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Education Policy Formation in Africa
A Comparative Study of Five Countries

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Education Policy Formation in Africa
A Comparative Study of Five Countries

For the
Donors to African Education

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Introduction and Overview

David R. Evans

Following the 1988 publication of the World Bank's policy report "Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Adjustment, Revitalization, and Expansion," the Donors to African Education (DAE), a consortium of donors and representatives of African governments, was formed. DAE organized a series of working groups to address specific issues in African education such as: examinations, textbooks, female education, and educational research. One of these working groups was charged with addressing the Mobilization of Resources for Developing Education Strategies, which led to a recognition of the need for research on the process of education policy formation in Africa. Under the aegis of this group, a proposal was drawn to study the education policy process using teams of local researchers in selected countries. The proposal failed, however, to attract sufficient funding support from DAE members. In 1991 it was revised, and a USAID grant provided funding for a small first phase.

The revised proposal called for a series of desk studies that would create the foundation for dialogue with African policymakers and lead to more extensive research based in Africa. Limited resources meant that the studies would have to be done by individuals who had enough in-depth experience with education policy formation in a specific country to write a case study without field investigation. Wherever possible a senior educator from the country was asked to write the case, or work as a co-author. In some instances that was not possible and an expatriate with many years of experience in that country was chosen. Despite the lack of resources a number of the authors were able to conduct limited field work while they were in the country for other reasons. Most authors had considerable personal libraries of relevant documents upon which they could draw as well.

The result is a detailed and insightful set of case studies and two analytical overview chapters that lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of the process of education policy formation in Africa. The cases, reflecting developments up to late 1992, include Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, Mali and Senegal. They are complemented by two overview chapters that discuss common characteristics of the policy formation process in Angolphone and Francophone Africa. Each of these chapters summarizes lessons learned from the case studies and the experience of the authors, and discusses some implications of these lessons for improving policy formation. This document concludes the first phase of this research effort. Subsequent work will be needed to derive specific donor and government strategies for strengthening national capabilities to formulate and implement new education policies. A new or revitalized working group within DAE should serve as an institutional base from which to directly involve educators and policymakers from Africa in the next phase.
The Problem

The education systems of most African countries have evolved directly from the institutions and procedures that they inherited from the colonial power at independence. While there have been substantial changes since independence, uneven growth and inappropriate structures have left most countries with the need for significant education reform. The conditions of the 1990s are very different from earlier decades, creating additional demands for changes in education. Rapidly growing school-age populations, slow growth of government revenues, and demands for an education system that is better linked to economic opportunities and national ideology, all create difficult choices for education policymakers. Formulating politically and economically realistic policies under these circumstances will require improved procedures and additional capabilities. The core recommendation of the World Bank’s 1988 policy study on education in sub-Saharan Africa is that “...each African country now embrace the task of formulating and implementing an internally coherent set of policies...in the education and training sector.”

Education goes well beyond its obvious role of providing a setting for teaching and learning. Education is the arena in which all components of society compete for access to modern sector employment and high status positions, and where currently successful groups strive to maintain or increase their access to these benefits. Policy recommendations for education reform therefore have two components, technical and political. Even modest changes in education, desirable from a technical perspective, can lead to substantial unrest and even violence if they are perceived to threaten the access to benefits of various groups in society. Change in education requires public consensus and political acceptability to a degree not needed in other sectors. To be successful, the process of education policy formation must provide for sufficient dialogue and realism to satisfy both the technical and the political requirements.

Effective development of education systems in Africa ultimately depends on the ability of African governments to develop a workable process for formulating coherent education policies and the capacity to translate policy into realistic investment and implementation plans. Donors working in African education are realizing that having a viable national education policy framework is an essential prerequisite for effective donor-government cooperation in education.

The Research Study

In that context, the purpose of this first research phase was to describe and analyze the approaches currently used to formulate education policy and thereby to set the stage for assisting African countries in creating more effective methods for the future. Specifically, the study sought to understand:

- The policy-making process: How has education policy-making been carried out since independence? What are current policy formation procedures? How effective are they in creating a viable policy framework for educational development? How could the process be improved to better enhance its openness and access, to insure that diverse groups’ needs are
effectively heard, to generate credibility and legitimacy, and to build support and consensus for proposed education policies?

- The policy product of that process: What form do policy statements currently take? Do they provide meaningful guidance to those charged with choosing between competing alternatives and designing detailed implementation plans? Is the product prioritized in a meaningful way? Is it financially and administratively feasible given the local conditions? Are copies easily available outside of the government?

- The policy environment: How can the policy process and product help generate a workable consensus; insure the support of key opinion leaders both in and out of government—especially leaders of religious or ethnic communities; and provide a context for creating a detailed investment plan that both government and donors can support?

Authors were asked to construct a historical summary of key events in the evolution of education policies since independence. All the cases contain a summary table of key policy events as well as a detailed bibliography of the major education policy documents. Most cases provide a more detailed description of policy-making in recent years, including an analysis of the role of major donors, the influences of political and economic events at the national level, and the extent that external factors have driven internal policy-making. The cases analyze competing forces in the policy process and assess the effectiveness of the resulting policies and their supporting documentation.

Current Practice

The five cases suggest two basic features of education policy formation in Africa: each country has a unique historical context that is reflected in the specifics of its education system and the procedures that it uses in policy formation, and there is a clear pattern of policy-making that characterizes Anglophone countries and a different and somewhat less systematic pattern for Francophone countries. The colonial experience is still a powerful determinant of the role of the government in education, the shape and goals of the education system, and the ways in which citizens are allowed access to the policy-making process.

For Anglophone countries, education policy formation typically involves appointment of an independent National Education Commission to review education goals and policies. The commission is made up of representatives of various parts of the education system and people drawn from different elements of society. Government is not officially represented, but technical support is normally provided by education officers and academics. The commission carries out a national consultative process, frequently traveling around the country to hear testimony, and then formulates a comprehensive set of recommendations on future goals and policies for submission to the government. The government reviews the recommendations and issues a White Paper setting forth the government's position and indicating which recommendations it will accept and try to implement. The White Paper usually goes through some process of debate and final approval by the Cabinet or sometimes the national legislature.
In Francophone Africa, a somewhat different approach is used. National dialogue on education policy seems to be less frequent and more likely to occur in response to a political or economic crisis. Typically a large conference or meeting, an États Généraux sur l'Éducation, is called. The process is usually managed directly by the Ministry of Education which exercises control of the amount of participation from various representatives of society. The resulting report, a Déclaration des États Généraux, and recommendations are not normally reviewed by government, since the process is seen as an activity of the government. The result in most Francophone countries seems to be a less institutionalized policy-making process and infrequent opportunities for participation by those outside of the Ministry of Education. (The Senegal case in this document suggests that recent events there depart somewhat from this pattern.)

Such commissions reports, declarations, and White Papers currently form the policy foundation for education reform and development in most African countries. However, these papers typically are wide-ranging, contain a long list of recommendations—often several hundred—and are generally lacking any explicit discussion of priorities or the fiscal implications of the recommendations. Typically, the report represents a set of national aspirations for the shape of education in the future. Governments and donors struggle to use such documents as a basis for identifying program priorities and developing specific investment plans.

The nature of these documents should not be a surprise, since they are created through a process of national dialogue and committee-generated consensus. Members of the commissions or the États Généraux are not responsible for finding practical ways to implement the recommendations or financing them in the context of severe resource constraints. Rather, they are reflecting what in their best judgement is a set of normative targets for the nation as demanded by the people and by national ideologies. The Ministry of Education is left with the task of setting priorities, either explicitly or by default, and figuring out how to finance and implement recommendations selected from the long list in the policy documents.

These processes serve a valid and essential purpose in setting the national stage for articulation and implementation of more specific policy reforms in education. With luck, they provide a mandate that the government can use to justify changes—particularly unpopular ones needed to improve equity in the education sector. However, the documents do not provide the level of clarity, specificity, and realism that is needed for either meaningful planning on the part of the government or for dialogue with donors about assistance to the education sector.

When donor representatives arrive in country to develop assistance options, they find that the existing policy documents provide only the most general guidance. Under the best of circumstances, these missions are able to create conditions for a real dialogue with government officials around the issues raised by national policy documents. However, such teams ultimately must produce detailed analyses and plans that will satisfy their internal review procedures. Even when developed jointly with government officials, such documents are perceived as belonging to the donor agency and being exogenous to local policy-making. The policy foundation set by national procedures is quickly submerged under a flood of donor generated country plans, sector studies, project papers, feasibility studies, and staff appraisal reports that drive new investment
and shape education policy as implemented. As a result, the national capacity for policy formation remains uninstitutionalized and episodic.

**Issues Suggested by the Case Studies**

These case studies provide a rich texture of historical and current context to illuminate the evolution of education policy in the five countries discussed. The nature of the process, the identity of the major actors, and the specific constituencies supporting various policies become clear, as do some of the weaknesses of both the process and the results. A major benefit of the cases is the availability in one place, often for the first time, of a comprehensive overview of education policy formation in that country. Typically, educators and development specialists working in a country have access only to the most recent policy documents and are not able to place them in the historical context of previous actions and policies. Despite all that has been written about education in many of these countries, there is little that focuses on education policy formation.

The education policy formation process is quite explicit in the Anglophone countries. In the three cases included here it has consisted of a series of national commissions that engage in a process of public consultation and then issue a report. Of the three countries, Botswana has the most developed process for regular consultation with its people about education policy. Uganda has a process with a similar structure, but it is less institutionalized and has been sidetracked several times by internal conflict and severe economic disruption. Policy-making in Tanzania is more idiosyncratic, reflecting the unique characteristics of its Ujamaa philosophy and the education policies that it produced. Common to all three is a tension between centralized control and participatory consultation, which in Tanzania took the form of mobilization in a series of centrally managed education campaigns that relied heavily upon locally contributed resources.

The Francophone countries—Mali and Senegal—reflect a quite different approach to policy formation. In both countries there is less of a tradition of consultation with citizens, although both have a history of national education conferences where policies are debated. In Mali, consultation took place mostly within the framework of the ruling political party. When a new party came to power, a new conference would be called to review and reform education policy. The most recent conference, held in 1991 reflected a new openness to a more democratic and participatory process.

Senegal appears to have a similar pattern, but several of the more recent conferences actually represented attempts to break away from the strong central control with some radical reforms. The conferences promoted genuine expression of education goals of those outside of the government, and to some extent created a dialogue between the government and those instrumental in setting up the conferences. However, to a large extent, the government was successful in seizing the initiative after the conferences and implementing only those aspects of the reforms consistent with its position.
Common to all the cases is the lack of institutionalized capacity for ongoing dialogue about education policy and its implementation. Commissions and conferences are temporary structures that produce reports and then are dissolved. Translating their reports into government commitment to support new policies is often problematic. In Anglophone countries, the White Paper mechanism provides an expected avenue of response that more or less forces the government to react to the recommendations. However, it is not bound to accept any of them, particularly those that might be politically difficult to implement. In Francophone countries, there is no similar mechanism. The conference report belongs to the government, but there is no public forum for responding to it beyond what pressure outside groups can bring to bear on the government.

In neither set of countries is there any explicit mechanism for translating the reports into detailed, prioritized and financially feasible investment plans for the government. The nature of the documents allow wide latitude in interpreting and implementing policy recommendations. Neither donors nor governments find the documents particularly helpful in designing new investment or in choosing between competing alternatives. Even where there is general agreement on goals and government willingness to implement the recommendations, there are few mechanisms for translating them into changes in budget allocations, reform of curricula and teaching practices, or changes in the roles of teachers and education administrators.

Next Steps

The cases presented here represent only the first phase of a process to analyze and improve both the formation of education policy and its translation into viable education reforms. The materials in the cases should now be used to stimulate discussions between education leaders in Africa, donor agencies, and researchers. From these dialogues should come a clearer understanding of the strengths and limitations of current procedures and suggested reforms of the process. Donors can then work together with African leaders to strengthen procedures and capabilities needed to make education policy formation and revision an ongoing and institutionalized process. The increasing reliance by donors on policy lending and non-project assistance creates an urgent need to shift the initiative on policy-making and implementation away from the donors and give it directly to the African nations.
Acknowledgments

Education policy formation in Africa is a diverse and complex process. This collection of cases and analytic chapters represents a fresh look at Africa's past and current experience in creating education policy. Throughout the analytic process, many agencies provided financial support, many individuals on behalf of agencies contributed intellectual guidance, and many authors bestowed their experience and perspectives.

While several contributed to the genesis of this work, Jim Socknat, division head of the Africa Technical Department of the World Bank, deserves explicit recognition. Mr. Socknat realized early the need to focus directly on understanding the process by which education policy is created. He believed that building capacity for education policy formation needed to begin with an understanding of past efforts, particularly the national context in which policy-making occurred. Peter Moock, who succeeded Socknat at the Bank, ably continued support for the study. Later, a network of people dedicated to improving education in Africa, the Donors to African Education, with Chris Shaw at the helm, took over the study from Peter Moock.

A research project requires financial backing. Initially conceptualized as a series of case studies conducted in country by national teams, this study almost foundered for lack of financial support. Ron Bonner and Julie Rea, from the Office of Analysis, Research, and Technical Support in USAID's Africa Bureau, came to the rescue by committing financial support, as well as the technical guidance given by Sue Grant Lewis, Ash Hartwell and Jeanne Moulton. USAID also provided production and layout services. In this regard, particular thanks must go to David Gately and Patricia Mantey, at the Center for Development Information and Evaluation's Research and Reference Services, for completing the final copy editing and layout to produce this document.

The real strength of the study of course lies in the work of the individual authors who contributed the chapters. Their personal experience and insights into the policy process of individual countries provides the raw material for understanding current approaches to education policy in Africa. Without the willingness of these authors to volunteer their time and expertise this study would not have been possible. The small honorarium provided to each author was only a token payment for the amount of effort needed to produce a finished chapter. The work of the authors was made possible by the generous willingness of many senior African educators and administrators to share their own insights and experiences.

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Case Summaries

Jeanne Moulton

Botswana

Like many African countries, Botswana strives to balance the role of communities and that of the central government in making education policy. While the central authority has grown stronger during the periods of colonization and independence, the history of policy formation evidences an effort to maintain the strong cultural tradition of consultation in decision-making processes.

The Sargent Report (1905)

When the British began in the late nineteenth century to colonize what is now Botswana, almost all education was provided by missionaries. In 1905, E.B. Sargent, commissioned by the colonial government to examine what was taking place in missionary schools, recommended formation of tribal school committees and national tribal schools. He also recommended the adoption of a relevant, practical-oriented curriculum and the use of Setswana in grades 1-4 and English in higher grades.

His report became the blueprint for education policy until the mid-twentieth century. Other significant developments prior to national independence included the establishment of six secondary schools, the Brigades Youth Movement (a non-formal alternative to academic secondary education), and a university (located in Lesotho with resident tutors in Botswana) in cooperation with Swaziland and Lesotho.

Independence (1966)

Favorable Factors. After national independence, those appointed to formulate education policies had certain factors favoring their effort:

- the government was based on democratic institutions with representatives from district and local (village and town) levels;
- the government remained stable and received generous donor support;
- the country had mineral resources (diamonds that were being exploited by the late 1970s) and accompanying foreign investment; and
- the Transition Plan, which preceded a series of National Development Plans, created an overall institutional capacity for a development strategy, including an education strategy.
General Development Policy Concerns. A general concern of the Transition Plan was to balance controlled strategic analysis of economic and social plans with public participation through four institutional processes:

• annual plan reviews at each of the national, district, and local levels;
• Parliament’s annual review of ministerial programs and budgets;
• standing advisory committees key stakeholders; and
• ad hoc commissions to examine particular issues.

Education Policy. When Botswana received its independence from Great Britain, the nation had 260 primary schools and nine secondary schools that had graduated 40 students; only 16 of these qualified for tertiary education. Most jobs that required a school certificate were held by expatriates. Education policy-makers placed high priority on building the secondary and tertiary levels of the school system.

The results during the first decade of policy-making were mixed. Although the annual reviews entailed national conferences with participants at every level, policy-making tended to be dominated by central government officials. This was inevitable, because the central government had the bulk of financial resources as well as the technical expertise and knowledge to formulate plans. This tended to erode traditional local authority and undermine the stated policy to involve communities in development.

On the positive side, established policy-making institutions and money from mining allowed the policies to be implemented, which called for building many new primary and secondary schools. Also, in the mid-1970s, the prescribed institutional structures gave birth to an ad hoc National Commission on Education, mandated to respond to growing criticism that the quality of schooling was deteriorating.

National Commission on Education (1975-1977)

Comprising educators from Botswana and other countries, the seven-member commission identified five major problems. It recommended that the government strengthen primary education, create a new kind of intermediate school, make the purpose of school at each level to prepare children for productive life, eliminate urban/rural and public/private inequities, and develop effective and wide-ranging non-formal education policies.

Based on these recommendations, the government issued a White Paper in 1977, National Policy on Education, and set up new and at the same time strengthened existing standing advisory committees to plan and monitor the implementation of education policy. These included: a Policy Advisory Committee to improve communication and coordination within the ministry; a Ministerial Consultative Committee to consider terms and conditions of service, working conditions, and staff relations; and a Joint Committee on Primary Education to strengthen coordination between the ministries of education and local government in the delivery of primary education.
Through a large number of these committees, the government formalized the process of consultation in formulating and reviewing policies. The process guarantees that those who will implement education policies are fully involved from the outset in identifying the problems, discussing options, and selecting strategies.

But because these processes continue to be dominated by government officials rather than village chiefs or councils, the basic policy goal of community-government partnership in managing schools continues to deteriorate. The attempt to implement one basic policy, a nine-year basic education system, serves as a case study of these problems.

Implementing policy: A Case Study

The Policy. Following the National Commission on Education's recommendation, the government set a goal of gradually moving from a seven-year to a nine-year cycle of universal basic education, six years in primary school and three in junior secondary school. The purpose of secondary schools would shift from preparing an elite for available jobs to extending the basic education of a much larger number of students. The government established the Secondary School Expansion Committee to develop all junior secondary schools on the basis of a partnership between the Ministry of Education and local communities. The communities were to establish a school board, select land, and provide housing for teachers. The ministry would build and equip the school, provide and pay teachers, and cover costs of running the school.

Implementation Problems. Although the policy is justifiable, its implementation was frustrated in several ways. First, students and parents did not understand the transformation of secondary school away from preparation of an elite for available jobs; public disillusionment grew as the youth leaving school had no marketable skills. Second, the program moved too fast to allow communities to meet their commitments, thus failing to incorporate their support and participation. Third, costs to the government escalated as it took over more private schools and canceled school fees.

As a result, the government recognized the need for policy dialogue and analysis and attempted to link up village and school voices with national policymakers.

Consultative Conferences. In 1988-89, in response to growing public concern about this policy, the Ministry of Education held a series of consultative conferences in order to reestablish public confidence in the process of education policy-making. Researchers interviewed representatives of the entire range of stakeholders, vividly capturing both thoughts and emotions on videotapes that they presented at policy conferences. They then presented videotapes of these conferences at three regional follow-up conferences.

Conference participants addressed four issues: the community's role in developing and operating the schools, the changed purpose of the curriculum, the school-leaver problem, and communications about educational changes.
The Current Situation

The education system has increased in size and complexity. In 1992, a second National Education Commission was appointed to review educational issues and strategies. The role of foreign donors in this process of policy formation continues to be one of providing technical assistance, training, and technical transfer within an extremely clear policy framework.

Implications for Donors

- Botswana has a number of factors favoring sound education policy formulation and donor support for those policies. It has also developed effective institutional procedures for continuous policy development.

- The government has formalized the tradition of consulting the people in decision-making. However, the balance between central and local participation in decisions has become more difficult as funding and technical expertise has become more centralized. Donors need to be aware of the importance of the consultative process.

- The education sector, based on recent experience in implementing policy, has recognized that communication between the ministry and local communities requires a major effort, and it has successfully completed one such project. This may be a model for other donor-supported efforts.

Tanzania

The broad line of education policy-making in Tanzania has been from dependence on foreign assistance through assertion of self-reliance and back to dependence on foreign assistance. Policy formulation has been complicated by conflicting priorities and shifting coalitions of policymakers.

Political Historical Context

Tanzania made a peaceful transition to self-rule even prior to its official independence from Britain in 1961 as elite discontent linked with mass resistance to confront the British and acquire more authority. The social transformation that followed was based on liberal principles, including nationalization of major economic institutions, planning, equality of income, improved social services, democratic participation, and concern for agrarian reform. Several crises dashed liberal hopes: an army mutiny, a sharp drop in the price of the major export crop (sisal), diplomatic ruptures, and student protest against policies aimed at curbing elitism.

Nyrere’s Arusha Declaration in 1967 put forth policies of self-reliance and lessening of external dependence: closure of the open economy and development of cooperative socialist (ujaama) villages. By the early 1970s, policy (ironically termed “decentralization”) fostered more central
control of social and political development. This movement was corroded by three events: a sharp rise in oil prices, severe drought, and war with Uganda. The crises forced a return to foreign aid. Following a temporary recovery in the late 1970s, new drought brought the country to adopt the structural adjustment measures imposed by the World Bank in 1986 in exchange for financial aid. Tanzanian policy fell again under the strong influence of foreign advisors and technical experts.

Vacillating Goals of Education Reform

Education policy-making has thus responded to conflicting and alternating prevailing development goals: a peripheral capitalist state, a nationalist non-capitalist state wavering between strategies of centralized control and attracting foreign capital, and a social transformation viewed as a prerequisite to economic development.

A series of educational reforms reflected the tension between a goal of education as skills development for modernization and that of education as a right of citizenship and a basis for social development. Though responsive to both pressures, Tanzanian leadership, more than leaders of most other African nations, implemented reforms based on social transformation, including universal primary education, adult literacy, and projects intended to narrow the gap between the value of mental and manual labor.

Policy reforms have revolved around major issues in three areas:

- Education expansion, held by political leaders and the public as a central element in national development, but not always for the same reasons. Parents and communities wanted schools for their children; socialist leaders believed all citizens have a right to education and need it to participate in national development; and modernists wanted schools to increase the production of skilled manpower.

- Curricular reform, generally toward a rural- and community-oriented focus, with political education at all levels. Syllabi and texts were nationalized and Kiswahili became the language of instruction in primary school; educators developed a national examination. Such policies were sometimes undermined by conflicting assumptions and actions, such as requirements for periodic external certification and higher rewards for intellectual than manual labor.

- Education and society, an area with more conflict than the other two. Here disagreements arise over whether to give priority to reducing regional inequities in primary education or giving more resources to secondary schools; to emphasize practical or academic curricula; and whether to treat adult literacy training as a technical skill or a means of political organization. Responding to the growing lack of employment opportunities in rural areas, a "vocational" curriculum has emphasized agricultural skills.
Eras of National Agenda Setting

The lines of education policy formulation generally correspond with political developments.

- From independence in 1961 until the Arusha Declaration in 1967, education policy, based on analysis and assistance from the World Bank, emphasized manpower planning and education for modernization—the development of high-level skills.

- Following Arusha until 1974, education was for self-reliance; it was anti-elitist and emphasized basic education, including adult literacy, and the use of learning to create citizens of the socialist villages and nation.

- The Musoma resolutions of 1974 linked education with socialism, reducing inequalities by accelerating the move toward universal primary education and requiring practical experience and national service of students prior to their university education. Professional educators opposed these kinds of political priorities.

- In 1982, a Presidential Commission on Education reacted to discontent with previous policies and recommended consolidation and expansion of schools over equality and socialist construction. The commission's report, however, was abruptly withdrawn immediately after its publication, and deliberation continued for two more years. Controversial proposals included restructuring the schooling cycle, imposing secondary school fees, and eliminating the practical experience requirement for university students. In this inclusive policy-making process, recommendations moved away from Nyrere's vision and back toward a more technical aim of education for skill building.

- Early in the decade, economic and financial crises intervened, and schools simply struggled to survive.

- In 1986, the World Bank's structural readjustment program caused educators to become entrepreneurial, marketing projects to potential foreign donors and sponsors.

Policymakers

The education policy process has been tangled by overlapping roles and shifting institutional boundaries and political coalitions. The various parties involved include:

- Administrators in the education ministries whose preference for central direction is sometimes at odds with demands for local autonomy in policy-making. Waves of institutional reform to increase leverage of local citizens compete with rationalizing and redistributing resources. Policy vacillates between reliance on mass support and distrust of mass participation.
• Ruling party (TANU) members who shape and guide policy but do not officially create policy

• Participants in national campaigns instigated by political leaders. In a 1974 campaign to increase primary school enrollment, for example, participants mobilized local resources and energized support. These rallies, however, are usually difficult to sustain.

• Leaders of local initiatives; for example, a number of localities built their own secondary schools in spite of the government's intention to hold back resources for secondary schools.

• Foreign models of education, financial support, and technical expertise.

• Non-decisions, such as the absence of pedagogical reform that would do away with authoritarian classrooms and the dominating role of exams in the curriculum.

• Technicians have generally replaced politicians as policy-makers as a result of the economic crises in the late 1970s that forced the government to call for foreign assistance.

Implications for Donors

• Education policy formulation in Tanzania has vacillated as a result of its close adherence to the changing ideals guiding national development goals. In addition, the nation's reliance on the World Bank and its development strategy, both at the time of independence and in recent years, promoted policies that contrast with the intervening years of effort toward self-reliance.

• At present, technical concerns with improving the education system prevail over political concerns about education's role in nation-building. In this respect, donors have taken the upper hand, and need to be sensitive to political as well as technical goals.

• Like other African nations, Tanzania's education sector has competing demands for its scarce resources. While the goal of expanding basic education is generally accepted, some want to do this for the purpose of reducing regional inequities in primary schooling, while others want to give more resources to secondary schools. Donor-supported projects need to clarify their objectives in regard to this issue.

Uganda

Since the colonial era, education policy formulation in Uganda has featured high-level commissions, whose recommendations have been adopted and implemented by the government. The exceptions to this characterization are the period of political turmoil in the 1970s, when policy-making was dominated by economic development plans, and the early 1990s, when the
government has deliberated more slowly the 1987 Education Policy Review Commission’s recommendation.

The Colonial Years (1925-1962)

The de Bunsen Commission, convened in 1952, was the last in a series of advisory commissions appointed by the British colonial government. Dominated by British men, the commission showed faith in the capability of Ugandans to make effective use of educational opportunities and led to the policy framework and strong educational structure that ushered in independence in 1962.

Independence (1962)

Independence from Britain came in an era of focused interest and enthusiasm in education as the means of developing the manpower required by new nations. Education policy-makers set ambitious goals. Published prior to independence, Uganda’s first five-year development plan (1961-66) reflected the colonial government’s vision of an education system designed to meet manpower needs; hence, it focused on postprimary education.

In 1963, the government appointed the Castle Commission, composed of nine Ugandans and eight non-Ugandans, but no one representing the missionary schools, the only people with practical experience in schooling in Uganda. Further foreign influence came from the recently published World Bank study of the education sector, which served as a point of reference for the commission’s own work. The commission conducted extensive travel around the country, data collection, and meetings. The dominating issue was whether to place priority on universal primary education and adult literacy, or on manpower training and secondary education. They opted for the latter, though they also made recommendations to improve the quality, relevance, and accessibility of primary education. They did not make detailed cost or enrollment projections.

During the decade that followed, the Ministry of Education complied with the commission’s recommendations, and policy formulation focused on implementing them within the economic capabilities of Uganda.

Turmoil (1972-1979)

The 1970s saw an increasingly difficult period in Uganda, dominated by the “Economic War.” Schools deteriorated, and, until 1977, policy-making was limited to five-year economic development plans, ad hoc conferences, and ministry directives.

The education chapter of the second five-year plan (1966-1971) was written by officials from the Ministry of Education and Makerere University. It continued the trend of increasing the share of expenditures for postprimary schooling, including the tertiary level, and the strong emphasis on manpower production and linkages to the economy.
The third five-year plan (1972-1976) expressed concern for the first time about the neglect of primary schools, which, unlike secondary schools, were not meeting even modest enrollment targets. The plan called for universal primary education by the year 2000, though it did not increase the primary level's budget in proportion to the other levels.

These plans were largely dominated by economic analysis. The Ministry of Education's planning unit drew up the education components, which focused on the structure of the system, rates of expansion, and capital expenditures. Content matters, including curriculum, usually reflected recommendations of the latest national commission.

In 1973, the government created the National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC), the first institutional home for systematic thinking and implementation of decisions about curriculum content, teaching methodology, textbooks, and learning materials. A committee appointed to advise policymakers on curriculum matters recommended a basic education plan supported by UNESCO and its Namutamba experiment in primary education.

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The first Educational Policy Review Commission (EPRC) was formed in 1977 in response to a general feeling that a new, comprehensive policy was needed to reflect changed circumstances in Uganda. Its 18 members came from government, educational institutions, and the private sector; it was chaired by a Ugandan, and all but two members were Ugandans. The commission held widespread consultations, study groups, and deliberations; it consulted a few foreign experts. The commission made about 280 recommendations on a wide range of both formal and non-formal educational activities and was particularly concerned with financing education. It was influenced by a number of events that had preceded it, including UNESCO's Namutamba experiment and a conference held to inaugurate the NCDC. Unfortunately, in the turmoil of the "Liberation War" with Tanzania, the report was shelved while still in draft form.


The first half of the 1980s held constant political and military instability that devastated the already weakened education system. Policy-making was largely a matter of ad hoc management for survival, with no new initiatives. A 10-year development plan published in 1981 reflected the themes of the EPRC. Secondary education continued to expand even though the EPRC had emphasized primary education. But, although on paper substantial progress had been made, in reality the entire system was near total collapse. Schools depended largely on the support of local communities; thus technical schools and teacher training colleges fared badly.

The second half of the decade saw gradually increasing political stability. A second EPRC was commissioned in 1987 by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the party that had come into power. Twenty-seven people from a cross-section of Uganda comprised the commission, dominated by senior education professionals. Its recommendations focused on values, national goals and objectives of education, curricular reforms to impart practical skills, and improvement of teacher training and support.
Normally, a commission report is quickly followed by a White Paper that articulates the recommendations from the commission that are acceptable to the government. In this case, the government departed from standard practice, and in effect, created a second internal commission to reconsider the report. The final version of the White Paper contained some significant changes in EPRC recommendations and was not released until April 1992.

With technical assistance from the World Bank, the Ministry of Education developed a five-year education sector investment program intended to provide a basis for negotiation with foreign donors. While it had the favorable outcome of producing a prolonged discussion of educational priorities by a large group of officials, the program did not clearly identify priorities. Large donors, pressured by their own timetables and policies, have forced the ministry to work on an ad hoc basis in negotiating foreign loans and grants. Thus, the World Bank has played a major role in policy formulation, especially the recent focus on basic education. USAID, though absent during the period of political turmoil, has made a large grant to improve the quality of basic education. In contrast, UNESCO’s national commission, which works within the Ministry of Education, has had a steady presence and quiet influence on education policy during the 1970s and 1980s.

Implications for Donors

- Like other African nations, Uganda continues to struggle with the choice between improving access to high-quality primary education, or strengthening schools at the secondary and tertiary levels in order to provide skills training to meet manpower needs.

- Uganda has formulated major policy directions by convening high-level commissions to collect data from around the country, look at what other countries are doing, and make recommendations. The national commission process has a number of strengths and appears to be well accepted in Uganda. Despite this institutional base for education policy formulation, the current government has not set clear priorities, and donor agendas appear to be heavily influencing education policy.

   

   

Mali

The history of education policy formulation in Mali is readily described in terms of four eras. Each has had distinguishable general policy objectives and processes, which have been directly relevant to education, and is viewed as the means by which a new society and a new order of political relationships is created. Between and within these four eras, education policy has been addressed in response to a political crisis. Each major crisis has prompted a national conference on education, and only political crises have brought about national discussion of education policy.
The Colonial Era (1887-1959)

The purposes of education envisioned by the French colonial government were to educate sons of chiefs to become intermediaries between the government and the native people, and to reinforce the government’s control. The policy process amounted to decree by the ruler. Since the French schooling system was utterly foreign to the African process of cultural transmission, and parents resisted sending their children to French schools, neither the policymakers nor the parents felt the latter had anything relevant to offer to policymakers.

The Keita Era (1959-1968)

The Early Years (1959-1963). The newly independent nation was governed by the leaders of the socialist party under President Keita. Following a study of education systems in other socialist states, the party aimed to build a system of universal basic education based on Malian values. This implied a sweeping reform of the existing colonial elitist system. The policy process, which resulted in the Reform of 1962, can be described as monoparty participatory education policymaking. Preparation for the reform entailed extensive consultative dialogue among party members at all levels and technical input from the Ministry of Education.

The reform encompassed a wide range of policies intended to make basic education available to all children and to “decolonize the mind.” Practical elements included restructuring the schooling cycle, and eliminating boarding schools and exams given at the end of the primary level. All policy since then has been hardly more than amplification or modification of those policies. One policy that has never been rejected, but often challenged and reaffirmed, is ruralization, practical training in rural area skills.

The Later Years (1964-1968). In 1964 the conservatives of Keita’s party unsuccessfully challenged his faction of more radical Marxists. Once Keita had securely established the dominance of his group, he convened the First National Conference on Education in 1964 to help reaffirm his government’s legitimacy and to recast the purpose of education in more anti-imperialist, anticapitalist terms. The conference report called for linking learning to action and training students in the economic functions of their local milieu. In contrast to the genuine attempt for public participation in the Reform of 1962, policy formulation in this era lapsed into more authoritarian patterns; any pretense of popular participation was dead and not revived until after 1991.

The Traoré Era (1968-1991)

The extremists of the Keita regime eventually led to the demise of his government and brought schools to the brink of chaos. Traoré, a military man, led a successful coup and established a government willing to forego austerity and restore individual benefits and privileges. In the education sector, government agreed to pay teachers on time and furnish perquisites, to send “brilliant” students overseas for higher education, and to meet other demands. Emphasis was
placed on secondary and higher education and on making a more comfortable environment for
teachers and students.

During these years, the policies of the 1962 reform were supported but not firmly implemented. Policy formulation included sporadic attempts at participatory decision-making but no systematic involvement of Malians in the creation of Malian schools. These attempts included three national conferences, each in response to a political crisis and having the symbolic value of reaffirming the government’s interest in education.

The National Conference of 1968, resulting in the Decree of 1970, like Keita’s conference in 1964, helped the new president legitimize his authority. Policymakers endorsed ruralization and use of national languages in instruction. During most of the 1970s, though numerous activities were carried out relating to educational innovations, the government was stable and policy formulation processes lay dormant.

The Second National Education Conference in 1978 was called in response to a split in Traoré’s junta shortly after he had reconsolidated his power. Although the political crisis had ended, the conference was filled with students and teachers angry at the government’s mismanagement of educational resources. Policymakers determined that ruralization should be spread to all schools. On the other hand, parents resisted ruralization as they saw their children learning nothing of value and providing free farm labor to school officials. Parents’ confidence in schools deteriorated, and enrollment rates declined notably during the 1970s and 1980s.

During the 1980s, assistance from foreign donors increased; donors’ terms added to the pressure on the government to implement the reforms of 1962, but the government continued to drag its feet.

The Etats Generaux in 1989 was a response to rising popular unrest and growing disenchantment with the Traoré regime. Participants embraced the reforms of 1962, but patience with the regime was exhausted, and Traoré was ousted in 1991 in another military coup.

Throughout the Traoré era, parents had little say in decisions about education, saw no value in schooling, and large numbers kept their children away from school.

The Democratic (1991-Present)

In contrast to the two preceding governments, the new one has seemed sincere about installing multiparty democracy and involving popular representation at every level of the political process. In the education sector, the National Debate and Conference on Education was held in September 1991, not to formulate policy, as the new leaders of the government had not yet been elected, but to define a set of priorities. In preparation for this conference, the Ministry of Education organized local workshops with the participation of parents, teachers, community associations, unions, and political parties.

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Priorities were much in the spirit of the Reform of 1962, including a reaffirmation of ruralization, instruction in national languages, basic education, increased access for girls, and efficiency in administration.

Thus, after more than 30 years of policy formulated in closed administrative circles, policy formulation has once again become a participatory process. Multilateral and bilateral donors have provided funds and technical assistance to the education sector, even in the absence of a clear policy framework.

Implications for Donors

• Until recently, national education policy in Mali has been made at major conferences convened in response to political crisis. This reveals the absence of any effective institutional mechanism for formulating policy, and consequently, a dilemma for foreign donors who want to provide financial and technical assistance responsive to national goals and objectives.

• Many Malian people living in rural areas have resisted the formal schooling system imposed by the French colonial government. Their participation in reforming that system was solicited only twice—in 1962 and again in the early 1990s. Thus, donors aiming to support genuine reform must also consider developing new means for ongoing participation of the public in reform activities.

• Policymakers still have not resolved the tension between those who want to provide academic studies leading to higher education and those who want to provide practical training that is “relevant” to students’ lives. Donor-supported programs in primary and secondary schools must be aware of this dilemma.

Senegal

The education system in Senegal has developed in the context of a strong supportive relationship with France. Senegalese leaders at independence inherited the francophone elitist attitude toward education, and a move toward serious reform of the francophone system did not emerge until 20 years after national independence. Even today reforms are compromised by bureaucratic maneuvering to keep the existing system fundamentally intact.

The Colonial Period (1815-1959)

The colonial period had three phases. Between 1815 and 1869 the French government discouraged missionaries from proselytizing and took responsibility for education of Africans, though eventually missionary schools prevailed by default. French was declared the language of instruction, but even at this time, a conflict arose between the academic and practical purposes
of education. Between 1870 and 1944, the urban francophone elite and rural Africans became increasingly polarized; the elite continued strong ties with France. Between 1945 and 1960, political participation of these elite in the government of France expanded. Education was the basic qualifying factor in this participation; Africans who gained authority equal to that of French leaders were living proof of the efficacy of the school system.

Because the French colonial administration had forged strong ties with and firmly acculturated a number of Senegalese, transition to independence was smooth. During the years prior to independence, policy could be empowered only by Paris, and the government remained impervious to popular participation. Senegalese bureaucrats became well trained in education policy formulation. Success in schooling became a prerequisite for advancement in modern, particularly bureaucratic sectors; the curriculum had no room for “Senegalization,” and mass expansion was not promoted. Relative to other parts of Francophone Africa, Senegal had lower enrollment rates at the primary level and higher rates at the secondary and tertiary levels.

**Independence and Senghor’s Rule (1960-1981)**

**Independence.** Senegal’s first president, Leopold Senghor, continued allegiance to French ways, and France, in turn, gave financial and cultural support to the new government. With French support, Senegal, which had formed a brief union with what later became Mali, broke away from this union, and abandoned the fundamental reforms in education that the new union had adopted. Schools in Senegal continued to be a “reproduction” of the French system. On the tertiary level, regional cooperation grew stronger, as evidenced by the University of Dakar, which served all former French colonies in the region.

Education policy was formulated in the context of a series of five-year development plans in which a substantial cadre of French technicians assisted. The planning process was complicated by the involvement of four ministries and the increasing push from foreign donors for better education planning capability. The process was rigidly faithful to the Cartesian deductive logic model, and inputs from the population at large were not solicited. In spite of repeated studies and reports recommending an education more relevant to Senegal, the francophone policy prevailed.

In sum, the policy orientation of the colonial government became that of the modern Senegalese elite. The former had evolved into the latter with little input from the majority.

**Conflict and Reform.** In 1968, conflict and crisis finally emerged. Because the school system produced leavers who had no job opportunities, schooling began to be seen as irrelevant to the realities of Senegal. Students, teachers, and unions caused strikes and mass demonstrations demanding fundamental education reform.

In guiding the Reform of 1969, Senghor differentiated between education problems, youth problems, and employment and productivity problems. The government created the National Commission for the Reform of Primary, Intermediary, and Secondary Education (CNREPMS), which led to the Reform of Education bill in 1971. The thrust of the bill was the “New School,”
which was to feature a restructured schooling cycle, “ruralization” (education tied to life, or practical agriculture), “Africanization” of curricula, and inspectorates for primary education.

The education reform was accompanied by a general administrative reform that created rural communes (collections of villages) with the power to elect representatives to vote on budgets and taxation and to set up rural expansion centers that provided, among other services, functional literacy training. Both reforms, however, failed to reach their potential, as they challenged the highly centralized structure of policy-making and governance. In education, the government could not expand the base of the pyramid while continuing to restrict the top. It agreed to proposed reforms but did not hurry to implement them. Contrary to government policy of shifting resources to primary schools, expenditures on primary education dropped nearly 3 percent, and a new campus annex for the University of Dakar was built in Saint Louis.

Government Under Diouf (1981-Present)

More Conflict and Reform. The 20 years of frustration and procrastination under Senghor erupted in new demands to the new president, Abdou Diouf. In 1978, a newly formed teachers union convened an Etats Généraux (a designation given to a popularly organized conference with revolutionary overtones), which failed to attract much attention. In the following years, the unions held several one-day strikes and demonstrations that prompted Diouf to agree to the convocation of a major Etats Généraux immediately after he came to power in January 1981.

The conference resulted in major recommendations for change, including universal primary education, Islamic instruction in national languages, greater interaction between schools and communities, teacher training programs, and greater recognition of teachers as active development agents who require adequate facilities. The government formed a National Commission for the Reform in Education and Training (CNREF) to develop proposals in response to the reform. The commission was heavily staffed by government personnel, with the result that the national bureaucracy partially captured the popular movement and took responsibility for follow-up away from the organizers.

Without the guidance of specific policy determinations, Diouf’s Minister of Education committed the government to establishing the “New School,” based on recommendations of the CNREF. The model that emerged meshed some recommendations of the CNREF with recommendations of the World Bank, which aimed at increasing access to primary schools and improving internal efficiency. The World Bank’s influence on policy grew as the government recognized the need to adopt the Bank’s terms of structural adjustment in order to receive badly needed loans.

Resistance to Implementation. The government implemented those CNREF recommendations that had low budgetary implications but not the more costly ones, which were largely related to teachers’ salaries and benefits. Neither did it forcefully implement measures that might have weakened the elitist model of education, such as practical training in the curriculum, textbooks based on Senegalese rather than French experience and distributed at no cost to students, and religious education. It delayed these policies with studies and experiments. Some of the policies
that were implemented were eroded by a declining share of the national budget for education and an increasing population.

Thus, three policy priority levels are operating: francophone policies maintaining an urban, academically oriented system; reform policies, many of which improve internal efficiency; and those reform policies concerned with access, Africanization, and ruralization that have been delayed by further study.

Policymakers in Senegal have been favored by a stable democratic government, absence of military coups, a well educated national bureaucracy, and an official structure free of corruption. In this national political context, education has been a stabilizing factor.

The role of foreign donors in policy-making grows as donors collaborate with one another in support of particular policies, generally those of the reform not implemented. At the same time, the ministers of education in Sahelian countries have met and may begin to develop regional education policies that influence national agendas.

**Implications for Donors**

- By transmitting their francophone values and procedures to a group of Senegalese elite, the colonists created a radical divide between that elite group, who largely control the government, and the mass of Senegalese people, most of whom live in rural areas. Tension between each of these two groups' use of the education system has continued until present day.

- In spite of the government’s agreement to reforms instigated by people left out of the system, the ministry has been slow to implement reforms, allowing enough “Senegalization” to forestall further demands but not enough to undermine the enduring francophone system. Thus, donors need to be aware that de facto and de jure policies do not always coincide.

- Senghor attempted to resolve the tension between those who want the education system to meet manpower needs and those who want it to expand basic education by differentiating between the problems of education, youth, and employment. Each of these problems has been given bureaucratic territory as a separate ministry—or ministries, in the case of education. Some donor-supported projects may require cooperation with more than one of these ministries.
Education Policy Formation in Anglophone Africa

The Work of Education Commissions

Ash Hartwell

Introduction

The contents of this chapter are derived from experience in the field of education policy formation, planning and project implementation in Africa. The central proposition is that education policy formation is necessarily an exercise in social learning: it is a process where technical expertise is required to establish information requirements and the parameters of reasonable choice, but this analysis must be embedded in a process of social dialogue, negotiation, and learning. The word *must* here is not a moral imperative so much as a practical necessity.

Two realities dictate the need for social dialogue. On one hand, our information about the conditions and options for improving education is never adequate at a national level. Even well designed and implemented educational management information systems are inadequate for defining policies concerning qualitative improvements. Inputs from those on the ground with experience and insight are therefore imperative for sound decisions. Secondly, educational policies are notoriously ineffective when expressed as pronouncements at the national level, or when implemented by the peremptory announcement of a budget cut. Teachers, students, and communities actually have the final say about what is taught, learned and valued. The weak management capacity of ministries can not effectively impose behavioral change if there is resistance at the level of the school, and even less so for participants in adult education. Effective educational changes must be negotiated rather than imposed, and that requires dialogue during the formation and implementation of policies.

One critical implication of this is that there is no technically correct solution to the question of how best to create human resource policy in Africa, or anywhere else. To be effective, policy choices in education will rest on choices and consensus concerning values. These may be more or less determined by market forces in some countries, but there are compelling political reasons in Africa why the state plays the central role in defining educational policies. Most governments are committed to using basic education to establish national unity and move toward social equity. In addition, education has played a central role as the focus of personal and national aspirations for the future, although this has been abused in recent years with the decline of economic well-being and opportunity.

International agencies which have tried to define the procedures for education policy analysis and planning have tended to highlight the technical aspects of the process. They operate from the assumption that education is a tractable system; that once the proper information is at hand and
has been analyzed, the policy options become evident. The dominant tools of economic analysis which inform education policy and planning are manpower analysis and rate of return analysis. These tools are a part of a rational framework that includes:

- data collection and verification;
- analysis—using the tools of economic analysis and prioritization with cost/benefit methods;
- presenting options which are examined within a framework of cost and benefits;
- decision-making based on rational and essentially economic criteria.

Much of the academic controversy about educational planning has to do with the choice of one or the other of these tools, but in fact they play a secondary role in the actual work of educational planning in the field. However, of the two methods for assessing human resource development, manpower analysis is more widely used for shaping overall country policies and plans.

Although there are vigorous critiques of the manpower analysis planning paradigm, in fact, most policy and planning agencies find that analytical reviews of existing employment and wage profiles and qualified projections of future trends are of some use in estimating future demand for education and training. But no planning office in my experience places unquestioned confidence in these projections. First, there are serious conceptual problems with the categories of analysis, such as the continuing difficulty with the basic concepts of employment, unemployment and underemployment, particularly in the rural, agricultural and non-formal sectors. Even more daunting are the problems of data: time series are incomplete and coverage is at best partial most Anglophone African countries have no employment data on firms of less than 10 persons. The data hides almost as much as it reveals. For instance, the number of engineers employed by government in agriculture tells us nothing about the need for engineers in the undocumented private sector, and existing data, itself, is suspect.

Nonetheless, estimates of overall employment and unemployment by sector, broken down by function and educational level and related to average wages in government and the private sector, placed against macro-economic scenarios of future development, provide a rough set of maximum and minimum estimates of demand for education and training. These estimates, when placed in juxtaposition with current and future supply of persons moving through the educational system—using flow rate analysis and a variety of assumptions—establishes a supply and demand scenario that provides useful parameters to guide policy dialogue and negotiation.

On the other hand, the contradictory signals arising from rate of return analyses applied to specific country cases have resulted in considerable skepticism among education policymakers and planners about the usefulness of this tool. If the data from manpower surveys is suspect, the historical data on earning streams by educational level is often ludicrously incomplete, not even accounting for the necessary step of estimating shadow prices. As Klees points out, "...there is substantial disagreement among neoclassical economists over how best to estimate an effect indicator like rate of return and over how much we can trust the results of our studies as useful
in guiding policy. Chaos theory in the physical sciences has an analogue in rate of return analysis. Slight differences in initial assumptions about future earning streams—which in the best of cases, we can only estimate—radically change the estimate of the rate of return. In one example, changes in estimates of future rates of unemployment of primary in comparison to junior secondary school leavers, reduced the estimated rates of return for junior secondary education from over 40 to 12.4 percent. How much better, perhaps, to use the cruder but more malleable conceptual framework of the manpower demand.

The principle here, for both manpower projections and rate of return analysis, is that policy formulation cannot be sensibly conducted in practice as an exercise for a team of experts using a set of technical procedures. Rather, the process of analysis must be imbedded into the larger frame of social learning and political processes. When that happens, the technical analysis itself becomes as much an object of critical scrutiny as do the vague and self-interested decisions of policymakers uninformed by accurate information and good analysis.

This chapter is concerned with describing the process of education policy formulation as social learning and participation. The importance of statistics and data—particularly when it can be disaggregated, of analytical methods when tempered by wisdom, and a conceptual framework based on an examination of educational efficiency is acknowledged. But here we are concerned with the social and political process of policy formulation which provides the context for technical analysis. Without the technical analysis policy remains vague in expression, and a reflection of the interests of the powerful in action. But without a social and political framework of participation in policy formulation, technical analysis alone leads to gross errors, to unimplemented policies, or to complete disregard of the recommendations.

**Education Policy in the 1990s—Crisis or Opportunity?**

*Policies occupy the initial phase during which fundamental choices, formulated in the name of the community, are made by organs or individuals designated for this responsibility.*

The determination of policy in education, as in other public sectors, is a complex and multi-faceted activity. An effective education policy involves a wide variety of persons, from those at the school level, through the middle level of educational officers, to leadership at the Ministry of Education, central government, the Cabinet, and Parliament. At each level the various actors have their own specific agendas, understanding of policy, and ways of obtaining and interpreting information related to policies. In some countries, where there is a strong tradition of local participation and consultation, educational policies are not implemented so much by decree as by a gradual process of dissemination and acceptance.

This tradition of local consultation has been an important aspect of education policy development in many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This is not to deny that many, perhaps most, educational policies have come from the top down. Indeed, the structural adjustment policies—when that means a direct or indirect cut in resources—are almost always made without local consultation. Resources are simply withheld, so that additional or replacement teachers don’t
show up, the anticipated replenishment of chalk, exercise paper and basic texts don’t come, and the local school suffers yet another year of gross overcrowding and understaffing. Over the past 10 years, with an increasing debt burden and declining capacity for generating government revenue, and as a larger portion of the recurrent budget is diverted to debt servicing, recurrent expenditures for basic education in Africa have declined in real terms, often dramatically.8

But such “policy decisions” are made in a crisis mode: when budget cuts simply have to be made and there is no time for the process of policy analysis and multi-level dialogue and negotiation. For example, two weeks before final submission of the recurrent budget, the Ministry of Education receives instructions from the Ministry of Finance to cut all program budgets across the board by 15 percent. The Ministry of Education can only cut those budget items where there are no contractual obligations: first to go are the votes for materials and books, then those for transport, conferences, and in service activities. Since these items are often less than 10 percent of the total budget—the remainder going to teacher salaries—the impact can be devastating.

Or perhaps the allocation of funds to the Ministry of Education was insufficient to cover running costs, given inflation and a structural increase in the wage bill, as large numbers of new teachers each go up one notch on the salary scale. To meet salary commitments, all other “nonessential” expenditures are frozen after eight months and a request for a budget supplement is sought to ensure that teachers will get paid to the end of the year. During the budget negotiations for the next fiscal year, the Ministry of Finance insists on using the prior year’s allocated budget figure without including the supplementary budget. A policy is established and continued that ensures rapid and continuing deterioration of quality. How could programs of curriculum enhancement, teacher supervision and support services, equipment and materials supply be planned under these conditions?

Some commentators may choose to call this a policy of structural adjustment, but it is more accurate to simply call it the absence of policy, certainly it is an absence of carefully considered policy. It is a general truth that attention to policy analysis and public dialogue on strategies and options occurs in a context of budgetary plenty, rather than during budget austerity and cutbacks. When the Ministry of Finance has to cut expenditures, they are disinclined to ask the victims where the pound of flesh should come from. And they certainly don’t want to ask the public.

The consequence of an absence of policy analysis and dialogue is a marked deterioration in the quality of schooling.9 The first to suffer is the administrative and staff support services: transport budgets for supervisors; in-service training for school heads and teachers; communications like newsletters and conferences—in short, the networks of leadership and communication that characterize an effective system. Also cut are the school supplies: chalk, workbooks, paper, textbooks, science laboratory equipment, cleaning materials, and agricultural implements. The combination of the lack of supervision and the cutback in instructional supplies can lead to a downward spiral of teacher frustration and apathy, particularly when the cycle continues for two or more years, while ongoing inflation reduces teachers’ real income.
The greatest casualty arising from budget cutbacks is the deterioration in the capacity for management and supervision. The lack of funds and resources becomes an excuse for not planning, rather than becoming a spur for more creative use of constrained resources. Schools, teachers and children go through the motions without direction or hope. It is a fertile ground for school strikes, which are common at the secondary school level in Africa. When this stage is reached, talk about the “aims of education” and education policy are seen as deceptive political oratory by teachers and school managers.

Whether there is a situation of budgetary austerity or surplus—and few African countries have a surplus—a systematic, regular and informed process of policy analysis, program design and implementation is a prerequisite for effective schools and educational programs. In the face of budgetary austerity and structural adjustments it is difficult to carry out a process of policy formation, strategy design, planning, and managing for educational programs. Anything less will lead to the uncontrolled deterioration of educational quality and the loss of management capacity which then results in even greater inefficiency and inequity.

The Rational and Interactive Models of Planning

One of the approaches to education policy review developed by donors in recent years is the educational sector assessment. An educational sector assessment carries out a thorough technical analysis of an educational system, examining internal and external efficiency by a rigorous collection and analysis of data. A recent USAID project produced a well-designed training manual for planning and managing educational sector assessments which describes a systematic step-by-step procedure for data collection, data analysis, identification of issues and constraints, conclusions, recommendations, and review.10 Earlier manuals produced by UNESCO, USAID and the World Bank also provide detailed guidelines for analyzing educational sector requirements and priorities.11

In these manuals, the work of an educational sector assessment is described in terms of technical procedures, but they do not describe the processes of participation, dialogue and negotiation which lead to a popularly supported political decisions about education and resource allocation. That process is seen as quite separate from analysis, to be conducted within a political rather than a professional and technical arena. The manuals assume that the educational sector assessment will provide information, analysis and options to the policymakers who will make the final policy choices.

This approach has been termed the rational model of planning, and assumes an agreement on social and educational goals.12 The emphasis of the assessment is on using existing data to ascertain needs, particularly needs identified through an analysis of internal and external efficiencies, and to prioritize programs to meet these needs. There is an unstated, implicit assumption that the political process of negotiating social goals has either been satisfactorily carried out or, at least, is not of concern to the professionals doing the planning.
In contrast, experience shows clearly that the rational techniques of policy analysis and planning must be imbedded within an interactive, politically sensitive dialogue concerning educational goals and priorities. An interactive, rather than simply a rational and technical approach, is essential when changes are sought in such areas as the curriculum, the role of the teacher, the organization of the educational system, and the examination and selection procedures. All of these areas require behavioral change from teachers, school heads, supervisors, and officials. If the policy decisions do not have the understanding and support of these actors, full and effective implementation is very unlikely.

This is not a trivial problem, to be resolved simply by laying on in-service training. In John Craig's study of literature on policy implementation in Africa, he found that of 145 education policies examined, only 13 policies, less than 10 percent, were mostly or completely implemented. Failure of implementation begins with the failure in the process of policy formulation in the first place. The lack of communication, dialogue, consensus, and acceptance by the implementers leaves the policy on the shelf. Havelock and Huberman conclude from their pioneering study on educational change in developing countries that "the pattern of participation among the members of social system in the decision to adopt or develop an innovation [read policy] is probably the most central issue in the process." The issue of participation is precisely the area in which the work of a commission is different from the approach of an educational sector assessment. A commission works at both the analytic and political levels. It seeks to develop information and analysis into general policies and organizational development strategies that are not only accepted, but supported during implementation. The process of consultation and negotiation with the significant groups who are affected by, and who ultimately must support, the policies is the critical difference between the sector assessment and the educational commission. The commission approach is especially appropriate where government budget constraints require it to generate other sources of domestic support for education, including community contributions.

The decision as to which approach should be used within a country at a particular time will depend on prior developments. If an overall policy framework has been articulated, communicated and accepted, then a sector assessment is useful as a means of specifying technical requirements, priorities and costs for implementation. The assessment can also serve as an extremely useful instrument for securing external and internal financing. The study can become the basic reference for preparing cost programs and plans for financing by government, donors and banks.

However, when a renegotiation of education goals, priorities, organizational structures and instructional strategies is required, particularly in light of financial austerity likely to face most African countries in the 1990s, the choice should be for a commission, not a sector assessment.
The Education Policy Commission

How does an education policy commission get started? Once underway, how does it carry out its work, and finally prepare and communicate its findings? This section of the paper describes this process, based on first hand experience with the establishment, organization, technical support, and reporting of two national education policy commissions, and the work of two educational sector assessments.17

The description in this section is intended to provide an account of how a comprehensive and participatory process of policy review, popular dialogue and consultation, analysis and reporting takes place. There is much written about educational policies themselves, and the economic, political dimensions of education policy formation and implementation. There are few published sources of information about the steps involved in organizing and carrying out an effective process of education policy review and assessment.18

In this narrative, we are interested in examining the following elements:

- context: how does a commission get started?;
- design of the work of the commission: the scope of work and financing;
- membership: identifying technical skills and stakeholders, selecting a chairperson, the secretariat and consultants;
- organization of the commission: communications, scheduling, information management, subcommittees, research;
- processes of consultation: organizing public hearings and regional visits;
- developing strategies and negotiating change: confronting stakeholders with options;
- organizing the report and write-up;
- presentation: making the findings public;
- follow through and impact: what happens after a commission?

Context: How Does a Commission Get Started?

All significant initiatives within government ministries trace their origin to the interaction between persons in top political positions—the minister and members of cabinet—and the expertise, leadership and energy of one or more highly placed persons in the educational system. Also, in the majority of cases in African nations where a major initiative for education policy review has taken place, the catalyst has been partly external: one or more external donor agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, or UNDP have lobbied for such a review.

External donor agencies, and particularly such financing agencies as the UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank, which insist on a coherent and economically sound education policy as a precondition for sector assistance, have had a powerful influence on policy formation within African countries. External agencies play a critical role because they have the resources needed to initiate change. Ministries of education in Africa operate on a survival basis: annual recurrent budgets are unable to meet pressing operating program requests, so that there is no flexibility to
accommodate the funding of policy innovations. This has meant that external agencies, whose explicit agenda is the financing of “development,” become key actors in the definition and direction of policy change. The greatest danger with this role is that external agencies not only stimulate but sometimes essentially determine policy choices, without the necessary political and bureaucratic review and consensus building process. The result is often a crippled implementation, where there is insufficient institutional capacity or political will to create change.\textsuperscript{19}

The establishment of an Education Policy Commission is an important strategy for establishing policy priorities and building a consensus to which external assistance and financing can usefully contribute. Without such a policy framework, external assistance for change is often ineffective, and sometimes damaging. The Tororo Girls School in Uganda, built as a model comprehensive secondary school with USAID funds, had a unit cost more than three times that of other secondary schools, and when its structures began to deteriorate 10 years after its completion, engineering studies indicated that it would cost more to repair or even demolish it than to build a new secondary school. The school continues to operate, but with rapidly deteriorating buildings and with a reversion to the traditional secondary school curriculum. No consensus or understanding was ever created for the alternative curriculum and goals of the school. When problems arose there was no support to continue with the innovations.

A typical cycle of policy development, planning and reassessment might occur as follows. During a review of the national development plan, government recognizes that its stated target of universal primary education is unattainable without additional external capital resources. Preliminary discussions with financing and aid agencies leads to the proposal that an overall strategy for the educational sector is needed as a pre-condition for the financial assistance of the level needed. Particular concerns expressed by the aid agencies will usually focus on inefficiencies in the system: high rates of repetition and dropout in primary and junior secondary grades; neglect of quality in basic education including instructional materials, teacher support systems, and school management; and inequitable patterns of subsidy provided for secondary and post-secondary students, particularly given the high recurrent unit costs of university education.

Within government there will be a variety of agendas, with the ministries of planning and finance sharing the concern about the large proportion of total government recurrent expenditure going to education. Within the Ministry of Education officials will be concerned about the lack of management and support systems needed to maintain quality during a period of educational expansion. Indeed, many senior educational officers and inspectors view with dismay the inevitable deterioration of pre-independence elite secondary schooling which they fondly remember, while new secondary schools proliferate against declining per student expenditures.

At the community level there is a growing demand for more school places, particularly for those who have finished primary and wish to go on to secondary education, or for those who have finished secondary education and want a job, more training, or subsidized university education. Many believe that schools are irrelevant because graduating students do not have the skills needed to obtain a job, and concomitantly, that if youth could be given the right kind of
educational jobs would be available. The intuitive logic of this line of reasoning insures that there is a continuing pressure for "vocationalizing" education at all levels, even primary schools.

A context gradually grows where government, aid agencies, and from the public all feel that something should be done to fix the education system. There is a cycle of approximately 10 years—the time span of social memory concerning policies and promises in an age of revolutionary social, economic and technological change—during which a major initiative is taken in formulating and articulating a policy, parts of it are implemented, dissatisfaction with the results grows, and the perceived need to review and reformulate the strategy, if not the policy, begins to take hold.

At this point, one or more aid agencies may offer the government technical assistance to undertake a review of the educational system. The aid agencies want to be assured that the policies emerging from such a review will be grounded in economic rationality and will improve the effectiveness of the educational system. Governments need to have external financing and technical support for implementing new policies and strategies, and at the same time need to rebuild support and political consensus for the role of education.

There are three modes in which policy is formulated with donor assistance:

1. *The Project Approach.* A donor agency agrees to finance a specific project based on a feasibility study carried out by the agency—using a team of consultants—which sometimes, but not always, includes government staff. The project study will usually include some general analysis of the educational sector and the identification of possible priority projects. Priorities are usually defined in terms of the donor agency's mandate—an agency policy of support for basic education, or non-formal education, or instructional materials—linked to an obvious need.

2. *The Education Sector Assessment.* Here the donor agency works with a national team to do a full technical review and analysis of the educational sector, concentrating particularly on internal and external efficiency. Based on the review, which is done by experts analyzing existing data, a set of costed options and priority recommendations is prepared for consideration by the funding agency and national policymakers.

3. *The Education Policy Commission.* The third mode is the formation of an educational commission, which will use both the analytical methods of the educational sector assessment and policy dialogue involving wide public consultations, negotiations with specific interest groups on policy initiatives, and a blending of educational, economic and political perspectives to arrive at a set of recommendations. The commission will produce a report, which in turn usually stimulates an official government response in the form of a White Paper—an official statement of those recommendations which it accepts as national policy. Subsequently the educational section of the national plan, Ministry of Education policies, and project proposals will all make reference to the appropriate enabling parts of the White Paper. The policy commission seeks to produce a consensus between expert judgement and a negotiated public vision of what the educational system
should become. Its focus is not only technical, it serves as an exercise in social learning, and its results are widely disseminated and discussed.

The decision as to which of these three modes to initiate is made at a ministerial and cabinet level, although the priorities and goals of one or more donors may significantly influence the options which are seriously considered.

When a donor expresses the desire to identify and finance a particular project, and the project is roughly consistent with the formal policy stance of the government, the first mode of policy analysis—the project approach—is likely to be chosen. Unfortunately, this approach is often taken when a wider policy analysis is called for. Numerous cases of failure in externally financed projects in areas such as vocational education, curriculum change, and innovative rural school experiments illustrate the problem. UNESCO’s admonition to teams doing project appraisals is worth noting: “...it [project assistance] can bear fruit only in the context of a development policy whose objectives and priorities have been clearly identified and expressed. Specific, ad hoc and limited assistance...can never be regarded as a substitute for national development efforts.”

Nonetheless, donor agencies need to identify and implement projects within their own time frames, and governments often wish to take advantage of whatever aid is available. That congruence of interest leads to ad hoc policy analysis and projects which are not firmly grounded either technically or politically. There is some evidence that this approach to aid is fading, to be replaced by a more programmatic and systematic approach in some settings.

Throughout the Third World, and particularly in Africa, many countries are continuing to experience a decline in economic well being, precipitating a restructuring of government finances. Also increasingly evident is the fact that the debt crisis and budgetary constraints will not soon be over, and therefore longer term policy and planning is needed to focus on educational effectiveness and efficiency in the face of austerity.

In this situation the second mode of policy formation, the educational sector assessment, has become particularly useful. A general statement of policy is in place, but five-year plans and assumptions are no longer accurate given the budgetary problems. A revised strategy is needed to guide decisions on educational financing and resource allocation. This mode of policy making is best reserved for medium-term budget and financing strategies which do not require major institutional and behavioral change. If the recommendations require significant change, then the mode of policy formation must shift to a more participative approach.

An educational commission is appropriate: when the nation’s overall education policy needs review and restatement, when the strategies for attaining educational goals are not working and need to be re-examined, and when there will be, as a likely consequence of the commission’s work, significant changes at all levels of the system. Achieving such changes will require a combination of political leadership, widespread popular agreement, bureaucratic and technical support, and cooperation from donor agencies.
Getting a commission started requires the judgement, from cabinet level, that opening up the educational enterprise to public scrutiny and debate is useful and appropriate; it requires from the ministry bureaucracy the support and commitment of key chief officers to a thorough and fresh review of their policies and practices; it requires from those in the educational profession and the general community a response to the opportunity to offer insights and vision, and the suspension of skepticism which confounds any useful discussion of long-term policy and strategy.

The decision to convene an education policy commission should be based on consideration of these issues. The required leadership must come from the minister and the permanent secretary, with the collaboration of one or more top officers and the technical advice and support from at least one key external financing agency.

**Design: Scope of Work, Membership and Financing**

Once the decision is taken to form a policy commission, the overall design of the commission must take shape. This work may be done by the minister, but is more commonly delegated to a permanent secretary, supported by the expertise of the planning unit, or an appointed task force. The preparation for a commission, which includes developing the scope of work, forming the membership, securing the financing, and putting in place the secretariat, can take a long time, up to a year. At this stage, being able to refer to reports from some of the better known commissions carried out in African countries over the past 15 years can be very helpful. Some of these have created a firm foundation for continuing educational development in their countries, even in the face of political and economic turmoil. The principles which are described in this paper can be seen in the work of commissions such as those in Nigeria (1968), Botswana (1977), Uganda (1978), and Lesotho (1983).

The scope of work for the commission is typically very broad, focusing on the relationship between the process of education and training and the overall social, cultural, economic and political development of the country. The following is an example from the Uganda Commission:

- review established policy documents and statements and consider existing recommendations concerning objectives, structure, context and policy for education;
- examine the existing system of education and training in terms of its capacity to promote economic, social and cultural development. The following are to be examined:
  - basic education including pre-school education, primary and out-of-school education for children, youth and adults;
  - secondary level education: general secondary, technical, commercial and agricultural schools;
  - higher education—university and professional training covering science and technology;
  - teacher education;
  - vocational education including apprenticeship, departmental and private sector training.
- consider the aims and objectives, structure, examinations, curriculum, scope, organization and financing for each level and type of education;
• propose long-range objectives for human resource development for each level of education, reaffirming those that already exist where appropriate and recommending revised or new objectives, where necessary;
• recommend the curricula, organizational and financial policies to facilitate effective implementation of educational objectives and programs by institutions, regions and communities; and
• recommend a procedure and mechanism for the periodic review of educational policies in the context of changing social, economic and organizational conditions.

The time period for the work of the commission should be clearly specified. While a sector assessment can be completed within a three to six month period, a commission generally requires up to a year because of the need for public consultations and negotiations with stakeholders in arriving at policy consensus.

The sources and level of financing must be worked out. In addition to honoraria for members, which must be generous and take account of the actual time put into the commission's work, funds are required for technical advisors and consultants, for the secretariat, for travel and meetings, for internal reporting and the final preparation of a formal report. The Lesotho education policy review cost approximately $40,000 excluding three expatriate technical advisors as members and two UNESCO consultants. The Improving the Efficiency of Educational Systems (IEES) manual on sector assessments estimates total costs for a four-month (full-time) level of effort at $85,000 of which $54,000 is for 10 technical specialists and support staff, and $12,750 is for three consultants. But the IEES guidelines assume a technical approach and a full team of external experts, rather than a membership composed largely of high level nationals receiving honoraria and supported by technical advisors and consultants.\(^{23}\) The latter pattern is to be preferred on many grounds, and is the more common approach today.

**Membership and Staffing**

The membership of the commission will be the most important factor in its performance. Two factors must be considered: the representation of those who can provide the insight, experience and the political perspectives of various stakeholders; and the technical expertise and knowledge needed to provide guidance, judgement and effective reporting. The full membership of the commission should probably not exceed 15-20 persons; anything much larger than that becomes unworkable. However, working membership can be expanded by appointing a series of subcommittees which can have members who are not part of the commission itself.

Stakeholders will include teachers and their associations—usually quite distinct for primary and post-primary levels; the school headmasters—often a headmasters association; persons from the field of technical and vocational education—particularly from the private sector; university educators; organizers of adult and non-formal education; senior officers from the ministries of planning, finance and local government; key persons from the private sector agriculture, industry and commerce, the sectors which employ trained manpower.
In countries with a strong tradition of private schools, often provided by a religious community, representatives of these groups should be included. Persons should be deliberately selected for diversity of ethnic and class background, political convictions and affiliation, religious orientation and women and well as men. Developing a three-way matrix to map out the characteristics of membership is a useful method: one dimension is professional orientation and expertise; a second dimension is political, religious and social background; and a third dimension is organizational affiliation. A final review of proposed membership should ask who or what organizations are not represented.

Selecting individuals rather than asking for groups to select representatives is usually the best strategy. The nature of the work of the commission is not so much to negotiate existing organizational or political positions on policy, but to engage in enquiry, learning, analysis and negotiation. When considering an individual who will represent the views of a stakeholder, discuss the appointment with those from the organization to whom the individual is responsible and explain the principles involved. One approach is to ask the organization for nominations, and then interview those nominated, but keep responsibility for selection with the ministry. Commission members should bring their individual expertise, experience and insights to the process of arriving at a consensus on national policy and strategy.

One way to recruit good members is to first select the chairperson of the commission, and then the permanent secretary can work with the chairperson to recruit, interview, select and brief other members, using the offices of the minister of education where necessary.

The selection of the chairperson is the single most important decision to be made about the commission. The chair should be someone with a really broad and informed view about education and development, a person who is highly respected for professional judgement and experience. The chairperson must have strong skills in group leadership, negotiation and public speaking, and must be a person who is not seen to be a strong advocate of a particular group or ideological position. An important role of the chair is to set a public tone of openness and fairness in the proceedings of the commission.

The technical skills needed on a commission are similar to those needed for an educational sector assessment. Members who are chosen from particular stakeholder groups should also, in most cases, be chosen for professional competence: as educators, social scientists, and economists. However, it is vital that the commission include within its membership at least one high-level professional—and generally two to three persons—who can spend full time on the work of the commission. This is where an external agency can sometimes be of assistance: paying for national members to work full time, or providing technical support persons who can devote full time to the commission, working closely with the chairperson and directing the work of the secretariat.

The members will normally be expected to attend all meetings, most field trips and hearings, and participate in drafting sections of the report. The full-time persons who will provide the technical and organizational heart of the work can either be full members or part of a secretariat, which
for a number of commissions has been drawn from the staff of the educational planning unit of the Ministry of Education.

A secretariat, directed by a full-time member of the commission, is essential for the work of a commission. The secretariat will need an administrative assistant, to make all the arrangements for the meetings, travel, finances, public relations and reporting of the commission, and access to experience, high-quality secretarial support.

Organization

The operations of a commission, which set it apart from a sector assessment, are its pattern of communications with the public. The communication begins with a public announcement of the commission’s formation, membership and scope of work. That announcement is made officially, usually by order of the minister, in the government gazette. But in addition, press and radio coverage should be used to inaugurate the work of the commission and communicate the intent to open public dialogue.

At the first meeting of the commission is customarily opened by the minister of education—or perhaps the permanent secretary. The opening remarks serve to present the commission and its terms of reference in a public forum and convey the importance of its work. When the Lesotho commission began its work, the minister pointed out that the churches in Lesotho were the proprietors of the schools. The members, who included three senior representatives of the church-sponsored school system, were advised to respect the strength of the African three-legged stool. The legs of the stool for Lesotho’s education policy were to be the cooperation between the churches, the government and the communities. That image set the context for the work of the commission and the basis for educational development.

In Uganda, the minister’s opening remarks emphasized the obvious limits on the government budget and the consequent need to seek ways of increasing community participation and financial support. The dissemination of these opening remarks by radio and newspaper alerted the public to the work of the commission and to some of the central issues it would be discussing.

The organization of the work of the commission should be developed in the initial meetings. Allowing for various delays, holidays, and other events, a minimum of a year will be needed for the complete cycle of commission activities. A typical schedule would look something like the following:

- initial meetings and organization (1 month)
- assignment of research and subcommittees (1 month)
- public hearings: in all districts (3 months)
- public hearings: with key organizations and institutions (1 month)
- reports back from research teams and subcommittees (1 month)
- write up of the report sections (2 months)
- revisions, editing, final negotiations (2 months)
In a little more than one year in Uganda, the commission held a total of 50 days of commission meetings, plus 30 days of public hearings—including those in 10 regional centers. The Lesotho commission conducted 40 days of meetings and spent 15 days in public hearings.

The work of the secretariat in its supporting role to the commission is crucial. The secretariat must have office space, typewriters or word processors and printers, photocopying equipment, telephones and a fax to support the work of the commission. The administrative support will include making local appointments, arranging transportation, keeping all members informed of developments and schedules, handling the finances of the commission, and keeping a full and accurate record of all hearings and reports, and providing copies of these to all members in a timely way.

Early in the work of the commission a collection of resource documents and data should be put into a temporary resource center. Copies of key documents and data will need to be circulated to all members. The resource center should include annual reports for all concerned ministries and institutions; statistical reports on census, school enrollments and finances; development plans of ministries and donors; copies of previous educational assessments and commissions; copies of key research and surveys on education and human resource development; documentation of all legislation governing education and training; and a collection of pertinent international reference documents—such as the World Bank’s comprehensive review of basic education, “Improving Primary Education in Developing Countries: a Review of Policy Options.”

One of the strategies for spreading participation in the work of the commission, and particularly for working through options in difficult policy areas—like language policy for basic education, or the relationship between the public and private sector in providing technical and vocational training—is to establish subcommittees, drawing on specialized expertise and specific stakeholders. Each subcommittee is charged with examining the existing subsystem, the information, the research, and in light of the general policy considerations of the commission, is asked to create and cost strategic options. On the Ugandan commission there were 11 subcommittees with some 80 members, in addition to the members of the commission.

The subcommittee approach is particularly helpful for drawing in persons from such sectors as health, population, agriculture, local councils, rural development, and appropriate technology. Sub-committees can also include representatives from donor agencies which have active projects in education and related fields. The representative membership and work of the subcommittees establishes in ministries, organizations and agencies an awareness of the seriousness and scope of the commission’s work which later facilitates the acceptance of its findings and recommendations.

If the subcommittee approach is to be used, the number of committees and their focus should be organized early. Each subcommittee is organized and chaired by a member of the commission, who is responsible for developing scope of work and suggesting its membership. Like members
on the commission, persons appointed to subcommittees receive honoraria for their contributions, or are seconded from various government ministries. The secretariat also provides support for the sub-committees.

**The Process of Consultation**

There are two reasons for extending the discourse on education policy beyond the analysis of experts working within the ministry:

- to obtain new information and insights;
- to develop and negotiate policy options and strategies that will be understood and actively supported during implementation.

Most national educational statistics in Africa, as well as much of the available research on education, hides as much as it reveals, and cannot be used uncritically just because it is the only data available. Particularly misleading is aggregated data on enrollments, repeaters, dropout rates and unit costs, since these often hide disparities at a local level that are greater than even inter-regional differences. Without the personal experience and on-site school visits to understand the meaning of phenomena the data suggest, education policy analysts can go far astray in proposing policy initiatives.

For example, in Lesotho there was a very high repetition rate in the lower grades, as high as 40 percent in the more remote mountain areas. Discussions with the teachers in these areas quickly revealed what the data was hiding: children are expected to look after cattle. They team together in groups of two or three, taking turns on a daily basis to look after a herd. A review of the average daily attendance registers in the mountain schools revealed that as many as one third of the children were away from school on any given day. At the end of the year, children have not been able to cover the school work, are not promoted, and then repeat the grade. The incentive for children to continue in school in spite of this was very great since all primary schools provided nutritious school meals at midday. This is the kind of insight and understanding which comes easily when the inquiry is taken to the field, but cannot be readily obtained from an examination of existing statistical data.

In order to organize consultations with the public a good deal of advance work is necessary. Hearings at districts and provincial level involves:

- establishing a schedule of one-two day visits to all regions of the country;
- informing the office of the administrator of the region at least one month before the mission and requesting his office to:
- invite key stakeholders to a meet with the commission and to submit their views; organize the venue for that meeting;
- publicize and circulate the terms of reference and the issues that the commission wishes to discuss;
• invite persons who have carried out research, or who have positions to take, to present papers to the commission; and
• schedule visits to one or more key educational or training centers for discussions with the director, staff and students.
• announcing the schedule of visits over the radio and in the newspaper; and
• following the hearings and the visits to institutions, writing up a report summarizing the major points, and sending it back to the region for further comments or observations.

Using this format in Uganda produced testimony from more than 650 persons, approximately 145 written papers, including useful research documents, and visits to approximately 25 schools and centers.

One of the most useful outcomes of this approach is that the cliches of public concern are quickly exhausted, and the members of the commission become very keenly aware of the need to explore policy options within a responsible financial context with the public. Such matters as community and organizational contributions to educational services and quality; the link between the community and the school; the relevance of the curriculum to local development problems and opportunities; the behavior, incentives and conditions facing the teacher—all these matters are examined in a fresh way through dialogue between the members of the commission, teachers, parents and local government officers.

As the process of public hearings continues, there is also a social learning process: members of the commission begin to more fully grasp the fundamental problems and issues as seen from a variety of local, regional and national perspectives, and the public who engage in dialogue with the commission learn of those insights and are challenged to think through their observations and requests.

Developing Strategies: Negotiating Change

The second reason for extending the discourse on education policy beyond the analysis of experts working on available data is to negotiate policy options with significant stakeholders.

In a recent paper prepared at the World Bank, Fuller and Habte (1991) identify 44 education policy shifts under five general headings. They examine each of these in terms of its technical complexity and the likely institutional resistance to its implementation. Seventeen of the policy initiatives are expected to meet high resistance. These include such items as using teachers more intensively by increasing teaching hours, implementing double shifts, lengthening the school year and discouraging teacher absenteeism; linking a portion of teacher salaries and benefits to performance in the classroom; shifting part of the cost for vocational training to the private sector; and introducing new learning technologies, including distance education.

These policy shifts, as a part of a larger effort of policy analysis and change, must be the subject of negotiation to determine feasibility and acceptability. These are political as well as economic
and educational issues, and the choice of means for realizing efficiency and cost-savings needs to be negotiated as an integral part of a policy formation process.

It is not adequate to argue, as some technical specialists do, that the work of policy analysis is simply one of presenting costed alternatives and leaving the choice to politicians. It is never this simple. For one thing, any single policy shift—such as increasing utilization of teachers—will have administrative and political implications which have to be addressed. Changes in schedules for teachers will require reorganization at the school level, changes in the timetable, and shifts in teacher responsibilities.

What is necessary in the process of policy formation is to have the technical expertise, with the information on public concerns and insights described above, placed before those in key political and bureaucratic positions. In this sense, the outcome is a combination of technical and political wisdom. Technical and political perspectives cannot be treated as if they were entirely separate domains of human and social functioning. The result of such separation is either neglect of the policy recommendations or a decision to implement policies which cannot work.

One of the key aspects of this negotiation is to make an assessment of management capacity of the educational system in relation to the management requirements implied by a given policy. For example, an integrated approach to the organization of non-formal education has much to recommend it, not least being a more efficient use of manpower and other resources. But in negotiations with the various public and private agencies with non-formal educational programs, it becomes obvious that the coordination of the diverse programs would be an unrealistic management task for any existing agency.

Following the public hearings, when the commission is ready to draft its recommendations, taking into account estimates of overall financial requirements and sources, the commission should enter into discussions with key leaders in various agencies. Reactions should be sought from teachers associations, headmasters associations, public service commissions, the teaching service commission, the university, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Local Administration, labor unions, and private sector associations. Given that the policy commission membership has already been drawn from these organizations, and that they have been involved in work of the sub-committees, the discussions and review should quickly dispense with formalities and enter into serious negotiations, testing what will and will not be acceptable, and what kind of effort, force, or incentives would be necessary to implement specific policy initiatives. In such discussions, the commission should always maintain its independent role in making recommendations, but should be aware of likely reactions and their implications.

**Organizing the Information and Writing the Report**

In describing the organization of the work for the commission, the role of external consultants was mentioned. External consultants can play a very useful role at a number of points. At the outset, consultants can provide assistance in organizing the scope of work, the methodology, the information requirements and the applied research agenda. Secondly, consultants as technical
specialists can assist in the work of the subcommittees like those addressing technical and vocational training, national literacy programs, or university costs and financing.

An external consultant can also be very useful in the organization and preparation of the report. Since the members of the commission will have each been intensively involved in developing their own perspectives, and will have specialized in the work of a subcommittee, the design of the final report will not easily emerge from a consensus. The chairperson of the commission, working with the secretariat and an external consultant who is a generalist in education policy can provide a final framework for the report. Of course, a strong chairperson who provides strong direction for the members may be able to exert enough leadership to suggest the final shape of the report. The recommendations from the IEES handbook on the preparation of a sector assessment report bear repeating:26

- each chapter should be organized and presented so the reader can follow the logical progression of ideas from the beginning to the end;
- every assertion should be supported by appropriate evidence and be accompanied by a suitable explanation and justification;
- recommendations should logically follow from the analysis of constraints, issues and conclusions which precede them. The need for a clear relationship between evidence and the resulting conclusions and recommendations is critical if the recommendations are to understood, accepted and implemented;
- use plain, clear and simple sentences that are easy to understand for an intelligent layman.
- avoid technical terms if possible, but if they must be used, they should be defined clearly when first introduced;
- the writing should be encouraging and positive, reflecting an analytical rather than a negative stance. The emphasis should be on identifying solutions rather than allocating responsibility for failures;
- as far as possible, chapters should follow a similar format. For example, if there is a chapter for each level and type of education, the format might be: status, objectives related to development issues, financing implications, and recommendations.

Perhaps the most difficult time in the life of the commission comes when the first draft of the entire report is completed. At that time, the members gather under the direction of the chairperson, and critique the entire document, sometimes section by section, sometimes line by line. Since the members represent different perspectives and interests, it is vitally important for the chairperson to exercise leadership by insisting that the report and discussions

- be focussed on the national welfare and not partisan issues;
- be as specific as possible in indicating policy shifts and initiatives, including the organization and financial implications of individual recommendations;
- be responsive to economic constraints;
- indicate an awareness of the various interests and perspectives involved in a policy shift, admitting where consensus is not possible and indicating the level of consensus when agreement is possible.
A minimum of three weeks should be set aside to review and approve the final draft of the commission report.

In addition to the main report, most educational commission reports will have annexes which summarize important information. Typically, such annexes include, the terms of reference and membership of the commission, the schedule of activities, a bibliography, a section on population and manpower trends, current and projected enrollments at all levels of education, and a technical section on budgetary estimates and financial requirements. In the Lesotho report, there was also an annex which provided a database covering all externally financed projects in the educational sector which indicated the development objective(s) served, the program area, the project name, the financing agency, a description of activity and duration, the status of the project—completed, implemented, proposed—and a summary comment.

A number of commissions and sector assessments include a separate volume of research studies that support the main report. Lesotho produced a companion volume of seven research reports: four grew out of the work of subcommittees and three were produced by external consultants.

**Presentation**

Prior to a formal presentation, it may be appropriate to organize a conference, calling together key policymakers and consultants to the commission, to make an oral presentation and provide an executive summary. This serves two purposes. The presentation may introduce some final changes or refinements in the draft report that will reflect points of view that only emerge from the total report. Secondly, all those involved at this stage become partners in the process, which will help promote subsequent acceptance of the report by the government. The more that high-level policymakers can themselves acknowledge participation in the report, the easier and faster it will be accepted by Cabinet.

Countries vary in their anxiety about the security of public documents. Government concern over possible reactions to commission recommendations must be tempered by the need for generating support and understanding of needed policy changes. Given the public nature of the educational sector, it makes a lot of sense to circulate the draft commission report widely, including to the donor agencies, asking for feedback as a part of the legitimate work of the commission. This method of communicating initial findings and recommendations increases the stakeholders' awareness of the policy issues, alerts the government to problem areas, and also informs donor agencies about likely future financing needs.

The executive summary of the report is a critical component of the document, since it may well be the basis for the government white paper. The White Paper cannot be detailed and comprehensive, but rather will summarize the main policy recommendations. This is what the executive summary should do. As a general outline for the executive summary, the following items should be included:

- context and objectives for the commission;
• membership and procedures followed to obtain information and to consult with the public;
• summary of the main policy recommendations;
• overall status of the country's development prospects and the role of education and training;
• strategies for basic education, secondary education, vocational & technical education, university education, manpower supply and demand, and non-formal education.
• organizational development and staffing;
• financing of education at all levels.

In preparing the final report, and included in the executive summary, the use of photographs, graphics, illustrations can be creatively used to convey the focus of the commission's work and to make its central messages more clear. If government wishes to have widespread discussion of the report, then a simpler and shorter summary of key recommendations needs to be prepared in a format which will facilitate understanding and informed discussion of the issues. Consideration might be given to translating this discussion summary into vernacular languages if discussions are to be carried out below the regional or provincial levels.

Follow-up

Once government accepts the work of an education policy commission, usually by issuing a White Paper, the processes of educational planning, annual budgeting, and negotiating program and project support with donors begins. At the national level, the educational submission for the next five-year plan becomes straightforward as an elaboration from the commission report within the larger policy context of enrolment growth, structural changes and resource allocations.

In a number of countries, sometimes as a part of a national development review conference, and sometimes just for the educational sector, there is a donor roundtable meeting, where the government presents its policy proposals and priorities and seeks donor coordination in supporting the required financing. In both Lesotho and Botswana, and more recently in Uganda, a donor conference was convened after the publication of education policy commission reports.

In Lesotho, following the educational report in 1983, legislation was passed to facilitate the development of apprenticeship training and to encourage stronger support from the private sector for technical and vocational education. Also, an education act was passed which broadened the powers of the Ministry of Education in relation to the church schools, enabling the formation for the first time of a unified teaching service commission which could address the conditions of service for all school teachers. Major financial assistance was negotiated from USAID for supporting qualitative improvements in basic education, and from the World Bank for school facilities improvement and instructional materials. These five-year, sector-wide programs have had an impact on expanding opportunity, improving quality and increasing efficiency in basic education.

In Botswana, as a consequence of the excellent report of the commission in 1977, Education for Kagisano, there has been a dramatic growth in junior secondary education coupled with a marked improvement in the quality of the schools at that level. A clear policy framework, strongly sup-
ported by the government, has attracted significant levels of financing from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, USAID, and the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA). As a follow-up to the educational commission, and prior to the expansion of junior secondary education, USAID in 1985 sponsored a sector assessment which documented changes in the overall economic situation since the commission report, and worked out the organizational and financial strategies for implementing the policy recommendations. Through its carefully prepared national five-year plans, and a process of formally reviewing its policies, Botswana has established an excellent record of policy consistency and coherence.

The outcome for policy commissions is not always so beneficial, since the educational system, however well its policies are articulated, can only flourish when the overall economic, social and political environment is favorable. In the case of Uganda, the first policy commission completed its report just three months before the overthrow of Idi Amin. Indeed, the commission had prepared its work in anticipation of a new era for Uganda. And yet what followed was almost 10 years of chaos, with one government following another, internal civil war, and no basis for the organized implementation of the policies that were developed by the commission. Nonetheless, some of the initiatives identified and encouraged under the commission did manage to survive and resurfaced in the work of a subsequent policy commission.

Political and Technical Conditions for an Effective Commission

The decision to establish a commission can be an astute political decision aimed at increasing the legitimacy of a democratic process, even in a period of fiscal and political uncertainty. Education is a very public activity—there is not much that a commission can uncover in the way of educational practices that would be unexpected or startling. Wide public participation is possible because virtually everyone has a view formed by personal experience as a student or parent. Education is thus one of the best areas of public policy to invite and encourage meaningful participation. In any case public understanding and support is needed for any large scale innovation in educational practice. Further, if it is expected that community and public financial support will be needed for educational programs, the commission can explore and negotiate these financing options.

However, if the political context does not inspire confidence in a democratic process because conditions are so chaotic, or participation is so stifled, then the effectiveness of a commission can be severely reduced. The commission ought to be seen as a body which reflects the social structure of the nation, including minorities, and to be led by a person of professional integrity. If the mandate and leadership of the commission is seen as a political party platform, tied to dominant group interests, then the views of those who dissent will not be heard or fairly judged.

A related problem occurs when a commission report is closely tied to the legitimacy of the government, and that government changes. Even if the policies articulated are sound from a technical perspective, the new government will wish to have a new expression of policy. However, if the work of the commission is seen as being a professional, participative and democratic exercise in itself, the policies and programs it establishes are likely to survive political changes.
This is more likely when the chairperson and membership of the commission are chosen on professional criteria, and selected from enduring institutions and social groups.

One of the consequences of selection of membership on professional and technical criteria will be that the collection of data and its analysis will be of high quality. If this is not the case, the work of the commission will be restricted. Getting the facts clear is the starting point. The guidelines provided for the technical aspects of the work of educational sector assessments are very important, and should be followed. Technical failure will result in lowered credibility and greater resistance to the work of the commission.

Another manifestation of serious weakness in a commission report is an overabundance of lofty statements concerning purposes and goals, proposed with lengthy and turgid prose, and little discrimination concerning priorities or realistic financial limitations. Lack of specificity may in fact conceal fundamental disagreements within the commission and the society about education policy.

The failure to achieve unity and coherence through the commission can be reflected in a report that presents all points of view and selects no strategy for reconciling them. Such a report will indicate full support for both basic and higher education; for technical and vocational institutions and private sector training; for non-formal education and for in-school academic excellence. In short, the commission seems to advocate everything that one can reasonably support as a sensible educational initiative. The report fails to provide meaningful guidance for decision makers because it suggests no priorities, no strategy and no choices. The report is more of a wish list than a statement of policy.

The strength or weakness of a commission report will be reflected in the chapter on finances. This chapter must: a) set reasonable ceilings in the context of the country’s overall economic condition and prospects; b) be consistent with the main strategies provided in the body of the report; and c) provide enough details on the capital and recurrent budget projections to shape specific programming, plans and projects. The failure to specify financial ceilings and priorities usually reflects an overall failure to make difficult policy choices.

Conclusion

The primary challenge of an education policy commission is to provide a comprehensive, participative exercise in social learning, leading to significant educational change which is understood and supported by the public and the key actors in the educational system. The education policy commission is used infrequently, but is necessary when the social and economic environment has changed, and when it becomes important to achieve a social and bureaucratic consensus for new directions and policies.

When a broad policy is in place, but there are changes in economic conditions, calling for structural adjustments to realize greater efficiency, the sector assessment mode of policy analysis is a more appropriate alternative to a full commission. A sector assessment will target priorities,
and delineate strategic options and financing down to the program level. The exercise provides an excellent basis for securing financing both domestically and internationally to pursue established policies.

National five-year plans can also be an important vehicle for educational planning and program implementation. When the plan is well done, it provides the mid-term prioritization for educational programs, including enrolment targets, curriculum changes, teacher supply and demand, organizational development, and both the capital and recurrent budget framework. Many countries have moved towards rolling five-year plans, where targets and budgets are carefully reviewed and modified during annual reviews.

One sign that a country is needs more than a five-year plan, or a sector assessment, is a breakdown in effective management observed at school and regional levels. When teachers are not regularly in classrooms, when books and instructional materials are not available to pupils, when performance on standardized examinations is declining, when programs of non-formal education are in disarray, when there are wide and bitter complaints about unemployment of the educated, and when there is no spark of interest in innovation and change from supervisors and officials, then a major exercise of rethinking educational policies and priorities is in order.

The main point of having policy with a rational and political basis, which is the object of an education policy commission, is to establish a strong linkage between public support and education policy. School and educational program effectiveness relies upon management that is based on a creative understanding of educational objectives, backed up by the resources needed to attain them. A commission can bring this about by identifying central issues and strategies for educational change, mobilizing public and professional support for rational strategies, and identifying modes of financing to support the strategies.
Endnotes

1. See Klees (1986) for an excellent review and critique of both the neoclassic and radical/institutional economic paradigms used in educational planning. His basic conclusion is that since none of the tools can be used with much confidence, a process of social dialogue must be the basis for rational education policy.


3. See Psacharopolous (1983) for a harsh critique of the manpower forecasting approach to educational planning.


6. Participation is not the same as decentralization, where financial and decision making responsibilities are devolved from the center to regions. Decentralization differs from a strategy of participation in that it requires a high level of management capacity both in the regions and at the center. In fact, it requires a far more sophisticated and competent management capacity at the center than does a strategy of central control. Given the scarcity of management skills in the Africa, a strategy of decentralization, as contrasted to participative planning and management, is generally not a reasonable approach to improving education.


8. Lockheed 1990, Table 20. Of the 14 low-income African countries for which recurrent expenditure data is available between 1980 and 1985, 8 reduced levels of per pupil expenditure over the period. The mean per pupil expenditure on primary education for all 14 countries declined from $45 to $41 during the five year period. In Burundi, which suffered severe budgetary cutbacks, per pupil expenditure dropped from $65.1 to $31.1.

9. See Reimers (1991b) which demonstrates the case, from South America, where "structural adjustment" simply means a cutback of resources and diminished planning and management capacity. In Reimers (1991a) the argument is developed that the "quick-fix" response to policy adjustment leads to inefficiency and inequity. Political rather than technical criteria take over when budgets are cut, to the disadvantage of the weak.

11. Examples of these earlier manuals, largely intended for professionals working within the agencies are:


13. Inbar (1984) makes an excellent case for educational planning as a process of creating and communicating shared symbols to establish intent. He shows how in practice a plan must be understood and implemented through the contacts between groups, administrative units and organizations.


16. The distinction which I draw here between the work of an Education Policy Commission and an education sector survey is not absolute, but a question of emphasis. All the manuals on sector assessments, including IEES, mention the importance of consulting key stakeholders, but do not elaborate.

17. The Education Commissions were in Uganda (1979) and Lesotho (1983); the Botswana education commission: *Education for Kagisano* (1977) is also used here as a model. The education sector assessments include Botswana (1985, updated in 1987) and Egypt (1991).

18. See Craig (1990) for a thorough review of the academic literature on education policy implementation in Africa.


21. IEES (1988) presents the most complete description of the education sector assessment approach.


23. IEES op. cit. Chapter 7.

24. See Table 4.4 IEES (1988), p. 4-7 for a thorough listing of skill areas used on the Indonesia Sector Assessment.

25. Rondinelli et al. (1990) contains an excellent treatment of the analysis of the gap between organizational requirements and organizational capacity as a problem in the design of educational programs.


27. See IEES(1986), pp. 6-14 to 6-52, concerning the type of data needed and general methods of analysis.
Bibliography


In Botswana, parliamentary democracy has been based on traditional politics since the country’s independence from England in 1966. The kgotla, a village meeting to discuss governance issues, has a long tradition in Botswana and played a central role in the early development of education, even during the colonial period (Tlou & Campbell, 1984). When issues affecting the village need to be discussed on a public platform, the chief, or kgosi, assembles a kgotla where adults can openly voice their concerns. While it is often a time of intense consultation, it is also a forum to notify the village of major decisions. However, with the rapid growth of Botswana’s market economy, based in large part on diamond mining, there has been a notable shift from traditional authority and processes like the kgotla to central decision-making.

What distinguishes Botswana from other African countries is that although the locus of policy dialogue has shifted from the tribal kgotla to the national ministerial level, a strong cultural tradition of consultation has persisted and is coupled with a commitment to a high quality of technical policy analysis. This shifting was inevitable, given Botswana’s rapid transformation from a poor, pastoral rural society to a booming market economy, drawing its principle wealth from mining.

Botswana began to exploit its mineral resources in the late 1970s and today is the world’s third largest producer of quality diamonds. Income from the diamonds provided a large budgetary surplus on the central government’s recurrent account during the 1980s. The policies, plans, and authority for the use of these resources originates from the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Nonetheless, the considerable political will to develop the rural areas, to provide employment, and to diversify industry, will depend on and benefit the rural population. Education, which also is financed centrally and delivered locally, illustrates Botswana’s dilemma in attempting to balance the role of the community and the pressures of central policy analysis.

This paper will trace the development of education policy in Botswana, examining the evolution of the traditional processes of consultation into an apparently effective system of central policy analysis and planning, which strives to maintain effective linkage to the community level. The analysis will focus on basic education, where the relationship between local participation and national planning is critical.

The Colonial Era (1885-1966)

About 80 percent of Botswana’s 1.3 million people live in the eastern strip, where most of the waterways are located and the main highway and railroad connect the country with Zimbabwe
to the north and South Africa to the south. During the colonial era, Botswana, then called Bechuanaland, was administered as one of the high commission territories as a British protectorate. Slow progress was made toward self-government through nominated advisory bodies.

The first real review of education was conducted in 1905 by E. B. Sargent, appointed by the British government to examine educational practices, largely conducted by missionary bodies. Sargent consulted widely with chiefs and elders and participated in kgotlas. As a result, tribal school committees were formed and chaired by the chiefs. Growing out of the work of these committees, many national tribal schools were developed (Tlou & Campbell, 1984). This pattern of significant local participation in the development of schooling continued through independence. In addition to the tribal school committees, Sargent's recommendations included:

- the immediate appointment of an inspector of education;
- the formation of a Central Board of Advice on Native Education, composed of mission representatives and tribal authorities, to advise the resident commissioner;
- development of a relevant, practically-oriented curriculum; and
- the establishment of Setswana as the medium language of instruction through standard 4 (U.S. grade 3-4), with instruction in English only starting in upper primary standards.

The first tribal council on education wasn't established until 1909, and the board of advisors wasn't formally established until 1930. The Sargent Report provided a blueprint for the colonial government's development of education until 1945, however, it took some time for the recommendations to be implemented.

During the colonial period, the main actors in education were the missionaries and the tribal school committees. The first secondary school, St. Joseph's College, was opened with Catholic financing and control in 1944. Prior to that, the colonial government had resisted the opening of secondary schools because of the availability of secondary education in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. In spite of regular petitions from the tribal school committees and the missions, the colonial government was not prepared to finance secondary education. In 1947, Chief Tshekedi convinced his people that secondary education would have to be based on self-help, and through the implementation of a cattle tax, his council raised enough money to build Moeng College. In 1950, South Africa closed its secondary schools to Botswana. In a quick response, six new tribal council secondary schools were initiated. However, the problem of raising sufficient funds with local financing plagued the development and operations of these schools and not all of them were functioning at independence.

Prior to independence, there were two significant educational developments. The first, in 1963, was the establishment of the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. This three-country university had its seat in Roma, Lesotho, with resident tutors in Botswana and Swaziland.

In 1965, Patrick Van Rensburg, a refugee from South Africa, initiated the Brigades Youth Movement in Serowe. The brigades were an alternative to academic secondary education and
aimed to provide both skills and cooperative employment ventures in carpentry, building, agriculture, and other crafts. Over the years, the brigades movement has spread throughout the country and continues to play an important part in the overall educational, training, and employment policy strategy of Botswana.

**Independence (1966) - Democracy and Diamonds**

During the colonial period there was a gradual process of increased local participation through the office of the chiefs and nominated advisory bodies. A new constitution was introduced in 1960, and a legislative council first met the following year. In 1964, the office of the high commissioner was abolished, and Botswana gained full independence in 1966.

Botswana is one of the few countries in Africa with a full multiparty democracy. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly, which has 38 members. Executive power is vested in the president, who is elected by the assembly for its duration. He appoints and leads a Cabinet of 11 ministers.

Local government is conducted through nine district councils and four town councils. These councils hold important responsibilities including the provision of rural health, welfare services, water supplies, roads and primary education. Each district administration, which represents central government at the district level, is headed by a district commissioner. This structure of local government has important implications for policy formation, implementation, and administration of education.

At the time of independence Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa. With a population of around 500,000, the per capita GDP was much less than P100 (U.S. $50). Tarred roads didn’t exist outside of Gaborone, the capital. There were only 260 primary schools enrolling a total of about 70,000 pupils and nine secondary schools.

With a semi-arid climate subject to periodic drought, Botswana is not well suited to agriculture. The economy was traditionally based on nomadic herding of livestock and the cultivation of subsistence crops. From a position among the poorest of the less developed countries at the time of independence, by the mid-1980s Botswana ranked among the most rapidly growing economies in the world, with a per capita national income placing it in the World Bank’s middle-income category. GDP grew eight-fold from 1966-1986, despite rapid population growth, with per capita GDP rising to more than P3,000 (U.S. $1,300). (Hermans, 1988)

A number of factors have contributed to this success, not the least of which have been the political stability, the continuity of leadership, the government’s disciplined approach to economic management, and the financial and technical assistance it received from multilateral and bilateral donors. But democratic institutions, good government, and generous donor support don’t themselves create jobs and wealth. Botswana’s remarkable economic record is largely attributable to the existence of mineral resources, principally diamonds, and to foreign private investment in the development of the mines. Nonetheless, this level of performance economic performance and
the services and development it supports could not have occurred without a favorable political and policy framework.

Botswana’s first objective at independence was to establish the institutional framework within which economic development and investments could take place. Accordingly, about a year after independence a Ministry of Development Planning was created to coordinate the planning and implementation of development programs, including the responsibility for negotiating external aid.


The Transition Plan was the first plan after independence. It placed great emphasis on creating the institutional capacity for an economic development strategy: “The available resources are so small and the problem so great, that only by careful planning can these resources be put to their most effective use.” Clear objectives and priorities were set forth to guide both current and capital expenditures in order to both secure internal political support and the sympathy and aid of friendly nations and donor organizations.

The plan targeted the expansion of secondary and tertiary education as the key to localizing the public service and the general development of the country. The primary schools were inadequate, notably overcrowded, poorly staffed, and lacked teaching aids and other instructional equipment. At the time of independence, the secondary schools had produced only 16 students qualified for admission to tertiary education, out of a total of 40 graduates. As a result, the plan identified secondary education as a priority need.

A study of the economic problems of Botswana reveals that a major obstacle to development is a shortage of school certificate and general certificate holders. While it is possible, but more costly, to employ expatriates in senior administrative and professional posts, the intermediate junior executive and subprofessional post can only be filled from local sources.

The Transitional Plan was intended to establish the institutional base in government so that more comprehensive economic planning and action could be organized. It led to the first Five-Year National Development Plan (NDP), 1968-73. In addition, the discovery of rich deposits of minerals, particularly diamonds, made the vision of real economic progress palpable. In the words of the late president, Sir Seretse Khama:

*The excellent prospects of the development of large-scale mining offer hope for the future. But we must not sit idle and wait for the royalties to accrue. There is much that can be done now. The National Development Plan sets out in detail the tasks to be tackled. Every Motswana (a person from Botswana) must play his part.*

The process of central institutional development and planning was a necessary strategy at independence for creating the capacity for economic development. It was clear even during the
colonial period that education, local self-help, and financing could not take Botswana far in the face of rural poverty.

Nonetheless, the concept of democracy and citizen participation in the planning process is also extremely important—it is one of the key articulated policies of development. Thus, in Botswana a central issue in policy formation is the balance between centrally controlled strategic analysis of economic and social plans and the participation of the public. Four institutional processes have developed since independence to guide public policy formation and implementation:

- the process of annual plan review through village, district, and national councils and conferences;
- the annual review of the ministerial programs and budgets by parliament;
- the establishment of advisory councils; and
- the ad hoc establishment of temporary commissions, such as the notable National Commission on Education in 1975-1977.

In Botswana, NDPs are a central instrument for the definition and execution of government policy and programs. They are technically competent, detailed, comprehensive, and flexible. Implementation involves careful annual internal government technical reviews between the Ministry of Finance and Planning and each sectoral ministry. There is also a major midterm plan review to identify programs which are off track and need modification.

The organization of the NDPs and the annual reviews of their implementation has evolved new structures of dialogue, with the traditional kgotla and chiefs' councils playing a minor role. In the first NDP, and thereafter, Village Development Committees (VDC) were set up to make proposals for development and to consider the consequences of such projects, particularly the resources needed to sustain them. For example, in proposing a new school, the VDC was asked to present estimates of recurrent expenditure for staff salaries, teaching materials, supplies, and operational costs, although, in practice the VDCs are generally not able to do this level of planning.

VDCs take their proposals to District Development Committees (DDC) where they are discussed and forwarded to the annual National Development Conference (NCD) whose participants include district commissioners, regional and district officers, professionals from ministries and institutions, senior civil servants, and district extension workers.

The agenda for the national conferences, which are typically a week long, includes: a critical review of existing programs; a review of development objectives and strategies; and the presentation and review of new proposals coming from the local level and from the central ministries.

The conferences open with discussion of general economic conditions and strategies and then move to sectoral reviews. The annual conferences provide valuable material for modifications in implementation of the national plans, and for input into the preparation of the next five-year plan.
Each ministry receives proposals from district councils and includes these within the framework and budgetary constraints of the national plan. This planning process provides both information and strategies from top downwards and from the bottom upwards. It is an effective mechanism for keeping an open public linkage between district perspectives and central government.

One important factor of this systematic, consultative approach to policy review is that the great majority of participants in the process, and all who hold the power, are government staff or appointees. While at a local level, chiefs may review issues through the kgotla or council, and at a district level the council of elected members will review plans and programs, the plan is based on resources that are allocated from the national level. This is a consequence of two factors. First, that the resources come from the top, with the greatest part of the considerable national budget derived from taxes and profits on minerals and external financing. Secondly, the central government has the technical expertise and knowledge to formulate plans and obtain the needed resources for them. Over time this has tended to erode traditional local authority, reduce the role of opposition political parties, and undermine the stated policy to fully involve communities in development (Holm and Malutsi, 1990).

In addition to the local, district, and national annual reviews of the NDP, each ministry presents to Parliament its annual recurrent and capital budget. During that presentation, each department describes its program and defends its proposed budget. Members of Parliament, acting on the information from their constituencies, prepare their own briefs and critically review the ministry programs, particularly failures to implement previously approved plans. The voice of the opposition parties is most clearly articulated in these parliamentary reviews. Yet this seldom amounts to more than pointing to local problems of weak management or slow implementation. A third institutional procedure to assist in policy formulation and review has been the establishment of standing advisory committees and councils. The membership of the councils represents the technical expertise of government and the private sector, and the perspectives of key stakeholders. An example related to the educational sector is the National Employment, Manpower, and Incomes Policy Council (NEMIC). NEMIC was set up to oversee the implementation of the incomes policy, to provide a forum for consultation on the measures to restrain process and profits, and to provide the training that is integral part of that policy. Its representation includes employers, rural and non-formal sectors, trade unions and senior civil servants—permanent secretaries from finance and development planning, education, labor, commerce and industry. The council is chaired by the assistant minister of finance and development planning. NEMIC is active in the formulation of the financial assistance policy which aims to create productive employment opportunities, particularly in the rural areas.

A second example of this type of structure is the Brigades Review Working Group, set up in 1981 to improve the weak management in the privately organized brigades movement. This group brought together private sector organizations, such as the Botswana Employee Federation and the Rural Development Association, with representatives from key ministries led by the Ministry of Education. Its first report led to a formulation of a long-term policy and plan. The plan attracted foreign technical and financial support for strengthening and expansion, and has resulted in revitalization of the brigades movement.
The fourth policy formation process in Botswana is the establishment of ad hoc commissions to examine particular issues and sectors. This fourth approach has had a remarkable and positive effect on the educational sector, due largely to the excellent work done by the presidential commission set up in 1975.

The Middle Period - Setting National Education Goals

By the mid-1970s, education had grown dramatically since independence, with a great increase in the number of pupils, teachers, and schools. But this quantitative growth was accomplished at the expense of quality. Schools which were understaffed and ill-supplied at independence had continued to deteriorate. Also, the educational system was slow to respond to the changing demands of a growing economy for relevant work skills, abilities, and attitudes. Many believed that students’ ability to read, write, and calculate had actually declined. Criticism from various quarters, including the National Assembly, made it imperative for government to take action. It was clear that a careful review of policies and strategies was needed, and that financing for the goal of quality basic education for all was critical.

The National Commission of Education 1975-1977

In response to these pressures, the president, Sir Seretse Khama, appointed the National Commission on Education in December 1975. The commission was charged with undertaking a comprehensive review of the educational system and charting the strategy for its future development. The commission was chaired by Torsten Husen, a Swedish educator with a very high international reputation, and included two experienced and highly regarded Batswana (people from Botswana), and four outstanding international educators. The selection of such a team for the commission was clearly intended to produce a high quality report, which would assist in attracting external aid, and addressing the domestic need for internal perspectives and consultation.

The terms of reference for the commission, as proposed by the Cabinet and then refined by the National Committee on Educational Policy, were as follows:

- to identify the major problems affecting education in Botswana and the issues of principal concern to the government of Botswana;
- to clarify the goals of the educational system as perceived by key parties within and outside government;
- review the current educational system and propose a program for its development; and
- to present recommendations regarding the implementation of an effective program to overcome problems and achieve goals.

The commission began its work in January 1976 and over an intense period of fifteen months carried out an impressive program of research and consultations. Holding five plenary sessions, the commission structured its work through a series of task forces and commissioned studies. Members visited every district in Botswana to collect evidence and observe the schools and literacy programs in operation. The commission consulted widely with people both within the
districts and at a national level, focussing on educators, prominent persons in government and the private sector.

The result of the commission's work was a two volume report: *Education for Kagisano* (Unity). Volume I is a model for such a work: it provided an excellent socio-economic overview, an analysis of national policies and economic prospects, and insightful analysis and recommendations for each level and type of education. Its 156 recommendations provided a comprehensive strategy for pre-university education until the 1990s. The recommendations are presented in terms of priorities, and implementation scheduled in three stages: short-term (1977-1980), medium-term (1981-1985), and longer-term (1986 and later).

Volume II includes the special studies reports. Some of these studies provide extremely useful baseline data for future monitoring and policy analysis. Torsten Husen was a key actor in the development of the International Educational Achievement tests, and was able to design a sub-set of the IEA instruments to be administered to primary and junior secondary students. This information provided insights into Botswana school performance, and allowed some international comparisons. The results and test items of that baseline study were found useful in carrying out a follow-up national achievement test under the Junior Secondary Education Improvement Project in 1988. (Snyder, 1988).

The commission identified a number of fundamental problems that needed to be overcome:

- too little emphasis had been given to primary education, resulting in a wide gap between the quality of primary schools and that of the much better equipped, staffed and financed secondary schools;
- the schools were too separated from the world of work, syllabi and curricula were too academic, and children were not taught about the real, practical world;
- emphasis was given to full-time education in schools with too few opportunities for people to continue their learning outside the formal system;
- the numerous private, self-help schools initiated by communities did not receive financial support from government, so that their quality was very poor in relation to government schools; and
- there was inequality between urban and rural educational opportunity and quality, with the rural schools under supported.

It was notable that large numbers of the commission report were produced and widely distributed within Botswana. After the government accepted the report, it was also distributed to other countries, and was readily available in Ministry of Education planning departments of English-speaking African countries. It thereby had an important impact as a model for this kind of exercise far beyond Botswana. The government reacted swiftly to the report, and within a few months issued the White Paper of 1977 titled: *National Policy on Education*. The paper set forth the strategy for education that government intended to pursue:

- high priority must be given to strengthening the primary level;
• there must be reasonable progression from primary to higher levels of education; therefore a new kind of intermediate school was needed, with standards of provision and levels of costs between the present level of primary and secondary schools;
• the purpose of the school at all levels should be to prepare children for a useful, productive life in the real world;
• the difference in educational quality between urban and rural areas, and between public and private education, must be eliminated in accordance with the principle of unity and social justice; and
• effective and wide-ranging non-formal educational policies must be developed.

The commission’s report, and the subsequent white paper and other government actions have played a central role in the definition of and implementation of education policy in Botswana. Government’s commitment to the main lines proposed by the commission has been clear and consistent. After the white paper was issued, Cabinet and the Ministry of Education set up a number of standing committees to plan and monitor the implementation of education policy. The work of those committees, most of which are still operating, has helped to promote interministerial and interdepartmental cooperation.

Beginning in 1979, the NDPs have articulated the programs, phases, and budgeting of the policy, and have been annually reviewed by the village, district, and NDC. This should not suggest that all runs smoothly. In the implementation of policies there are serious and continuing issues to be faced. The problems of school leavers and employment, particularly in rural areas is perhaps the central development dilemma that surfaces in these consultations, but there are many operational details that are criticized, analyzed, and reformulated.

Institutional Structures for Policy Development & Review

The particular strength of Botswana’s education policy is not its technical brilliance and consistency, but rather the institutional structures that allow it to be continually monitored, reviewed and modified through professional analysis and public scrutiny. This is illustrated by looking at some of the management and advisory committees that were set up or strengthened after the National Education Policy White Paper was issued in 1977.

*Policy Advisory Committee (PAC), Ministry of Education.* This is an interdepartmental committee set up in 1979 to improve communication and coordination within the ministry. The chairmanship alternates between the minister and the permanent secretary and all department heads are members. The committee meets regularly, a minimum of one meeting each quarter, and is expected to:

• review policy and program implementation;
• assess departmental progress reports and constraints;
• undertake joint problem solving and information exchange; and
• review papers to be presented to Cabinet.
The PAC agenda is prepared by the deputy permanent secretary, and the record of the meetings is prepared by the planning unit. An analysis of this committee’s reports and minutes reveals that it has an important role in providing policy coordination within the ministry, and that it provides an excellent internal forum to review proposals prior to presentation to Cabinet. The PAC has, from time to time, set up and abolished committees to prepare policy and program proposals. Starting in 1987, the PAC sponsored an annual three-day conference, held at the new Molepolole Teacher Training College outside of Gaborone, to critically review broad educational strategies and departmental programs. These conferences involve approximately 150 educational officers from all departments at headquarters, regional educational officers, leadership staff from teacher training colleges, and the university, including those conducting relevant educational research.

Ministerial Consultative Committee. This is an interministerial committee established under the Public Service Act. The committee is composed of the permanent secretary, who acts as chairman, three members of the ministry who together with the chairman represent the official perspective, and four other members who represent the staff perspective. The purpose of the committee is to improve productivity within the ministry by considering terms and conditions of service, and advising on methods of ensuring improvements in general working conditions and staff relations. The work of this committee contributes to improving communication, coordination and prompt decision-making. Since the permanent secretary is the chairman, he is kept aware of staff problems within each department.

Unified Teaching Service Consultative Committee. This committee was established in 1976 and is also chaired by the permanent secretary. It includes senior officers of the ministry and representatives of teachers’ associations. It advises the minister on issues such as the terms and conditions of service of teachers, the professional development of teachers, and teacher training. Over the years this committee has continued to have effective leadership and membership, and has provided relevant advice and follow-up.

Joint Committee on Primary Education. This interministerial committee, formed to strengthen communication between the Ministries of Education and Local Government and Lands, was established in 1978. Its representation includes staff from both ministries, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and the Regional Educational Offices. Although originally the committee simply exchanged information, during the latter part of the 1980s it served a key role in policy formulation and decision-making for primary education. For example, it initiated a study and then redesigned the entire system of primary education supplies procurement and distribution in 1988-89, making it more effective and efficient.

The National Council for Teacher Education. This council was originally established in 1975 to advise the minister on all matters relating to pre-service and in-service teacher education. It meets twice a year, and includes all principles of teacher training colleges, representatives of all departments of the ministry and from the university’s Faculty of Education, the Teaching Service, the Headmaster’s Association, and Regional Educational Officers. The council has grown in strength and serves as an effective forum for the reviewing and recommending policies in teacher education. During the 1980s, when there was a very rapid growth in junior secondary schools and
the establishment of in-service teacher training centers throughout the country, this council played a critical role. Its policy recommendations, were rapidly and effectively implemented since they came from those who were responsible for implementation.

The large number of committees and councils, of which those described above are examples, reflect the degree to which government has formalized the process of consultation in formulating and reviewing policies. Such consultation guarantees that those who will implement educational policies are fully involved from the outset in identifying the problems, discussing options, and selecting strategies. Not only do these bodies meet on a regular basis, the tradition of pre-circulated agendas and technical papers is consistently followed. In addition, special studies and analyses are frequently commissioned.

However, as noted earlier, this emphasis on the professional, official review, carried out by those who are trained and experienced, tends to dominate the policy-making environment. Whereas at one time it was the chiefs, through the kgotla and councils, and the missions, whose views were key to policy initiatives, today it is government officials. Likewise, political opposition, even when articulated through Parliament, carries relatively little weight, as it tends to be ill-informed and poorly conceived, in comparison to policies and plans formulated within the ministries.

As a consequence, one of the basic policy goals of Botswana, that the communities will manage schools in partnership with government, has been problematic. The issues related to the development of a nine-year basic educational system for Botswana reveal some of the challenges to this goal. The next section will explore the policy of “Education Through Partnership” as it has played out in the rapid transformation and expansion of the junior secondary school (JSS) system.

The Policy of Education through Partnership

The National Commission on Education noted that the unaided community junior secondary schools were ill-equipped, poorly staffed and supported, and that the students at these schools generally did not perform well on the national examinations. The commission argued that: “The government has tended to consider the unaided schools as part of the problem of planning the expansion of the system, we consider them part of the solution.” The report recommends:

- Government should immediately review its policy toward the unaided schools and in the short-term should be prepared to offer professional help to any school that is neither individually owned nor profit-making, and which puts itself under the management of a properly constituted board of governors.

- As resources permit government should develop in the medium-term a program of gradually increasing assistance, in the form of money and teachers, to the presently unaided secondary schools. In the longer-term the schools should be completely absorbed mainly at the junior secondary level into the public system.

The commission also recommended restructuring the entire school system from the 7-3-2 year cycles of primary, junior secondary and senior secondary courses to a 6-3-3 pattern. It argued that
the new structure should be possible with qualitative improvements in primary education to achieve basic literacy and numeracy in six years, and that adequate courses at both the junior and senior secondary level would require three-year programs. These changes were seen as part of a strategy of moving from a seven-year cycle of basic education—in primary school—to nine-years basic education for all, with six years of primary school and three years in junior secondary school. The commission felt that Botswana would soon be able to afford an extension of schooling to achieve universal junior secondary education, although that would only be prudent if the cost of junior secondary school were kept much lower than costs of the government, and aided secondary schools.

The commission was reconvened briefly in 1979 to advise on the transition to the new structure. The NDP which appeared in that year incorporated many of the policy recommendations made at that time. However, progress toward the new structure and expansion of enrollments was slow. In 1980 the Ministry of Education established an office to work with the unaided community junior secondary schools (CJSS). A major effort was made to provide additional classes in Form 1 (U.S. grade 7-8) of CJSS, partly through the establishment of new schools. In 1983 there were 20 CJSSs, and in 1984, 15 new community schools were opened. The political pressure was obvious: the timing of this sudden increase coincided with the impending general election of 1984. (Kahn, 1990). Enrollment in Form 1 grew from 5,449 in 1979 to 7,400 in 1983, and then jumped to 10,818 in 1984. However, since the enrollments were growing even faster in the rapidly expanding primary system, the actual proportion of standard 7 leavers (those who drop out of school after standard 7) entering Form 1 declined from 38 percent in 1979, to 27 percent in 1983. With 15 new community schools in 1984, the figure jumped to 40 percent.

This period marked the beginning of the rapid growth to nine years of basic education for all. As an interim measure, the government, on the advice of the reconvened commission, opted to move to a 7-2-3 educational structure, with only two years for the junior secondary schools. The intent was that this interim structure would move to a 6-3-3 structure when universal primary and junior secondary participation had been practically achieved, estimated to be by the mid-1990s.

How was this to be achieved? The ministry embarked on a policy of "Education through Partnership." In 1983 the Secondary School Expansion Committee was established to initiate the process of absorbing unaided schools into the public system, and to work with communities in establishing new CJSSs. The policy intent was that all junior secondary schools would be established on the basis of a partnership between the Ministry of Education and local communities. The implementation of the policy, as developed first in the committee, and later through the ministry's Policy Advisory Committee and Cabinet, was that communities would establish a school board, select appropriate land, and provide housing for teachers. The ministry would build and equip the school, provide and pay the teachers, and cover school running costs.

On this policy basis, government negotiated financing through the World Bank and the African Development Bank to finance community school building, and from 1985 initiated a remarkable program of JSS expansion. From 1985 to 1991, 24 of the 35 existing schools were expanded and 131 new CJSSs were built. During this period, although primary education continued to expand,
the percentage of primary school pupils moving into JSS rose from 40 to 65 percent. The shift from 7-2-3, to 6-3-3 was considered feasible only when the percentage of primary children moving into JSS approached 90 percent.

There were some significant policy issues that had to be negotiated in relation to this expansion. There was a phasing out of the junior secondary grades for the established secondary schools; the shift from admissions to Form 1 in elite schools on the basis of performance on the national primary leaving examination, to selection restricted to the local catchment area; and the transition from boarding schools to day schools. In each of the 131 locations, a school board had to be established, all of which had to have at least a primary level education, land had to be identified, approved by ministry architects, and legally assigned to the school, and then housing for teachers constructed. Although there was extensive consultation on these matters, there was not sufficient time to create ownership and real participation from many communities where schools were placed. In the words of the NDP for 1991-1996:

The community school concept is that government and the local community are jointly responsible for the establishment and management of CJSSs. There have been problems with the partnership. First, many communities have not been able to live up to their obligation to provide staff houses. Second, though schools seek help from the community, the community seldom makes use of the facilities and expertise available in the schools.

Secondary education in Botswana had traditionally been a channel for a new elite, and its popularity was largely a result of the general perception that a secondary school graduate was assured of high status and a good position, if not further study at university level. With the mass expansion of junior secondary education, and a simultaneous reduction in the program from three to two years, suddenly large numbers of junior secondary school leavers faced the frustration of no further schooling opportunity and no jobs. This rather rapidly called into question the wisdom of the entire policy, certainly from the perspective of communities where "educated" youth had "no place to go."

Part of the problem with this very rapid expansion was that the majority of teachers and headmasters were new in their jobs, and certainly new in the communities they were to serve. In 1988, approximately one-third of the junior secondary school teachers were expatriates on contract. Along with new teachers, came a new two-year curriculum, which itself was undergoing continual modification. As the students and the communities began to ask, "What is all of this really for, if there are no jobs or further training opportunities?" the teachers and new headmasters had no clear answers. It is noteworthy however, that during this period of rapid expansion and change, academic performance did not suffer (Moahi & Bowers, 1988), and the students in the community schools began to perform as well as the students in the government schools on the junior secondary final examination. (Kahn, 1990, p.155). Nonetheless, while there was still strong demand for access to junior secondary education, there was a growing public disillusionment as the youth leaving the new schools had no obvious opportunities or marketable skills.
Another critical issue involved the escalating costs to government of this expanding system. The commission had argued that universal nine-year education would only be feasible if costs for the junior secondary level were kept low. In the event, the ministry took over all running costs of all the junior secondary schools and considerably raised the standard of facilities, staffing, equipment and hence the operating costs. In 1989 the Cabinet decided to abolish all secondary school fees, further increasing government expenditures. Total recurrent expenditure for the ministry jumped almost two and one-half times from 1984-85 to 1990-91. Yet this also reflected the wider pattern of increased government expenditures in the 1980s: the ministry’s share of government’s total recurrent budget remained virtually constant at 22 percent (NDP 7, p.317). Nonetheless, there was clearly a strong case for rethinking both the strategy and the economic consequences of such swift progress towards a nine-year education for all.

**Recent Patterns - Innovations in Consultative Policy Dialogue**

The proposition that a country as economically strong as Botswana should aim for a universal basic educational system of nine years appears fully justified. However, the implementation of this policy has resulted in increasing social frustrations of youth—and their parents—who don’t perceive how they can “use” this schooling. It has also vastly increased government expenditures on education, and has not led to increased community support and participation. These problems, however, must be balanced by a longer-term perspective in which it is obvious that Botswana’s continued and inevitable transformation will require an educated citizenry. What is at issue now is the form and scope of that education, and particularly how the vision of nine years of basic education for all can be achieved with better results than in the current program. This is not an issue that can be resolved solely by technical analysis, by the work of a committee, or through external funding.

**The Consultative Conferences (1988-1989)**

In response to the growing public concern over CJSS expansion, the Ministry of Education, with the technical and financial support of USAID, initiated an innovative approach to policy dialogue and analysis. Called the “Consultative Conference,” it incorporated the use of video tape as a way of linking up the village and school voices with the national policymakers. Four key policy issues were identified for public scrutiny at the conferences:

1. **The role of the community.** How could communities be effectively prepared to play a constructive role in the development and operation of the schools? A variety of research studies using ethnographic techniques, as well as more conventional survey instruments, indicated that the new junior secondary school program was not well understood or accepted by communities that were intended to govern them. This was also demonstrated by the lack of effective functioning of school boards and the failure of communities to provide teacher housing.

Thus, the general policy issue of the role and contribution of the community became a central concern in the implementation of the program at a political, economic, including the problem of the cost of teacher housing, and programmatic level.
2. The curriculum. The role of the junior secondary school in the past had been to prepare students for senior secondary schooling. The curriculum was narrowly focused:

*The syllabus is intended to form the basis of a course which will meet the needs of pupils proceeding to the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate.* (Ministry of Education, 1981, p.25).

With the expansion, the role of the junior secondary schools changed to becoming the top two years of what was rapidly becoming a universal eight-year system. A new curriculum issued for 1986, made a radical shift:

*This new integrated science syllabus is written for junior secondary school pupils, most of whom will leave formal education after Form 2. The syllabus is therefore essentially aimed at providing pupils with knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed for understanding and responsible participation in our society.* (Ministry of Education, 1985).

Communities, teachers, and students were confused about this shift. It did not fit the traditional expectations about the role of a secondary school, nor were there training or employment opportunities opening up. There were strong calls for a “practical” curriculum, one that would result, in some way, in productive employment.

3. The school leaver problem. What should the school leaver do? Surveys and tracer studies showed that a very high percentage of youth completing JSS were unemployed. A declining proportion were able to continue to senior secondary, and other training opportunities, such as the brigades and apprenticeship programs, were relatively small. What should communities do about this? What should the country do? This question became a central policy issue in the late 1980s.

4. Communications about education changes. Although there had been wide public debate during the meeting of the Educational Commission, in fact the policy intentions of government in expanding and transforming JSS were unclear to new teachers, headmasters, students, and communities. Many questions were being asked and not answered: Why is government expanding schooling so rapidly? Why are junior secondary schools changing from three to two years? Why are there changes in the curriculum? New community school boards, unsure of their authority and role, wondered what they could do. There were large numbers of relatively inexperienced teachers and headmasters in the new schools, most unsure of themselves and anxious about what they were doing. Many felt at a loss with the dropping of the traditional examination-oriented curriculum aims. The lack of effective communication between the Ministry of Education, the schools, and the communities compounded this problem enormously.

*Using Video in the Consultative Process.* These were the central policy issues to be examined by the Consultative Conferences. The process used to promote communications about these issues was organized in an innovative and effective way with a series of participative meetings and an unusual use of video tapes.
Research was carried out in a representative sampling of communities and schools on the four issues. In-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, including: chiefs, senior, and influential community leaders, members of the kgotla, headmasters, teachers, students, and parents. There were also public meetings of the kgotla. The interview schedules were designed by U. Kann of the National Institute of Research, and were carried out by experienced Batswana field research workers. After an initial profile of responses by the various groups was analyzed for each of the policy areas, questions were framed and a representative sampling of new interviews were videotaped. In Botswana, the video was not seen as a threat and did not inhibit the people's willingness to respond. In many cases respondents became more forceful and pointed, knowing that the video was to be shown to Gaborone government officials.

The video tapes were tightly edited and four 10-minute presentations were created which highlighted the range of responses for each of the policy issues. Interviews in Setswana were given English subtitles, and interviews in English had Setswana subtitles. Each video introduced a policy issue with a sequence of powerful images. For the video on school leavers, a long line of about 300 youth seeking interviews at the Gaborone Employment Bureau, which had less than 10 job openings, formed the background for the opening titles. Then students in that line, and officials in the bureau, were interviewed. In each video the chiefs, parents, teachers, and students speak out on the issues: the full force of frustration and misinformation was presented, along with strongly expressed views of what might be done.

The four videos were the centerpiece of a series of innovative policy conferences. The first conference was held in Gaborone, and was directed at national leadership. It was attended by the Minister of Education and virtually all top educational officials, key university people, public figures, business representatives, and representatives of donor agencies. The conference was opened by the Minister of Education, who reiterated Botswana's tradition of grassroots policy dialogue. Thereafter, the format of the conference was to play a video to groups of about 15 participants followed by a discussion on key issues. Then a panel of four "experts" reacted to what they saw on the video, followed by a short period of open discussion. The conference then broke into working groups to examine the range of policy options. The options and recommendations were then presented to the full conference, and these presentations were videotaped as was the plenary debate and minister's final remarks.

What distinguished this national policy conference was the grounding in reality provided by the videos. Far better than reports of field research, or papers presented by "authorities," the words and dynamic images of the "people"—the chiefs, parents, teachers, and kids—had a telling impact. Over and over, the images and words on the tapes were used to bring the discussion back to the reality of those in the villages and schools. Escape into vague platitudes—which is so often the response of officials to real problems in policy implementation—was not tolerated.

Following the National Conference, the video tape of the presentations, the plenary, and the minister's comments were edited into a fifth 10-minute video. Regional follow-up conferences were organized in three locations of the country to which local leaders, educators, and community representatives were invited. At these conferences the format of the national conference was
repeated, but in addition, the responses of the national leaders to this agenda were presented on video.

The purpose of the series of conferences was to develop a collective perspective on the problems, their causes, and approaches to solving them. The process was a means of establishing a common discourse for appreciating the issues and options available in response. The resultant dialogue helped to move the country toward a consensus of action at local, regional, and national levels. Participation provided a unique learning experience for technical experts and senior officials in the Ministry of Education as well as community leaders, chiefs, and school staff attending the conferences.

The outcome from this exercise is difficult to assess. The process was not intended to solve problems, but to come to a better common understanding of the problems and to explore ways of coping with them. The philosophy that "problems in education aren't solved, they are managed," guided the organization and reporting. The conferences re-established, to some extent, public confidence in the process of education policy-making, which was under attack. They led to improvements in communications from the ministry to the schools and the community school boards, and stimulated local initiatives for improved community support to the schools.

**A New National Education Commission (1992)**

While the junior secondary program is perhaps the most dramatic policy area, other levels and types of education, such as the role and scope for the brigades and vocational training, also are at a critical stage, and need new policy directions. As a result, the government has decided to establish a new educational commission.

*NDP 7 (the seventh National Development Plan) commences 15 years after the report of the National Commission on Education, which charted the educational strategy which Botswana has been following. In view of the increasing size and complexity of the educational system, and the economic and social changes Botswana has experienced, government considers that it is time for another broad review of educational issues and strategy. Another national commission will be convened early in the plan period. Its terms of reference will require it to view the educational system as a whole and in the context of Botswana's long-term economic prospects and developmental requirements.*

*It is intended that the commission’s findings should be available in time to be taken into account during the midterm review of NDP 7. Issues to be examined will include:*

- appropriate educational strategies and targets for Botswana over the next 15-25 years;
- the balance between different educational sub-sectors;
- appropriateness and quality of educational provision; and
The Role of Donors

Throughout the description of the process of policy formation in Botswana the roles of the donors have been touched on. Donors are not primarily needed to provide financial aid, but rather to provide technical assistance, training, and technical transfer. In many African countries, specific donors play a leading role in developing programs and projects in particular sectors. Botswana is characterized by having an extremely clear policy framework within which donors can effectively coordinate their efforts.

Botswana has consistently maintained a high regard for technical excellence and experience in obtaining advisors and assistants. Further, its own government salary structures and benefits are relatively good, so that professionals from other African countries are often prominent in key ministerial posts. Within the teaching force, many experienced and capable expatriate teachers and headmasters are employed, some with salary additions provided by donors. While Botswana has expanded its teacher training colleges to reduce the proportion of expatriate teachers, this is a gradual process which also enables the best of these teachers to assist in supervisory and curriculum development efforts.

Since independence, the British government, through the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), has provided a large number of senior staff in key positions within the Ministry of Education. The head of the technical educational department, the advisor on secondary school management, the director of the Junior Secondary Teacher Training College, the inspector for technical subjects—all were experienced ODA advisors. ODA also provided travel and gratuities for British teachers who were recruited to teach in Botswana’s secondary schools.

USAID financed two large basic educational programs during the 1980s: the Primary Education Improvement Project and the Junior Secondary Education Improvement Project. Both of these provided a comprehensive package of technical assistance, institutional development, training, and physical infrastructure including a new university department for trainers of teachers, a curriculum center, and 10 regional in-service teacher training centers. In both cases, the assistance was based on achieving specific educational reform objectives and their associated institutional development. These agendas were not always consistent with government priorities and strategies, but on the whole these projects made a major contribution.

The World Bank and the African Development Bank provided the financing and assisted in the development of the management framework for the large-scale building projects. Theirs was an appropriate role, given the technical support provided by the other major donors.

Notable contributions to technical capacity were provided by other bilateral donors: the Swedish International Development Authority, The Commonwealth Fund, and the German government among others financed very high quality technical advisors in fields of non-formal education, educational planning, and technical education.
The really important fact about donor assistance is that it does not operate independently of the clear policy framework provided through the national plans and other policy mechanisms described in this paper. In dialogue with donors, whether bilateral or multilateral, Botswana starts from strong policy framework: technically and politically it offers a comprehensive yet flexible program. When donors try to operate outside that framework they are clearly discouraged. If a donor offers financing for a policy alternative, that must go through a full process of analysis and dialogue before it is accepted.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the period since independence, Botswana has increased its institutional capacity for policy analysis and monitoring. Government has acted to put into place standing bodies and procedures that ensure public and technical reviews of policies and plans. The government also supports innovations in public review of policy, such as the consultative conferences.

Botswana is remarkable for its formal processes of professional and public policy formation and review. The country has recruited and effectively employs high quality, experienced international staff to assist in developing strategies and plans, and it has strong internal policy review committees and councils. Further, it has developed a process of systematically consulting on policy issues at the village, the district, and national levels.

However, with a very high proportion of national resources derived centrally from mining, with a sophisticated and strategic macroeconomic policy, and with a rapidly growing and changing educational system, those at the village level, and those outside the inner circle of government, are, de facto, unable to effectively participate and attain “ownership” in policy development. Yet Botswana’s continued commitment to a democratic policy environment is strong and consistent. Consultation is a process requiring patience and tolerance. The process is often protracted and can easily be abused by people who use it to exert power. Nevertheless, it is a necessary ingredient which ensures that whatever the government does, other points of view are solicited and taken into account. The process has worked fairly well in Botswana. And Botswana will undoubtedly continue to seek means to maintain the process, even when the actors and stakeholders change.
### Key Events in Education Policy Formation in Botswana

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Event</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Sargent Report on Education</td>
<td>This report proved to be the blueprint for colonial government development of education up to 1945.</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td>Chief Bathoen I orders levy in Bangwaketse Reserve</td>
<td>Possibly the first financial contribution of the public to education as a result of the Sargant Report.</td>
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<td>1909</td>
<td>First School Committee in Bangwaketse</td>
<td>Recommended by the Sargant Report.</td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>Board of Advisers on Education established</td>
<td>Recommended by Sargant Report but took three decades to implement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>St. Joseph’s starts secondary school classes</td>
<td>The colonial government resisted the opening of secondary schools because of the availability of secondary education in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.</td>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>Cattle levy approved by the Bangwato to build Moeng College</td>
<td>The colonial government was not prepared to finance secondary education. Tshekedi convinced the people that it had to be a self-help, self-reliance project.</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>South Africa closes its schools to the Batswana</td>
<td>As a result, six tribal secondary schools were initiated in addition to St. Joseph’s and Moeng College.</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>Royal Charter of 1963 establishing the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland</td>
<td>Initial objectives of the university were to have two faculties of arts and science, together with an extension department with resident tutors in each country.</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Brigades Youth Movement initiated by Patrick Van Rensberg</td>
<td>The communities were concerned about young school leavers and dropouts from the formal system who lacked vocational skills for employment. Brigades Training Centers in carpentry, building, farming, etc. were established in selected major villages.</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>The Transitional Plan for Social and Economic Development</td>
<td>The first National Development Plan (NDP) whose aims were to bridge the period of constitutional change and the rudimentary planning mechanisms of the outgoing colonial administration. It set the stage for a more comprehensive national plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Second NDP</td>
<td>This plan emphasized the participation of every citizen in the development of the country including a policy formation process which should start at the grassroots level.</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>Third NDP</td>
<td>Emphasized the need to train Batswana at the higher level—degree and diploma—to enable them to participate fully in policy formation and decision-making. Advocated strengthening secondary education.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>The National Commission on Education set up</td>
<td>By the mid-1970s, it became clear that the whole educational system should be overhauled to meet the emerging needs of the country. Quality and relevant education was demanded by the public.</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td><em>Education for Kagisano</em> - report of National Commission on Education submitted</td>
<td>The commission held consultations with all levels of people in Botswana, as well as visiting several other countries. Their report based on generally accepted consensus.</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Government’s first White Paper, National Policy on Education</td>
<td>This policy was based on the commission’s recommendations, most of which were accepted by the government. Policy prioritized areas of concern and the implementation process.</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>The Department of Curriculum Development and Education established</td>
<td>Recommended by the commission, which expressed a major concern about curriculum relevance starting with primary education. The new department formed subject panels to revise the curriculum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>The Department of Non-Formal Education established</td>
<td>Also recommended by the commission to address the need for out-of-school education including literacy. The National Literacy Council was instituted with widespread representation.</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>The National Commission on Education reconvened to advise on a newly proposed structure for education</td>
<td>Ministry faced difficulty in making changes from 7-3-2 to the transitional structure of 7-2-3 in route to the ultimate goal of a 6-3-3 structure which met the nine years of basic education which the commission recommended by fully implemented by the mid-1990s.</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Primary school fees established</td>
<td>This was the first step toward Universal Primary Education (UPE); the government felt it would be affordable with existing resources.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>New primary educational curriculum introduced</td>
<td>The Department of Curriculum working with subject panels and publishers was able to introduce new syllabi, with textbooks and teachers guides.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Brigade Youth Movement Review working group set up</td>
<td>From the late 1970s, it became clear that the relationship between the ministry and the Brigade Centers was not working. The brigades suffered from poor management and government had no policy on subsidizing training at the centers.</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>New policy on government scholarships for Brigades</td>
<td>After protracted discussions a policy was formulated which was acceptable to all those involved with youth training programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>New policy on Partnership between government and local communities on improving access to nine years of basic education</td>
<td>The commission recommended the absorption of community junior secondary schools in the system, but with management of those schools in the hands of local communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Botswana Education and Human Resources Sector Assessment</td>
<td>Assessment carried out with support of USAID, under the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.</td>
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1986  NDP 6, 1985 - 1991  NDP 6 envisaged a rapid expansion of education, particularly for junior secondary level. The strong economy allowed for this, with the major constraint being manpower and institutional capacity.

1986  Education and Human Resources Sector Update  USAID supported sector assessment update to take account of economic growth and need to focus on teacher training & curriculum changes.

1986  Start of rapid expansion of the junior secondary system  From a base of only a few government-aided JSS in 1985, 131 new schools were built and fully supported by 1990.

1988  Structure of the educational system shifts from 6-3-2 to 6-2-3.  This was the first of a two-step shift to a universal nine-year basic education system.

1989  National and regional education policy dialogues  An innovative approach was used to review with the public and policy makers the directions of the fast changing educational system.

1991  NDP 7, 1991 - 1997  While reaffirming basic policies, NDP 7 calls for a new education commission to examine the next 10-15 years, and to critically re-examine the proposed 6-3-3 structure.
Bibliography


With few experienced educators and unsure of how to proceed at their country's independence in 1961, Tanganyika's new leaders relied on World Bank expertise to develop their education plans. Within a few years, however, the party asserted its own initiative and reversed the earlier priorities. At the beginning of the 1980s, the country's president formed a national commission to assess and guide education policy. By the 1990s, however, the World Bank had once again come to play a central role in education planning and policy-making.

Who sets the education agenda in Tanzania? At first glance, the main questions are straightforward. Who were and are the principal participants in policy-making? Who had the loudest voices? Whose contributions were most influential? Which policy preferences prevailed? How were priorities maintained or revised? What were the responses of those unsuccessful in securing their preferred policies? As is often the case, that first glance is deceptive. These are fundamental questions about how a society is organized and how it makes decisions, which are complex issues in any country. Addressing those questions, therefore, requires a broad and inclusive approach to education.

Unfortunately, much of the conventional wisdom about African education and training rests on analytic foundations that have two major structural weaknesses: inadequate attention to the problems evident in available data and oversimplifications of the policy-making process. The former I have addressed elsewhere (Sarnoff 1992a). On the latter, the complexities and ambiguities of Tanzanian policy-making have in general been a source of resilience and a manifestation of resourcefulness in a very trying setting. Overlapping roles, shared responsibilities, and shifting institutional boundaries are more important than ostensibly clear lines of authority. Oversimplifying the analysis, say by insisting on a definitive answer to the question, Who is in charge here?, makes it impossible to understand the locus of power and the shifting coalitions that characterize Tanzanian policies. Accordingly, it is important to include here brief discussions of the Tanzanian political economy and the content of education reform as the foundation for the review of the changing patterns of education policy-making.

Because education is so central to the social order and to a very widely shared understanding of development, education policy is always fashioned on contested terrain and always manifests the principal features of its political environment. Education policy-making, its terrain, and its environment are the central concerns of this chapter. A study of education policy and planning in contemporary Tanzania is an exploration of the transition from colonial dependence to dependence on foreign assistance; from the proud assertion of a philosophy of education for self-reliance to the swallowed pride of goals reflecting what foreign agencies will support.
Opening the Closed Economy

From the accolades of the Tanzaphilia of the early 1960s through the acerbic critiques and wistful laments of Tanzaphobia two decades later, Tanzania has captured far more attention than its poverty and vulnerability would seem to warrant. For many observers, Tanzania fascinates as well as disappoints. Exciting and inspiring aspirations and occasional successes are easily obscured by the rest of the story. Three decades after its independence, Tanzania is neither socialist, prosperous, clean (the dirt is both material and fiscal), nor self-reliant.

The analyst's challenge has been to comprehend this complex mixture of failure and success. Productivity remains low and officially marketed production is apparently declining alongside the achievement of universal primary education, substantially reduced illiteracy, significantly expanded access to clean water, and increased life expectancy--accomplishments not matched by even the more affluent African countries.

Grappling with these puzzles has become big business on the continental and global scales, supporting many researchers and advisory agencies overseas and a few in Africa. For Tanzania, the contemporary reassessment continues a long-standing debate conducted both within and outside the country. The numerous and diverse debaters have been at times perceptive, insensitive, sympathetic, shrill, systematic, as well as attentive to the unique characteristics of the local setting, but inattentive to evidence, and more. A full review of the confrontations in that contentious arena is, alas, beyond the scope of this discussion.

The end of British rule in 1961 created the possibility for a fundamental economic, political, and social transformation. Yet, as in much of Africa, the end of European rule in Tanzania was not in itself a revolution. The Africanization of political power and administrative office was of course important and dramatic. Perhaps less dramatic but equally or even more important were the maintenance of the basic structure of the Tanzanian economy, the persisting external orientation of production and consumption decisions, and the expanding role of international capital. The transition from British to local rule did not foster a prolonged mass mobilization and participation in an active struggle. Indeed, the major anti-colonial armed conflict in Tanzania had been waged at the beginning of this century. In the mid-twentieth century, rooted in myriad local grievances and led (though that may overstate the power of national leaders to control the direction of events) by a better educated elite, the nationalist party provided a framework for linking elite discontent with mass resistance and for confronting the British. Although it may not have been clear at the time, both the violence against European institutions and authority and the British harassment of nationalists were relatively mild. Successful negotiators, more than victorious guerrillas, orchestrated the assumption of sovereignty.

Having secured power largely non-violently, the new leadership envisioned a similar process of broad social transformation. Its revolutionary character would be manifested in its spirit and in its consequences, not in the blood spilled to achieve it. The positive response to the nationalist movement throughout the country, the apparently rapid collapse of British control, and the sweeping victories in the national elections of the late 1950s encouraged observers both within
and outside Tanzania to blend rhetoric and reality. In fact, organizational and institutional capacities were far more limited than they seemed.

It was only several years after Independence that the national leadership began to make its guiding ideology more concrete. Tanzania's articulated policy orientation is summarized in the term *ujamaa*, a Swahili word literally translated as “familyhood” and generally used to mean “socialism” or “Tanzanian socialism.” The ambiguities in that range of reasonable translations mirror the ambiguities in its meanings.

There have been two distinct sources of socialism in Tanzania. One has been a relatively few socialist militants, or perhaps anticapitalist revolutionary democrats (Thomas 1978), both within and outside the small bourgeoisie. They believed that overcoming poverty required a socialist organization of production, and they initiated and supported cooperative production long before *ujamaa* became an official policy. The second and more visible and politically influential source of attention to socialism has been a defensive radicalism (Ake 1976, 1984). A combination of anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, nationalism, rejection of the extreme inequalities of the capitalist world, and a preference for planned change found expression as socialism. Although their ideology reached to Marxism for its terminology, it was more critical of the bourgeois lifestyle than supportive of socialist construction. To the extent that there was an outlined socialist program, it emphasized nationalization of major economic institutions, planning, equality of income, improved social services, and democratic participation, with intermittent concern for agrarian reform (Cliffe 1978). In other words, a nationalist critique of imperialism, and thus capitalism, led a portion of the leadership to espouse a largely undefined socialism to defend the liberal policies they supported.

The lack of definition was quite purposeful. As Julius Nyerere later pointed out, challenging British rule required a broad national alliance. To have specified that alliance's ideology more precisely would have risked excluding potential and powerful allies and would have assisted the British in their efforts to exploit divisions within the nationalist movement to maintain European control.

The 1960s began with a romantic optimism about development in Tanzania. With the fetters of European rule removed, the imagination and energies of Tanzania's citizens could be unleashed to fashion the new society. Successive political crises jarred that initial optimism: an army mutiny, a sharp drop in the world price for a major export crop (sisal), diplomatic ruptures with England and West Germany, sharp disagreements with the United States, and university students' dramatic protest against conscription into the National Service and more generally against policies aimed at curbing elitism among the small educated elite.

The liberal hope had failed. The liberal development strategy included a relatively open economy, an emphasis on export production to generate foreign exchange, encouragement and support for successful farmers, concentration of resources in pilot projects expected to have a broad impact, an increasing but still limited state role, and the maintenance of friendly relations with the major powers, but it had not produced the desired results and seemed to be moving in
the opposite direction. The analysis of this failure appeared in the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and the series of position papers that followed. Presented in a style accessible to the citizenry, these papers identified the major problem as external dependence. The remedy outlined was to be a commitment to self-reliance in all spheres. There was, finally, a serious effort to define the content and form of Tanzanian socialism, as well as a clearer recognition of the significance of inequalities within Tanzania.

The end of the liberal hope was also marked by a new assertion of party supremacy in various forms. The 1965 Interim Constitution provided for a single party state. Lethargic party branches were rejuvenated, and new party branches were created in work places. In 1968, nine outspoken critics were expelled from the party. There was a limit to tolerable criticism, and when that criticism was in a public forum, the limit did not stretch very far.

The end of the 1960s saw the creation of a new development strategy, with the reduction of external dependence through increased self-reliance at its core. The government’s direct role in the economy was substantially increased. The nationalized companies were organized as parastatal corporations, with directors responsible to the national leadership rather than to stockholders. The open economy was increasingly closed: license and tariff restrictions on imports, controlled foreign exchange transactions, and government partnership for most foreign investors, who were to be limited to specified economic sectors. Individual accumulation and consumption were severely restricted. Cooperatives and socialist villages were encouraged, both rhetorically and through preferential treatment in allocating credit, awarding government and parastatal contracts, and providing technical assistance. Industrialization was to focus on basic industries, those whose products were critical to local agriculture, provided inputs to other basic industries, and sought to meet consumer needs. Indigenization of skilled positions was to be accelerated; where expatriates were needed, they were to be recruited from more diversified sources, especially from socialist and smaller European countries. Foreign policy became more sharply critical of imperialism and international capitalism and more Africa-oriented.

Socialist construction figured more prominently on the political agenda. The Arusha Declaration and related papers sought to provide a clearer specification of the content of Tanzanian socialism. They also marked an effort to weaken the grip of foreign capital and to displace the largely Asian commercial class. There were new encouragements to the formation of socialist villages, both practical and symbolic. Apparently prompted by the coup in Uganda, in 1971 the party issued guidelines that included a strong statement on the central role of workers and a critique of the arrogance and self-aggrandizing behavior of party and other leaders (TANU 1971). An additional set of party resolutions in 1974 (the Musoma Resolutions) addressed elitism among students and led to the acceleration of the achievement of universal primary education and the requirement that university applicants have at least two years of successful work experience and party activity (TANU 1974).

This socialist thrust had its origins in the center. The early 1970s in fact saw a new assertion of central control. Ironically, the policy was termed decentralization. From the perspective of the
national leadership, decentralization was intended to address both too much and too little local autonomy. Local government had become increasingly problematic, both administratively and politically. Some local councils were essentially bankrupt, while others had become rallying points for opposition to national policies. The key decision was to eliminate councils at the district level, effectively undermining what had been the primary elected center of local power. The elimination of cooperatives followed in 1976. Earlier regarded as the appropriate model for introducing socialism to Tanzania's farmers, cooperatives too came to be criticized as inefficient and occasionally corrupt. Like the local councils, they were increasingly dominated by local interests, in this case the larger farmers, resistant to the socialist development strategy.

Decentralization thus meant the assertion of increased central control and direction at the expense of local power bases. It did, however, permit a series of national campaigns, including villagization and adult literacy, and an incipient effort to transform the organization of rural agriculture that surely would have been more difficult to institute, more troublesome to manage, and much slower paced in a setting where local interests had more secure and more legitimate power bases. Yet, as decentralization undermined locally-responsive political institutions it both contributed to increased local disaffection and reduced Tanzania's ability to cope with the crises that were to follow.

The restored optimism of the radical development strategy, eroded by decentralization, was corroded by three dramatic events in the 1970s: a sharp rise in oil prices, severe drought, and at the end of the decade, war with Uganda. For these and other reasons, agricultural production stagnated, foreign reserves were quickly depleted, and industrial expansion slowed, forcing the Tanzanian government to seek extensive foreign assistance.

Still, the late 1970s was a period of apparent economic recovery. The production of key crops improved. That increased output, coupled with a shift from crops intended for export to foodstuffs to be consumed locally, reduced the need for food imports and thus freed some foreign exchange. The recovery in foreign exchange reserves, fueled especially by the sharp rise in world coffee prices, was apparently deemed sufficiently secure to ease import restrictions.

The apparent economic recovery was to prove short-lived. After a few years of more regular rains, drought returned. Marketed agricultural production, still below early 1970s levels, again stagnated. Foreign exchange reserves were again quickly depleted. This time, however, international assistance was far less forthcoming than it had been only a few years earlier. Several external agencies took their cue from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose insistence on sharp cuts in public spending, especially on social services, and on a substantial devaluation, was rejected by the Tanzanian government. Indeed, the disagreements between the IMF and the government of Tanzania were not resolved until 1986, despite devaluations in 1983 and 1984. Although some foreign assistance, especially from the Scandinavian countries, continued to be available, the occasional shortages of consumer goods, and at times of foodstuffs became endemic. Petroleum product imports consumed half the limited foreign exchange available, with severe impacts throughout the economy. It was not until the late 1980s
that the adoption of structural adjustment programs brought a new influx of both foreign capital, and with it, foreign advice.

In sum, influenced by theories of modernization and still heavily reliant on external sources of capital, skills, and technology, independent Tanzania’s leaders initially sought and largely followed foreign development advice. By the mid-1960s, however, their initial optimism had been tempered by frustration. Rapid modernization, social harmony, and international cooperation all seemed in jeopardy.9 On the agenda, but hardly secure, socialist construction proceeded at best spasmodically. Or rather, in practice socialist initiatives and the consolidation of peripheral capitalism co-existed, with neither definitively victorious. Tanzania’s marginal situation in global terms both imposed constraints and created possibilities. Its leaders gained some maneuvering room from the former British administration’s and international capital’s relative disinterest. At the same time, the process of underdevelopment left little foundation—neither a dynamic economic sector with a self-sustaining increase in productivity nor an organized and increasingly self-conscious subordinate class—on which socialism could be built. With what was called the liberalization of the late 1980s, an economy that had never been more than partially closed, was quite open and exposed.

**Education Reform**

*The Setting.* Thus, a combination of optimism and frustration provided the setting for the extensive education reforms since Tanzania’s independence in 1961. In the tension between consolidating peripheral capitalism and organizing a socialist transition, three major political trajectories can be discerned.10 One envisioned a rather more independent state firmly entrenched in a capitalist world system: the consolidation of peripheral capitalism. Tanzania’s mid-1980 economic “liberalization” marks the reinvigoration of this orientation, with renewed attention to the standard of living of the upper strata, greater receptivity to foreign investment and development advice, and a willingness to slow or postpone social transformation. A second political current sought a non-capitalist development strategy (Thomas 1978; Cliffe 1978). Here, the language of socialist construction functions to elaborate a critique of capitalism and to rally support under a nationalist, anticapitalist banner. The task is to transform Tanzanian society without alienating any of the powerful states. The resulting policies alternate between asserting national autonomy and establishing state control over production and distribution on the one hand and placating international capital and providing incentives and rewards for the national elite on the other. A third political orientation asserts unequivocally that societal progress requires social transformation, that the standard of living is a function of the progress of socialist construction.

The three images thus projected—of a peripheral capitalist state, a state in transition, and nascent socialist state—are not simply images, or goals, or even primarily ideologies. They are the products of the contest for the control of state power in independent Tanzania. It is that contest for the control of state power, combined with efforts to maintain the legitimacy of the state and of its dominant classes, that has generated inconsistent educational policies. It is useful, therefore, to characterize those policies in terms of their political roots.
The Agendas. The primary education concerns of the early years of independence were rooted in the creation of a nationalist leadership that was both a protege and a critic of the departing Europeans. Like their predecessors, the new leaders firmly believed that the lack of high level skills was a major obstacle to development goals. With a very small pool of adults who had completed secondary school and an even smaller number of university graduates, Tanganyika had, it seemed, to assign its highest education priority to human resource development, especially at the upper levels. For the new leadership, the political imperative to replace Europeans with Tanzanians reinforced that priority. At the same time, expanded access to school had been a central plank in the nationalist platform. Initial education policy in independent Tanganyika, therefore, emphasized high level skills and more schools (in that order).

In the tension between these two goals, education expansion had different meanings for citizens and leaders. The popular pressure was for access to primary schools, which in the earlier era promised upward social mobility. In the human resource orientation of the national leadership, however, the critical education task was to develop high level skills. Primary school expansion would come later. Hence, although many new schools were opened and the enrollment increased rapidly, after an initial spurt, school expansion roughly matched the growth of the population. By 1973, still fewer than half the school age children were attending school (TANU 1974, 106).

As the developmental nationalism of the early 1960s was succeeded by the radical populism of the late 1960s, education goals were modified. Education was no longer to be considered an elite privilege or even primarily an investment in human capital. Rather, education was to be a fundamental right of citizenship (Nyerere 1985, 45, 52). These two themes—that education was a basic right of all citizens and that effective popular participation required literate citizens—reflected a revised education agenda. The development of high level skills remained important, but providing a basic education to all Tanzanian citizens and developing adult literacy were now also high priorities.

Notwithstanding the terminology of underdevelopment and dependence it frequently employed, the leadership’s conception of development continued to reflect a sense of development-as-modernization and of education as an investment in human capital. That is, there persisted a deep-seated and powerful understanding of education as a vehicle for transmitting to the new generation the skills deemed necessary for economic growth. The logic seemed clear. If a critical obstacle to development is the shortage of skills and if skills are essentially the property of individuals, then it makes sense to expect schools to have training as their core mission, to organize schooling around a progressively more demanding selection of the most skilled students, and to assess both programs and individuals in those terms.

Not infrequently, the persistence of this understanding has undermined educational reform efforts. Indeed, efforts to define education for Tanzanian socialism are continually evaluated in terms of education-for-modernization. Advocates of education as the development of human potential, of schools as the breeders of cooperative and collectivist self-reliance, and of the
closer integration of schools and their communities have all been assailed for proposing deviations from the ostensibly objective process of training and selection-by-individual-achievement that is assumed to be essential. The importance of non-cognitive school activities is debated in many countries. In Tanzania, however, that debate is not simply about educational priorities. Rather, it has to do with the specification of the political agenda. Although socialism remains on that agenda, modernization has dominated the practice, but not completely.

A fundamental premise underlying national policy over Tanzania's first two decades of independence was that social transformation must precede economic growth. The modernizationists assume that the reduction of inequalities and the expansion of participation can in general be accomplished only at the cost of economic growth. From that perspective they argue that addressing inequality and encouraging participation must wait until after the initial economic growth, or, at best, that social transformation may occur as a by-product of growth strategies. Notwithstanding disagreements over direction within it, however, at least through the mid-1980s the Tanzanian leadership maintained its sense that remaking society must precede, or perhaps accompany, rather than follow economic growth. Unlike the modernizationists, their assumption is that social transformation is required to promote political participation which in turn is a prerequisite for economic growth.

In part, education policy has reflected the tension between these two pressures. On the one hand, understanding social transformation as the foundation for economic growth calls for schools that organize learning around principles of equality and participation, that reduce the gap between the rewards attached to intellectual and manual work, and that develop close ties with their communities. On the other hand, the emphasis on academic mastery and individual achievement in the schools manifests the deeply embedded and persisting expectation that economic growth requires skills more than participation and equality.12

By the late 1960s and early 1970s there had also begun to emerge a more explicitly socialist agenda for education (Hirji 1973; Mbilinyi 1972, 1973a, 1973b). In part, the socialists argued that expanded access, community schools, and adult literacy would change little if the reward structure continued to favor academic achievement and individual success. To achieve equality and democracy required not only universal education but also specific attention to the role of education in reaching the educationally (and politically) most disadvantaged parts of the population. Education, therefore, had to become a vehicle for mobilization, for class organization, and for constraining elites.

By the end of the 1970s the progress was impressive. Essentially all Tanzanian children could find a place in school. Literacy was widespread. That progress, however, had at best lukewarm support from many education administrators, who criticized spreading limited resources so thinly and who pointed to the apparently declining quality of education. The renewed assertiveness of the technical-managerial perspective on Tanzanian development of the early 1980s was accompanied, therefore, by an effort to refocus the education agenda on academic achievement and vocational training. Human resource development, with some effort to respond to popular pressure by permitting school expansion and by assuring employment for at least
some school graduates, had again become the order of the day. The education agenda of the bureaucratic governing class and its allies seemed, at least for the moment, to have swamped the socialist initiative.

The Trajectory. Since it is not possible here to discuss each of the many educational reforms in Tanzania over the three decades of independence, it is useful here to outline their salient elements and to suggest a rough periodization. (See the Chronology of Education and its Context in Tanzania at the end of the chapter for a sequential presentation.) Each of the major education policy initiatives was prompted by a sense that Tanzania’s schools were not adequately serving their development tasks, and, to varying degrees, all have been implemented. Thus, although burdened by the institutional legacies of European rule and operating in an external environment that was simultaneously hostile to major national policies and supportive of many educational reforms, Tanzanians would conduct their revolution by education. In the view of President Nyerere, socialism—the declared national goal—was a state of mind. To achieve the transformation of individual consciousness that socialist construction required and to prepare its architects and work crews, radical education reforms were essential. Hence, the reforms noted here were both responses to specific problems within the educational system and at the same time basic elements of a broad strategy of socialist transition.

Schools in Tanzania are expected to accomplish the tasks assigned to schools everywhere: teaching young people to read, write, and manipulate numbers; instilling the discipline of social order and of workplace routine; inculcating a sense of pride in the nation, the people, and their history; and for a select group of students, developing their imagination, creativity, and ingenuity as far as possible. Since independence, however, developing skills has been considered schools’ most important task, reflecting the initial focus on education for modernization.

As I have noted, the expansion of the skills pool is deemed necessary to achieve economic growth and thus to improve the standard of living. As well, an expanded skills pool is presumed necessary to assert public control over and manage large scale economic enterprises and to staff the civil service of a government committed to planning, to regulating the economy, and to providing extensive public services. School-based training is also expected to improve the employability of the youth and to reduce the need for, and the length of, post-school training programs. During this early period, it was possible for planners both to project future human resource requirements with a high degree of precision and to organize both selection policies and curriculum content to reflect the dominant orientation, then called manpower planning.

By the mid-1960s, however, in both development strategy and education policy expectations had not been fulfilled. The flow of events highlighted the inadequacies of the modernization perspective. Among the 1967 policy papers that addressed these problems was Education for Self Reliance, which offered a broad indictment of Tanzanian education and announced several major reforms. The principal goal was to reduce dependence by promoting education for self reliance, the orientation that was to prevail from 1968 until the mid-1970s.
Primary schooling was to provide a basic education: a shift from emphasis on the preparation of those few students who would advance to postprimary institutions—an arrangement in which a majority of those enrolled failed—to a curriculum primarily intended to equip young Tanzanians for adult roles. School-based productive projects were to integrate each school more fully into its local community, to involve the educated elite in manual labor, and to provide some resources to support the school. Since their education was provided from the public treasury, higher level students had a national obligation to perform community service. In short, schools were to be development institutions, oriented toward national needs and goals. Although major education resources were still be devoted to high level skills development, the school system as a whole was expected to upgrade the competencies of the entire populace, to promote a broader sense of community, to nurture attitudes of cooperation and patterns of collective effort, and to foster a sense of self-confidence. For Tanzania to become self-reliant, its schools had to construct the foundation.

The 1967 policy papers also indicated an increasing concern with the apparent intensification of social differentiation. What had been assumed to have been an egalitarian social order began to show the marks of stratification. A second goal for schooling, therefore, was to reduce social inequality. Education was expected to contribute to this goal, most directly by reducing inherited inequalities in recruitment to high level positions. The education sector was also expected to reduce inequalities by affirmative action: special allocations to districts and regions deemed to be disadvantaged, preferential selection and promotion, and increased rewards for manual labor and community service.

As the elaboration of Tanzanian socialism proceeded into the 1970s, the leadership recognized that an expanded skills pool, a literate citizenry, and reduced political dependence provided a necessary but far from sufficient base for creating and then managing the egalitarian, non-exploitive society that was envisioned. To overcome peripheral capitalist underdevelopment required socialist construction.

Schooling was to become education for Tanzanian socialism, an orientation that influenced education planning until the end of the decade. The task was to lay the foundation for expanded citizen participation and democratic practice. Citizens had to learn not only how to manage their local councils and cooperatives, but beyond that, how to govern. If public institutions were to be accountable to the populace, people had to be taught to expect accountability, to routinize it, and to protect it from both attack and erosion. Especially after the decision to accelerate the achievement of universal primary education, the schools seemed the obvious site for this sort of education practice.

Of these three major education policy directions—modernization (human resource development), self-reliance, and Tanzanian socialism—the last has been the least well analyzed, articulated, and elaborated. In part, that is because many policymakers presume the three policy goals to be sequential. Greater self-reliance depends on successfully meeting skills needs. Nurturing a mobilized citizenry and maintaining participatory political institutions in turn is
assumed to depend on both generating needed skills and achieving significant self-reliance. From this perspective, it was straightforward to conclude that assigning the highest priority to skills development required delaying attention to politicization and popular mobilization.

The continuing economic crises of the 1980s transformed education for Tanzanian socialism into education for survival. For educators, the challenge was simply to maintain the education system in the face of increasing demand, decreasing resources, and a perceived decline in quality. As the government focused its attention on achieving universal primary education, the expansion of public secondary and higher education was effectively frozen. Even the energetic adult educational program began to lose momentum and direction.

Structural adjustment and renewed foreign support in the late 1980s nurtured entrepreneurial education. In Tanzania's unique setting, entrepreneurship was often as much public as private. At the center, education planners talked less about initiating new programs and more about marketing projects. Their challenge was to understand the preferences of the foreign assistance agencies and then to use that knowledge to tailor specific projects that would attract external funding. In the regions, local communities scrambled to create private (that is, nongovernmental) secondary schools. Responding to that pressure, the government developed plans to double its own secondary schools. A substantial portion of the cost of university education was shifted from the public treasury to students and their families.

Throughout, the priority assigned to skills development and to schools as recruitment filters for most of the wage labor force reflects the persistence of understanding development as modernization rather than social transformation, and of the political dominance of the modernizers over the socialists. Indeed, the tension between these orientations and the regular reassertion of modernization as the dominant perspective have been enduring features of Tanzanian education policy.

The Issue Areas. As I have suggested, education reform in Tanzania has been frequent and extensive. The large number of reforms adopted, and for the most part implemented, cluster into three major issue areas: expansion of schooling, revision of the curriculum, and transforming the relationship between schools and society.

1. Educational Expansion. Much of the resources and human energy allocated to education in Tanzania have been directed toward expansion. As I have noted, expansion has been regarded both as a widespread popular demand and as an independence promise of the nationalist movement. Expansion is considered critical to self-reliant economic growth, to the political mobilization of the citizenry, and to establishing and maintaining a democratic political order. In addition to these collective concerns, expansion is widely perceived by individual Tanzanians as the critical requisite for improving their access to jobs, power, wealth, and prestige.

Expansion of access to schooling has followed several paths. The elimination of the Standard IV examination, first in urban schools and then nationwide, permitted those who found places in primary school to remain in school throughout the primary cycle. Similarly, the elimination
of the Form 2 examination made secondary school a four-year program for those selected. The nationalization of all private primary schools at the end of the 1960s and then the achievement of universal primary education by the late 1970s made basic education available to all young Tanzanians. Although the policy contours have been somewhat erratic, tolerance for and periodically encouragement of private (that is, non-governmental) secondary schools had by the mid-1980s doubled secondary enrollment. Adult literacy programs, whose emphases and forms in part mirrored the changing priorities in education policy more generally, have reached widely across the society, reducing illiteracy from an estimated 67 percent in 1967 to 10 percent in 1986.

In addition to the logic that relates schooling to development, the role of schools as a prominent social service has fueled this expansion. Experiences throughout Africa underlined the fragility of postcolonial political institutions. New leaders needed to provide visible and rapid benefits to the populace. Although they might lack trained teachers, curriculum materials, and even stationery, there could be new schools nearly everywhere in a relatively short period, especially when local communities were willing to donate materials and labor. Even the most rural areas could see the fruits of the new order. Providing clean water, rural medical facilities, paved roads, electrification, or functioning agricultural extension centers was likely to take much longer. Hence, rapid expansion of schooling was commonly understood—by both leaders and the mass public—as a central element in the legitimization of the new government, and of the structure of the state itself.

2. Curriculum Reform. Over the 30 years of Tanzanian independence there have been successive curricular reforms. Syllabi and texts have been nationalized, with continuing attention to studying Tanzania, East Africa, Africa, and the Third World from a Tanzanian perspective. Kiswahili became the language of instruction in primary schools (with the indirect consequence of effectively eliminating expatriate teachers from those schools). Setting and marking national examinations is now done within Tanzania. Political education has been introduced at all levels.

There have also been efforts to shape the curriculum to nurture the world view, values, orientation, and style deemed appropriate for the new Tanzanian: inquiring and self-reliant, an active participant in community affairs with a preference for cooperative and collective activity, and concerned more with public service than with individual rewards. The introduction of basic education—primary schooling to be available to all young Tanzanians and to be complete in itself—brought a more rural and community-oriented focus to the curriculum. It seeks to demystify expertise, or rather, reject the disjunction between mental and manual labor. The evidence here, largely impressionistic, is mixed. On the one hand, some young Tanzanians do finish their schooling with a sense of political direction, an orientation toward public service, and a degree of confidence in themselves and their society. On the other hand, many do not. Teacher-student relationships, classroom organization, and approved patterns of student behavior reflect the focus on skills development (schools as places where knowledge is transmitted, students are processed, and graduates are produced) far more than they incorporate the practices
of education for liberation (schools as sites of critical consciousness, learner-centered dialogues, and cooperative communal initiatives) (Hirji 1973; Mbilinyi 1977, 1979).

Although there are now productive projects at all schools, initially intended to develop skills, institutionalize the school-community links, and offset some school operating costs, the results are mixed (Adams 1982; Baume 1983). Not infrequently, the children labor and the teachers supervise. Systematic attention to agricultural strategies is minimal; farming practices tend to be those of the surrounding community. Since additional work in the fields continues to be used as a sanction for school infractions, and since students come to school in part to escape the farm, everyone tries to avoid manual work. Additions to the school treasury are modest, occasionally disappearing entirely before they can be spent on the school. There are striking exceptions. Some secondary schools function as quasi-autonomous villages, generating sufficient funds to support capital improvements.

These reforms of education content have moved toward several divergent goals simultaneously. Like the other dimensions of the education system, they are themselves contradictory, and they reflect tensions in the larger political system. One push is toward localization and nationalization. At the same time, external expertise is valued more highly than knowledge developed locally. Both academic programs and individual results require periodic external certification. A second push is toward reducing the psychic gap between mental and manual activities. Clearly, however, intellectual labor is rewarded more highly, a pattern unlikely to affirm to youth that farming is a valued endeavor or to encourage them to look forward to life in the village. A third push is toward closer links between schools and their communities. That, too, is undermined by the fundamental assumptions that schools are primarily for developing knowledge and expertise, that knowledge and expertise are qualitatively different and necessarily detached from farming and other productive activities, that knowledge and expertise are fundamentally properties of individuals, not collectivities, and that, therefore, the isolation of the schools serves both students and communities well.

3. Education and Society. A major challenge to the integration of schools into their communities has been the difficulty in combining rapid educational expansion with the commitment to reducing inequalities, usually expressed in regional terms. Both school fees and private primary schools expanded educational opportunities in the relatively affluent regions (the cities and those rural areas where farmers produced a high-value export crop). The elimination of school fees and the nationalization of private primary schools was, therefore, expected to narrow the gap between more and less affluent regions. The achievement of universal primary education further reduced differentiation at the primary level. By then, however, the terrain had already begun to shift. Inequalities in the number of primary schools were succeeded by unevenness in the distribution of high-quality primary education. And the struggle to expand access moved from the primary to the postprimary level (for details on a striking case in point, see Samoff 1987a). At the same time, the rate of school expansion overwhelmed available funds, leading to a restoration of school fees.16
Successive efforts to reduce university students’ elitism through curriculum modification seemed to leave students’ sense of their unique status and their expectation of privileges largely unchanged. Consequently, the focus of those efforts was broadened to include preuniversity selection and preparation. Party policy adopted in the early 1970s required university applicants to present evidence of two years’ successful productive and party activity along with their grades. The expectation was that sending students to work between secondary school and the university, largely in their home villages, would reduce their alienation from family and community. Ultimately, however, other concerns prevailed. When the enrollment of women at the university plummeted precipitously, the two years’ work requirement was waived for female secondary students. Apparent shortages of qualified applicants led to similar waivers for students in geography and subsequently engineering. Eventually academic schooling proved more powerful than education for social transformation. At the urging of university faculty and education administrators more generally, the government and party accepted the recommendation of the Presidential Commission on Education to abolish the work requirement for university admission.

As Nyerere has repeatedly stressed, Tanzanian development could not await the education of a new generation. Education had to focus on adults as well as children. Literate farmers were expected to adopt new agricultural practices more readily and to apply inputs more effectively. As well, literacy was deemed necessary for effective citizen participation. Since the late 1960s, adult literacy programs have played a major role in Tanzanian education policy (Hall 1975; Hinzen and Hunsdorfer 1979, Chapter 5; Kassam 1978). An initial pilot functional literacy program in the UNESCO pattern was rapidly expanded, with impressive results (Malya 1979).

Literacy programs were expected to be community-based and to have substantial party involvement. Local adult educational coordinators were deployed throughout the country and funds were allocated for village libraries. Folk Development Colleges (FDCs), in part modeled on the Scandinavian pattern and largely installed in what had previously been agricultural training institutes, were created to provide postliteracy-program learning centers (Mosha 1982, 1983; Unsicker 1987). FDC students were to become village animators, energizing opportunities for villagers to use their newly developed literacy. Yet, although the language of Paulo Freire’s education for critical consciousness was occasionally employed, the literacy campaigns were not organized as efforts at political mobilization. Here, too, modernization prevailed over social transformation. As a consequence, newly literate peasants did not become an organized political base for establishing and extending their incorporation into the political system, or perhaps even for protecting the FDCs and maintaining them as institutions primarily responsive to village needs and interests.

Ironically, defending expanded education largely in terms of the need for skills has reinforced the public’s expectation that schooling is the primary route to an improved individual (and thus family) standard of living. That in turn has intensified the frustration of the young people who complete their basic education with little prospect for employment other than returning to the family farm. The skills focus has also reinforced credentialism—employers’ demand for increasingly higher level certification—in the work place (Dore 1976).
The skills focus for education in general, public and private concern with unfulfilled employment aspirations of primary school completers, and diploma-driven employment practices combined to create pressure for increased vocationalization in schools at all levels. Educated unemployment could be addressed by more relevant education. Within a brief period all secondary schools were required to create vocational specializations for all students, modifying their curriculum accordingly.\textsuperscript{17} The expectations were that students who completed secondary school would make better farmers (agriculture is by far the largest specialization) and that little or no postsecondary vocational training would be required for urban sector employment. The initial results have been disappointing (Psacharopoulos and Loxley 1985), though perhaps predictable.

At least in the early years, vocational education in what the leadership and the populace expected to remain largely academic secondary schools was limited, often perfunctory. Like their parents, students regarded schooling as the route off the farm, not back to it. In practice, students' secondary school preferences and official placements were little influenced by the vocational biases. That the vocationalization of the secondary schools did not reduce unemployment among their graduates is not surprising. The unattractiveness of farming had largely to do with the unavailability of start-up capital and tools and in some areas land, producer prices, expected long-term returns from agriculture, and the apparent sparkle of urban areas, not with the lack of requisite skills. Unemployment too had more to do with the relatively slow rate of job creation than with the youth's skills. Notwithstanding the disappointing results,\textsuperscript{18} vocationalized schooling is attractive to educators and the public and is likely to continue. "Irrelevant education" is, after all, a comfortable explanation for educated unemployment and its accompanying social dislocation. The remedy appears feasible and need not be politically disruptive. Transforming rural agriculture, accelerating job creation, reducing urban-rural differentiation, and politically educating young people all seem much less manageable and much more politically threatening. Vocationalization is now implemented in all secondary schools throughout the country and has begun to develop a momentum of its own.

Making Education Policy

Setting the National Education Agenda

Over the past three decades the principal mechanism for setting the national education agenda in Tanzania has changed. It is useful here to associate the several different strategies that have been employed with the policy emphasis and periodization outlined above.

\textit{Manpower planning/education for modernization (Independence-1967).} Tanzania's first two national development—and thereby education—plans relied heavily on foreign expertise. The first, prepared quickly during Tanganyika's transition from a United Nations Trust Territory to an independent state, depended almost entirely on the work of a team commissioned by the World Bank. By the time of the second (as the first of the independence era it was termed the
First Five-Year Development Plan) the principal foreign experts were employed by the Tanzanian government.\textsuperscript{19}

Guiding the agenda for education was:

\textit{an early commitment to systematic manpower planning. The first plan included as one of its major objectives the achievement of self-sufficiency in high level manpower by 1980, starting from a situation of extreme scarcity of trained local manpower, the result of the deplorable neglect of higher education during the colonial period. The plan, therefore, emphasized expansion in secondary and in higher educational facilities, according to a pattern which would generate the required manpower while avoiding the creation of excess capacity in such expensive facilities. (van Arkadie 1969, 33)}

Detailed projections of needed skills were to guide selection, promotion, and curriculum policies. The development of higher level skills was the principal priority. Equality, equity, and the content and direction of social transformation would have to be addressed later.

\textit{Manpower planning resulted in a significant advance towards the creation of an educational system tailored to the needs of the society. During the first plan the urgent task was to expand and to match the professional balance of the educational programme to planned manpower requirements, rather than to change the social content of the curriculum. One price of such development throughout Africa has been the expansion of a secondary and university system copied from the colonial model, which in turn had many characteristics of the British higher educational system. (van Arkadie 1969, 34)}

Modifications of the content of primary and secondary education were to be similarly guided by notions of skills development and vocational preparation.

\textit{Education for self-reliance (1968-1974). Within a few years, the national leadership found this agenda intolerable. Although many new schools had been built, still less than half the primary school age population was in school. University students—the elite toward whom the entire system was oriented—marched to the State House in 1966 to protest the required national service. The broad response was the Arusha Declaration of 1967, a dramatic statement of new policy directions. For education, the new agenda was outlined in \textit{Education for Self Reliance}, Nyerere’s analysis of what was wrong with the current system and his vision of what it could and should be. There had been important progress, Nyerere noted. Racial discrimination within education was eliminated. Educational facilities expanded rapidly. And much of the curriculum had been Tanzanianized. At the same time, Nyerere argued, the central focus of the education system served poorly Tanzania as a whole:}

\textit{the most central thing about the education we are at present providing is that it is basically an elitist education designed to meet the interests and needs of a very small proportion of those who enter the school system. (Nyerere 1987, 56)}
As they educated that elite, schools divorced students from their communities and society and instilled the notion that the most valuable knowledge came from books and experts.

The new education agenda was to be organized around education for self-reliance. Instead of the earlier heavy focus on higher level skills, Tanzanian education was now to emphasize basic education—a program complete in itself that would equip young people to function effectively as productive adults and citizens in their communities—and adult literacy.

**Education for socialism (1974-1980).** The Arusha Declaration and Education for Self-Reliance marked the assertion of a national initiative in the late 1960s and in particular the guiding vision of Julius Nyerere himself. That effort to specify an educational agenda and to organize a system of formal and non-formal education that were distinctly Tanzanian was consolidated and reinforced by another set of party resolutions issued in the mid-1970s (TANU 1974). Meeting in Musoma in 1974, the party leadership called for a general mobilization to accelerate the achievement of universal primary education (UPE). Earlier plans expected UPE to be reached in 1989. However, Tanzania’s leadership was impatient to respond to mass demand for expanded access. Every child between the ages of 7 and 13 was to be enrolled by 1977, they declared. The result was nearly to double the primary school intake in a few years. The timing was especially inopportune, since a crash expansion program had to be mounted in the midst of an economic crisis. At the same meeting the party leadership sought to reduce elitism by requiring two years’ practical experience, along with one year of national service, prior to university admission.

Both of these major policy initiatives were generally opposed by professional educators. Accelerated universal primary education, they argued, would overextend the ability of the education system to provide sufficient trained teachers, curriculum materials, textbooks, chairs and desks. The quality of education would surely decline, they insisted. Many educators also foresaw what they described as declining quality at the university. During the transitional period, since the students who had most recently completed secondary school could not be admitted to the university for two years, new university students would have to be selected from among those who had been rejected earlier. Over the longer-term, at least some and perhaps many of the most competent students would be unwilling to delay their university education and would seek other opportunities, either within or outside the country. From the party’s perspective, however, elitism could not be permitted to masquerade as quality. To enable all young Tanzanians to go to school was to raise the quality of education, not reduce it. At the university level as well, quality was to be measured by the content and character of the entire educational experience, not simply examination results.

**Education for survival (1980-1986).** The effective achievement of universal primary education shifted the focus to the next level. The corollary of expanded primary education was tight restriction on the expansion of secondary schools, whose intake was to be increased only when that could be justified in terms of needed higher level skills. As the educational pyramid widened at the bottom, the bottleneck at the top became more acutely painful and visible. At independence more than a third of those who completed primary school in Tanzania were
admitted to government secondary schools. By the early 1980s that figure had fallen below 3 percent. Not surprisingly, popular demand for more secondary schools intensified.

Strikingly successful in accelerating the pace of universalizing primary education but troubled by a sense of malaise and crisis in education at the beginning of the 1980s, Tanzania’s president appointed a national commission to provide assessment and guidance. Individuals with significant political offices or constituencies constituted its membership. Educators composed its professional staff. The commission was responsible to the president, and through him to the Cabinet and National Assembly on the one hand and to the party and its National Executive Committee (NEC) on the other. After an extensive national tour, numerous public and private hearings, and a mountain of commissioned and unsolicited documents over two years, the Presidential Commission on Education offered analyses, projections, and recommendations. Its vision, *Education in Tanzania: Toward the Year 2000*, which was publicly released and then abruptly withdrawn, initiated a national debate (Tanzania 1982). Two more years of deliberation, especially within the NEC, were to pass before a new national education policy could be formally announced (Tanzania 1984).

The interests and issues reached across the political and educational spectrums. Most controversial, apparently, were proposals to restructure the schooling cycle (rejected), impose secondary school fees (approved), and eliminate the practical experience requirement for university admission (approved). The chain of policy-making is striking. The commission was initiated by the president, clearly responding to public discontent. Dominated by national figures who were also responsive to their political constituencies, the commission considered nothing sacred and eventually presented a set of recommendations that emphasized consolidation and expansion over equality and socialist construction. Having played a limited direct role during the commission’s hearings and deliberations, professional educators focused their energies on deliberations within government, especially the Cabinet. That is, rather than directly attacking the recommendations they opposed within the commission itself, senior educational decision-makers sought to influence the outcome by structuring the debate, providing the critical information, and guiding the discussion among those who would make the final decisions. And as has been the pattern in Tanzania, reaching consensus, or at least a generally acceptable decision, was deemed more important than rapid action.

The decade began with an effort to retrench and consolidate education and to address popular critiques through an inclusive and legitimate policy-making process. Many voices were heard. The victory of what was termed the social demand approach to educational expansion over the primary focus on human resource development was clearly and formally announced by the presidential commission. At the same time, the presidential commission reflected movement away from Nyerere’s vision and back toward a more technical view of education. Its recommendations reflect a mid-point between the strong assertion of local initiative in the late 1960s and the localization of external advice in the 1990s. Those recommendations were developed and presented in terms of attention to the (academic) quality of education, its costs, and its training roles, rather than in terms of education for socialist construction, or redistribution, or equality. The policy thrust preferred by the professional educators—including
fees for government secondary schools, doubling the number of those schools, and encouraging private educational institutions—prevailed over the objections of those concerned that charging fees for admission to the key recruitment mechanism and leaving much of its development in private hands were inconsistent with basic egalitarianism, democratic participation, and socialism.

As the decade unfolded, education consolidation foundered on financial crisis. Education decision-makers and administrators were simply overwhelmed by the magnitude of the gap between what they were expected to accomplish and what seemed possible. To plan is to choose, Nyerere insisted. But he also reminded Tanzanians that beggars cannot be choosers. Survival, which meant simply keeping the schools functioning, became the order of the day.

**Entrepreneurial education (1987-present).** After a period of disagreement, confrontation, and acrimony, Tanzania and the IMF agreed in August 1986, on a set of policies. That reconciliation was followed by significantly increased foreign assistance and with it, forceful advice on what was to be done. Because that advice was sometimes firmly attached to the external funding, it proved difficult to ignore or reject.

During the 1980s, expanding demand and inadequate resources led to ever greater reliance on external funding. That in turn meant that education planning increasingly took the form of marketing projects to external assistance agencies and that those agencies became more influential voices in setting the educational agenda. Recourse to foreign funding had become a way of life for Tanzania’s educators. Planning came to be seen as marketing. What is the purpose of a donors’ conference, I asked at the beginning of the 1990s? That’s when we put together a large number of projects that we try to market to all of the foreign agencies, I was told. Over time priorities were set less by government and party leaders and more by what foreign governments and their aid organizations were willing to finance. The power brokers in education had once been those who could put together coalitions of people influential in Tanzania’s public and private life. Now they were more likely to be those who were most successful in securing foreign funding, those who seemed to have the easiest access to embassies in Dar es Salaam, and institutional headquarters in London, Washington, Stockholm, Paris, and elsewhere.

It is important to note this orientation—marketing projects to prospective sponsors—permits Tanzanian educators to retain some autonomy and control, both within the country and outside it. During the period of greatest financial distress and unrelenting pressure to adopt structural adjustment measures, the percentage of government funds allocated to education apparently did not decline, and the general priority for basic education and adult literacy was maintained.

A decade after the appointment of the Presidential Commission on Education, changed circumstances and the increasing role of Nyerere’s successor in both government and party called for a new review of the national education agenda. This time, however, the national commission was appointed by the education ministry, not the president. Its members are primarily academics and educators, not political leaders. It reports to the education minister, not
the parliament and party. Its own work—that is, outlining the direction for Tanzanian education into the next century—is dependent on foreign assistance. And the way it specifies the important issues, the constructs it employs, and the data gathering and analytic strategies it favors all reflect the influence of the World Bank, now the most prominent education research institution in the world.

The transition is striking. From the World Bank to the World Bank. At Tanzania’s independence, expatriates commissioned by the World Bank effectively set the initial education agenda. By the end of the 1960s, the president and the party had seized the initiative. Reversing the education priorities, they insisted on emphasizing primary and adult education over postprimary education oriented around the development of higher level skills. Reinforcing that commitment, the party in the 1970s stressed education’s role in reducing inequality and promoting socialism. In the 1980s the center of gravity shifted somewhat, manifested in a national commission appointed by the president and responsible to both parliament and party. By the early 1990s the situation had changed. The technicians and administrators were once again in charge. And the World Bank once again had a powerful and influential voice. So pervasive and persistent is that influence, some senior Tanzanian educators argue, that Tanzania’s education agenda has been hijacked.

Education Policymakers

Education policy-making and implementation in Tanzania manifest conflicting, at times incompatible, policy styles (Hyden 1979, 1984). Efforts to plan, to accomplish major changes rapidly, to maintain central control, and to encourage local participation are all in tension with each other. Indeed, the attempt to fashion a non-capitalist state may have left Tanzania with some of the least desirable characteristics of each of the systems used as models.

Although decision-making is often described in a clear schematic form with interconnected but distinct categories of responsibility, authority, and decision-makers, actual practice is never as neat and tidy. Policy-making is always a negotiation, or more commonly a set of related and overlapping negotiations, conducted on contested terrain. Decision-makers in official positions set some, but clearly not all, public policies. It is useful, therefore, to characterize education policy making in Tanzania in terms of poles of influence that are simultaneously independent and interdependent.

Formal Authority. At first glance, education policy-making in Tanzania is quite straightforward. As in much of the world, a ministry of education (since 1990, two ministries: the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology) implements policies approved by the National Assembly. Within those ministries, separate departments oversee the different levels and components of the education system. The key civil servants are the principal secretaries and the commissioner of education. The Department of Educational Planning is both powerful and somewhat misnamed, since much of its effort is focused on project implementation and the management of foreign assistance. The Secretariat of the Unified Teaching Service and the National Commission of UNESCO have
been located within the ministries of education. Somewhat more loosely connected to the ministries of education, with varying degrees of autonomy, are six parastatals: the Institute of Education (curriculum development), the Institute of Adult Education, the National Examination Council, the University of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzania Library Service, and Tanzania Elimu Supplies (procurement and distribution of equipment and materials).

Since the early 1980s the administration of primary and adult education has been decentralized to the regions and through them to the districts and wards. In this scheme, the Regional Education Officers have extensive authority. Several other institutions in Tanzania operate education programs. The Ministry of Agriculture, for example, has primary responsibility for farmers training courses. The ministry responsible for community development (currently, the Ministry for Community Development, Women, and Children) has always organized community focused short courses and has recently assumed responsibility for the national network of Folk Development Colleges, originally conceived as the sites for the continuing education of adults who have completed the basic literacy course but increasingly serving those who have completed primary school. The Ministry of Labor and the national trade union organization undertake workers’ education programs. The party operates a national college and four zonal satellites. A study in 1988 identified 435 separate training institutions in Tanzania.

Although the rhetoric always distinguishes between making and implementing policy, nowhere does that asserted separation accurately characterize what actually occurs. Both large and small scale policies are defined in the process of implementation. The successive policies of discouraging and encouraging the creation of private secondary schools, for example, were defined in practice by the willingness of Ministry of Education officials to register new schools and tolerate the operation of unregistered schools. While the senior officials of the Ministry of Education played a supportive role during the canvas and deliberations of the Presidential Commission on Education, they argued their own agenda energetically and apparently effectively once the commission’s recommendations reached the Cabinet.

It is widely assumed in Tanzania, by people across the political spectrum, that decision-making ought to be centralized. For the modernizationists, avoiding the divisive demands of region, religion, and ethnicity, and rationalizing and maximizing scarce resources require that planning be dominated by an even more scarce resource, expertise. To this perspective the socialists add a concern with redistribution, which is unlikely to occur in the absence of strong central authority. Consequently, notwithstanding the rhetoric of participation and bottom-up planning, public policy in general, and especially in education policy, has been highly centralized. Precisely because expertise is scarce, however, and because communication channels are often circuitous and unreliable, the degree of centralization in policy-making exceeds central capacities to make policies. Pronouncements proliferate, but follow-up, evaluation, and adjustment are weak, driven more by crises than by systematic monitoring.

At the same time, at least some leaders are seriously committed to popular participation. There have been several waves of institutional reform, all intended to increase the leverage of local citizens in specifying goals, programs, and practice. For example, every school is required to
have an advisory board or committee composed largely of parents and community residents. More than in many other African countries, Tanzanians speak out on policies that concern them and are able to influence both the policies and their implementation. Indeed, in important respects, centralization in Tanzania requires local participation. Although there has legally been one political party since 1965, and despite occasional heavy-handed exercises of central authority, Tanzania is not a totalitarian state. Even were that the leaders' intention, the infrastructure could not support the nation-wide imposition of an authoritarian order. To secure compliance with central directives, therefore, the Tanzanian government requires popular support. The existence and intensity of that popular support are in turn dependent on popular participation. Hence, effective centralization is necessarily a function of effective local participation which is necessarily often corrosive of central direction. This tension between central direction and local autonomy is neither avoidable nor ephemeral. Neither prevails definitively, and each limits the other. The formally centralized policy process adopted in Tanzania regularly collides with limited managerial and communication capabilities. At the same time, within a hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative structure, to encourage local participation by asserting that key decisions will be initiated and made locally must eventually generate frustration, opposition, and cynicism.

Put somewhat differently, institutional forms designed for a highly politicized setting, where informed and politically conscious local citizens participate regularly in making policies and implementing decisions, have regularly been overwhelmed in Tanzania by a deep-seated ethos of modernization. Decisions require expertise, which means that the popular role must be severely constrained; energized local participation is more likely to be divisive than constructive, and therefore to be avoided rather than encouraged. Formal policy vacillates between reliance on mass support and distrust of mass participation. Ostensibly politicizing institutions become vehicles for depoliticization.

**Overlapping Institutions.** The catalogue of institutions and authorities developed thus far is misleading. The party, for example, appears in none of the education organization charts. Yet its role in education policy is extensive, if not always determining. *Education for Self Reliance* was, after all, a policy statement issued by the party, as were the Musoma Resolutions. Much of the two-year delay between the submission of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education and the approval of a modified subset of them was apparently due to opposition within the party's National Executive Committee, especially to the imposition of secondary school fees. Both of Tanzania's presidents were school teachers, and Julius Nyerere clearly had a major role in setting education policy—directly, indirectly, and through the appointment of senior educational officials. At least through the mid-1970s, his personal involvement in personnel decisions extended to the regional educational officers.

Notwithstanding the supremacy of the party, TANU and the CCM have never ruled, and only in special circumstances have they governed. Most often, they have shaped, guided, and facilitated. On important issues, there has generally been intense debate within the party. Successful coalitions frequently involve individuals both within and outside the party leadership.
The point here is simple and not unique to Tanzania. The institutions and individuals formally responsible for education policy do not in practice exercise unchallenged authority. Policy-making through implementation, the dispersion and decentralization of responsibilities, and overlapping institutions all limit their autonomy, especially when alternative poles of influence provide fertile ground for developing and articulating competing interests and preferences.

_National Campaigns._ The dispersion and decentralization of formal policy-making authority does not mean that the education policy process consists primarily of piecemeal and incremental adjustments. Rather, policy introduction and implementation by “campaign” is common in Tanzania (Hyden 1979). With great publicity, a sweeping new policy is announced and optimistic goals are set. Initial implementation often precedes detailed analysis and planning. The new policy becomes a national crusade, demanding energetic support and selfless dedication.

Accelerating the achievement of universal primary education was one such campaign. After the party decision in Musoma in 1974, resources and personnel were mobilized across public and private institutions. Effectively, from the national to the local level every official even remotely associated with education was expected to show some activity to support the campaign. The results were impressive, especially in quantitative terms. In 1978, 878,300 pupils were enrolled in Standard I, an increase of 254 percent over the 248,000 Standard I pupils in 1974. The total primary school population rose from 1,228,900 in 1974 to a peak of 3,553,100 in 1983, an increase of 189 percent. A striking achievement by any standard, this rapid growth was an extraordinary accomplishment during a continuing economic crisis.

This effort also indicates what is problematic about the campaign strategy: the intensity of the effort is difficult, and eventually impossible, to sustain, and critical follow up activities may be undermined by the diversion of resources and people to the next campaign. Primary enrollment grew rapidly, but the percentage of students who did not finish school increased correspondingly. For example, of the 878,000 pupils who were enrolled in Standard I in 1978, only 649,600, 74 percent, sat for the Primary School Leaving Examination. Twenty-six students out of every hundred stopped school before completing their primary education. In the years following the UPE campaign there seemed to be a decline in the number of students entering school. Some observers regarded that apparent reduction as evidence of parental disaffection or an even more serious problem in Tanzanian education. In fact, since Standard I enrollments subsequently increased, the apparent decline may have been little more than the aftereffect of the UPE campaign. In the sweep to get all children into school, some may have begun a year or two earlier than would otherwise have been the case. After the most intense period of the campaign, parents who preferred registering their children for school at, say age 9 or 10, may have resumed doing so.

Mass campaigns of this sort have several advantages. They can mobilize resources and energize popular participation and support. They can extend communication and widen the political and administrative reach of party and government. Policy-by-campaign is also self-limiting. After an initial flurry of activity attention wanes, pronouncements become less frequent, and actual
policy may revert to what it had been earlier. Equally or perhaps more important, since the initial unrealistic targets are rarely met, all goal-setting efforts come to be regarded as statements of intention and hope rather than as guides to practical action. Where it is evident that notwithstanding the national campaign there has been little change, the legitimacy of the political process itself erodes. An inherently political policy process of this sort, where political education and mobilization are far more important than technical expertise and rationalized resource use, simply cannot be sustained in Tanzania's vacillation between technical-administrative and political-mobilizational perspectives on development.

**Local Initiatives.** Challenged at the center by individuals located in the party and other ministries and organizations, education officials must regularly face locally based critiques and initiatives. The rapid expansion of schools in one of the most affluent areas of the country provides a particularly clear example. In Kilimanjaro in the 1960s, with support from their churches, a local coalition effectively subverted a national redistributive policy by creating and managing a parallel primary school system that came to enroll nearly as many students as the government schools. A similar process in the 1980s undermined the national policy of limiting secondary school expansion. As local community groups organized to create new private secondary schools they gradually assumed several of the principal functions of local government, including levying taxes.

Again the point is simple and not unique to Tanzania. Major policies may in practice be more the result of community action and popular initiative than of central decision-making. In some circumstances, the formal authorities and central decision-makers may see little alternative but to tolerate or even acquiesce in the new policy direction.

**External Influences.** Education policy-making in Tanzania is not solely a Tanzanian activity. Like their colleagues elsewhere in Africa, Tanzanian education policymakers look to the North Atlantic for models, analyses and diagnoses, and approval. Often subtle, this deference to external authority conditions policies—from specifying what is problematic to designing intervention strategies to evaluating outcomes (Fuenzalida 1983). Even more important, most new projects in education and a significant portion of the recurrent budget rely on external finances.

I am not suggesting a conspiracy among external assistance agencies or between those agencies and Tanzanian leaders, or that they set education policy in Tanzania, or that Tanzanian educators do only what those agencies will support. Tanzanian educators have shown remarkable independence in a very constrained situation and surely will continue to do so. Expectations about what can be funded do, however, influence what is proposed and what is attempted. For example, there are Folk Development Colleges with a Swedish heritage, vocational schools in the Cuban style, and functional adult literacy programs with UNESCO's underlying assumptions.

Reliance on foreign finance has another indirect impact. Success in securing foreign assistance becomes itself a source of power and influence within Tanzania. The tendencies toward self-
protection and self-aggrandizement that characterize administrative structures everywhere are played out in part in Tanzania within a web of international connections. Increasing the resources within one educational subsector, for example, may depend as much on building an alliance with, say, Swedish educational advisers as on constructing a supportive political coalition within Tanzania.

It seems clear that Tanzania's dire economic situation and growing debt have increased external influence at precisely the time when the World Bank is expanding its own direct role in the provision of advice and research as well as financial assistance. As I have argued elsewhere, over the long term the consolidation of this financial intellectual complex is unlikely to lead to better educational policies or projects (Samoff 1991). One troubling manifestation of the consequences of this arrangement is that with which this paper began: the specification of the Tanzanian education agenda for the 1990s and beyond apparently cannot proceed without foreign support.

**Striking Non-Decisions.** I have been concerned here with decisions about education policy in Tanzania. There have also been some very striking non-decisions. Although many of those involved in Tanzania's highly regarded adult literacy program referred to and used the terminology of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, there was little systematic discussion of Freire's core conception of such programs: peasant mobilization and political empowerment. Functional literacy was assumed to be the appropriate strategy; the pedagogy of the oppressed, education for cultural consciousness, and liberatory learning never made it onto the agenda.

Although the effort to develop a curriculum relevant to Tanzania was energetic and the decision to adopt Swahili as the language of instruction in primary schools was widely applauded, there was little corresponding attention to transforming the pedagogy. Official statements proclaimed that Tanzania's schools were to develop curious, self-reliant, and self-confident citizens who would participate actively in their society. Yet classrooms in Tanzania (as in most of Africa) remain authoritarian, hierarchical, and teacher centered, with relatively few student-initiated activities and little tolerance for dissent and deviation. Most of the curriculum and much of the teaching is driven by the national examinations. Participation in school projects intended to reduce the disdain for physical labor and elitism is in fact often used to sanction unacceptable behavior. The maintenance of the authoritarian classroom and the dominating role of examinations are assumed, and not widely debated.

There are of course many other issues that do not appear on the policy agenda in Tanzania. The point, once again, is straightforward: important policies are effectively made by excluding particular alternatives from consideration. To understand both the policies and the policy-making process, therefore, requires exploring which issues, or rather, whose issues, have been excluded, how, and why.
Technicians and Politicians

The thrust of recent education policy changes reflects the technical-administrative orientation that has come more visibly to dominate the national leadership and national policy in Tanzania. To employ a rough but convenient shorthand, in the struggles among the contenders for power in Tanzania, the experts have displaced the politicians. The relative dominance in the late 1960s and mid-1970s of a political perspective that regarded development as at its core a political process and that emphasized politicization, mobilization, and to some extent, socialism, was in the 1980s supplanted by a return to the view that development is principally a technical process. Again put crudely, in the popular perception the politicians had simply failed to produce, and as a consequence suffered an erosion of legitimacy. The need to import cereal grains in the mid-1970s weakened their base, though it was restored somewhat by the economic recovery and military victory of the late 1970s. The continuing difficulties in meeting the demand for both basic foods and consumer goods in this decade have further weakened that political base, or rather, have reinforced the political claims of the technocratic orientation.

Although it is impossible here to assemble extensive evidence for or discuss in detail the sources and consequences of this transition, its symbolic manifestations are, I think, reasonably clear. Individuals widely regarded as relatively apolitical now head key ministries, parastatals, and other organizations. The visible portions of public policy debate, in which at other times political concerns have been paramount (for example, arguments about which proposed policy is more clearly socialist), are now more often dominated by discussions of ostensibly apolitical policy alternatives, defended in terms of their technical merit. The recent relaxation of restrictions on consumer goods and luxury imports, for example, has been defended largely in terms of economic rationality, not socialist construction (notwithstanding the socialist terminology employed).

Within education, this transition is clearly visible in the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education. As I have noted, strong opposition to some of its recommendations, apparently centered in the party’s National Executive Committee, did delay for two years the adoption of the new policies, and some proposals were rejected. Ultimately, however, it was the party that acquiesced. The ministry responsible for education, which a decade earlier had been renamed the Ministry of National Education to assert the importance of the political role over the technical responsibilities of education, again became the Ministry of Education. At the same time, Colleges of National Education resumed their former name: Teachers’ Colleges. Regarding education in primarily technical-administrative rather than political terms has been supported by most of the external educational advisers to Tanzania, especially the World Bank and UNESCO.

This transition—from the proudly political to the aggressively apolitical, from self-consciously socialist to dispassionately neutral, from education-as-social-transformation to education-as-the-transmission-of-skills-and-attitudes—is nicely captured in the contrasting language of the 1974 Musoma Resolutions and the 1984 report of the Presidential Commission. Both begin with a reference to Nyerere’s 1967 paper, Education for Self Reliance. At Musoma in 1974, it seemed
essential to go beyond Nyerere’s vision. By 1984, it was deemed essential to return to it. The
Musoma Resolutions:

the main purpose of education is to enable man to liberate himself. . . . education
ought to enable whoever acquires it to fight against oppression, and the only way of
doing this is to establish socialism . . . . (TANU 1974, 103)

The approved recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education:

Basically, the aims and objectives of education in Tanzania remain the same as outlined
by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in his booklet, 'Education for Self Reliance,' published in
1967. . . . These . . . shall form the cornerstones of our educational plans and practices
as we approach the twenty-first century. (Tanzania 1984, 1-3)

It would, of course, be quite erroneous to assume that what I have termed here the political
orientation is unconcerned with issues of technique and administration or is indifferent to the
academic quality of educational institutions. It would be equally erroneous to assume that the
current political configuration is either immutable or immortal. My point here is simply that
recent education policies correspond to the current dominance of a more
technical-administrative and less political perspective in national politics.

Conflict and the Consolidation of Power

Nearly everyone regards education as the most important policy arena, at least in the short term. Socialists expect the schools to mold new attitudes. Planners expect the schools to produce required skills and increase productivity. Employers expect the schools to do hiring preselection, as well as to provide training and instill discipline. Politicians expect the schools to reinforce legitimacy, both through the expansion of the schools themselves and through political education within the schools. Students and their parents expect the schools to offer a route off the farm and to higher income. All expect schools to matter—to make the future quite different from the present.

The persistence of private influence in the various dimensions of this key public allocation is striking. Perhaps even more striking are the links between private organizations, especially the churches, and local political participation. The assertion of strong central control in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved both nationalizing private schools and dismantling local government and cooperatives. Popular initiatives focused on schooling in the 1980s have, at least in Kilimanjaro, fostered the reconstruction of local government and cooperatives even before they had official sanction.

Public policies, of course, both reflect the structure of power and result from conflict. The most recent education policy changes reflect the consolidation of the power of the bureaucratic governing class, anticipating the political realignment at the end of Julius Nyerere’s tenure as president. They demonstrate as well the indirect and subtle process by which particular values
and ideas become so thoroughly embedded in an institutional matrix that they are little challenged—in short, hegemony.

At the same time, there is no reason to expect the conflict over education policy and over the direction of national policy to cease. Over the longer term, education policy is marked as much by contradiction as by correspondence. Socialist construction has not been definitively defeated, or even necessarily sidetracked. Education can be liberating as well as constraining. Widely expanded access to schools and the continuation of mass literacy programs do widen the recruitment pool and expand the scope of political participation. The government's response to popular demand—regardless of its articulators and their motives—is fundamentally empowering. Even as the new policies function to legitimize the political order, they also lay the foundation for challenges to it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Event</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>TANU formed as national liberation party</td>
<td>TANU Constitution: Promise No. 6 commits leadership to educate and to use that education for the benefit of all.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Trade Disputes Act of 1962: effectively bars most strikes</td>
<td>University College, Dar es Salaam, opened (Law School)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Independence of Zanzibar</td>
<td>Initial decolonization of curriculum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>One-Party Interim Constitution adopted</td>
<td>Swahili becomes language of instruction in primary schools. Phase out of Standard VIII (8th year of primary school) and Standard IV examination, and merging of upper (V-VII) and lower (I-IV) primary schools begun.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>University students demonstrate against required National Service.</td>
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1967  Arusha Declaration; clarifies and strengthens Tanzania’s commitment to Ujamaa socialism; nationalizations; leadership code
Creation of Permanent Labour Tribunal, limiting workers’ ability to strike and negotiate contracts

Education for Self-Reliance Policy: emphasis on mass education, particularly primary schools—both increasing enrollment and changing curriculum to provide skills for rural agricultural development strategy
Phase-out of Standard VIII completed
National Literacy Test: 69 percent illiterate

1968

Entrance examination to Standard V eliminated (all primary school pupils able to remain in school for seven years).
UNESCO/UNDP-supported World Oriented Adult Literacy Project [WOALP]—Mwanza Functional Literacy Project—initiated.


SFYP: directs that all primary schools will become adult educational centers and directs that the main emphasis of adult education will be on rural development.
National Education Act: government assumes control of all schools.
First mass educational campaign: To Plan To Choose (focus: new Five-Year Plan).

1970  Workers’ Councils established in every public corporation/enterprise (Presidential Circular No. 1)

Party declares 1970 Adult Education Year.
Second mass educational campaign: The Choice is Yours.
University of Dar es Salaam created (dissolution of University of East Africa).

1971  TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo)

Six Districts Literacy Campaign.
TANU 15th Biennial Conference: Resolution 23 calls for the eradication of illiteracy in the next four years and directs that worker education be carried out within working hours.
Third mass educational campaign: A Time for Rejoicing.
National Forms 4 and 6 examinations replace Cambridge examinations.
1972 Decentralization policy adopted
TANU Annual Conference: Iringa Resolution finds agricultural productivity too low and declares politics and agriculture inseparable
National Literacy Campaign, planned for three years, is initiated in response to 1971 TANU Conference Resolution. Fourth mass educational campaign: Politics is Agriculture.

1973
Primary school fees abolished.
TANU 16th Biennial Conference: Resolution 29 declares that students in classes VI and VII should be taught skills directly useful for work in villages. Prime Minister's Directive on Worker Education.
National Examinations Council established (localization of examinations). Fifth mass educational campaign: Man is Health.

1974 TANU National Executive Committee (Musoma) Resolutions
Villagization campaigns
Workers' Committees become Union (NUTA) Field Committees (that is, union branches)
Musoma Resolutions directed accelerated progress toward universal primary education (by 1977), elimination of illiteracy (by 1980), and self-sufficiency in high level skills (by 1980); instituted vocational orientation in all secondary schools; required village or factory work experience and recommendation and party endorsement for admission into university. Initial (4) zonal Kivukoni Colleges opened.

1975 Third Five-Year Development Plan postponed
Village Development Act
Folk Development Colleges established. Sixth mass educational campaign: Food is Life and Death.
National Literacy Test: 39 percent illiterate.

Universal primary education accelerated Adult literacy programs extended and intensified.

1977 TANU and Afro-Shirazi parties merged to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]
Collapse of the East African Community National Union of Tanganyika Workers [NUTA] becomes Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania [JUWATA]
National Literacy Test: 27 percent illiterate.
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>National Economic Survival Programme</td>
<td>Presidential Education Commission formed to evaluate past 19 years of education and plan the next 20 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Decision to restore local government and cooperative societies</td>
<td>National Literacy Test: 21 percent illiterate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
<td>Presidential Education Commission reports to President and party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, opened.</td>
<td>Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, opened.</td>
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<td>Primary school fees restored as “development levies.”</td>
<td>Primary school fees restored as “development levies.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Formal adoption of selected recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education: <em>Educational System in Tanzania Towards the Year 2000.</em></td>
<td>Formal adoption of selected recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education: <em>Educational System in Tanzania Towards the Year 2000.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeds Julius K. Nyerere as President of Tanzania</td>
<td>Initial implementation of approved recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education, including introduction of secondary school fees; plan to double the number of government secondary schools; restoration of Form 2 examination; and encouragement to private secondary schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>New agreement with IMF, resumption of IMF and other external agency support; structural adjustment loans</td>
<td>National Literacy Test: 9.6 percent illiterate.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1990 Economic Recovery Programme II: Economic and Social Action Programme (ESAP), including the Priority Social Action Programme (PSAP)


1991 Julius Nyerere retires from active political leadership
Endnotes

1. In preparing this chapter, I have drawn heavily on my own studies of Tanzanian politics and education, especially 1990 to 1992. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Comparative and International Education Society, Annapolis, Maryland, March, 1992.

2. Like other generalizations that focus attention on major relationships and the trajectory of change at the large scale, periodization necessarily omits and distorts at the small scale. A more detailed exploration of the subtleties and nuances of these earlier periods, however, would overwhelm the discussion of the education policy process.

3. For convenience, I use the term Tanzania to refer to both the contemporary United Republic of Tanzania and to Tanganyika prior to its union with Zanzibar in 1964. This chapter deals with mainland Tanzania since its independence in 1961. Education in Zanzibar, which has remained a sphere of local authority throughout the union, is less well documented and is most often not included in national education statistics.

4. Note here a persisting terminological problem: to refer to “Tanzania’s” experiences is either to assert that those experiences are common to Tanzania’s diverse populace or to treat the experiences of one set of Tanzanians as the experiences of the populace as a whole. Students of Africa far too often obscure the importance of the social location of ideas and interests in this way. To the extent that “Tanzania” acts, or is acted upon, it is usually only some of the people who are involved. Yet, the expansion of the world capitalist system led to the identification of nation-states as major actors, and thus the global arrangement made the territorially defined entity labelled “Tanzania” an arena for conflict and a focus for action. The global system thus affected what Tanzanians did, or could do, in part by shaping their field of action. It is in this sense that “Tanzania” is used here.

5. For this characterization of Tanzania’s development policies, see Samoff 1981.

6. The Arusha Declaration and related papers, including Socialism and Rural Development and Education for Self Reliance, are collected in Nyerere 1968a and 1968b. In addition to the analysis of the failure of the liberal development strategy, these papers attempted to define more clearly the content of Tanzanian socialism, the announcement of the nationalization of major economic enterprises, the imposition of sharp income and consumption restrictions on leaders (defined broadly), and the beginning of the reorganization of the school system.

7. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) became Tanganyika’s sole official party in the 1965 Interim Constitution. It merged in 1977 with its Zanzibari counterpart, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), to form a single national party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi [Party of the Revolution] (CCM).
8. See Green et al. 1980, especially Chapter 6, for details of the policy response to the crisis of the mid-1970s and the subsequent apparent recovery. They conclude that “By the end of 1977, the [recovery] strategy had been substantially successful and the results were positive” (p. viii). It is striking that this period of partial recovery, and the economic strategy employed to produce it, are scarcely noted and rarely discussed in the generally critical reviews of the Tanzanian economy during this period.


10. A detailed review of Tanzanian politics and its extensive literature is beyond the scope of this discussion. Tanzania as a peripheral capitalist state, has both advocates (Lofchie 1978; Kahama, Maliyamkono, and Wells 1986) and critics (Shivji 1976; Mueller 1980; Coulson 1982). Tanzania as a state in transition, has some authors that find sluggish but significant progress toward what might be termed social democracy (Pratt 1976; Green et al. 1980; Resnick 1981), and others that regard the apparent transition as a short-lived and inherently insecure moment of class alignment, conflict, and realignment (Samoff 1981, 1987b; Saul 1979). Although the case for socialist development has been argued (Shivji 1976), the politics of its implementation—beyond general critique and ringing calls for sweeping change—have been less well addressed (but see the contributions to Othman 1980; Shivji 1985; Tandon 1982). In this assessment it is important to distinguish between rhetoric and policy, for example, programs that are announced as socialist initiatives but that clearly reduce popular participation and/or increase stratification.

11. Unfortunately, there are many inconsistencies in the education statistics for Tanzania, even within the data provided by a single source (a problem not unique to Tanzania). Often, data on schools and enrollments in Tanzania pertain only to government (or government-assisted) schools and their students. For a more detailed discussion of the problems in these data, see Samoff 1992a.

12. These comments refer primarily to school-based education activities. Thus far, the impressive successes in reducing adult illiteracy have not been integrated into a strategy for political mobilization or into a program for continuing education programs outside the schools. Although educators speak in terms of continuing education, their practice suggests that they, and perhaps the political leadership, regard adult education as a transitional program addressed to unschooled adults that is rendered unnecessary by its own success and by universal access to basic education.

al. 1983, Psacharopoulos and Loxley 1985, and Unsicker 1987. Nyerere’s initial paper, *Education for Self Reliance* (1967), has been reprinted many times, including in Resnick 1968, and Hinzen and Hunsdorfer 1979. See also Nyerere’s retrospective overview (1985), the report of the Presidential Commission on Education (Tanzania 1982), and the government’s responses to it (Tanzania 1984).

14. Although commentators on Tanzania frequently quote Nyerere’s statements of the 1960s as evidence for his later (and current) thinking, it would be a serious error to fail to recognize changes in his understanding over the past three decades and an injustice to Nyerere himself to reject a priori the possibility that he has revised his own thinking. It is impossible within the confines of this paper to explore fully the understandings of socialism in Tanzania of the 1980s and 1990s, but it is important to note that by the 1980s socialism was taken to involve contradiction and conflict in the society and not simply an attitude of mind. (See, among other sources, CCM 1981.)

15. The Form 2 examination was restored in the mid-1980s. Improving the quality of instruction, and perhaps exercising tighter control over teachers, had again become more important than expanded access and reducing inequality.

16. Initially small, and termed “contributions,” school fees figured prominently in the deliberations of the Presidential Commission on Education, whose recommendations led to the establishment of the principle that parents should assume more of the direct costs of educating their children. School fees have increased regularly since then. To date, school fees are probably less regressive than they might seem. Though not insignificant, required fees are not high enough to exclude many children from school. Since nearly all parents want their children to go to school, such fees are much more collectible than other taxes.

17. Each school was required to offer one or more of the four specializations (termed “biases”): agriculture, commerce, home economics (for female students), and technology.

18. In fact, the preliminary assessments are not particularly persuasive. Since the vocationalization had barely begun, its limited impact is primarily a function of its slow start-up and does not reveal much about its longer term consequences. Confidence in these initial findings is undermined by the major study’s inadequate differentiation among school types, severely flawed outcome measures (especially, the likelihood that most examinations assess English competence rather than the content being tested), and inattention to both the choice criteria for student preferences and the match, or lack thereof, between those preferences and ultimate placement (King 1986).

19. For a commentary by the principal overseer of the First Five-Year Plan, see van Arkadie 1969.

20. For an overview of this assertion of local initiative, see Samoff 1987a.
21. Throughout Africa external agencies formally provide support for development (capital) projects and are usually reluctant to finance continuing (recurrent) activities. In practice, however, there seems to be a good deal more support for recurrent expenditures than is generally acknowledged. That is certainly the case in Tanzania, where both the achievement of universal primary education and the adult literacy program would have foundered without foreign, especially Swedish, assistance. Experience in Tanzania and elsewhere suggests that inattention to the recurrent expenses associated with development projects has proved to be particularly problematic. Quite simply, the country finds itself unable to continue projects it has begun, notwithstanding their utility and the promise to the initial funding agency to do so.

22. For a personal perspective from within the education system, see Hirji 1990.


Bibliography


The development of policy for education takes place on many levels, from the official pronouncements of national commissions to informal local decisions at the district or school level. This case provides an initial look at the official policy formation process in Uganda with an emphasis on the large-scale, public processes involved. The case will examine the interaction between government, government appointed policy commissions, the international donors, and internal forces within Uganda. A table of the key policy events in the history of education in Uganda is attached to provide a summary skeleton of that history for the reader.

In order to improve the policy-making capability and process in Uganda, one must begin by understanding education policy formation as it has proceeded in the past and what the outcomes have been. Which approaches have been effective and which are in need of change or reform? What actions of the government or donors have had undesirable consequences? What alternate approaches to policy formation might be used? What alternate forms of policy creation have been used and in what combinations—popular participation, central decrees, consultant studies, national commissions, donor agency studies and project plans, sector surveys? Uganda has 40 years of policy-making experience for education; what lessons for the future are embedded in that history?

The Colonial Era (1925-1962)

Providing education for Africans in the pre-independence period was largely in the hands of missionary organizations. They not only determined policies but were responsible for all implementation within their respective organizations and the areas in which they operated. An early public suggestion that this state of affairs was inadequate came from a 1925 report by the Phelps Stokes Commission which visited colonies in eastern and southern Africa. The commission noted that education was controlled solely by missions in cooperation with local chiefs. Their report advocated for government participation in education through supervision and financial assistance to strengthen and control missionary efforts. Concomitant with the publication of their report the government of the Uganda Protectorate established the first Department of Education and appointed a director responsible for African education.

This commission was the first in a long line of advisory commissions that would investigate education in Uganda and make recommendations for creation or reform of education policies. The Phelps Stokes Commission was completely external, having been appointed and financed by the Phelps Stokes Fund in New York and charged by them with assessing education in much of British Africa. There was no direct linkage to the colonial government, but their report had
substantial influence on thinking about the colonial government responsibilities for the education of Africans.

Government policy was subsequently influenced by the 1928 Hilton-Young Commission which studied the relationship between the educational activities of the missions and the government. The de la Warr Commission on Higher Education in 1938 made recommendations that led to the setting up of Makerere College as an interterritorial, postsecondary institution with independent financing. In 1940 the Thomas Education Committee was created to review the guidelines for allocation of grants-in-aid and draw up a development program for 1941-1945, although its implementation was hindered by the war. Immediately after the war, the Worthington Development Plan was published which set criteria for expansion of education and linked the provision of education to the capacity of teacher training institutions to produce trained teachers. This plan was subsequently revised again and in 1950 the government decided to change the method of assisting self-governing schools by providing staff salaries and a fixed capitation grant, rather than picking up annual budget deficits.

All of these bodies were appointed by the colonial government and drew their membership from the British civil service or distinguished expatriate educators. They were charged with reviewing policies relating to the provision of education to the Africans of Uganda. Presumably they drew their inspiration from prevailing norms and beliefs about education in England and their viewpoints about the desirable goals of education for a colonized people. Yet, the colonial government did appoint to these committees Europeans with extensive Ugandan experience and not infrequently sympathetic views toward Uganda and its future. This was certainly the case with the de Bunsen Commission.

An East African Study Group sponsored jointly by the Colonial Office and the Nuffield Foundation toured East and Central Africa in 1951 to study education. Subsequently a committee chaired by Mr. De Bunsen, the principal of Makerere College, was formed to provide more detailed recommendations for the future structure of education in Uganda, using the work of the study group as a basis. Members of the de Bunsen Commission attended an education conference in Cambridge, England in 1952 prior to writing their report. The commission recommended substantial expansion of educational capacity in Uganda with the goal of preparing Uganda for self-rule—a significant policy shift from the past. In the decade before Uganda's independence the de Bunsen report provided the policy framework for the many changes that took place in the education system. The recommendations of the commission were mostly followed with the exception of the proposed lengthening of primary education to eight years. Although strongly influenced by outside forces, the commission showed both foresight and faith in the capability of Ugandans to make effective use of educational opportunities. The relatively strong educational structure that existed at the time of Uganda's independence can be traced to the vision of Ugandan education set out by the report of the de Bunsen Commission. The policy framework in existence at independence was based firmly on that vision.
Phase I - Independence and Setting a Path for the Future (1963-1971)

Uganda celebrated its independence on October 9, 1962 at a time when worldwide interest and faith in education as an instrument of national development was burgeoning. The United Nations had just declared the 1960s to be the “Development Decade” during which the majority of mankind was to be released from poverty, disease, and ignorance. The Ashby Commission on higher education in Nigeria had just published its report on investment in education. The Princeton Conference on Education in East Africa led to the initiation of the Teachers for East Africa Project (TEA) to strengthen the supply of secondary school teachers for Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. In 1960, the Ford Foundation sponsored a conference in Massachusetts of African educators, which initiated a series of far-reaching curricular reforms in mathematics, science, and social studies education throughout Africa.

The first UNESCO-sponsored conference of ministers of education of independent states in Africa held in Addis Ababa in 1961 declared that:

*The citizens of Africa see in education a means by which their aspirations may be met. They are willing to sacrifice for the attainment of this means for gaining economic and social development and wish to provide for more and more of their people education suited to their desires.*

The enthusiasm and optimism which the ministers felt at the time are indicated by the ambitious targets which they set for their countries to achieve by 1980:

- free compulsory universal primary education;
- universal adult literacy;
- education at secondary level to be provided to 30 percent of primary school leavers; and
- higher education to be provided to 20 percent of those who complete secondary education.

Meeting again in 1962 the education ministers set goals for African universities including the responsibility to “develop human resources for meeting the manpower needs of their countries and to ensure unification of Africa.”

The Castle Commission 1963

*Terms of Reference.* In this heady atmosphere of enthusiasm for education and in the aftermath of Uganda’s independence, the Castle Commission was appointed in January 1963. The education policy framework in place at Uganda’s independence was determined largely by the recommendations of the de Bunsen committee, which met 10 years earlier. The chair of that committee, Sir Bernard de Bunsen was still the principal of Makerere and in fact facilitated the work of the commission by making available the meeting and office rooms needed for their work. The commission was given the following terms of reference:

*To examine in the light of the approved recommendations of the International Bank*
Survey Mission Report and Uganda's financial position and future manpower requirements, the content and structure of education in Uganda; to consider how it may best be improved and adapted to the needs of this country to submit recommendations accordingly.

The context of the commission was set by the challenge of Uganda's newly acquired independence, but constrained by the immediate economic conditions and their implications for education as reflected in the opinions of the World Bank's recent report. The continued influence of the colonial power and external donors is reflected in the explicit reference to the World Bank study and in the international membership of the Commission. Yet, considering the enthusiasm of the times, the Commission was to produce a remarkably focused and practical document in a timely fashion.

The Commission. The historical context in which the Commission was appointed is reflected in its membership which included nine Ugandans and eight non-Ugandans: three Englishmen, one Indian, one Nigerian, one American, and one UNESCO representative. Three of the members were women. The nine Ugandans included two members of Parliament, one representative of the Uganda Teachers Association. The rest were educators appointed because of their experience with education in Uganda. The four regions of the country, Buganda, Eastern, Western, and Northern had representatives on the commission, but religious organizations were conspicuously absent with the exception of Reverend Mother Mary Dominique who was a co-opted member. The commission was chaired by Professor E. B. Castle who had long experience with education in East Africa. The commission was supported by two joint secretaries, one English and one Ugandan.

During its deliberations, the commission received over 350 memoranda, and interviewed about 400 witnesses in its travels around the country. Members of the commission visited every part of Uganda including the remoter districts. The commission met twice daily, either in plenary or in working parties, for approximately two months, producing a finished report in less than six months. All members of the commission signed the report and there appears to have been remarkable consensus, with only three relatively minor instances of disagreement noted in the report itself.

The problem that faced the commission in trying to formulate an education policy for Uganda at the time of independence is captured by the following question:

When over half the nation is illiterate and the people rightly clamor for education, when teachers are in short supply and inadequately trained, when government and industry demand trained recruits, when unemployment is widespread and increasing, when the nation is poor—what policy should the government pursue?

If the government concentrated on universal primary education and adult literacy, to the neglect of secondary and higher education, it would fail to produce the high-level manpower needed to staff the government and teach in the schools. On the other hand, the country could not afford
to make all the needed improvements in a general advance on all fronts.

The Report. After a careful analysis of the country’s educational needs, the commission recommended a 10-year development program that gave priority to providing trained manpower by expanding secondary school enrollments and the capacity to train teachers for both primary and secondary schools. The focus at the primary level was on improving the quality and relevance, and improving access in more remote areas. The commission also sought to improve the standards of technical and agricultural education, to expand the access of girls, and to provide more adult and literacy education. No recommendations were made concerning higher education because at that point the planning of higher education was an interterritorial responsibility.

The main comments and recommendations of the commission were summarized in a list of about 130 statements which covered the full range of educational activities in the country. The commission did make an attempt to indicate the need for phasing and to assess the financial implications of their recommendations. Neither were done in a detailed systematic way, but their awareness of resource limits constrained their recommendations. They wrestled with the competing needs for large-scale expansion of primary education and the demands for high-level manpower brought about by independence and came down in favor of expanding postprimary education. The report contains a chapter that addresses the financial implications of their main recommendations, seeking to provide rough estimates of savings and added costs which would result from them. No attempt at detailed costing or of projecting enrollments was made. They were aware that the cost implications of even their modest recommendations would exceed the budgetary capacity of Uganda and that substantial external assistance would be needed. Their report ended with an exhortation to the people of Uganda: “...if the people of Uganda want education for their children, it is they who will have to work and pay for it.”

The Outcome. The government responded quickly and favorably to most of the commission’s recommendations, first by issuing a sessional paper and subsequently with a circular (see Key Events in Education Policy Formation in Uganda) which set forth an implementation plan. Both of these were issued in the latter half of 1963 and reflected the fairly close agreement between the government, the commission, and presumably the major political forces within the country at that time. This set of events formed the foundation on which Uganda’s educational system was built during the first decade after independence.

The Castle Commission can perhaps best be understood as the culmination of a process of withdrawal and preparation for self-government undertaken by the British with varying degrees of support from Ugandan political forces. The Commission was strongly influenced by two factors: the policy framework set by the de Bunsen Committee whose recommendations had been largely accepted by the colonial government, and the considerable penetration of the corpus of beliefs and values of the international donor community at that point. The international membership and influence on the commission was clearly dominant, beginning right from the terms of reference which explicitly drew their attention to the World Bank Survey and its recommendations. It is to the commission’s credit that they explicitly chose to make their own recommendations rather than merely comment on those of the Bank.
At this early stage in the "Development Decade" the viability of the confident prescriptions so freely offered by international experts had yet to be tested in the soil of newly independent states. Africans and Europeans alike were caught up in the expectation of abundant harvests from these investments—the failures and shortcomings of these ideas were not yet visible to any of the participants.

The dominance of external forces also resulted in part from the lack of experienced Ugandan leadership in the field of education. The ministry and most of postsecondary education in Uganda was still largely staffed by expatriates immediately after independence. While many capable Ugandan leaders existed, they were just beginning to feel their way in the new atmosphere of independence and still depended heavily on the old expatriate staff for technical support. Notable for their near total absence from the commission, were representatives of the missionary bodies which had created and still operated most of the educational institutions in the country at the time of independence. However, all the Ugandan members of the commission had been trained in missionary schools and likely provided some representation for that perspective. Nevertheless, the membership clearly reflected a signal that education was to become a state-controlled activity dedicated to supporting the creation of a unified nation of Ugandans of all denominations.

**Phase II - Turmoil and the Downward Spiral (1972-1979)**

During the 10-year period following the report of the Castle Commission, most of their recommendations were implemented by the government. Policy formulation focused on implementation within the economic capabilities of Uganda. Education policy was guided primarily by the five-year Development Plans, and at the university level by University Grants Committee Reports. Each of the five-year plans contains a chapter devoted to education that was typically produced by the efforts of the planning section of the Ministry of Education in collaboration with the Central Planning Bureau which later became the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Negotiations between the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Education determined the final version of the chapter and the enrollment and budgetary targets that it normally contained. During the period between plans, individual education projects undergo more detailed analysis and revision. This process leads to decisions to implement as is, revise, postpone, or cancel specific projects as conditions and priorities shift during the plan period. The resultant decisions also frequently reflect the tension between the technical economic rationale of the planners, and the social and political realities which politicians must accommodate.

*The First Five-Year Development Plan (1961-1966).* This plan was published several years before independence and reflected the priorities of the outgoing colonial administration. Its overall emphasis was on preparing Uganda for independence. The education system was charged with providing the high-level manpower needed to Africanize the government administration and meet the demands of a growing economy. As a result, the plan stressed secondary and technical education, and left primary education to continue pretty much as it was. These recommendations were largely parallel to those of the World Bank Survey Mission whose results were available to the government planners responsible for the five-year plan. By 1966, the plans targets for
secondary education, both budgetary and enrollment, were substantially overfulfilled. In contrast, primary education targets were not achieved. The pressures to staff the government, provide high-level manpower, and provide opportunities for primary school graduates supported the government’s beliefs in the priority value of secondary level education.

The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1966-1971). Following in the footsteps of the first plan, the second plan also emphasized growth in postprimary education to produce high-level manpower. This justification largely supplanted the focus on Africanization from the first plan. Priorities in social development were explicitly determined by two criteria: contribution to economic growth and impact of the service on a large proportion of the population. For the first time, the plan included specific enrollment and financial targets for postsecondary education as well. The result was a continuation of the trend of an increasing share of education expenditure being devoted to postprimary education. The continued fascination with high-level manpower reflected the prevailing strategies of the international agencies and educational development experts of the time—many of whom were employed as expatriate officers in the technical departments of government. Education policy was shaped by this larger policy environment with its emphasis on education as an investment in high-level training for economic development. The plan takes some pride in noting that their recommendations will “give Uganda an educational system as developed as many of the systems in ... Latin-American countries, and far ahead of most countries at Uganda’s stage of economic development.” By 1971, substantial increases in secondary and tertiary education had been achieved, again overfulfilling the targets. Enrollments in primary education fell far short of even the modest targets set by the plan.

The education chapter of the plan was drawn up by a working party on education and manpower, one of 12 working parties. The education party consisted of five members from the Ministry of Education—including the chief education officer who chaired the party, three from Makerere—including the only woman, three from the Central Planning Bureau—who acted as secretaries to the party—and one from the Uganda Teachers’ Association. They were assisted by 10 additional advisors, mostly drawn from the Ministry of Education. Four of the members were expatriates, all planners or economists. The strong emphasis on manpower production and linkages to the economy reflect both the terms of reference given to the party and the technical and economic focus of most of the members of the group.¹

The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1972-1976). The third plan for the first time expressed concern about the neglect of primary education (which is still reaching less than 50 percent of the age group) and proposed a more vigorous expansion policy to help overcome the deficits created by the emphasis on postprimary education during the previous decade. Long-term objectives were to make primary education available to a rapidly increasing proportion of the age group, aiming at universal primary education (UPE) by 2000, and providing sufficient manpower of the kind needed by the Ugandan economy. Secondary education was to be strictly limited to manpower needs until the target of UPE had been reached. Substantial increase in primary teacher training capacity was used to insure that the proportion of primary leavers going on in the system would be maintained, without having to expand the size of the cohort entering secondary school. Notwithstanding, the priority given to primary education, the proportion of the recurrent
expenditures to be spent on primary education over the plan period, was projected to decline slightly to about 41 percent. The only significant expansion (about 5 percent) is for teacher training for both primary and secondary teachers, both of which were forms of post-primary education. In short, while enrollment targets for primary education were substantially increased, the financial allocation patterns remained largely unchanged in the plan.

**Ministry of Planning and the Planning Section of the Ministry of Education.** The fourth five-year plan was under consideration in 1975 when a UNESCO/UNDP planning project got underway. Ultimately, this plan was a casualty of the increasingly difficult economic and political situation brought about by the “Economic War” and its consequences. No new five-year plan has been produced since then, although a series of rehabilitation plans and a 10-year development plan for the 1980s were produced. Development plans are largely dominated by economic analysis and reflect their genesis in the Ministry of Economic Development Planning. The education components of the plan originate in the planning section of the Ministry of Education, sometimes in connection with inter-ministerial working groups. The emphasis is on the linkages with the manpower needs of the economy and capital expenditures. In the education sector the plans typically focus on the structure of the educational system, the rates of expansion of the different levels, and capital budgets to support that expansion. The planning section of the Ministry of Education concentrates on compiling statistics, planning capital expenditures including the annual presentation of capital expenditures to the Ministry of Finance, and the supervision of capital development projects.

Policies relating to the goals, content, and operation of the education system are mentioned only in passing, although they are given noticeably more attention in the third plan than in the previous two. These issues are reflected in education goals, curricula, methods and content of teacher training, and in the structure of the examination system. Policy relating to these “softer” aspects of education is left in the hands of the ministry which operates within the general framework of recommendations handed down by the most recent commission report, which may have been a decade or more ago. Periodic national conferences on education supplement and expand on goals set forth by national commissions. These conferences are much more likely to discuss the content and relevance of the curriculum to national aspirations and to make recommendations for revision of both curriculum and examinations. While such deliberations and recommendations usually don’t have any official status, they can be an influential force in shaping subsequent actions of the Ministry of Education.

**National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC).** In 1973, the NCDC was created with centralized responsibility for developing and implementing curriculum for primary and secondary education throughout Uganda. This would provide for the first time an institutional home for systematic thinking and implementation of decisions about curriculum content, teaching methodology, and the needed textbooks and supplementary learning materials.

In 1975, the NCDC sponsored a well publicized national conference attended by 350 people. The report, titled *The Inaugural National Curriculum*, incorporated a number of resolutions and recommendations for the aims and structure of both primary and secondary education, including
the extension of primary education to eight or nine years. This recommendation led to the appointment of a committee on the Structure of Education, which generated its report in 1976. For primary schools and primary teacher training colleges, the report endorsed the approach known as Basic Education for Integrated Rural Development (BEIRD), developed at the Namutamba TTC with the assistance of UNESCO during the first half of the 1970s. The "Namutamba" model was to become national policy and be extended across the country. At the secondary level, the chief inspector of schools issued a directive to all heads of secondary schools, (Circular, August 5, 1975) instructing them to implement a new curriculum. The goals of the new curriculum were increased emphasis on science, math, and practical subjects so that school leavers could be immediately productive in commercial and industrial endeavors. The deliberations of this conference were a major factor in stimulating the need for thinking about Ugandan education and helped to set the stage for the appointment of a new national commission.

The Educational Policy Review Commission (EPRC) 1977

Context. By July 1977 when the Kajubi Commission was appointed, Uganda was experiencing almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as a result of the excesses of the regime of Idi Amin. The expulsion of the British Asians, the devastating decline of the economy, and massive human rights violations, produced a mammoth exodus of high-level personnel, including civil servants, secondary school teachers, and university faculty. External assistance for education from traditional sources was cut off as many countries suspended diplomatic relations with Uganda.

The education system had to cope with new problems such as severe shortages of secondary school teachers (since the majority of post-primary teachers had been expatriates), scarcity of instructional materials, the rising cost of equipment, and crippling shortages of "essential commodities," all of which had to be purchased in cash from international markets.

There was, however, a great feeling of and need for self-reliance instead of a feeling of deprivation and helplessness. Minister Brig. Barnabas Kili expressed this feeling during his speech at the inauguration of the commission:

"In the past, education commissions were chaired by non-Ugandans. Our basic education policies were recommended for us by others. Today we are embarked, under the leadership of our Life President, on a policy of self-reliance in which we ourselves will chart the course and the direction of our development... Ugandans today are the masters of their own destiny, no longer do those from outside the country define our objectives, manage the schools, businesses, and other institutions of the country. This very important fact must be reflected in the training and education of our people..."

The government and the commission, however, took cognisance of what was going on elsewhere in the world through, for example, UNESCO publications such as *Learning to Be* (1972), with its focus on out-of-school education, life-long education, and the learning society. The minister
also explicitly charged the commission to heed the resolutions of the UNESCO/OAU conference of ministers of education held in Lagos, Nigeria in December 1975, which reviewed the progress, or lack there of, made by African countries in achieving the goals set by the Addis Ababa Conference of 1961.

The Castle Commission had completed its report 14 years earlier, shortly after independence. Since then education policy had been based on that foundation as interpreted by a series of three five-year development plans and several ad hoc conferences and various ministry directives and circulars. Economic hardship had substantially undermined the inherited educational structure. There were ample signs of lack of fit between the products of the system and the needs of society; and there was a new sense of national desire to create a Ugandan system of education that reflected the new ideology of the government. There was also a general feeling that a new, comprehensive review of policy was needed to reflect the substantially changed circumstances and goals of Uganda.

*The Commission.* The Education Policy Review Commission was appointed by the minister of education on February 8, 1977, and began work on July 11, 1977. The commission was drawn from government, educational institutions, and the public sector, including: finance, planning and economic development, culture and community development, provincial administration, labor, health, agriculture and forestry, defence, education, Makerere University, parastatal bodies and the private sector: industry. It is significant to note, however, that apart from the headmistress of girls secondary school, there were no women and there were no representatives of religious or voluntary agencies. Two of the 18 members were from the private sector, with the remainder representing either government ministries or education institutions. The commission was chaired by W. Senteza Kajubi, the vice-chancellor of Makerere University and a well-respected Ugandan educator. Kajubi was also the only member of the commission who had served on the Castle Commission. As the minister noted, this was the first time in the country’s history that such a commission had been chaired by a Ugandan.

The planning unit of the Ministry of Education served as the secretariat to the commission. Planning contained three UNESCO experts who provided technical support to the commission and one of them was a co-opted member of the commission, one of two non-Ugandans on the commission. The existence of the UNESCO project to some extent was a factor in promoting the idea of having such a commission. The planning unit had sought a means to contribute to the process of education policy and planning in the difficult circumstances that existed at that point. The idea of a national commission to review the situation and set goals for the future when more normal circumstances had returned, offered a constructive way to invest in the long-term future of education in Uganda.

*The Terms of Reference.* The terms for this commission were much more extensive than those set out for the Castle Commission earlier. They reflected the need for an examination of the goals that Uganda had for its education system in the light of nearly 15 years of experience with the colonial model, inherited at independence and maintained pretty much intact. The goals are as follows:
• to review established policy documents and statements, and existing recommendations concerning objectives, structure, content, and policy for education;
• examine education and training in terms of capacity to promote economic, social, and cultural development;
• consider the aims and objectives, structure, examinations, curriculum, scope, organization, and financing of education;
• propose long range objectives for human resource development for each level of education reaffirming those that exist where appropriat;
• recommend curricular, administrative, and financial policies to facilitate effective implementation of objectives and programs by institutions, regions, and communities; and
• recommend a procedure and mechanism for periodic review of education policies in the context of changing social, economic, and administrative conditions.

Commission Activities. To carry out its task, the commission adopted procedures that included widespread consultations, formation of a number of study groups, and extensive deliberations. The planning unit prepared a set of background papers in advance for members of the commission. One paper analyzed the recommendations of the previous commission in terms of the extent to which they had been implemented and the factors that had influenced the degree of implementation. Another sought to assess the current state of education development in the country and the economic feasibility of alternative proposals for the future development of education. Others summarized and described the education development experience of selected African or Asian countries—India, Kenya, Nigeria, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania. Planning documents from these countries were also made available. Part of the commission also traveled to Kenya to meet with senior education officials and to study Harambee schools and village polytechnics, two alternatives to traditional schools that were unique to Kenya.

As had happened in 1963, members of the Castle Commission visited the provinces in groups. However, by the late 1970s the government’s policy of “taking services to the people” had resulted in the country being divided into 10 Provinces and 33 Districts instead of the four provinces and 16 districts which had previously existed. The visits were preceded by advance meetings organized by the provincial commissioners for education with various planning teams, parents, educators, religious leaders, and other interested people. During the visits the members toured educational institutions to study local conditions. At sessions held in Kampala, the commission received representatives from the major educational institutions as well as teachers’ associations and religious bodies. More than 650 people presented their views to the commission and 123 written memoranda were received. Throughout this process, the planning unit, acting as the secretariat, prepared agendas, wrote minutes and provided summary accounts of oral and written submissions.

In addition to the 18 original members and four co-opted members, the commission set up 11 subcommittees with almost 100 additional members to study various topics and report back to the commission. Each subcommittee focused on one area of education: finance, administration, teacher education, private education, or language policy. Terms of reference and background notes were prepared for each of these working groups by staff of the planning unit, who also
served as secretaries to the groups. The groups met during the first five months of 1978 and each prepared a report that was discussed by full commission and made into a series of chapter drafts.

The commission had the benefit of views of educationists and experienced individuals from outside Uganda. Discussions were held with a visiting American expert on education planning, and subsequently the commission spent two weeks working with a three-person team from UNESCO which provided a critique of the existing draft and made suggestions about policy issues and ways to improve the organization of the final report.

**The Report.** Although given only six months to do its work and report its findings, the commission successfully concluded its efforts in December 1977, and approved a final draft report at the end of January 1978. The report was submitted to the minister of education in February 1979. Unfortunately, Uganda was soon to be engaged in the “Liberation War” with Tanzania. The findings of the report had to be shelved. The commission made a deliberate decision not to submit the report to the Cabinet or the public, feeling that it could not be implemented. They nursed the hope that it could be used later when order was restored in the country. The commission report was never given a final editing or printed for wider circulation. Copies were given to members of the commission and some of the more active members of the subcommittees (As a result few copies are available today except those kept by individuals.) The planning unit drafted a shorter summary statement as a possible basis for a government White Paper, but it was never used. (UNESCO, 1979. p. 36)

The full report was more than 400 pages and contained 279 recommendations. The report examines not only formal education, but a wide range of education activities undertaken by other ministries and their potential for contributing to development and ways in which they could be linked to the school system. The recommendations were categorized into four groups which combined criteria of time and cost: short-term, two to three years with limited costs; medium-term, during the period of the next development plan with significant cost implications for new activities; long-term, after the next development plan and requiring long-term preparation for fundamental changes in education with correspondingly high financial demands; and continuous, for changes that have already been implemented or express a general intention or orientation. Their recommendations are couched in the context of an articulate analysis of the way in which education has evolved and the desired roles that it should play in a self-reliant Uganda. The final chapter sets out a strategy for implementing its proposed policies, beginning with an interim period of several years when only minor administrative changes will be made until stability returns and a new development plan can be implemented.

The commission was explicitly concerned with the financing of education and sought to be both fiscally and politically prudent in the timing and extent of its recommendations. The report makes clear that its major recommendations for primary and secondary education are dependent on the economy achieving at least a 3 percent growth rate. Their concerns for financing however, did not extend to costing of implications or explicitly linking them to assumptions about revenue availability. They had sufficient understanding to see the limitations but presumably felt the details should be left to the then active and competent planning unit of the Ministry of Education.
The Education Policy Review Process. The commission, as requested in their terms of reference, also sets out a plan for ongoing policy review which had four components: 1) creation of a permanent advisory committee on education policy composed of senior education officials and representatives of related ministries to monitor progress and provide advice during the annual budget process; 2) a systematic monitoring and evaluation of commission recommendations which would form the basis for interim reviews of implementation at the end of each phase, about every three years; 3) a comprehensive review of education policy should take place every 10 years with a national commission; and 4) active public participation in the making of education policy should occur regularly by means of a large national conference about once every three years.

Outcome. Taken as a whole, both the consultative process used by the commission and the quality of the final report are noteworthy. The phasing categories for recommendations and the way in which they are linked to larger economic situation are realistic and would provide some clear guidelines for decision-makers charged with implementing them. Their recommendations for ongoing education policy-making were unusual and potentially very effective. Part of the reason for the effectiveness of the commission lay in the systematic and extensive preparation and support provided to the commission by the planning unit of the Ministry of Education. The planning unit was able to draw upon the resources and personnel made available by an ongoing UNESCO project to provide strong technical assistance to the commission.

Another source of strength for the commission was provided by the sequence of educational reform activities that proceeded it. The Namutamba experiment, which began as a pilot project in 1968, led to a tested and generally well regarded approach to primary education that had succeeded in generating wide understanding and support, partly through a series of national conferences. Complementing the Namutamba approach were the recommendations resulting from the large national conference which inaugurated the National Curriculum Development Center. The commission report builds on these activities and solidifies those outcomes by giving them shape and legitimacy. The commission served to culminate a participatory education process that had occurred in the recent past and laid the foundation for consensus. The result was a clear and generally accepted set of recommendations which had high potential for guiding future educational development.

Unfortunately the Commission report and many of its recommendations were overwhelmed by the turmoil of the war and the successive governments that occurred as the commission finished its work. For example, when Professor Wandira, a well-known educator, took over briefly as minister of education, he initiated weekly sessions to discuss the philosophy and major recommendations of the commission. But before going through much of the report, he became the vice-chancellor of Makerere and the process ceased under the new minister. After that, the report was never formally referred to again, although ministry officials occasionally consulted it from under their desks. The experience of the commission did live on informally to resurface again, 10 years later when the next commission was appointed with Senteza Kajubi once again in the chair.
Phase III - Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reforms (1980-1992)

The first half of the 1980s was a period of constant political and military instability which had a devastating affect an educational system already much weakened by the turbulence of the Amin regime. The war of liberation lasted six months and caused extensive destruction to all parts of society, including the schools. It was followed in swift succession by the short-lived administrations of Luie, Binaisa, and Muwanga. The second Obote government came to power in December 1980. However, almost from the beginning, his army was fighting a war against Museveni's guerilla forces. This continued struggle frequently resulted in schools being attacked and looted with pupils and teachers killed or forced to flee. Managing to keep any sort of an education system functioning represented a significant achievement under the circumstances. Ministers of education came and went in rapid fashion; resources available for education were very limited; the administrative structure needed to provide supplies and learning materials and effective training and support for teachers functioned only sporadically.

In this atmosphere, education policy-making was largely a matter of ad hoc management for survival. No new policy formation initiatives were undertaken, although the various plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction put forth during this period all contained provisions for the rebuilding of education, mostly at the secondary and tertiary levels. The Ten-Year Development Plan of 1981 reflected many of the ongoing themes in education policy, most of which were fully articulated in the report of the Education Policy Review Commission (EPRC) of 1979. The Africanization of the curriculum along the lines of the Namutamba model continued with the revision of the primary school curriculum by the NCDC supported by changes in the primary leaving examination under the newly created Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB).

The early 1980s also saw a rapid expansion of secondary education, somewhat contrary to the emphasis of the EPRC report, which had given priority to primary education and suggested a variety of mechanisms for creating alternatives to absorb the great demand for secondary education. External support from Canada and the third International Development Association (IDA) education loan from the World Bank enabled a large increase capacity of secondary education to take place. The traditional emphasis on expensive, boarding secondary schools was dropped and a rapid expansion of community-based day secondary schools occurred. In the early 1980s, several hundred of these schools were established, often by taking over existing premises from primary schools. Government undertook only to provide teachers' salaries and small additional grants for recurrent costs. These changes were complemented by the introduction of a new secondary curriculum which replaced the one in use since 1972. The new curriculum moved away from the old core subjects in favor of a variety of marketable skills in agriculture, technical, and vocational areas. In reality, the extreme scarcity of any kind of texts, learning materials, or even basic equipment, meant that few schools were able to implement the changes, with most offering only some agriculture and principles of accounting.

These de facto implementations of policy changes in education were largely taken without the benefit of an approved policy framework, although many of the changes were congruent with long-term trends in Ugandan education. The rapid expansion of secondary education, although
contrary to the recommendations of the 1979 EPRC report, in fact continue the trends that were apparent throughout the 1960s when secondary enrollment targets were consistently over-fulfilled at the expense of primary enrollments. The Ten-Year Development Plan does provide support for some of these changes in secondary education, but there appears to have been little consultation or participation by those outside of government in the formulation of the education policies contained in that document. The effect of these changes at the school level was limited by the severe deprivation that existed. The daily reality of what happened at both primary and secondary schools depended heavily on the extent to which local communities, through parents’ associations, were willing and able to provide support for individual schools. Institutions like technical schools and teacher training colleges fared badly because they did not have a local base in the community from which they could get additional support.

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) finally came to power in 1986, after the brief reign of the Okellos who had overthrown Obote in 1985, they inherited a school system that was more a skeleton than a functioning educational enterprise. On paper, substantial progress had been made in increasing secondary enrollments, Africanizing the curriculum, and developing management and teacher training structures during the previous five years. In reality, the system was near total collapse with most institutions being empty shells where little viable education was taking place.

**The Educational Policy Review Commission (EPRC) 1987**

*Context.* When the NRM government came to power in January 1986, Uganda was near total disarray. Social services, including education and the physical infrastructure of the country, were a shambles. To break the cycle of vicious dictators, coups, and armed forces terrorizing the populace, the NRM sought to bring about not just a change of guards, but a fundamental change in the moral leadership and quality of life. The cornerstone of the NRM’s political policy and economic thinking was a commitment to “man, his security, freedom, dignity, quality of life, and happiness.” As part of this commitment, the NRM realized that to bring about a real change, the population would have to be provided with basic education and socialized into the new ideals embodied in the philosophy of the NRM.

*Our schools and colleges must play an important role in uniting our people. The curriculum and content of education and the various sporting and cultural activities in these institutions must be revitalized to reflect the national character and constitute the beginning of a genuine mutual respect and understanding.*

*(1985 NRM)*

In the belief that it was possible to produce fundamental changes in all aspects of life in Uganda, the NRM government instituted a series of committees and commissions to investigate the situation in all areas of government. Groups were appointed to study corruption, abuse of human rights, Makerere University, the restructuring of Kyambogo National Training College, the Constitution, the structure of local government, economic adjustment and long-term development in Uganda, and of course education. In this larger context of reform and setting new directions,

The Commission. The 27 members of the commission were drawn from a cross-section of people including educators, educational administrators, and others. There were nine university professors from five faculties at Makerere, three heads of secondary schools, two principals of tertiary education institutions, seven senior officers from the Ministry of Education, representatives from the ministries of labour, planning, water, local government, and youth and culture. The private sector was represented by the general manager from a brewery and the chair of the Export Promotion Council. One representative of the NRM secretariat completed the roster. An education officer from the planning unit of the Ministry of Education served as the secretary to the commission.

Although intended to be a diverse body and self-described as such, the commission was composed predominantly of people directly involved in education as either senior administrators or professors at Makerere. There were only four women, two of whom were headmistresses of girls’ secondary schools. There was no explicit representation of religious bodies—although one of the headmistresses was a catholic nun—nor of the Uganda Teachers Association or parents. There was some overlap with the 1977 commission, most notably in the role of the chair who had served on both of the previous commissions, but two others also served on the 1977 commission. The overall impression of the membership suggests that the commission was intended to function primarily as a body of professional educators who knew Uganda’s education history well and could interpret the demands of both society and the new government for a more relevant and responsive education system.

Terms of Reference. The terms of reference set out 10 specific tasks for the commission. They included recommending policies at all levels—primary, secondary and tertiary—for the aims and objectives of education, the structure of the system, integration of commercial and technical subjects, improved management, cost reduction and financing, location, assessment and examination, and the role of the private sector. The terms refer explicitly to a resolution from UNESCO’s 40th International Conference on education with regard to integrating academic and practical subjects into the curriculum. They also explicitly charge the commission with addressing the issue of the structure of the system, the number of years for primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Both of these reflect long-standing education policy issues in Uganda which continued to be matters of debate. With regard to structure of primary education the wording “having regard to the tender age at which pupils leave primary schools...” strongly suggests that pupils are too young to do productive work when they leave primary school and hence a lengthening of the primary cycle would be desirable.

Unspoken, but clear in the minds of the commission were the goals of the new government and of society for the education system. In the preface to the commission report, these are expressed clearly as a sense that “education is failing...to promote a sense of national unity, self-reliance, social justice and equity, scientific and technological knowledge, cultural values, literacy and a sense of mutual social responsibility to a degree that society would like to see.” Everyone in Uganda was desperately seeking to avoid a continuation of the chaos and violence that had
dominated the past 15 years. The new NRM government and its relatively moderate policies were offering a ray of hope that this commission sought to keep alive by serious reforms of the education system.

A member of the planning unit of the Ministry of Education again served as secretary to the commission, in fact he had been part of the secretariat for the 1977 commission. In contrast, however, by 1987 the unit was much less able to provide a substantive base of data and documentation for the commission, than had been the case in 1977. A decade of war and decay had rendered the collection of education statistics nearly impossible and the production of thoughtful policy papers based on field investigations very difficult. As a result, their ability to support the commission was much more limited.

**Commission Activities.** The commission began its work by creating 10 subcommittees and co-opting 16 additional members from outside the Ministry of Education to work on these committees. Secretaries to the subcommittees were selected from within the Ministry of Education. With support from an ongoing IDA loan and from Oxford University Press, members of the commission visited education institutions in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, India, and the United Kingdom. The commission invited special resource papers from knowledgeable persons, solicited memoranda from individuals and institutions, receiving a total of 507 papers. In addition the commission visited and held public sessions in the major towns and almost all of the districts and important educational institutions in the country. The origins of all the memoranda received are listed at the end of the commission’s report. They represent an amazingly diverse and extensive range of people and institutions which certainly provided the members with access to a considerable range of opinion and facts.

During the course of its work, the commission received inputs from an expatriate consultant supported by the fourth IDA education loan. The consultant provided suggestions on structuring the commission’s draft; articulating the recommendations of the commission in operational terms; prioritizing the major recommendations and policy options; identifying appropriate implementation strategies; and assessing the resource implications and costing the various proposed strategies.

The commission had access to and was cognizant of the contents of a number of documents from international donors or conferences. The commission had access to the World Bank’s 1988 policy document on *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa* which called on each African nation to:

> ...embrace the task of formulating and implementing an internally coherent set of policies that reflects the nation’s unique history and aspirations and that effectively addresses its own recently exacerbated problems in the education and training sector.

Another influential document was the Four-Year Rehabilitation and Development Plan (1988-1991) which articulates as the major goals of national education development: intensifying efforts to restructure the education curriculum with a view to producing responsible citizens; restoring
education facilities destroyed by the war; expanding technical and commercial education; and expanding education opportunities for the growing population, including the establishment of another university. The commission also consulted the Makerere University Visitation Committee Report (1987) and the Ministry of Education’s 1986 policy statement regarding the establishment of the Institute of Teacher Education Kyambogo (ITEK) as an autonomous institution.

The commission also felt it necessary to constantly assess the economic and political feasibility of the various education proposals put forward by the new government. The declared policy of the NRM government, for example, was at that time more concerned with rehabilitating the productive sectors of industry, agriculture, and transport which would then generate income for future investment in education and other social services. This meant that limited resources would be available for education in the short run. In addition, the proceeding years of turmoil had accentuated religious, ethnic, and regional differences. These feelings had affected the distribution and establishment of new education institutions, and produced strong reactions to issues such as the choice of language for elementary education, the political content of education, and access to post-primary education. Conditions during the past decade had led to education development that was largely the result of uncontrolled social demand. Government’s financing of schools declined as costs escalated, and the burden of constructing and maintaining schools was progressively left to parents and communities. The commission was very much aware of the fragility of the political situation and that an important aspect of its task was the building of an acceptable consensus in Uganda about the future of education.

The Report. The commission’s report was not finished until January 1989, 18 months after their appointment. The lengthy gestation reflected both the extent and complexity of the issues with which they had to contend, and the limited resources available to the secretariat. Unlike previous commissions, this one was operating in a context where the old consensus about education had been largely destroyed, and the process of creating new, shared visions for education had to be undertaken. The commission’s process of public hearings and deliberations were intended to assist in the development of a new consensus, which realistically would be built on a combination of memories of the old, high quality system which Uganda had in the 1960s and the current realities as espoused by the ideology and goals of the NRM. This was a task that the commission could only hope to initiate and as a result its recommendations would reflect a process that was still very much in progress and had yet to reach final conclusions.

This ambiguity is reflected to some degree in the 220 recommendations, spread throughout the commission’s 236-page report. The report’s summary reduces these to 68 major recommendations grouped under the headings of general recommendations, and eight specific headings which deal with each education level or component. Each of these recommendations is categorized as being short-term (1990-1992) or medium-term (1993-1996). Two additional recommendations, the creation of two more universities and the abolition of tuition for P7 and P8, are to be delayed until the 1996-2000. In general, the recommendations reflect an emphasis on: values, national goals and objectives of education; curricular reforms to impart practical skills which will foster national development and close the gap between schooling and life; and the critical need to improve the motivation and capability of teachers through improving their training and support.
The report provides some summary estimates of the costs of their recommendations, with the two phases together estimated to cost nearly 700 billion shillings. The bulk of the costs are for building new primary and secondary schools, and much of that expense is to be incurred by communities and local governments that have responsibility for primary education. An appendix prepared by the planning unit indicates estimated costs for the major recommendations, broken down annually (1990-1995) for development expenditures, and an estimate for additional annual recurrent expenditures for the period. The estimates are supported by a detailed set of notes indicating the assumptions made and the way in which the estimates have been calculated.\(^3\) The appendices also contain a fairly detailed attempt to estimate unit costs for primary and secondary education—an essential part of assessing the cost implications of recommendations for enrollment increases. Although the estimates are rough, their presentation and documentation are more detailed and thus more useful than those in previous commission reports. However, the enormous size of the total estimates is so improbable in Uganda’s current economic circumstances that the lack of any prioritization by the commission leaves a substantial political and planning task to the ministry charged with translating the commission report into a workable set of investment strategies.

**Outcome.** The EPRC report was produced at a time of gradually increasing internal and external confidence in Uganda’s future. Three years of relative stability, the generally moderate policies and actions of the NRM government, and increasing evidence of life in the economy all were contributing to a cautious raising of hopes. Donors that had withdrawn from assisting education in Uganda in the 1970s were returning or sending exploratory teams to assess the situation and identify possible investment options. Donors expected that the report would be quickly followed by a government White Paper endorsing most of the recommendations of the commission. With the publication of an official statement of government education policies, hopefully accompanied by clear statements of priorities, the stage would be set for donor-government dialogue leading to the design of specific education assistance packages.

At this point, the general disintegration of shared visions for Uganda as a nation and about the role of education in that nation prolonged the process while continued dialogue took place around national ideology and its implementation within the education system. Instead of a relatively quick process of publication of the commission report followed by government review and promulgation of a White Paper, a series of protracted discussions were begun. The commission report has never been officially published or distributed, although copies were generally available to senior officials, commission members, and to the various donor teams which visited during this period.\(^4\) The lack of a publicly available version, however, meant that there was no opportunity or forum for public reaction to the recommendations and a general cloud of uncertainty about government’s reaction to the contents.

*The Government White Paper.* The response of the government to the EPRC is perhaps best described by the minister’s statement that introduces the March 1991 version of the White Paper.

> Government, therefore, adopted an innovative and democratic approach, and appointed a White Paper Committee consisting of eleven members...to examine the
Report of the EPRC and to identify the recommendations which are acceptable and feasible to implement, and to make amendments where necessary...The committee co-opted 40 more people...it carried out consultations as extensively as possible...before writing the White Paper...(for) presentation to the Cabinet. This White Paper deliberately departs from the established traditional approach whereby a White Paper is prepared to be read side-by-side with the commission's report....The White Paper makes revolutionary innovations and, therefore, simplifies the reading process...it is easily readable and adequately intelligible on its own.

Much of the rationale for this unusual procedure is couched in terms of the need for financial prudence in the context of the still very limited resources available for social services and therefore postpones the implementation period for phase one into 1992/93-1996/97. Supporting this rationale are the substantially reworked cost estimates contained in the March 1991 version of the White Paper. The paper rejects the cost estimates calculated by a team of consultants shortly after the completion of the EPRC report, and substitutes a quite detailed set of assumptions and costs of its own which are contained in a 20-page annex. The White Paper indicates that the new estimates are more thorough, including many costs omitted from the earlier version, take into account inflation in the intervening period, use a variety of cost-saving and austerity measures throughout, and reflect increases in the payments to teachers which have already been implemented. The result is a substantially higher set of cost estimates, that are nevertheless felt to be attainable with substantial inputs from local communities and help from external donors.

The White Paper has several other notable additions from the perspective of policy formation. Section 599 recommends the creation of a standing planning and monitoring committee to continuously watch over the implementation of the policy elements of the White Paper. The committee will be reporting directly to the minister who is advised to consider a list of 19 organizations or categories of individuals when appointing this committee—including representatives of industries, trade unions, NRM organizations at all levels, and journalists in addition to a wide variety of educators. The committee is to provide regular advice, including a more thorough review every five years, and recommend the appointment of a commission every 10 years. This section fills a vacuum in the EPRC report which doesn’t address ongoing policy formation as directly. Finally the paper also directly addresses the use and management of foreign assistance with a goal of improving efficiency, simplification of aid procedures, and insuring that the such aid will not endanger the national policy of self-reliance.

In addition to strengthening the technical aspects of the report, the White Paper process also reflects an underlying tension between some of the ideological goals of at least part of the NRM leadership and the recommendations of the EPRC which are largely derived from the perspective of professional educators. The NRM is committed to revolutionary reform of the psyche of Ugandans to build a new and viable basis for a nation. In this context, the education system must play a critical role in socializing Uganda’s youth into these new values and attitudes. Any official statement of goals and investments for education must be congruent with these objectives.
The need to deal with these issues at length after the completion of the commission's report is in part a reflection of the composition—with little representation of the more ideological components of the NRM—of the EPRC Commission and an apparent feeling on the part of government that their priority concerns were not adequately represented in the recommendations. It is also a reflection of the inability, or perhaps inappropriateness, of the commission to resolve certain issues on which no general consensus in the larger society had been achieved. Topics such as the language of instruction in primary school, the degree of vocationalization of the curriculum, and the extension of primary education to P8 are all contentious to varying degrees and reflect different conceptions of the role of the education system. The chairman of the EPRC commission felt strongly that the choice and use of a national language was not an appropriate topic for an education commission. Such decisions were political and should rightly be made by government directly, not through the an advisory commission on education. Putting such unresolved political issues on the agenda of the commission jeopardizes its ability to reach consensus on education issues and creates potential conflicts between the commission and the government.

Once the EPRC had presented its report, the government embarked on an internal debate, which finally led to the appointment of what was in effect another commission to redo the work of the first and produce its own report, which was intended to stand on its own (the 1991 draft contained more than 400 pages), thereby effectively replacing the report of the original commission. This process took more than two years, and by the end of 1992 had not led to an officially approved (by the Cabinet and the National Resistance Council) or published White Paper (a first draft was produced in April 1990 and a second draft in March 1991). During this period, the drafts of the White Paper were circulating unofficially among donors and senior officials, but everyone was strongly cautioned not to refer to them in any written documents.

*Five Year Education Sector Investment Program.* Concurrent with the White Paper process, the Ministry of Education, through its Project Implementation Unit, commissioned a series of pre-investment studies in education. Ultimately, there were 16 of these studies, most written by teams of Ugandan and external consultants. The studies covered a range of topics including: supply and demand for teachers, financing of education, science and technical education, examinations, texts and instructional materials, management, instructional radio, and an enrollment projection model. At the same time the planning unit undertook a school census in 1989 and finished summarizing the results in 1991. In addition, some initial results from the national census of 1991 were available by mid-1991.

After three years of intensive effort, with all these components available, the groundwork had been laid for the government to produce an investment program for the education sector. The program was intended to revitalize the education sector by implementing the recommendations that emerged from the EPRC and White Paper process. The investment program went through a series of drafts and the process included a detailed review of each project by a large group of
senior officials in the Ministry of Education. The final version was ready in mid-1991. The program contains a general overview and a series of project profiles grouped by priority into three categories. The projects are linked to policy objectives derived from the EPRC and the White Paper. In all there are 39 projects, winnowed from a much larger set of suggestions in the preinvestment studies. For 24 of the projects, priorities are also assigned to project components indicating the order or extent to which they should be implemented if resources are not sufficient for the complete project. The priorities are intended to insure that a balanced package of complementary investments will occur even if the full program can't be funded.

The total package amounted to nearly U.S. $700 million in development costs. The investment program was intended to provide a basis for negotiations with external donors by providing a prioritized list of investments from which they could choose. In theory, this would promote coordination and control of investment in education so that the government's goals and priorities would be maintained through a series of separate activities by different donors.

So far, the effectiveness of the investment program has fallen short of what was hoped for. Lack of experience and capacity prolonged the process and made the results indicative rather than definitive in terms of investments. And, as in the case of the White Paper, the process was somewhat overtaken by concurrent activities of donors driven by their own development timetables. The investment program is notable because it was predominantly a Ugandan initiative in which the ministry took direct responsibility for planning investments in education, and because it produced a prolonged discussion of education priorities by a large group of officials. The learning aspects of the process were substantial, although the results were less influential than expected. While not a complete success, nevertheless, the investment program represents an impressive achievement and an experience that could portend increasing capacity and resolve on the part of the government to manage the development of their education system.

The Role of Donors in Policy-Making. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education was faced with the urgent need to proceed in its discussions with external donors who were ready and in some cases eager to make substantial investments in the reconstruction of Uganda's education system. The ministry recognized that there would be a relatively short-lived window of opportunity when the donor's attentions were focused on Uganda. Donors needed to get significant commitments from the ministry within the framework of some coherent national policies for education. Both the donors and ministry were trapped in the void between an unpublished set of EPRC recommendations and the absence of a White Paper. As the delay dragged on with no signs of early resolution, the donors and the ministry began to proceed with a tacit understanding that actions would have to be taken without an officially approved set of policies. Both groups tried to work generally within the context of the unpublished EPRC report without being too explicit. Plans were floated on several occasions to have a conference of government and donors where the White Paper would be presented and both donors and government could come to some shared understandings of how they could best work together to rebuild education. After several postponements, the idea was finally dropped—although a small one-day meeting for information sharing was organized by the World Bank with local representatives of donors and Ministry of Education officials in July 1991.
Lacking any formally approved plans, the Ministry of Education quietly proceeded to implement selected recommendations including certain aspects of cost sharing at secondary and higher education institutions, and guidelines controlling fees and their management at primary schools. While desirable from the commission's perspective, the chair commented that implementing recommendations piecemeal failed to link those actions to complementary actions that were supposed to take place simultaneously. In several instances this led to disturbances because added costs were not seen to be balanced by additional benefits for students or parents. By being forced to act on an ad hoc basis the ministry was unable to implement a coherent policy framework that would have made the changes both more productive and more acceptable.

Similarly, in dealings with the donors the government missed the opportunity to negotiate from a position of clarity and strength which would have given it more control over donor proposals. Conversely, it could also be said that the eagerness and haste dictated by the internal timetables and political forces within various donor institutions failed to allow a realistic time period for the government to formulate and agree upon a coherent set of policies. There are lessons to be learned on both sides from the experience.

During the late 1980s, the government was dealing with a number of external donors, many of whom had previous or ongoing histories of involvement in the development of education in Uganda. Two donors, the World Bank and USAID, were proposing quite substantial investments in basic education and teacher training that would inevitably have a major impact on policy and implementation. Their activities during this period became part of the de facto policy formation process.

The World Bank - IDA Loans. The World Bank's involvement in education in Uganda is reflected in a series of four IDA loans. The first IDA credit supported construction of secondary schools, but was hampered by the ongoing civil strife and decline in the economy. The second credit provided assistance to technical, agricultural, and medical education and some teacher training. The third credit focused on rehabilitation and provision of instructional materials, a theme continued in the fourth credit and scheduled to finish in 1992. A fifth credit with major emphasis on improving the quality of primary education and rationalizing primary teacher training was begun in 1993.

The activities financed by these loans were managed through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) located within the Ministry of Education. This unit was instrumental in providing financial and managerial support to the ministry during the process of producing its five-year investment program for education. The PIU also provided an institutional framework for ongoing policy dialogue between the World Bank and the ministry, a physical and administrative location where bank personnel and Ugandan educators could meet and discuss policy issues and their implications. By making available Project Preparation Facilities (interim funds that can be used to prepare for an upcoming credit), the PIU has been able to support a variety of policy formulation activities, including much of the work of the EPRC. These funds give the ministry the mechanism and resources needed to hire local and international consultants, carry out needed studies, undertake data collection and analysis, and produce documents.
In the period following the EPRC report, the World Bank through the mechanism described above, has played a major role in the policy formation process. Their involvement has supported and encouraged Ugandan policy efforts that resulted in the investment program, and it has also influenced policy priorities as implemented with a strong emphasis on basic education. Throughout the 1980s other donors played a more minor role in education due in part to modest levels of investment and partly to the lack of ongoing structures for continual dialogue with the government.

**USAID.** The United States was actively involved in supporting Ugandan education until it was forced to withdraw as a result of the Amin regime’s mid-1970s disturbances. Their support included building a number of major educational institutions, including a comprehensive girls’ school, four large regional teacher training colleges, and a variety of buildings for central institutions. USAID began exploring a renewal of its support for education by sending a team of consultants in March 1990 to undertake a survey of the basic education subsector. This team produced a comprehensive report which outlined a number of options for consideration by USAID and Uganda. The team included one Ministry of Education official and a local Ugandan educator as a consultant. The report subsequently formed the basis for the next steps in the USAID program development process, but appears to have had relatively little visibility or impact on policy thinking in the Ministry of Education.

After the sector survey, several short consultant missions took place, but it wasn’t until November 1991 that USAID was able to begin moving ahead more decisively. By early 1992, USAID was talking seriously about a very substantial program of assistance to basic education. Initially USAID’s plans had little linkage with the reform and restructuring concepts contained in the emerging design of the fifth IDA credit, which was further along in its development. In late 1991, informal cooperation between the Bank and USAID led to a much closer relationship between the two proposed investments in which each agreed to support the overall strategy contained in the IDA loan by taking responsibility for different inputs. While the IDA design was the result of extensive dialogue between the World Bank and the Ministry of Education, the donor collaboration was largely the product of informal contacts between the two donors with little involvement of the Ugandan government.

Throughout this process USAID’s efforts involved only minor inputs from the government. Although USAID sought to consult with the government regularly and obtain their input, there were no ongoing links between the two to facilitate that kind of dialogue. USAID was hampered by the absence of a resident human resources development officer and the lack of any recent history of cooperation in the field of education. The large size of the planned investment, provisionally planned to be more than $100 million, could have significant implications on how policy for basic education is ultimately implemented.

**UNESCO/UNDP.** UNESCO has perhaps the longest continual donor involvement in education in Uganda. It is unique among the donors in creating a local commission with a permanent structure that maintains a presence and can establish long-term relationships with the government. UNESCO’s participation in policy formation is thus often greater than might be expected from
the modest resources that it has available for investment. An example is provided by the Namutamba rural education project from the 1970s which gradually evolved into a nationally accepted policy for the curriculum of primary education and is officially recognized by the 1978 EPRC report. The current White Paper continues that support, adapting it to fit within NRM policy goals. In 1992, UNESCO had a small project working on updating and testing that curriculum, seeking to finance a longer-term project.

During the late 1980s, UNESCO's presence was modest, but did include continuing support for several experts in the planning unit of the Ministry of Education which provided the technical support for the 1987 Education Policy Review Commission. UNESCO also provides access to international thinking and trends in education through its support for Ugandan participation in regular international meetings of education officials. The result is a more diffuse kind of influence, but one which helps to shape the thinking of senior education officials about education and desirable policy goals.

Forty Years of Education Policy-Making in Uganda

The overriding impression left by the pattern of education policy-making in Uganda since the de Bunsen Committee report in 1953 is one of continuity and consistency despite periods of great turmoil and instability. Persistent themes include: increasing access, providing skilled manpower for development, providing vocationally relevant skill training, and building a complete and high quality system from primary school through university. Over the years there have been gradual shifts in emphasis, from secondary and higher levels to basic education, but these have been gradual as both internal and external beliefs about the role of education in development have shifted. The continuity is partly due to the existence of a strong cadre of professional educators who emerged during the 1960s after independence and who have continued to exert strong influences on education development since then. Political leaders and administrators have come and gone, but this cadre has remained, moving in and out of positions in Makerere University, the teacher training colleges, and overseas with international agencies. An underlying source of continuity has always been the structure and philosophy of education inherited from the colonial power. Unlike many African countries, Uganda has not made any significant changes in the structure of education since independence. Although muted, the ongoing presence of education ideals still shared with Great Britain has served as an anchor during stormy times.

Education policy-making in Uganda has always had strong ties to the larger international community of educators, first through the dominance of the colonial power, and later through active participation by Ugandan educators in a variety of international forums, where evolving understandings of the nature and function of education in Africa have emerged. A gradual shift in the directness of external influence is apparent in the functioning of successive commissions. At first, the influence was by direct membership, including the chair of commissions until the 1970s. Later, the influence is more muted, coming from technical working staff and from international policy documents and conference proceedings and the socialization of Ugandan educators. Uganda has thus broadened its contacts substantially beyond Great Britain, but has sought to integrate new ideas into the existing structure, rather than attempt radical changes.
External donors have played a significant role in education policy, particularly as implemented in specific contexts. Donors with the resources for major investments have had substantial influences on important components of the education system, such as the institutional structure of teacher education. Smaller donors have supported reforms in specific aspects of the curriculum, such as teaching English or French, new approaches to science, or revised math syllabi. The influence of specific donors waxes and wanes with their own priorities and ability to carry out programs. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, USAID was quite influential, helping to restructure all primary teacher training into four regional colleges, yet since the mid-1970s they have had little influence until recently. UNESCO's influence was strong in the 1970s, but has been modest during the 1980s. The World Bank has been gradually expanding its activities and its involvement in policy issues to the point where in the early 1990s it is clearly the most influential of the donors in affecting the direction of education investments.

The influence of any donor also depends on the strength and political support that the Ministry of Education can muster at a given point. When there is a strong minister supported by the political leaders, then the ministry can and does take greater leadership in implementing policy. When the ministry is in disarray from frequent personnel changes, political conflict, or lack of competent technical staff, then external donors, if only by default, are much more likely to be dominant in policy interpretation. Even when the ministry is not dominant, all parties tend to operate within the larger framework set out by the most recent commission, perhaps in part because the commission reports have all been largely congruent with international thinking prevailing at the time.

Policy formation in Uganda in the early 1990s is somewhat in transition, as the NRM government seeks to put its stamp more firmly on the policy framework that emerged from the most recent commission. The process of producing the five-year investment plan and the prolonged gestation of the White Paper both reflect some tension between the perspectives of professional educators, national as well as international, and alternative ideas emanating from the NRM leadership. The NRM is seeking more fundamental reforms in education which it believes must be a prime source of socialization for the new citizens needed to ensure a politically stable Uganda.

Donors, individually and collectively, indicate a desire to help Uganda strengthen its policy-making capability. Yet, the internal dynamics of the assistance process, driven as it is by timetables and forces within each donor, often works in ways that undermine or overshadow indigenous attempts to formulate and implement education policies. Initial attempts by the ministry at costing and prioritizing implementation plans have tended to produce overly ambitious and sometimes unrealistic plans, but they do represent definite movement toward taking control of the process. But as Uganda emerges from a long period of decay and disruption, the urgency of the needs often overshadows all questions of policy, leading to pragmatic ad hoc decisions that determine de facto policy. The government has demonstrated its determination to move beyond that mode and has taken some steps in that direction. Government and the donors can work together to invest in people and procedures that can move Uganda toward improved self-sufficiency in making and implementing education policy in the future.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Event</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Government Department of Education first created</td>
<td>First director of education appointed - first recognition by the government of responsibility for African education.</td>
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<td>Central advisory council for African Education and district boards of education created</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Phelps-Stokes Commission</td>
<td>The commission assessed education needs and noted that education was controlled solely by missions in cooperation with chiefs. Strongly suggested the need for government supervision and financial assistance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>de la Warr Commission on Higher Education</td>
<td>Makerere College became an interterritorial postsecondary higher college with an autonomous governing body and independent finances provided by Britain and ultimately the three East African governments.</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>Thomas Education Committee Report</td>
<td>Reviewed allocations of grants-in-aid and set out education development plan for 1941-45. In 1942 an agreement with missions led to establishment of selected schools and training colleges as self-governing institutions jointly run by the missions and the government, and with government contributions balancing their budgets.</td>
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<td>Advisory Council for African Education expanded to include representatives of women and all provinces of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Worthington Development Plan</td>
<td>Government began taking some responsibility for teacher salaries. In 1950 the government began providing grants-in-aid to cover teacher salaries and a fixed capitation grant toward other recurrent expenses.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td><em>African Education in Uganda</em> The DeBunsen Committee Report</td>
<td>Recommended substantial expansion of education with goal of preparing Uganda for self-rule (a major policy shift). Detailed recommendations, including expansion at all levels (e.g. doubling primary enrollment), reorganizing and improving teacher training, lengthening primary education from 6 to 8 years, and shortening secondary education from 6 to 4 years (neither ultimately accepted), and the devolution of responsibility for primary education to local authorities.</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>Technical Education Development Plan</td>
<td>Ambitious plan to train artisans by building a dozen schools. Ultimately an expensive failure since capable students preferred academic secondary education.</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>Uganda Government Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1958-1959</td>
<td>Education policy statement that led to revised Education Ordinance (No. 13 of 1959) accepted the principle of interracial schools and further delineated responsibilities for schools between local and central authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Uganda's Independence</td>
<td>The constitutional changes that accompanied independence shifted responsibility for administration and control of education: primary education largely placed in hands of Kingdom governments, regional administrations, and urban authorities. Kingdom of Buganda was given responsibility for most forms of secondary education. Most education still effectively managed by missionary organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Uganda’s First Five-Year Plan, 1961-1966</td>
<td>Major objectives: Africanization of the administration and high-level manpower pro-</td>
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</table>
duction for economic growth. At the end of the plan primary-level targets were underfulfilled and secondary-level targets, both budgetary and enrollment, had been substantially exceeded.


The first major education policy event after independence which set the guidelines for the development of a national educational system for Uganda.

1963 *Uganda Government Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1963*


1963 *Uganda Ministry of Education Circular No. 66 of 1963*

Sets out government’s implementation plan for the recommendations in the Castle Commission Report.

1963 *Education (Amendment) Act No. 83 of 1963*

Amended the Uganda Education Ordinance to explicitly give government the power to plan future shape of education. Charged education committees with preparing a development plan for approval by the minister of education.

1966 *Work for Progress—Uganda’s Second Five-Year Plan, 1966-1971*

Primary emphasis placed on high-level manpower development for economic growth, including for first-time targets for postsecondary education. Education to get 17.5 percent of central capital budget, up from first five-year plan. Share of postprimary education also continued to rise. Again, targets for primary level underfulfilled and those for postprimary exceeded by end of the planning period.
1968  High Level Manpower Survey, 1967 and Analyses of Requirements, 1967-1981  Prepared by Ministry of Planning. Bottlenecks in implementation of the Five-year plan indicated the lack of high-level manpower. To address this need, economy would have to expand to support subsequent expansion of lower levels of education. Report emphasized “Ugandanization” of economy by 1981, with steps needed to achieve that goal. Sought to improve on limits of previous studies done in 1958 and 1962-64. Recommended creation of inter-ministerial Manpower Planning Board.

1970  The Makerere University Kampala Act  Established the National University at Makerere. This act was the outcome of the Visitation Committee of the same year which reported on a wide range of issues relating to the role, the internal organization, the administration, and the relationship of Makerere to the government.

1971  Uganda’s Third Five-Year Plan, 1971-1976  Placed priority on primary education, seeking to provide better distribution and places for increasing proportions of the age group (53 percent of cohort entering by 1971) culminating in UPE by the year 2000. Plans major expansion of primary teacher training, nearly tripling recurrent expenditures for it over the period. Growth at postprimary strictly limited to manpower needs, emphasis placed on improving quality. However, proportion of recurrent expenditures for primary education actually projected to decrease by 1 percent over the plan period.

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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Circular from Chief Inspector of Schools (August 5, 1975)</td>
<td>Instructed the heads of all secondary schools to implement a new curriculum which emphasized science, math, and practical subjects with the aim of producing students who could be more immediately productive in society.</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>The Action Programme: A Three-Year Economic Rehabilitation, 1977-1980</td>
<td>Recognized centrality of education for long-term economic development and the current scarcity of trained manpower as a barrier to rehabilitation. Focused on a crash manpower development program to provide key manpower, with emphasis on agriculture, commerce, and transportation to meet economic needs.</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td><em>The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda.</em> Commonwealth Secretariat Team Report (Dudley Seers, Chair)</td>
<td>International team asked to assess the task of rehabilitating the Ugandan economy by the Uganda National Liberation Front government immediately after taking power in April 1979. Focused on immediate economic needs for rehabilitation. For education recommended supplies, equipment, radios, and some expatriate staff to strengthen science and technology. Emphasis mostly on postprimary level needs and the return to previous standards while maintaining gains in enrollment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>A Ten-Year Development Plan, 1981-1990</td>
<td>Recognized human resources as the key to economic development. Education objectives were to rehabilitate education system, repair war damages, achieve UPE by 2000, revise curricula, in particular to implement the Namutamba model of Basic Education for National Development, and expand teacher training. Also emphasized a series of cost-saving measures including secondary day</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Document Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>The Rehabilitation and Development Plan, 1988-1992</td>
<td>The initial development plan of the NRM government. The education section emphasized the need to restructure curriculum to produce responsible citizens, rebuild schools, expand technical and commercial education, and expand access at all levels including establishing another university.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td><em>Education for National Integration and Development. Report of the Education Policy Review Commission (The Second Kajubi Commission.)</em></td>
<td>The most recent national review of educational policies. A large commission that sought to combine the professional educational perspectives with the ideologies and policies of the National Resistance Movement government. Many of the education recommendations have their roots in the first Kajubi Commission report.</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td><em>Uganda Education Sector Review: Issues and Option</em></td>
<td>USAID-financed sector survey that focused on basic education. Document represented the first step in USAID reentering Uganda’s education sector since the mid-1970s during the Amin years when its support for the regional primary teacher training colleges came to an abrupt end. Subsequent consultant teams produced a series of documents leading to substantial support for primary education in the 1990s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Government White Paper on Implementation of the Recommendations of the Report of the EPRC (March, 1991)</td>
<td>This version of the white paper was produced after several years of deliberation and revision. At the time of publication it had not been approved by the Cabinet or the National Resistance Council. In general, it supports and amplifies the recommendations of the EPRC with an eye toward making them more congruent with national ideology. Controversy continues over some policies including the use of Swahili as a medium of instruction, adding P8 to primary schools, and extensive vocationalization of secondary education.</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Five Year Education Sector Investment Programme, 1992 - 1997</td>
<td>An unusual document that reflects intensive work by the Ministry of Education over a three-year period to produce a comprehensive investment plan for coordination of both internal and external investments in education. Contains 39 project profiles categorized into three priority categories, with components of some projects also prioritized to facilitate balanced investment under conditions of limited resources. Investments systematically linked to goals set forth in EPRC and White Paper.</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Education Reconstruction and Development Project</em>. World Bank Appraisal Report for Fifth Education Loan</td>
<td>Report culminated a two-year process of joint study and preparation between Ministry of Education and World Bank, supported consultants, both internal and external. Project focuses on rationalization of primary teacher education system by means of a sweeping reform that integrates pre-service training with in-service training and support activities based at district-level TTCs. Loan provides funds to reconstruct 10 - 14 such TTCs and restructure their activities. Reform is jointly supported by a USAID project that will be concurrent.</td>
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Endnotes

1. For a detailed discussion of the process followed by this working group see Nicholas Bennett's article on *Educational Cost Evaluation*. The article also provides an instructive insight into the dialogue between various forces as reflected in successive estimates and targets which are considered before government makes a final decision which appears in the published plan. The membership of all the working parties can be found in Appendix D of the second five-year plan.

2. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the Planning Unit in supporting the first Kajubi Commission see Chapter III of the final project report. (UNESCO: 1979) Although written from the perspective of an expatriate advisor, the report provides useful insight into the kind of analytic documentation that is needed to allow a national commission to do its work on the basis of systematic and accessible data. Policy issues that may otherwise be vaguely perceived can be highlighted and documented in ways that promote constructive discussion.

3. These improvements can largely be traced to the introduction and use of personal computers during the decade between the two commissions. Although the basic data about schools available in 1987 was much less reliable than in 1978, the ability to set up databases and to do cost estimates with spreadsheets substantially enhances the ability of the Planning Unit to provide technical support to the work of a Commission.

4. Donor agencies and team members commonly have much better access to a variety of documents than even quite senior government officials. The entire Ministry of Education may possess only one or two copies of critical documents, and these will be mostly inaccessible. Donor agencies routinely share unofficially among themselves so that visiting teams, even when composed of 'experts' with no previous experience in Uganda, will normally have much better access to documentation about education than local officials. The high cost of access to functioning copy machines, the awkward size and length of many documents, and the lack of any easily accessible repository for documents, means that government officials still depend largely on oral communications and personal experience. Meetings between donors and government officials are characterized by significant imbalance in access to details about the current situation and details of planned or recommended interventions by donors. The problem is compounded by lack of time and experience of many officials in working from document-based information rather than oral and personal sources. The result is often the de facto abrogation of policy-making responsibility to the donors by the government.

5. The commission chair reported little or no interference or pressure from the government during its deliberations. If the government was concerned about certain issues, it made no direct attempts to influence the commission during its deliberations. In that sense, this was truly an advisory commission which was independent of the government.
Bibliography


Education Policy Formation in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa

François Orivel and Christopher Shaw

The process of education policy formation in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa has several distinctive characteristics in comparison with approaches used in Anglophone Africa. The two case studies of Francophone countries in this collection, Mali and Senegal, provide a partial basis for analyzing the methods that are used. The cases are supplemented by the experiences of other countries described elsewhere in the literature or known to the authors. When read in conjunction with the chapter on education policy commissions in Anglophone Africa, this chapter highlights several interesting differences and provides early evidence on the emergence of an interesting new policy formation process.

The chapter contains four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the historical development of education in sub-Saharan Francophone Africa. The analysis traces three groups of countries through four broad phases from independence to today. At several points in their historical development, selected education policies are cited as examples, and their development and implementation are briefly examined.

The second section examines the context in which education policy formation occurred. Powerful forces in society and in the education system, which have limited the effective domain of the policy debate, are identified. This section discusses the internal tensions and inconsistencies that have helped to create the vertical character of the Francophone sub-Saharan Africa education systems. The argument is made that many policies were conceived as additions to the existing education systems and did not address the structural issues and the fundamental philosophy of education. The section concludes with a discussion of the major actors in the policy formation process and their role in the formation and implementation of education policy.

In the third and main section of the chapter, six different policy-making mechanisms are analyzed: "Etat Généraux;" national development plans; ministerial declarations and reform of the education law; the round table mechanism; conditionality attached to externally funded education projects; and recent experimental work in developing national sector declarations.

The chapter concludes by restating its limited nature and suggesting directions for future work that aim at broadening our understanding of the policy formation process. It is self evident that only with deeper understanding will it be possible to judge the utility of different policy formation mechanisms, and identify both gaps in the knowledge base and relative strengths and weaknesses of methodologies currently in use.
Historical Overview

At the time of independence, most education systems in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa were very underdeveloped. Rates of schooling were desperately low, and very few qualified nationals were available to run the countries after the departure of the colonial powers. During the last 30 years, education systems in the Francophone countries have moved in different directions at varying speeds. The result is that their systems can now be grouped into three broad categories.

First, a dominant group of countries in the franc zone have modelled their education systems on that of France. They include Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo and Gabon. These education systems are subject to strong regulatory control. Their education systems are highly centralized, and their teachers are civil servants. The statutes governing teachers are strong and favor teachers. Posting and reassignments are done by seniority and are driven by staff preferences rather than school needs. Teachers' salaries are linked to civil service pay scales, and salaries of private teachers cannot be less than the salary of civil servant teachers.

A second, smaller group of countries can be characterized either by their break with French influence or their historical link to Belgium or countries other than France. This group includes Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Guinea and Madagascar. As a result, the attachment of these countries to the French model and the direct similarities with it are weaker than those in the first group. Their education systems are centralized but have teachers' statutes that are weaker and less favorable for teachers. In some of these countries Christian missionary groups continue to have a strong influence on the education system.

A third group of countries exhibits features of both the first two groups. This group includes countries such as Chad, Mauritania and Mali. They have a “dual” system—that is they have both the classic centralized system, strongly influenced by the French model, and a parallel system that is still developing. The parallel system is often either a spontaneous community activity, or is based on religious or confessional education. Community schooling has developed as the population's response to the inability of central government to deliver basic education services, sometimes as the result of civil war or insecurity. Religious schools meet the population’s preference for religious-based education (madrasahs and koranic schools) with funding often going directly to the schools from external or local religious groups in the community. Such schools enroll somewhere from 2-10 percent of the students. In many cases, the state has little or no influence over such schools and the quality of education is often low. Not surprisingly, in countries where the parallel system exists and is growing, the formal school system is known as the ecole francaise, the French school.

How did the education systems in Francophone Africa reach these three different points? Since the early 1960s, the development of the education systems in most Francophone African countries has evolved in four phases: (a) expansion and consolidation based mainly on the model of the previous colonial power; (b) the “progressist” movement of the 1970s; (c) a period characterized by the emergence of a national identity; and (d) the current period of
severe fiscal crisis and increasing uncertainty. The first decade after independence has been called the golden age for Francophone education systems; the second, a decade of aborted reforms; and the third, a decade of diminishing resources per pupil and constant struggle with shrinking budgets.

In the first phase, as a consequence of the limited numbers of qualified personnel after independence, the priority of the new rulers was the rapid production of a new elite. The quickest way to achieve this objective was the adoption of an education system close to that of France, utilizing French textbooks and French teachers. Strictly speaking, the African Francophone countries did not inherit the French education system; rather they adopted many of its salient characteristics as the most effective way of resolving the problem posed by the shortage of trained personnel. Thus, this first phase was characterized by a prolongation of the colonial influence and the maintenance of many features of the colonial system. Emphasis was placed on the preparation of a limited number of civil servants for manning and running the newly independent countries. There was a heavy reliance on regional African and metropolitan French education institutions. French governments were generous in assisting African governments in implementing this policy and thousands of French teachers were made available for free to independent countries.

During this phase, Francophone African education systems were highly satisfactory for the select few who had the schooling opportunities. Teachers were well qualified; French cooperation provided enough textbooks; salaries for a few indigenous teachers were highly attractive by comparison with average income; students were automatically entitled to scholarships; and, after graduation, a public-sector job. Going to primary school was considered a first step on the ladder that led to secondary and higher education and access to white-collar employment.

With the adoption of the colonial model by the independent rulers and their preoccupation with the immediate manpower needs of the new nation, only minor attention was given to the policy formation process for the education sector. Government was highly centralized with decision-making power in the hands of a few. Policy formation was rarely an explicit collaborative process. In sum, policy was inherited—often unquestioningly—as part of the colonial legacy. The bilateral advisors were often the major actors in the policy formation process.

The second phase, emerging in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, was driven by the intellectual “progressist” movement of the 1970s. French intellectuals interested in the problems of the Third World were, working primarily from a marxist or neo-marxist tradition. Many were inspired by the work of, or had even been trained by Professor Althusser of the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris. Intellectuals from the Third World, like Frantz Fanon, reinforced this approach. In this intellectual climate, the analysis of education systems was heavily biased in favor of an idealistic vision that would satisfy a country’s educational needs through the elimination of external constraints. In parallel with the “progressist” movement, policy was driven both by the Pan-African movement and by international conferences and workshops often organized by specialized agencies setting objectives for African education.
systems. Regional and international conferences of heads of state, in such places as Addis Ababa (1962) and Lagos (1980)—followed by Jomtien in 1989—placed pressure on African countries to adopt universal primary education (UPE) as one of the central education objectives of the continent.

The third phase was, in many countries, a direct consequence of the external “progressist” movement of the 1970s. With a lag of five to 10 years—the time for African post-graduates to complete their training and establish their careers back home—this phase was the local counterpart of the externally driven “progressist” phase. Centered on an affirmation of independence, it was characterized by a process aimed at consolidating “nation building” and supporting the emergence of a distinctive national identity. Presented sometimes as a movement that aimed to “break with the white man’s schools,” it often emphasized the use of local languages in schools, promoted national identity through the use of a non-western “national” language, introduced productive work in the schools and stressed the need to adapt the content of the programs to the “national context.”

These reforms also sought to introduce mass education systems, but were incomplete in that they did not take into account the fiscal and budgetary constraints resulting from countries’ resource bases. Thus, it did not attempt to define a system’s priorities in the light of the state’s possibilities. Two examples of reform policies are given below: the use of mother tongues as the initial language of instruction, and the introduction of educational TV in schools.

**Mother Tongues.** In contrast to former British and Belgian colonies, the countries linked to France did not promote vernacular languages or use them for instruction in primary schools. Notable exceptions existed for awhile in Guinea and Madagascar, but have since been dropped. Support for changing the language policy came largely from international agencies, notably UNESCO, which supported the use of vernaculars as an essential part of preserving the cultural heritage. African nationalists and European critics saw the use of vernaculars as a way of escaping from dependence on the colonial power and affirming national identity. Additional support came from educators and learning specialists who argued that literacy in one’s first language was an essential foundation for self-development and facilitated learning the basic content of all subjects. In higher grades, other languages could then be safely introduced.

The strongly centralized French education system, with its emphasis on preserving quality and equivalence with education in metropolitan France, resisted these changes. Indeed the promotion of French language and culture as the core of France’s “mission civilisatrice” had been thoroughly absorbed by most African educational leaders, and worked strongly against changing language policy in education. The contrast with other African countries is striking on this issue, and demonstrates how powerful the context of the prevailing ideologies are in determining the outcome of policy and practice. Adding to the challenge was the existence of many vernaculars, some spoken by relatively small populations, which complicated and rendered more expensive the utilization of local languages for instruction. The reaction of
parents to this reform was at best mixed. Elite groups arranged for exemption of their children and others saw one of the underlying motivating reasons for their children's schooling disappear. Demand for education declined. In this context, modest attempts at innovation made little progress and were dropped, as the countries reverted to the sole use of French as the language of instruction from the beginning of primary school. The influence of French bilateral assistance on this issue was significant, with teachers, textbooks and financial aid all playing a part.

Educational TV. Educational media is perhaps the most externally motivated of all innovations, being the creation of western technologies adapted by western economists and educators seeking to improve the quality and reduce the cost of delivering education. A small-scale experiment with educational TV in Niger preceded a large, long-term project in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite massive investment by external agencies and some technical success, educational TV was finally dropped, in no small part due to local opposition from teachers and parents. Again, what was instrumental in the ultimate reject of educational TV, was its failing to generate widespread understanding and support for change during both policy formation and implementation. However, the fate of this innovation may represent as much a judgement of its lack of appropriateness by the recipient countries as it does a failure of the policy process.

The processes used to make education policy during the second and third phases were driven by and derived from the aspirations of the post-independence period with emphasis on asserting a distinct national identity. Several processes coexisted, and in some cases, competed for dominance during this phase. The two major instruments were that of the Etat Généraux—derived from the French heritage, and that of Five Year National Development Plans— as promoted by the United National Development Program. Both of these mechanisms were intended to produce a series of "projects" suitable for inclusion on the government’s investment budget. The consequences for the recurrent or operational budget of such investment projects were often overlooked or underestimated. These policy and planning practices worked relatively well, as long as access to education was limited to a small elite group. However, by the mid-1970s, tensions began to increase with the pressures for increased access and a move to a mass system. The number of pupils increased much more rapidly than national production and wealth, forcing public budgets to allocate a large and growing part of the GDP to education.

These developments set the stage for the fourth and current phase where political uncertainty, increased civil disturbances, growing numbers of refugees, a new wave of democratization in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, and the decline of the single-party state have led to growing tensions in the education systems. In the late 1970s, many Francophone countries began to face serious budgetary difficulties, especially in financing education. Real salaries were on the decline, textbooks tended to disappear from schools, pupil/teacher ratios sky-rocketed, school buildings deteriorated, schooling ratios ceased their previous rapid increase, and school quality declined noticeably. During the late 1980s, the fiscal situation became even worse as the recurrent cost implications of the past investment projects became apparent. Tensions
rose further when graduates found the entrance to public jobs difficult and no viable alternatives elsewhere in the job market.

Is this historical framework unique to the groups of Francophone countries? Certainly not, but some characteristics have made the situation more difficult for Francophone countries. Compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth was higher in these countries from independence until 1985, but lower ever since. French aid was more massive than that of other former colonial powers, which had the effect of hiding the real budgetary constraints and reinforcing the illusion that the adopted system was workable. The low initial enrollments in school contributed to this illusion, insofar as the countries’ resources seemed quite sufficient to support the system. The many French expatriate teachers introduced a typical Gallic ideology that included the public monopoly of education, the untouchable status of civil servants, and the way schools should be organized regardless of the context—a “good” school is defined in a normative way, not a pragmatic one. The idea of optimizing cost-effectiveness of education under financial constraints was not considered appropriate.

Today the number of processes used to generate education policy has increased. In some countries there has been a second or third occurrence of an Etat Généraux. With the fiscal crisis of the 1980s and consequent increased influence of external agencies, education policy formation has relied increasingly on the technocratic and financial analysis used by the external partners. Very recently, aware of the weakness of Etat Généraux, and with dissatisfaction growing with donor-driven policies and the policy conditionality used by some external agencies, experiments in policy formation have emerged in several countries—Benin, Chad, Mali and Guinea. These experiments have moved away from a project-based approach towards the explicit definition of a national sector-wide education policy. National governments, in conjunction with technicians from external agencies, have developed national policy statements that have been subsequently used to mobilize external funds and to channel both national and external resources to the priority programs defined in the policy statement.

The Policy Context and the Dominant Policy Actors

This section presents the context in which policy formation occurs. It examines the powerful forces that limit the options that each of the major actors in the policy formation process can realistically consider.

The prevailing philosophy of education in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by the central objective adopted at the time of independence. At that time, the role of the education system was defined as the selection and preparation of a high-quality elite needed to staff the centralized administrations and economies of the Francophone countries. To meet this objective, successive administrations introduced powerful incentives into the system in order to guarantee the adequate production of such elites. Not surprisingly, such incentives have resulted in major distortions of the system. Over time, they have acquired the status of uncontestable rights conferred on those in the education system. Although subsequently the resource base and the employment opportunities of countries have deteriorated, questioning
these rights is politically risky. Suggesting possible changes in these acquired rights was seen as a potential cause of social unrest and occasionally led to civil disturbance. But, more subtly, it was sometimes interpreted as undermining the implicit goal of the education system and thus endangering the regular supply of the elite needed for the continued administration of the country.

What are these incentives that have been built into the Francophone education systems? At their root was the strict equivalence of the national diploma (baccalaureate) with that of France. This equivalence—maintained until very recently—was needed to guarantee access to the French higher education system, for which there are no tuition costs for students coming from Francophone countries. Even in today's situation, where entry to French universities by overseas students is based on the examination of a candidate's file (sur dossier) rather than a right of entry conferred by the baccalaureate, in many countries success at the baccalaureate confers automatic acceptance by a national tertiary education institution. Thus, entry to university is rarely competitive. In fact, certification of completion of secondary education and entry to higher education are done through the same mechanism: the baccalaureate. Even today, the baccalaureate is automatically linked to attendance at university, which removes an opportunity for regulating the system. In addition, university attendance automatically guarantees a student scholarship to cover living expenses. Furthermore, until the mid-1980s, graduation from the national university led to protected employment at relatively high salaries in the civil service. The automatic linkage between the baccalaureate, university entry, a student scholarship and eventual civil service employment was a policy nexus that was defended rigorously by strong power groups. In many countries debate about these policy issues was "off-limits" and the range of policy options tacitly reduced. As a result, the discussion tended to focus on issues related to the lower levels of the education system.

Another characteristic particular to the Francophone education systems has been its strong bias toward vertical rather than horizontal development. The vertical model is a pyramid with a narrow base and regular development of its vertical dimension, while the horizontal one has the opposite shape, a large base and a thin vertical dimension. Historically, developed countries have created horizontal models, and introduced vertical ones much later, when their level of development was relatively advanced. France for instance set up UPE IN 1882 (Jules Ferry Laws), and introduced its vertical dimension only in the late 1950s, 70 years later.

The vertical model places priority on human resource development and production of a national elite. In such a system the objective of each educational level is to prepare for the following one and not for the job market. The vertical model assumes that once admitted to schools the demand for continuation and progression through the system will be both high and robust.

In contrast, the horizontal model sets universal literacy as a first priority and it is driven by strong demand for primary education. Before developing secondary and higher education for all primary school leavers, the horizontal approach insures that basic education is provided to everybody. Thus, the horizontal model regulates the development of secondary and higher levels of education by limiting transition rates from one level to the next. The horizontal
model is criticized for strictly limiting the development of secondary and higher education to meet the demands of the job market for qualified personnel.

While policy statements in many Francophone countries espouse the rhetoric of horizontal systems, almost all education systems in Francophone Africa can be characterized as vertical. Why is this? In addition to the strong historical legacy, there are three reasons: low demand for primary education; the distorting effect of high rates of repetition; and the use of private education as a "back-door" route to further education. Information on the demand for education is notoriously hard to document and little is available from recent statistics. However, enrollment figures from rural areas show that the demand for access to basic education is low in many Francophone countries. In the Sahelian region, religious and other cultural factors continue to present a barrier to formal schooling, and the vulnerability of traditional agriculture to fluctuations in climatic conditions has often placed formal schooling beyond the reach of many. Even in middle-income Francophone countries, the demand for primary schooling in rural areas remains low.

The second reason is based on the distorting effect of the high levels of repetition, which in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa, are half as much as those levels in Anglophone Africa. Official policy often indicates that a limited percent of pupils in the last grade of primary school should transit to secondary education, thus implying a strict regulation of flows in the system and reinforcing its horizontal nature. However, reality is often far different. In some countries, the directors of secondary schools, while instructed to limit recruitment to 30 or 35 pupils in each new class, take advantage of the high demand for secondary education and over-enroll their entrance classes, accepting those who have made informal payments. Even where such practices are not common, the real rate of transition from primary to secondary school is often much higher than the planned transition rate. Pupils simply repeat the final primary grade several times until they gain access to secondary education. Studies have shown that, while the annual transition rate from the final grade of primary to the first grade of secondary education is 30 percent, the effective proportion of those in the final grade of primary who eventually reach secondary education over a three- or four-year period can be as high as 80 percent. Under such circumstances, any attempt to pursue a policy aimed at a horizontal system is rapidly distorted toward the vertical.

A further example serves to illustrate this. In Chad, as in most Francophone countries, repetition rates at the primary level are very high, more than 30 percent each school year. The proportion of repeaters in the last year of primary education is 38 percent. National officials agree that such a high level of repetition is a waste of resources. But what is interesting is their reaction when asked the question: "Who" should or could be allowed to repeat grades? For some officials, it was clear that only the best students should be allowed to repeat because they had a better chance to be promoted to secondary education than low achievers. Thus, the principle role of the last year of primary education was seen, not as the mastery of the curriculum of that year, but as the preparation of pupils for admittance to secondary education.
The third explanation relates to the role the private education system plays, especially at the secondary and technical levels. Where demand for continuation throughout the system is high, but the capacity of secondary education is limited, parents have only state schools to which they can turn to fulfill the aspirations that they hold for their children. With high demand for continuation and limited places at the next level, pressure to repeat is high. However, where a private school system exists, it often has the same distorting effect as high repetition. When pupils fail to gain immediate access to secondary education because of the rigorous application of transition targets and limits on the number of times a pupil may repeat a grade, those from families who have the necessary resources and who are excluded from the state system, re-enroll in the private system in order to obtain “back-door” access to the secondary system. At a different level this mechanism will be familiar to many from the developed world where “crammers” are part of the regular strategy of parents to secure the continuation of their offspring into further education. Thus, the private system often weakens the supposedly rigorous regulation of the system and contributes to a move from a horizontal to a more vertical system.

The de facto vertical nature of Francophone African systems and their central objective of preparing elites increasingly came into conflict with education objectives that were being defined outside Africa in international meetings of heads of state and ministers of education. The influence of such conferences as Addis Ababa (1962), Lagos (1980) and Jomtien (1989) was powerful in all of Africa. Each of these events increased awareness of the goal of UPE and championed its acceptance as a central education objective for the continent. Yet, the introduction of UPE as an objective implies a transition to a horizontal education system. The commitment to the preparation of the elite, the incentives that reinforce the vertical nature of the system, the distortions brought about through high repetition, the difficulty of limiting the transition from primary to secondary, and the “right” of those with the baccalaureate to enter university have all operated to reinforce the system’s vertical characteristics. There is thus an automatism built into the system that transmits any expansion at lower education levels up the education pyramid and leads the system to expand at all levels. As progress toward UPE is made, the expansion moves upwards in the system, diverting scarce resources from the goal of UPE.

Who have been the major policy actors in education and what has been their role? The next few paragraphs will briefly examine five groups of actors: government, especially the ministries of education and finance; teachers; other national groups such as local communities and associations; parents; and the external partners, both bilateral donors and multilateral financing agencies.

Government is not a single homogeneous unit with a single coherent education policy. The first distinction to be made is that between the ministry of education and the rest of the government. Contrary to expectation, the ministry of education has a limited role in setting policy for the education system. While issues relating to the content of the curriculum, pedagogy and teacher training are generally controlled by the education ministry, decisions about key resources are rarely controlled by the ministry of education. A critical example is
the hiring and salaries of education staff. In the majority of Francophone sub-Saharan countries teachers are civil servants; setting salaries and benefits is not an area in which the ministry of education plays an active role. In fact, in many countries the preparation and administration of the civil service salary budget is done outside sectoral ministries. The size of the non-salary budget for the ministry of education is often in the hands of the ministry of finance, although its distribution by level of education and type of expenditure is normally left to the ministry of education. Thus, most key decisions on resource allocation in education are made by government, but outside the sector. In fact, decisions on public expenditure and many decisions on more than 80 percent of the personnel budget are not made by the ministry of education at all.

Policies on higher education student grants and occasionally the national examination and certification systems are also created and implemented by government outside the ministry of education. Relatively small changes in either of the two areas have the potential to lead to social unrest and civil disturbance. To avoid destabilizing the government, many administrations have either removed these issues from the policy agenda or have placed their management with the central organs of government.

A further point is the gap between policy rhetoric by politicians and senior sector managers, and the translation of policy into operational procedures by sector staff. A good example of this problem is the effect of high levels of repetition on a policy designed to regulate the flows of students through the system. Discontinuity between the rhetoric of a policy declaration and its implementation are often quite different from those intended by the policymakers. Often, conservative forces manage to neutralize policies that would change the existing distributions of power and advantage.

Teachers as a group are important policy actors, and often have a disproportionate role in the education policy formation process. Their current role mirrors the statutes of the inherited colonial system, because during the early years of independence, their job was reinforced by association with large numbers of expatriate teachers. Teachers are heavily unionized and constitute a major political force in most of the Francophone countries. Their approach to education policy has been dictated more by pedagogical criteria than by cost-effectiveness. They have often been responsible for the distortion or rejection of education policy either through direct action or through the continuation of practices that undermine policy reforms.

Where the state has been unable to provide or maintain the basic schooling facilities, local communities have tended to step forward. In Chad for example, about half of the basic schools are of community origin. Expatriated communities of African nationals have served as external funding sources and sponsored the creation of educational facilities in their places of origin. Often such initiatives have preceded any rational planning by the state education authorities, which have found themselves faced with a fait accompli. The same phenomenon has occurred through the initiatives and pressure of local personalities on behalf of their locality. Following independence, governments adopted an attitude toward missionary education closely mirroring that of France, which has a tradition of secular education and is
barely tolerant of religious influence in education. This is not the case of those Francophone countries whose earlier attachment was to Belgium rather than France. In these countries, especially Zaire, the role of the churches in the management and provision of education remains dominant. In the Francophone tradition, the role of the parent and teacher's associations (PTAs) has been weak and there has been a tendency to avoid any movement to unify individual associations at the national or regional level. The idea that education is the business of the state, specifically the central government, remains one of the central principles of the education policy in Francophone Africa.

Parents are the main protagonists in these community-based groups, but as a group they also have had an effect on policy. While they rarely participate in the policy formation process, their reaction to policy often determines whether the proposed policy is effectively implemented. They react to policy by “voting with their feet.” Several of the reform policies of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, which aimed at the introduction of local languages as the medium of instruction or the “ruralization” of primary education, were effectively rejected by parents.

Donors have always played a disproportionately large role in the education policy formation process. The situation in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa is similar to other regions of the developing world. In the period immediately following independence, France had a dominant role through the presence of its technical assistance personnel and the large numbers of cooperant teachers. In the 1960s and 1970s, the specialized agencies of the United Nations (UNESCO and UNICEF) were seen as neutral sources of reform ideas and as pools of international expertise available to assist the developing countries in their policy formation. In more recent years, the major multilateral institutions—especially the World Bank—have come to dominate the policy debate through the extensive use of conditionality attached to external financing of education. Even the IMF has had an impact on the education systems through the rigorous policies aimed at reducing the public finance deficit, which often implied a freeze on civil service personnel, including teachers.

Major Policy-making Mechanisms

In this section we describe six different policy-making mechanisms used to varying degrees in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. There are: (a) Etat Généraux; (b) National Development Plans; (c) ministry declarations and reform laws; (d) roundtables; (e) conditionality; and (f) some recent experimental approaches using national sector policy declarations.

*Etat Généraux.* Between 1978 and 1982, several governments in the region organized national meetings, the “Etat Généraux” of education. The label *Etat Généraux* goes back to the time of the French Revolution (1789), when Louis XVI called together a kind of national assembly representing the three main social classes—aristocrats, clergy and the third class, namely all other groups—in order to make reform proposals concerning major social issues of that time. The more recent *Etat Généraux* of education were asked to discuss the causes of discontent and to propose education reforms. All social forces were supposed to be represented, but as the social elite was highly concentrated in public employment, a majority of
participants came from education authorities, teacher trade unions, other interested ministries, political forces, churches, employer organizations, youth movements, and women’s associations.

The major innovation of these État Généraux, compared to current practices in the education sector, is the preparation of working papers prior to the meetings. Traditionally, most of the literature on education systems has been produced by international experts and consultants. In contrast, these meetings were conceived as purely national exercises and the papers produced for them were written by local educators. The tone of these papers is therefore quite different. The papers reflect a tension between the desire to celebrate the great achievements of the country in the field of education and the necessity of recognizing the scope of problems that made necessary the setting up of these État Généraux. For instance, one of the documents from Benin extols the glory of its education system: “La Réforme de l’Education et de l’Enseignement au Bénin est un des plus beaux monuments que le génie de notre pays ait jamais construit.”

One major effect of the État Généraux is psychological, by providing part of the population an opportunity to discuss, make suggestions, criticize, and supposedly, to influence national policy. It is also an opportunity to stifle reform proposals that cannot find majority support during the meeting, and provide public visibility to various opponents of government policies.

Several État Généraux have supported the concept of fundamental schooling instead of five or six grades of primary education. This model had been earlier adopted by other developing countries, most East European countries and Scandinavia, and was praised by UNESCO as a progressive model. However, none of the countries has thus far been able to implement it, and very few have been able to ensure universal access to five or six years of primary schooling.

On the whole, it can be said that the État Généraux have had little impact on the development of Francophone education systems and have not contributed significantly to solving any of the problems they are facing. In particular, they have been unable to diffuse the idea that given severe budgetary constraints encountered by most countries, they have had to make a choice between universal literacy and limited access to state financed secondary and higher levels of education. Several reasons may explain the relatively low impact of État Généraux on education policies, in particular the questions of timing and participants of the meetings.

As far as the timing is concerned, the État Généraux of the late 1970s and early 1980s took place before the current period of economic crisis and budgetary constraints. The dominant intellectual atmosphere of that time focussed mainly on the issue of adapting education systems to the national identity and values—implicitly to removing the influences inherited from the colonial past—and of introducing more democratization into the system. By not having to focus on the question of resource limitations, the État Généraux were free to promote education policies that tended to be unrealistic, preserving the advantages of the existing systems and introducing reforms that were seen as “additions” and not as “substitutions.”
The mobilization of participants from many different origins, public as well as private, was to a certain extent an illusion. The presence of the teaching lobby was clearly dominant. In Francophone Africa, a large proportion of the politicians, senior civil servants in ministries outside education, and leaders of various social groups, were and still are teachers. Even parent associations, which should have acted as a counterbalancing force to the teachers, are strongly dominated by teachers, and most of the time run by them. Planning and administration functions for the ministry of education are performed by former teachers, not by professional managers. On the whole, État Généraux were dominated by the teaching profession and missed the opportunity of providing other points of view from society at large.

**National Development Plans.** In Francophone African countries, as in other developing countries, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other external agencies encouraged the use of five-year development plans as a major mechanism to articulate national development policy. Development policy was almost entirely focussed on the investment budget and on externally funded capital projects. Typically, the planning section of the ministry of education would draft the education chapter, and in dialogue with the ministry of finance, set enrollment and investment targets for the education sector. In the absence of other statements about goals and priorities, the development plan would become de facto policy for education. Such plans were primarily products of technical and economic analysis and rarely involved any public discussion or opportunity for inputs from non-governmental sources. In general, the plans served to provide a general context within which government and the ministry of education operated, but the linkage with actual implementation and allocation of resources on an annual basis was generally weak. In the 1980s, the impact of five-year development plans diminished, with other approaches taking on increased importance.

**Ministry Declarations and Reform Laws.** The Francophone system is characterized by an approach that relies heavily on written laws, decrees and formal administrative procedures. Many of these ministries of education are also characterized by a rapid turnover of their senior staff. As a result, those in decision and policy-making positions, realizing that their tenure in the ministry will in all likelihood be short, and that they will not have the time to generate policies and reforms in a consultative manner, tend to present revisions or reform of the written laws and decrees that have not been adequately prepared. A telling example is provided by the government decree in Mali, creating a regional university structure before a feasibility study could be completed. Consequently, the institution exists on paper but has never been operative. The same can be said of the laws, sometimes embedded in the country’s constitution, which fix the duration of compulsory education well above the state’s resource capacity, or those decrees that indicate that textbooks will be free for all pupils and students.

**Roundtables of Donors.** As the fiscal situation deteriorated in the 1980s, countries became increasingly reliant on donors for the funds needed to expand the education system, and in many cases, simply maintain existing levels of effort. Problems of coordination and overlap between donors grew more serious as donors took on larger responsibilities in education. The mechanism of the donor roundtable became more important as governments sought to reduce
the inconsistencies between donors and to maximize the amount of assistance to education.

Roundtable meetings, typically convened by UNDP or the World Bank, served first as pledging conferences at a macroeconomic level to set overall commitments for assistance. They were often followed by sector-specific meetings where donors would decide which subsectors would receive assistance from which donors. During these latter meetings, driven mostly by donor priorities and guidelines, patterns of assistance would be agreed upon. To the extent that the external assistance was critical for the educational activities concerned, the assistance decisions were setting de facto education policy. Activities that received little or no funding were in effect assigned a low priority.

**Conditionality for Assistance.** Once assistance levels were set for specific education activities, each donor proceeded to create the documentation needed to gain internal approval for allocated funds. Where available national documentation was weak and policy statements either nonexistent or very general, donors would often initiate studies designed to define the problem, articulate possible solutions, and ultimately design a project or other form of intervention. Increasingly included in this process were a series of policy conditions that donors would insist was part of the assistance package. In the 1960s and 1970s, such conditions would typically have to do with insuring government contributions to project activities, such as provision of housing, office space and national counterparts. In the 1980s, however, emphasis shifted toward broader conditions that emphasized the policy environment within which education operated. Conditions would typically focus on increasing allocations to primary education, maintaining the overall proportion of government revenues going to education, capping the number of civil servants employed by the government, reducing the allocation of funds to higher education scholarships, introducing innovations to improve the utilization of staff resources (multigrade and double-shift schooling), eliminating “ghost” staff, and implementing other measures aimed at ensuring staff were present and active in the classroom and not posted to superfluous administrative positions.

In effect, these conditions were externally driven policy decisions that were presented to governments as necessary conditions for access to external assistance. Governments often had little choice but to accept because of their need for resources. Yet, generally the policy conditions were not part of any national plan or commitment. Governments acquiesced and did what they could to satisfy the conditions without necessarily being committed to the rationale or goals from which they were derived. In many cases, the highly diverse origin of individual projects led to diverse and sometimes contradictory policy conditionality. Indeed, the very inclusion of certain investment projects in the public investment program sometimes contradicted explicit elements of conditionality attached to other projects.

While this process was used with all countries, the Francophone countries were more vulnerable to the demands of donors because of the relative lack of publicly articulated and generally agreed-upon policy frameworks for education. The result was often a series of ad hoc conditions emanating from different donors, with no integrated sense of national goals and policy for education. Often, the underlying premises of the conditions were at odds with
the education philosophy to which the government and the ruling elite was still firmly committed. In short, there was often no coherent overall sector policy, but rather a collage of ad hoc conditions.

**Recent Experimental Approaches.** African governments and the external development community have become increasingly aware of the problems and limitations inherent in an implicit policy formation process linked to the external financing of specific investment projects. Policies derived from such “policy-based” assistance have been seen at best as an imposition from outside and they have often been only partially understood. They have rarely been explained to the national team responsible for operation and, as a result, have frequently been ignored. At the same time, the fiscal crisis affecting sub-Saharan Africa has sharpened and issues directly related to the macroeconomic policy of a government have gained in importance. The issue of the sustainability of the existing education system and the recurrent cost implications of any investment projects has moved to the forefront of the policy debate.

Aware of such weaknesses, especially the problem related to the “ownership” of education policy by the national team expected to implement it, the World Bank and UNDP have started to use their sector analysis techniques to assist the professionals in government departments in developing national sector policies. A small number of cases can be cited in which such techniques have been applied with varying success, including Benin, Chad, Guinea and Mali.

Rather than defining policy through a series of discrete investment projects that are then aggregated to create a development plan, a conscious attempt has been made to make a clear general statement of policy. Such policy statements have been based upon a series of diagnostic studies and internal workshops held over a period of several months, usually managed and run by national professionals. A noteworthy feature of this experimental approach has been stronger linkage to the macroeconomic framework of the government and greater attention given to the sustainability of all education programs. Using techniques promoted by the external funding agencies, national experts have undertaken diagnostic work aimed at identifying the major problems in the education system. With agreement on the main problem areas, further workshops have developed clear positions on the following three issues: resources available for the education sector; priorities in the government’s programs; and underlying strategy and guiding principles to be adopted in operating and implementing government’s policies.

Studies of the resource situation have involved both analytic work on education costs and financing, and an estimation of the resource picture for education based on the government’s overall macroeconomic situation and the framework that the country expects to follow in the mid-term. In the past, most ministries of education have had little experience with such work and most of the data required to undertake such analysis has not been easily available to them. The results of the process clearly define the resource constraints under which the education system will operate. The underlying feature of this experimental approach has been to make explicit the linkage to the macroeconomic framework of the government and to quantify the sustainability of all education programs.
Arriving at a priority listing of the government’s policy is not without difficulty. The tendency to be comprehensive and all-embracing derives from the national development plan process, and the natural inclination for each subsector or department to have its own “project,” is a hard habit to break. Ministries of education tend to have little difficulty in preparing programs; indeed the difficulty lies more in restraining the number of initiatives and ensuring that they are coherent across the sector. To reinforce adoption of a priority order, the comparison of the cost-effectiveness of more than one alternative and the regular checking of the cost feasibility of possible options is essential. An iterative process is used to ensure that the resource constraints quantified in the macro-economic work are respected. Once again, ministries of education have limited experience in setting priorities, screening programs and almost no experience in calculating the resource requirements needed to implement such programs.

Identifying the underlying strategy and guiding principles to be adopted in order to implement government’s policy requires a view that goes beyond the education sector and takes into consideration the strategies that underpin overall government policy. Thus, overall government policy must have already been clearly articulated.

The resulting national education sector policy statements have been used by sub-Saharan governments, in conjunction with technicians from external agencies, to mobilize external funds and to channel both national and external resources to the priority programs defined in the sector policy statement. In the more successful experiments, the approach was not project-based but adopted a sector-wide view. The case of Guinea is a good example. Using a national policy declaration that focussed on a limited number of issues and gave clear guidance on the priority elements, Guinea was able to mobilize three agencies—the World Bank, French cooperation and USAID—and eventually several other multilateral and bilateral agencies to provide substantial budgetary support rather than earmarked assistance or external finance tied to specific project elements. The strength of the policy declaration lay in its clear grounding in the macroeconomic framework and its adoption of a strategic process that went beyond the education sector and drew on overall government policy for its legitimacy. With such a firm foundation, the sector policy was able to resist the distortions that build up over time. Special interest groups had difficulty inserting additional elements in the program, and were only successful when demonstrating that the additions were possible inside the current resource constraints, that they did not distort the stated priorities, and that they were linked to the underlying overall strategy of government.

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to highlight distinctive characteristics of the education policy-making process in the Francophone sub-Saharan African countries. Several patterns emerge from a study of the experiences of these countries: their shared historical relationship to France and its approach to education; highly centralized, vertical education systems; strongly centralized political and economic administrations; and weakly developed and infrequently used mechanisms for public participation in education policy formation.
The mechanism of the Etat Généraux de l'Éducation is unique to Francophone Africa and has proved to be of limited effectiveness in broadening participation in the dialogue about education policy, or in creating conditions that lead to significant change in education. Under different circumstances, such national consultative meetings could serve as mechanisms to generate awareness and support for new initiatives, and allow diverse components of society to share their perspectives on the role and nature of education.

More hopeful is the emergence of new experimental approaches rooted in a process of self-study by local educators. A lengthy period of study and analysis by national officials is used to produce a series of technical working papers and draft policy documents that can form the basis for a fully informed dialogue about policy options. This foundation then creates a situation where a meaningful national discussion about education could take place, and ultimately lead to the formation of a widely accepted, coherent set of national education policies. The conditions for this last step don’t exist yet in most of these countries; it would require creating new mechanisms or modifying existing procedures to achieve. The experience gained from the experimental approaches may have helped to create an environment in which new processes could be implemented in some countries.

The poor economic conditions in recent years have led to an increase in the impact of donor organizations on policy. To move the center of gravity of policy creation back to the countries themselves will require creating new policy procedures and opening existing ones to greater and more meaningful participation by those outside of the education establishment. The increasing lack of fit between existing education systems, coupled with the aspirations of their citizens and the national economies, creates a situation in which change is necessary. The opportunity to forge new policy-making procedures in this context should not be missed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


This chapter examines the main currents and landmarks in Malian education policy during each of four historical phases, highlighting continuities and discontinuities between eras. The study’s emphasis on the social and political context for education is based on a pattern in Mali which could be characterized as one of education policy formulation as a response to political crisis. Each major political crisis since independence has prompted a major national conference on education, and only political crisis has brought about broad national discussion of education policy. A political crisis is operationally defined here as a dramatic change of government or a serious threat to the stability of an existing regime.

The four phases began with the colonial period in 1887 with the establishment of the first French school, in the city of Kayes. The second phase began with the independence of the Federation of Mali in 1959 and the establishment of the Republic of Mali in 1960. This phase will be referred to as the “Keita Era” after Modibo Keita, the first president of the Republic. The third phase began with the fall of Modibo Keita in a November 1968 military coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traoré. This will be referred to as the “Traoré Era” after the head of state and president in the intervening 23-year period. The fourth and current phase in Malian education policy will be referred to as the “Democratic Era.” The era begins with the coup d’etat in March of 1991, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, which brought an end to the Traoré Era.

Each of these political crises will be discussed in tum and the its impact on Malian education policy formation will be elaborated within the framework of the four phases.

The Colonial Era (1887-1959)

The first French school in what is now Mali, then known as “The French Soudan,” was established in 1887 and christened “l’Ecole des Otages”—the School of Hostages. This revealing name summarized French education policy for all of French West Africa (“Afrique Occidentale Française”—AOF): to train the sons of conquered chiefs to insure loyalty and subservience to colonial power. Lieutenant-Colonel Gallieni, the first French “Commandant Supérieure” of the French Soudan was responsible for the establishment of the school. His replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel de Trentinian changed the school’s name to “l’Ecole des Fils de Chefs,” the School of the Sons of Chiefs, in 1895. An 1896 decree delineated the function of schooling in AOF and in 1903 the Governor General Rouné signed the charter which defined the objectives of French education in AOF as follows:
Just as we need interpreters to make us understood by the natives, so also we need intermediaries, belonging to the native milieu by their origins and to the European milieu by their education, to cause the people of the country to understand and adopt this foreign civilization.¹

The legitimacy of French rule in the French Soudan was permanently under attack. Consequently, the very existence of the colonial regime was constantly threatened, not only by Malian resistance, but also by the colonial aspirations of other European nations. This crisis of legitimacy confronted each new French governor in the form of Malian reluctance to send their children to colonial schools. As a result each new colonial administration (Gallieni in 1887, de Trentinian in 1895, and Rouné in 1903) formulated new education policies for the purpose of reinforcing control.

New policies for colonial education were again enunciated by French officials following each of the two World Wars as new political orders emerged in the metropole. Thus, political crisis in France led to educational change in the French Soudan. The reorganization of AOF colonial education system in 1948 came as a result of the adoption of the new French constitution of October of 1946 which abolished the “indigénat” regime and declared the overseas territories of France to be an integral part of the French Republic. By now, however, the groundwork for African independence had been laid, especially with the historic party congress of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) in Bamako in 1946. It was from this party that Modibo Keita, and a new era in Malian education policy-making, would come.

Commenting on the Franco-centric school of the colonial era, former Malian Minister of Education Thierna Diarra said:

_The school in our country was not our school. Schools are designed to meet needs and solve problems. Our schools were also designed to meet needs and solve problems, but they were not our needs or our problems. Our schools were designed to meet French needs for the roles we were to play for them._²

Enough has been written about colonial policy that it need not be repeated here. It is enough to note that patterns established during the 72 years between l'Ecole des Otages and independence were deeply ingrained patterns. Mali has been independent less than half that length of time, and, as Diarra added, “We caught a train that was already in motion.”³

The Policy Process in the Colonial Era

The education policy process was a replication of overall colonial administrative practice in that decisions were made exclusively by the rulers, carried out by intermediaries who had no input into their formulation, and imposed upon the ruled. The following notable patterns of education policy formation, established during the colonial era, continue to shape Malian education:
**Education Policy as a Response to Political Crisis.** Rulers expected the education system to perform specific political socialization functions, resulting in the consolidation and legitimation of their power. The school, because of its allocation function, would make the colonial administration not only acceptable but, more importantly, attractive to the bulk of the population. This would, they hoped, moderate the constant threat to the stability of the colonial regime.

**Policy Implementation as Regulation.** Policy implementation was frequently framed in terms of regulative norms demanding compulsory behavior rather than using popular persuasion or financial incentive techniques. Since schools were rejected by the population as a source of alienation of their children both from a religious and a sociocultural perspective, it was difficult for colonial rulers to succeed in winning participation through persuasion or financial incentives. Consequently, they often resorted to commanding parents to send their children to school, with predictably mixed results.

**Political-Military Rulers Set Policy.** The elitist nature of French colonial administration set the tone and the pattern for centralized, directive policy-making. The pattern was reinforced by the reluctance of the Malian population to get involved in the process as minor participants. This practice was used throughout French colonial era to ensure that the benefits of any effort would eventually accrue to themselves.

**Parents and their Children as Policy Hostages.** Parents and their children tended to become "hostages" to education policy, with little or no input into its content. Colonial schools were perceived as a source of disruption for the whole African society. African education had traditionally been delivered without schooling, in a process of cultural transmission involving the entire adult population. Colonial schooling was a new learning system that required an expertise, a language, and an instructional methodology utterly foreign to the African adult population. Therefore, neither the policy-makers nor the population themselves considered parental input relevant, especially since, given a choice, the parents would not have sent their children to the schools.

**Isolation of Rural Populations.** The rural population of Mali had no means to participate, even indirectly, in the discussions of educational policies that would most directly affect them. Being very remote from the center of decision-making, which was the capital city, the rural population was ignored and, consequently, uninvolved in education policy discussion. Urban parents, on the other hand, were more aware and more interested in education policy since some of them were teachers or educational administrators and some had children in school. No specific mechanisms were developed by the colonial power to communicate with either the urban or the rural population.

**The Keita Era (1959-1968)**

Following independence from France in 1959, four Francophone West African nations: Dahomey (now Benin), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Senegal, and Soudan (now Mali), sought to establish a "Federation of Mali." The federation was eventually formed in 1959, with only
Senegal and Mali participating. But Senegal pulled out within two months, and Mali—cursing the “fascism of Senghor”—established the Republic of Mali on September 22, 1960.

Independence for Mali was the culmination of a long and arduous struggle for national sovereignty. The leadership had broad support following this sequence of political crises. There was continued concern about possible new interventions by the Senegalese or the French in the affairs of Mali. The climate was right for a dramatic change in the national system of education.

Modibo Keita, a former school teacher, declared his US-RDA (Union Soudanaise-RDA, the Malian branch of the West African RDA party) the sole representative of the new socialist state. Keita selected as his minister of education a trade unionist named Abdoulaye Singaré. Singaré made a series of visits to socialist countries such as the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. He also visited other newly independent, Marxist-oriented African nations such as Ghana, Guinea, and Congo. Following these visits, Singaré launched the educational reform process which began with a report to the Socio-Cultural Commission of the party. This party commission then collaborated with a technical commission from the Ministry of Education on a draft reform document that was subsequently distributed to each of the 52 party sections throughout the nation. Sectional party representatives—ostensibly democratically-elected—then proposed amendments to the reform, which were taken into account by the technical and party commissions before the final draft was submitted to the National Assembly for adoption and then signed into law by President Keita.

The formulating process of the Reform of 1962 can be represented schematically as a series of steps:

- presidential initiative;
- ministerial study and report;
- party commission formulates initial statement of education policy;
- Ministry of Education technical commissions write set of technical proposals;
- technical and party proposals are combined into a draft reform statement that is circulated to sectional meetings nationwide;
- the party sections propose various amendments;
- Ministry of Education revises reform proposals based on inputs from national discussions;
- party commission puts reform proposals into final form;
- National Assembly adopts the reform bill; and
- president signs the reform into law.

This was an experiment in monoparty, participatory education policy-making. The product was a document that was strongly anticolonial and nationalistic, and provided a promising framework for change and development. The stated goals of the reform were as follows:

- an instructional system both massive—“de masse,” reaching, according to the hopes of 1962, 100 percent of Malian children by 1972—and of quality. At the time of independence, the primary enrollment rate was 12 percent and very few Malians had any higher education;
• an instructional system that would furnish, with maximum economy of time and money, all the trained personnel needed for the diverse development needs of the nation;
• an instructional system that guarantees a cultural level permitting the establishment of equivalencies of our diplomas with those of other modern states;
• an instructional system for which the content will be based not only on our specifically African and Malian values, but also on universal values; and
• an instructional system that decolonizes the mind.\(^5\)

In assessing this policy message, some commentators have seen a contradiction between the quality objectives—prioritizing equivalency with external systems, implying selectivity—and quantity objectives—prioritizing a massive expansion of the system to serve the entire Malian school-age population within a decade, and adapting content to the milieu, which, for 90 percent of the Malian population, was rural in character.\(^6\)

Among the practical elements of this reform was the reduction of the length of schooling by one year through the establishment of l'Ecole Fondamentale. It joined five years of primary education—now the first cycle of fundamental education—with four years of what had been the first cycle of secondary education, which now became the second cycle of fundamental education. The reform also eliminated boarding schools and the examination for the primary school certificate of studies. These were well-defined, cost-effective changes which were quickly implemented. The reform also established policies for technical, secondary, and higher education, teacher training, and literacy training.

The reform contained a flood of new policy, the birth of a new system that would have taken a tremendous amount of money to fully implement. The universal education objective alone would have taken the whole of Mali's national budget. But in the enthusiasm of independence, cost estimates were left out of the reform document.

Nevertheless, today there is widespread agreement in Mali that the reform effort of 1962 was a bold attempt to transform the education system into one that would truly embrace local realities and mobilize the people of Mali. All the education policy enunciated since has had to pay homage to the principles of the Reform of 1962. It might even be said that education policy during the past 29 years has been a series of footnotes to the sweeping reforms set forth in 1962.

Ruralization

Among the controversies unleashed by the reform was one emanating from Decree No. 235/PG-RM of October 4, 1962. The decree declared that:

*In all fundamental schools in the regions in which agricultural activities predominate, agricultural instruction is obligatory. Annexed [to these schools] are a workshop, a home economics class, and according to the circumstances, a farm or a fish pond.*\(^7\)
This was the beginning of "ruralization" and the beginning of the most heated and lasting debate in Malian education policy-making. The decree left open the possibility of two systems, one rural in character, and the other urban and classical. Such a dual system seemed incongruous with the rest of the declared intentions of the Reform of 1962, which sought to be egalitarian and socialist. Future conferences would also concern themselves with ruralization, but as of 1992, 30 years after the initial introduction of the concept, the policy still had not been fully implemented.

The Policy Process During the Reform of 1962 (Early Keita Era)

The Keita Era was characterized by two major modes of education policy formation. The first was a socialist version of a participatory model hereafter referred to as extended consultation. This was the predominant mode during the early years of the Keita regime.

When measured against the patterns established for education policy-making during the colonial era, the Reform of 1962 offers several instances of continuity and several of discontinuity. First, education policy rose out of political crisis, the crisis of independence, the rupture of the Federation of Mali, and the creation of the US-RDA/Modibo Keita regime. Second, framers of the Reform of 1962 did try to use popular persuasion and not merely regulative norms in order to facilitate implementation. This effort would be short-lived. The Keita regime would soon lapse back into more authoritarian patterns of policy implementation. Third, the reform was initiated and defined from above, but at least some opportunity for participation was offered through party sectional meetings. Not only did party members participate in local meetings, but each party section was also represented in the National Assembly, which considered and approved the final statement of policy.

Fourth, parents and children were offered a system which, rather than holding them hostage, would liberate them through the "decolonization" of the mind. However, some argue that parents and children in rural areas had very little say about the content of the new Malian educational system. Even party representatives to the sectional meetings tended to be relatively well-educated local political elites. In the final analysis, rural populations had little more say in education policy in 1962 than they had in the colonial era. Party leaders felt that rural parents, being the products of traditional ways of seeing the world, could have little input into the creation of a modern education system.

Even in 1962, Mali was facing an emerging new political crisis. During the US-RDA party congress of 1962, there was a major break between the more radical Marxist elements of the party and the more conservative elements. The key moment of division, when the independence consensus began to break down, may have been on July 1, 1962, when Mali broke with the French Franc Monetary Union of West Africa and created the Malian Franc. On July 20, a group of merchants took to the streets of Bamako and marched past the French embassy shouting "Vive la France!" and "Vive de Gaulle!" In clashes with the military, two demonstrators were killed, 10 injured, and more than 200 arrested. A "tribunal populaire" sentenced three of the protesters to death.
During the congress of 1962, power in the US-RDA shifted to the left. Biennial party congresses should have been held in 1964 and 1966, but were not. The more radical leaders were afraid that they would be outnumbered and unseated by more conservative, pro-Western elements.

Right from the beginning of the Keita era, there were economic problems. From 1962 to 1966, the balance of payments for Mali averaged 7.4 billion Malian Francs in debt. A July 1964 emergency meeting of the Malian government sought and received a U.S. $9.9 million stand-by credit from the IMF. However, the debt continued to get worse. By 1966, Keita's government negotiated with France a devaluation of the Malian Franc by 50 percent. As is commonly the case, the economic crisis precipitated a political crisis that would soon lead to the fall of the Keita regime.

First National Conference on Education of 1964

In 1964, Keita called for the First National Seminar on Education. The stated purpose of the seminar was to undertake a formative evaluation of the Reform of 1962. But the mechanisms of popular participation used in 1962, notably participation at the sectional level, were not evident in 1964. At a time when popular disenchantment with socialism was growing, the 1964 conference came out with a hard-line statement of education policy in the form of a "Report of Doctrine and Orientation." While the 1962 report was anticolonial and nationalist, the 1964 report was antiimperialist and anticapitalist.

The report opened with a Marxist interpretation of the history of education, citing cases where dominant elites had used educational systems to oppress and manipulate the masses—in ancient Greece, in feudal Europe and China, and in modern-day capitalist states. Then it deplored the disruption in the evolution of African and Islamic educational systems caused by colonialism. The seminar resolutions used strong revolutionary language such as the following:

*The seminar:*
  - reaffirms the indefatigable attachment of teachers to the fundamental principles of the party and the socialist option...
  - salutes the engagement of the populations which, under the enlightened guidance of the party and the government active in national construction, bring an effective support and aid to the good implementation of the reform...
  - denounces the aggressions and the imperialist plots in Africa, in Asia, and in America.

The report reinforced the earlier call for learning linked to action, for training in the economic functions of the local milieu. The 1964 report also contained an even stronger statement concerning ruralization:

*All students of fundamental schools will receive, during the length of the first cycle, the basics of agricultural instruction within the framework of manual work, intended to familiarize them with farming, animal husbandry, fishing, etc...*
Those who are not able to pass to the second cycle will thus be psychologically prepared to go to agricultural training centers. 10

Policy Process During the Later Keita Era

The 1964 seminar returned Mali to a more demagogic style of education policy-making. By 1966, any pretense of popular participation in policy-making was dead. A sort of internal coup d'etat within the US-RDA party left Modibo Keita in power, but surrounded him with a National Council for the Defense of the Revolution (CNDR) and radicals who initiated the dissolution of the Political Bureau, the sectional party mechanisms, and, in 1967, the National Assembly.

Education policy formation during this period tended to follow the administrative decision model, abandoning popular consultation. In this model, policy formulation, revision, adoption, and implementation are carried out by means of presidential decree or ministerial decision based on recommendations from their inner-circle of advisors and other members of the ruling elite. The conference of 1964 was called by President Keita at the request of a handful of members of the radical wing of the US-RDA. There was an attempt to undertake a formative evaluation of the Reform of 1962, but in terms of its political orientation rather than for the purpose of implementation. The administrative decision model can be represented by a series of steps that differ significantly from the process used earlier:

- presidential decree or ministerial decisions, perhaps using recommendations from a few advisors at the national level;
- implementation procedures designed by technical specialists in the ministry and transmitted to local administrators and teachers; and
- students, parents, and the local population are informed when decisions are implemented in the schools.

Decisions to formulate, revise, adopt, or implement educational policies were made at the top by one person or a small group, and imposed on the recipient population with no particular attention to that population’s perceptions of its needs. In this model, decisions are legitimized by the political and administrative power held by the decision-maker and not by popular support. The popular base of the Keita regime was reduced to the small cadre of leaders and their radicalized youth movement.

The Traoré Era (1968-1991)

Mali’s cultural revolution unleashed young people in a new “Révolution Active” which sought out and humiliated or punished supposed counter-revolutionaries and brought Malian schools to the brink of chaos.

The economy had reached the crisis stage, and finally, on November 28, 1968, the military stepped in. While Keita was on a trip to the north, Moussa Traoré led a military coup. One of the first acts of the new military regime was the organization of the National Conference on
Education in December 1968, another instance of political crisis precipitating education policy discussion.

The Keita era in Malian education had begun with optimism and idealism, but had ended with disappointment and considerable anger. As the Traoré era began, educational elites were not in the mood for self-sacrifice but rather for restoration of their privileges and a return to more familiar ways. There had been much talk of austerity during the final years of the Keita regime, and professors had gone without salaries and without perquisites for extended periods of time. Subsidies for secondary and high school students had been unreliable. Teachers were tired of dealing with the undisciplined students unleashed by the Révolution Active. The National Education Conference of 1968 was called the month after the coup d'etat in order to address these concerns.

National Education Conference of 1968

The General Resolution produced by the National Education Conference of December 1968, was an angry document, demanding payment and reimbursement, and demanding an end to sacrifices. There is a dramatic change in tone: no more socialist idealism or sacrifice for the good of the nation or talk of the blossoming of the full human potential of each child. This is essentially a statement of a pragmatic elite that wants their privileges back after having unseated a corrupted, ideological elite. Under the category of “urgent problems,” here are some of the demands of professional educators emanating from the conference:

• payment of overtime to professors of higher education for the previous school year for supplementary hours worked;
• reduction of professors’ work loads from 12 hours to eight hours per week;
• the extreme urgency of paying scholarship subsidies for the month of December 1968;
• the extreme importance of finding an urgent solution to the problem of equivalencies of diplomas;
• the sending of particularly “brilliant” students overseas to be trained for teaching at the level of Malian higher education; and
• the necessity of restoring the authority of educational personnel.11

The emphasis was on secondary and higher education. Fundamental education was addressed late in the document, with no mention of ruralization. There was talk of “reforming the reform,” but most educators still thought that the basic principles of the Reform of 1962 remained valid, so the emphasis was placed rather on discussions of the misinterpretation and poor implementation of the Reform. The conference ended up making a statement of support for the principles of 1962, though most believed that the Traoré government wished to completely reverse it.

Once it got past the demands of the various educational interest groups, the document and subsequent policy did not depart greatly from previous principles. The fundamental school was changed from a 5+4 year configuration to a 6+3 year configuration. The competitive exam for entry into the second cycle was restored. But practical work and “ruralization” were, in principle,
retained as part of education policy. In fact, the ruralization statement of Decree No. 57/PG of April 20, 1970, which modified Keita’s 1962 Decree No. 235/PG was even more explicit about the need for universal agricultural and practical training. The documents of the early Traoré era had a slightly more “free-market” tone to them as well, emphasizing the need to make students “free producers.”

The 1970 decree also launched the Association des Parents d’Elèves (APE)—Association of the Parents of Students. While this might have been envisioned by some as a means of bringing parents into the decision-making process, it functioned more as a way of producing funds for schools—and sometimes for corrupted school officials. More and more, parents were expected to pay for everything from the construction of the school to their child’s chair and desk. The government spent money on little other than teachers’ salaries, and even that became an on-again, off-again phenomenon. Throughout the Traoré era, parents were expected to foot the bill for education while having little or no voice in decision-making.

In one sense, the Traoré era was rich with educational innovations, with various international agencies funding experiments in science and technical education, the use of national languages for primary school instruction, functional adult literacy, and various modes of ruralization. But most of these had already been part of the 1962 reform, and the implementation and generalization of these innovations remained weak.

The period between 1970 and 1978 was marked by numerous seminars, projects, and experiments related to educational innovations. In 1972, a Day of Reflection was held in Sikasso to discuss the expansion of the ruralization experiment in the Sikasso region. In 1973, the annual inspectors seminar had as its topic, “The Implementation of Ruralization.” UNICEF selected 30 experimental schools in the region, to equip for full ruralization. These schools did not receive the equipment, however, until 1977. In 1976, another ruralization seminar in Sikasso defined ruralization in preparation for generalization.

These discussions were among technical advisors, experts, and professional educators, usually with support from outside funding agencies. But despite these years of discussion, national policy regarding the specifics of ruralization was still not defined. The generalization of ruralization would come only in response to political crisis, and this crisis occurred in 1978 within the government.

Second National Education Conference of 1978

There were sporadic attempts at participatory decision-making during the Traoré Era, such as the Second National Conference on Education in 1978, but this was a response to political crisis rather than a systematic attempt to involve Malians in the creation of the Malian school.

The Traoré regime gradually split into two camps: the “hawk” faction made up of those who wanted more power over society, and the “dove” faction, made up of those who claimed to want a more open society. Several generals from the regime were in the hawk faction. Traoré, who at
this time had not gained absolute personal power, and his supporters were doves. In 1978, the
doves succeeded in subduing the hawks, and Traoré consolidated his personal power.

This political crisis was rapidly followed by the Second National Education Conference. This
conference was again full of students and teachers angry at the Malian government for their
mismanagement of funds and their failure to implement good policies. By popular acclaim, the
educational conference demanded that ruralization be generalized immediately and that the use
of national languages in instruction be accelerated. In response to these demands, the Traoré
regime required all schools to implement the ruralization curriculum with no promise of new
equipment or funding, and with no clear instruction as to what the program should look like. This
began a decade-long process of misapplication of the principles of ruralization. Many schools
were turned into work units where students were working many acres of land and preparing the
crops for market. In many cases, local educational officials were accused of keeping profits from
the sale of these crops for their own use.

Parents were never sold on the idea of ruralization, and their resistance increased as it became
clear to them that their children were often being used as manual laborers. Few schools could
provide students with instruction in improved agricultural techniques. Throughout the 1980s, rural
parents’ confidence in the schools, already shaky because of the history of being “hostage” to the
dictates of authorities, further deteriorated. Rural parents continued to bear the burden of funding
without the opportunity to participate in decision-making. Primary school enrollment rates
dropped throughout the period, dropping to about 18 percent by 1991.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Malian government received a great deal of foreign funding and
assistance in planning. Whether in the form of World Bank loans, United Nations projects, or
bilateral aid, this assistance consistently sought to support the implementation of the principles
of 1962: improved efficiency, linking of curriculum with real life, ruralization, improvement of
science and technology education, and use of national languages. While most of these projects
had worthy intentions, they were hampered by the failure of the Malian government to display
the political will or the good faith to carry out policies that would prove to Malian parents that
their concerns and interests were being addressed. Furthermore, some Malians fault international
donors for not putting more pressure for change on the Traoré regime, given the leverage at their
disposal in the form of desperately needed hard currency. Whatever pressure there was for
improved efficiency and for beneficial innovation was insufficient to bring about more open and
democratic forms of education policy-making.

The Etats Généraux of 1989

There was one more landmark educational conference during the Traoré era, the Etats Généraux
of 1989. This conference occurred in a context of growing disenchantment with the Traoré
regime, and with its failure to implement positive change. It was vital, both for the interests of
foreign donors and for internal that the regime to try to reestablish its legitimacy and to convince
people that it was serious about improving education in Mali. The Etats Généraux was organized
under the auspices of Traoré’s political party. During the conference, many officials tried to limit
discussion of the failures of the system, but in plenary sessions there was strong expression of discontent. After rehashing the recurring problems of the system, the participants embraced once again virtually all the principles of the 1962 reform—principles that had been reaffirmed in 1964, 1968, and 1978. But Malian patience was exhausted. This conference was a harbinger of the political crisis to come.

The crisis came in January of 1991, with student demonstrations and clashes with the military. In March 1991, while students demonstrated and called for the end of the Traoré regime, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré led a coup against Traoré and, with representatives of all segments of the opposition, formed a Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP).

**Policy Process During the Traoré Era**

There is a strong tendency in Mali to return to educational policies that were previously formulated and adopted by earlier authorities. The weakness of implementation efforts explains the repeated return to themes such as ruralization, the need for instruction in national languages, functional adult literacy, and the expansion of scientific studies. Each of these policies suffers not from lack of declared support, but rather from lack of effective implementation. This failure of implementation may be partly attributed to the lack of consistent and effective mechanisms for broad participation in the formulation of policy. Extended popular consultation, involving exchanges between central authorities and local populations, remains unique to the period leading up to the Reform of 1962. The 1962 model of consultation was attempted during the 1978 Second National Seminar on Education and the 1989 Etats Généraux, but these were one-shot consultations and not part of meaningful, long-term, popular participation in education policy-making.

The administrative decision-making model was more common during the Traoré Era. Policy was formulated at the central level and decreed by the president or the minister of education. This was the case with the 1970 decree #57/PG-RM introducing rural, artisan, and industrial practical training as compulsory subjects in fundamental schools, for example. In 1973, the Ministry of Education received a government-approved First Education Project from the World Bank, targeting improved scientific and technological education. In 1977, the government adopted the Second Education Project with funding from the World Bank, continuing support for science and technology, and targeting the ruralization of the second cycle of fundamental education. In 1978 and 1982, administrative decisions were made to reduce budget allocations for scholarships at the secondary and tertiary levels. In the early 1980s, regional directorates of education were created.

In 1984, the government of Mali signed the Third Education Project agreement with the World Bank, focusing attention on the ruralization of the first cycle of fundamental education, as well as teacher training and agricultural training. Subsequently, the Fourth Education Project was adopted in 1989 for the purpose of reforming primary education and improving the efficiency of the Malian educational system.
While many of these policy decisions and educational projects appear to have reasonable objectives, they were consistently created outside the framework of popular consultation. The targeted recipients did not participate in their conceptualization or formulation, which certainly contributed to the continuing decline both in quality and quantity of education in Mali.

These administrative decisions were usually the product of cabinet meetings and meetings of educational technicians and experts. The meetings of experts were often fruitful, such as the extended discussions of ruralization that took place during the Journées de Réflexion (Days of Reflection) which occurred during the 1970s.

The patterns of the colonial era remained very much the norm. The tendency to discuss and formulate education policy as a response to political crisis persisted. The government continued to frame policy implementation in terms of regulative norms dictating required behavior, rather than in terms of popular persuasion or financial incentives. Even while demanding implementation of the ruralized curriculum, the government failed to make explicit how that was to be accomplished and with what resources. The lack of guidelines led to abuses such as the exploitation of child labor. Political-military rulers continued to set policy from above. A classic example of this occurred in 1987 when the government decreed that funds generated by the Association of Parents of Students would henceforth be controlled by regional development committees. Schools were to receive 30 percent of this general fund, but most have seen none of it in the past four years.

Parents and their children continued to be “hostage” to policy, with little or no input into its content. The only vote available to most parents was a vote with their feet, and children were kept away from school in droves. Rural populations were virtually absent from discussions of education policies that would directly affect them. The discussions that did take place were almost exclusively between high educational officials, governmental authorities, and foreign technical advisors.

The Democratic Era (January 1991-Present)

There is presently profound dissatisfaction with the Malian educational system. Secondary and tertiary students have had their scholarship subsidies slashed over the past 10 years. Many secondary school graduates are unable to find jobs. Teachers go for months without being paid. Rural parents, resenting the use of their children as manual laborers, are keeping their children home to work family fields instead. Many have concluded that schooling is just a bad investment in Mali. After the protests of January 1991 and the coup of March 1991, students refused to work any more in the school fields, and the powerful student union, Association des Etudiants et Eleves du Mali (AEEM)—Association of Students and Pupils of Mali—called for change in the ruralization policy.

In response to the political crisis of 1991, the transitional government organized a major national education conference that September. Some worried that this would be another exercise in futility, discussing the same old problems and recommending the same old solutions. But the transitional
government took pains to make this conference a genuinely democratic one. Regional inspectors were asked to organize local meetings in advance, to discuss the issues at the local level. Ministry officials informed the public of the realities of the current situation, through television appearances and radio shows which pulled no punches in describing just how bad things have gotten in Malian education. The transitional government was demonstrating the political will to bring about change.

The National Conference on Malian Society and Government, which took place in July and August 1991, preceding the National Debate on Education, was remarkable for its "transparency," and for the inclusion of representatives of rural Mali. At this conference a preliminary new constitution was approved—establishing the Third Republic—which was subsequently approved in a national referendum. The constitution was subsequently approved by referendum in January 1992. Following presidential elections in April 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former history professor and prodemocracy leader during the uprising, was sworn in as Mali's first democratically elected president in June 1992. The popular participation and openness of the national conference raised hopes that this educational conference would begin to break the traditional patterns of education policy-making and lay the groundwork for a more participatory system.

The initiative for the National Debate on Education of 1991 came from the Minister of Education, Issa N’Diaye, who had been an outsider, even a pariah, during the Traoré regime, because of his opposition to that regime's authoritarian policies and practices. N’Diaye's proposal for the conference was approved by the prime minister and then by the transitional government, the Comité de Transition pour le Salut Publique (CTSP)—Transitional Committee for Public Salvation, whose president, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, was interim head of state for 15 months, guiding Mali in the transition between the time the citizens revolted in March 1991, and June 1992 when President Konaré was sworn in.

The Ministry of Education organized local and regional preparatory workshops in which teachers, parents, community associations, unions, and political parties participated. Reports were submitted for discussion. These groups then participated in the National Debate in September 1991, along with educational experts, representatives from the Ministry of Education and other ministries, and representatives of other countries such as Senegal, Mauritania, France, and the United States. The new multiparty political system was reflected in the participation of 46 political parties and by the powerful AEEM and SNEC (Syndicat National de l'Education et de la Culture - the national teachers union). Muslim, catholic, and protestant religious leaders were also represented.

The conference was not an appropriate place to generate definitive new policy, with elections scheduled for the new year. Only an popularly elected government, it was felt, could set long-term policy. But this conference defined a set of priorities very much in the spirit of the Reform of 1962, minus the socialist economic theory. Once again there was a reaffirmation of the importance of ruralization and instruction in the national languages, increased enrollment and retention of girls, the priority of fundamental education, the improvement of access and equity in education, and the improvement of the efficiency of educational administration. The National
Debate of 1991 was a promising beginning for the new era of a newly elected government that will bring about real improvements in the Malian educational system.

**Summary and Conclusion**

The following table summarizes the connection between political crises and the corresponding education policy formation efforts in Mali since independence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Education Policy Result</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 Split in ruling party of Modibo Keita</td>
<td>First National Education Seminar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968 Coup d’état bringing Moussa Traoré to power</td>
<td>National Leadership Conference for Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978 Split in Traoré’s ruling junta</td>
<td>Second National Education Seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Threat to Traoré regime from popular unrest</td>
<td>Etats Généraux de L’Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Fall of Traoré regime</td>
<td>National Debate and Conference on Education</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Why have national political and economic crises been so consistently accompanied by major educational conferences since independence in Mali? Since World War II, formal education has been seen as perhaps the most powerful means of transforming and improving society. Development and democracy have been universal themes. Education has been seen as the means by which a new society and a new order of political relationships is created.

Political regimes are intent on demonstrating their commitment to improving society through education. When a regime’s power or legitimacy is threatened, by political conflicts or economic failures, education provides the regime an arena in which to express its good faith concern for national well-being. A national educational conference provides a visible, participatory and justifiable setting for discussing the national ills and entertaining suggestions about what might be done to cure them.

As has been seen, in Mali these conferences are often more important symbolically than practically. The symbolism of educational conferences is especially powerful because education has to do with the lives and futures of our children. Everyone wants their children to be better
off and their future to be bright. An educational conference provides the regime with an opportunity to say to the nation: “We care about your children.”

If the conference occurs before a regime is deposed (as in the Etats Généraux of 1989), it may be used as a means of persuading the citizenry that, “We are doing everything we can to improve the nation. We are providing for democratic participation. This conference is evidence of that. The accusations against us—that we are immobile and autocratic—are not true.” If the conference occurs after the overthrow of a regime, as in 1968 and 1991, it provides a way for the new regime to distinguish itself from the previous one: “We are not like those autocrats whom we just deposed. We believe in an open society, in democratic participation, and are committed to improving the lives of our Malian children.”

The educational conference may also provide a means by which a newly ascendent faction within the ruling elite asserts its political control, reinforces its political theory, and distinguishes itself from other factions—such as occurred with the conferences of 1964 and 1978.

An educational conference may also provide a pressure valve in which some of the tensions in the society may be released, “letting off some steam,” in discussions. The failure of these conferences to seriously affect Malian education policy—with the exception of the Reform of 1962—or to improve the implementation of existing policy is evidence that their efforts were largely symbolic, and that the regimes which organized them were aware of the discretionary options which they had in terms of implementation.

Outside the framework of educational conferences precipitated by political crises, Malian education policy was largely formulated in closed circle of administrative decisions, cabinet meetings, presidential and ministerial declarations. Policy implementation was framed in terms of regulative norms demanding compulsory behavior. Parents and children had little or no input into its content. Both urban and, especially, rural populations were absent from discussions of educational policies, such as ruralization, which would most directly affect them.

The Reform of 1962 was the major exception to this pattern. This was a genuine reform effort where a government sought to establish a new order of political relationships and to derive a new educational theory from its political ideology. Not only was there real change in education policy, but also real change in educational practice. In this case, the political crisis generated by independence and the rupture of relations with Senegal provided the impetus for real educational change and produced a genuine education policy framework. Whether the National Education Debate of 1991 will also become a spark which ignites real change in Malian education policy and practice remains an open question.
## Key Events in Education Policy Formation in Mali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Event</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Independence from France</td>
<td>Formation of the Federation of Mali, uniting Mali and Senegal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Formation of the Republic of Mali separate from Senegal</td>
<td>Beginning of research and public discussion of major educational reform in Mali.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>National Conference and Reform of the Educational System</td>
<td>The Reform of 1962 sought to create a system “de masse et de Qualité” which would decolonize Malian minds, supply needed trained personnel, and establish equivalency between Malian and external diplomas. Created the new nine-year “Ecole Fondamentale.”</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>Radical wing of Keita regime gains control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First National Educational Seminar convened</td>
<td>The Keita regime sought to reinforce linkages between the education system and the socialist philosophy of the government, issuing a statement of doctrine and reemphasizing the need for love of work, especially manual, technical and agricultural labor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>National Leadership Conference for Education after coup d’état bringing Moussa Traoré to power</td>
<td>Conference focused on the claims of teachers and students for adequate salaries and scholarship subsidies. Final report accepted the basic principles of the 1962 reform, but noted problems of implementation and need for adaptation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Decree No 57/PG-RM</td>
<td>Made practical activities of a rural, artisanal, or industrial character obligatory in all fundamental schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>“Journées de Reflexion” on ruralization held in Sikasso</td>
<td>Preparation for the expansion of ruralization in the Sikasso region.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>World Bank First Educational Project signed</td>
<td>Supports expansion of science and technology education.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruralization seminar in Sikasso</td>
<td>Defines ruralization in preparation for the rest of Mali.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>World Bank Second Educational Project signed</td>
<td>Additional support for science and technology education; assistance for ruralization of the second cycle of the fundamental schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>&quot;Doves&quot; faction within Traoré regime gains control, jettisons the &quot;Hawks&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second National Education Conference</td>
<td>Recommends the immediate generalization of ruralization and increased use of national languages for instruction; implemented by decree of Traoré government in 1980.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978-1983</td>
<td>Various decrees</td>
<td>Reduction in proportion of educational budget devoted to scholarships for secondary and tertiary students; establishment of regional educational directorates; institution of competitive examination for entry into civil service after completing school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>World Bank Third Educational Project signed</td>
<td>Supports ruralization of the first cycle of fundamental schools; also supports teacher training and agricultural training.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Educational Seminar in Gao</td>
<td>Shifts control of funds generated by Associations of Parents of Students to Regional Development Committees, taking discretion over these funds away from parents and school personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>World Bank Fourth Educational Project signed</td>
<td>Supporting reform of fundamental education, training of school personnel, improvement of efficiency in basic education.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Etats Généraux National Educational Conference</td>
<td>Discussions on all aspects of education, sponsored by the ruling party.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Traoré regime overthrown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Debate on Education</td>
<td>Seeks to lay new groundwork for a more democratic Malian educational system after the overthrow of the Traoré regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

1. Ministry of National Education. Contact Special: L'Enseignement au République du Mali, Bamako: 1983. This is a compilation of educational articles, documents, conference summaries, and policy statements covering the years from independence to 1972.

2. Interview with former Malian Minister of Education Thierna Diarra, August, 1991.

3. Ibid.

4. For a discussion of strategies available to policymakers for the attainment of their declared objectives, see John Craig, Comparative African Experiences in Implementing Educational Policies, World Bank: 1990.

5. Contact Special, p. 30.


10. Contact Special, p. 70.

11. Contact Special, p. 86.


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World Bank. Project Performance Audit Reports, First and Second Education Projects in Mali.

World Bank. Projects Staff Appraisal Reports, First, Second, Third, and Fourth Education Projects in Mali.
Among the French colonies in Africa, Senegal was not in the forefront of the independence movement. Compared to neighboring francophone states, there was relatively little anticolonial bitterness to be overcome. Consequently there were few commitments by nationalistic political parties to embark on drastic post-independence reforms. In historical context Senegal, as the first French colony in Africa—a relationship that lasted for just over 300 years, occupied a privileged colonial position widely recognized in the French African Empire. The magnitude and perseverance of the francophone impact on Senegalese education and thus on the formation of the modern elite and the state is unmatched elsewhere in Francophone Africa. The French acculturation goal has been maintained in Senegal in part because of resistance to post-independence educational reforms which might have compromised francophone components. Thus, the historical context of this case study is felt to be especially significant. The evolution of the education system will be reviewed over three major periods (1815 to 1870, 1871 to 1944, and 1945 to independence in 1960). Subsequently, the post-independence era will be reviewed in two major periods: President Senghor's tenure as president (1960-1980) followed by that of President Diouf (since 1981).

As formal Western education has been expanding in Senegal so too have concerns about critical issues facing that system: its internal and external inefficiencies, dissensions based on cultural diversity, and gross inequalities of access between rural/urban and different regional areas. Since colonial education was initiated, and with increasing concern since independence, concerns have surfaced periodically about the need to “Senegalize” the educational system. However, consensus is still lacking on what “Senegalization” means and how it could be achieved. For the educated elite the issue is how to preserve the existing francophone capacity within any reformed system. The lack of consensus on these issues lies at the root of the educational problems which Senegal has faced throughout its post-colonial history. In spite of this litany of problems, many of which are shared by other African countries, Senegal has had a remarkably stable democratic government (multiparty before 1963 and since 1977), a military force that has remained in the barracks, a national bureaucracy led by those who are among the best educated of its people, and an official structure not in jeopardy of being bankrupted because of corruption. In this national political context, education has, overall, been a stabilizing factor.

Education policy has evolved in Senegal in the historical context that: (1) national independence included no commitment to a “revolutionary educational reform” package; (2) not until 1968-69 were there protest strikes by teachers, students, and union members demanding that education be made less academic and more practical; and (3) not until the meeting of the Etats Généraux (EG) in 1981 did political pressure reach the magnitude needed to convince the government that educational reform had to be addressed seriously. In spite of the policy reforms espoused by the
government of Senegal (GOS) following the EG and the multiyear follow-up proposals generated at that conference, those reform elements that were most in conflict with the traditional francophone components of the existing system have been those most often studied, modified, and unimplemented. New foreign assistance programs, however, appear to hold the promise of instigating reform implementation in addition to policy reform.

**Historical Background**

The relationship between France and Senegal has been quite distinct both in terms of duration and content. As early as the fourteenth century the French were trading along the Senegalese coast and by 1638 they had established a post at the mouth of the Senegal River. This became the City of Saint Louis in 1659 and the colonial capital of Senegal until independence. Later Dakar was founded and came to serve as the capital for French West Africa. Thus Senegal was not only a colony in its own right but served as administrative capital of one of the largest colonial regions in the world. The economic, political, and educational benefits derived from this colonial role were significant. Responding to this rather intensive bureaucratic environment Senegalese soon recognized: (1) the importance of formal schooling in acquiring the credentials needed for positions in the colonial services, and (2) the longer the schooling and the more perfectly it reflected the French model, the more advantageous it was for their careers. As a result, Senegalese came to occupy not only unusually large numbers of bureaucratic positions in their own country, but filled positions allocated to Africans throughout the colonial bureaucracy of French West Africa.

While French colonialism was perceived as being unique in seeking a degree of control over its colonies comparable to that which Paris exercised over France, the French colonial model also had another important and unique characteristic. Following major wars in Europe during the colonial period in which France suffered severe military losses or defeats, the process of redemption—the drive to reaffirm and regain international recognition of France and “Francophonism” as forces which, for the good of Western civilization and culture, had to be maintained in international politics—was promoted with remarkable effectiveness through dramatic expansions in the French colonial empire, most strikingly in Africa. This French response followed the Napoleonic (1815) and Franco-Prussian Wars (1871) as well as World War I (1918) and World War II (1945). After the World Wars, meaningful steps were taken to recognize and reward the sub-Saharan African colonies for their support and loyalty—and to reinforce their ties to France. In implementing these colonial policies, Senegal, as the toehold and bridge between France and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, occupied a privileged position. Essentially Senegal became a junior partner supporting the French during painful periods when the latter were reaffirming their self-respect, national and international status, and identity. It can be argued that elements of this special affective relationship linger with the French and especially the acculturated Senegalese, in spite of independence. Now, however, the link focuses on the preservation of Francophone Africa rather than of the French African Empire. At issue is whether or not this policy continues to benefit the Senegalese enough to warrant their continued support of this objective.
The First Colonial Period (1815-1869)

Nationally planned French colonial expansion began in 1815 following the defeat of Napoleon and France's loss of control over most of Europe. France did manage, however, to regain fragments of its previous empire including posts in western Africa. The period from 1815 to 1870 has been classified as a "primitive period" for French colonial policy during which the first development plan was conceptualized with the "concentration of metropolitan attention on one colony, Senegal." Since Senegal was, except for the southwestern region, largely Muslim, colonial policy began, as early as the 1820s, to discourage missionaries from engaging in extensive proselytizing. The possibility of inciting a Muslim religious reaction to missionary practices was, apparently, the rationale behind this policy. Whatever France gained from that decision, it is also true, given the missionary contributions elsewhere in West Africa, that the number of Senegalese who lost the chance for schooling during a period of roughly 150 years must indeed have been significant.

France alone adopted such a policy in Africa as missionaries in all other European colonies dominated education. Thus, colonial policy in Senegal determined early that African education would be basically a government responsibility; it would not be left to the missionaries or traders. By the 1820s the ministry responsible, the Ministry of the Navy and Colonies, determined that "...social transformation... in conjunction with the institution of free labor and a cash crop economy... would require the introduction of elementary education." The ministry did permit limited Catholic missionary activities, but at the same time hired teachers (even Englishmen) to found a new primary educational system for Senegalese, with instruction only in French. In addition, promising Senegalese primary school graduates began to be sent to France to complete their training, while agricultural education was being added to the primary curriculum of some schools.

By the end of this first period, accomplishments included the establishment of a school for girls, schools for agricultural training, and for the sons of chiefs who were required by the French to enroll, a secondary school and a junior secondary school. Most of these schools were not missionary establishments, but by the end of the first period many had failed and the missionary system prevailed by default. During this period the decision was made that French would be the language of instruction in native schools and that an educational system modeled after French public schools would be used to restructure indigenous societies. In addition, the conflict between an "academic" and a "practical" education began which has persevered during the one-hundred twenty-five years since then. Finally, it was made clear by the number of failed educational endeavors that occurred during this period that while educational initiatives might be undertaken in the colony, they would have no lasting effect unless the bureaucratic cadre in Paris maintained their support.
The Second Colonial Period (1870-1944)

The devastating loss of Alsace-Lorraine followed the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. The post-war Third Republic, coinciding with the Second Colonial Period, witnessed French acceptance with a vengeance of the proposition that, "To remain a great nation or to become one, a people must colonize." France's sub-Saharan African expansion, consecrated at the Treaty of Berlin in 1885, was reconfirmed by the Fashoda Incident in 1898 when Great Britain and France determined their respective boundaries of colonial influence would be the watersheds of the Nile and Congo rivers. By 1905 Sudan (now Mali), Guinea, Ivory Coast, the French Congo, and Chad had been brought under French control. The French Empire was second only to that of Great Britain. At the same time French businesses became increasingly involved with, and supportive of, colonialism.

For the average Frenchman, the reality of imperialism became much more personalized during World War I when French colonial troops, among whom the Senegalese were prominent, fought with distinction in the trenches of eastern France. The historical arguments about the costs of the colonial budgets seemed trivial in the face of the sacrifices made by the colonials for the survival of the Metropole (the "motherland"). The affective component in Franco-Senegalese relations became palpable. In this context, the 1916 decision to award French citizenship to the four most historical sites of French colonialism in West Africa, the communes of Saint Louis, Dakar, Rufisque, and Gorée, was considered appropriate.

In these four urbanizing coastal areas educational access and quality were already far superior to what was available elsewhere in Senegal. Following the war France made additional improvements in these education systems which further widened discrepancies in schooling. Senegal was facing a growing polarization—on the one hand the earlier francophone, modernizing, urban, and better educated coastal enclaves, and on the other hand, the interior, which was subjected to French rule much later and was more traditional and Islamic with distinctly inferior educational and economic opportunities. Secondly, there were concomitant growing class differences between Senegalese, based fundamentally on education and employment in the modernizing and bureaucratic sectors in contrast to those in the rural and agricultural population still using a barter economy.

French gratitude to the African colonies was further enhanced during World War II when Felix Eboue, the black governor of Chad, led the revolt in French Equatorial African against the Vichy government which permitted Charles de Gaulle to transfer the headquarters of the Free French regime from London to Brazzaville.

Third Colonial Period (1945-1960)

By the end of World War II, and for the remainder of the colonial period, equality between the French and colonial elites was remarkably enhanced. African deputies were elected to the French Chamber and Senate as well as to the Territorial and Grand Councils in Africa. The latter, locally elected councils, stimulated the organization of African political parties in sub-Saharan
Africa some of which were linked to French political counterparts. The presence of Africans in Paris serving as assistant ministers, secretaries of state, and occasionally as ministers, became increasingly common. Two Senegalese, Lamine Gueye and Leopold Senghor, also played prominent roles in drafting the French constitution of 1958. These Francophone African leaders were elites in France as well as Africa and were making both French and colonial policies. Moreover, political participation by Africans was being steadily expanded and democratized. In 1946 universal suffrage was introduced by stages and the electorate in Senegal increased from 192,000 voters in 1946 to 890,000 in 1958–Senegalese colonials were increasingly being incorporated into the French body-politic. Overwhelmingly education was the basic qualifying factor.

Even though France was among the “winners” in World War II, the combined multiyear occupation/domination of the Metropole and the acknowledged elimination of France as a “major world power” again seemed to stimulate the drive to preserve and protect French culture internationally. French gratitude for the loyalty of the African colonies during the war was again expressed in increased funds for development with education being underscored by the founding in 1949 of the first component of what would become the University of Dakar. Emphasizing the changing relationship between France and its colonies, the Ministry of Colonies was replaced by the Ministry of Overseas France, which, in 1961, was superseded by the Ministry of Cooperation for sub-Saharan Africa. The bonds between that region and France were not seriously affected by the wars for independence that ravaged Vietnam and Algeria. In Senegal the francophone elite, some of whom returned from Paris, assumed control supported by a large cadre of former French colonial officials most of whom were paid by the French government. Compared to neighboring francophone states, the transition process in Senegal was carried out so smoothly that it was almost imperceptible.

**Summary of Colonialism**

Whereas colonialism has usually been seen as having been powerfully driven by capitalist economic factors (Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands), the French commitment, while gradually becoming more capitalistically oriented, appears to have been driven more by a national belief that colonialism provided a means for reasserting, reaffirming and expanding French culture, civilization, and influence. This national policy, while often expensive, came to be rather unquestionably accepted by the French. Even today France remains among the leading donors, significantly exceeding the United States and Great Britain, in the proportion of GNP contributed to Third World countries, especially the former French colonies.

For Senegalese who were educated under the colonial system who were devoted to francophone acculturation this emphasis meant:

- There could be relatively little flexibility in the curriculum of the school system after independence. In spite of periodic concerns being expressed about the “Senegalization” of education, command of the French language and culture remained colonial priorities and left
space for relatively few other options. Education relevant to the 80 percent of the population who were rural was a non-issue—they were not in school anyway.

- Intervention from the center, i.e., Paris via Saint Louis, on matters related to the structure and control of education was frequent and directive; this “direct rule” model, often based on centralized policy debates and decisions devoid of transparency, was basically impervious to popular participation and was not structured to handle “bottom-up” transmissions. Governors of Senegal occasionally made suggestions, recommendations, and engaged in interventions but if even their proposed policies were to be more than transitional, they had to be empowered by Paris. In Senegal’s educational history, numerous initiatives proposed and promoted within the colony without the imprimatur of Paris proved to be only transitory.

- The new Senegalese elite earned their status by mastery of French academic content—simply being a member of the traditional elite did not meet the qualifications required. Success in schooling, therefore, became a prerequisite for advancement in the modernizing, and especially the bureaucratic, sectors. Education in Senegal continues to focus disproportionately on the preparation of candidates for the national elite and in the governing hierarchy.

- The governing Senegalese elite at independence not only had extensive administrative experience at home but in France and in other French colonies as well—in reality they had first been part of the French system then part of the Senegalese system. Through educational achievements in the French and French colonial systems they had earned a degree of equality with the French in the governance of the francophone world that was unique in colonial administrations—they had become “part owners” of that system. Senegal’s francophone elite even before independence participated in education policy determinations, they knew how and why policy was made, enforced, and preserved. Senegalese independence was an acute change, but many Senegalese leaders, successful in that system because of their francophone education, moved to protect rather than change the system within their newly independent country.

The leaders produced by the colonial public school system did not promote mass expansion of school enrollments since that was not their goal. Revenues from most of the colonies were meager at best and during much of the colonial period French policy sought to make the colonies as financially self-sufficient as possible. There was also fear that if schooling were too accessible, a problem of educated unemployment would result. Consequently, in spite of increasing Metropole contributions to education following both World Wars, Senegal, even though acknowledged at independence as a center for education and training in Francophone Africa, had a gross primary education enrollment ratio of 27 percent, well below the corresponding sub-Saharan Africa average of 38 percent, but in general significantly above the level pertaining in the other Francophone Sahelian states.

Senegal’s reputation as a center for secondary and higher education was unchallenged in the Sahelian region. At post-primary level Senegal’s enrollments matched those of the other sub-Saharan states (2 percent) but significantly exceeded them at the tertiary level (0.5 percent in
Senegal compared to 0.2 percent for sub-Saharan states). However, when Senegal’s enrollment figures at secondary and tertiary levels are compared with other Sahelian states its privileged position is striking. Senegal’s national priorities, especially with regard to tertiary education, have unwaveringly supported its traditional elite formation role.

Independence and the Era of President Senghor (1960-1981)

Senegal’s movement toward independence had significant ramifications for its subsequent national education system. Senegal became an autonomous republic within the French Community in 1958 and for a brief period in 1959-60 joined with the Sudanese Republic to form the Federation of Mali. In 1960 however, in a move supported by France, Senegal withdrew from the Federation to become an independent state within the French Community. This sequence of events affords interesting insights: politically even while achieving independence from France, Senegal welcomed French support in withdrawing from the Federation. Educationally, Senegal abandoned the policies it had helped to formulate under the Federation’s auspices. As a chagrined Mali (Sudan retained the new name even though the Federation was dead) moved with deliberation to implement the radical education reforms proposed under the Federation, Senegal did not then, and has not since, enacted comparable education reforms. Certainly the failures resulting from education reform efforts in neighboring states has also reduced the pressures for reform within Senegal.

France has maintained a significant commitment to Senegal. Militarily it guaranteed protection plus a large French naval installation in Dakar which employed hundreds of Senegalese, economically and maintained special quotas and prices for Senegal’s major export of peanuts, in addition to extensive economic assistance and politically. French involvement has continued even though some of the other former colonies, such as Gabon and Ivory Coast, have been much more profitable trading partners. In education especially, France has consistently provided assistance. Particularly noteworthy has been its support of the original French university in Africa, the University of Dakar, and French contributions to education in the newly independent Senegal in 1961 of: "...about 19 percent of funds for primary schooling, 38 percent for general secondary, 29 percent for technical, 20 percent for teacher training, 40 percent for scholarships abroad and 84 percent for university education." By 1964 France had increased its support, "...to 51 percent for general secondary, 32 percent for teacher training; 48 percent for scholarships abroad," but decreased assistance to "...technical secondary to 27 percent and to 82 percent for the University. In addition France has also provided other subsidies and low-interest loans from time to time."9

President Senghor who led Senegal to independence received his policy training as a political leader in both France and Senegal. Senghor, alleged to have once stated that “French was the language of the Gods,” a brilliant Francophone, considered to be the founder of Negritude, and the only black African to have ever been elected to the Academie Francaise, staunchly defended maintaining the French education model. During his Presidency Senegalese schools continued to be classified as, “an apprentice of the French School. Its programs and its structures ... a reproduction of the French school system.”10 This education policy was endorsed by Senghor’s party, the Union Progressiste Senegalaise which, in 1966, merged with the only opposition party
at the time, the Parti de la Revolution Africaine, whereupon many of the former opposition leaders received ministerial appointments. Among other things, this meant that there was no political party in opposition to question or challenge the one-party policies which in the educational sector were Senghor’s. Moreover, Senghor reinforced his policy in support of French through the constitution, foreign affairs, and economic development.

The constitution promulgated in 1963 declared Senegal to be a social, democratic and lay (non-ecclesiastical) state with French as the official language. Building French into the constitution as the official language was, of course, a powerful policy statement reinforcing the heavy commitment to French in the Senegalese curricula and, subsequently, the examination system. An analysis of the subject matter requirements in the national curriculum for primary and secondary school shows that when requirements related to developing a command of French language, culture, and civilization along with math and science are subtracted from the total number of subjects and hours, there is relatively little left for content more directly relevant to Senegal.

Senghor’s foreign policy also affected education by emphasizing greater regional cooperation and the establishment of an international French-speaking community. Ideologically, the government identified itself as African Socialist which was a “...mixture of Christian Socialism, Marxism, and Negritude.” (This declaration is especially interesting in the context of a nation that is overwhelmingly Muslim.) In promoting regional Francophonism, the University of Dakar played a key role since substantial numbers of foreign Africans attended. In 1968-69 of the 3,888 students enrolled at the university only 1,480 were Senegalese; by 1980-81 of the 13,560 enrolled 3,065 were foreign. The student strikes of 1968 at the university coerced the government to implement tertiary level reforms including: changes in the administration and curricula, giving students a greater voice in decisions made regarding university policies and operations, plus agreeing to replace expatriate–mostly French–faculty with Senegalese. Consequently, the proportion of African tertiary faculty members at the university and at other postsecondary level institutions increased from about 45 percent in 1970 to 75 percent in 1986. As a consequence of this “Africanization,” the university’s degrees, with the exception of those granted in medicine, have, since 1972, no longer been equivalent to those obtained in France. The proportion of non-Senegalese African students dropped significantly from roughly 62 percent in 1968 to 23 percent in 1981.

The First and Second National Development Plans ran respectively from 1961 to 1964 and from 1965 to 1969. During that first decade of independence, economic growth was relatively slow: the estimated increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was slightly over 4 percent but prices rose at a rate of 2 percent to 3 percent while the annual rate of population growth was estimated at 2.6 percent. By implication, therefore, per capita income was probably decreasing. In 1967 per capita income was estimated at US$182. The proportion of the recurrent national budget spent on education increased from 20.6 percent in 1961 to nearly 25 percent in 1968. The first plan set forth targets heavily oriented toward increasing access across the three educational levels with special consideration being given to primary. Educational achievements during this period included enrollment increases at the primary level from 18.5 percent of the 6-13 year old age
group at independence to 35-38 percent in 1968 while during the same period secondary enroll­ments jumped from 8,663 to 47,400. In spite of these advances, GOS failed to meet the educational targets it had set for each of the plans and by the end of the second plan the country experienced serious student and teacher strikes supported by significant union participation which influenced the policies of the Third Plan (1969-1973).

During the first decade, a very substantial cadre of French technicians assisted in the development of the planning process in Dakar. The first plan, which basically placed the emphasis on quantitative growth of primary education, was also influenced by pre-independence plans and by the Addis Ababa Conference of 1961, which assigned to member states the task of “scholarization in mass.” These were reflected in Senegal’s plan and its policies. These policies met with little opposition within Senegal—they were congruent with the stated objective of greater democratization and thus compatible with independence. Even though at that time the plan had to be endorsed by two major political parties, President Senghor supported it and only minor opposition was encountered.

Under the Educational Reform of 1962 the postcolonial political context was acknowledged with the curriculum structured so as to promote language arts (French), computation skills, understanding the environment (agriculture), citizenship, and making education relevant to Senegal. Each inspector selected the books that would be used in his area—a victory for decentralization later nullified in the second plan when the selection of textbooks was again made at the national level. Most textbooks continued to be published in France but were “Africanized” or even “Senegalized.” Senegalese educators often complained, however, that although pictures and geographical names had been changed, independence had not changed the spirit or mentality of the curriculum content. The second plan shifted priority to expanding secondary education, while at the primary level more emphasis was being devoted adapting the curriculum to the needs of an agricultural country.

By the second and third plans planning had become more refined and sophisticated—Senegal had a better organized and qualified bureaucracy but it still employed many French technical assistants. This enhanced planning capability was increasingly being required by international donors. A Superior Council for the Plan, headed by the president, conceptualized the general orientation and objectives, and drew upon research data which were then used as a basis for different economic and manpower scenarios. Analyses were based on short-term, fairly solid annual budget estimates, followed by long-term less precise geographical impact projections. Included in the council’s assessments were estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the need to keep a balanced budget, limits that had to be imposed on investments considering future impacts on the recurrent budget, and overall allocation levels by sectors within the total national plan.

The complexity of national planning for education in Senegal was exacerbated by the fact that four ministries were directly concerned: the Ministry of National Education (general education), the Ministry of Technical Education and Training (vocational-technical education), the Ministries of Popular Education and of Youth and Sports (adult literacy and youth civic service and sports
In addition, several other governmental units were involved in the process: the Ministry of Agriculture (post-secondary agricultural education) and the Ministry of Information (education via mass media), plus the National Assembly. Thereafter came the processing of presidential executive orders or decrees (especially if capital budget expenditures were involved), the Higher Council of Education, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court (to determine the legality of documents) and the Office of the President for final signature.

This planning and policy formulation process remained rigidly faithful to the Cartesian deductive logic model. Extensive inputs were made by experts after which the final decision was taken by the national leader; the inputs from the population at large were not solicited since they were seen to be uninformed and unqualified to make meaningful contributions. This type of policy-making environment prevailed before independence and persisted after independence even though during the latter period those making the decisions were Senegalese—albeit substantially assisted by French technicians. The complexity of the process also increased the administration’s options for avoiding, procrastinating, or changing actions on approved policies.

Nevertheless, near the end of the decade, serious conflict about the government’s education policies erupted. The crisis began in 1968 and continued into 1969 with series of strikes by primary and secondary students, teachers, and unions. The demand for fundamental education reform focused on the adaptation of education to the realities of Senegal. “After many years of training, our schools only provide qualifications for higher education. Our bacheliers after 13 years of study, have received very general training that can only be employed in administration, in education or in the liberal arts—none of which is directly productive.” Indeed, students were not learning skills for which there were employment opportunities in Senegal. The external efficiency of the system remained minimal. Despite quantitative expansion of the system, Senegal was far from meeting its constitutional pledge to provide free universal and compulsory education.

Strikes during May and June in 1968, with follow-on strikes the next year, led to the Reform of 1969. President Senghor sought to address the situation by proposing a process by which the schools might help students to differentiate between educational problems, youth problems, and employment and productivity problems, and hence, to deal with each issue more effectively. The cry was for, “The creation of a new school ... adapted to the real conditions and which will meet the needs of Senegal.” As a result a National Commission for the Reform of Primary, Intermediary, and Secondary Education (CNREPMS) was appointed and a Reform of Education Bill was announced in 1971. Proposed modifications in the system included: students would enter school at the age of 7 and primary school would be reduced from 6 years to 5 years during which practical, technical, and general education were to be stressed. At the intermediary level a practical educational program of “ruralization”—education tied to life, or practical agriculture—would be promoted. In addition, there would be greater “Africanization” in the content of all curricula. There were also changes made in the organizational structure of the Ministry of Education and in creating inspectorates for primary education. By 1975 there was to be full implementation of the 1971 Reform proposals except, as subsequently decided, primary school entrance would return to age 6 instead of changing to 7 as proposed in the 1971 Reform.
These reforms have been criticized as basically cosmetic; much of what was implemented simply constituted manipulation of the bureaucracy or the educational structure. Declared policy objectives were near target but changes were not actually occurring in content or access nor in improving the internal and external efficiencies of the education system—in short what changes there were did not lead to meaningful reform. A Senegalese researcher has referred to the entire twenty year period from 1960 to 1980 as, “... the period of crisis which gave birth to the period of radical change (1980-1984).” In fact, “...it was almost ten years after our independence (that) the school became a major preoccupation for the political authorities of our country.”

Pressure for reform was not restricted to education. In 1972 an administrative reform was promulgated which provided for a governmental structure through which the rural population might achieve the kind of control over their own lives that is often discussed in African contexts but which in fact is seldom realized. This reform provided for the democratization and decentralization of the two lowest levels of the administrative structure: Rural Communes—collections of villages, and Arrondissements—collections of Rural Communes. These administrative levels were given the power to hold local elections for leaders who would have taxation and budgetary powers and could set up Multipurpose Centers for Rural Expansion to provide technical assistance and training—including functional literacy—for the rural population. Some of these have proven to be excellent models of “bottom-up” development but overall they have not yet lived up to their potential. There have been problems with handling the budgetary process, with control over expenditures, with projects being funded that never existed, and with rural councilors trying to perform their duties despite their own illiteracy.

However, a more fundamental reason for the failure of this rural reform to reach its potential is the degree of challenge its success could pose for a highly centralized structure. The senior civil servants (members of the cadre de conception or ‘A’ level planners) are by definition and role deliberately separated from the lower level technicians (Grade ‘C’ civil servants) who are responsible for implementation. The former are university graduates, the latter are not. The decentralization could, if implemented, threaten the traditional degree of elite control from the center. Trying to promote the decentralization of the administrative structure might be compared in the education system to expanding the base of the pyramid but restricting the top—the recommendation that became a key popular demand first during the early 1970s.

This example of administrative reform linked to agricultural development as well as to non-formal, functional education is included to illustrate that the problem of realizing reform linked to achieving greater participation, access and relevance within education was also partially an administrative reform. Promised reforms became exercises in frustration in terms of anticipated results because they were not being implemented. These unimplemented policies have, however, provided political payoffs by demonstrating the government’s commitment to reform policies and they have managed to transfer significant blame for mediocre outcomes or failures to local implementors and to “factors beyond governmental control.” Again, as was the case in administrative reforms, centralization also plays a part in educational reforms since the government does not want to jeopardize its direct control over such a large portion of the population and budget.
In the last year of President Senghor’s administration, the total expenditure for education reached a level that represented 5.7 percent of GDP and 25.4 percent of total recurrent expenditures. Moreover, 96 percent of what was spent on primary education was spent on personnel and from 1978-79 to 1980-81 the proportion of the educational budget that went into primary education dropped from 61 percent to 57.2 percent.²⁶ Expenditures on middle and secondary education increased during that period by the amount taken from primary education. The reduction in primary education was contrary to GOS policy and as a result the government committed itself to initiate a macroeconomic reform and did initiate the structural adjustment program.

At the same time, and consistent with the discrepancy between stated policy and action, a new campus annex for the University of Dakar (Gaston Berger University) was being built at Saint Louis and was scheduled to open in 1982. The annex was designed to accommodate 4,000 to 5,000 students who would be enrolled in the first two undergraduate years in law, economics, and humanities. The projection of the needs in these three fields for the period 1977 to 1981 were: law—60, economics—130 and humanities—378 as compared to enrollments at the University of Dakar in these three faculties for the three academic years 1977-78 to 1979-1980, which were: law—1,260, economics—1,558, and humanities 2,121.²⁷ The Saint Louis campus remains closed but after 10 years of effort President Diouf may in the near future receive enough economic assistance from France and Italy to open it. Many other donor countries have refused to provide assistance for this purpose. This annex was built under President Senghor’s regime during the time when his policy statements endorsed, and there was growing popular demand for, the achievement of universal primary education with relevance for Senegal.

Where, during President Senghor’s regime, steps were actually taken to make the education system more broadly relevant to the lives of the majority of Senegalese rather than focused on training the finest of Francophone African elites, they were steps generally forced by popular discontent expressed through strikes and mass demonstrations by students, teachers, and unions. Thus while the first 10 years of President Senghor’s era saw the colonial model enhanced and expanded, the second ten years began and ended with serious confrontation between popular demands and government actions. These confrontations led to new governmental policies, some of which were implemented and many of which were not. However, 20 years of frustration and procrastination erupted in demands to which the new government of President Diouf appeared to capitulate and the quite unprecedented phenomenon of the Etats Généraux occurred.

The Era of President Diouf (1981-Present)

As early as 1975 a suggestion had been made by a teachers’ union that an Etats Généraux (EG) should be held to deal with the growing educational crisis.²⁸ The designation as an Etats Généraux was selected because of its traditional links to democracy and reform. Historically the EG was composed of the three estates in France (nobility, clergy, and majority) and although it met occasionally between 1302 and 1789 it was never a permanent institution. Participants were not elected but were felt to represent the diverse elements of the body politic in France; in 1789 the EG came to be controlled by the majority. It then created the National Assembly and reorganized France administratively by abolishing the monarchical governing structure. In
historical context the designation carried powerful revolutionary reform overtones and has also been used in Mali and other francophone countries. As the members of the teachers' union met and negotiated to launch the EG, they also decided to create a new teachers' union in April 1976, Le Syndicat Unique et Démocratique des Enseignants du Sénégal (SUDES), which subsequently played a key confrontational role leading to the realization of the second EG.

Through a series of conferences, study sessions, meetings, and information campaigns SUDES succeeded in sponsoring the preliminary Etats Généraux de l'Éducation conference on July 29-30, 1978, in Dakar, to which it invited a broad spectrum of interested representatives from organizations nationwide—including parent and student associations—concerned with educational problems. The purpose of the initial EG was to evaluate the negative impact of education problems on the nation. While GOS was invited to attend, they did not. The government apparently did not want to add credibility to nor appear to sanction such a meeting. In effect, the 1978 meeting had relatively limited attendance both in terms of diversity and numbers—it didn't achieve the representation needed to live up to the name. However, much of the program, content, and materials used subsequently in the 1981 EG were generated and refined in this preliminary conference.29

By 1978-79, following several one-day strikes plus demonstrations combined with threats of a massive strike, President Diouf, in his first nationally broadcast speech to the nation on January 1, 1981, acknowledged the seriousness of the education crisis and agreed to the convocation of the Etats Généraux. On January 13, 1981, it was announced that the EG would occur from January 28-30, 1981. SUDES, based on its experience with the first EG conference in 1978, and joined by two other teachers' unions (SNELL—Syndicate National de L'Enseignement Elémentaire and SYPOS—Syndicate des Professeurs du Sénégal), played major roles in organizing and running the national EG. Government personnel were made available to facilitate the meetings, e.g., providing general logistical support, drafting proposals specifying recommended changes in the educational system and processes for their implementation, and recording and distributing conference motions and recommendations. By providing civil servants to support the operations of the EG, the government undoubtedly increased the output and efficiency of the EG program.

This time the conference could justifiably claim similarities with its French namesake—it was revolutionary in terms of the substance of its educational recommendations but evolutionary and democratic in its proposed processes of implementation. It was “representative” in its composition for even though it too was not popularly elected, its participants were selected from the membership of major unions—including those of peasants as well as teachers, parents' organizations, government officials, religious leaders of all kinds, political parties, rural cooperatives, private organizations and businesses; and widely diverse groups from around the nation with powerful interests in education. In spite of the diversity, an impressive degree of consensus emerged in the recommendations which the EG produced: universal primary school enrollment; Islamic education and instruction in national languages within the formal school system; greater interaction between school and community; teacher-training programs established to accomplish these recommendations; and greater recognition of teachers as active development agents who should be provided with adequate physical and material facilities for their expanded educational roles.30 Special
attention was paid to the problems of the high rate of school failures and the increasing number of unemployed school graduates, both of which underscored a tragic decline in the external efficiency of the educational system.

A National Commission for the Reform in Education and Training (CNREF) was formed on August 5, 1981, some six months after the EG ended. The CNREF formed a series of constituent committees to help develop proposals that would respond to EG recommendations regarding educational objectives and programs. These committees were scheduled to submit their findings and recommendations for review at scheduled times over the following four years. It should be noted, however, that with the creation of the CNREF the government had again intervened and large numbers of government employees participated in handling the critically important follow-up activities: arranging committee meetings, processing documentation and preparing the final reports. An additional implication was that the national bureaucracy partially captured the popular movement; those who anticipated perpetuating the EG legacy lost much of their independence and freedom of action. The EG had targeted completion of all recommendations by February 1985, when they would meet again to finalize proposals and recommendations. That has not yet happened.

The CNREF completed and submitted its Rapport Général to the president three years later on August 6, 1984. In transmitting the recommendations of CNREF, its president, Professor Souleymane Niang, noted that the conclusions of CNREF’s work “...were only propositions” which appeared, however:

sufficiently elaborated, sufficiently dynamic and sufficiently flexible to permit their selective and progressive application according to the principles and the time schedule contained in the original terms of reference. Naturally, the strategies for application and the choices which had to be made, their prioritization and their application to the creation of the New School, were choices and strategies for the government to determine.³¹

It appeared, therefore, that any policy follow-up remained totally in the hands of the government which was free to exercise its own choices and strategies in determining which recommendations of the CNREF to implement and when.

In accepting the CNREF’s Rapport Général, President Diouf stated:

The commission submitted its proposals today. They include the entire range of topics they had been mandated to explore: the organization of the new school, the content and methods of teaching, the duration of school, non-formal education, training the kind of teachers the school needs, reforming the university, reorienting scientific and technical research, re-evaluating the function of teaching proposed in a code of deontology including modifications to undertake in the statutes of different groups of teachers, and research on new funding for the school...There is not, in fact, any aspect of education or of training which has not, in one way or another, received the attention of the commission.³²
The president committed his government to proceed with the establishment of "the New School" incorporating recommendations of CNREF through a process of governmental prioritization of objectives, evaluating programs, experimenting with new approaches, and adopting those most applicable to the nation's needs and goals. It will be noted, however, that any specificity as to what would transpire in the "New School" policy determination was clearly lacking.

During this period of the early 1980s, as was noted earlier, the government initiated its structural adjustment program to achieve more efficient utilization and allocation of resources. It was critically important to obtain greater productivity from resources being invested in the system since financial constraints were becoming implacable barriers to achieving the goals announced at independence and repeatedly thereafter. The GOS began to experiment with improvements in productivity, and by 1985 was achieving impressive results. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) joined to support these programs. Senegal received, "the equivalent of 842 million 'special drawing rights' (SDRs) from IMF (worth approximately $1.1 billion) in the form of grants. And it (got) 1.3 billion SDRs (about $1.7 billion) in the form of medium and long term loans since 1984."

Primary education was especially targeted for these trial efforts including such cost-saving possibilities as: the assignment of administrative staff back to the classroom, double sessions, double shifts for teachers, larger proportions of teachers having lower qualifications, and designing classrooms that could be constructed at lower costs without degrading building codes. Because these cost-saving approaches were being initiated on an experimental basis, it was not then possible to determine their impact on the national education budget. However, initial results were indeed promising.

In July 1986, the Ministry of Education published L'Ecole Nouvelle (The New School) a document that outlined the government's proposed implementation plan for instituting its revised and approved version of the reform. In 1987 elements of the new curriculum began to be introduced. This process of governmental implementation of the reform was most recently culminated by the promulgation of the Education Orientation Law of January 30, 1991, which redefined the orientation and the goals of Senegalese education. The law is intended to further the implementation of the "New School" model.

The support of the World Bank and IMF for structural adjustment in 1986 was intended to improve access to primary education by making more teachers available and by increasing class sizes to achieve more efficient use of teachers, and led to the following results:

- the ratio of associate teachers who have received one year of training to teachers who have four, has increased from 1:1 to 4:1;
- 800 primary school teachers who were holding administrative positions were returned to the classroom;
- multigrade classrooms have been introduced—mainly in rural schools—helping to increase the ratio of students to teachers;
• double sessions have been introduced—mainly in urban schools—helping to increase the ratio of students to teachers and make more efficient use the buildings;
• teacher-training colleges, whose enrollments fell drastically in 1983, would take in and graduate more teachers; and
• promising new construction techniques have been perfected that will significantly reduce the cost of new classrooms.\(^{36}\)

During 1988, an estimated 65,000 additional primary school students were accommodated as a result of the initial efforts to use multigrade and double session schools. The results outlined above indicated that the GOS could achieve the target projected in negotiations with the World Bank of reducing the average unit cost per primary pupil by 7 percent. This commitment was in effect being meshed with the government’s New School commitments contained in the EG recommendations. Increasing the internal efficiency of the primary educational system would also assist in meeting the EG proposals, and provided that the savings were then plowed back into the primary system, lower per capita student costs would result in greater primary school access.

It must also be noted that while the GOS had acted on some 14 CNREF recommendations, it had also ignored six others. The 14 accepted had relatively minor budgetary impact while the six that were ignored would have strongly influenced the budget, largely in relation to teachers’ salaries and benefits, which, from the GOS’s perspective, were impossible to accept. In responding to criticisms about the failure of the GOS to agree to all of CNREF’s recommendations and to the question, “The New School which will be built, will it be that of the Etats Généraux and the CNREF?” the Minister of National Education, Iba Der Thiam, affirmed, “The New School is that which I am going to build.”\(^{37}\) Minister Thiam had excellent rapport with the teachers’ unions; he had several union members in the ministry as associates and advisors and he was respected by them. Given these circumstances, they did not react negatively to his statement since they had confidence in him. Moreover, as noted earlier, it is in the Franco-Senegalese top-down mode that after full application of the deductive logic processes those in command of the education system and who are recognized as the most qualified are going to interpret the inputs and then rationally construct the Ecole Nouvelle for the benefit of the people.\(^{38}\)

By the end of 1991 it was apparent that policies related to Senegalese educational reforms were being implemented—including some of those with economic ramifications. Unfortunately, even these accomplishments were eroded by: (1) the falling share of the national budget allocated to education (from 25 percent in 1983-84 to 19.7 percent in 1988-89); (2) a 3.1 percent rate of population growth so that even though enrollments grew from 346,373 in 1978 to 643,477 in 1988 the enrollment ratio over that period grew only from 40.9 percent to 54.6 percent; and (3) the falling quality of primary education.\(^{39}\) Moreover, reform that might lead to serious erosion of the foundations of the elitist colonial model tended to be unenforced, ignored, modified, or delayed. The elements of the EG reforms that remain essentially unimplemented include:

• the introduction of practical training into the curriculum;
• the use of textbooks based on Senegalese rather than French experience and published in Senegal—rather than in France—and distributed to students free of charge;
• the instruction of students in their maternal languages during the first years of primary school; and
• the introduction of religious education.

The first three tend to be antithetical to elitists' perceptions of desirable reforms; the last deals with the government's reluctance to expand Koranic education, and possibly promote the enhancement of fundamentalism. However, even though all of these reform measures have been "approved" for roughly a decade, there are still studies and experiments going on to determine to what extent, how, and when some or all of these may eventually be implemented. Thus there are three policy priority levels operating: first, the francophone policy which continued and perpetuated at independence; second, reform policies which are acknowledged and being adequately implemented; and third, recognized reform policies which are being delayed by further evaluation.

The most recent law (91-22) related to Senegal's educational reforms (promulgated on February 16, 1991) demonstrates that there is a commitment to remain publicly loyal to the spirit of the reforms recommended by the EO. The only reference to the preservation of the traditional francophone system are two following points:

1) National education is Senegalese and African:
   • developing education in national languages to create students who are aware of their culture;
   • reflecting the adherence of Senegalese to the community of cultures of francophone countries while at the same time being open to the values of universal civilization prevalent in the contemporary world; in this way education develops a spirit of cooperation and peace among men.

2) Secondary and Professional Education: familiarizing students with the great works of national culture, of African culture, of the francophone world and of universal culture.\(^{40}\)

Nowhere else in the law is there any other reference to French as the language of instruction or to French-based content. The issue, however, is how these provisions of the law are to be interpreted. No mention is made either of the fact that all levels of education continue to be in French and that no serious consideration appears to have ever been given to using a language other than French at the secondary and tertiary levels.

Gross inequities do continue to exist based on geographical (especially urban/rural or coastal/interior) locations, which fail to receive the consideration they deserve. The region of Dakar has nearly double the primary school enrollment of seven of the 10 regions in Senegal. In 1988, of the 231 public and private lower secondary schools in Senegal, 11 were in rural areas; thus, less that 5 percent of national enrollment at that level was available in the rural areas. There are no upper secondary schools or teacher training institutes in rural areas.\(^{41}\)
As indicated in the introduction, however, a new force in policy-making has become increasingly significant and that is the growing role of donors. Historical linkages that enhance Senegal’s ability to acquire extensive French support have already been noted. For other donors, bilateral as well as multilateral, the positive factors would include the strategic position of Senegal, the maintenance of political moderation, voting on the side of Western donors at the United Nations, vulnerability to natural disasters (especially drought) requiring humanitarian assistance and the maintenance of political stability, and, as noted in the private Dakar weekly, Sub Hebdo, “...democracy itself is Senegal’s most profitable resource.” 42 According to OECD data over the past decade (1979-1988) Senegal has received approximately three times the per capita assistance given to other sub-Saharan countries, and three times that received by countries that the U.N. deems least developed. 43

In 1988, excluding military assistance, it is estimated that Senegal received US$400 million. At the same time, this assistance is being increasingly “orchestrated”–OECD notes that there are numerous “joint initiatives, with two or more donors closely coordinating their input; and budgetary assistance which is conditioned on the government’s meeting agreed-upon implementation targets in a given sector or even across sectors.” 44 The significance of these donor interventions was previously noted by World Bank/IMF intervention with the structural adjustment in support of the government’s 1984 policy statements. Such external assistance may force implementation of more of the stated “Senegalization” policies in combination with local pressures, particularly given Senegal’s pressing needs and lack of funds—the latter ceasing to serve as a reason for failure and instead becoming a means to implement more democratic policies.

In January 1990, the Sahelian ministers of education met at a workshop in Mali to compare their developmental agendas, to clarify educational goals, and to plan key steps toward attracting and coordinating support. Thus, there is the possibility in the future that Sahelian recipients will develop regional policies that will influence national policies for educational development. The practice of increasing collaboration among donors to achieve policy commitments and performance from receiving countries may, in the future, be augmented by coordination among the receiving countries to coordinate their national policy commitments regionally.

**Summary and Conclusions**

In a situation where the major issue since independence has been the modification of the colonial education system, the relationship between the colonial power and its former colony remains a central factor in education policy. The issue is so contentious that a former Senegalese minister expressed the opinion that the French retained a strangle-hold on the education system and that the options for reform lay only in the non-formal system where the government permits the learning process to be more relevant and responsive. During the decades of French expansion and rule in sub-Saharan Africa, French colonial prowess served to regenerate and reaffirm Gallic pride and self-confidence. Colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa was a healing tonic for the French during wretchedly painful recovery periods in their history, and in these colonial relationships Senegal was the linchpin of their sub-Saharan Empire. The Senegalese “foundation” of the French colonial empire insured positive relationships between the two.

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The colonial educational system provided the Senegalese elite with full access and equality, personified by Senegal's first president, Senghor, whose status and prestige were recognized worldwide. Thus, the educationasystem inherited at independence was not simply the "French system"—it was also the system of the modern Senegalese elite. Through their participation and achievement in that system they had also acquired "ownership." Moreover, by being exposed to such a highly centralized system for so long the Senegalese were "imprinted" to a degree unmatched in the other colonial territories. This was the acculturation success story of French colonialism—francophone policies would be supported by the Francophone Senegalese elite themselves, not just the French.

In the evolution of the colonially-sponsored school system, the concern of many French in the early days of the Empire was to promote the relevance of education to the daily lives of Senegalese. As the colonial period evolved, however, there was less concern about relevance to Senegal and more emphasis on "Francophonism." That policy was based on the conviction that colonial schooling could make the greatest contribution to the development of the Senegalese if it were as identical as possible to schools in the Metropole. While this may have contributed little to the realization of "liberty," it was powerfully promising in terms of "fraternity" and "equality" between the educated Senegalese and the French. This egalitarianism was capped by the awarding of French citizenship to Senegalese who could qualify in 1916, and expanded in 1946. The Senegalese who made it in the school system and eventually the political and bureaucratic hierarchy, some having even governed French as well as Senegalese, served as powerful positive role models for their countrymen and were "living proof" of the success of the colonial educational system. Senegal was a francophone star among the colonies; in spite of repeated inquiries, reports, and studies recommending more education more relevant to Senegal, the francophone policy prevailed.

The educational system existing at independence, which Senghor endorsed, initially faced few pressures for change over the first decade of independence. The expansion achieved during most of that decade blocked much of the impact of criticism. However, toward the end of that decade the growing 'negatives' could no longer be controlled by a pervasive bureaucracy and a one-party political system; the demand for more relevant education could no longer be ignored. Teachers' unions, joining students and teachers, provided the leadership in this policy challenge, and after first ignoring them, the government responded with bureaucratic maneuvers and acknowledged that popular demand deserved a reaction but in fact it provided little in the way of implemented reform.

The French continued to support the GOS in efforts to preserve the system presided over by Senghor and transmitted to Diouf. The challenge to reform in the 30 years since independence has come largely from those who have only partially benefited from this system, who have assumed the role of spokespersons on behalf of the majority of Senegalese; half of whom had derived nothing from the primary school system and a very small proportion of whom had benefited from the post-primary system. In effect, the divergence in perspectives on Senegal's future educational system carries distinct overtones of social status differences among the protagonists— statuses derived from their different educational heritages, perspectives, and positions.
The “haves,” of course, reflect the position of many of the educated elite, a substantial number of whom even replicate the French practice of taking their summer vacations during the month of August in France, which means that the bureaucratic functions remain closed down in Dakar until September when traditionally “la rentree” (the return) occurs. The “have nots” are fundamentally the vast majority in rural inland areas deprived of the advantages that have accrued to the urban coastal communes.

The pent-up frustrations driving the educational strikes and demonstrations of 1968-69 were not addressed by reforms undertaken in 1971-72, but the mollifying steps that GOS did take delayed the crisis. By failing, however, to initiate actions that would have begun to respond to the cultural, social, and economic disparities stimulated and exacerbated by the education system, tensions were only temporarily placated. By 1975 students, teachers, and teachers’ unions were once more convinced that action had to be taken to achieve progress on reform. They began to identify and join the diverse, disenchanted segments of the population to rectify their shared grievances with the nation’s education system. The first attempt to stage an EG worthy of its name basically failed, but important experience was gained along with renewed conviction that this approach could work.

It had taken determined union structures with sustained commitment and a truly remarkable assembly of diverse organizations nearly a decade to force the government bureaucracy into serious negotiations. When they convened together at the EG the new government was anxious to listen and participate. Thus, while the first ten years of President Senghor’s era saw the colonial model enhanced and significantly expanded, the second ten years led to the culmination of the reformers’ demands—the acceptance by the government that a national EG be convened. Unquestionably timing may have worked to the advantage of the unions; with the installation of President Diouf on January 1, 1981, the unified popular pressure may have been daunting for the new chief of state. At any rate, he moved with enviable dispatch and the EG was announced and completed within one month—a performance that was politically advantageous to a new president seeking to assure the population that he would respond to the popular will. A GOS publication that reviewed the proposed reforms from the EG said that they provided a basis for the creation of a new school: “a challenge for the present generation but a promise for a better future for subsequent generations.” This challenge is what the bureaucracy continues to face.

Based on popular reactions, enough has been accomplished in accordance with the reforms demanded by the EG to preclude a major confrontation between reformers and the government. The EG’s convocation was heavily dependent upon teachers and students and while they were reflecting popular discontent with the education system, the advocates in this case were not without vested interests in the outcomes. Recommendations that the GOS has not implemented include several that would have been of benefit to these advocates and that factor has been accentuated by the GOS in justifying some of its “inactions.” On the other hand, the EG also failed to control its own destiny when it became heavily dependent upon the government to accomplish the extensive follow-up activities that the conference required. Since the EG did not reconvene after four years as anticipated, the GOS controlled the outcomes of EG proposals, recommenda-
tions, and priorities. The GOS's role has been politically astute and its performance has been adequate enough to placate and keep the opposition elements off-guard.

While it has been rumored that the EG would meet again in late 1991 or early 1992, no firm date has yet been set. The question is whether the government's compliance with its commitments to EG recommendations have been adequate enough to risk having the EG reconvene to evaluate the government's performance. An unofficial reaction when this question was posed to a government official was quite simply that, "the government has reacted to the EG's recommendations and there is no reason for the EG to be reconvened to review issues already settled."

In spite of occasional genuflection toward "Senegal relevant" education, the system inherited at independence is still easily identifiable at the secondary and tertiary levels as the former colonial model. However, there have been some modifications at the primary level. Education policy appears to operate at three levels: those policies espoused by GOS that are reflected in the operation of the education system; the reform policies accepted by GOS that are being implemented; and the reform policies apparently accepted by GOS that are not being implemented. As for the latter, it is not unusual for policy positions to be little more than "posturing;" the "policy position" held, not the resulting "lack of compliance" by the government is what counts. The government may or may not ever have intended to pursue a particular policy, but even unenforced it may serve governmental ends. These three "policy practices" were followed in Senegal long before independence: Senegalese were used to proposals being made on "Senegalization" that never materialized. They had, in short, been conditioned.

Thus, there may be a discrepancy between de jure policies which the government promulgates and de facto policies which guide performance even when those policies receive relatively little publicity. The "unimplemented policy" position can in many cases be justified as simply exercising prudence in order to assess adequately the impact of proposed reforms, i.e., trying to achieve preimplementation modifications that are most likely to result in the long-term outcomes desired. The tendency to delay policy implementation because of potential effects on sensitive areas might also be attributed to a national commitment to evolutionary rather than revolutionary governance, to "carefully considered" rather than "impulsive" actions. It is also true that deliberation is a solid component of the Cartesian deductive logic approach.

In summary, prior to the EG in 1981, "education policy-making" in Senegal for many policy initiatives might better have been termed "policy perpetuation." That perseverance of the "inherited" education policy has been, it is proposed, based: (1) on the historical relationship between France and Senegal; (2) on the quality and degree of francophone acculturation of the Senegalese leadership; and (3) on the enviable level of economic assistance not only from France directly—which included hundreds of French technical assistants among whom were teachers and professors—but also from other international donors, with France often taking or assuming the role of intermediary. Finally, (4) the negative outcomes in neighboring francophone states committed to radical educational reforms have, if anything, reaffirmed Senegal's commitment to evolutionary reforms. The situation in neighboring states may have also tended to reduce reactions on the part of the Senegalese people to the government's resistance to reforms. Even though the incomes of
Senegalese have increased little since independence, Senegal has, nevertheless, made progress in its economic development programs and has maintained domestic tranquility and peace.

The increasing collaboration of international donors in providing assistance to Senegal—assistance absolutely critical to the country—increasingly requires that funds be disbursed on the basis of compliance with commitments to implement policies. Many unimplemented EG recommendations are partially or totally included in new education development programs underway. The extent to which they will now be implemented in this donor driven context remains to be seen. However, where funds are attached to compliance, it will be difficult to blame non-compliance on lack of money. So far compliance seems to be at the expense of the primary system since increased efficiency at that level has resulted in funds saved being transferred to the secondary and tertiary levels. In its responses to the domestic popular demands for reforms, the GOS has very astutely taken enough steps in the direction of compliance with the reforms and "Senegali­zation" to avert serious confrontation. Whether these same strategies will work in dealing with international donors who, in many instances, are acting as surrogates for recommendations of the EG, is a question of some interest to all who have followed the evolution of education policy in Senegal.
## Key Events in Education Policy Formation in Senegal

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy Event</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Introduction of first French school</td>
<td>Mutual School in St. Louis with goals of teaching reading, writing, arithmetic, and training to develop discipline, order, punctuality and the use of Wolof as the medium of teaching and as a status symbol for the hostage (sons of chiefs) schools.</td>
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<td>1826</td>
<td>First Ecoles des Filles (School for Girls) in Saint Louis and Gorée</td>
<td>Curriculum: Catholic religious education, hygiene, domestic sciences, reading, writing, and arithmetic.</td>
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<td>1829</td>
<td>First Educationalal Reforms</td>
<td>(1) Primary education to use French as medium of instruction, downgrading Wolof, (2) Promotion of boarding schools, (3) Pedagogical standards which required more qualified teachers.</td>
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<td>1903</td>
<td>Decree #806 established the French Colonial Educational System</td>
<td>This decree marked the first French national organization of educational services in the colonies and territories of the French West Africa. It established the following structure: (1) lower primary education, (2) professional education, (3) higher and commercial primary education for those with Lower Primary Certificates and with the approval of the school director, (4) girls education, and (5) Arabic education—to be introduced in all village schools in Muslim regions and taught by a marabout affiliated with the school. Indigenous faculty could be responsible for Ecoles des Villages, while regional and urban schools would have European personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Introduction of Secondary Education</td>
<td>Lycee Faidherbe opened as the first secondary school in AOF—later to become Lycee El Hadji Oumar Tall.</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>Decree permitting private education enacted</td>
<td>Recognition of the potentially important contributions of private schools and acknowledgement of their importance in colonial areas acquired in World War I.</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>Reorganization of the education system to reflect the administrative and financial autonomy of the colonies, and to consolidate the schools in the territories acquired during World War I into the French Empire.</td>
<td>Imposed French as the language of instruction and communication—especially those in the formal school system. The new organizational structure included: (1) Primary schools to be open to all, but compulsory for sons of chiefs and notables; types of schools included: a. village schools or first degree schools; b. Elementary schools or second degree schools; c. Regional schools or third degree schools. (2) Upper primary schools. (3) Professional education. (4) Special technical training institutions: a. William Ponty School, b. medical school—the precursor of the University of Dakar, c. school for children of marine mechanics. (5) Special education provided for orphanages and Medersas—Muslim religious schools.</td>
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<td>1949</td>
<td>Reform Bill—reflected the impact of World War II</td>
<td>Created the University of Dakar. Conference of academic inspectors held to reform the curriculum for francophone Africa. Introduction of modern pedagogy—the active method.</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>Decree (50-109/MES) Reform Bill for the new Federation of Mali, Senegal, French Sudan</td>
<td>Created a Federal Ministry of Education and Public Health; decree established compulsory education, post- and peri-school institutions, approved use of indigenous languages in schools.</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>Loi-cadre of Gaston Deferrer passed at independence approving African teachers’ unions</td>
<td>Education union pressured government of Senegal to approve unionization and to reform system by “decolonizing” it to include developmental objectives in the curriculum.</td>
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1962  Educational Reform (Circular No. 13550/MEN/DTI)  Minister of Education given authority over curriculum reform to: adjust to new political context; stress nation’s agricultural vocation; introduce content on African culture and politics; Senegalize and Africanize the curriculum. Teachers’ unions pushed for assertion of the “African personality” and improvements in quality and relevance of education.

1969  National Commission for the Reform of Primary, Intermediate and Secondary Education (CNREPMS) appointed  Riots of May-June 1968 focused on linking education with productivity and employment as well as academic performance; resulted in a National Commission (CNREPMS) charged with reforming primary, intermediate, and secondary education. President Senghor sought to differentiate between education as schooling and education in general.

1971  Reform Bill: University of Dakar and school system  At the university, the administrators and faculty were to be Senegalized and Africanized. The Orientation Law specified that: education is to raise the cultural level of the population; to train free men and women; to maintain standards for schools and university; and to serve youth and working adults as well as un­schooled youths and adults.

1972  Educational Reform: identified new mission for Senegalese schools  Schools were to: pay more attention to psychological needs of the children; to train men and women open to progress, having a civic sense, an entrepreneurial mind, and able to develop themselves and their society. Accordingly, a new organization chart was adopted, the length of schooling was changed along with curricula and schedules, and regional and departmental inspectorates for elementary education were established.

1975  1972 reforms implemented  The reforms laid out in 1972 were implemented at all levels of education in Senegal.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>A preliminary Etats Généraux organized by SUDES.</td>
<td>The government boycotted this initial meeting called by the unions, but much of the program, content, and materials used subsequently in the 1981 EG were generated and refined in this preliminary conference.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Etats Généraux de l’Education convened by President Abdou Diouf</td>
<td>A widely representative meeting which addressed specific issues in education including: the high failure rate in schools, the increasing number of unemployed graduates, and the need to adapt the schools to the needs of society.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>National Commission for the Reform of Education and Training (CNREF) created</td>
<td>Commission charged with translating the resolutions of the Etats Généraux into implementable educational policies and practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>CNREF report submitted</td>
<td>The final report was completed and submitted to the president of the Republic of Senegal.</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Ministry of Education press conference on CNREF report</td>
<td>Public explanation of the position of the government on adaption of the recommendations of the Etats Généraux and the CNREF.</td>
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</table>
Endnotes


4. Ibid., p. 17.

5. Ibid., p. 57.


8. Bolibaugh, HEW, op. cit., p. 86.


16. Ibid.


20. Source: Mr. Assane Seck.


23. Ibid.

24. Sylla, op. cit., p. 3.


27. Rideout, op. cit., p. 54.


29. Sylla, op. cit., p. 66.


32. Ibid., Annex 2.


37. Sylla, op. cit., p. 117.

38. Note those interviewed in the bibliography section.


41. USAID, op. cit., pp. 15, 30-35.

42. Doyle, op. cit., p. 8.

43. USAID, op. cit., p. 50.

44. Ibid., p. 51.

45. USAID, op. cit., pp. 11, 31, 47.

46. Doyle
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Famadou FAIDIGA, former director of the Cabinet, MEN (National Ministry of Education); presently chief of Bureau for Educational Projects.

Mammadou A. LY, director of preschool education and of elementary education, MEN.

Bougouma N.GOM, director of planning and of educational reform, MEN

Iba Dere THIAM, former minister of education, Senegal.

Sadibou THIOYE, director of AFORS (Association pour la Formation au Sénégal).

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