Yale University

From the Selected Works of David Mayhew

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D Notecards

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The sequence of events leads to the challenge of getting a specific plan accepted. In this case, it is quite plausible for everyone to get the specific plan accepted, yet the same point. I hear specific plans may be quite acceptable to a majority.

The very process by which becomes the general consequence of the final deal is the majority. For each party is so intent on his specific goal that the final deal is analyzed almost exclusively in terms of its effect on his specific proposal. Indeed, usually we mechanism even trying to analyze the general consequences.

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The question was never posed whether a majority is the preferred act, really grounded on many, trying to toll reduction. The question was whether a specific active minority believed it stood to gain or lose by a toll increase. It became the gains in toll reduction are widespread, general, and in any specific toll slight, and the gains from toll increase were very significant if small active groups, trying inevitably went up. As long as the question was posed in specific bargaining terms in Congress, it seemed to each party to the bargain that if it stood to gain more than it lost.

Built on Dec. 1968 national sample; this is on purposive role prescriptions.

653. "A large majority of the respondents... select the Tribune interpretation of the Representative's functions: the legislator as discoverer, reflector, or advocate of popular needs and demands." (The other options are Ritualist, Inventor, Broker, and Opportunist. Responses are coded.)

653. "Some Tribune responses were vague, but most carried the clear implication that the citizen expected some degree of personal representation from his Congressman."

653. "Qualitative inspection of the responses strongly suggests that the public conception of the Tribune implies a local (or statewide) focus and a delegate style of representation. While there was (usually tacit) recognition that legislators must exercise their judgment, they are expected to consider their constituents' opinions uppermost.

This is really pretty thin. Tribunism seems to include a lot of things.
Roger H. Davidson, The Role of the Congressman

p. 116 "Trustee", i.e., he more or less "proceeds by his own lights" rather than Delegate (he "accepts instructions"); or Politico (a combo)
Then there's the focus dimension (national vs. district, etc.)

p. 128, Marginals are more likely to be district-oriented and delegates than are safes (naturally)

p. 129 "Amoghn southerners, however, both marginal and safe members are more Trustee-National oriented than the average member of the House. For example, in that region 53 per cent of the legislators from safe districts and 40 per cent from marginal districts indicated a national focus." (Well above national figures in both cases.)

So: Trustees-Nationals turn out to be disproportionately southerners, even with marginality controlled for........... QED

Perhaps a better way to put it (citing the whole chapter) Trustee-nationals (or Burkeans) ism is associates with high seniority, Dems., safeness, Southernness (This is in chl 4, "The Congressman as Representative" inconclusive)
The document contains handwritten notes with the following content:

1. Congressmen are the only people in the world who can say, "I wish I had said that," and mean it.

2. Congressmen remain totally unaware of the enormous financial control they have obtained. A recent study revealed that 60 percent of the Quarterly United States Congress opposed a proposal.

3. The notes mention several other points, including the influence of seniority, the importance of institutional factors, and Congressmen's moral standing.

4. The handwriting is clear and legible, with some emphasis on certain words and phrases.

The document appears to be a detailed analysis of Congressmen's role and influence, with a focus on seniority and institutional factors.

This gives some reps on this & beyond Downs

(Tullah Johnson 71/3) - I don’t have to look at these. They’re too obtuse. Their conclusions are complex; more agree with Downs.

These give some democracy’s budget will be too big.

(for the opposite) Downs.

No point in surrounding these. Phase 2 are more technical than Downs + less Ceremonial.
James W. Davis Jr. + Kenneth M. Dolbeare,
"Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Deferral Policies in the 1960s," eds. in (Austin Ranney, ed.),
Critical Science + Justice Policy.

This is a good example of an expert study
(Who gets drafted, etc.)
Raymond H. Dawson, "Imposition + Inheritance in Defense Policy,"
ch 10 in P+P (1963)

0273—86% longer, in 1959, — a new regiment for segregation against of the project
weapon programs of the military (the Russell Amendment passed)

0282-83—Before this, a high excess, had been the author in need of
real estate acquisition + just who constructs.

0283—"Congress has always had a very pronounced interest in the real estate transactions
that was part of the military depot + kept them under close surveillance.
"For reasons that historically have had few more to do with constituency

rallies than with strategy."
Congressmen generally indicate that they have little tendency to raise in Congress questions of military policy in terms of its bearing on some national or international objective or goal. "... In fact, during the 1946-57 period, few examples could be found when any Committee raised any significant or seriously evaluating questions about weapons applications, personnel, missions, organization, or policy in terms of national or international goals or objectives."

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Dexter (w.r.t) #2

311 - he quotes an influential member of HASC: "Our committee is a real estate committee."

312 - again a quote, from "perhaps the most experienced staff man on military affairs on the Hill": "Our committee is a real estate committee. Don't forget that. If you study our committee, you are studying real estate transactions."

Dexter: "by that, he meant that the location of installations and related transfer, purchase, and sale of properties is the main concern of the HASC members."

As suggested:

An immediate problem is: where there are no alternative sites, arguments.

315 - HASC: "How do the members of the relevant committees reach their decisions and evaluate the programs made by the military? The answer seems to be that usually no such evaluation is made."

316 - House Committee: "... the Appropriations Committee is concerned mainly not so much with legislation as with avoiding accountable waste."
... "Congressmen's duties are rarely, if ever, beaten on just one issue. But they may be beaten because they have offended potential supporters or assumed otherwiseagogic arguements on a series of matters."

Kenneth Keile has done here, a case study entitled "The Motion Picture Theatre Lobby in Action."

It tells how these people got a new stage taken off 83rd and South. They bullied scene of Congress, got lots of commitments; got it through even though IKE was against it."

Arthur D. Little Inc., a management consulting firm, formed loose as Congress. This book is based on their Study of Congress.

Nothing Here
p. 195 "The political life is by its nature a competitive one. To stay in the swing requires effort; to make one's ideas prevail requires more. With huge electorates, it is vital to make news and to have it published."

pp. 238-241. He calls Frank Graham a "saint," and talks of how he tried to persuade Graham to campaign, what to do, etc, in 1949-50. But he wouldn't do it! and he lost. This is usable. A guy by Douglas's account, not acting in his own interest.

p. 268. "...Javits had..."a genius for hitting the front page of the New York Times and Herald Tribune every morning. The rivalry for newspaper attention between Jack and his Republican colleague, Kenneth Keating, was often intense and amusing. When one would make a brief and catchy statement on the floor during the morning hour, the other would soon rush in to deliver another speech on the same topic, but with a different twist."

pp. 269-70. He talks about his freshman assault on the r&h bill. "This bill seemed to me a prime example of how local interests could triumph over national."

p. 312. On economy etc. "While liberals will fight to provide funds for agencies that advance the public interest, they seldom exert themselves to reduce outlays that are

Douglas #2

wasteful. Except for Senator Proxmire, they are generally oblivious to influences leading to expansion of the budget. Indeed, like their conservative colleagues, their concern is to add to other appropriations. Hard pressed as they are on the welfare front, they seek to conciliate other groups by voting for all projects. One of my closest associates never voted against any appropriation for any purpose, no matter how extravagant or foolish it was. This never hurt him politically. In fact, I think it helped him."

p. 313. He says he opposed the Senate in 1949 by voting for a cut in the Labor Dept. budget. It was a l-c issue; he was doing his own balancing here. He's more sophisticated than the Congress as a whole. Waste, etc......

p. 314 R&H appropriations bill in 1949 (this is his second attack, and it's not clear whether the previous one was an author or an earlier approps bill. Anyway, he's loaded for bear this time.) R&H fed him info on weak projects. He attacked some specifically on the floor.

p. 315 "In any event, I did not get the necessary one-fifth vote for a roll call on specific amendments, and on my final proposal to cut the appropriation I was defeated overwhelmingly." He opposed one Illinois project, and has to explain himself at home.

p. 315 "Only a few national reporters grasped the significance of my efforts, R&H which I continued and which were always voted down."

Douglas #3

still on R&H

p. 315 "Republicans did not want reductions any more than Democrats. This was an issue on which they united with a happy sense of fraternal comradeship."

the process on these

p. 315. "Once the Appros Committee had made its decisions, its members stuck together and were always present on the floor during debate on their bills. If there was trouble such as I was causing, they also appeared brought in the chairman and ranking members of the other committees, who were joined with them in an informal mutual-assistance pact. Other members of the Senate had little to gain and everything to lose by supporting a specific cut, and so they had no incentive to stay on the floor to vote. As a result, although I tried for ten years to make cuts, always with a thorough case, I was constantly beaten. Often I failed to get the necessary one-fifth for a quorum roll call, and even if I did, I was overwhelmingly defeated."

p. 317 he went after irrigation projects too....

general references here on public works and irrigation: pp. 269-70 and 314-315.
Douglas #4

or, generally, see ch. 23 on "Waste and the Economy", pp. 311-335. which goes into R&H, irrigation, and other things like the military, subsidies generally, CS etc. pp. 342-45. Here he gives a good case: a marine wrongly convicted of something by the service. Douglas's office did a lot of work on it, and eventually got a full pardon signed by the prexy. This looks good. There was no other apparent recourse for the guy....

p. 376-77. 1937, mimimym wage bill was hung up in Rujes.
p. 376: "Two primary elections, in Florida and Alabama broke the jam." (Petter and Hill)..."Both campaigned on behalf of the Wages and Hours bill, and both won smashing victories." "Immediately after the results of the Florida and Alabama primaries became known, there was a stampede to sign the petition, and the necessary 218 signatures were quickly obtained."...it passed......

p. 390. He refugees to AMA campaigns against Lucas and Tydings. AMA claimed credit in both cases. "Legislators accepted the conclusion that the voters were opposed to all forms of health insurance and that they should avoid an open conflict with the AMA."

Douglas #5

ch. 31 "The Battle for Tax Reform"
p. 437 He got on the Finance Com (after a long struggle!) and served 11 years there, the fight against the depletion allowance....
p. 433. "Toward the end of the long struggle, I became conscience-stricken over the dangers to which I was exposing my fellow liberals. I had often obtained a roll call on the depletion allowance, and the faithful twenty followed into the battle. We were always beaten, after which my colleagues faced reprisals from the oil industry. Gore, Clark, Proxmire, and I gladly took our chances and, indeed, rather enjoyed the battle of matching wits and will-power against the giants. But I hesitated increasingly to send others, less concerned, into great danger."
"... As a result of this, any potential government policies are relatively ineffective. The policy of the government is geared towards a series of budgetary tricks that may be of some benefit to the electorate but not enough to influence the electorate's political support extensively."

"Let facts be our conclusion, not the opposite."

Donner 1960 #2

A measure: he sees govt too much in budgetary terms.

Donner 1960 #3

Budgets will probably be smaller than they will be with perfect info...

"...lack of information..."
Dowse, Robert E. "The M.P. and His Surgery." [Title and details illegible], 1963.

333 - one idea is that MPs are...write. "The dominance complex is used by television and the newspapers to demonstate that some M.P.'s - those who never or rarely speak - are more and inglorious failures."

337 - a random sample of 100 MPs. - came from...years.

338 - in both parties, solid majorities of MPs hold their local surgeries in their party offices.

337 - Young women are the least common surgery problem - and both...to agree that women's job should have...be more women?

- and most have nurses

OK - raising - but a pale reflection of US.
p. 13. Senators and representatives desiring press coverage can acquire it in a variety of ways. The most ubiquitously used is the press release. The typical office on both sides of the Hill distributes several of these each week. Some announce routine government grants. Others indicate bills which the member sponsors or co-sponsors. Important conferences attended, tours arranged, letters sent to the President or member of the Cabinet, or general policy positions on current topics comprise the subjects for most of these releases.

p. 14 also weekly news column or radio or TV program.

P. 14 "The typical S and H office has automated mailing lists of newspapers in the state or district. . . . Most news releases go routinely to these papers through use of such a list." CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC

p. 14-15. "Weekly radio or television programs are sent by tape or film directly to the stations. They are frequently professionally produced within the S or H itself, as both houses maintain recording and filming studios offering services at minimal cost."

p. 15. And, of course, personal contact with reporters.

p. 17 and press conferences or briefings (not so common)