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From the SelectedWorks of David Mayhew

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E Notecards

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Available at: https://works.bepress.com/david-mayhew/193/

Pp. 23-29 - He discusses popularity agencies as a prime example of lag between symbol and reality.

P. 26: "Instilling, 'labor's magna carta' (the Clayton Act), protection against price discrimination and deception had practices, protection against excessive public utility charges, restrictions against union bureaucracies (or, by other groups, the 'dope John Cow'), federal income taxation accordingly to 'whichever pay' are the terms symbolically disseminated to the public as descriptors of much of the leading federal and state regulation in the last seven decades, and they are precisely the descriptors shown by careful students to be misleading.

P. 28: "The federal income tax has under a rather neat illustration of the divergence between a widely entrenched symbol and actual resource allocation patterns."

Here’s an example where some packaging was necessary.
Congress had renamed and/or changed things without consequence.

\[
\text{Congress} = \frac{\text{year} \times \text{assembly}}{\text{legislative years}}
\]

Let me phrase it:

"The explanation for this peculiar 'formula' of congressional autonomy over a vital phase in the decision making in the education bill is adequately simple... One Democratic member of the committee put it this way: 'We were all sensitized to the start of another holy war. Politically, I doubt many of us can afford a religious war— at least not from our [religious] ducks.'"
p. 397 - an interesting quote:

"We in Congress represent our people," explained Tom Steel of Oklahoma. "It is my duty to represent their views. I would be replaced otherwise and would deserve to be." (No citation given.)
C377 — Nigel Nicolson did get deprived of his munificence in 1967. They did forced it to a run ballot and namely lost them too.

395. "Presume from constituency associations merely as it is self-generating, tends to be that of relatively extremeleaders...

"Principle, not professional careers, are what matter here."

In general — constituencies are clearly capable of sanctions, and they use them in these two cases.

G385. "As amply illustrated, the tendency of c.c.a. presence is to reinforce the leadership of each local party."

G386. "In an inept way, the c.c.a.'s do view their role as that of supporting their national leaders."
Advantage of incumbency does not appear to be a good explanation for the fact that incumbent congressional candidates almost always win re-election. Instead, the major explanation appears to be simply that most districts are safe for one party and that the rare challenger who is able to defeat an incumbent tends to be a strong enough candidate to win re-election on his own.

1238. He talks about the decline of the objective GOP gerrymander in the years after 1966. He concludes that it wasn't a consequence of redistricting. (No real difference between sets redrawn and not redrawn.)

p. 1239. He discusses how successful the 1964 Dem. frosh were in surviving the 1966 election....

p. 1240. He concludes: "The reason for the strong showing by incumbents in 1966 appears to be that the electoral advantage from being an incumbent simply increased suddenly with the 1966 election." And he shows it. "Apparently in 1966 the gain to a candidate from running as an incumbent for the first time and the loss to a party when its incumbent retires increased from roughly two per cent to about five per cent of the vote."

Sound: no disagreements. He doesn't draw any conclusions about swings....

Northern D and R incs, 1952-68 (66 left out); relations of roll call liberalism to Cong. electoral %, with Prexy held k. (with controls for Cong's previous electoral % and for ballot form)

1023. Republicans, Roll equations: "All sixteen partial correlations presented in Table 2 are in the expected negative direction, indicating that with relevant variables held constant a Republican Congressman gets fewer votes when he has a relatively conservative roll call position." ......."...a reasonable estimate is that an unusually liberal Republican Representative gets at least 6 percent more of the two-party vote than his extreme conservative counterpart would in the same district."

1025. Dems; results much weaker. A variance problem (not enough ND spread)

1027. "...regression analysis provides no statistical evidence that a Democratic Congressman loses votes by liberal roll call voting." 1928. By matching pairs of Dems., he gets some evidence of a symmetrical effect here. But it's inconclusive.

1029. 1964 SRC survey data:
1029-30. Take Johnson voters with GOP congmen, dichotomize the congmen as L-C, then stratify the voters (3 sets) by level of recognition of congmen

(continued) p. 1030. "As the table shows, while voters with low or medium recognition did not appear to have discriminated between relatively conservative and relatively liberal Republican Congmen, a fairly clear difference in the level of support for Conservatives and Liberals is found for the 'high' group. In fact, liberal Republicans received double the support that their more conservative counterparts did (46 per cent vs. 23 per cent) from Johnson voters with the highest recognition of them."

1030-31. It gets finer here, very small samples. It seems that a) general level of political info, and b) FI, also help people to distinguish.

1031. "Thus it would appear that virtually the entire roll call effect can be accounted for by the apparent strong susceptibility to roll call influence of the small subsample of voters who, besides recognizing their Congmen, are the most politically informed and crosspressured."

1031.FW. "A rough estimate of the proportion of the voting electorate that possesses sufficiently high levels of recognition and involvement to be influenced by the roll call performance of their Republican Congressman, given sufficient crosspressures, is eighteen or nineteen per cent. Eighteen per cent is the proportion of Johnson voters voting in congressional elections with Republican Congmen who were in both the 'high recognition' and 'high information' category. Nineteen per cent is the proportion

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or Republicans and Independents for Johnson who scored high on both recognition and information."

1031-32. This could be still 2-step flow rather than direct info. If the former, good and bad impressions trickle down in certain circumstances. p. 1032: "If this interpretation is correct, a sometimes crucial determinant of the Congmen's vote margin is a strong attitudinal consensus that develops among the constituency's relatively informed opinion leaders and followers that, for Republican Congmen, can be directly traced to the degree of moderation exhibited in roll call performances."

(This ain't necessarily so. The Congmen could be generating other signals that square with their roll call records.)
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A Co ordination on gun control fails

Even a majority of gun owners want regulation.

There's also a poll on Cong. performance on the subject. (p. 667)

It's difficult to imagine any other issue on

which Congress has been less responsive

to public sentiment for a longer period.