The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) serves to underpin the structural framework, and strengthen the functional effectiveness, of the overarching comprehensive financial stability system in the European Union. The ESM provides financial supports in the cash or non-cash form exclusively for eurozone member countries in a situation of economic emergency through various bailout programmes such as loans, precautionary financial assistance, direct and indirect recapitalization, primary market support facility, and secondary market support facility. Specifically, the ESM bailout programmes assist eurozone countries undergoing, or faced with the imminent threat of, an economic crisis in restoring a disrupted or destabilized domestic financial system where there is no available self-help means for dealing with it. An underlying concern over the operation of ESM programmes arises from the perspective of the normative interface between international trade law and international financial law. The controversial question can be raised whether, and how, the mechanics of how the ESM programmes work interacts with the WTO subsidy rules. Consider that a particular ESM bailout programme has a wide range of economic effects that ultimately end in extending over domestic industries and conferring direct or indirect economic benefits upon specific ailing companies and industries. This program, albeit disputably, would be deemed a form of financial contribution by a public body of the EU and further fall within the meaning of a trade-distortive subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. With this mind, this article provides a pioneer multidimensional anatomy of legal and regulatory landscape of ESM bailout programmes. Thus, the article is aimed at providing an in-depth investigation of the full spectrum of functional and structural framework of the ESM bailout mechanism and an unprecedented legal analysis of its compatibility with the WTO subsidy rules.