"Congress: The Electoral Connection" - Original Draft

David R Mayhew

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Congress: The Electoral Connection – the original longhand draft

Back in the 1970s, how did we go about doing our writing? Here is an instance. In the summer of 1973, I wrote the original draft of Congress: The Electoral Connection in longhand on (mostly) yellow lined 8x14 legal-sized pads using a number two pencil. That was the way to go. No computers back then. I didn’t use an electric typewriter or even a manual one. As for devising a figure (on page 64) and a table (page 92), I drew them by hand. Once I got it all done, I whipped it off to a professional typist. I kept a photocopy, which I found and fished out of a closet a few years ago. This is that photocopy. I have left it alone except to supply a more legible version of page one. That old page is uniquely messy since I seem to have stuttered at getting into the writing.

I wrote this book draft paragraph by paragraph, footnote by footnote, in a form that went into print at Yale University Press in 1974 virtually unchanged. I drew on stacks of note cards and other materials that I had accumulated previously. The actual writing took thirteen weeks. It was a June-into-September enterprise wedged in between teaching semesters. There was a rhythm: I wrote during the days and watched the reruns of Sam Ervin’s Watergate hearings during the evenings.
Congress: The Electoral Connection

— David R. Mayhew

Note to typist: When a Congressman has an identification tag after his name it should be spaced like this:

John Smith (D. - N.M.)

George Brown (R. - Calif.)

Do not space except when specified (footnotes all single - space)

Footnotes at bottom page
For their most useful counsel as I was preparing this work, I should like to thank Chris Achen, Alastair clay, Joseph La Palombara, David Ogg, Douglas Rae, and David Feldman. I could not have written this without having spent a year on Capitol Hill as a Congressional Fellow in the American Political Science Association's program. In that year I enjoyed access to the offices of two members who were in the public interest - - Congressman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.-N.J.) and Senator Lee Metcalf (D.-Mont.). All the arguments in the following work are mine, except those I have explicitly attributed to others.
I. Introduction

H. K. coway behind face question that less out a emotional / change many other. The lack of an interplay / in the field and me until shall N.H. Coway. Coway/ in particular. Point that scholarly / whatever should off explanations - however / shall go for descriptive accounts. J. Coway of / supply special domination. But by both somewhat may be / what

In this century great fish / scientists have ranged fer and wide. Attacking / the many/ from the many/ sciences / Ch. 1. Most important. Following: Ross, / sociology

L. N. Coway, "Life's Essentials" / N.H. Coway / At one point / with the earlier numbers / in fact it is cognizant research in the 1950s and / it's had / to it. One patern of things that / "many" "system" and "special". We know that / since this notion about an "aorta" peter / but

The first page of the original C:EC draft is uniquely hard to read. Where was I going? There is a lot of stuttering and crossout. Here is an upgraded version.

I INTRODUCTION

How to study legislative behavior is a question that does not yield a consensual answer among political scientists. .................. An ethic of conceptual pluralism prevails in the field, and no doubt it should. If there is any consensus it is on the point that scholarly treatments should offer explanations—that they should go beyond descriptive accounts of legislators and legislatures to supply general statements about why both of them do what they do. .................................................................................. What constitutes a persuasive explanation? In their contemporary quest to find out, legislative students have ranged far and wide, sometimes borrowing or plundering explanatory styles from the neighboring social sciences.

The most important borrowing has been from sociology...................... In fact it is fair to say that legislative research in the 1950’s and 1960’s had a dominant sociological tone to it. The literature abounded in terms like “role,” “norm,” “system,” and “socialization.” We learned that some U.S. Senators adapt an “outsider” role;¹ that ......................

The Office Appropriation Committee is frequently looked at as a
self-perpetuating agency. That Congress is capable of categorizing a
number of its committees as "standing," "select," or "ad hoc,"
that the U.S. Senate has "standing" committees, and that the House
has "standing" committees, all this is true. These findings, and others like them, present a research
basis for the first time for a systematic study of congressional
behavior.

From another social science the borrowing was done. It was a
sojourn in psychology. But it is possible to point to an
inherent--a family--a need of congressmen for
discipline. The difference between academic and practical
sociology is that the former regards the social organism
as a whole, whereas the latter looks at it as a series of
individual units. The sociologist looks at the social organism
as an entity in itself, which is subject to social change as a
whole. The academic sociologist looks at the social organism
as a series of individual units, which are subject to social
change individually. To this end, the sociologist has
maintained that research in congressmen
but a member. In one way or another, individuals are
encouraged to "organize" agencies to explain. Therefore, there are
three
others. The first is committee, which the House is supposed to
engage in legislative activity. There is little real
activity. The second is the budgetary procedure, which
is Riker's general work on the subject--building it.

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There is probably a growing drift towards the perspective of a drift, so to speak, from the sociological toward the economic. If so it occurs at a time when some economists are themselves shifting over into the Legislative field. There is likelihood of writing on parties of the legislative model with the legislative environment. More generally, there are recent writings on economists in the public finance tradition. Public finance has its own normative and empirical side, the former part amplified in the development of legislative decision-making, as noted by Buchanan and Tullock. Nickerson develops the angular side in his work, positioning finance as habit of government—and I think it is an attractive theory of habit formation that the relations between finance and legislative decisions. Public finance scholars seem to have gotten involved in legislative studies as a result of their abdication.

But the idea of the Buchananite legislator; that is, the legislator concerned with public goods actually does rather than an assumption that officials will automatically translate good policy into law. Once somebody finds out what they are with political scientists exploring the perspective and economists the legislative, the gap is cut. There is a great future between what is going to happen and what is written. Second, we could engage in an essentially struggle over strategy. Third, they could use each other's insights to develop policies or a more vigorous legislative scholarship in the style of political economy.

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(2) A notable characteristic of these writers: the capacity of a sociologist to address itself to the question of how much money should be spent on public expenditure. The new arbitration should be at which among different public goods, and how the costs should be distributed between present and future, and not among the members of society. James S. Coleman, "Individual Incentives and Collective Action," in Gordon Tullock (ed.), Papers on Public and Private

(3) Nicholas, op. cit.

All this is an introduction to a statement of what I intend to do in the following chapters. Mostly through personal experience on Capitol Hill, I have become convinced that cautionary, "preservative," behavior offers the best route to an understanding of legislative -- or at least of the U.S. Congress. In the fashion of economics, I shall make a simple abstract assumption about human motivation and then speculate about the consequences of behavior based on that motivation. Specifically, I shall conjure up a vision of U.S. Congressmen as single-minded seekers of re-election, to wit, what kinds of activity best galvanize and win support from their constituents. I shall then speculate about what Congressmen might be able to do to improve their re-election prospects, to the extent it is consistent with the existing legislative institutions and making policy. I shall also conjecture on the re-election goal for various members of Congress and the consequences of such strategies. Further, I shall note that the re-election quest generates an accountability relationship with an electorate, and any deviation from what the electorate expects is held accountable.

I regard this venture as an exercise in political science rather than economics. I leave aside for now but I believe economics carries its own peculiar problems with it. To study, Congress seems to be an institution dependent upon the principles of political science. Not to mention the public desire, scholars tend to think legislatures are central to public policy. I shall give consideration to questions that arise for governmental activity and the political science policy. As I shall touch upon such traditional political science subjects as elections, parties, government, and regime stability.
Another distinction here is that economics research has infused with the normative assumption that policy decisions should be judged by how well they meet the standard of Pareto optimality. This is an assumption that was not shared and that I definitely must reject in scientific research. There will be no need here to set forth any alternative assumption. I may say, to be fair, that I find the model of great legislative activity of Lynd a good deal more edifying than any that could be built on foundations of Pareto optimality.

By subjecting Congress in a single legislative institution, the U.S. Congress, to rigorous scrutiny, we Congress for a unique or unusual thing.

It is partly the result of this classification of legislatures, as Congress that it promotes examined among the states and gives them the various self-congratulating resources to question, from its failure to objectively debase. It is unlikely to be equally "same" among legislatures for a check of executive power. Like most other American legislatures but unlike many European, it allows in the shadow of a separate elected executive. My decision to focus on the Congress must mean a belief that there is something to be gained in an internal analysis of a particular and important institution. But there is something general to be gained as well, for the exceptionalist argument should not be carried too far. I am not arguing the Congress fits just one in a large family of legislative bodies. I shall find it useful to connect with the evidence of evidence its own and with American legislative and city councils.


Functions to be given special attention are those of legislating, overseeing the executive, expressing public opinion, and securing the constitution. No federal republic can be constitutionally assured, indeed the very form "so-called" is an unfortunate one because it confuses structure and function. Accordingly, I shall now use the more favorable and more neutral term "representation" to refer to members of the class of offices inherited by the U.S. House and Senate.

Whatever the worth of the political institutions in the class, the nation has been well served by learning: it is not of all such entities that (1) they members are formally equal to each other in status, etc. (2) the authority of their members depends on these claims to representing the views of the community in some sense of that concept, "representation." (10)

The following discussion will take the form of an extended theoretical essay. Of course, it will raise more questions than it answers. The extension in non-causal features, it will not be always apparent whether or not the point is examined finally, of course, I shall be satisfied to examine a significant part of the American political system. In this essay I shall examine the work of the delegation of the re-election of a president. We have already pointed out the distinction made between the political and the political. These essays will be followed by advice to political scientists, politicians, economists, and politicians I have found useful in writing about these agents.

Chapter 2 will deal with the electoral incentive and the allocation it produces. Chapter 3 will deal with institutional arrangements in Congress. Chapter 4 with Congressional policy-making.

(17) "Now it is equally true, though the interest of life and death deprived the public good." The two sentences are not the same. Indeed, the price of the public good is the price of life and death. "The National" (Chicago: 1959), p. 101.

THE ELECTORAL INCENTIVE

"Congress has drifted into a battle for individual survival. Each of the Congressmen seek (only) to secure votes to re-elect them. I've got to do something for myself. If you remember that old bard advice, you know he said, 'When winding up; keep your temper.' This goes to Congressmen and to the people for volunteers. Most of them are willing only to follow those things that will create them and get them the reelection which allows them to bleed into their respective districts or their respective states. If you don't stick your neck out, you don't get it chopped off."

--- Senator William B. Shetle (R-ohio)

The discussion tomorrow will center on the proposition that U.S. Congressmen are interested in getting re-elected — indeed, in their self-images as majorities, interested in nothing else. Any such assumption does violence to the facts, so it is important at the outset to put these as firmly as possible in reality. A number of questions that keep reality immediately raise.

First, is it true that the U.S. Congress is a place where members wish to stay once they go there? Clearly, there are representatives who are not there. In the Colombian parliament, there is a sense of members for very long. Newton,Warren, the Japanese parliament tend in some sense, just so and then move on. Voluntary tenure is quite high in some American state legislatures — in, for example, New York State or California, in which many of the congress people are reluctant — people not very much interested in politics other than those who were briefly involved in politics. An ethic of "voluntarism" pervades the politics of California city councils.

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Notes:


20. Where the center is not the Congressmen, the term "Congressmen" will refer to members both in and outside.


Congress itself voluntary turnover was high throughout most of the Nineteenth Century. Yet in the modern Congress it is unmistakable that the "congressional career" is used up. Members served through Republican majorities, Democratic majorities, in the 1850's, among Senators, in the 1860's, also in the 1870's and 1880's. Thereafter, the proportion of veteran Senators generally fell after the Civil War. The highest followed the Civil War, with turnover slightly in the late Nineteenth Century, and continuing to decline through the Twentieth. Average senatorial terms served have given up and gone with the House in 1871 registering an all-time high of 20% of its members who had served a least half terms. It seems fair to characterize the modern Congress as an assembly of professional politicians spinning out political careers. The job offers good pay and high prestige: they are no want applicants for them. But, successful pursuit of a career requires continued re-election.

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Indeed it has been proposed that professional politicians could be gotten rid of by running re-election reports. As a result, one-term legislator by running against the professional see Dennis Mueller et al., "Legislative Government: Who Finances the" 12 Civic Science 57-68, 1972.
A second question is this: Does it make sense to attribute such dedication to the exclusive pursuit of goals? Of course, the answer is that a more plausible explanation (if one were possible) of a Congressman's or any other political leader's dedication to his goal is the desire to win re-election. There are occasional Congressmen who intentionally do things that make their own election survival difficult and impossible. The late President Kennedy wrote of Congressional "patriotism" saying, "Congressmen are not saints, even in private life, in order to survive in a 1950 primary. Graham, a newspaper editor and Republican, wanted to be re-elected. He lost this primary. There were not many saints. But surely, if it were possible for Congressmen to re-elect themselves to the electoral office and not necessarily incompatible with it, some candidates for re-election might be re-elected.  

Fenno assigns three prime goals to Congressmen: getting re-elected, but also achieving influence within Congress and making "good public policy." These latter two will be given attention further on in this discussion. Anyone can point to Congressmen whose public activities are not obviously reducible to the electoral considerations. Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.) comes to mind. Yet, if he were not the electoral goal, he was an impressive member of Congress. It has to be the approximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved and pursued, the end that is to be entertained.  

Our former Congressman writes, "All members of Congress have a primary interest in getting re-elected. Some members have no other interest." Re-election includes everything else, as indeed it should if we are to.

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31. In the case of the late Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.), there were goals apparently conflicting. See James Boyd, Above the Law (New York: New American Library, 1962), p. 55. The financial goal is probably less common in Congress than in most of the state legislatures (e.g., Illinois and New Jersey).
Frank E. Smith (D-Miss.)

It will not be necessary here to reach the question of whether it is possible to detect the nature of Congressmen by asking them what they are, or indeed the question of whether there are unconscious motives lurking behind conscious ones. In Lasswell's classical formulation, "political types" are power seekers, while "private motives displaced on public objects rationalized in terms of public interest." Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 38.
Expect that the relation between politics and public will be one of accountability. What justifies a focus on re-election? Is it the justification of those who supports it — its justification associated with the expectation of an accountable government? For analytic purposes, thought, Congressmen will be treated in this paper as if they were single-minded re-election seekers. Whatever else they may seek will be given passing attention, but the analysis will center on the electoral connection.

Yet another question arises. Even if Congressmen are single-mindedly interested in re-election, are they in a position as individuals to do anything about it? If they are, it is of course shared by and for by those who share their political environment; if not, it takes some severe to pay much attention to their individual activities. This question requires a complex answer, and it will be useful to begin reading for one by pondering whether individual Congressmen are the proper analytical units for an investigation of this sort. An important alternative view is that parties rather than some individual Congressmen are the prime movers in electoral politics. The new classic account of what a competitive political universe will look like with parties as its analytic

Off the books, I get, is entitled to be surprising. "They can be no doubt, then, if power is granted to a body of men, called representatives, if they, like any other men, will use their power, not for the advantage of the community, but to their own advantage, if they can. The only question, then, is, how can they be prevented?" James Mill, "On Government," in Essays on Government, Independence, Liberty of the Press, and Laws of Nature (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937).
units is done. Economic theory of democracy. In the familiar Iranian
world parties are entirely selfish. They seek the rewards of office but
in vain to achieve them they had to win gain and respect. They bid for
up in public as highly desirable post-source "favors." A party
enjoyed complete control over government during term in office. In a
two-party system, to decide how to cast their ballot by examining
the record and promises of the party in power and the previous record and
current promise of the party out of power. He then calculates an
expected utility, preferential strategy. In the coming term, the party in
power preferred candidates accordingly. Choice as the power tells a
candidates. Legislative representatives, if they are passed, inserted into
the governing body. They gather information on grass roots
preferences and relay to the government, and they try to persuade
constituents back home that the government is doing a worthy job.

How well a party model of this kind captures the reality of
democratic regimes is an empirical question. The difficulty lies in
the need for parties as cohesive "teams" (members whose goals cannot be
viewed as a single, consistent preference ordering). In all
non- democratic regimes, governments are made up of a plurality of
elective officials—not just one man. How can a group of people
stand together so that it looks something like a democratic "team"
(though not necessarily in a non-democratic regime). As a group
achieve the political fusion of preference ordering needed to satisfy
the model's party government in Britain, a simple process

36. ibid., chs. 1-3.
37. ibid., p. 83-90. Because the information and opinions supplied by representatives
are important in decision making. Davis suggested in effect some decision making involved
representation. And thus is the constituent. Therefore, government is considered to exist as
a power with the essential gain in elite from political efficiency. Representation is
enhanced by the representative's ability to coordinate its action. Pp. 6-20.
Substantially by intra-party bargaining. Nonetheless, it is plain that some regimes fit the model better than others. For some purposes it is quite useful to study British politics by using parties as analytic units. Britain, to start with, has a Constitution that permits minority government. But beyond that, British M.P.'s vote in collective party blocs. Not aggregated "teens." It is not inevitable that they would do so and indeed few would if the individualists in the Commons were permitted. Why do contemporary M.P.'s submit to party discipline? There are at least three reasons why they do, and it is debatable how far coercion has in fact allowed other contests with the American regime.

First, in both British parties, the nominating systems are geared to produce candidates who will vote the party line if and when they reach Parliament. This happens not because nominations are centrally controlled, but because local nominating committees are small elite groups which serve in effect as nationally-oriented chordleaders for the party. The British M.P.'s lack the resources to set up shop as politicians with bases independent of party. Television time in campaigns goes to parties rather than to individual candidates. By custom a rule in both the two parties, sharply limit the funds that Parliamentary candidates can spend in their election campaign (27).

Second, British M.P.'s lack the resources to set up shop as politicians with bases independent of party. Television time in campaigns goes to parties rather than to individual candidates. By custom a rule in both the two parties, sharply limit the funds that Parliamentary candidates can spend in their election campaign (27).

Once elected, M.P.'s are not supplied the lavish office expenses -- still less, free meals, free
printings, and no dab -- that can be used to achieve public
salience. These, argument, should not be carried too far;
M.P.'s are not artists, and obviously dissident leaders
like Aneurin Bevan and Enoch Powell manage to build
important independent followings. But an average backbencher
is constrained by lack of resources. It comes as no surprise
that individual M.P.'s add little to (or subtract little from)
party opinion, electoral strength in their constituencies; the
Beebs's share of the variance in vote change from election to election is
changeable to national swing rather than local or regional
conditions.

Third, with the executive entrenched in Parliament
The only posts with real influence in the Commons come are the
held out by party leaders. Up to a third of majority party
M.P.'s are not included in the Ministry. In the ambitious
backbencher, the rule is to impress ministers and particularly the
Prime Minister. Party loyalty is rewarded: reassignment.

But the U.S. is very different: In

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R.T. McKenzie, British Political Culture (New York: St. Martin's, 1953)
Off 154-155, 155.

"For senior Congressmen, it is said, colleagues with shock on being shown
the writing-rooms, and the Library of the Congress fall of men writing
letters in England, Members of Parliament answer the constituency
mail." Howard Odell, The Power of Parliament (Garden City, N.Y.: Double day, 1965), p. 583 and generally, Odell, pp. 556-57. They have changed
somewhat since Odell's account, but the contrast is still valid. See also
Anthony Link and Michael Rush, The Member of Parliament
Loewenberg reports that, in West Germany, "the average member of the
Guardian was under Spartan conditions." Gerhard Loewenberg,
*Need to the German Critical State* (Ithaca: Cornell University

(45)

Crick, op. cit., p. 30-31. Crick adds: "A modern French Minister has

gained a patience beyond the wildest dreams of political anoia of a Walpole

in Newcastle," p. 31.

(46)

*John P. Mackintosh*, "Legacies of the House of Commons: The Case for

Structural Change" in *Loewenberg* (ed.), *Midem Parliament: Change or Decline?* p. 39..
America, the underpinnings of "federalism" are weak or absent, making it possible for politicians to circumvent court orders. It should be clear that traditional structure and Jamaican federalism are not necessarily incompatible. Connecticut state government, in which party organization plays a substantial role over nominations and ticket distribution, comes close to the British model; government and state legislative parties are bound together by party organization. But Connecticut, as exceptionally as anywhere, is at one end of a spectrum toward the other end of which there are states in which parties have little binding effect at all.

In American politics, the place where Jamaican logic really applies is in the selection of individuals to executive posts — executives, governors, and city mayors. To choose among candidates for the presidency or the New York City mayoralty is to choose among "executive teams" — candidates with their retinues of future high administrators, financial supporters, gatekeepers, student ideologues, journalistic flacks, hangers-on, occasionally brigands and spies. Yet in executive elections, the candidates are highly visible; they bid for favor in Jamaican fashion; they substantially control government.

Taken in city politics, this is the standard functional case that cohesive parties may aim to deal with problems caused by constitutional decentralization. See, e.g., Chicago, Edward C. Banfield, Political Science in the City (New York: Free Press, 1961), ch. 8. American parties have traditionally been stronger at the local level, but something similar happens to them as they come to the city. Where parties are both together by patronage, and where they are no geographically salient governments which can serve as independent political bases, there is a strong tendency for party politics to become more salient within these competitive. Jamaican politicians have little incentive to sustain an opposition party and every incentive to join the ruling party. The same argument generally holds for national politics in mid-Eighteenth Century England.

In the California Senate, for example, committee chairmanships have been given out to the most senior members regardless of party. Alvin D. Sokolow and Richard W. Brooks, "Partisanship and Seniority in Legislative Committee Assignments: California After Redistricting," 24 Western Political Quarterly 741-747, 1971.
(in general) and can be charged with its accomplishment and
sacrifices (Agenda No. 3 for relief, Mayor Bingay for crime),
elites are typically close (as seen in most of middle cities).
Voters can figure in "spectral differentials." When the Cole V.
Key, Jr. write The Responsible Electorate 51 a book in the division
spirit, he had the original goal score to focus on competition
between incumbent and prospective presidential administrations rather
than mere broadly on competition between parties. Indeed it can be
argued that American representative government has declined in force
in the 20th Century (especially at the city council level) and
executives have even chiefly because it is the executive who often
elects something the domination accountability. 52

But at the Congressional level the Riemannian model breaks down. To
think back to the British discussion, the specified revenue and income
arrangements conducive to party unity among M.P.'s are absent in the Congressional environment. 

First, the way in which Congressional candidates win party
nomination is not, to say the least of it, one which fosters
party closure in Congress. For one thing, 435 House member and
98 senators (but not the Indiana pair) are not nominated by
direct primary (rarely, in the few states with challenge
primary), rather than by caucus or convention. There is no reason
to expect large primary electorate to honor party loyalty.
(An introduction of the direct primary system in Britain might
itself destroy party cohesion in the Commons.) For another, even
where party organizations are still strong enough to control
Congressional primaries, the parties are locally rather than
practically national, local party unity is vital to them.

51 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.)
52 There's an interesting point that evening dinner of a Jacksonian sort was occurring
in national politics only at the representative level. Samuel P. Huntington,
"Congressional Progress in the Twentieth Century," Ch. 5 in David E. Truman (Ed.), The Congress and America's
53 In Chicago, for example. See Leo M. Skowron, "Congressional Recruitment and
national party unity is not. Apparently it never has been.

Second, unlike the M.P., the typical American Congressman has to mobilize his own resources to win initially a nomination, to win election and win re-election. He builds his own electoral coalition and sustains it. He raises and spends a great deal of money in doing so. He has at his command an elaborate set of electoral resources that the Congress leader upon all its Members. They will be more on these points later. The important point here is that a Congressman can indeed want — build a base where one is substantially independent of party. In the words of a House member quoted by Clapp, "If one depended on the party organization, and election, none of us would be here."

Third, Congress does not have to sustain a cabinet, and hence does not engage the ambitions of its members in cabinet functions in such a fashion as to induce party cohesion. It would be wrong to posit a one-to-one relation here between party dominance and cabinet sustenance. On the one hand there is nothing preventing Congressmen from building disciplined Congressional parties, anyway, if they wanted to do so. On the other hand, as the records of the Third and Fourth French Republics show, cabinet regimes can be maintained in relatively...


Clapp, op. cit., p. 351.
Jacobsen pointed. Yet, to face the proposition in statistical
rather than deterministic form, one need for an assembly to sustain a
coalition probably requires the likelihood that it
will support disciplined parties.  

The fact that no theoretical statement of the U.S. Congress which points parties as non-entity
units, the very far, we are left with individual Congressmen with 535 men and
women rather than party as units — to given
attention in the discussion to come. The style of argument will be
somewhat like and of Dewey's. The reality was like that of
Narrative. Whether the choice of particular initiatives can be shown
only in the facts, a number of the preconditions established around
with the facts raised to the level of first, non-discovered questions of
whether Congressmen in search of re-election are more a politician or do
anything about it.

Here it will be useful to deal first with the minority
subject 9 Congressmen who serve marginal districts or states —
constituencies fairly evenly balanced between the parties. One
reason for taking up the marginals separately is that whether
their electoral precariousness might induce them to engage in
distinctive electoral activities. Marginals have an
obvious problem: to a substantial degree they are not the
money of national partisan or electoral service. But general
rather than awareness of Congressional legislative activities is low.
Hence national swing in the Congressional vote are unusually

(57) See the argument for Leon D. Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," 58

(58) Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accessions of Queen III
(London: Macmillan, 1960). For a Namier passage on
assemblies without disciplined parties see p. 17.

(59) Harold E. Winters and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the
Salaries of Congress," ch. IV in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and
Judgments on what the President is doing rather than on what
Congress is doing. In the formal case where parties controlling the
President face House seats for the mid-term, several seem to
be more judgmental; everything tall but rather artifacts of the election
cycle. Here along a judgmental line, there has been an
upswing in relation over the years between partisan voting for the House
and vote and gains in real income among voters. The natural electorate
wants the Congressional party of a President who reigns during
economic prosperity and rewards the party of
who reigns during adversity. Remarkably, parties may be given
by the same circumstances more for other states of affairs, including
involvement in wars. In this behavior the way
they do, it is in the electoral interest of a marginal Congress to help ensure that a Presidential administration of his own party
is a popular success or that one of the opposite party is a
failure. (Party for the support of electoral interest, there is no reason why a Congressman with a safe seat should care one way
or another.)

But what can a marginal Congressman do to affect the
outcomes of a Presidency? Some shorthand suggest a marginal
giving to a President of the own party can take in to suggest
his allegiance in votes crucially. There is ambiguous evidence
But relevant marginal do behave disproportionately in this

60 Angus Campbell, “Stars and Scars: A Study of Electoral Change,”
chap. 3 in 1962, C. Harlow, “Inventing Elusive Policies:
Elections and the Determinants of the Free Party’s (Expert)” Lack of

62 Gerald H. Kramer, “Short Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting

See also the Symposium on Mr. Kramer’s findings in 63 American Political Science Review 160-180, 1971.
This strategy may not always be the best one. During the 1938 recession, for example, it may have been wise for marginal Congressmen to support deficit-spending bills, even if the opposition of President Eisenhower; in the 1958 elections, economic policies would have been ruinous for members of his own party. About what is the opposition party? By the same logic it might be advantageous for opposition marginal to try to wreck the economy, if this were likely to harm the President, not them. Therefore, many of intriguing theoretical possibilities here for marginals of parties both in and out of power. Yet marginals seem not to give much attention to strategies of this sort, whether ingenious or ingenious. What we are pondering is that individual marginals can realistically hope to do anything to affect the national impact of the various economic time in Congress or in the President's election prospects. And the answer seems to be no—or at least trimmings little. Leaving aside the problem of generating collective congressional action, there is the root problem of knowing what to try to do. It is hard to point to an instance in recent decades in which any group of Congressmen (marginal or not) has done something with clear effect of which has been to change the national congressional electoral percentage in a direction in which the group intended to change it. There are too many unanswerable. Most important, freedom fells their own legs. So do events. Not even economists can have a clear idea about what the effective economic measures will be. The election cycle adds its own kind of gravity. A famous statement of President Johnson's Great Society legislation (as all the others) was followed in 1966 by the largest Republican gains in House popular vote percentage of the last quarter century. Hence there is lack of usable force among Congressmen on which actions will.
Judging what rational political effects and there is evidence of 

growing collective action—especially among unorganized 
Congressmen who can watch national election percentages, thực hiện công việc và dự kiến sẽ tới với relative impunity. All in all the 

rational way for marginal Congressman to deal with national 

funds is to give them to their political opponents. They then can exercise no control. If much unusual for legislative 
doings ever which they think they can have some control. There is evidence 

that marginal do think and act differently. House unorganized 

are more likely to claim up as “district-oriented” and “delegated” in role 

shifts. They introduce more local laws. In general, marginal of 

both parties display more energy for their election-centered activities. 

But these activities are not directed toward affecting national 

election percentages. Ask although they may differ in intensity, they do not differ in 

link for the 

activities engaged in by anyone else.

The marginal Congressman is in a position to do anything about getting re-elected? If an answer is sought to their ability to affect national fortunes percentages that determine in no. But if an answer 
is sought in their ability to affect the election percentages in their own 

primary and general election, the answer is yes. At least so 

the case here will be. More specifically, the case will be that they

65

However, there are interesting questions here that have never been asked: 

Demarginal Congressmen—nonmembers generally—of Congress try to sabotage the economy? Of course they may not appear to 

do so, but they are “negative way” damaging the economic 

of legislation. Can the Eighteenth Congress with their burning a time of inflation? Can Congress 

with their spending program under President Nixon—dramatic a 

of inflation? Did pressure in precisely no. It would have to be shown that 

are some Congressmen actually suffer under the influence of different parties. And 

probably do not. Strategies like this do not seem particularly 

likely to require a vigorous consciousness of different effects of a sort not 

from the Congressmen individually.

Davidson, op. cit., p. 128.

66

David Whitten, Edward and Cynthia R. Nomler, "Measures of Legislative Performance in the U.S. 

Think that they can adopt their own percentages, that in fact they can adopt their own percentages, and furthermore, that there is reason for them to try to do so. One last is obvious for the marginal seat, but perhaps not so obvious for the non-marginal. Are they not, after all, occupying a "safe seat"? It is easy to form an image of Congressmen who inhabit party bastions and who, having won high office, are never in danger of losing it. But the image is misleading, and it is important to show why it is misleading.

First, when looked at from the standpoint of a career, Congressional seats are as safe as they may seem. Of House members serving in the Ninety-third Congress, 58% had at least one first-named in their careers were in general elections with less than 55% of the total vote; 77% with less than 60%. For senators, the figures were 70% and 83% (for last-fifteen years, including 15 of the 22 Southernies). And yet for these November results, there is competition in the primaries. The fact is that a typical Congressman is someone who, at least occasionally, has won a primary in his own.

Second--to look at the election figures from a different angle--in U.S. House elections only about a third of the variance in party percentages overtime is attributable to structural change. About half the variance is local (city, town or state, etc.). The variance not explained by national and state trends. The local component is probably at least as high in Senate elections, hence vote variation over which Congressmen have reason to think they can exercise some control (i.e., the primary vote, and to the extent that the November vote is substantially).

Over the long haul, the proportion of seats switching from party to party is quite surprising. Of Senators serving in the Ninety-third Congress, 43% had succeeded members of the opposite party; 56% had succeeded members of the same party, and one (then-speaker R.-Now) had come into the Senate at the same time that seat elected the former (Roberts went straight to the Post Clarendon presidency). Out of House members serving in the same Congress, 36% had originally succeeded members of the opposite party; 51% members of the same party.
Said party, and 13% have originally taken newly created seats. (Distress certainly at month. Abolish banishment. Format 2 to a low district for in substantial, the same with second one.

Spokes, p. 186. Ohio "rating of vote components in order of importance" differs from the British ranking.
While this comes down to general elections, it's that district vote fluctuations beyond or in opposition to national trends can be quite striking. For example, between 1968 and 1970 an Republican share of the House vote fell 3.3%, but the Democratic share at the same time increased 6.4%. The seat had been 67.6% to 45.0% and in 1970, the seat was 50% to 45%. In 1972, for precedent, Republican seat--resent seat; in general it was not a bad year for Republicans and all four districts had won in 1966 with at least 52% of the vote and it just... In addition, there are the primaries. It is hard for anyone to feel absolutely secure in an electoral environment of this sort. In King's interview study of candidates who had just ran in an office in Wisconsin, [about a third of them, running for Congress], the majority remembered having been 'surprised' about electoral outcomes during their campaigns. That said, the increased uncertainty was only partly relative to actual electoral outcomes. It is hard for anyone to feel absolutely secure in an electoral environment of this sort. In King's interview study of candidates who had just ran in an office in Wisconsin, [about a third of them, running for Congress], the majority remembered having been 'surprised' about electoral outcomes during their campaigns. That said, the increased uncertainty was only partly relative to actual electoral outcomes.

In the 1982-1972 period, few House committee chairmen had their primaries.

From about 1974 through the 1980's, their seats were decided 57% in 1974; and maybe higher by 1974-1972. See Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Election," 3 Policy 395-406, 1971; Erikson, "Midterm Problems," Public Opinion Quarterly, and party features in Congressional Election, 66 American Political Science Review 1245, 1972; Derek M. McFarland, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Majority," Public Opinion 1974. This is not clear, in any case, in the electoral environment, and it's also certain that it is attributable to the electoral method. It is certain that it is attributable to the electoral method. It is certain that it is attributable to the electoral method. It is certain that it is attributable to the electoral method.

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This is a more basic point. The ultimate concern here is whether Congressmen are re-elected. It is possible for an assembly in which no member can ever hope to be re-elected to be an assembly in which no member will ever feel it is in anyone's interest to vote for him. This might be an assembly in which no member will ever feel it is in anyone's interest to vote for him. When we say "Congressmen are re-elected," we do not mean that there is nothing he could do that would lose him his seat. Rather, we mean that Congressmen are re-elected as long as he continues to do the things he is doing. If he stopped coming to Washington, for instance, visiting his district, or began voting randomly in all bills, or if he voted on not more than three major bills in a year, it is difficult to offer conclusive proof that his last statement is true. For there is no Congressmen or state to make an experiment. But normal activity among politicians with healthy electoral margins should not be confused with inactivity. What characterizes "safe" Congressmen is not that they are beyond reach but that their efforts are very likely to bring them unexpected electoral success.

Whether Congressmen think their activities have electoral impact, and whether in fact they have impact are, of course, two separate questions. Of the two, the latter is of little interest. The "symbolic" Congressmen are elected as long as he continues to do the things he is doing. If he stopped coming to Washington, for instance, visiting his district, or began voting randomly in all bills, or if he voted on not more than three major bills in a year, it is difficult to offer conclusive proof that his last statement is true. For there is no Congressmen or state to make an experiment. But normal activity among politicians with healthy electoral margins should not be confused with inactivity. What characterizes "safe" Congressmen is not that they are beyond reach but that their efforts are very likely to bring them unexpected electoral success.

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doubt that the electorate's general awareness of what is going on in Congress is something less than robust. Yet the argument here will be that Congressmen's attention to the evidence is likely to be brought in as the discussion proceeds.

One next step then is to offer a brief conceptual sketch of the relationship between Congressmen and their electorates. In the down-ballot analysis, party leaders' coordination over a pool of voters' expected party differential

(28) for Congressmen this is in practice irrelevant to reasons specified earlier. A Congressman's attention must therefore be directed to what can be called an "expected incumbent differential," let us define this "expected incumbent differential" as any difference perceived by a relevant political actor between what an incumbent Congressman is likely to do if returned to office and what any feasible challenger (in primary or general election) would be likely to do. Let us define "relevant political actors" as any actors who may be a resource that might be used in the election in question. At the ballot box they might be resources or voters. But these are resources and can be described as "voters" among the additional resources bringing skills, etc. By this definition a "relevant political actor" need not be a contender, one of the most important resources being the country in Congressional campaign years.

Stokes and Kelley op. cit.

The most significant treatment of this subject is in Graham E. Miller and Donald C. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," ch. 16 in idem, pp. 366-370. Note that a smaller but important kind of accountability influencing would exist if Congressmen thought their activities will impact even if they held more of an

Lind, op. cit., p. 38-45.

To give an extreme example, the 1972 Richard Nixon campaign spent $50 million on television ads of "spoopy". Philip M. Klein, op. cit., (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 384.
Now it must be emphasized that the average voter has only the remotest awareness of what an incumbent Congressman is actually doing in office. 78 In fact, an incumbent has to be concerned about actions which do some impression about him, and especially about actions which can work votes other than their own votes. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WVA) has a "little list" of 2,545 West Virginians he regularly keeps in touch with. 79 A Congressman's assistant interviewed for a Newsweek story in 1972 reports the "thought leadership" back in the district of campaign resources was the most vital issue. An incumbent not only has to assume that his own election fund and adequate staff to try to minimize the probability that action will cancel out or provoke a campaign against him. There is the story that during the first Nixon term Senator James E. James (R-Kans.) was told he would face a well-financed opponent in his 1972 primary if he did not display more party regularity in his voting. 80 Availability of money can affect the strength of campaigning in both primary and general elections. 81 Another resource of significance is organizational expertise, probably more important now money among labor union offerings. Single ability to get electing members is a resource the invoking of which may give campaigns an interesting twist. 82

For thousands of November voters little reasons of candidate particularities are combined with selection criteria in mind. The party label on the ballot. These votes are normally left undisturbed in their ignorance, although candidates may find it useful to bring resources to get the right ones to the polls. But, it must not be assumed that these are no circumstances under which such votes can be turned into vigorous candidate announcements.

held college degrees (as against 127 of the larger popula-

tion), and that the people were more issue-oriented than the general popula-
tion. He

need to attract people may induce candidates to pledge in advance that

they will otherwise would. Former Congressman Alfred K. Lawrence (D.-N.Y.)

His 

his key resource a cache of student volunteers who

will follow him from district to district, making him an unusually

credible candidate.

Still another highly important resource is the ability to make

persuasive endorsements. Manhattan candidates anger for the

endorsement of The New York Times. New Hampshire politics revolves around

endorsement of the Manchester Union Leader. Labor union committees

circulate their approved lists. Chicago Democratic politicians seek the

endorsement of the Mayor. In the San Francisco area and

elsewhere, some candidates try to score points by winning endorsements from

officials of the opposite party. As Neustadt argues, the influence

of the biggest men Congressmen (of both parties) varies with their public

fame and with the financial ability to punish and reward. One

Presidential tool is the endorsement, which can be carefully calibrated

according to level of favor. In the 1970 election Senator Charles Goodell

(R.-N.Y.) who had achieved public acclaim by attacking the

Nixon Administration, was apparently ignored by the Republicans. Called

forth by Nixon attack; the Vice President endorsed his Conservative

effort and the Administration acted to channel unusually rejection

money away from Goodell. [82]

[83]

[84]

[85]

[86]

Of course, when the candidates fail to win, they do harm ability to punish

and reward and his influence on Congressmen. When they do help, they

it becomes politically profitable for Congressmen of his own party to attune

him to -- as with Democrats in 1151-52 and Republicans in 1973.
What a Congressman has to try to do is to realize that in primary and general elections the resource balance — will all other things being equal — favors himself rather heavily.

To maneuver successfully he must remain constantly aware of what political acts "mean" to the "voters" and how he must act in a fashion to secure results that favor himself. Combating this task is one of the political weak resources. That is, only a very small proportion of the resources (other than those that are conveniently deployable in Congressional campaigns) are in fact deployed. But these issues may over the coming years will suddenly become pressing and with what consequences. For example, just after the 1947 election the American Medical Association warned by the medical program the United Covered and by Democratic campaign promises to institute national health insurance decided to venture into politics. By 1950 Congressmen in accord as sponsors of health insurance found themselves confronted by a million-dollar "A.M.A. voting drive" consisting of "魚 colleagues' committees" seeking candidates and even doctors sending out campaign literature with their mailing lists. By 1952 it was widely believed had the A.M.A. had decided later election, and few Congressmen were mentioning health insurance.

In all his calculations the Congressman must keep in mind that he is serving two electorates rather than one — a primary electorate and as primary electorate might just be a representative sample of it. From the standpoint of the primary, a primary is just another election to be survived. A typical scientific tool of a constituency yields a Congressman information on the public standing of "potential challenger" to him in the other party but also in his own party. For precedent with a firm "safety coalition" of elite groups in his party the primary election is normally "easy". And there can be sudden turbulence.
The corruptive influence of the Nineteenth Century political organization was highly prized and that there was an ethic that they should be rotated. "An ambitious Congressman is therefore forced to think day and night of his re-nomination and to secure it not only by procuring, if he can, grants from the Federal Treasury, for local purposes, and places for his relatives and friends of the local wire-pullers who control the nominating Convention, but also by sedulously 'nursing' the constituency during the vacation." James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, Vol. I (New York: Putnam's, 1889), pp. 40-41.

Although the direct primary system is uniquely American, there are variants that face similar problems for politicians. In Italian parliamentary elections, each vote registers a vote for a favored party's candidates, but then can also cast preference votes for individual candidates on that list. Whether a given candidate gets elected depends both on her/his party's standing against other parties and how well he does on the resources of his candidacy. Mass organizations (e.g., labor and farm groups) capable of mobilizing preference votes rely heavily on the campaigning, "where nothing seems counted so much as the ability to deliver the required number of preference votes." — Joseph P. Fidler, *Interest Groups in Deliberative Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 248-249.
all the popular vote. As the personal cost (e.g., expenditure of personal energy) of a hypothetical "seat gain" race, the Congressman at the 53% level of support is more likely to be willing to try to turn his colleagues at the 2% level and more down.

The second reason why a pure maximization model is inappropriate is that Congressmen act in an environment of high uncertainty. An assumption of minimax behavior, therefore, gives a better fit. Behaving as an innovative sort can yield important benefits. For the most part, it makes sense for Congressmen to fiddle conservative strategies. Each member, after all, is a recent victor of two elections (primary and general), and it is only reasonable for them to believe that whatever it was that won for him the past time is good enough to win for next time. When a Congressman has a contested primary electorate and a comfortable November percentage, it makes sense for him to rely on one another's support in the conventional fashion -- John and John, on one side, business on the other -- then it hardly any alternative. Yet simply repeating the activities of the past is of course inadequate for the world changes. Here are abstract, abstract, new issues. Congressmen therefore need conservative strategies for dealing with change. And they have none. For members with conservative leaning coalition, it is almost impossible to accept party cues in deciding how to vote until the bitter end. A political director can hardly go wrong in following the party line (though in an Alabama, Democrat in Massachusetts, Republican, it would be madness to do so). It may be useful to build a voting record that blends in with the ranks of party colleagues in one's state delegation. It is surely useful to watch other members' primary and

general elections to try to gain places on their ticket. But candidates can be carried only so far. It requires a limited degree of venturesomeness just to hold on to call coalition formation and to maintain in good standing a major (again, clash of)

inability to react to developments.

Whether one is pragmatic, cautious or ambitious, Congressmen must constantly engage in activities related to re-election. These will be different for every one, but it generally shows the most practical thing 

indeed to do things day by day and put them together. The activity here is to present a typical

A short cut of the
types of activities Congressmen find the easiest to engage in. The case will be that there are three basic kinds of activities. It will be important to lay them out and some cases for arguments in later chapters will be built on them.

One activity is advertising, defined, here as any attempt to disseminate one's name among constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little from content. A successful Congressman builds what amounts to a name, which may have a generalized electoral value for other politicians in the same family. The personal qualities to emphasize are experience, knowledge, recommendations, sincerity, independence, and the like. Just getting one's name across is difficult enough; only about half the electorate, if asked, can supply three house members' names. It follows a Congressman to be known. In the main, recognition carries a positive valence; to be perceived at all is to be perceived favorably. A vital advantage enjoyed by House members is that they are much better known among voters than their Noozer colleagues. They are better known because they

91

Shires and Miller, op. cit., p. 205. This case may not be true.

92

Shires and Miller, op. cit., p. 205. There are not as many as it is on the

Home side. There is no hard evidence on the point.
Send a good deal of time, energy, and money trying to make themselves better known.\(^\text{95}\) There are standard routines—frequent visits to the community, non-political speeches to town meetings, mailing out of infant care booklets and letters of advice and congratulation.\(^\text{96}\) Of 158 House members questioned in mid-1966, 121 said that they regularly sent newsletters to their constituents.\(^\text{97}\) Write separate news stories during in newspaper; 82 regularly report to their constituents.\(^\text{98}\) By phone or television.\(^\text{99}\) Write regularly and not just for mail.\(^\text{100}\) Some routines are less standard. Congressman John F. Smith (D.-III.) claims to have met personally all 200,000 of his constituents.\(^\text{101}\) In over 20 years, Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D.-Mich.) has run a radio program featuring himself as a “cabin rustic—pick-axe constit.”\(^\text{102}\) Congressman David J. Ford (D.-Va.) is “famous for appearing unannounced and often uninvited at wedding anniversaries and other events.”\(^\text{103}\) Amanuenses and other assisting daily Congressmen often expense are done largely at public expense.\(^\text{104}\) Use of the franking privilege has increased in recent years; in early 1971, it was estimated that House and Senate members would send out about 476 million pieces of mail in the year 1971.

\(^\text{95}\) In Cline’s interview study, “Constituents will come than fifty more members

\(^\text{96}\) A statement by one of Cline’s Congressmen: “The best speech is a non-political speech. I think a constituent speaks in the best of all.\(^\text{105}\) Say he has never been a politician in a man who has made a commencement speech.”

\(^\text{97}\) These and the following figures on member activity are from Donald G.

\(^\text{98}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was lating at my TV show today—I know done one story

\(^\text{99}\) Jackson and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman (Indianapolis:

\(^{100}\) Loeb—me, 1966). 102, 287, 458.

\(^{101}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was watching my TV show today—I know done one story

\(^{102}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was watching my TV show today—I know done one story

\(^{103}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was watching my TV show today—I know done one story

\(^{104}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was watching my TV show today—I know done one story

\(^{105}\) Another Cline Congressman: “I was watching my TV show today—I know done one story

Ellen Spitz, Nader Profile on Shefley, p. 12. The Congressman also admitted: "When Shefley is home in his district and a drowning occurs, he is sometimes asked to dive down for the body. 'It gets in the paper and actually, it's pretty good publicity for me,' he admitted." p. 3.

With the new should be classified under casework rather than advertising in difficult to say.

Lenore Cooley, Nader Profile on Duples, p. 2.

Anne Zandman and Arthur Magida, Nader Profile on Ford, p. 2.
police at a cost of $380,000 per person with a subsidy of $250,000 per person. By far the heaviest mail from the Congressmen in October, even at numberless years. There are some differences between House and Senate members in the ways they go about getting their names across. House members are free to blanket their constituents with mailings for all kinds of promises. Senators are not. But Senators feel it easier to appear on national television -- for example, in short speeches on the Senate floor, on the nightly news shows. Advertising is a staple congressional activity, and here is no end to it. For each month, there are always new reports to be approved of his worthiness, and old reports to be reminded of it.

A second activity may be called credit-claiming, defined here as 'acting so as to engender a belief in a relevant' political act (or acts) that one is generally responsible for causing the government, or someone thereof, to do something that the act (or acts) causes desirable. The political logic of this, from the Congressman's point of view, is that an act (or acts) that makes people believe that a member can make pleasing changes, will do best with keeping him in office, so that he can make pleasing changes happen in the future. The emphasis here is on individual accomplishment (rather than, say, party or governmental accomplishment) and on the Congressman as deus (rather than as, say, expanding constituency views). Credit-claiming is highly important.

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Often, when I begin the late President John F. Kennedy's conclusion: "There is nothing a Congressman likes better than to forget his name in the headlines and for it to be published all over the United States." From a 1961 speech quoted in the New York Times, June 20, 1971.
to Congressmen, will the consequence. The need of Congressional help is a relentless search for opportunities to engage in it.

Where can credit be found? If there were only one Congressman rather than 535, the answer would in principle be simple enough. Credit (a blame) would attach inProvides fashion to the doing of the Government as a whole. But now we have 535. Hence it becomes necessary for each Congressman to try to peel off pieces of governmental accomplishment for which he can believe generates a sense of responsibility. For the average Congressman the simple way of doing this is to traffic in what may be called "partisanship benefits." Each governmental benefit, as its term will in part here, these two features: 1) Each benefit is given out to a specific individual, group, or political constituency; the recipient unit being defined which allows a single Congressman to be recognized (by political action) as the claimant for the benefit (other Congressmen being prevented from taking credit for it). 2) Each benefit is given out in proportion to one's virtue (work, say, social security checks) with a Congressman ago with having a hand in the legislation. A partisanship benefit requires one benefiting a class. That is, a benefit gained by an individual, group, or constituency can usually be shared by Congressmen in one of a class generally benefit given out to create a number of individuals, groups, and political units. Hence the pressure can arise that a Congressman is getting the benefit and then the government is suffering. (And Congressmen may not definitely. Some state legislatures decline in which their members call "local legislation."

In this volume the bulk of partisanship benefits come under the heading of "casseework"—the thousands of men in local offices perform for suppliers in ways that in many local require casework action. High school "into the casework" notably, selling for emerging goods, pensions for location of missing children, local government for grants information, and on and on. Each office...
This skilled professional who can play the bureaucracy like an organ—pushing the right pedals to produce desired effects. But these benefits require legislation, or at least implicit allocative decisions, on matters covered by greatest expertise. Here for Congressmen is the traditional role of informing and, to the extent desired, a believable role, which is members claim credit for, a benefit in reading polls. He may well receive it. Setting construction projects seem especially useful. In the decades before 1934, tangible, fiscal benefits were major commodities. In recent years, however, given urban grants, aid programs have become more useful. They have become more numerous. Some grants for credit are exceptions. In 1971 the story broke that Congressmen had been earmarking foreign aid money for specific projects in Israel in order to win favor with home constituents. It should be said of majority benefits that Congressmen are quite capable of taking the initiative in drumming them up. They can be not automatic assumption that a Congressmen's activity is The result of pressure brought to bear by organized interests. Fenza shows...
The purpose of a member's joint effort in the business of the House, an Inland Committee.

A fund from which to solicit with geography. Examples given are: "If benefits can be found for constituents or recipients sharing (the latter including the home residents who explain the Israeli project). But the purpose of "paternalistic" benefits was carefully specified so as not to include the possibility that such benefits may be given to citizens outside the home constituency. Some probably are. Narrowly drawn, the benefits qualify as "paternalistic benefits," and some of them are probably confined to specific recipients outside the home district. (If it is difficult to find such citizens on the front.) Campaign contributions flow into districts from the outside, so it would not be surprising to find that benefits go where the resources are."

How much paternalistic benefits can be at the polls is interesting. But it would be hard to find a Congressman who wants to see the House involved in such efforts. The laws that they cannot follow, governing expectations, such that they must be signed in regular sessions. As a reminder, it's the only word with the Board."

"Awareness of issues may spread beyond their recipients."

"Building a member's general reputation as a good provider. An ad for."
A good example of Capitol Hill bias on electoral impact is given in this account of the activities of Congressman Frank Thompson, Sr. (D. - N. Y. 14th District):

"In 1966, the 14th was asked to decide on reelecting J. W. Blanding County and gaining the position of the Republican candidate for the seat of the late District Representative. Thompson, the candidate of the Republican party, lost the primary by 12,000 votes, winning. Reelecting with 52% of the vote. He then survived a similar election in his re-election campaign. In 1970, Thompson ran against County Commissioner, winning by 20,000 votes and gaining the seat of the district by 6,000, gaining with 58%. The district benefited from the efforts of the late District Representative to protect the local interests which had developed in the city. But after Thompson's term, he was succeeded by a Democrat, who became the member of Congress from the district. In the case of Thompson, it is interesting to note how the seat was won by the incumbent for the 11th time in 11 years as the result of the vote of the majority in the district."

So much for congressional benefits. But is credit available elsewhere?

for governmental achievements beyond the scale already discussed?

The general answer is that the prime mover rule is a hard one to play on large matters. It is difficult to bring about a large achievement. It requires a large amount of effort. The Congressman goes before an audience and says, "I am responsible for passing a bill to curb inflation or to regulate the banks or to improve the educational system."

"I am responsible for passing a bill to curb inflation or to regulate the banks or to improve the educational system."

The question is whether this is what the people really believe. There are two reasons why people may be skeptical of such claims. First, there are many pockets of support.

On an accomplishment of a bill that probably engaged the interest of many, people are not really sure that credit should be given away freely. But secondly, there is an overwhelming problem of information. For example, on Capitol Hill is constant and mystique place; few have anything like a working knowledge of its proceedings. Hence there is so easy way of knowing whether a
Congressmen in staking a valid claim or not. The odds are that the information puller cuts in different ways on different kind of issues. On particularized benefits it may work in a Congressman's favor; he may get credit for the damn he had to do with building. Sprinkling a decent wad of money over, is something a Congressman is supposed to be able to do. But in larger matters it may work against him. For a voter lacking an easy way to sort out valid from invalid claims, the Sennelle (because it is so rich) is one more example of credit-claiming on a larger matter before

Yelp: "I am obvious and important qualification here.
For many Congressmen credit-claiming on non-particularized matters is possible in special subject areas because of the Congressional division of labor. The term "governmental unit" in the original definition of "credit-claiming" is broad enough to include committees, subcommittees, and the like, including Congress itself. Thus many Congressmen can believe their credit for blocking bills in subcommittees, adding an amendment in Committee, etc. The audience for the actions of this sort is usually small, but it may include important political actors (e.g., an influential interest groups, the President, the New York Times, "right" nodes) who are engaged with Drafting, Committee information, and deploying political resources. These are well-documented examples of this in fierce battles at post offices, dates in the 1960s. The post office worker seeks to avoid a very costly, unfriendly of House and Senate Post Office Committees, and is a highly valued political resource (money, volunteer work) by members who want their bills on subcommittee. Of course there are many examples.

Any leader of American politics has had to stretch ask if Senator Kennedy
for Senate. (Estes, McGovern, Mccarthy, any of the
Kennedys), "But what bills have he passed?" There is no universally accepted

Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, pp. 234-235.
of the Kid Sticking, and there is more to be said about it. The subject will
be covered more exhaustively in the next chapter. "Credit-decennial" can
forthwart be abandoned as complacency having been introduced

The third act is: a Congressionally engaged may be called
position-taking. It is thought of as the public pronouncement of an implicitly or
explicitly normative statement on anything likely to be of interest to political
actors. The statement may take the form of a roll call vote. "The war should be ended," is
an example of an explicitly normative statement; "Inflation has reached 10%" is
supposed to be presented as an implicit or implicitly normative statements when they
are made by politicians as political leaders. The essential requirement is that
the speaker makes the statement and that the speaker makes the statement.

The position taken is one of the political canals. Especially on matters where governmental responsibility is
likely affected, it is not surprising that political actors shuddered in public as
acts of political virtue. For voters engaged in Congressionals processes
require an answer. The following comment by one of Class's text intervenors
is highly revealing: "Recently, I went home and began to talk about the
act. I was pleased to hear arguments that fell, but even
claimed, no one. And in fact, we're getting through it all. What was getting
through was that the act might be a bully to the people. I changed the
emphasis: I didn't mention my role; I restated it, but stressed my
support of the legislation."

On acts in which position can be registered are numerous and
often imaginative. There are frank addresses ranging from weighty
speeches before Congress, television appearances, books, newsletters, presentations,
guest-written articles, even interviews with politicos.

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(120) For the terminology is that, "statements may be a 'commitment,' "position in other literature,
David H. Smith, "Political Leadership's Loyalty Question," ch. 9 in Complete Set.

(121) Class, op. cit., p. 108. A different Sadie's line question is whether
introduction of Bills in Congress should be conducted position-taking or credit-
claiming. The balance partly under the former. Yet another. Class...
Congressman addresses the point: "I introduce about sixty bills a year, the 120th Congress. I try to introduce bills that express my views and enlarge my ideas - legislative, economic, and social. I do like being able to say when I get criticized, 'yes, boys, I introduced a bill to..."

1934. To me that is the perfect answer." Op. cit., p. 141. But voters probably give advice like this about the value they derive.

On floor speeches see Matthews, op. cit., p. 247. On statement collected.

Petitions addressed by A.W. Gunther, Hearings on the Organization of Congress before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, 89th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1127.

Indications. Versatility of this sort is occasionally possible in roll call voting. For example a congressmen may vote one way on recommittal and another on final passage, joining it because just how he stands on a bill. (127) Members who cast identical votes on a measure may give different reasons for having done so. Yet still it is on roll calls that the punch comes; there is no way to anticipate a problem's record on hundred or thousands, some of which are controversial in the home constituencies. Of course most roll call positions determined in isolation are not likely to cause much stir, regular at home. But break voting patterns can and do from member voting calculated by the American National Action, American for Constitutional Action, and other outfits are not necessarily guidelines in the beginning of electoral resources. And particular issues often have their special politics. Some national interest groups watch the votes of all congressmen on single issues and act accordingly, try to penalize or punish members in either position; over the years some notable examples have been the Anti-Saloon League, (128) the early Farm Bureau, (129) the American Legion, (130) the American Medical Association, (131) and the National Rifle Association. (132) On rare occasions single roll calls achieve a rather high salience among the public generally. This seems especially true of the Senate, which every now and then wakes up as whose political affiliation media attention give to individual senators, posting, and suggests what the outcome. Even though he


(128) "Electoral choices of plotters and their records were kept at Washington and in most of the states, and not long after they were published with those of the last election, Americans who had represented," Peter H. Olney, Peace (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1923), p. 27.

(129) D. Farm Bureau dealing with Congressmen in the 110th, Orville M. Kile, The Farm Bureau Firm in Three Decades (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1925), p. 7.


On the defeat of Sen. Joseph Tydings (D-Md.) in 1970: "Tydings himself tended to blame the gun lobby, which in turn was quite willing to take the credit. "Nobody in his right mind is going to take on this issue again [i.e., gun control]," one Tydings strategist admitted." John F. Bibby and Roger T. Davidson, On Capital Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1972), p. 50.

Perhaps the best post-dating strategy for most Congressmen at least times last to be premature, to clinging to positions of the past. White possibilities to reach for newness with a great caution where necessary. Yet a sufficient precondition of strategy, the suggestion was made that it might be rational for members in electoral danger to revert to innovation. The form of innovation available is entrepreneurial position-making. Its logic being that for a member facing defeat with his plenipotentiary position it makes good sense to gambol on some newness. It may be that Congressional evangelines will fulfill an important function. They are issue pioneers—experimenters who test out new issues with the result that other politicians can see which ones are possible. An example of such an pioneer is Sen. Warren Magnuson (D. - Wash.), who, according to a surprisingly novel victory in 1962 by seeking for a reputation in the area of consumer affairs. Another example is Sen. Ernest Hollings (D. - S.C.), a seasoned a skilful and resourceful member of Southern constituency who launched "reform as an issue in 1967, at race pointing to a problem and giving it a highly emotional dimension. The most successful issue entrepreneurship of recent decades was the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R. - Wis.); these two near close primary of 1946, when facing defeat in 1952, this desire casting about for something, this former 1950 dinner at the Colony Restaurant when suggested new leadership, his decision that "Communism might just do the trick."

A central theme will settle itself I suppose will be a campaign. Polling continues to suggest that it can be a decisive issue.


130 Although Senator, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. "Only the old, experienced, introverted, shrewd, obliging, and losing a reliable majority, wiser and sagacious, the champion of the consumer, the patient, legislative leader, and the citizen council, is a vigorous and innovative legislative staff." P. 78.
Marjorie Hunter, "Riding Fight in Hunger Is Stirring the South," New York Times, March 8, 1969, p. 14. The local reaction was formidable. "Already Senator Herman E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia, has indicated he will begin a hunger campaign in his own state. Other Senators have hinted that they may do the same."

The effect of position-taking on electoral success is best assessed to
measure as the effect of potential winning. Once again there is a vari
problem: Congressmen do not differ very much among themselves
on the methods they use in the skills they display in attaining Visionary
their diverse constituents. All of them, after all, are professional
politicians. There is intriguing hard evidence on some matters where
variance can be captured. Schoenberger has found that House Republi
can who signed an early pre-Coldwater petition plummeted significan
tly further in their percentages than their colleagues who did not sign. (The signers appeared
genuinely to believe that identification with Goldwater was an electoral plus.)
Erikson has found that Foul bell records are interestingly related to
election percentages:
...[1] record estimates that an unusually liberal
Republican Representative gets at least 6 percent more of the irrelevant vote
than his extreme Conservative counterpart in his own district. In the
words, training helps. (most specifically, if relevant November
some primary elections will become relevant if heard other.) Sometimes an
inspection of absolute passafter phases. There is the ideologically shifting
of former Congressman Walter Faeging (D - Nov.), who shifted Congress as
a man a loyal regular Democrat in the mid-1950's, but who moved over to
appear where he was the most conservative House Democrat outside the South
by the late 1960's. The Nevada electorate reacted predictably; Faeging's
November percentages were extraordinarily high (82.5% in 1970), but he encountered
quarrel weapons in the primary which finally cost him the nomination in
1972—therefore the best-favored Republican.

[137] Richard A. Schoenberger, "Campaign Strategy and Partisanship: The Electoral Behavior
of Candidates Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections," 63 American

They can be no doubt that Congressmen believe positions make a difference. An important consequence of this belief is their custom of watching each other's elections to try to figure out what pictures are salable. Nothing is more important in Capitol Hill politics than the sound conviction that election returns have meaning. Thus the 1950 returns were read not only as a rejection of health insurance but as a ratification of McCarthyism. When two North Carolina men-voting between the 1950 southern manifests immediately lost their primaries, the message was clear to southern members that there would be no staying from a hard line on school desegregation issue. Once to build a life left in the case if school busing was squeezed out by House returns from the District area in 1972. So all it was to give-uping regard as the passage of the first

minimum wage bill in the twenty-fifth Congress. In 1937 the bill was tied up in the House Rules Committee, and there was an effort to get 60 to 70 votes for a discharge petition. Two primary elections in Florida and South Carolina were held at the same time. Claude Pepper (D.-Fla) and Claude Hill (D.-Fla) were convicted to fill vacant Senate seats. Both campaigned on behalf of the Vargas and Moses bill, and both won primary victories. Immediately after the returns the Terry and Moore primaries became known, there was a stampede to sign the petition, and the necessary 218 signatures were quickly obtained. The bill later passed. It may be useful to place this section in perspective-taking with a piece of political lore on an impact that can stand beside the piece on credit-claiming judicial reform earlier. The discussion of the

pre-1972 Sixth California House district.

Griffith, op cit, pp 122-131. The defeat of Sen. Millard Tydings (D.-Md) was attributed to returns (many, enthusiastic, volunteer votes) caused by McCarthy. "And if Tydings can be defeated, then who can be safe? From the most conservative and entrenched Democrats began to fear for their seats, and in the months that followed, the legend of McCarthy's political power grew," p. 123.

Doge, op cit, p. 140.
"Since 1952, the district's congressman has been Republican William S. MacMillan, a wealthy member of a small California family. The district's residents have consistently voted for him, and he has been reelected to four terms. However, he has not always run unopposed. In 1972, he faced a challenge from a Democratic candidate, who was a local farmer and businessman. But MacMillian won with a comfortable margin, 72% to 28%.

After 1972, MacMillian's voting record became increasingly controversial. His support for President Nixon's policies and his own conservative views alienated some of his constituents. In 1974, he faced another challenge from a Democratic candidate, who accused him of being too close to the White House.

These are the three kinds of elected officials: congressmen who engage in--advertising, credit claiming, and position-taking. It remains only to offer some brief comment on the third. Different members give to the different activities. No deterministic statement can be made; just as with each member, his federalism to build his own electoral coalition and hence strong to change his party's doing it. Yet there are broad patterns. For one thing, senators, with their access to the media, seem to put more emphasis on foreign policy, while House members seem to put more emphasis on domestic policy. But these are differences among House members. Congressmen from the traditional party-growth machine cities hardly advertise their positions on any piece of legislation (except maybe) and develop a great deal of time and energy in the distribution of benefits. In fact, they use their office mostly to play themselves in the New Deal party organizations. Congressmen William A.

Barlow, op. cit., p. 55. MacMillian was from a small district in the 1972 election.
Curtiss (D.-- New York Philadelphian), chairman of the House subcommittee of the Price Fixing and Currency Committee, claimed in 1971 to have indirectly partitioned the price of wheat for 1000 to 1500 in the home market; 

"Fellas, bring in the C&I brand, please."

On the other hand, Congressmen with upper middle-class tastes (suburban, city reform orовичи) tend to deal in positions. In New York City, the switch from regular to reform Democrats is a switch from members who might seize benefits to members who enjoy the positions; it reflects a shift in consumer taste. The same difference suggests, geographically, rather than temporally, because those from the inner wards to the outer suburbs of Chicago.

Another kind of difference appears if the initial assumption of a re-election quest is relaxed, or taken into account. The "prospecting" ambitions of some members -- i.e., the aspirations of some to move up to higher elected offices from the lower one they have. There are two potential subsets of congressmen in the Congress -- those members who would like to be senators (over the years about a quarter of senators have come directly from the House) and senators who would like to be Presidents or Vice Presidents (in the thirty or so Congress elections, the Senate has had one time or another run for their offices or been seriously "mentioned" for them). In both cases higher aspirations seem to be the same distinctive mix of personalities. For one thing, credit claiming is all but impossible. It does little good to talk about the bacon you have brought back from the

\[\text{Note:} \text{ port by Linda M. Kupferschim and winn. Am. Can. (B. - Ph. 1.)} \]

\[\text{This note gives a very good account of a meeting Congressmen's dinner.} \]

\[\text{One Comment is New York, noting "a tendency for the media to promote the image of the "pen-and-paper" politician." The result is that, "younger members tend to promote their image as someone who has been interviewed, and perhaps sympathetic, like foreign affairs and government issues, rather than those with less kind - and - bitter phrasing." Donald Horace, "The New York City Congressmen's Institute."} \]

\[\text{City Alliance.} \text{ (published bi-weekly, by the Center for New York City Affairs of the New School for Social Research), vol. 7, no. 6, April 1973, p. 11.} \]

\[\text{Sources, op. ed.} \]

Ibid., p. 92; Baldus, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
Chapter 4

Historically, New York Republicans moved in the Senate's commonwealth to the left. This served as a good example of the advertising and promotion that goes along with being known as "Mr. Congress." The book by Sen. Robert F. Griffin (R-Mich.) in "Mr. Washington"

In New Cotillion (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1968), ch. 4.

Senate, Congressmen in Committee, 60-141-142.
"Since then, the segregationist Senate has done the following things:

- Hired Thomas H DirectX black political organizer who directed Negro Voter registration efforts for the North Carolina Voter Education Project. He has
  been active in both Carolina, and as chief secretary to his Washington office.
- Sponsored Federal grants for projects to help areas including and
  education and health areas in North Carolina.
- Addressed a predominantly black audience to announce a
  new anti-poverty program and remained afterward to speak.
- Issued minority statements on racial issues.

The statement to Ebony magazine that reads: "Dr. King's words himself,
he said, "I must tell you that I am confident that the time is coming
as Southern blacks, we have reason to greet each other because the
idea of opportunity for all is a goal upon which blacks and
whites can agree."
PART II: PROCESSES AND MEANINGS

"We live in a cocoon of good feeling -- no doubt. The compensation for the cruel buffeting that is received in the world outside."

--a comment by the late Clark Miller (D. - NY) on serving in the House.

The purpose of Part I of this essay has been to show what activities are electorally useful to Congressmen. The goal of Part II will be to show what happens when members who need to engage in these activities present themselves to the public.

The argument will be developed, with some backing and filling, but with the general outline of subjects: first, an examination of the salient structural units of Congress (offices, committees, parties) and the way in which these units are arranged to meet electoral needs; second, an enlarging of the "frictions" between each of the units, and how they are designed to fulfill a fluid, organic examination of structural arrangements in Congress that serve the end of institutional maintenance; fourth, a discussion of the place of representatives in governance in the past and elsewhere; and fifth, a consideration of reform efforts provoked by dissatisfaction with congressional performance.

But it will be useful to start here with two preliminary points -- to be substantiated as the discussion proceeds. The first is that the organization of Congress must, remarkably well, elect the needs of its members. To put it another way, after Congress has been established and tried to design a pair of America national assemblies with the goal of serving members, the needs year in and year out they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists. The second point is that satisfaction of the needs of members requires, remarkably little, zero-sum conflict among members. That is to a remarkable degree, it means can be found, electorally useful activities without denying other members the opportunity.

151. Clark Miller, Member of the House (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), 293.
A congressional norm easily arrived at and well ingrained is that members should not attack each other — even across party lines. "Public disparagement of colleagues is sharply disapproved; it is not the way to play the game. Personal attacks are sharply censured, and members seldom invade the congressional districts of colleagues of the other party to campaign against them. Democrats reacted strongly to the action of one House Republican in sending letters into the district of a Democratic colleague criticizing the letter for apparent inconsistencies between a third party's position and a vote." Clay, [cited], pp. 16-17. See also Matthews, op. cit., pp. 97-99. These references are to personal attacks. Substantive disagreement between members "on the issues" can generally be helpful to both sides if the constituencies differ.


The trend was more or less the same a century ago. See Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), p. 76.
The dollar value of the services of legislative personnel is difficult to estimate. Campaigns can be a large part of the annual budget. In 1964, the average salary for a House member was $100,000 (including a substantial supplement for staff salaries). In 1971, a House member had a salary of $100,000 (including a small supplement for staff salaries). The average salary has certainly increased over the last decade.

It should be noted that the availability of these incurrence advantages causes little displeasure among members. In the early 1970s, a series of court decisions brought the franking privilege under attack. The court held that the House was not entitled to pass a bill containing some of the more questionable uses but also rendering the franking privilege to judicial jurisdiction. The spirit of the reform movement in a statement of the late Speaker: "The fact is that 98 or 99 percent of the material going out of the mailroom is good, solid information and in the public interest." An initial comment on the public's Office is perhaps the most important role; office resources are given to all members regardless of party, seniority, or any other qualification. They come with the job.

Second among the structural units are the committees, the 21 standing committees in the House and 17 in the Senate—with a scattering of subcommittees and joint bodies. Committee membership can be elected by all members of different origins. Some committees are by regular or special session. The best example is probably the House Un-American Activities Committee (now the Committee on Internal Security), whose members have been elected by a procedure that is not consistent in legislative bodies. The House has a chart showing meetings of days devoted to H.U.A.C.-

Reps. in Congress for the Eightieth through the Eighty-ninth. It can be read as a single chart, showing the volume of participation in subcommittee and related matters; by inference, it can also be read as a measure of popular demand (the peak years were 1949-1950).


Shils had this assessment of the investigations of the late 1940's: "The congressional investigator is often just the instrument which the legislator needs in order to remain his constituents' existence. That is the reason why investigations often involve such unceasing use of the organs of publicity. Authority is 'the next best thing to the personal contact which the legislator must forgo. It is his substitute offering by which he tries to construct the personal contact which his rivals at home have with their constituents.'" Edward A. Shils, "Congressional Investigation: The legislator and His Environment," _18 University of Chicago Law Review_ 573, 1950-51.
Joseph重任在身，他与政府的公共权力委员会作为调查的初步资料，调查在20世纪60年代的众议院内。参议员阿伯拉罕·里比克夫（D-CNM）和威廉·科普（D-NC）使用委员会的权力来调查公众对汽车安全和防惊吓的注意。委员会得到了一个许可，可以发表关于外交政策的演讲。

尽管委员会在外交政策委员会中确实存在，但其演讲主要集中在“委员会”的职能上，特别是在提高选民意识方面。一个例子是在教育和劳动委员会，该委员会的主要目标是宣传有关教育、安全和类似事项。在最近几年里，教育和劳动领域也吸引了媒体敏感的成员，如希拉里·克林顿（D-NY），赫尔曼·博德（2-NY）和路易斯·伯格（D-MN）。

一些委员会的权力已经受到挑战。例如，保卫的权力通常被分发给政府，这被称为空中的重要性。布克曼和塔克在他们的作品中提出了一种小小的“低挡位”模型，其中少数的ovation在政治中导致了包括的僵局。巴里在他们的作品中提出了一个理论。
to deal with each other over time are more likely to come up with an “obvious solution” that more securely protects their interests. 

The congressional interest is overwhelming with power. Specifically, in giving out particularized benefits when the costs are diffuse (falling on taxpayer’s account) and when the beneficiaries are vague. One Congressman is not obviously to deprive others.

The previous follows a policy of universalism. That is, everyone, regardless of party, seniority, or any other criterion, has a right to his share of benefits. There is evidence of universalism in the distribution of projects for Public Works, projects in House Committees, Appropriations, and Senate Finance, and (by inference from the rejected bills) in the refusal of Congress on the Committee on House Ways and Means, and (by inference from the rejected bills) in the refusal of Congress on the Committee on House Appropriations to allocate money on Senate Appropriations. Thus, the right of the Senate Finance Committee to allocate money on Senate Appropriations is not affected.

The House Finance Committee, in Turner’s account, “takes as its major decision rule the determination to process and pass all requests and to do so in such a way as to maximize the chances of passage in the House. Similarly, then, Turner’s major strategic premise is: to secure House passage of all constituency-suggested, House-approved bills.”

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167 It should be noted that there is a mix of interest and compromise, as well as an effort to settle on some scheme from which all would benefit compared with the alternative of deadlock and chaos.

168 There can be a controversy, of course, over specific benefits. If only one federal office building is to be built in the northeast it cannot simultaneously be the site for定制 and office. But over time, office buildings can be sites of goods that can be given at

169 fair prices. Another kind of problem arises with the 1934 tariff, beginning, a game in which all Congressmen were in a position to play. But the card was that most of the

170 ingredients to play were dealt in (e.g., Pennsylvania and Louisiana Democrats). Members who had no protectable products suffered no political deprivation for

171 they could fall back on minimal anti-tariff position-taking.

172 In Pollock’s treatment of the House, one of the properties of an “institutionalized” organization. Pollock, op. cit., p. 145.


174 ibid., pp. 165-166.


Munday, op. cit., pp. 78-84; Surrey, op. cit.

Fenna, op. cit., pp. 156-159; Surrey, op. cit. Depletion allowances offer a good example of penumbraism. Initial allowances for products like oil, natural gas, and coal were restricted to coal and tuff, while rock, ash, and页目 clay were permitted as well. They are likely to stay, even if not a single state without it own built-in depletion lobby.

Sney, op. cit., p. 298.


Fenna, op. cit., p. 58.
House Public Works, wrote Humphry, has a "principle of mutual advantage" in the wording of its rules. "We have a rule on the Committee, it's not a rule of the Committee, it's not written down or anything, but it's just the way we do things. Any time any member of the Committee wants something, or wants to get a bill out, we get it out for him.... Makes no difference -- bipartisanship or Demo. We are all Americans when it comes to that." 178 Not surprisingly, there is some evidence that members of these investigative committees gain more from their work than non-members. 179

But there is also evidence that committee members act as personal advocates for their state or region. An interesting aspect of public works politics is its special brand of "rules." These have to allocate guidelines (precise enough to allow judgment on benefit "fairness" as well as "everything has to work" yet ambiguous enough to allow members to claim personal credit for what they get. Hence there are "amending policy minorities" an example is the one in public works where the junior senator from California's Army Committee with its post-benefit calculation and the Congress have their ad hoc exceptions. 180

In contemporary political attention by denouncing the allocation process itself; thus in 1972, a minority of House Members held up some Ways and Means "members bill" on the House floor. 181 But such efforts have little effect. Senator Douglas used to offer floor amendments to public works appropriations bills, but he had a hard time even getting the Senate to vote on them. 182

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178: Murphy, op.cit., p. 23.
181: See Murphy, op.cit., p. 37, 1972; and also Arthur M. Massey, "Military Committee Membership in the House of Representatives," 83 Wash. L. Rev. 215-223.

In the late 1970s, the Congressional Budget Office was a set of allocation guidelines, based on differences between home and foreign production costs of individual products. The economy of all, this was decidedly daunting, and its cost figures were notoriously uncertain. But the idea was virtually bipartisan. See Schattschneider, op.cit., p. 67-87.
Eileen Shanahan, “Spurred Tax Bills Blocked by Colleagues-drive in House”


Douglas, op. cit., pp. 264-270, 314-315: “Other members of the Senate had little to gain and everything to lose by supporting a specific cut, and so they had no incentive to stay on the floor to vote. As a result, although I tried for years to make cuts, always with a thorough case, I was constantly beaten. Often I failed to get the necessary one-fifth for a quorum to call, and even if I did, I was overwhelmingly defeated.” p. 315.
Finally and very importantly, the Committee system aids Congressmen simply by allowing a division of labor among members. The prevailing cut of legislators into small gangs of Congressmen by size is an area has two effects. First, it creates small voting blocs in which membership may be valuable. An alternative interest group will prize more richly the favors his party can give to members of committees pondering to pictures than his party can give to members of Congressmen. Second, it creates specialized small group settings in which individual Congressmen can make things happen and be perceived to make things happen.

"I put that bill through committee." "This was my amendment." "I talked them around on that." This is the Congress of credit-claiming. It comes easily in the committee setting and falls - when a "report" committee member handles bills on the floor. To attentive audiences it can be believable.

Some political action films committee activities closely and mobilize elected resources to support deserving members. The postal unions have been most active. In the late 1960s the tobacco industry got together a campaign kitty to finance House Commerce Committee member Joe Red. Bar taking a position against tobacco labeling. In 1970 B.A.M.A.K.A.C., a bankers' outfit, distributed money among members of the House Banking and Currency Committee. In 1970 campaign, Congressman George H. Miller (D.-Cal.) chairman of the House Interior, Works Committee received 167 donations from highway-construction interests, in 37 states other than his own. Also in 1970 a group representing cable-TV interests gave $1000 to the Committee on Effective Government, an outfit set up specifically to back the campaign of Congressman Vincent H. Marcali.

Challenging the Communications and Power Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy is the Communications and Power Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy. Money, given, can only be collected under certain rules, with the greatest amount allowed being $200. But money is an important resource, and it can be used to organize and plan by good Committee-relation.

For several decades there have been enough political data to allow statistical analyses of the strategies used by giving members to Congressional candidates. No one has done this. Three strategies are detectable... Some efforts the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Committee for Political Education is an example - follow a "magical-ideological" strategy; that is, they give funds to candidates of a particular ideological view and they concentrate money in the marginal seats and districts: The official Democratic and Republican campaign committees have their recent "fair share" strategy; that is, they divide up money more or less equally among their incumbents and some groups (including some referred above) follow an "interest" strategy; that is, they
give money to members of particular committees, with little regard for party affiliation, and\n
Terry Lantos, "Political Fund-Raising: A Murky World," Wall Street Journal,


Harris, "The Politics of Politics," p. 52 - Fellow still managed to lose his primary.

Ibid.

"For example, at the Washington Headquarters of the National Rifle Association... a computer operation has been set up to make the most of the money its members have donated to members of Congress. When a bill that the association is interested in comes up in committee, a specific list of who gave how much to which member of the committee is produced by the computer. Workers in the headquarters then telephone the donors -- often men with wide influence, since they usually sit on the board of directors of various companies and can call in those connections, too -- and ask them to get in touch with the member, or members, of the committee. They helpfully relayed them to the association's point of the legislation in question. That way, only eight or ten members of a committee, rather than a majority of the House members, have to be reached." Ibid., p. 56.
A list of the standing committees only begins to show the Congressional
division of labor. At the beginning of the Ninety-third Congress there were
143 subcommittees in the Senate and 132 in the House. With specialization
came to its logical phase. The number of members covering subject fields
small enough to permit relatively easy credit claiming. Thus in the
House Agriculture Committee there are more than about half a dozen
members handling each commodity. In small working units formed
by assignment of duties voting tends to recede in magnitude and what individual members do with
their time and energy rises in importance. Whatever else it may be, the quest
for specialization in Congress is a quest for credit. Every member can
therefore to occupy a part of at least one piece of policy that will
be enough so that he can claim personal responsibility for some of the
Chips. And Rogers said, better yet, the Congress was beginning to realize
and claim some responsibility -- perhaps partially even "case by case" or a
whole. The Congressional credit system does as system is credit
for a project, it assumes a Congressmen that once he initially occupies
a piece of policy no one can ever push him out of it. And the project
automatically appreciates in value over time. With these advantages for all
hands, it is not surprising that Congressmen are strongly attached to
the credit system. In recent years Congress has begun efforts to reform the credit
system in the House, and in fact both parties have changed some of their rules.
But the problem here seems to be not that members are against the system
but that there is not enough time to go around. House members are staying
on too long, with the result that new are more junior and have less and
less time and the feel entitled to wield a subcommittee influence.
The reform drive has produced a division (in some committees) of staff and budget
power to the subcommittee level and a democratic rule that no member can
hold more than one subcommittee clearingroom. But the House may have to

123. As leader in Congressional Quarterly Weekly, April 28, 1973. Rogers was also 16
subcommittees of the joint committees.

Political Science 327-337, 1962.

125. This supplies a good example of an occasion of quoting by in his writing on
Sen. Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.): "Sniffing and fishing ... was never in mind
Magnuson. Had been interested since he first came to Congress in 1937. They were...
Important to the state of Washington, and the groups involved wielded considerable influence over aid and controlled sizable campaign checks. As Meig shown gained seniority and influence, he was increasingly in a position to changing the interests of American shipping and fishing. This assumption of that role worked to his and industry's mutual advantage. "Price, Who makes the laws?" P. 63.

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(194) In the Eighty-eighth Congress House members were polled to find out their positions on 32 proposals for reforming the House. The proposal with least support (19%) was to "require members to forfeit seniority privileges after each six consecutive terms." (The only proposal with a majority "strongly for" was to allow one more money for staff salaries.)

(195) It should be kept in mind that some subcommittees are useful as a basis for position-taking — with hearings, investigating, and such. This may be the consequence of a recent purification of chairmanship on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. See, e.g., cited, pp. 283–285.
create more subcommittees to satisfy its members. Then it will
form prejudice in its head, which these are more subcommittees than there are
iniatators.

Such lack of committee. The petty structural units in Congress
are parties. The case here will be that the parties, like the offices
and committees, are tailored to suit men's electoral needs. They
are more useful for what they are not than for what they are. It is easy to
conceive reorganization of the sort of zero sum politics parties could import
into a representative assembly. One possibility -- in line with the
analysis here -- is that a majority party could deprive minority
members of a share of patronage benefits, a share of committee influence, and share
of resources, a vetoes roll and make their positions known. Congressional majorities
therefore do not shut out minorities in this fashion. It would make no sense to do so;
the costs of cutting in minority members are very low when the costs of
losing majority control in a contentious partisan politics would be very high.
A more conventional zero sum vision is the one in which assembly parties
organize in disciplined forces for the purpose of capturing general party
interests. If the battle is one whose programs shall prevail, it should be clear
that if they wanted to, Congress could immediately and permanently
array themselves in disciplined legions for the purpose of programmatic combat.

They do not. Every party in a member does suit a Wilsonian call for program and
cohesion. But these exhortations fail to achieve much member interest.

The fact is that the enactment of party "programs" is electorally not very
important to members (although one may find it important to take position in
program).

Discrimination of issue might also be a recipe for civil war, and it is
difficult whether any assemblies anywhere engage in it. Where
committees have important decision powers, a pattern of militant politics
taking on the form. Combined with variable partisanship coalitions and
interest group服务业 in committee service, a famous one of the
Italian parliament. Communist Fighters seem to get their share of
partisan benefit and they seem to have little trouble working with
Christian Democrats for the common good. See Enzo Galli and Alfonsa
Prati, "Paternal Political Participation in Italy" (Maurizio and Yale University Press, 1972),
p. 266-274.

Former Senate Joseph Clark (D.-Pa.) puts forth this objective: "To change the party leadership structure so that within both parties and in both houses a majority will decide party policy and enforce party discipline against recalcitrant members." Clark, Congress: The Unseen Branch (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 166.
What is important to each Congressman, and vitally so, is that he be free to take positions to serve his advantage. There is no member within his who would not be politically injured—or at least who would not think he would be injured—by being made to vote a party line on all issues. Thus, on the school-busing issue in the Ninety-second Congress, it was vital to Detroit, whose liberal Democratic House members had been free to vote their own way and to Detroit black liberal Democrats. And they had been free to vote their way in other cases. With these members, the best service a party can supply to its Congressmen is a negative one; it can leave them alone. And this is what the organized parties do.

Party leaders are chosen not to be program salesmen or vote mobilizers, but to be broken, far-seeing, agenda-setters, and protectors of established institutional norms. Party “pressure” to vote one way or another is minimal. Party “whipping” hardly deserves the name. Leaders in both parties have a habit of counseling members to “vote their constituencies.”

The Senate Democratic whip, Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), studies the voting records of his members, and when they appear on the floor for a roll call he “tries to steer them in their own direction with a ‘this is a no (or yes) for you.’” In fact, neither Congressional party demands anything like a truth test of its members. Anyone who survives in the Democratic (or Republican) primary and a November election is entitled to appear in Washington and proclaim himself a Democrat (or Republican) Congressman. Wild Renshaw can pose some problems—

Cf. Hitt on party platform: “The attitude of the member of Congress toward the platform is precisely the same as that of the President: he goes it, condemns it, ignores it, as it suits him in dealing with his constituency. . . . The constituency has a virtually unqualified vote to his antifire. If he were to lose it, his party leaders could fallibly force him, if he so wishes, no national party organization can save him.” Ralph K. Hitt, “Democratic City Leadership in the Senate,” ch. 3 in Hitt and Polakoff, op.cit., p. 140.

"Many new members of the House express surprise that so little pressure is exerted by the party leadership regarding voting. Clearly they had anticipated more frequent guidance or direction. Their more senior colleagues also indicate that leadership intervention is minimal. Activities of the party whip prior to a vote generally consist of telephone calls or foot visits to see if a member has received the intended vote of the majority. Seldom is advice given on party position arguable."

Clapp, op. cit., p. 150.

Fawcett and Acheson report data on polls the House Democratic Whip's Office took in 1963 to find out how members voted on upcoming bills. The office polls members on only ten bills, and the predictions on whether a member would vote were correct in only 90.5% of cases. A ten percent error rate! Party leadership works in a context in which member positions are pretty well fixed, and in which it is surprisingly difficult to figure out which they are. Lewis A. Fawcett and Randall B. Keyes, "Conditions of Party Leadership; The Case of the House Democrats," 59 American Political Science Review 57, 1965. The problem is the same: Democratic Party leaders are uncertain about party causes. See Randall B. Keyes, "The Party Whip Organization in the United States House of Representatives," 58 American Political Science Review 569, 1964.

a Republican could find it difficult to win an appointment to the Ways and Means Committee. Even so, a member can build a great constituency vote within either Congressional party regardless of his issue position. At some point on the seniority system, he can retire from party incursion.

The issue activity of the Congressional parties probably accounts for the fact that healthy long Congressmen serve as independents as members of third parties. With no alternative standards it is easy enough for a district to demand no Republicans.

Of course, Congressional parties are still important pieces of Capitol Hill furniture. There remain significant differences between Democrats and Republicans in their roll call voting. Partisan elected swing, by taking out members sustained by one kind of supporting position and bringing in members produced by another, can change the pattern. Taking Polk in both houses with definite Republican effect. (After Eightieth and Eighty-sixth Congress.)

The custom of assigning committee and subcommittee membership to minority winners remains one of the two leading forms of invincible discrimination on the Hill (the other being discrimination by seniority). Yet as time goes on this adds up to less and less. "Pity voting" in the House, however defined, has been declining since the turn of the century and has reached a record low in the last decade. Partisan seat gaming in the House has declined similarly in amplitude, as reason that a fall in the proportion of independents

In recent years, these Democrats have acquired three members of minority for candidacy backing (in the primary candidacy of other parties. But they tend to avoid running candidates who want to keep their seniority. It is extremely easy to begin from an offending Republican candidacy of the status.

When coupled with essentials of a different country (even the English-speaking countries)

The American Congress is exceptional in its lack of minor party members. See the discussion in Douglas's thesis. The political economics of the Federal area (New York: Yale University, 1947), p. 197. The proportion of the House popular vote cast for minor party candidates has declined during the century -- from figures usually in the 40 to 50 percent range in 1890-1920, to figures of 2.5 to 4.5% in 1930-1932. In figures generally under 2% after 1942. See Gerald W. Kramer and Benno R. Schiller, "Congressional Elections," ch. 5 in William E. Anderson, et al., The Politics of Representative Government.
In History (Connecticut: Connecticut University Press, 1972), pp. 264. 265. The decline is probably a consequence of the adoption of the direct primary system at the state level. Its favoring gives each of the major parties a great deal of issue flexibility at the nominating stage. Any popular cause can find expression in an insurgency, and any politician, regardless of his views, can try to win a major party nomination.


Turner, op. cit., ch. 2. In the 1970 uprising of the 1951 Turner wave, Schneider writes, "By comparison with Julius Turner's original Party and Constituency, the single most striking finding of this study is the continuing decline of party voting in the House of Representatives." P. 239. Clearly what has been going on here is that politicians have come to rely on party cues less as the "information explosion" has made other cues available (e.g., cues for polling data).

of a "party of state" at the Congressional level, in both Houses atop diverse
division of power between the parties. In the years 1955-1974, the so-called "un
matched" since the rise of the
the floor party system in the 1830's. As for chairmanship discrimination against
Democrats, it is made sensible by the fact that minority members on most
committees share in the decision-making implicit to stages. Some committee
leadership seems to have been shared by the Democratic chairman and
rankings. Republicans, originally having influence, as the notable
partnerships of recent years have been those of J.W. Vulech (D-Ill.) and
George D. Alton (R-Mo.) on Senate Foreign Relations, Wilkie D. Mills
(D-Ark.) and John W. Byrnes (R-Wisc.) on House Ways and Means, and
Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) and William M. McCulloch (R-Ohio) on House
Judiciary. The general picture of the Congressional party system is one of a system in
leaderless -- or, to put it another way, a system that the centralization of
edges which have
been worked away by the central norm of institutional
universality. Imagined many ways the interesting division is Congressional
Politics is not between Democrats and Republicans, but between politicians
in and out of office. Looked at from one angle the cult of universality
has the appearance of a cross-party conspiracy, among incumbents
to keep their jobs.

There are records of minority exclusion in the past. In the 1920's, the 15
Wayne and Means Republicans, under Thomas B. Jeffries, By themselves,
See F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1931), pp. 492. When the Republicans came to power in the Eightieth Congress, they used steamroller doctine against the Democratic
minority on the House Appropriations Committee. See United States
House, pp. 245-249.

Yet there does remain the discrimination. One wonders what kinds of thinking
Democrats can still be ordained with, to justify it. Committee chairmen undisturbed
are in a party program? No such thing. That's statesmanship differentiated
by district to separate set of party principles? Very dubious. Alternation in control
between the states? None. What lingers on is a sort of
demographic discrimination.


Now, with Congress men having the electoral needs they do, and
with Congressional institutions tailored to suit these needs in the pragmatically
what happens? What are the policy concomitants of these arrangements? Abstract
vote of an answer takes the form of a number of "rulings" (rejected)
representative assemblies. That will be an idea briefly pursued here. One
function scalpel by John Stuart Mill is that of expressing public opinion.
At doing this, I am giving voice to the opinions held by a significant number of
voters back in the constituencies. The U.S. Congress is extraordinarily effective.
There is direct payment for services rendered: the practices of position-taking
measures that voters statements will be rewarded. The diversity of the constituencies
inherent in America's territorial area will find an official voice somewhere. Hence
Congress emerges as a representative place, its members saying different things
but sometimes saying something. One effect is that criterion of executive conduct
is both more negotiable and more vulnerable. This is a typical cabinet regime.

Parcell and the constraint of party loyalty. To keep majority members from
criticizing each other, minority members from developing their own individual views.
The idea of an "opposition" achieves institutionalization. In recent decades
Presidents have been harassed most palpably and by officials
opposing party spokesmen (Can I fight an opposition leader? Even an oldie?)
But, by Congress as meaning the presidential party with assured party
following. On national security policy, whose opposition ha been most fated,
Roosevelt had to contend with Sen. Burton K. Wheeler (D-Mont), Truman and
William Fulbright. Sen. Sam Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.) on Watergate followed the
tradition of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh (D-Mont) on Teapot Dome. (204) Open the weighting of

(211) Mill, op. cit., p. 211.

(212) G. Bryce, in 1845: "There is no country whose representatives are more affected on popular
opinion, more ready to trim their sails to the last breath of it." op. cit., p. 46.

(213) The complaint is made in K.C. WOOG, LEGISLATION (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1983), ch. 142-143.

(214) The Congressional reaction to Teapot Dome was generally more partisan than the
reaction to Watergate. Still, the Teapot Dome investigation was sustained for several
years by a Senate with a formal Republican majority. See our account in Burd
Julia's opinion that policy efforts without any clear being passed by Presidents, bureaucrats, and judges, anticipating trouble with Congress, take action to avoid it. Thus the Congressional guidance during the Tet Offensive of 1968 (with legislation or passed) was a contributing element in President Johnson's decision to stop escalations in the Vietnam War.

As an expressive institution, Congress can be said to mare, dominate, and influence policy. This is not simply because the Versatility allows for the frequent policy shifts, but because policy is subject to change when politicians begin to fear being voted out of power.

A second function is that of handling constituent requests—sometimes met when the requests have to do with grievances against officialdom, or "embarrassed." Congress is again the best payments in service, I some of credit, allowing Congress a strong incentive to supply its constituents, benefiting from supplying them quickly and efficiently. With their office friends, U.S. Congressmen are absolutely better equipped than anyone in other nations to deal with people. The over-all efficacy of Congressional services has been given little scholarly attention. Gelthorn is skeptical of the argument being that Congressmen, without requiring intervention in the bureaucracy, can provide constituent relief without changing bureaucratic procedures. Further problem is that there is almost nothing in the record in Congress making service activities, a basis past appears to influence in data on what kinds of people write letters to their Congressmen. A 1965 national survey poses the question: "Have you written to your Congressman during the last 12 months?" and this yields the following proportions of affirmative responses: 15% wrote 0-4999, 4.8% wrote 5000-9999, 9.1% wrote 10,000-19,999, 11.5% wrote 20,000-29,999, 21.0% wrote 30,000-39,999, 31.0%, and 40,000-49,999, 32.0%. By education, the less educated have a large majority, 23.0% wrote 0-4999, 10.4% wrote 5000-9999, 8.0% wrote 10,000-19,999, 11.5% wrote 20,000-29,999, 21.0% wrote 30,000-39,999, 31.0%, and 40,000-49,999, 32.0%. In the occupations, lower executives, 17% of the less skilled with 19.4%, and skilled workers at 9.7%.

The data are supplied by the survey center. In their elite sample of blocks of Congressmen, over 70% of them have learned the others' names and followings of the letters. 60% can be seen as having a human satisfaction. 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction, 67.4% can be seen as having a human satisfaction.
millions of letters annually in each class category. The Congressional service is open for anyone who is aware of it and wants to use it. It may give a way of registering immediate interest and available through administrative channels.

Moreover, in an age of legislating bureaucracies it would be fertile to disengage any governmental process that offers individual attention. In Political Ideology by J. V., with the support of congressmen among the working-class interests, "from the Congress, and more particularly from the idea of human-state congressmen, there are clear and present dangers of a friend in power of an accessible person who is not likely to be protected by a number of secretaries. The weight of legislation lies in persons, human contact, and through paper forms and paper channels." (217)

With the function of legislating and correcting administration (take control together here), the story in store more interesting and vastly more complicated. As individual responsibility for what Congress passes is what the government does becomes less readily attributable, the relation between payment and services becomes obscured. On the other hand, there are great opportunities for business opportunity. Analyzing what happens in legislatively would be simple enough if measures to be voted on in Congress were prepared and worked by men unacquainted inside the source, if congressmen did not communicate with each other or the source, and if all approved measures were automatically implemented. In these circumstances, Congress would be something like a referendum electorate, and the activity of its members would be detailed into joint question-taking. But in these circumstances Congress would look much like an American legislative body. There are at least three things Congressmen can do there. The referendum principle: if they can engage in mobilization activity on passing legislation, this may require only more counting, in itself an exhausting enterprise in an assembly of 100 or 435. It might also require bargaining—failing

away votes on the bill or modifying the legislation at hand to attract support. b) They determine the content of measures they will or will not accept. c) Presidential formulation is part of an alternative they accept or still a choice. d) They can affect the way legislation is implemented by giving post-enactment cues to bureaucrats. e) The cues let the threat of follow-up legislation but in a relation of anticipated responses the cues may be inefficient. The usage is that Congressmen do these three things (and in the cases of a) and e) the resistant to which they do them are the products of competing between credit claiming and position-taking implications.

Vote participation in legislative bodies has been the subject of much speculation but surprisingly little empirical research. Probably the dominant image is one of the legislative struggle of successive semiliteracy among members for victory. In overview -- Nikols in the theory of Political Coalition we should expect participation in legislative bodies and other settings to form minimum-winning coalitions. The logic being that members of winning majorities can maximize benefits for their supporters by splitting the least as few ways as possible (usually among 51%). A possible corollary of this idea is that we should expect Congressmen to roll calls to be close.

The short empirical response is that most of them are not. Figure 1 gives frequency distribution of proportion of House and Senate roll calls won by percentages in projected range in the year 1972. (Whether a vote motion carried is irrelevant here. What is irrelevant is whether the winning side. No data are included for the many motions carried without formal roll calls. The distribution for both houses are bimodal, with a mode in the marginal range (50-59.9%) and a mode in the unanimity or near-unanimity range (90-100%). In both houses fewer than 30% of the roll calls turn up in the 50-59.9% range. It is hard to
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Proportions of House and Senate Roll Call Votes in Specified Ranges, 1972

Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly. Figures are based on all recorded House and Senate roll call votes in the year 1972, excluding those votes where the voting requirement was 2/3 (i.e., Treaty, Senate advice and consent, veto override, Constitutional amendments). Senate N = 501. House N = 287. Percentage out of total votes cast on each roll call (rather than of total membership).
know what to make of these marginal marks. They could be evidence that not
least in one or two Congressmen try to build winning coalitions. But the same marks would appear if there were "natural" patterns always in the membership, indicating a
member's voting record with members.
If there is a lack of evidence, it makes sense at least to try to get the
thing straight. One legislation supplying particular and beneficial goals may rarely be made. The first is that a vital relationship to win victories; a paucity of good unless it is a winning and durable. The second is that
winning victories can be quite easy. The best way for members to build
the particular is to establish a reliable, insurmountable, standback. Thus the
House Interior Committee advances a popularly reasoned bill, and it one
and pass the House that 95% go through without formal roll calls at all.
In the House, the same effort can be achieved by use of "eminent" bills. Hence on particular and beneficial there is no reason to expect to find minimal
winning coalition or close roll calls.

But on legislation the benefit of particular and beneficial bills is another
reason not to look for winning coalitions. The members'
enthusiasm for winning vanishes; the bills promise no governmental
effects, members can claim no credit for. Hence the image of
members as winning bills is "getting up the floor" is negligible; there is no
politically relevant fact. A good example of legislation beyond any trace
of particular benefits is in the previously mentioned school teachers
legislation of the Ninety-second Congress. The Detroit Congressmen had
every reason to worry about whether they were voting on the right side
and no reason to worry about what passed was implemented. The electoral
favour was purely for position. Of course Congressmen must at all times
generate an illusion that they are interested in winning victories, but they
may not be much behind the illusion. The single fact that Congress regarded itself
with close a one-sided, superficial, in vain, the project and any other activity.

A real problem in winning is that it is difficult to separate the relationships
between legislative and non-legislative behavior. In 1932 people weren't very interested in winning elections, but once it had been
won, the relationship with the election would make it appear as if it were won. The distinction is critical.
When will they mobilize? The short answer is: they will do so when something of consequence is at stake, when there is credit to be gained for legislative maneuvers. The most alert watchmen are doubtless representatives of attentive interest groups -- or, more broadly, of attentive clientele groups -- and more so for the public and private sectors. They may be able to detect whether or not a Congressman can deliver. Surprisingly little precise evidence exists on just how programs like the agricultural and merchant marine subsidies win congressional majorities year after year. If The Thing is likely to be a relevant Congressional core sufficiently motivated by clientele scrutiny to engage in the bargaining needed to keep them going. To use Lighthall's term, "partial mutual adjustment" prevails. Of course, there are other watchmen besides clientele agents. "Good government" outfits may join in which Congressmen are taking the trouble to mobilize for their causes. On occasion the audience for such measures becomes quite large. As in 1909 when C.B.S. studied Roger B. Myrdal's "Politics" for several weeks to give daily television accounts of what was going on. The civil rights bill required public accommodations.

Yet scrutiny has its limits. Congressional processes are so complicated that it is very difficult for outsiders to tell what is going on. On matters where the audience for Congressmen's activities is not a clearly scrutinizing audience, the incentive to mobilize diminishes. Mobilization often requires time and energy -- it may require the finding away of valued goods. Congressmen always keep these things in mind -- making further scrutiny fruitless, looking into passcorn, etc. for members who want the scrutiny, or carry the title "biased." There may be a value in running, but how much of a value? A Congressman can readily be blamed if there are not enough right-thinking members to call him to carry this burden of foster-fighting.
The good fight. On large, contentious issues, with broad audiences, observers realize that most members' positions are fixed anyway. In the Ninety-seventh Congress Sen. Robert Griffin (R-Mich) once said that it was useful to be the confectionary purveyor of an anti-busing amendment, but did it make much difference to him whether it carried? In fact, does anybody remember whether it carried? World Sears.

Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oreg) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) have been seen more often by their fellows if their anti-war amendment had won rather than lost? Particularized benefits aside, the blunt fact is that representatives have less of a stake in winning victories than they normally expect to have.

Indeed, by the postmodern way, we do not usually think of losses as being politically harmful. We can all point to good many instances in which Congressmen seem to have gotten into trouble by being on the wrong side in a roll call vote, few who can think of one where a member got into trouble by being on the losing side? A decade ago the southern senators fought a last-ditch stand on civil rights, it failed, but at no time was his job in danger. That the pressure to win is only a measure of an enormously important fact of life in Congress and threadbare in essence.

Generally, If members had to win all the time they would scan each other with brooding. When confronted with universality or particularized benefits, the ability of its members to survive losses renders Congress the most effective, integrative institution in American politics; its members can live in a "cocoon of good feeling."

In their study of Texas roll calls, Lotz and burner found that the clearest vote were on "non issues" — prostitution, blue laws, legionnaires' disease, etc.

Op. cit., pp. 11, 28. These are precisely the kinds of issues on which a rule of minimum winning coalition is least applicable. Every member worries about how he should stand, and so feels that side wins. If each constituency is homogeneous in its views, every member is in a sense a "victor" regardless of how close a vote he got.
Journalists commonly offer bitter insights on Congressional affairs from social scientists. Among is this comment of Elizabeth Drew: “The quality of ego that motivates people to seek political office is not conducive to collective action once they succeed. Each member of Congress is went to Congress himself as a sort of autonomous principality, sent forth to Washington by an adulatory constituency. Having arrived, they find it difficult to accommodate these views, work for legislation that does not bear their name, or spend time on the dreary business of seeking each other’s support and counting the votes on forthcoming bills. What’s more, the chairman come to learn that this is not the sort of thing to which glory attaches. A Charmin speech is more likely to attract the attention of the press galleries and the hometown papers. There is quiet work in the committee to change national policy.” Drew, "Member of Congress Are People," New York Times, January 29, 1973, p. 27.
How much mobilization occurs in Congress is still an empirical question. Probably less than is commonly supposed. Members in both Houses seem to offer a lot of floor procedures with nothing accompanying them except speeches. An interview with Sen. James L. Buckley (R., N.Y.) shortly after he took office (he was still agitated and innocent but not entirely a good speaker) continued this argument:

"He has been surprised, he said, to discover how many things happen in the Senate 'for symbolic reasons' rather than practical reasons, such as the practice of Senators offering amendments that they know have absolutely no chance of passing. Hence, according to the practice of the House, Education and Labor Committee is a classic example of non-mobilization. An executive official: "When an Education and Labor bill is introduced, things are so confused that the Members don't know who is in charge of the bill. Then one amendment comes out of your ass.... From the beginning every bill is accompanied by filibustering. Council, Mrs. (Trill) Green, Carl Peterson, and John Dinkins are all sitting at once, trying to see who will get into it. And it makes the confidence of the Members go down."

Fenno: "More often than on other five committees, in the Fenno study, Education and Labor members will be reluctant to choose something over nothing. More often than on the other five, they will prefer a safe political issue to a passed Congression bill."

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Clifford points interestingly to what may be barriers in compelling activity between what process in particular he means and what goes on elsewhere: "Although the legislation is sympathetic to the needs of colleges and they support projects, that may be expected to benefit the colleges in that district. They tend in a much more detached and objective way to the argument of advocates who have come to be recognized as spokesmen for important interest groups. The importance of their local interest to elected success is a matter which they are quite aware, and a member pleading his own cause receives attention with enthusiasm, and usually cooperation, particularly if he does not request the support of his colleagues often. Congressmen who represent large interests are less successful." Op. cit., Pp. 181-182.


Of course, involvement in the committee closely. But on "causes" beyond labor-management relations the unions themselves cannot play a significant role."

Committee's success rate in the House fell no less... It is an interesting question how much mobilization activity went on in the Senate anti-war campaign of the late 1960s and early 1970s. One constant problem was a kind of constant but visible -- Senator's each coming up with their own peace plans. Overall, it may just be that the level of mobilization activity in Congress is declining. Electoral demand for position-taking seems to be on the rise. In the House, factionalism is being replaced by a more unified vote-taking, a trend which reduces the futility of members attempting to score political points. In the Senate, the traditional method is no longer feasible, as it may appear.

What happens in determining the content and pace of implementation is also the result of an interplay between credit-claiming and position-taking impulses. Of course, each can be shaped by what goes on in mobilization. The important point here is that for measures, especially particularly because the Congressmen's intrinsic interest in the subject of legislation varies. Hence, it is a matter of resources. To devote time and energy to passage or scrutiny of impact. Unless, again, credit is available for legislative maneuvering. On matters where credit-claiming possibilities are small, therefore, we should not be surprised to find that members display only a modest interest in what goes into bills or what their passage accomplishes.

Thus, after interviews in late 1960s with some of staff and Congressmen on the military committees... Concluded that their members had a vigorous interest only in particular real estate functions -- the location of installations and related emergency planning, and role of'science.'

On other military matters:

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(231) Ibid., p. 215.
(232) In a previous commentary, see John Diefendorf, "Going Down the War: The Senate's Home Votes," Washington Monthly, August 1971, pp. 6-19.
These city machine Congressmen have been more willing to vote for farm price support programs (probably a trade) than city reformers. An infinitely alert public would encourage vote trading in its own interest, but publics are not infinitely alert. At times American reformers have tried to get rid of representational logrolling. Thus, reports Truman, the Mississippi constitution of 1890 "required legislators to take an oath that they would not use their votes." David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1960), p. 268.

Looking at impact becomes important when government is conceived as an agency for making things happen rather than just for cutting up pies. Some of the most significant governmental decisions require no spending at all.

the relevant committee reach their decisions and evaluate the projects made by the states? The answer is not to be found usually in such evaluation forms. In the book j, the committee did, of course, recognize that both cells a "rhetoric of justification." On the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with no rule to validate any votes made, it seems to be difficult to get members to do legislative work at all. For nothing foreign relations has a severe attendance problem in making unanimous decisions. This is the kind of committee that Senator like to be on, but they don't have to do anything." On House Education and Labor, the concern for programmatic impact, to say the least, yet retained an executive official's approval: "The work habits of the members are variable and it makes for bad legislation. These habits become the news. . . . The younger members of the committee have a unique opportunity. They can get amendments in the bill, amendments galleys. They can speak up and participate all over the place. Nothing about being seen and not heard on this committee. They can make speeches knowing that no one will contradict them, because nobody knows enough. No one knows the bills." In recent years the House Interstate Committee has attracted a small corps of members dedicated to the cause of environmentalism rather than to supplying Committee benefits. But they seem to skew on their homework. Are so busily occupied by an official of Friends of the Earth, a preservation group? They are usually persuaded with their other committee.

[237] Ibid., p. 185.

[238] Ibid., p. 172. In effect, the given statements. "Congressman interviewed generally indicated that they have little tendency to be a conduit in public matters of matters that are matters of international political interest and goals." In fact, during the 195-57 period, few examples could be found where congressional Committee could any impression of clearly establishing decisions about weapons, geographic areas, personnel, missions, organization or administration in terms of national or international goals or "objectives." p. 173. For a more recent connection, Congress has military, and policy input, see Charles L. Schultze, ed., Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1972) pp. 171-174. One conclusion is about the same as before.


conjunction. So they don't provide any leadership. They vote with us, but they don't take the time to learn about the subject matter. They don't have a real interest." (240) And so goes the Congressmen's lack of interest in subjects, posing a corollary lack of interest in 'research. To assign committee staffs or the Congressional Research Service to do research on the non-partisan effects of legislation (record before my first attendance) would be to misallocate resources. Hence, generally speaking, Congressmen do not assign them. They can find a good many more useful things for staff members and the CRS to do. (242) The conclusion that holds here for treatment of legislation that also for overweighting, generally, members intervene selectively on matters where they can claim credit for intervention. (243)

Now, if these are the impetuses behind reporting and overseeing what are the effects? What seems to happen is that Congressional policy-making activities produce a number of specifiable and predictable policy effects. Taken together these effects display what might be called an 'assembly column'--an over-all policy pattern that one might expect any set of assemblies constructed like the U.S. Congress to generate. (244)

One effect is delaying--or more properly, since the agency of the legislature created it, a widespread perceiving of delay. Not too much should be made of this, but it is fair to say that in the years Congress has often lagged behind public opinion in enacting major legislation. (245) Thus a perceived 'partiality' was the major source of dissatisfaction with Congress in a survey of a

(245) Ferrero, op. cit., p. 6. Ferrero adds: "The Committee members who do know the subject matter and do take a real interest are those with past of committee service and re-election. Mostly Westerners, the strikes are far from time immemorial and the expectation to perpetuate Ryder." (245) Ferrero, D., "Page 10, Mike Monroney (D.-Okla.), a practical reformer of Congressional constipation and procedure, voiced in the late 1950's the opinion that the Legislative Reference Service (now P.L. 805): 'We have yielded criticism to a wide area of the failure of the Legislative Reference Service to increase y as a receiving and research tool that could be available generally to Congress. I personally have expressed the view in these hearings, and I believe it. Not one of the failures in the Congress itself will vindicate the Legislative Reference Service for continued need, for existing staff already exists and that staff is in the hands of people who are doing splendid work. And without the echo of that kind, neither than improving Congress on the basic design of hearings on the Organization of Congress, etc., in p. 845.
The best theoretical treatment of the subject is in Soter, "Conditions for Legislative Control."

In recent years the study of policy effects has flourished among analysts writing in a
rubric of different scholarly traditions. The range of writing on policy stimuli
shaped by Congress includes the following:

- James T. Bunn, "The Distribution of
- on urban renewal: Theodore
- Richard Stalin and Richard Moncke, "Federal Regulation of Whiskey Labelling:
  From the Legend of Prohibition to the Present," 15 Journal of Law and Economics
- Richard S. Sterne, Alvin Rabushka, and Helen A. Scott, "Serving the Elderly:

A. Bruce Johnson, "Federal Aid and Area Redevelopment," 14 Journal of Law
- James W. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth M.
  Dolbrear, "Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Discharge
  Policies in the 1960s," ch. 5 in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Service and
  Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968).
- Yale Eizenman, "The Effect of Statutory Minimum Wage Increases on Teen-Age
- on national policies generally:
- Schlesinger et al., op cit., ch. 15.

There is an analysis of the attention

Congress gave in 1967 at the time it considered a policy decision in


Thus, for example, this critique: "The policy of this country ... are, as it seems to me,
Thoroughly tied to the stagnation of business and the general inertia of Congress.
They are disrupted as soon as you go by and great measures affecting the business
and political interests of the country accumulate at the doors of Congress and never
reach the stage of action." The author was Henry Cabot Lodge in 1889. Quoted in

generally dissatisfied with in 1963. ...{246} In the delay was ... to be increased by most political factors. The delay lasts until enough time has elapsed since the previous proposal of a bill to make it unprofitable to vote on it at all; a live issue may be better than a live program.

Two effects are not insignificant permanently. A second effect is particularism -- that is, a strong tendency to urge policies in packages that are salable to particularized benefits. Not only do Congressmen aggressively seek opportunities to reap such benefits (less as "pennywise" is said), they also in framing laws "to give" a particularistic cast to matters that do not obviously require it. The only benefit intendedly excluded, of course, are ones that cannot be packaged. The presence of recession causes Congressmen reach for "accidental public goods" bills cutting projects in the various districts; Presidens prefer more general federal efforts. In the educational field a Congressional favorite in the "inequities areas" program with its ostensible grant of federal school districts again funding new ventures of one effective impact, Congressmen are capable of closing a hundred thousand schools "like a shot in the interest of efficiency." Congressmen continue to legislate. 

The handling of revenue policy in particularistic; in nearly's exhaustive treatment of Congressional tax (presumably partly augmented in an interest in

{246} Frieden, et al., Congress in Crisis, pp. 56-59.


{248} Only several pages of legislation still write any sense are the area of impact, in economic terms, the terms of the budget. To put it in the "white box" is perhaps easy to reconstruct. In any case, it is worth considering the specific impact on determined groups, because such benefits are highly visible to those beneficial whereas costs are not so visible to the general taxpayers.
social effects (though not the means used) are very different. The pressure groups without distinctive 
offsets. The highly venerated film of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Thrusting, selling both State finance and these ways and means, is in the name of 
"expediting ... few individuals and many will be affected by changes in the Internal 
Revenue code..." 234

A few points can generally be premonitory 
notary of Congress in the categorical grant. In fact, the Categorical 
Grant for modern Democratic Congressmen who move and demand and the 
early New Deal Republican Congress. It supplies goods in small 
packets. Congressmen ... the categorical programs. Because of the opportunities they afford 
to interface in administration and thus to secure special treatment, or at least the 
agrarian just,顷priorities among whom ... state and local as well as 
federal agencies. Sometimes figure prominently." 235 The grant for the particular 
example, Congressmen, to take a vaguer method in the operation of the federal 
senatorial. Thus, for example, the Corps of Army Engineers, structured to 
undertake discrete district projects, must be reminded from Presidents who would 
subservient it in a grand for a pleasing." 236

A Third facet is the "screening of the organized." This takes two familiar 
forms. First, there is a de-territorialization organized groups with enough 
overlooked local clout to imagine favorable roll call positions among a majority 
quarters. These make for Presidents a row --- "lashing through precedent! --- 
Corps, federal veterans' bonus bills, the Presidents voted them, and the House voted 
decisively to override the veto. 237 In recent years the National Rifle Association

237 Near, op. cit., p. 309. Glenn notes the relevant

macroeconomic is often an "aggregation theory" meat built by aggregating irrelevant 
preferences. "The fact that Keynes' goal is a determinent one, surprisingly 
beneficial to the people, has often obscured the fact that the perspective is that of the state, 
and that state is the macroeconomic substrate through which individual financial 
interests leads to a Keynesian policy."

238 Ex. op. cit., p. 33-34.

239 Edward C. Banfield, "Revenue Sharing in Policy and Practice," The Public

Interest, Spring 1971, p. 41-42.

250 On struggle over the Corps under Franklin and Truman see Maday, op. cit., ch. 3.5.

251 Particular is no doubt universal. It is hard to single out sources for the experiencing 
The Federal parliament of the Late Nineteenth Century: "The legislative in fact, Scafell alone, was 
as agents of pressure from a for their constituents, and a widely deterritorialization of the state."

252
To which his country is furnished by the difficulty. The government found it
management the railheads in running fast express trains, or account of the interference.

"The number of the chamber, who insisted that all the trains passing through their

districts should stop at any stations," A. L. Lowell, Government and Parties


Sets of voters who are organized for political action should not be confused with set of voters

who have intense preferences. Whether he better because the former depends upon whether there are

incentive to organize and stay organized. One specific pattern is if producers have better

incentives for consumers. In the general point see Marcus Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective


and Gary, Crisis, p. 273.


In the 1930's, 1931 and 1936 were the only years in which the fiscal effects of fiscal

spending activities of American governments (at all levels) were clearly measurable. In both

years, the Keynesian incentives were apparently valued, but not faced by presidential voters (Beck's and Brown's).

This weighed in against congressional legislation. Second was the deference toward groups with powerful electoral resources whose representatives kept close watch on congressional proceedings. Clinch another at the committee level is the result, with the manifest nexus across a wide range of policy areas. Agriculture is an obvious example; particularly, the farm subsidies are federal bureaucracy. Congressmen protect clientele systems—an alliance of agencies, Hill committees, and clientele—against the incursions of Presidents and Cabinet Secretaries.

A fourth effect is symbolic. Partern needs explanation. It is typically best to say that a purely symbolic Congressional act is one expressing an attitude but

presuming no policy effects. An example would be a resolution denouncing a Commission finding. But the term “symbolic” can also usefully be applied when Congress prescribes policy effects but does not act (in legislating or overseeing itself) so as to achieve them. No doubt the main case of prescription—
achievement gap in the interactivity of human affairs. But there is a special reason why a legislative body charged like the U.S. Congress can be expected to

engage in symbolic action by this second, or symbolic, construction of the term. The reason of course is that in a large class of legislative undertakings

the expected prescription is not the final

or primary position in the realm for effects.

An interesting subset. Here consists of enactments that are “clientelistic” in nature. That is, they are designed to benefit people other than the ones whose

petition leads to the payment for passage. If the petitions receive cloudy funding or

programmatic accommodation. The actual supply of the requested benefits becomes a

relatively secondary Congressional concern. Thus the civil rights act of

Natural poll been exogenous gun control. Congress has to do it. It is difficult to

imagine another issue on which Congress has been less responsive to public sentiment of a

large part of time." Hazel Erskine, “The Polls: Gun Control,”


There is an analysis of agricultural clientele in low. The End of

Liberation, pp. 102-115. A clientele system has developed in Congress,

point in time European countries is the in education. With the maturing of educational finance it seems likely that the two Congressional houses will form

or later create independent education committees (argued from above) whose members

will serve educational groups in bipartisan fashion.

This argument is taken from Gordon Tullock, "Information Without Profit," in Tullock, op. cit. On charitable outlets: "They are 'selling' a feeling of satisfaction derived from sacrifice -- whether the sacrifice does or does not improve the well-being of someone else -- out of direct interest to the donor. He is interested not in what actually happens, but in his image of it. The entrepreneur, accordingly, should polish the image." P. 146. The reasoning holds where no financial sacrifice is involved -- i.e., when some people write under anonymously other people's names.
1957 and 1960 were passed to benefit minority school blocks but to please
Northern audiences. No one shall be required but any had little use in the bill.

Title I of the Education and Secondary Education Act of 1965 allocated monies to
aid the poor. The audience focused on the immediate. In its implementation the
monies went elsewhere.

C) laws regulating private conduct have a "chastisement" force
to them. Thus prohibition - its audience - deadlifters and its beneficiaries
other wise was giv the pleasure of having their region taken away. That the
enforcement power infirmly should cannot procure.

In the mere general case there is reason to expect Congress to act "symbolically" when the private will beneficiaries are separate, evolving, or identical. Rather, taking
provision may permit states that are key on public but short on means to achieve
them. Or argument may suggest that there is little Congressional interest in
enforced. Or efforts to achieve president goal may run against Congressional
particularism on chummery. Or all these things may happen once. These
when water pollution became an issue it was more of less predictable that Congress
would pass a law channeling as an anti-pollution act. That the law would take
the form of a grant-in-aid program to localities, and that it would not
achieve its proclaimed end. Clearly the Usual examples of Congressional symbolism
are those arising out of efforts to mediate. Frequently. Regulatory states
are the by-products of Congressional position-taking at times of public
disatisfaction. They tend to be vaguely drawn. What begins in

The civil rights acts of 1964 and 1968 did for many have considerable impact in locals.
In an unusual legislative venture, the 1965 voting rights act was a remarkable exercise in bipartisan
involvement in enforcement. Both those latter acts were substantially bipartisan proposals.
See James T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Failure of Implementing Federal Education
are sure to be more responsive to the wishes of state and local school officials than to the
desires of bureaucrats in the Executive branch. As a result, the Title I program
administered acts as bridge for main constituency bloc in the Congress and the state
and local school officials, vallelum among their peers whose children. The legislation
is supposed to secure. P. 51.

Within the Congress works are sometimes confused with deeds. The reported final acts.
There is a concern with administration but it is focused primarily on those elements
which directly affect constituting interests or committee jurisdictions. Legislatu
proposals seldom are debated from the viewpoint of their administrative feasibility. " Sciàman, op.cit., pp. 65-66.

(261) See A. Myrick Freeman and Robert H. Haveman, "Clean Air, Dirty Water," The Public Interest, Summer 1972, pp. 51-65. The article is only incidentally about Congress, but its arguments are appropriate.


A special word may be in order here about the politics of transfer programs. What distinguishes American transfer programs is not that they are "redistributive." They are no more so than some other programs — but that they offer legislators not particularized benefits. Who gets a check of what size is not an issue.
| 266 | The state of Mississippi once had a prohibition law, widespread bootlegging, and at the same time a liquor tax. Would any other arrangement have seemed good? See Key, *Southern Politics*, p. 233. |
To clearly present by law, so Congressmen get somewhere in the heading out of individual checks. In these circumstances, what can be said about the politics? A first point is that Congress will favor the purchase of transfer programs when they are challenged by powerful interest groups against organized opposition. The obvious examples are the veterans' bonus. A second point is that Congress will legislate incremental increases in existing programs when there is little organized sentiment favoring the changes. Hence the biannual hike in Social Security benefits.

The public assistance program has been enriched in an alert-minded way over the years, mostly through action of Senate from amendments. A third point is that Congress will be reluctant to legislate new programs benefiting the organized opponent of the operation of the program. The third point important. Remember, deciding how to vote means lack of projected performance credit to Congress for the influence of organized opposition. Hence major transformative changes are unlikely to spring from individualistic proposals.

The infinite caution elsewhere — Bard next for regime assistance. Lloyd Coca for Andy response, Roosevelt (social security), Johnson (medicare) and Nixon (family assistance) for presidential reasons. A final and least point is that the politics of pensions will be more difficult if Congressmen were allowed to put their names on the checks.

The final argument is that Congress and the legislative function they are different. The argument is that Congress is in a peculiar way is an extraordinarily democratic body. If, on matters regarding the presidency, Congressmen are judged by actions rather than outcomes, then what kind of laws are they likely to write? The answer is that they are much more likely to incorporate popular exceptions of instrumental rationality into the statute books. Attentive publics judge politicians on means as well as on ends. Hence the Congressional penchant for the blunt, single action — the national debt limit, the maximum wage. But the give-and-take, the 10% across-the-board budget slash, the amendment cutting off aid to Communist countries, the amendment ending the war in

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[70] Politically attractive but economically dubious. One analysis is a fairly large literature is frozen, despite...
A good example of an issue where popular expectations prevail is crime; one side tries to bring back the death or silence the Supreme Court; on the other side (with a taste of sociology) goes after the "real cause." If it is widely believed that spending money will "solve social problems," then Congress will spend money. Keynesian economics receives a chill because the Hill Man in the White House now because Congress is more "conservative." But because it is in a sense more "democratic," the image of a balanced family budget is a powerful one. The fact that Keynesian economics makes it necessary that large governmental ventures receive Congress approval is explainable. President Truman had to justify NA To and the Marshall Plan only if they were launched. A failure to make persuasive explanations probably underlies the fact that Robert Nixon's family assistance plan failed. The ability of mass politics to prescribe means as well as ends is a neglected subject of democratic theory. If, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the question of whether ordinary citizens are capable of making normative estimates is a central one in democratic theory, so also is the question of whether we are capable of making cognitive estimates. An institution like the U.S. Congress can only if it can. The public group of means ends relationship is rarely questioned. It does not affect; it, although it are, elects new and new. Perhaps the common citizen needs more direct contact with the public; if it is so to the question of whether we are capable of making cognitive estimates. An institution like the U.S. Congress can only if it can. The public group of means ends relationship is rarely questioned. It does not affect; it, although it are, elects new and new. Perhaps the common citizen needs more direct contact with the public; if it is so to the question of whether we are capable of making cognitive estimates. An institution like the U.S. Congress can only if it can. 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Perhaps the common citizen needs more direct contact with the public; if it is so to the question of whether we are capable of making cognitive estimates.
The plan made it through the House but was sandbagged in the Senate Finance Committee.

David P. Mayhew, the author of Family Assistance, says that another committee might have acted differently—perhaps constructively, revised the House bill. "But the Senate Finance Committee was not bent to any such norm of casuistry, undemonstrated persistence. The senators were individualists, and more than a normal quota were exhibitionists as well. At the expressive, symbolic level of politics they are hardly to be faulted, but they were lacking an essential seriousness which is the hallmark of mature government." Mayhew, The Politics of Guaranteed Income (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 482.

Yes indeed. And the senators, after all, were worried about how the program looked rather than about what was in it. The symbolism was confusing; it was hard to know what Martin & deane, Morton White, Science and Sentiment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Public awareness, and also with the inherent complexity of governmental affairs.

The notion of 'staying on top' can serve as a lead-in to a discussion of a different topic: How 'involved' does Congress stay about it? The problem is a
feudal one, requiring enough to require a more direct involvement to deal with it.

Consider 'assembling' at the 'assembling point' — delay, particularizing services of
the executive, and subsidizing. It is easy to persuade my viewers, prominent policies in
search of materials for effect, altering Congress's role and delineating
their
business elsewhere. Efficient pursuit of electoral goals by members gives
no guarantee of institutional survival. Quite the contrary. It is not too
much to say that if all members did nothing but pursue their electoral goals,
Congress would decay or collapse. Simple institutional maintenance policies are implicit
in earlier discussions, excluding a serious one arising from the difficulty of getting
members to do your bidding and unlearning appointed work. Sometimes in the
Senate it is even hard to get them to appropriate.

At least these kinds of policies can aid in the handling of money. A basic Congressional perspective the question of
which is central to money in Congress is: The first step is with allocation.
Given popular preferences, will members spend money on a matter not "optimal"
levels? Will they distribute to "broadening"? They may be predictable; fund-raisers
"underwrite" in some areas — e.g., defense. It is easy to see how particularism and
obstruction could produce "distortions" in both taxing and spending. The old
image of Congress as a pork barrel outfit can be looked upon as an

See the review in "Congressional Quarterly" for 108-110.

The original phrase is "Congress in Policy," an article by the author's colleague, Paul, which I had intended to be in this issue. In the classic 1939 book, "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington"
the hero, Jefferson Smith, (J. Maury Smith) chose as his theme the
building of a "boys' camp along Willet Ave."

And the situation before the bill (Edward Mandel) wanted to build a dam in the same area. Senator Smith's bill
was to flatten until the dam dropped. The dam. It's a problem.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont): "How can we win a situation like
this? I don't know. But I am the end of my list. I do not know any means except open
unless government the local newspapers start publishing the objection of those Senators."

Institutional maintenance problem. The second has to do with crisis economic effects. There are the effects of Congressional taxing and spending decisions on general employment levels, and the effects of Congressional fiscal decisions on fiscal levels and trade flows. (Whether the tariff should be taken up under taxing policy is of course unclear. Its object in a tax, but the direct effects may not come out of the Treasury.) An institutional change proceeds from the fact that Congressmen have little or no elected view among their electoral forces. Yet an institution that generates them belongs to an institution in trouble. The third kind of problem is fiscal in nature, but in a way it more fundamental. Spending generally popular and taxes are not. In the public mind the connection between taxation and benefit is definitely ambiguous. If Congressmen reflect public opinion, what is to prevent them from systematically voting in favor of spending but against taxes? Alert public opinion can do this, save check on behavior of this

There is a theoretical economics literature on rational democratic governments can be expected to occur in various states at optimal levels—i.e., levels geared to popular preferences. Authors differ in their assumptions about information costs and about governmental structure. A recent guide to the literature is J. Ronnie Den and Charles W. Meyer, "Budget Size in a Democracy," ch. 14 in James M. Buchanan and Robert J. Tollison, Theory of Public Choice (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1972).

Buchanan and Tollison agree that a government centered in a majority-rule assembly without restrictions of re-eligibility. Opinion, ch. 10-12. But an policy involving re-eligibility. Buchanan allows for information costs (e.g., messengers quite sure what the activities of bureau accomplish) and argues that if certain assumptions about public opinion exists, the one men, a government with close relations between bureau and suggestive assembly committees will prevail in the areas of those relations. Opinion, ch. 14.

What happens in effect, in fact, particularly in cities of both large to occupying? Dowson argues that a democratic government (structure changes) will systematically understand because of its information costs. To states it is clearer where the money comes from (e.g., then who are expenses (i.e., defense and education). Then understanding. Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy," 12 World Politics 93-103, 1960. A possible corollary of the above argument is that a government centered in an individualistic society will spend less than an organized one, say, the British—the reason being that a government like the British can save through ill-conceived programs and get paid for new efforts from five years later. These are two important questions but here are no certain answers. One problem is the virtual non-existence of empirical analysis.
either of the sort that matches public opinion readings with spending levels or of the sort that congrees spending levels in systems with different governmental arrangements.

A critical problem in allocation thinking is that governent budgeting diffuses family budgeting in an important respect--on many salient matters we can do some sort of spending analysis. Arguments about cutting the pie quickly turn into arguments about the effect of giving out slices.

While ideologues can be insistent on such questions, partisan spending can reduce variety. (Brown discusses the question somewhat in ch. 5.) On the U.S. Congress, it may be not both Niskanen and Means are right. That is, there may be underlying and some areas for the Brown reason and overarching problems.

Niskanen reason (although it is not clear that Brown's vague--building fly--enter the picture for particular common interest programmatic to reduce overarching). This was one or less Woodrow Wilson's conclusion. Op.cit., ch. 3.

It is surprisingly difficult to figure out what independent impact Congressional money decisions have on price and employment levels. Some spending authority is discretionary and some extents are weeks of years. Peckman concluded in 1971 that the net effect of Congressional decisions had probably been fairly less restrictive in the preceding decades. Joseph A. Peckman, Federal Tax Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1971), pp. 47. It may be that the filing of categorical grant programs in the 1960's has tipped the Congressional balance to the right-thinking side. But has it?

Transfer payments have been less.


Smith Douglas writes: "One of my closest associates never voted against any organization for any program, no matter how extravagant or foolish it was. This never hurt their prestige. In fact, I think it helped them." Op.cit., p. 312.
soul, but how much of a check? There is a primal danger here. Not any
taking and squandering body hasn’t come to grips with.

One way to stay aloof is to hire people to run the helm. This is effective.
what Congress does. It seems proper here to discuss institutional maintenance, as
a collective good. Following Olson’s arguments in *The Logic of Collective
Action*, the case goes as follows. If members hope to speak causes in Congress
they have a stake in maintaining its prestige as a powerful institution. They also have
a stake in maintaining Congress’s control over resources that are useful in electoral
games. But if every member pursues only his own electoral goals the prestige and
funding of Congress will dwindle away. What can be done? The inclination to do
anything at all is, of course, minimal. Congress is more fragile than it looks.
Yet from the member point of view the maintenance of the institution is a collective
good of some magnitude. What is needed is a system of “selective incentives”
to induce at least some members to work toward keeping the institution in
good repair. And it is just such a system that has evolved over the decades.

Prestige and funding within Congress itself are accorded to upholders of the
institution. The Capitol Hill parking perk is geared to the needs of
institutional maintenance. Members are paid in intangible currency for variously
didactic activities that are beyond a wall against their own electoral interests.

To some extent these incentives apply generally across the membership:
This or that of the Hill is not as rare as the airwaves. The member who came prestige
among his peers in the lonely gnome who passes over news conferences, cocktail

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It may occur to the reader that the earlier discussion of policy-making could have been set up as a collective goods problem. That is, on matters like regulatory policy, members could have been portrayed as seekers of effects (enbare to achieve them because of the difficulty of generating collective action. But to argue this way would have been a mistake. The notion of members as seekers of effects needs a much more specific formulation; the electoral consequences for positive, not effects. A related point is that the "selective incentives" discussed above work quite clearly in the interest of institutional maintenance and not in the interest of general programmatic performance.
Party leaders may not amount to much as partisans, but they are vitally important as institutional protectors. As Fosco says of the more successful House majority leaders and Speakers, "They have been men whose devotion to the House was considered greater than any devotion to ideological causes." Keeping legislative business moving is a major source in itself. But leaders are also on the alert to ward off activities that threaten to earn Congress a bad reputation. Thus, Democratic House leaders put a danger on the House Un-American Activities Committee in the Eighty-First Congress after the H.U.A.C. circus in the Eighty-ninth. In the Democratic Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tx.) placed a general ban on the televising of House hearings. Leaders have always been the more potent elements in interest-group scrutiny and criticism. Central to the leaders' tactics is to bring up matters like full-grown issues on rules suspension motions, requiring a two-thirds vote. They know the danger of the trick; Speaker Rayburn could give an account of Rayburn pleading with House members not to open an Eisenhower trade bill to floor amendments. Some of the major achievements of the Texas leaders can be interpreted as acts of institutional maintenance—Johnson's maneuvering in 1954 to bring about the McCarthy censure. Johnson's maneuvering in 1957 to pass a civil rights bill (Synnove or not, it proved that Congress could pass one). Johnson's maneuvering in 1961.

Institutional maintenance in the Senate: Joe McCarthy's position. In 1950, the Senate, "Senate war" was. Richard Russell (D. -Ga.).


See Goodman, op.cit., p. 173. At no time since 1938 have a majority of their members been willing to take a position against the committee. But there has been intense opposition to the committee in sections of the public on a position to cast general doubt on Congress's reputation.
Rayburn's biographer quotes him: 'When a man has to run for re-election every two years,' he explained, 'the temptation to make headlines is strong, enough without giving him a chance to become an actor on television. The usual processes toward good law are not even dramatic, let alone sensational enough to be aired across the land.' Booth Moore, Mr. Speaker (Chicago: Follett, 1964), p. 167. See Neil McNeil, Fage & Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York: David McKay, 1963), p. 342.

Bauer et al., Of City, p. 64. Rayburn's attitude has been handed down to his successors. Thus this statement by the new House majority leader, Thomas P. O'Neill (D., Mass.): 'The country's becoming more protectionist again,' he said, 'forget a tariff bill on the floor today with an open rule, and there will be 5,000 amendments to it. There are going to be people who want to protect the steel industry, protect the glass industry, protect the fish industry....' Marjorie Hender, 'O'Neill's New House: A Majority Leader's Perspective,' New York Times, January 20, 1973, p. 21.

to seek a "natural committee"-holding up little found by public opinion. The three "natural committees" of the House — Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means — are deliberately arranged to contribute to institutional maintenance. (In his right none of the three has a functional analogue in the Senate.) The inducements to serve on them are the power and prestige within the House that goes with membership. 

Appointments are not easy to get; for several decades Congressmen have more eagerly sought places on these committees than on any other.

Appointments also flow to "repsisitor" legislators, with this definition of the term: "According to the party leaders and the members of the committees on committees, a responsible legislator is one whose abilities, attitudes, and relationships with his colleagues serve to enhance the prestige and weight of the House of Representatives." (297)

Membership on any of the three is not an electoral liability, and in the case of Appropriations and Ways and Means it can be a considerable asset. But what makes the committees interesting is the set of services each supplies to Congressmen in particular, and to the Congress as an institution. In one way each committee gives direct services; it makes decisions that are helpful to individual Congressmen in their electoral quests. In another way each committee supplies indirect services; it does things helpful to the Congress as an institution that go beyond its direct member electoral quests. This may seem an odd mix, but here is institutional wisdom in it; the committees have to offer the right combination of power and prestige to induce talented members to serve on them.

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See Miller C. Cummings, Jr., and Robert L. Carley, "The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: A Study of the 1961 Vote," Ch. 11 in Carley and others, Polit. For Appropriations and Ways and Means, see the direct interplay cited in Part 1. Altering membership because of new members and prestige is given. See Ferno, Eisen, and Pusey, The House, p. 923; Madison, op. cit., p. 56; Ferno, Congress in Committees, Ch. 12-5.

For the 1914-1919 period, see the data collected by John C. Eberhardt and reported in George S. Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads (New York: Crowell, 1916), p. 90.

Nicholas A. Matsas, "Committee Assignment," Ch. 10 in Carley et al., Polit. for cit., p. 240.
The Rules Committee's services derive from its power to hold or expel roll calls. It can aid members directly by writing along bills they want or by blocking bills they find unworkable or vote on itself. The best recent example of this letter is partly the Rules blocking action on federal aid to education in 1961. From the member's viewpoint, the Kennedy education bill was a majority; few were cross-cutting participation for race, or religion, and other issues federal spending. Rules voted 8 to 7 to kill the bill with James J. Delaney (D-MN) casting the deciding vote. In the floor press Delaney was a villain but in the House he was a hero. Newsweek notes: "He [Delaney] cast his vote in Southern style, you call it the voice of the people. But in the House, he's a hero. Delaney represents his district and the party and the people and his roll is in the New Yorker's hand." Delaney's Red is a genuine opponent of the New Yorker's hand. But the parties' role in blocking bill. The blocking bill itself served as a check on the floor and interest-group service; Robinson reports that the standing committee voted on denial rules for their bill and a vote to withdraw. United States Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on the bill, 291. And it may also serve as a check on the floor by blocking proposals that are unworkable.

"[A]n institution that dispenses power and responsibility has justified advantage for many fifth members who find it useful to reduce political pressures upon themselves by shifting to others the blame for the success or failure of certain measures. That the House Committee on Rules performs a valuable function is clearly demonstrated by our survey data [a single roll call 291. ... a majority vote against striking the bill]." DeStano et al., Congress in Action, p. 104-105.

Newsweek, July 3, 1961, p. 28.


 Ibid, p. 28.

The Rules Committee passes over the problems of course, it times when a majority's vote in important issues among House members, is justly a minority position among Rules members. The figures in the House—First and Second Houses, Congress, 291. in each case on a majority, 291. House, one in a majority in a minority, 291. The third, and third, passing the problem of striking it from blocking bills framed by a few majority.
The Army Appropriations Committee directly acts through members by supplying money to their pet projects. But its indirect service is far more important. What Appropriations does is act as the "guardian of the federal treasury." Its members accept as their mission the scrutiny of budget estimates, and they work remarkably hard at it. They "cut," "save," "shovel," "prune," "trim," "chop," "slash," "share," and "wield." There is a custom of arranging subcommittees so that members do not handle programs they have a direct interest in funding. The Senate Appropriations Committee has no budget, so it acts as an "expectant:" it gets its money from the House Appropriations Committee and disburses it to the Senate Appropriations Committee. All this is well known from Fender's account.

What has been the House committee's activities? In at least four ways, its members fill an institutional maintenance role. By cutting budgets, they work against the diffuse and primal charge that Congress will spend too much money. They also work against precitizens and post-citizens. They care about precitizens and post-citizens. And they care about the "waste," which the members call "waste." A term that disappeared in modern histories of public finance. "Waste" can occur when a standing committee authorizes a billion dollars in good cause, but then no interest in what happens to the money afterwards; the potential claimants in the event of the Appropriations member recall that the item itself take a good institutional record of sin and redemption. Between 1855 and 1965.

- In the case of a case, 00: 93-102.
- In the case of a case, 00: 103-108.
- In the case of a case, 00: 90-95.
- In the case of a case, 00: 105.
- In the case of a case, 00: 117.
- In the case of a case, 00: 210-215.
- In the case of a case, 00: 112-117.
- In the case of a case, 00: 626-683.
most of the appropriation bills were separated out away from the budgetary committees, with committee suggestions of programs being dealt with in an orderly and unaggravating way. The reporting process used here has produced permanent spending in the area of suggestion. Occasionally, Appropriation members believe that a bill, such as the Agricultural Bill of 1921, built up the Spending Bank of all the Appropriation Bills into one place. The modern Appropriation Committee enjoys such House support. Members may get first by its decision-making; and later may benefit from its penny-pinching.

The House Ways and Means, like Appropriation, secures members directly—in this case mostly by passing special tax provisions. (The Democratic delegation also handles appointments to the other standing committees.) But again the indirect services are more important. In effect Ways and Means is placed to protect the taxpayer, particularly in tax and tariff matters, to produce what is called the “actuarial soundness” of the social security program. The Senate, with the Finance Committee assumes no such role, tends to differ from the House by voting for lower taxes, higher tariffs, and more liberal transfer payments. The current Senate instrument is the “Christmas tree bill,” laden with goodies of all sorts, often added on by keen amendment. Given their mission, Ways and Means members consider it vitally important that the House members must unravel their bills. The first statical ground for the

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"Such a devolution of fiscal action was forbidden before. Who are we going to get in Congress and shut up?"


"With many of the department heads and bureau chiefs sharing in the general irresponsibility of this spending heyday, Congress displayed no unusual greediness during this period. Instead, Congress saw that its power of federal supervision during this era became a natural scandal. The congressional budget was seen, and funds found, and sold tickets for such projects as improvements for rivers and roads. After World War II, the Senate was just as much in favor of taking money from the people."


Chairman George Mahon (R-Ore.) makes the case in a speech celebrating the 100th anniversary of the House Committee. Congressional Record (daily ed.), March 2, 1955, p. 8863-8867.
On social security see Manley, of cit., p. 281. On the net, Manley, ch. 6 generally.

Ibid., p. 272 - 279.

Ibid., Ch. 281 - 291.

Ibid., p. 279 - 281.

Ibid., p. 258. "To [Ways and Means] Committee members, the Senate is characterized by irresponsible depravity and by capitulation to politically popular but unreasoned demands; by the brutal decision making, in short, that one could expect in the House without the closed rule." P. 250.
committee, in Seno's formulating, is "to write a bill that will pass the House." Accordingly the committee has continued. The custom of using the "closed rule" -- outhing from amendments -- on tax, tariff, and transfer bills.

To the closed rule acts as a shield for Ways and Means bills against hundreds of individual demands that would be activated if not fulfilled by the bill subject passed on the floor. Ways and Means bills like Appropriations may degrieve Congressmen of immediate gratification now and then, but its members are expected for their institutional service.

It would be absurd, of course, to claim that the institutional maintenance effort by the leaders and the "closed committee" offers a cure-all for Congressional problems. No one exercises much of a check on symbolism; the Appropriations members bring to their search for "write" a manner accoutering mentality. But it seems to me to distinguish the Ways and Means Committee does after all deal in tax legislation, and it is hard to get on the committee at all without displaying support for the oil depletion allowance. The possibility that Congress "undergoes" in areas where they are not inspired by habit or organized pressure. And Congress has not clear view of generating intended fiscal effects; the effort to set up a joint budgeting committee in the late 1970's foundered in a divination. Fiscal policy surfaced in the meeting of 1972-1973 as an "imperialism crisis" with President Nixon leaning out at Congress for its alleged "infectious" activities. It was difficult to tell afterward whether conflict between fiscal and Congress was likely to be temporary (i.e., caused by an epiphenomenal difference in personality relations between President and Congress, or chronic (i.e., caused by a shift in Congressional programs and processes giving Capitol Hill activities an infectious basis). The Congressional response to uncontrolled use once again to try to establish a joint budgeting process. Whether it would work was another matter; again, here was a collective goods problem.

Committee, p. 55.
The public finance theorists build with the aggregate popular preferences. A Banker's definition of "understanding" would be different. See Bowles, op.cit.

 Allegedly, the Congression's spending programs have been advocated by Senate Majority Leader, Scott (R-Pa.), "It is difficult because, as I said yesterday, we are all responsible. We voted for these things last year and some of us will vote for them again. When the bills come before us after a veto, the veto is not sustained. We go through the debt ceiling by our own legislation, and we contribute to inflation, which we collectively dislike. Then we face a congressional tax increase, which we always call 'tax reform.'" Congressional Record (daily ed.), February 21, 1973, p. S2995.

Existed institutional maintenance arrangements in Congress are imperfect, they

...exist. They help to ward off what the past has shown to be real
dangers. They are blunt and negative — the three "cautel committees" are
the ones on which we all too easily become a runaway engine. Within their
borders the arrangements are effective. It is hard to see how Congress could maintain
its prestige and power without them. And here is an urgent constitutional point
here. To check the modern presidency, the Congress of America has to maintain its
prestige and power. Hence it is always important that Congressional "reformers" go
about their task with eyes open, to get rid of the closed rule in the interest of
"democratizing" for example, would be indubitable to weaken the Congress and
strengthen the presidency.  

Surely it is easy enough for assemblies to prove a collapse.
In the United States, with its flexible constitutional arrangements, decision
power can be transferred to other governmental organs. The history of American
city reform has largely been a history of taking power away from city councils
...There was a time, to be sure, when "bosses" were
informally eased to govern; in Chicago the party bosses in the mayor's office still
serve as a de facto machine check on council particularism. But one should
never speak of such institutional changes as being the pattern — at-large elections
to make councilors serve "the city as a whole" rather than their wards, item
votes to give mayors control over projects, rules outlawing council increases
in budget estimates, laws generally strengthening the mayoral office. City councils
are usually burned-out volcanoes here and there disfiguring the urban landscape.
Of course, giving into selective presidential empowerment would place both in the
public’s hands, Congress is more willing (as many) makes the case: "We have
not to make it over to the executive branch the right to select people and programs
to go forward and those to be killed. If we voted there is no further need to a
Congress for the Congress will have given up its power to the people’s branch where
prime responsibility is to look after the people." Congressional Record (1971-1980),

Urban Government: A Study in Politics and Administration (Glencoe, Ill.: Free

Banfield, Political Nativism, ch. 11, 12.

On the logic of city reform see Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Parties and the Community
Society Controversy," ch. 6 in Chambers and Burnham, op. cit., p. 170; and
Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University
The electorate, with its broad and flexible vote, has no fixed function in city government. In 1790, the Constitution was still a work in progress. The framers, like the people they represented, were uncertain about how the new government would function. They left much to the discretion of the states and the federal government itself.

Is it possible for an elected legislative assembly to govern all by itself? The United States, with its constitutional machinery, has a unicameral legislature. The North American provinces, on the other hand, had a bicameral legislature, with the Upper House being appointed by the executive branch. The French solution in the Third and Fourth Republics followed a logic: the 1790s were to concentrate power in a single national assembly, with the Senate being an advisory body. But France did not have a formal party system. The National Assembly was a mixed system, with some candidates elected on a party basis.

In both republics, majority coalitions generally included the centrist Radicals with their doctrine of deputy individualism. In both political cultures, the assembly was the decision-making body. The ability of the Radicals to work in common with the Americans was a mixed system. In the Fourth Republic, the parliamentary parties were more inclusive in their roll call voting. The American Congress was strong and independent, as was the American Congress.

The result was a mixed system. Deputies gave extraordinary power. The shift from the Third Republic to the Fourth Republic was not a shift from "party-group politics" to "party politics," but rather a shift from a mixed system to a more party-oriented system.
Bouvier and Wilson, op.cit., p. 95.


"...[T]here may be a pure political game of adopting one's position to win an election contest. Consideration of what is necessary to win in a constituency may thus dictate the legislators' decision in the legislature." Edward Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaulists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?" 63 American Political Science Review 487, 1969. The difference between French and American is that between a quarter and a half of the non-Communist legisaltives in the Fourth Republic were simulaneously local mayors. Duncan MacRae Jr., Parliament, Party, and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's, 1967), p. 54.

See MacRae, op.cit.

See Williams, op.cit., pp. 234-241.

It's anything after the point. See, e.g., Williams, op.cit., pp. 205, 211, 217.

Lowell, op.cit., p. 220.

Williams, op.cit., pp. 349.
of interest groups. Parliamentary committees with clientele clashed with policies on welfare, social services, education. Managing parliamentary business was in itself a formidable task. It was held in the name of the people to govern in their name. To serve the needs of institutional maintenance, the Finance Committee, which included the Treasury, was in charge of the central authority of the American House. As for doing non-job policy matters, the French had their own style: "mobinization." On social policy, Thousain argues that "parliament of the Third Republic were specifically incomplete to the point of pacification needs of the working class."

All this does not fully account for that individualistic assembly creado governo. With occasional German interruptions, the two French republics did for 28 years — and a third record given to democracy for 100 years. Indeed in the long run a particular regime may prove more durable than an efficient bureaucratic state without civil rights. And it should be recalled that the French republic, unlike the American, were experimenters in democracy, foreign to elected party regimes, sound in limited monarchy. Citizenship was a right subject, an equal to appreciate the means and ends of policy ventures in individualistic parliament. Yet the French republics partially had problems. They were called "crises de régime. In every election during the Fourth Republic at least 40% of the electorate voted for anti-system parties." The Marseillaise system

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225 Thib. p. 228-229.
226 From "A Course in History," p. 228. On committee, see also Burgess. 227 Ibid. p. 228-231
228 Williams, et al., pp. 227-229. "In rejecting a minimum of reform in the context of parliamentary sessions, the deputies start themselves. To concentrate exclusively in matters central to ongoing constitutional or as the main aspects of policy, which in greater frequency concern the whole institution." p. 229.
230 Ibid., pp. 229-232. 231-232. "The unwillingness of the deputies to vote for higher..."
"Indeed, the institutional barriers set up by the Assembly against integrative cooperation are wholly dependent for their perpetuation on the existence of the Finance Committee. On points of detail, despite a lack of in some respects it is the most ‘governmental’ of committees, while at the same time it will be where opposition is most dangerous." *Frits*, p. 243.

DavidThomson, *Democracy in France since 1870* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), ch. 5. "Thus the experience of the pre-war years brought disillusionment amongst the working classes, and great the conviction that social reform was "in the existing system and with the prevailing balance of powers, substituted in the political mechanism of parliamentary manoeuvres."

A distinction more or less gone from public consciousness. It was still vivid when Theodore Roosevelt and the French representative had to stand in a black coach behind a dray of kings at Edward VII's funeral in 1910.

The tenure of an assembly regime is too short for a clear accountability relation between electorates and officials. Voters find it hard to get a handle on government. Then, in a lengthy, democratic regime, it is assembly members to be individually elected, yet collectively aspiring. This is how it is in America. Fenno writes, "We do, ... office. One often finds, it seems, ... Congress ... one. As Table 1 shows, there has been no direct relation in recent years between voter dissatisfaction of Congress and performance, voter inclination to deprive incumbents of their seats.

In the circumstances, keeping Congress at bay for two centuries has been a considerable achievement, and it makes sense to close this essay by speculating briefly on the ways Americans have tried to deal with the problems inherent in Congressional rule. A good way to do so is to bring up the American "reform" tradition, which is something to be explained, perhaps, as ambitious or desired. By American means as well as ancient dynasties. The term "reform" carries a meaning of rationalizing, of conferring from a reason where it is lacking. The term is overworked and used incorrectly, but it can properly be applied to either or both of the two

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The popularity ratings of Fourth Republic's premiers, honed in the San Francisco, about the Suez crisis shocked by Traeven and Norek in their worst years. The second were reading for Pinay, Heslot, France, and de Gaulle (in his bitter face to face against the Fourth Republic), who reached for public support with the provinces. See Mochan, op. cit. pp. 307-310.
Fears: "As Ralph Waldo says, "Congress is an oughten fount," How can we love our Congressman?"

How much? P. I. Anon. Ad survey presented in 1937 turned up these results with percentages:

"How would you rate the job which has been done by Congress in 1938 -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" Excellent, pretty good, 46%; fair, 46%; not sure, 8%.

"How would you rate the service your Representative gives in looking after this district in Washington -- excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" Excellent, pretty good, 59%; fair, 22%; not sure, 19%.

Data supplied by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.
## Table 1. Public Ratings of Congressional Performance Compared with Membership Turnover

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Ratings of Congress</th>
<th>Number of Incumbents Defeated in Primary or General Election</th>
<th>Not倘若 won Seat Success</th>
<th>Open House Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Harris Survey data, compiled by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina. Figures are the result of a question posed to a national sample at the end of each election year: "How would you rate the job Congress did in 1964--an excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?" The first two choices are coded as positive; the last two as negative. Voting is the question has varied slightly over the years.

(b) These intra-congressional primary election reports... Some of the defeats of House members occurred necessarily when redistricting threw two incumbents of the same party into the same district in a primary election or the same House seat of opposite parties.
following kinds of activities: 1) Efforts to impart instrumental rationality to governmental undertakings. In the Congressional context, this means attempts to deal with symptoms and delay. 2) Efforts to apply universalistic distributive standards to the activities of government, or, more broadly, to have the government serve the public interest for the benefit of the society. This last we call “social reform.” In the Congressional context, universalistic standards pertain to particularism or the serving of the public. These are not the only factors to determine what instrumental rationality or universalistic standards determine. The meaning changes from time to time; it shifts the cumulative meaning of efficiency and justice changes over time. It will suffice here to take a historical fact—say that reform demands on government mean a class of popular pressures expressed in discussion in the language of efficiency or rationalization. Every regime generates its own style of reform. The American system is distinctive and it fits the contours of American institutions. Its most vigorous program is the “progressive” tradition, with emphasis on strengthening government, strengthening executives, rooting out particularism, exposing official corruption and obstruction. Progressivism is largely a middle-class tradition associated only ambiguously with redistributive ventures. Traditionally the label is “social reform.” Indeed, the ideological confusion of American reform movements stems from the fact that they share simultaneously universalistic pressures to their "social reform" to which Americans have turned as they dealt with their problems.
93B

Feasibility of using glass vessels for the storage of samples. Sample vessels of the same type were placed in a Feasibility study, it was found that the overall yield was 61% for glass vessels vs. 31% for plastic. The yield was significantly better for glass vessels, and it was concluded that glass vessels should be used for storage.

A.1. Ethnic groups will carry lower and more equal (of equal) weight.

Note: further study is recommended for dealing with ethnic and cultural differences.

Existing policies should be reviewed and revised if necessary.
The first and most urgent need has been to strengthen the Presidential office in the interest of democratic accountability. (So in the cities with the mayors.) One logic is reasonably clear. Since Presidents can be held primarily accountable for broad policy effects and state of affairs, they are likely to go about their business with a vigorous insistence on instrumental rationality. And both because they are paid for effects and because vote costs of watching their activities are lower, Presidents are less likely than Congressmen to trade in particularized benefits or to defer to the organized. So goes the logic. How about the facts? The American record lends a good deal of support to the logic, and indeed it gives a reminder of how often American political controversy has flared between institutions rather than between parties or ideologies. The old tariff issue divided the nation but it also divided President and Congress. Cleveland’s tariff reforms foundered in a Democratic Senate; Taft was ruined by the tariff log-rolling of a Republican Senate. Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley bill but it was far from what he wanted. Even McKinley supported reciprocity agreements that were given short shrift in a Republican Senate. The tariff was only one pre-Korean war Woodrow Wilson’s 1895 work was aptly titled Congressional Government — a system in which revenue came in through the tariff and went out in veterans’ pensions and river and harbor projects. Small wonder that Cleveland earned a reputation as a reformer simply by vetoing bills.

The disparities of office have persisted in the modern period. Nixon on the subject of categorical grants sounds like Cleveland on pensions.

John Stuart Mill stresses the following distinction between cabinet ministers and assemblies:

"To a minister, in the head of an office, it is of more importance what will be thought of his proceedings some time hence, than what is thought of them at the moment; but no essentially, if the cry of the moment goes with it, however hastily raised or
artificially stirred up, thinks itself and is thought by everyone to be completely engulphed. However disastrous may be the consequences."

On the Congressional side the protective tariff was a truly astonishing political creature. Schattschneider has the best account, and he uses the term "unmasking" to characterize the way Congressmen agreed among themselves to distribute benefits. Industries followed a policy of "reciprocal non-interference". If there was a duty on a raw material, a "concurrent" duty was levied against finished materials to satisfy manufacturers of the latter. An established duty was regarded as a vested right more as a law than an agency's "bias" in the appropriations process. It cannot add an

again suggesting the appropriation process. Not surprisingly, the tariff rose more high and higher decade after decade. To summarize all this in the 1930s was to destroy an elaborate political system. See Schattschneider, "Citizen, Pressure, and the Tariff," pp. 86,

130-131, 135, 144. His summary judgment: "The history of the American tariff is the story of a dubbin economic policy turned into a great political success." p. 283.

Wilson, op. cit., ch. 3.
Almost every President starting with Coolidge (Johnson and the early Reagan's are exceptions) has opposed Congressional farm programs. Every President starting with Kennedy has opposed the import surtax program. Every President starting with Kennedy has had to sell Keynesian economics to a skeptical Hill audience. Presidents surround themselves with deputies of efficiency—Louis Brownlow, Henry Reclus, Robert McNamara, and Roy Ash have been subjects among them—providing relations with Congress on the organization of the Executive Branch. Nixon's design for reorganizing the executive in 1971 was not far from a carbon copy of Roosevelt's in 1937. Legislative and executive branches attract different personality types—"one oriented to particular relations with persons and another which abstracts them persons to principles." Of his recusance of office there is no shortage; to find a man with a contempt for Congress matching John Ehrlichman's one only has to go back to Henry Hopkins. In the area of social reform for which the last six Presidents have proposed ambitious redistributive transfer programs and normally met indifference or hostility on the Hill—Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon respectively, got nowhere with health insurance, Medicare, and family assistance. The Presidency is in short a vitally important democratic office which complements the branch of democratic relations offered by Congress. One explanation of why Congress has maintained its strength reasonably well over the years is that it has struck off to the Presidency some of the policy problems it is incapable of handling; thus the Budget Review, the Budget, the Budgetary Control Committee, and the Budget Control Act. The Budget was lodged in the Executive in 1921 and in 1941 went even to a commission in 1939.

Carnegie, et al. op. cit., p. 446.


In a sense the American Supreme Court is a democratic institution also--an indirectly elected legislature dealing in general issues that Congress is invisible of enacting itself but unwilling to strike down if the Court sanctions them. Before the New Deal the rules mostly had to do with domestic free trade, after war with civil rights and civil liberties.

At which time Congressional tariff politics shifted largely (but not entirely) from credit-claiming to position-taking. The modern pattern: "The individual representative can create a local industry by writing to the Tariff Commission about an import-claiming proceeding or to the Committee on Appropriations when a trade agreement is about to be negotiated. But letters are cheap. He can also make a speech on the floor of Congress or before a trade association. Having done his bit for local industry in this way, he is not necessarily called upon to try to translate local interests into the law of the land." Bauer et al., op.cit., p. 297.
Japanese view on French memory. The French invested the plebiscite in the American presidential election; the latter has proven a more durable electoral connection and the French have thus adapted it. In fact the French have built a Fifth Republic. Their system seems to be designed by a man who had to govern government bills on proper public expenditure. 

The French have a French idea of the executive. The French idea is to suggest the difficulty of executive authority. The French seem to be a man in office. It is the same with the problem inherent in centralized decision-making -- which are serious. There is a single pattern of stability. A blessing of ambiguity to our society in that its activities are more or less predictable. Some of the patterns may turn out to be crooked, inconsistent, paradoxical, incoherent, or incoherent, but the pattern will be clear and will not change much over one time. But no amount of trial and error can exercise the fact that a man in office may prove a chronicler of surprise. An ever-increasing feature of all great administrative groups is that the President is not aware of what his Administration has achieved. And the President's dilemma is to go knowing that while any man in the history of men is a real one. American foreign policy can combine to a difference between presidential predominance and presidential predominance. Moreover, when elected, some have a chance to choose natural executives. They display a sobering tendency to choose generals. In the fall of 1962 what is a military man after all but a package of instrumental rationality? From the BenjaminFranklinBowen and de Gaulle the executive becomes in France (by a man in office). It has been WalterLippmann's case of the making of the President. A President has elected generals whenever they have been available. It is recalled that the founder of the Jacksonian tradition was General Jackson -- the leader of the British and the leader of the Cherokees. All in all, one must recognize that to promote power in an elected executive is a risky business. But Americans have taken the risk in order to overcome the policy deficiencies of Congress.

See Philip M. Williams, The French Constitution: Politics in the Fifth Republic (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 70, 120, 66, 110. Some Americans, including former legitimate, have favor the idea of making Congress vote presidential bills up or down within a given time period. See Washington Post, p. 30.

See Williams, op. cit.
A second American "reform resource"—more in thought than in action—has been to try to strengthen the parties within Congress, specifically within the system generally. The familiar logic of focused accountability has been especially appealing to academics. Rising up the parties was Woodrow Wilson's first reform movement in the years before he discovered the potential of the Presidency. An even more radical theory here on the theory of party government.

In fact, the main thrust of reform in Twentieth-Century America has been to destroy parties, rather than strengthen them. Progressivism and Kegley was largely just a revolt against the rooted particularism of American parties at the local level. Within Congress, there does remain as an historical curiosity the venture in strong, party leadership and cohesive party loyalty around the turn of the century—especially in the House. Between the laying down of the Reed rule in 1890 and the weakening of the Speakership in 1910. In its time, the boldness of the Speakership was perceived as a reform. The Reed rule allowed a more expeditious handling of House business. Many gave an economic judgment that the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 was the best to having been packaged and jammed through by party leaders. But the party experiment was short-lived. Strong Speakers clashed with Presidents, and the public accountability relations of the former were momentarily more ambiguous than those of the latter. Speaker Cannon may have been trafficking in an institutional form of assembly coherence.

perhaps not. On the question whether voters who live in a system of
 disfranchised parties in fact agree with its arrangements. Survey evidence on British House
 one local suggest that they would prefer M.P.'s to be more constituency-centered. See
 Raymond F. Wolfinger et al., "Popular Support for the British Party System," paper
 presented at the 1970 convention of the American Political Science Association. Another
 argument raises the question whether the abstract assumption of party competition is
 necessarily the proper assumption to make. Just about everyone favors it

proved that it is. Writers following Downs have refined the logic of competition with
the intensity of Thirteenth-Century metaphysics. But why has no one built
a model positing oligopolistic collusion? (Or triangular collusion?) The
New York party system, moreover, offers ample material to flesh out such a case. Some
elements of a collusion model appear in G. William Domhoff,

See Nevo, op. cit.
See Galton, History of the House of Representatives, pp. 52-53.
On its House passage: "In the main, the committee scheme was adopted with
shock, being accepted once for all as the party measure and passed under the
pressure of rigid party discipline. The whole procedure was doubtless not in
accord with the theory of legislation after debate and discussion. But it was
not without its good side also. It served to concentrate responsibility, to prevent
hasty and hot amendments, to check in some measure the log-rolling and the
give-and-take which breed all legislation involving a great variety
Part, aside from the issue, it was an assembly otherwise insubstantial. New reforms overthrew the old. Under Jeff, the Progressives emerged, brought by Congress an ethic of personal individualism that has since become its own. Freedom to take positions is so firmly established among modern Congressmen that something of a revolution would be required to resist it. The current attitude of Democrats, generated toward the idea of holding midterm national conferences to hammer out party policy, is certainly brittle.

A third reason, and the favorite of the journalistic profession, is "press." The logic here is that the influence of American governmental institutions makes it hard for voters to keep track of their incumbent politicians, so it and the effects of what they do. Information costs are high. Hence the newshogging tradition — essentially, a persistent effort by journalists and others to reduce information costs. The way Congressmen can a Congressional issue can be to change the outcome. Thus when automation came to an issue in the Eighty-Ninth Congress one optimist would have expected the House Commerce Committee to side with its proponents. "The reason it did not behave in this fashion can be summarized in a single word: publicity." In this case the publicity was supplied largely by Ralph Nader. In the last days of both the Nader and Commerce Committees set up shop in Washington to persuade of Capitol Hill activities. The legislation and most of the salience-receiving in Congressional politics has been the achievement of press.
governed by their efforts, and in fact the British have not sustained an against
tradition of exposure.

A fourth and final reason has been to try to regulate the
deployment of resources in Congressional election campaigns. The chronic
offset of regulatory campaign finance is distinctively American; in
the other system, where disciplined parties speak for identifiable social groupings,
as in much cases where the campaign money comes from. For both or more
almost all Congressional enactments on campaign finance have been
symbolic—solely theory, but hopelessly drafted and unanswerable in practice. An exception is the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, which placed ceilings on radio and television spending
by Congressional candidates. The law is acceptable because it forces Congress to
tackle its advertising revenue. Congressional members had an interest in
making it unworkable because it protected them from media blisters by
covering or November challengers. One certain yield of Watergate is a
reversing of attitudes on campaign finance; whether they will have much
effect in a short time is hard to say.

These reasons are as central to American politics as
Congress itself. Indeed it is fair to say that in indirect ways two of them—
the intensifying of political and the escalation of expenses—have contributed as
much to the institutional maintenance of Congress as internal arrangements.

And, again, keeping individualistic assemblies functionally related is not
an easy task. On current trends, there are two points worth mentioning.
The first is that the American national government has defined
the autonomy of sovereign government—an environment in which
assemblies have not functioned. The second is that candidates running for Congress
have been relying increasingly on question-taking; are now seen folk-show
Senators, a House ripe with subcommittees, a House and individualistic
California delegate, a reform New York City delegate. Whether future
question-takers can make an institution work is a difficult question. No doubt
academics and reformers have added to the impression of politicians by
elevating poll-cast voting as a test of political virtue. Making up
ideological dimensions is an agreeable activity, but from the voter's point-of-view

It ignores at least two other dimensions of considerable importance. There is, or could be, a "programmatic-rational" dimension, gauging the scope of Congressmen's activities. And there is, or could be, an "invisible-reality" dimension, gauging the inclination of Congressmen to try to accomplish what they say they intend to. Appraising Congressmen in these ways requires a good deal more information than that supplied in the roll calls, and the Watergate affair of 1972 are probably a response to a felt need for such information. In the long run, Congressional survival may require institutional maintenance arrangements more sophisticated than the ones we have supposed in the past. It may be necessary to build in selective incentives to reward members who take an interest in programmatic impact. To do so may be possible in an institution where life-time careers are the norm. But to do so would be to violate the careers of American legislative politics as we have come to know them.