

Yale University

From the Selected Works of David Mayhew

1973

E Notecards

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Available at: <https://works.bepress.com/david-mayhew/193/>

Hermy Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (UP Press, Berkeley, 1967)
(hard cover = 1964)

E

p 23-29 - Here he discusses regulatory agencies, as a prime example of disparity between symbol & reality

p 26: "Trustbusting, 'labor's Magna Carta' (the Clayton Act), protection against price discrimination and deceptive trade practices, protection against excessive public utility charges, tight control of union bureaucracies (or, by other groups, the 'slave labor law'), federal income taxation according to 'ability to pay,' are the terms & symbols widely disseminated to the public as descriptive of much of the leading federal and state regulation of the last seven decades, and they are precisely the descriptions shown by careful students to be most misleading."

p 28 ✓ "The federal income tax law offers a rather neat illustration of the divergence between a widely publicized symbol and actual resource allocation patterns."

Engene Biderberg + Roy D. Mearns, An Act of Congress

Here's an example of where Boxy packaging was necessary.
Congress had screwed around a long time without consequence

$$\frac{\text{Congress}}{\text{ed play}} = \frac{\text{you bp. Assembly}}{\text{Penguin War}}$$

Q77 Let the boys package it.

~ The explanation for this peculiar 'surrender' of congressional autonomy over a vital phase in the decision making on the Education bill is deceptively simple One Democratic member of the committee put it this way: 'We were all sensitive to the start of another holy war. Politically, not many of us can afford a religious war — at least those of us from two-religion districts.'"

Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil (U. Chi Press, 1961)
SSL — HD 9565 E54 1961 (LC)

p 397 — an interesting quote:

" 'We oil Congressmen represent our people' explained Tom Steel of Oklahoma. 'It is my duty to represent their views. I would be replaced otherwise + would deserve to be!'"
(No citation given.)

Leon D. Epstein, "British M.P.s and Their Local Parties: The Suez Cases"
54 APSR 374-390, June 1960

Q377 — Nigel Nicolson did get deprived of his membership in 1957, though he forced it to a mail ballot + narrowly lost there too.

Q385. "Beside from constituency associations, insofar as it is self-generating, tends to be that of relatively extreme partisans."
"Privileges, not professional careers, are what matter here."

In general — constituency assns are clearly capable of ~~rather~~ sanctions, and they used them in these Suez cases.

Q385. "As amply illustrated, the tendency of C.A. presence is to reinforce the leadership of each parl. party."

Q386. "In an important way, the C.A.'s do view their role as that of supporting their national leaders."

Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections,"
3 POLITY 395-405, Spring 1971

Q 396 - 2 factors 1) incumbency
2) The likelihood that incs are generally stronger candidates

Q 396 - method here 2 election vs 1st (for incs) 1952-54, 54-56, 56-58, + 58-60 - only Northern.
The controls for serving here (by intercept)

Q 400 - Conclusion - "... upon becoming an inc, a House candidate gains an additional one percent to two percent of the two-party House vote beyond what he would otherwise get" (2 election over 1st - this result from analysis of residuals - in a big pop of all sorts of elections. - and there's no real difference between those who beat incs to start with & those who didn't)

There is one way of getting at it - There are problems, which he discusses, of good candidate vs poor candidate districts in various situations.

Q 403) with retirement, he argues, we get a double party loss
1) number's benefits 2) candidates are probably worse.

CONT'D

Erikson (Polity) #2

Q 404 - Conservative estimate of inc ad = 1.7% (single gain)
Liberal estimate = 2.2% (party loss after retirement)

(An average here = ca 2%)

They agree, he argues, because of factors having to do with candidate talent mix.
(a good argument)

Q 405) Only 4% of all No. incs seeking reelection in 1954-60 were reelected in 50-52 range.

"Thus the electoral advantage of incumbency does not appear to be a good explanation for the fact that incumbent congressional candidates almost always win re-election. Instead, the major explanation appears to be simply that most districts are safe for one party and that the rare challenger who is able to defeat an incumbent tends to be a strong enough candidate to win re-election on his own."

— a weak conclusion

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Robert S. Erikson, "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections," 66APSR 1234-45, Dec. 1972

1238. He talks about the decline of the objective GOP gerrymander in the years after 1966..... He concludes that it wasn't a consequence of redistricting. (No real difference between sets redrawn and not redrawn.)

p. 1239. He discusses how successful the 1964 Dem. frosh were in surviving the 1966 election....

p. 1240. He concludes: "The reason for the strong showing by incumbents in 1966 appears to be that the electoral advantage from being an incumbent simply increased suddenly with the 1966 election." And he shows it.
"Apparently in 1966 the gain to a candidate from running as an incumbent for the first time and the loss to a party when its incumbent retires increased from roughly two per cent to about five per cent of the vote."

Sound: no disagreements. He doesn't draw any conclusions about swings....

Robert S; Erikson, "The Electoral Impact of Congressional Roll Call Voting,"
65 APSR 1018-32, Dec 1971

Northern D and R incs, 1952-68 (66 left out);; relations of roll call liberalism to Cong. electoral %, with Prexy % held k. (with controls for Congressman's previous electoral % and for ballot form)

1023. Republicans, full equations: "All sixteen partial correlations presented in Table 2 are in the expected negative direction, indicating that with relevant variables held constant a Republican Congressman gets fewer votes when he has a relatively conservative roll call position." "....a reasonable estimate is that an unusually liberal Republican Representative gets at least 6 per cent more of the two-party votethan his extreme conservative counterpart would in the same district."

1025. Dems.; results much weaker. A variance problem (not enough ND spread)

1027. "...regression analysis provides no statistical evidence that a Democratic Congressman loses votes by liberal roll call voting."

1028. By matching pairs of Dems., he gets some evidency of a symmetrical effect here. But it's inconclusive.

1029. 1964 SRC survey data:

1029-30. Take Johnson voters with GOP congressmen, dichotomize the congressmen as L-C, then stratify the voters (3 sets) by level of recognition of congressmen (CONTD)

Erikson - 1971 - #2

(continued) p. 1030. "As the table shows, while voters with low or medium recognition did not appear to have discriminated between relatively conservative and relatively liberal Republican Congressmen, a fairly clear difference in the level of support for conservatives and liberals is found for the 'high' group. In fact, liberal Republicans received double the support that their more conservative counterparts did (46 per cent vs. 23 per cent) from Johnson voters with the highest recognition of them."

1030-31. It gets finer here, very small samples. It seems that a) general level of political info, and b) PI, also help people to distinguish.

1031. "Thus it would appear that virtually the entire roll call effect can be accounted for by the apparent strong susceptibility to roll call influence of the small subsample of voters who, besides recognizing their Congressmen, are the most politically informed and crosspressured."

1031.FN. "A rough estimate of the proportion of the voting electorate that possesses sufficiently high levels of recognition and involvement to be influenced by the roll call performance of their Republican Congressman, given sufficient crosspressures, is eighteen or nineteen per cent. Eighteen per cent is the proportion of Johnson voters voting in congressional elections with Republican Congressmen who were in both the 'high recognition' and 'high information' category. Nineteen per cent is the proportion

Erikson 0 1971 #3

or Republicans and Independents for Johnson who scored high on both recognition and information."

1031-32. This could be still 2-step flow rather than direct info. If the former, good and bad impressions trickle down in certain circumstances. p. 1032: "If this interpretation is correct, a sometimes crucial determinant of the Congressman's vote margin is a strong attitudinal consensus that develops among the constituency's relatively informed opinion leaders and followers that, for Republican Congressmen, can be directly traced to the degree of moderation exhibited in roll call performances."

(This ain't necessarily so. The Congressmen could be generating other signals that square with their roll call records.)

BoQ - Fall 1972

ALC Briskin on gun control polls

Q 455+

Even a majority of gun owners want regulation.

— There's also a poll on Cong. performance on the subject. (p469)

"It is difficult to imagine any other issue on which Congress has been less responsive to public sentiment for a longer period of time."