The right of the people . . .”

There is a common myth which holds that the Bill of Rights is a vessel exclusively for individual rights. Although the Constitution is not a blueprint for communist revolution, the document, inclusive of the Bill of Rights, describes an undeniably collective enterprise. It recognizes the existence of “a people” and guarantees rights designed to protect them from the natural tendency of governments and their agents to extend and abuse their powers. This collective dimension is an essential feature of the Fourth Amendment, which secures a right “of the people.”

The American Revolution of 1776 was neither declared nor waged by a disconnected bunch of mutually alienated solipsistic reactionary libertarians. Rather, the Revolution was fought by and

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114 Const., Amend. IV.

115 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008) (asserting that “the right of the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body”); Donald Dourenberg, “Right of the People”: Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1983). But see Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790–91 (concluding that “the people” as used in the Fourth Amendment “refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”).


117 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 399–401 (1974). Cf. New Hampshire Bill of Rights, Art. X (1783) (“Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”); The Proceedings Relative to Calling the Convention of 1776 and 1790 the Minutes of the Convention that Formed the Present Constitution of Pennsylvania, 55 (1776) (hereinafter “Pennsylvania Proceedings”) (asserting that “all government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the author of existence has bestowed upon man,” but recognizing that “these great ends of government” are not always realized, requiring them to adopt a constitution in order to “promote the general happiness of the people of this state”) (available at http://www.duq.edu/Documents/law/pa-constitution/_pdf/conventions/1776/proceedings1776-1790.pdf).

118 Amsterdam, supra note 117, at 433.

119 See, e.g., Declaration of Independence (“We the People . . .”); Pennsylvania Proceedings, supra note 117, at 55 (“We, the representatives of the freemen of Pennsylvania, in general convention met, for the express purpose of framing such a government, confessing the goodness of the great governor of the universe (who alone knows to what degree of earthly happiness mankind may attain by perfecting the arts of government) in permitting the people of this state, by common consent and without violence, deliberately to form for themselves, such just rules as they shall think best
for a people who were, in part, constituted by the conflict itself. 120 This is evident in the Declaration of Independence, which begins by imagining that the colonists comprised “a people” who must “dissolve the political bands which ha[d] connected them with another [people] . . . ”121 The Preamble to the Constitution is clearer still, describing a collective enterprise by and for “the People.”122 That language carries through to Article I123 and the Bill of Rights, which, inter alia, guarantees “the right of the people to peaceably assemble . . . ”124 and “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . ”125 without “disparage[ing]” other, unenumerated rights, “retained by the

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120 Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 52. As Benjamin Franklin famously quipped, “We must hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

121 Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 65–66. The Declaration may well have been more aspirational than descriptive in this regard, but it is the imagining that matters for present purposes because it the imagining that informs our understanding of original public meaning.122

122 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity . . . ”). See also Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790 (conceding that “the people” as used in the Preamble “arguably refer[s] to ‘the people’ acting collectively”). The Preamble’s assumption that there is a “People of the United States” marks a critical departure from the 1781 “Articles of Confederation,” which were premised on the independence and sovereignty of the states and their discrete peoples. See Articles of Confederation of The United States of America, Art. II (March 1, 1781). As Justice Scalia has noted, preambles are relevant sources for determining textual meaning. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 217–20 (2012).

123 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states . . . ”). See also Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790 (conceding that “the people” as used in Article I “arguably refer[s] to ‘the people’ acting collectively”).

124 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court has left no doubt that these First Amendment rights of “the people” have a collective dimension. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”). But see Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790 (claiming in dicta that “the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause . . . unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights . . . ”).

125 U.S. CONST. amend. II. In Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2790-91, the Court held that the Second Amendment right to bear arms “unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.” That holding, while expansive, was neither necessary nor does it directly contradict the thesis being developed here. The issue presented to the Court in Heller was whether the militia clause of the Second Amendment limited the right of “the people” to bear arms such that no individual could assert a right to bear arms outside the confines of a state-regulated militia. On that reading, the Court rightly noted, the right to bear arms would be a right of the states or militias, not a right “of the people.” Unfortunately, the Court did not claim the obvious fruits of this point but instead indulged a false dichotomy between collective rights and the ability of an individual to claim or assert those rights. This is a dichotomy that is neither reflected in the rights literature nor the great works of political philosophy that influenced the framers and the document they produced. See, e.g., WIL KYM LiCKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 35–48 (2000) (explaining how
people” and reserving “powers not delegated to the United States . . . to the people.” Again, the point is not that the Constitution is a wholly collectivist document. Rather, the point is that the Constitution wrestles with fundamental and timeless political challenges and in the process instantiates a people who claim some rights for themselves as “one Body Politick” and some rights for individual members of that whole.

The Fourth Amendment describes a “right of the people” not a right of “each person.” That choice is not happenstance. Those who drafted the Fourth Amendment in 1791 had two

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126 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

127 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790 (conceding that “the people” as used in the Tenth Amendment “arguably refer[s] to ‘the people’ acting collectively”).

128 Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 59–60 (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Sec. 95). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549–50 (1875) (“Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights. In the formation of a government, the people may confer upon it such powers as they choose. . . . The government thus established and defined is to some extent a government of the States in their political capacity. It is also, for certain purposes, a government of the people.”); Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 62–66 (describing how the framers of the Constitution relied upon the work of John Locke in understanding the interrelationships between citizens, the citizenry, and the state and pointing out the primacy of “the people” as a “collective body” in both Locke’s political philosophy and the constitutional framework of government).

129 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., Art. III, Sec. 3 (rights of those charged with treason); amend. V (grand jury, due process); amend VI (criminal trial rights).

130 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Heller, the Court asserts that the Fourth Amendment “unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body.” 128 S.Ct. at 2790. This, of course, is dicta—and dangerous dicta at that insofar as the Court’s pronouncement was made without the benefit of any record regarding the text and history of the Fourth Amendment. See David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2015). On a fuller record, the Court would have been hard-pressed to avoid the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment unambiguously refers to collective rights. For example, the dicta in Heller, violates the first canon of textual interpretation: that words should be given their ordinary meaning. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 122, at 69-77. Furthermore, both the historical record and the Court’s own jurisprudence suggest that the Fourth Amendment unambiguously refers to individual rights that can only be exercises through membership in a group: “the people.” See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-75 (1990). Moreover, as the Court pointed out in Verdugo-Urquidez, the framers’ use of “the people” in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments strikes an important contrast between their use of “person” and “accused” in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, further suggesting that the Fourth Amendment has critical collective dimensions. 494 U.S. at 265–66. This choice lines up with similar choices made in then-contemporary state constitutions, and particularly the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights. See infra notes 147–156 and accompanying text. The Court’s contemporary exclusionary rule cases also focus on the collective dimensions of Fourth Amendment rights, maintaining that exclusion is justified only insofar as it can promote the general security of
models to choose from. The first was offered by Article Ten of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which provided that “the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure.” The second came from the Massachusetts and New Hampshire Bills of Rights, each of which provided that “[e]very subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures.” John Adams is a particularly important figure in the history of the Fourth Amendment. His work on search and seizure for the Massachusetts constitution later served as a blueprint for the Fourth Amendment. Despite his influence on the overall structure and content of the Fourth Amendment, the drafters ultimately chose to use “the people” rather than Adams’s “every subject.” This choice should guide our understanding of the text.

There is no surviving record of the deliberative process that led to the selection of “the people” over “every subject.” As Justice Scalia has argued, however, this sort of legislative history is highly suspect as an interpretive resource. Far more important is the plain meaning of the

\[\text{the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. See infra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. Ultimately, of course, it is not at all clear that the Heller Court would disagree. Just a few sentences after issuing its dangerous dicta, it adopts the more defensible view that “the people” “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” 128 S.Ct. at 2790–91.}\]

131 Singer & Singer, supra note 137, at 561–73 (pointing out that drafters are presumed to know the relevant existing law).

132 PA. DEC. OF RTS, art. X (1776).

133 MA. DEC. OF RTS, art. XIV (1780). The New Hampshire Constitution uses “hath” rather than “has,” but is in all other respects identical. See N.H. Const., art. XIX (1784). See also Ratification Statement from New York (1788) (recommending that the Constitution protect, inter alia, the right of “every freeman . . . to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures . . .”); Ratification Statement from Virginia (1788) (same); Ratification Statement from North Carolina (1788) (same).


135 United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 625 1886; Taylor, supra note 4, at 43.


138 This is in contrast to two-clause structure, which seems to be the product of Rep. Egbert Benson’s dogged efforts. See Nelson Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 101–03 (1970).

words that were chosen as opposed to those that were not. By as we do today, our late eighteenth-century forebears understood "the people" as referring to "a nation" or "those who compose a community." By contrast, "person" was understood to mean an "individual or particular man or woman." As a matter of both plain meaning and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Fourth Amendment should therefore be read as referring to collective rights of "the people" rather than individual rights of each "person" or "subject."

Relevant extrinsic evidence supports this reading. The founding generation was influenced profoundly by the political philosophy of John Locke. In keeping with that philosophy, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights recognizes the critical role of both collective interests and individual rights in the establishment of a just government. The body of the document therefore protects both individual rights and rights held by the people as a whole.

140 See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788 (asserting the primacy of plain meaning when interpreting the Constitution).

141 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed., 1792). See also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 122, at 419 (citing JOHNSON as among "the most useful and authoritative [contemporaneous-usage dictionaries] for the English language generally and for the law.").

142 JOHNSON, supra note 141.


144 See Scalia, supra note 139, at 38 (recognizing the relevance of contemporary writings when determining original public meaning).

145 Dourendberg, supra note 116, at 59–66. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Proceedings, supra note 117, at 55 (asserting that legitimate governmental authority is "derived from, and founded on the authority of the people only"); A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (objecting to the federal constitution on the grounds that it contained no bill of rights, thereby denying citizens the ability to "plead and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as authority" in defense of "natural right").

146 See id. ("[A]ll government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it, to enjoy their natural rights . . . ."). Differences in phrasing among these different provisions show differences in meaning. Kim, supra note 137, at 14. They also provide evidence that the drafters knew how to designate rights as individual and collective. Id. at 15.

147 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I (1776) ("[A]ll men are born equally free and independent . . ."); id. art. II ("[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty [God], according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding . . ."); id. art. VIII ("[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him or applied to public uses, without his own consent or that of his legal representatives . . ."); id. art. IX ("[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to be heard by himself and his council . . ."); id. art. XI ("[I]n controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury . . ."); id. art. XV ("[A]ll men have a natural inherent right to emigrate from on state to another that will receive them . . .").

148 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. III (1776) ("[T]he people of this state have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police of the same."); id. art. V ("[T]he community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish government, in such manner as shall be by that community judges most conducive to the public weal."); id. art. VI ("[T]he people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular elections."); id. art. XIII (". . . the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments: therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained."); id. art. XVI ("[T]he people have a right to assemble together to
There is a clear pattern to their choices. \footnote{That this choice should be afforded significance when interpreting the text is a matter of \textit{in pari materia}. \textit{See} SCALIA \& GARNER, supra note 122, at 252-55; Kim, supra note 137, at 14, 15, 42.} Rights assigned to individuals—such as the right to freedom of worship, the right to own property, and the right to fair criminal process—secure freedoms necessary to projects of ethical development and individual engagements with the state. By contrast, rights secured for the people—such as the right to hold elections, the right to free speech, and the right to assemble—comprise basic political rights essential to collective projects of self-governance. \footnote{This is a critical point missed by the majority in Heller, where the majority draws a distinction between uses of “the people” in the Preamble, Article I, and Article X, which “deal with the exercise or reservation of powers” and the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, which deal with “rights.” \textit{See} Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790.} This reflects eighteenth-century understandings of fundamental political concepts such as “commonwealth,” “democracy,” and “republican,” as defined in relation to “the people.” \footnote{\textit{See} JOHNSON, supra note 141 (defining “commonwealth” as “the general body of the people,” “democracy” as “a form of government . . . in which the sovereign power is lodged with the people,” “nationalness” as “Reference to the people in general,” and “republican” as “Placing the government in the people.”). \textit{Cf.} Scalia, supra note 139, at 39 (recognizing the political dimension of “the people” as sovereign).}

The United States Constitution follows this same pattern, resting Fourth Amendment rights with “the people” rather than “all men” or “every member of society.” This choice bespeaks an understanding that security from unreasonable search and seizure is linked to collective projects of governance and politics. \footnote{Goldman, 316 U.S. at 142 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“The benefits that accrue from this and other articles of the Bill of Rights are characteristic of democratic rule. They are among the amenities that distinguish a free society from one in which the rights and comforts of the individual are wholly subordinated to the interests of the state. We cherish and uphold them as necessary and salutary checks on the authority of government. They provide a standard of official conduct which the courts must enforce. At a time when the nation is called upon to give freely of life and treasure to defend and preserve the institutions of democracy and freedom, we should not permit any of the essentials of freedom to lose vitality through legal interpretations that are restrictive and inadequate for the period in which we live.”); Alexander Reinert, \textit{Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement}, 2010 Ill. L. Rev. 1461, 1486 (2010).} This may seem counterintuitive to the modern mind, but accurately reflects founding-era perceptions of threats addressed by the Fourth Amendment. As Tony Amsterdam writes, “The evil [targeted by the Fourth Amendment] was general, it was the creation of an administration of public justice that authorized and supported indiscriminate searching and seizing.” \footnote{Amsterdam, supra note 117, at 367.} In light of this general threat, he concludes that “the phraseology of the amendment, akin to that of the first and second amendments and the ninth, [was not] accidental.” \footnote{Id. Bill Stuntz has reached a similar conclusion, pointing out that:}
The important role of the Fourth Amendment in protecting collective political interests is evidenced further in the history of events that gave rise to its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 155 Like many provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment was motivated by the experiences of colonials and their British brethren with abuses of power. 156 The Fourth Amendment’s principal bêtes noires were general warrants, including writs of assistance. 157 By 1791, the common law had rejected general warrants. 158 Among the primary reasons English courts gave for outlawing general warrants was their effect on collective security. 159 These courts reasoned that nobody could feel secure if forced to live under a regime where executive agents had the authority to engage in programs of broad and indiscriminate search, limited only by their own unfettered discretion. 160

Indeed, the real harm [illegal] searches cause, the harm that matters most to society as a whole, is the diminished sense of security that neighbors and friends may feel when they learn of the police misconduct. Totalitarian governments do not cow their citizens by regularly ransacking all their homes; the threat is usually enough. At their worst, illegal searches can represent such threats, sending a signal to the community that people who displease the authorities, whether or not they commit crimes, can expect unpleasant treatment.

Stuntz, supra note 4, at 902. So too has the Supreme Court, which noted in the Keith case that:

Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power. History abundantly documents the tendency of Government—however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies.


155 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624 (“In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’ it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England.”).

156 TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 19.

157 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2494; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624; Davies, supra note 57, at 601.

158 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); CUDDIHY, supra note 136, at 439-40, 446-52; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 342 (Robert Malcom Kerr, ed. 1965) (1769); Davies, supra note 57, at 655.

159 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (“The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.”); Amsterdam, supra note 117, at 366 (“[T]he specific incidents of Anglo-American history that immediately preceded the adoption of the [Fourth] amendment we shall find that the primary abuse thought to characterize the general warrants and the writs of assistance was their indiscriminate quality, the license that they gave to search Everyman without particularized cause” which “threatened the whole English nation.”)

160 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966) (The “indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and imposes a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures. . . .”); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17 (“An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
Thus, in the General Warrant cases,\(^\text{161}\) which are widely recognized as a signal events in the history of the Fourth Amendment,\(^\text{162}\) Lord Camden notes that, if a government can grant “discretionary power . . . to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall . . . it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”\(^\text{163}\) There is, moreover, no doubt that the liberties Lord Camden was concerned to protect had an important political dimension. After all, the plaintiffs in the General Warrants cases were dissidents targeted by the King’s agents because they wrote and distributed pamphlets criticizing George III and his policies.\(^\text{164}\)

Crafted in the context of this common law history, concerns for the general security of the people form the warp and weft of the Fourth Amendment.\(^\text{165}\) By its language, and understood in its original context, the Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects rights held by “the people”\(^\text{166}\)

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\(^{162}\) Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626–27; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 19, 26, 38; Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1392-93; Amar, supra note 4, at 772.

\(^{163}\) Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489. See also, Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765) (“we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society”); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 33-35 (recounting how members of Parliament and other elites felt threatened by the use of general warrants in the Wilkes case); Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 57-58 (noting that “most eighteenth-century liberal doctrines can be traced to Locke and his concept that community power resides in the majority.”).

\(^{164}\) TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 29-30.

\(^{165}\) Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 357 (“[General searches] are denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every State in the Union.”). Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It is plain that the amendment forbids them.”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (“The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case . . . ; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.”); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1393 (The founders “sought to prohibit the newly formed government from using general warrants, a device they believed jeopardized the liberty of every citizen.”). In his famous argument in the writs of assistance cases, James Otis identified general warrants as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book.” James Otis (1761). As Donald Dourenberg points out, James Otis was among the many founding-era intellectuals who were deeply influenced by John Locke and his collectivist theories of government and political legitimacy. See Dourenberg, supra note 116, at 66 n.86. Among the people in the audience during Otis’s speech was John Adams, who would later identify Otis’s speech as “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2494.

\(^{166}\) Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790–91; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”).
against the government.\textsuperscript{167} Those founding-era concerns have carried through to the modern era.\textsuperscript{168} Thus, Justice Jackson advises in \emph{Johnson v. United States} that “The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”\textsuperscript{169} The role of collective interests is particularly evident in the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence,\textsuperscript{170} which focuses on securing the general right of the people by deterring law enforcement officers from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures.\textsuperscript{171} Of course, as a conceptual matter, any right of the people is also a right of each person.\textsuperscript{172} All of us and each of us therefore have a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.\textsuperscript{173} Whenever a member of “the people” challenges a governmental search or seizure, she therefore stands not only for herself, but for “the people” as a whole.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{167} Dourenberg, \emph{supra} note 115, at 260. \textit{See also} Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Amendment was directed only against the new and centralized government, and any really dangerous threat to the general liberties of the people can come only from this source. We must therefore look upon the exclusion of evidence in federal prosecutions, if obtained in violation of the Amendment, as a means of extending protection against the central government’s agencies.”).

\textsuperscript{168} Berger, 388 U.S. at 53 (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.”).

\textsuperscript{169} \emph{Johnson}, 333 U.S. at 14. \textit{See also} Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949) (“Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty . . . . So a search against Brinegar’s care must be regarded as a search of the care of Everyman.”); \emph{Camara}, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”).

\textsuperscript{170} Dourenberg, \emph{supra} note 115, at 273, 278-80.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{See} Gray, \emph{supra} note 14; David Gray, Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, \emph{The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine}, 91 Texas L. Rev. 7 (2012); Dourenberg, \emph{supra} note 116, at 105.

\textsuperscript{172} SCALIA \& GARNER, \emph{supra} note 122, at 129-31 (citing the canon of interpretation that the plural includes the singular). Pennsylvania Proceedings, \emph{supra} note 117, at 54 (“all government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protection ‘of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who compose it . . . .’”); \emph{Heller}, 128 S.Ct. at 2791 (concluding that “the people” as used in the Second Amendment describes rights “exercised individually and belong[ing] to all Americans.”); \emph{Heller}, 128 S.Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the people” in the Second Amendment describes a collective right, but “Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.”).

\textsuperscript{173} Dourenberg, \emph{supra} note 115, at 260. \textit{See also} \emph{Camara}, 387 U.S. at 527 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is ‘basic to a free society.’”); \emph{Johnson}, 333 U.S. at 14 (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) (The Fourth Amendment’s protection “reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.”). \textit{But see} Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“The [Fourth] Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of ‘their persons [and] houses’ and thus indicates that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right that must be invoked by an individual.”).

\textsuperscript{174} Reinert, \emph{supra} note 152, at 1487-91; Arnold H. Loewy, \emph{The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent}, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1263–72 (1982). \textit{See also} \emph{White}, 401 U.S. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Interposition of a
B. “. . . to be secure . . .”

If the Fourth Amendment aims to protect collective interests, then the natural next question is how to accomplish that task. Here again, the answer lies in the text, which guarantees “the right of the people to be secure.” The only way to achieve this security is by the enforcement of constitutional remedies that restrain exercises of state power and limit the discretion of government agents.\footnote{175 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’”); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92 (“The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.”). There is no doubt that some current Fourth Amendment remedies, such as the exclusionary rule and §1983, do less work than they could or ought to in guaranteeing the right of the people to be secure. See generally Gray, supra note 14; Gray, Cooper, & McAloon, supra note 171; Laurin, supra note 14. Subsequent articles in this project address these deficits.}

One of the principal concerns confronting those who met in Philadelphia during the hot summer of 1787 was controlling the newly constituted federal government. Conventioners harbored particular concerns about the power and authority of the central government and its ability to override protections afforded by state constitutions and the common law.\footnote{176 Davies, supra note 57, at 658.} Those worries carried over to the ratification debates.\footnote{177 CUDDHY, supra note 136, at 671-91; Davies, supra note 57, at 658.} Among the primary concerns of anti-Federalists and other constitutional critics was that the federal government might violate, ignore, or abrogate by statute search and seizure rights guaranteed by state constitutions and the common law.\footnote{178 See, e.g., A Maryland Farmer, no. 1 (1788) (“suppose for instance, that an officer of the United States should force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a general warrant, I would ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United States? Would a court, or even a jury, but juries are no longer to exist, punish a man who acted by express authority, upon the bare recollection of what once was law and right? I fear not, especially in those cases which may strongly interest the passions of government, and in such only have general warrants been used.”).}
Part I: The Warrant Requirement

Our eighteenth century forebears understood that the road to tyranny is paved by the best of intentions. As the Maryland Farmer pointed out, general warrants are particularly tempting “in those cases which may strongly interest the passions of government.”\(^{179}\) Half a generation before him, the Canadian Freeholder offered similar observations in his commentaries on *Wilkes v. Wood*, noting that appointed members of the executive are “fond of doctrines of reason of state, and state necessity, and the impossibility of providing for great emergencies and extraordinary cases, without a discretionary power in the crown to proceed sometimes by uncommon methods not agreeable to the known forms of law.”\(^{180}\) Because they understood these natural, institutional, motives, our founders sought to guarantee a general right of security from unreasonable searches and seizures through the enforcement of policies and procedures capable of constraining government agents and limiting the discretionary authority of those wielding the truncheon of state power.\(^{181}\) The warrant clause provides a blueprint for what they had in mind.

General warrants are unreasonable.\(^{182}\) By their very nature and existence, they threaten the security of the people. So, too, warrants issued on nothing more than “information and belief,” or other “allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount to nothing more than a suspicion.”\(^{183}\) Faced with threats of general warrants, and easy access to more specific warrants, our founders decided that the only way to guarantee the security of the people was to impose prospective remedies sufficient to guarantee a collective sense of security against “general exploratory searches . . . based only on the eagerness of officers to get hold of whatever evidence they may be able to bring to light.”\(^{184}\) This is precisely what the warrant clause does. By banning general warrants and limiting

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179 Id.

180 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489. See also Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635 (1886) (“Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.”).

181 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (“We must not allow our zeal for effective law enforcement to blind us to the peril to our free society that lies in this Court’s disregard of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 513 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or ‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts.”); Davies, supra note 57, at 578-83 (documenting the Founders’ concerns with executive discretion).

182 Frishie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (1787).


access to specific warrants, the warrant clause allows all of us and each of us to feel secure in ways
that we otherwise could not and would not.\textsuperscript{185}

The Fourth Amendment is not limited by the warrant clause, however. Quite to the
contrary, the “touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,\textsuperscript{186} which casts a much
longer shadow. Here again, the text tells the tale. Just as the drafters had a choice of models in
terms of whether the Fourth Amendment would protect “each subject” or “the people,” so too did
they have a choice between simply barring general warrants and prohibiting unreasonable searches
more generally. By the time of the First Congress, eight of the colonies had constitutional
constraints on search and seizure, including Vermont.\textsuperscript{187} Of these, six addressed only general or
deficient warrants\textsuperscript{188} and two contemplated both unreasonable searches and deficient warrants.\textsuperscript{189}
Given these options, the most reasonable reading of the final text is that it prohibits more than just
searches conducted pursuant to general or deficient warrants. It was meant to and does prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures more generally.

Alterations to the original text of the Fourth Amendment proposed to the House by James
Madison in 1789 reinforce the view that the reasonableness clause is meant to proscribe a broader
range of governmental activity than searches conducted pursuant to general warrants. The first draft
of the Fourth Amendment reported to the House provided that:

The rights of the people to be secured in their persons; their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly
describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{185} Davies, supra note 57, at 576-77.
\textsuperscript{186} Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
\textsuperscript{187} Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Vermont.
Connecticut and Rhode Island did not have constitutions in 1789. Connecticut adopted its first constitution in 1818.
Rhode Island did not adopt a constitution until 1842. New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia all had
constitutions, but none addresses searches and seizures. See CUDDIHY, supra note 136, at 852.
\textsuperscript{188} These were Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Vermont.
\textsuperscript{189} These were Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
\textsuperscript{190} CUDDIHY, supra note 136, at 692.
By its plain meaning, this language would have limited the reach of the Fourth Amendment to searches conducted under the authority of deficient warrants.\textsuperscript{191} Speaking on the floor of the First Congress, Representative Benson protested that this was not sufficient, proposing instead the familiar conjunction “and no warrants shall issue . . .”\textsuperscript{192} Again applying well-established rules of textual interpretation, we ought not to ignore the fact that his proposal ultimately was adopted.\textsuperscript{193}

C. “. . . shall not be violated.”

The Fourth Amendment does not merely describe a general right of the people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. It also provides that this right “shall not be violated.” This imperative can only be achieved by constitutional remedies that exert prospective force on government agents. As those who read the Fourth Amendment in 1791 understood well, abstract commands are not enough to constrain governments against the temptations of power, privilege, and emergency.\textsuperscript{194} They knew that the only way to guarantee the right of the people against the threats of legislative encroachment or executive overreach was to establish a constitutional requirement for concrete constraints.\textsuperscript{195} This is precisely what the Fourth Amendment does. It

\textsuperscript{191} This formulation seems to have been modeled on the statements several states attached to their ratification votes in 1788. \textit{See, e.g.}, Ratification Statement of North Carolina (Nov. 21, 1789) (“That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers and property; all warrants, \textit{therefore}, to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous, and ought not to be granted.”) (emphasis added) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratnc.asp); Ratification Statement of New York (July 28, 1788) (“That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searching and seizures of his person, his papers, or his property; and \textit{therefore}, that all warrants to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers, or property, without information, upon oath or affirmation, of sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive . . . .”) (emphasis added) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp); Ratification Statement by the State of Virginia (June 26, 1788) (“That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his papers, and property; all warrants, \textit{therefore}, to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers, or property, without information on oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive . . . .”) (emphasis added) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratva.asp).

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Lasson, supra} note 138, at 101.

\textsuperscript{193} \textit{See supra} notes 137–131.

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{See supra} notes 178–181 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Camara}, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is basic to a free society.”); Davies, \textit{supra} note 57, at 576 (“The Framers sought to \textit{prevent} unjustified searches and arrests from occurring, not merely to provide after-the-fact remedy for unjustified intrusions.”)
“erects a wall between a free society and overzealous police action—a line of defense implemented by the framers to protect individuals from the tyranny of the police state.”

The constitutional imperative that rights against unreasonable search and seizure “shall not be violated” acts as a precommitment, tethering us to the mast so we will not be tempted by the sirens’ songs of political convenience or executive necessity to accept “too permeating police surveillance,” even if it means living with some degree of risk. It also recognizes that the task of constraining the government against its natural tendencies to pursue more expansive and invasive practices of search and seizure is an ongoing project that must respond to new, developing, and emerging threats. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is not merely an instantiation of rights, it is a call to action. It demands that the political branches commit to policies of restraint. Where they fail to do so, the Fourth Amendment requires that courts, acting as constitutional guardians, impose remedial measures sufficient to effectively guarantee the people’s security. To be clear, this constitutional responsibility does not rise to the level of legislative authority. As the Court has explained in the context of its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, effectiveness, enforceability, and parsimony mark the border between remedies as rights and political policy-making.

At this point in the argument, it is worth pausing a moment to sum up a bit. The Fourth Amendment guarantees rights that have a collective dimension. This is evident in the text, which guarantees a right to “the people” rather than rights to “each subject.” The historical backdrop against which the Fourth Amendment is cast further illuminates the interests at stake. The principal historical motivations for the Fourth Amendment are found in the experiences of colonists and

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196 Renée Hutchins, Tied Up in Knots? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 444 (2007). See also Dourenberg, supra note 115, at 260 (“The fourth amendment was intended both to protect the rights of individuals and to prevent the government from functioning as in a police state.”).

197 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (“the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape of criminals from punishment.”).

198 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”)

199 Berger, 388 U.S. at 50–51; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 391–92.

200 See supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
Englishmen with general warrants, including writs of assistance. Although vanishingly few eighteenth century Americans were subjected to searches conducted under writs of assistance, the very existence of these licenses to engage in broad and indiscriminate search posed a general threat to the freedom and security of all in their persons and property. In ratifying the common law prohibition on general warrants, the Fourth Amendment serves the interests of all citizens by targeting policies and practices that grant unfettered discretion to executive agents or license programs of broad and indiscriminate search.

Although founding-era experiences with general warrants motivated the Fourth Amendment, the text does not simply prohibit general warrants, as, for example, did the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Rather, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” This sense of security can only be guaranteed by instituting and enforcing policies and practices that eliminate, restrain, or regulate threats against the privacy and security of the people. The reasonableness clause therefore establishes a collective right to policies that preserve the people’s security by effective, enforceable, and parsimonious means. The warrant clause provides an illuminating example of just such a policy.

The warrant clause reflects the drafters’ considered judgment that, as a matter of policy, the only way to preserve the security of the people against the threat of general warrants was to establish a constitutional bar on general warrants, to control access to warrants, to mediate executive authority to conduct warranted searches, and to limit the discretionary purview of agents who execute warrants. The warrant clause prescribes a policy and process that serves these goals. By

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201 CUDDHY, supra note 136, at 231; Davies, supra note 57, at 601.
203 VA. DEC. OF RTS. sec. 10 (“That general warrants ... are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted.”)
204 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 34–35 (1927) (“The Fourth Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the matter of searches and seizures both in England and the colonies, and the assurance against any revival of it, so carefully embodied in the fundamental law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which, regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right.”); Davies, supra note 57, at 576–77.
205 See WOLF, 338 U.S. at 28. See also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351–53 (2001) (pointing out that Fourth Amendment remedies should only be imposed when courts are faced with evidence of widespread abuse).
206 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the reasonableness clause incorporates common law constraints on search and seizure, including the prohibition on general warrants and, in certain instances, a warrant requirement).
207 Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 389–90 (1931) (“[T]he warrant clause] prevents the issue of warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact. It emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general searches. Since before the creation of our
requiring that warrants issue only upon a showing of probable cause, the warrant clause limits access to warrants and provides general assurances to most law-abiding citizens that their property and privacy are secure. By requiring that warrants issue only from detached and neutral magistrates, the warrant clause mediates executive authority, providing general assurances against the natural tendency of governments and their agents to indulge temptations of power or to succumb to seductive claims of emergency and executive necessity.\footnote{209} Finally, by requiring specificity as to the places to be searched and the property to be seized, the warrant clause limits the discretion of agents acting under the authority of warrants, providing general assurances that officers or their designees cannot engage in general searches according to their whims.

Given their experiences with writs of assistance, our colonial forebears expected that threats to their security would come from the political branches.\footnote{210} They were concerned particularly about the capacity of executive agents to justify programs of broad and indiscriminate search by making claims of emergency or executive necessity.\footnote{211} They also worried about the willingness of legislatures to ratify executive demands for expansive search powers by passing laws overriding common law prohibitions on general warrants.\footnote{212} They therefore empowered the courts to restrain the political branches and provided a flexible constitutional resource with which to meet future challenges. As the next part shows, the Court drew on those resources in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to establish a constitutional warrant requirement in response to threats posed to the security of the people by the advent and expansion of professional police forces.

**Part IV: The Warrant Requirement as a Constitutional Remedy**

Contrary to the conventional view described in Part I, the warrant requirement is not derived from the warrant clause. It is, instead, a constitutional remedy analogous to the *Miranda* prophylaxis

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\footnote{208}{Davies, *supra* note 57, at 576–77.}

\footnote{209}{Id. at 589.}

\footnote{210}{Davies, *supra* note 57, at 658.}

\footnote{211}{See *supra* note 178.}

\footnote{212}{Davies, *supra* note 57, at 658.}
that is derived from the reasonableness clause and emerged in response to threats against the security of the people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects posed by the rise of professional, paramilitary police forces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

A. Our Adaptable Fourth Amendment

The temptations of historical solipsism are strong. We all have a natural and understandable tendency to assume that the standing features of the world around us are as they always have been. These are dangerous fictions in the context of constitutional interpretation, however. As Justice McKenna wrote for the Court in *Weems v. United States*:

> Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall ‘designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.’ The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. . . . Under any other rule, a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.

In the case of the Fourth Amendment, the text itself ensures against impotent lifelessness at the altar of historicism by establishing a right to remedies sufficient to guarantee the security of the people from unreasonable governmental intrusions.

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213 At least one prominent member of the Court seems to concur in this view. *See, e.g.*, *Acevedo*, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is, of course, textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of reasonableness.”).

214 *Weems v. United States* at 373 (1910). *See also* TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 5–6, 12–15.

215 *Cf. Lefkowitz*, 285 U.S. at 464 (“The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable, and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.”); *Gouled v. United States*, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It has been repeatedly decided that [the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.”).
To be sure, “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted.”216 As Part III showed, however, meeting the uncompromising command that “the right of the people to be secure . . . shall not be violated” requires that courts act in a “manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”217 Courts fail to perform their constitutional duty to the people if they interpret and apply the Fourth Amendment in ways that ignore new threats to security in persons, houses, papers, and effects created by changing law enforcement techniques and capacities.218 On this point, at least, the Court’s leading originalist seems to agree.

In United States v. Kyllo, the Court asked whether the use of a heat detection device to monitor otherwise invisible thermal emanations from a home constituted a Fourth Amendment search.219 Both the devices and the physics upon which they operate were unknown to those who wrote and read the Fourth Amendment in 1791. It therefore would be folly to argue that the Fourth Amendment regulates the use of such devices according to either a strict reading of its text or its original public meaning. Writing for the Court in Kyllo, Justice Scalia nevertheless emphasized that the Court must not “permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”220

Although the devices at issue in Kyllo were novel, our forebears knew well general threats of governmental surveillance could compromise the security of the people.221 Even though surveillance conducted with heat detection devices is surreptitious, preserving the illusion of privacy, allowing law enforcement unfettered access to that technology would leave all of us and each of us to wonder whether and when the government might be watching. It is hard to imagine anything more unsettling or disruptive to the domestic sanctity of the home and its inherent intimacy.222 Writing

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217 Id.
218 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. (“Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.”).
220 Id. at 34.
221 Id. at 31 (“At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
222 Id. at 37–38.
for the majority in *Kyllo*, Justice Scalia therefore fashioned a prospective remedy that would guard the security of the people from threats posed heat detection technology and “more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development”\(^ {223}\): the warrant requirement.

Justice Scalia’s reasoning in *Kyllo* mirrors the Court’s original reasons for imposing the warrant requirement. Most of the law enforcement institutions that now define our experience with state power simply did not exist in late eighteenth century America.\(^ {224}\) There was no Federal Bureau of Investigation or anything remotely its equivalent.\(^ {225}\) There were no professional police forces or officers charged with detecting, investigating, preventing, and prosecuting crime.\(^ {226}\) Some municipalities had constables and night watchmen, but they were mostly a feckless bunch, criticized for sloth and ineptitude rather than overzealous use of power.\(^ {227}\) In fact, the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crimes in eighteenth century America were mostly matters of private enterprise mediated by magistrates and grand juries.\(^ {228}\) A citizen might swear out a warrant,\(^ {229}\) which a magistrate would direct a sheriff to enforce,\(^ {230}\) but arrests and prosecutions were seldom, if ever, motivated, organized, or directed by law enforcement officials.\(^ {231}\) Interrogations, the defining concern in *Miranda*, were conducted by magistrates in open court, not by executive officials holding suspects incommunicado.\(^ {232}\)

\(^{223}\) *Id.* at 36.


\(^{227}\) Commission Report, *supra* note 225, at 4; VERN FOLLEY, *AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT*, 70 (1980); Davies, *supra* note 57, at 641; Oliver, *supra* note 56, at 451-52, 456. Cf. Wasserstrom, *supra* note 5, at 1395 (noting that “The few law enforcement officials that there were—sheriffs, constables, and customs inspectors—had very limited power to search or seize without a warrant.”).

\(^{228}\) Oliver, *supra* note 56, at 452–65; Davies, *supra* note 57, at 622.

\(^{229}\) TAYLOR, *supra* note 4, at 24; Oliver, *supra* note 56, at 452–53.


\(^{231}\) Oliver, *supra* note 56, at 450-52, 55-56 (indicating that eighteenth century rules of criminal procedure made it risky for officers to make arrests without warrants, that warrants were generally obtained by victims of crimes, and that constables had little incentive to perform any investigation unless a reward was offered).

Given the absence of any serious law enforcement presence during the founding era, it should come as no surprise that there was no general warrant requirement at common law.\(^\text{233}\) That did not leave private citizens, executive officials, or their agents unfettered in their discretion to conduct searches or seizures without review or consequence, however. As Akhil Amar has pointed out, they, like everyone else, could be sued for trespass.\(^\text{234}\) The combination of trespass actions, the availability of specific warrants, and the common law prohibition on general warrants were sufficient in the late eighteenth century to maintain the people’s security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. The world changed, however.\(^\text{235}\) Principal among these changes was the emergence of professional, paramilitary police forces.\(^\text{236}\)

B. An Emerging Threat: The Advent of Professional Law Enforcement

Unlike its continental peers, “England, fearing the oppression [professional] forces had brought about in many of the continental countries, did not begin to create police organizations until the 19\(^{th}\) century.”\(^\text{237}\) The colonists were similarly reserved.\(^\text{238}\) During the early days of the nineteenth century, law enforcement in the United States remained a largely private affair.\(^\text{239}\) As David Johnson reports, that began to change mid-century when “some citizens began agitating for a more immediate solution [to the problem of controlling crime] which necessitated a complete

\(^\text{233}\) Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the common law recognized a warrant requirement in only limited cases); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 44–45 (noting that there was very little search and seizure litigation for a century after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, but that began to change with “the growth of organized police forces”); Oliver, supra note 56, at 523–24 (noting that common law rules “regulated a very different sort of police force and sought to achieve a very limited role for the officer in the criminal justice system.”).

\(^\text{234}\) Amar, supra note 4, at 774–78. Professor Amar goes on to argue that warrants themselves were regarded as a threat to the security of the people in 1789. On this point, he probably goes too far. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308 (“The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that search warrants were in familiar use when the Constitution was adopted and, plainly, that when issued ‘upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,’ searches, and seizures made under them, are to be regarded as not unreasonable, and therefore not prohibited by the amendment.”); TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 41 (“It is perhaps too much to say that [the founders] feared the warrant more than the search . . . ”).

\(^\text{235}\) Oliver, supra note 56, at 524; Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1394; Amsterdam, supra note 117, at 399.

\(^\text{236}\) TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 45.

\(^\text{237}\) Commission Report, supra note 225, at 43. See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 (2004) (“England did not have a professional police force until the 19th century . . . ”); FOLLEY, supra note 227, at 43, 59.

\(^\text{238}\) Oliver, supra note 56, at 448 (“Modern police departments, charged with aggressively investigating and preventing crime, were created over strenuous objections that their very existence would undermine common-law limits on police conduct.”).

\(^\text{239}\) Commission Report, supra note 225, at 43; Oliver, supra note 56, at 447-48, 450, 455 (“Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, victims and magistrates conducted investigations, not police officers. Victims obtained enough information to satisfy themselves that probable cause existed to seek a warrant. After the suspect’s arrest, magistrates, not constables, conducted the interrogation.”).
overhaul of the philosophy, organization, and techniques of policing."\textsuperscript{240} Reformers had in mind a model of preventative policing pioneered by Sir Robert Peel in 1829.\textsuperscript{241} Peel proposed establishing a uniformed police department, organized on a military command model,\textsuperscript{242} "whose collective efforts to suppress crime depended upon their ability to establish a pervasive, visible presence in all areas of a city at all hours of the day or night."\textsuperscript{243}

Peel’s model of a centralized, bureaucratized, ever-present police force slowly took hold in mid-nineteenth century America.\textsuperscript{244} Led by New York, most of America’s largest cities had police forces of some sort by 1870.\textsuperscript{245} By the early twentieth century, the model of a professional, paramilitary police force had spread to almost every municipality.\textsuperscript{246} Expanding police departments created new career pathways for young men in an increasingly urbanizing America.\textsuperscript{247} Law enforcement agencies also began to assert their positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy of government, competing for resources, public attention, and political favor.\textsuperscript{248}

The advent of professional police forces resulted in the creation of new disciplinary regimes\textsuperscript{249} and dramatic changes in citizens’ daily engagements with state power.\textsuperscript{250} Prior to the advent of professional police forces, the state and its capacity to use force were largely an abstraction

\textsuperscript{240} D\textsc{avid} R. J\textsc{ohnson}, Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American Police 1800-1887, 9 (1979). See also Folley, \textit{supra} note 227, at 68-69; Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 45.

\textsuperscript{241} Folley, \textit{supra} note 227, at 71; Johnson, \textit{supra} note 240, at 9; Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 44. Peel is familiar to criminal law students as the intended target of Daniel M’Naughten, of the eponymous M’Naughten standard that remains the predominate test for legal insanity.

\textsuperscript{242} Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 44.

\textsuperscript{243} Johnson, \textit{supra} note 240, at 9.

\textsuperscript{244} Johnson, \textit{supra} note 240, at 9; Oliver, \textit{supra} note 56, at 459.

\textsuperscript{245} Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 45; Oliver, \textit{supra} note 56, at 459.

\textsuperscript{246} Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 45.

\textsuperscript{247} J\textsc{ames} F. R\textsc{ichardson}, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901, 173 (1970); Commission Report, \textit{supra} note 225, at 46, 7; Oliver, \textit{supra} note 56, at 459.

\textsuperscript{248} E\textsc{dwin} G. B\textsc{urrows} & M\textsc{ike} W\textsc{allace}, Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898, 638 (1999) (describing how, unlike London’s Metropolitan Police, after which they were modeled, New York’s police were decentralized and therefore “inextricably enmeshed in local politics.”); Commission Report at 6. See also, e.g., Oliver, \textit{supra} note 56, at 465–66 (describing how the New York Police Department succeeded in lobbying for a legislative amendment to its statutory power to detain material witnesses where other groups had failed).

\textsuperscript{249} See generally M\textsc{ichel} F\textsc{oucault}, \textit{Discipline and Punish}, 21–28 (1979).

\textsuperscript{250} Oliver, \textit{supra} note 56, at 448
for most citizens. 251 With uniformed officers on the street, and cadres of professional investigators engaged in identifying and apprehending offenders, state power became a visible, visceral part of the daily tableaus of life in American cities. 252 Uniformed police officers populating the public sphere also provided the state with a new, far-reaching surveillance apparatus. State power was not merely present, it was watching. 253 Finally, officers and investigators asserted a broad license to use force. 254 Police claimed a right to command, to employ violence, to effect forcible seizures of persons, and to enter and search property. 255 More and more, citizens lived with very real threats to security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.

Police departments developed training models, internal standards, and cultural norms. 256 Officers were judged by these standards and norms for purposes of pay and promotion, which created incentives to be aggressive, and shaped their professional personalities. 257 They also produced a degree of cultural separation between law enforcement and their communities. Officers assumed a proprietary position as guardians of the peace. 258 Unlike civilians, the daily experiences of police officers were defined by the potential for violence. 259 Success and survival were tied to officers' abilities to conform psychologically and socially to law enforcement culture. 260 To join the police department was to join a brotherhood. To be a member of the brotherhood carried with it

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251 Colonial obsessions with writs of assistance arose from entanglements between a relatively small number of merchants and customs or tax officials, not common engagements between citizens and police officers. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 35, 44; Oliver, supra note 56, at 450, 45–57.

252 Folley, supra note 227, at 73, 101–02.

253 Folley, supra note 227, at 156–57.

254 See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 56, at 468–71 (describing how, in the late nineteenth century, the use of clubs by New York Police officers "to punish and intimidate those [they] identified as being part of the 'criminal element' was not only accepted, it was publicly encouraged.").

255 See, e.g., Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (“Entry into defendant’s living quarters . . . was demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to authority . . . ”).

256 Folley, supra note 227, at 78; Oliver, supra note 56, at 459.

257 Oliver, supra note 56, at 459, 524.

258 Id. at 469–70.

259 Id. at 469.

260 Id.
duties of faith and fealty.\footnote{261} It also provided access to power and status, which, in turn, bred a sense of practiced entitlement,\footnote{262} which often led to corruption and abuse.\footnote{263}

The rise of professional police forces also occasioned more expansive uses of police powers, including search and seizure.\footnote{264} Some of these developments were literally pedestrian, such as the advent of the beat cop;\footnote{265} but some cast a darker shadow, such as undercover investigations, eavesdropping,\footnote{266} investigative detention,\footnote{267} custodial interrogation,\footnote{268} and wiretapping.\footnote{269} Police departments and their political supporters argued that these new techniques and technologies were necessary.\footnote{270} They also argued that police officers and their departmental supervisors should have broad discretion to determine when and how to use these techniques.\footnote{271} The results were entirely predictable: excess and abuse.\footnote{272} Some beat cops became little more than bullies\footnote{273} and extortionists.\footnote{274} Some investigators became kidnappers and torturers.\footnote{275} Even officers and departments acting with the best of intentions could not resist the logic of practical necessity or the

\footnote{261} Thomas Ropetto, American Police: The Blue Parade 199 (2011).
\footnote{262} Id.; Oliver, supra note 56, at 473. This is described in the policing literature as the “command and control” model of police-citizen interactions. See, e.g., Eric Miller, Role-Based Policing, 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 661-62 (2006); Tom Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363-64 (2001).
\footnote{263} Ropetto, supra note 261, at 39-40; Marilynn S. Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City 63–69 (2003); Burrows & Wallace, supra note 248, at 638; Oliver, supra note 56, at 471–73.
\footnote{264} Oliver, supra note 56, at 460; Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1395.
\footnote{265} Folley, supra note 227, at 72.
\footnote{267} Oliver, supra note 56, at 465.
\footnote{268} Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 (1966) (summarizing cases dealing with custodial interrogations in which “the police resorted to physical brutality—beating, hanging, whipping—and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions.”); Oliver, supra note 56, at 466-68.
\footnote{269} Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping.”); Oliver, supra note 56, at 466-68.
\footnote{270} Oliver, supra note 56, at 460–61, 478, 482.
\footnote{271} Id. at 461, 468–69.
\footnote{272} See supra note 263.
\footnote{273} See, e.g., Id. at 469–70 (describing how one police captain armed squads of officers with clubs, ordering them to go into tough neighborhoods to beat known gang members).
\footnote{274} Id. at 472–73 (explaining that bribery of police was so prevalent in late nineteenth century New York that estimated illegal contributions was listed in tourist guidebooks).
\footnote{275} Id. at 460 (“In the early years of the Progressive Era, officers were given a very public mandate to torture suspects in interrogation rooms and inflict unnecessary violence upon suspected criminals on the streets.”).
adrenaline of the pursuit. In the process, the very existence of police forces became a threat to the people’s sense of security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. 276

C. A Constitutional Response to the Emerging Threat

The political branches proved largely incapable of regulating the police forces that had become the model for law enforcement in the United States by the early twentieth century. 277 Responsibility for protecting the security of the people from the threat of law enforcement excesses therefore fell to the courts. 278 The Supreme Court responded by reshaping the world of Fourth and Fifth Amendment remedies. 279 The warrant requirement was one of these efforts. 280

Born in response to the expansion of police forces, the warrant requirement provided a renewed sense of security for the people by interposing the courts between officers and citizens and setting prospective constraints on law enforcement’s discretionary use of force to search and seize. 281 Post hoc review of law enforcement actions through the civil process may have been sufficient to guarantee the security of the people when the only threats came from phlegmatic constables and duty collectors. 282 By the late nineteenth century, however, those common law tools were no longer sufficient to control politically powerful law enforcement agencies or their zealous officers. 283

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276 Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1395.

277 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629; Commission Report at 6, 7; Oliver, supra note 56, at 448, 460-61, 478-82; Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1395.

278 See, e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (1914) (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”)

279 See Oliver, supra note 56, at 448.

280 See TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 46.

281 Marron, 275 U.S. at 196 (“The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”); Río, 180 U.S. at 374-75 (“A citizen ought not to be deprived of his personal liberty upon an allegation which, upon being sifted, may amount to nothing more than a suspicion. While authorities upon this subject are singularly few, it is clear that a person ought not to be arrested upon a criminal charge upon less direct allegations than are necessary to authorize the arrest of a fraudulent or absconding debtor.”); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 568-69 (“Descriptive allegations in criminal pleading are required to be reasonably definite and certain, as a necessary safeguard to the accused against surprise, misconception, and error in conducting his defence, and in order that the judgment in the case may be a bar to a second accusation for the same charge.”); Davies, supra note 57, at 657.

282 Amar, supra note 4, at 774-76.

283 Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L. J. 144, 146 (1948) (“Police lawlessness excused as expediency has been encouraged by apathy and occasional affirmative support both from the public and its elected leaders. Defendants are to a large extent protected, for statutes generally provide that civil servants’ salaries cannot be
Something more was needed: an effective, enforceable, parsimonious, and therefore constitutional, remedy.

Unlike the *Miranda* prophylaxis, there is no signal case establishing the force and foundation of the warrant requirement. It instead evolved through a line of cases starting with *Boyd v. United States* and culminating in *Johnson v. United States*. In form, analysis, and rhetoric, these cases nevertheless foreshadow the Court’s defense of constitutional remedies in *Miranda*. Specifically, the Court highlights the scope and importance of the Fourth Amendment as a “sacred right” of the people and emphasizes the general threats posed by some law enforcement practices. The Court then identifies concerns with physical searches and seizures, particularly when conducted in homes or other protected spaces. It next rehearses the critical role of the Fourth Amendment as a

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284 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Although *Boyd* does not state explicitly the existence of a warrant requirement, Justice Butler later credits *Boyd*, among other early cases, for ingraining the warrant requirement in Fourth Amendment law. See *Agnello*, 269 U.S. at 33 (“While the question has never been directly decided by this Court, it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.”). *Boyd*’s role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recently was revitalized by Chief Justice Roberts, who cited and quoted from *Boyd* extensively in his majority opinion for the Court in *Riley v. California*. See, e.g., 134 S.Ct. at 2494–95.


286 *Boyd*, 116 U.S. at 630 (“The principles laid down in [Entick v. Carrington] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employés of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, — it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judgment.”).

287 *Berger*, 388 U.S. at 53, 63 (“This is no formality that we require today, but a fundamental rule that has long been recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America.”); *Camara*, 387 U.S. at 528 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is basic to a free society.”); *Ge-Bart*, 282 U.S. at 356–57 (“[The reasonableness clause] is general and forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent . . . .”); *Johnson*, 333 U.S. at 14 (“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”); *Nardone*, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (“That decision was not the product of a merely meticulous reading of technical language. It was the translation into practicality of broad considerations of morality and public well-being.”); *Weeks*, 232 U.S. at 391 (“This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our federal system with the enforcement of the laws.”); *Boyd*, 116 U.S. at 618 (“As the question raised upon the order for the production by the claimants of the invoice of the twenty-nine cases of glass, and the proceedings had thereon, is not only an important one in the determination of the present case, but is a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen, we will set forth the order at large.”).

288 *Brinegar*, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit.”);
protection against law enforcement regimes and zealous officers engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”

Faced with the expanding threat of physical search and seizure, the Court cites the necessity of giving “liberal construction” to the Fourth Amendment “lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted.”

While acknowledging the validity of law enforcement goals advanced by physical search and seizure, the Court notes the constitutional role of the Fourth Amendment as a check on executive powers and emphasizes the courts’ duties to enforce those constraints. The Court then highlights the role that

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Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (“Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); Lefkowitz v. City of Rochester, 285 U.S. at 464 (“Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime. . . .”); Go-Bart Trading Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. at 390 (“The need of protection against [general searches] is attested alike by history and present conditions.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 391 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions.”).

Go-Bart Trading Co., 282 U.S. at 392 (“The Amendment is to be liberally construed, and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement, lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted.”); Lefkowitz v. City of Rochester, 285 U.S. at 464 (“The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable, and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy.”); Gouled v. Sung, 255 U.S. at 304 (“It has been repeatedly decided that [the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.”); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1396. See also Scalia, supra note 139, at 37 (pointing out that judges should “give words and phrases [in constitutions] expansive rather than narrow interpretation”).

Berger, 388 U.S. at 63 (“While ‘[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement,’ it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one’s home or office are invaded.”) (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (“When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 309 (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 391 (“The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 629 (finding unpersuasive the government’s “argument of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence.”); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549 (“Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights. In the formation of a government, the people may confer upon it such powers as they choose. The government, when so formed, may, and when called upon should, exercise all the powers it has for the protection of the rights of its citizens and the people within its jurisdiction, but it can exercise no other. The duty of a government to afford protection is limited always by the power it possesses for that purpose.”).

Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (“When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 391 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times

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warrants and the warrant requirement play in guaranteeing security in the home and other protected spaces by limiting the discretion of officers\textsuperscript{293} and interposing courts between citizens and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{294}

Although the Court often draws on the wisdom of the warrant clause in elaborating the warrant requirement, the Court does not ground the warrant requirement in the warrant clause. Rather, the Court casts the warrant requirement as a prospective remedy grounded in the reasonableness clause.\textsuperscript{295} There is, of course, a close linkage between the warrant requirement and

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\textsuperscript{293} Berger, 388 U.S. at 58 (finding unconstitutional a New York statute licensing broad use of electronic eavesdropping devices because the statute failed to limit law enforcement discretion, thereby permitting "general searches by electronic devices, the truly offensive character of which was first condemned in \textit{Entick v. Carrington} and which were then known as 'general warrants.'"); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers."); \textit{Lefkowitz}, 285 U.S. at 464 ("Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.").

\textsuperscript{294} Berger, 388 U.S. at 59–60; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14 ("The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped by zealous officers is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."); \textit{Lefkowitz}, 285 U.S. at 464 ("he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests."). \textit{Cf. Brinegar}, 388 U.S. at 182 ("We must remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable search differs from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance protection. For example, any effective interference with freedom of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a course of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go to the court and obtain an injunction. Other rights, such as that to an impartial jury or the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the courts themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the taking of private property may be vindicated after the act in terms of money. But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident, perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for injunction or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence."); \textit{Richard Leone & Greg Anrig, The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism} (2003) ("By permitting searches and seizures only if reasonable, and interposing the courts between the privacy of citizens and the potential excesses of executive zeal," these constitutional protections help to protect against "'dragnets, or general searches, which were anathema to the colonists who rebelled against the British crown.'").

\textsuperscript{295} Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (‘As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’ . . . Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’); \textit{Acevedo}, 500 U.S. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring); See \textit{Camara}, 387 U.S. at 528–29 ("Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."); \textit{Agnello}, 269 U.S. at 32

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\textit{Part I: The Warrant Requirement}
the warrant clause. It is not one of implication however. It is, instead, a matter of modeling. Although our founders did not mandate warrants, they understood well the prospective remedial power of warrants and the warrant process.\textsuperscript{296} So too did twentieth-century courts.\textsuperscript{297} It is no surprise, then, that the Court would draw on this wisdom and experience when fashioning a constitutional response to new and emerging threats posed by professional police forces.

There is little doubt that the warrant requirement offers an effective contribution to our collective security against government intrusion.\textsuperscript{298} As the Court pointed out in United States v. Lefkowitz, “Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.”\textsuperscript{299} By interposing courts between citizens and law enforcement, the warrant requirement slows things down and imposes upon officers a duty of deliberation and care that is easy to forget in the heat of the chase.\textsuperscript{300} It also forces officers to identify, organize, and externalize their reasons for wanting to conduct a search. This process of deliberation and public reason-giving effects a powerful moral force on agents and action.\textsuperscript{301} Finally, the warrant requirement guarantees that warrant applications will be judged by detached arbiters exercising neutral judgment.\textsuperscript{302} This not only reduces the likelihood that law enforcement interests will overwhelm citizen privacy interests, it dramatically reduces error rates,\textsuperscript{303} and provides invaluable reassurance to the people that their rights are not subject to the whim of zealous officers charged with ferreting out crime.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{296} Taylor, supra note 4, at 38–42; Davies, supra note 57, at 650–57.

\textsuperscript{297} Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308 (“The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that search warrants[. . .] when issued ‘upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,’ searches, and seizures made under them, are to be regarded as not unreasonable, and therefore not prohibited by the amendment.”).

\textsuperscript{298} White, 401 U.S. at 789-90 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The very purpose of interposing the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is to redistribute the privacy risks throughout society. Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield ‘wrongdoers,’ but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security throughout our society.”); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 15.

\textsuperscript{299} 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).

\textsuperscript{300} Davies, supra note 57, at 576–77, 589 657; Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 926–27 (1986).


\textsuperscript{302} Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 464.

\textsuperscript{303} Max Minzer, Putting Probability Back Into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 923-25 (2009).

\textsuperscript{304} Reinert, supra note 152, at 1500; Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 1396.
In addition to being effective, the warrant requirement is easy to administer and enforce. It starts with a simple rule: searches of homes or other protected areas are presumed to be unreasonable in the absence of a warrant.\(^{305}\) That presumption can be overcome by showing consent or emergency.\(^{306}\) If the presumption cannot be overcome, then the evidence seized, along with all investigative fruits, will be excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.\(^{307}\) On the other hand, searches conducted under the auspices of a warrant are presumed to be reasonable.\(^{308}\) Even where a warrant turns out to have been improvidently granted, the good faith exception excuses officers who act in good faith.\(^{309}\)

Finally, the warrant requirement is parsimonious. As Justice Jackson points out in *Johnson v. United States*, it is hard to imagine a less burdensome remedial structure than the warrant requirement that is also sufficient to guarantee the right of the people.\(^{310}\) As further evidence of its parsimoniousness, the warrant requirement is not absolute, but admits of exceptions where “balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy” suggests that it can be “dispensed with.”\(^{311}\) In order for the warrant requirement to be effective, however, it is essential that these cases be regarded as “exceptional circumstances.”\(^{312}\) If warrants become the exception rather than the rule, then the goal of ensuring a general sense of security will be compromised.

**Part V: A Remedies as Rights Agenda for the 21st Century**

The foregoing account of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is valuable in a number of regards. Foremost, it brings conceptual and doctrinal clarity to persistent debates about the constitutional status of the warrant requirement. Although these pursuits make the game well

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305 *Vernonia Sch. Dist.*, 515 U.S. at 653.
307 *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. at 392.
308 *Gouled*, 255 U.S. at 308.
309 See David Gray, A Spectacular Non-Sequitur, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (2013). As Bill Stuntz has pointed out, the good faith exception plays an important role in reinforcing the systemic effectiveness of the warrant requirement as a constraint on law enforcement. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 909.
310 *Johnson*, 333 U.S. at 14 (“Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”).
312 *Johnson*, 333 U.S. at 14; Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 15, at 1620-22.
worth the candle, the remedies as rights framework offered here also has important advantages as we seek to understand and address contemporary challenges to the security of the people brought by rapid advances in surveillance and data aggregation technologies.

Granting government agents unfettered discretion to deploy and use modern surveillance technologies, such as stingrays, GPS-enabled tracking, cell-site location, drones, and Big Data pose general threats to the security of the people.\(^\text{313}\) Although these challenges are novel in dimension, they are not incomprehensible to our existing constitutional regime.\(^\text{314}\) In concept and principle, the Fourth Amendment questions raised by contemporary surveillance technologies have much in common with challenges confronted by our forebears in the late eighteenth century, when the security of the people was threatened by general warrants, and the early twentieth century, when the security of the people was threatened by the growth and expansion of law enforcement agencies. We may therefore turn to this history in order to draw wisdom and guidance for the present.

Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth a few moments in closing to consider how these past experiences might assist law enforcement, legislatures, and courts as they confront constitutional challenges posed by contemporary surveillance technologies.\(^\text{315}\) Foremost, the remedies as rights account of the Fourth Amendment makes clear that it would be unreasonable to bar law enforcement from using these technologies altogether. What is called for instead is a set of generally applied constitutional remedies that provide government agents with reasonable access while still preserving the security of the people. The familiar standards of effectiveness, enforceability, and parsimony will be the constitutional standard bearers.

Although a single remedial approach might be sufficient to meet the challenges posed by physical searches, the diversity of contemporary surveillance technologies, the range of threats they pose to the security of the people, and the different ways they serve government interests, suggests that meeting the demands of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the twenty-first century likely

\(^{313}\) Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 65-67.

\(^{314}\) See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 768 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”).

\(^{315}\) For a fuller account of why the deployment and use of contemporary surveillance technologies constitute Fourth Amendment searches, see Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 73-100. For a complete exploration of constitutional remedies that might be necessary and sufficient to restore the security of the people against threats posed by modern surveillance technologies, see Gray & Citron, supra note 34.
will require more range and flexibility.\footnote{See\n\n\n\n Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 (“How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution.”).} For example, some technologies, such as GPS-enabled tracking and cell-site location data, are most useful in the context of discrete investigations but pose the greatest threat if their use is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement.\footnote{Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).} For these kinds of technologies, extension of the warrant requirement might strike the right balance.\footnote{See Augustine, 4. N.E.3d at 865.}

For many data aggregation technologies, a blanket warrant requirement would strike the wrong balance. That is because many of these technologies must be engaged and running all the time in order to serve legitimate law enforcement interests.\footnote{Gray & Citron, supra note 3, at 112-24.} For these technologies, reasonableness therefore may require alternative regulatory structures, different timing of regulatory interventions, or some combination of both. For example, a law enforcement agency might be permitted to deploy a data aggregation technology on a showing of probable utility, but a court order or a warrant might be required before accessing any of the information that it gathers. Reasonableness might also require setting limits on what kinds of data can be gathered, how long that data can be stored, and the kinds of algorithms that used to analyze the data, when, and by whom. Retrospective analysis would be critical. If it turned out that a remedial structure failed to preserve reasonable government interests, then it would fail the test of parsimony. Contrariwise, if a technology turned out not to advance government interests in any appreciable way, then more stringent remedial controls would be necessary and appropriate.\footnote{The NSA’s telephonic metadata program is just such a technology. Despite its massive scale, and the universal threat it poses to privacy, it does not appear to have offered law enforcement any advantage over traditional methods in detecting, preventing, or prosecuting terrorists. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40 (D.D.C. 2013); Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 11 (Jan. 23, 2014) (available at http://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf). This should not come as a surprise. Law enforcement and threat detection are seldom advanced by having more information. To the contrary, data overload can dramatically compromise these legitimate governmental interests. See Julia Angwin, NSA Struggles to Make Sense of Flood of Surveillance Data, W.S.J., Dec. 25, 2013 (available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579252022823658850).}
There is, of course, much more to be said about the constitutional status of contemporary surveillance technologies and the proper remedial structures for regulating law enforcement’s use of these technologies. That discussion we must leave for another day.\footnote{See Gray & Citron, supra note 34.}