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The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee

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We examine the forces affecting organized interests' decisions to use particular lobbying tactics to target different legislators in committee, using the group-legislator dyad as our unit of analysis. Two basic assumptions underlie our conceptual model of lobbying strategies in committee. First, organizations have legislative goals of expanding the size of their supportive coalitions and shaping the content of legislative proposals, and an ongoing interest in maintaining themselves. Second, different lobbying tactics are better suited to the achievement of each of these goals. Given these assumptions, the tactics organizations use to lobby individual legislators are expected to depend on (1) groups' perceptions of how legislators may help them to achieve their goals; (2) their policy positions and other characteristics of the issue debate; and (3) groups' resources. Our multinomial logit analysis lends support to our expectations about the forces that shape the lobbying strategies organizations employ.

In this paper we use data from a survey of organized interests to investigate why organizations choose to lobby individual members of congressional committees in the House of Representatives through grassroots contacts, direct appeals, or a combined strategy of grassroots and direct efforts. Prior research about organizational lobbying has focused separately on groups' direct interactions with the targets of their advocacy efforts (i.e., who is lobbied), and the conditions that facilitate the use of different lobbying tactics (i.e., how groups communicate their preferences). As a result, knowledge of how groups with different preferences for policy and varying capacities for lobbying are able to interact with legislative allies, opponents, and fence-sitters in order to affect the content of policy proposals and build coalitions in the legislature remains incomplete. In contrast, we merge the study of tactics and targets to observe how a diverse array of organizations interact with individual committee members on

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four different issues. This unique approach allows us to test hypotheses about how the use of different lobbying tactics varies across organizations, legislators, and issues.

We believe that organizations' decisions about lobbying tactics and targets are nonseparable and derive from the same set of strategic considerations. Our ideas about the tactics organizations use to lobby individual legislators during the committee stage of the legislative process are developed by combining what we know from the extant literature with expectations we develop about groups' lobbying strategies in committee. The expectations we develop are based on two assumptions. First, we assume that groups lobby primarily to increase the size of their supportive coalitions in Congress and to shape the content of legislative proposals but also to maintain their organizations. Second, because each objective requires groups to convey to legislators different types of information, we assume that organizations use different lobbying tactics to pursue each objective. Given these assumptions, we expect that decisions about how to lobby individual committee members will depend on the objectives individual legislators are most likely to help groups accomplish and groups' preferences for policy. Grassroots lobbying communicates information about constituency preferences to committee members so it can be used to build a coalition of support in the legislature. Direct interactions allow groups to provide more specialized and discrete information to legislators so as to affect the content of proposed legislation and to build a coalition of support in Congress. In addition, the use of grassroots lobbying in committee is expected to be less prevalent than the use of direct lobbying in committee; grassroots efforts require more time and resources.

The results of our empirical investigation support these expectations and illustrate that groups working to change current policy are quite likely to lobby through the grassroots to supplement their direct lobbying efforts in Washington and to broaden their base of legislative support by targeting not only allies but also undecided legislators and some opponents. In contrast, defenders of the status quo are most likely to target friendly legislators in committee through direct personal contacts, exclusively.

Targets and Tactics of Organizational Lobbying

Two distinct sets of research structure the literature on legislative lobbying. One set of research focuses on the targets of organizations' lobbying efforts, examining the incentives groups have to lobby different legislators depending on their policy and leadership positions. Another set of research examines the tactics organizations use to communicate their preferences to members of Congress.

Within the body of literature that investigates the targets of groups' lobbying efforts there is considerable agreement that organized interests have incentives to lobby fence-sitters because they are most susceptible to persuasion (Denzau and

Munger 1986; Langbein 1991; Rothenberg 1992; R. Smith 1984; Wright 1990). Groups also target influential legislators (e.g., members of key committees, committee and subcommittee chairs, and party leaders) because these legislators can set the political agenda and serve as cue givers for their colleagues (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Kingdon 1989; Matthews and Stimson 1975; Rothenberg 1992; Wright 1990).

But there is controversy about whether and why organized interests have incentives to expend effort to lobby legislators who are already inclined to support their interests (e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright 1996, Baumgartner and Leech 1996). At one end of this debate stands the work of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) and their contemporaries who conclude that because legislators have the upper hand in relationships with interest groups (Dexter 1969; Hayes 1981; Matthews 1960; Milbrath 1963; Zeigler 1964), organizations take the "easy path" of lobbying friendly legislators and bypassing potential opponents (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Dexter 1969). Evidence that lobbyists and PACs engage in repeated interactions with the same legislators suggests that groups tend to work with their allies in Congress (Hansen 1991; Snyder 1992).

At the other end of this debate is the counteractive lobbying thesis developed by Austen-Smith and Wright (1992, 1994) which states that, all else being equal, groups lobby their allies in Congress only when it is necessary to counteract the efforts of organizational opponents.¹ The implication of this work is that the logic underlying much of the extant research is incomplete because it ignores the possibility that groups lobby allies solely in response to the actions of their organized opponents.

But counteractive lobbying may not occur if groups lobby in order to accomplish more than one objective.² When they aim to affect the content of legislative proposals and to expand their coalitions of support, groups are much more likely to lobby directly their allies in committee than they are to lobby directly their legislative opponents or legislators who are undecided, regardless of whether allies are targeted by a group's organizational opponents (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Organizations target legislative friends in order to mobilize their participation on issues by lobbying colleagues on a group's behalf, sponsoring legislation or amendments, keeping an issue off the agenda, or modifying the language of a bill (Denzau and Munger 1986; Hall and Wayman 1990). Nonsupporters provide groups with an opportunity to expand their coalitions of support, but not all organizations have the resources to lobby these legislators effectively.

¹ Similarly, Snyder (1991) develops a formal model in which lobbyists devote the most attention to legislators slightly opposed to the group's position.

² Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) define lobbying as direct information transmission to legislators to reinforce or change their policy views. Interactions with allies that are used for "indirect" lobbying, fund-raising, and membership maintenance do not, based on their definition, constitute lobbying (42).

In studies that investigate the tactics groups use to communicate their interests, researchers typically do not make explicit the linkage between the type of information organized interests wish to communicate to legislators and the actual methods used to present that information. Wright's research on lobbying is an exception (see esp. Wright 1996). As he explains, organizations use direct contacts with legislators or their staffs to convey specialized information about policy proposals (e.g., how a bill might be amended to address a group's concerns). In contrast, grassroots campaigns "which are essentially miniexperiments in political mobilization, reveal important information to legislators about how constituents might react to their policy stands on Election Day" (Wright 1996, 71). The relative amounts of policy-specific and electoral data legislators seek may vary over time and across issues, but groups are likely to be eager suppliers of information in order to maintain or establish their competitive advantage relative to other suppliers of information (Hansen 1991). Moreover, because grassroots and direct lobbying strategies are the means by which different types of information are conveyed, groups may use the two sets of activities in a complementary manner (Fowler and Shaiko 1987; Kingdon 1989; but see Browne 1995 and Godwin 1988).³

Lobbying tactics also are used by groups as a means of membership maintenance, conveying to supporters that the group is actively working to protect and advance their interests (Godwin 1988; McFarland 1984). Grassroots efforts accomplish the task of organizational maintenance more effectively because when groups work through the grassroots, members and clientele are aware of their actions; direct efforts may go unnoticed unless an organization reports those efforts to supporters.

The tactics organizations use to make their policy preferences known to members of Congress also depend on their capacity to undertake different advocacy activities. Organizations differ in the type of advocacy resources they possess, and some resources may be better suited than others to the use of different forms of advocacy (Berry 1997; Wright 1996). Because technological advances certainly make grassroots contacts easier to initiate today than in the past, such contacts can be initiated by all types of groups. Nevertheless, grassroots contacts are still more likely to be used by organizations that are able to orchestrate a lobbying effort through their membership or clientele. Indeed, given the evidence that district ties are important to groups' direct lobbying efforts (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Rothenberg 1989; Wright 1990),

³ Godwin (1988) argues that grassroots efforts may undermine Washington-based advocacy campaigns because, once initiated, grassroots efforts are difficult to control; Browne (1995) offers evidence that the policy views of organizational membership and Washington staff are increasingly in conflict. If intraorganizational conflict exists, groups may be less inclined to mobilize the grassroots to communicate their preferences because the information conveyed to members of Congress through grassroots efforts could be inconsistent with the information communicated by a group's lobbyists in Washington.

a base of support in a member's district is crucial for a grassroots lobbying campaign because district ties provide organizations with the infrastructure they need to undertake this type of effort.

An organization's capacity for direct lobbying also is shaped by its Washington-based resources. Coalition membership may provide groups with a resource or time savings to apply to direct lobbying (Berry 1977, 1997; Hula 1995; Ornstein and Elder 1978; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Organizations also may have more direct access to legislators if they are the parent organization of a political action committee; a PAC serves as a signal to a legislator about the expected quality of the information that will be obtained from the parent organization (Wright 1996). Organized interests that combine a base of support in a legislator's district with ample Washington-based resources are more likely than groups with one but not both of these resources for advocacy to adopt a mixed lobbying strategy, targeting individual committee members directly and also through the grassroots.

In addition to a group's resource capacity, the context or circumstances that characterize an issue shape organizations' decisions to use particular lobbying tactics. According to Diana Evans (1991, 1996), groups eschew grassroots lobbying on issues that engender consensus (e.g., distributive issues) because grassroots campaigns can be unpredictable, bringing greater attention to an issue and expanding the scope of conflict (see also Gais and Walker 1991). The inherent unpredictability of grassroots campaigns that both D. Evans (1991, 1996) and Godwin (1988) highlight implies that organizations advocating policy positions that run counter to the status quo will have more incentive to lobby legislators through the grassroots. Members of Congress, legislative observers, and organization representatives are keenly aware that it is more difficult to initiate policy change than it is to prevent change (Wolpe and Levine 1996). In this way, defenders of the status quo have an advantage in Congress (Schattschneider 1975; Wright 1996) because congressional action proceeds slowly by institutional design, and legislators who value a career in Congress are likely to be risk averse. Legislators realize they must be able to explain at least some of their votes to their constituents and that they may be held accountable for their actions on election day (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989). An organization that wants to initiate change may resort to grassroots lobbying in order to demonstrate to reluctant legislators that sufficient public support exists to alter the status quo.⁴ Opponents of change have more reason to pursue direct and discreet contacts with committee members rather than give attention

⁴ Baumgartner and Jones (1993) provide evidence that policy change often occurs when an issue gains agenda prominence and new interests become engaged in the issue debate. However, the public relations/advocacy campaign sponsored by one status quo supporter, the health insurance industry, is a striking exception.

to an issue that, from their perspective, should not be subject to additional public or legislative scrutiny.⁵

The amount of time Congress spends on an issue, either in committee or on the floor, also influences the ability of organized interests to lobby in Congress (R. Smith 1984). Issues that are well defined or prioritized by congressional leaders before the session begins are often acted upon quickly. When legislative action is swift, organizations may not be able to contact directly as many legislators as they would like, and they may not have sufficient time to mobilize their members and supporters to contact committee members (Berry 1997; Wright 1996). Moreover, because grassroots efforts are more costly to groups (in terms of resources as well as time) than is lobbying members of Congress directly, organized interests will likely lobby through the grassroots only on issues that have the most pressing implications for their interests.

Finally, some research indicates that certain types of groups are more inclined to undertake a grassroots effort. Grassroots lobbying is an especially effective means of cultivating the membership of an organization. For this reason, both Gais and Walker (1991) and Schlozman and Tierney (1986) argue that groups will make greater use of grassroots campaigns if individuals (especially those without occupational ties to a group), rather than institutions, contribute substantially toward the support of the organization. Grassroots campaigns also are less likely to be used by nonmembership groups.

In contrast to the body of research on lobbying targets and tactics, we argue that organizations' choices of lobbying targets and tactics are nonseparable. Both types of choices derive from the same set of strategic considerations, and it is likely that different tactics are more effective for reaching different targets. Extant research that focuses on the targets of lobbying efforts provides insight into whom groups rely on in the legislature when they attempt to affect legislative policy, but this research offers little information about how organizations communicate their policy preferences and interests when they interact with different legislators. On the other hand, studies that focus on lobbying tactics often provide excellent information about the conditions that lead to the use of different tactics, but they tend to ignore variation in the nature of the issue debate and legislators' characteristics that may alter the tactical choices made by groups.

⁵ This logic is similar to the argument made by Caldeira and Wright (1988) in their analysis of how the Supreme Court selects cases for plenary review. The authors find that the presence of amicus curiae briefs containing arguments in support of *and* in opposition to certiorari increase the likelihood that a case will be granted review. The presence of a brief—either advocating or opposing the granting of certiorari—suggests to justices that the case has broad social significance.

Merging Target and Tactic: Organized Interests' Lobbying Strategies in Committee

Our idea of how organized interests decide to lobby different committee members in the House is rooted in two assumptions. First, we assume that organizations attempt to accomplish two main tasks when a bill is referred to a committee in Congress: (1) organized interests try to shape the content and affect the fate of proposed legislation; and (2) groups seek to expand the size of their supportive coalitions in Congress. In addition to these two policy-oriented tasks, groups also have an ongoing interest in cultivating their memberships (i.e., organizational maintenance).

Our second assumption is drawn from Wright's (1996) information-based view of lobbying. If the type of information groups convey to legislators differs when they lobby through the grassroots and when they lobby directly, then the tasks groups attempt to accomplish with these tactics are likely to vary as well. Organizations have the opportunity to work toward both of their substantive goals when they lobby committee members directly. When an organization's lobbyists meet directly with members of Congress or their staff, they may communicate an array of information: suggestions about how the language in a legislative proposal can be shaped to protect the group's interests and clientele; information about constituents' opinions on an issue; talking points and arguments that legislators can use with constituents, the media, and others to build support for the group's positions; head-count information and requests to contact/lobby other legislators on the group's behalf; arguments relevant to the movement of a proposal from committee to the floor; and arguments and appeals outlining why a legislator should support the group's interests on a bill. A group also may lobby directly so that it can report to its members that the group is acting to protect their interests on an issue.

In contrast, the information conveyed through grassroots campaigns is most suited to the maintenance and expansion of a group's legislative coalition. As Wright's (1996) definition makes clear, when groups inform their members and supporters about an issue and urge them to contact members of Congress, their ultimate objective is to give legislators information about constituents' policy preferences. A group works through its supporters in order to make clear that its preferences for policy should be endorsed by a legislator because those preferences are shared by the Congress member's constituency. In this way, information conveyed through grassroots contacts is likely to be more general than the information lobbyists provide directly to shape the content of legislation. Because organizations engage their supporters when they use grassroots tactics, organizational maintenance may be pursued more effectively through these efforts than through direct lobbying efforts (see Bacheller 1977).

Our assumptions about organizations' objectives in committee and their use of grassroots lobbying and direct lobbying to achieve different sets of goals in this context, lead to two expectations about lobbying tactics and targets. First, because grassroots lobbying is used by groups to maintain and expand their base of legislative support, groups have an incentive to lobby any committee member through the grassroots, regardless of the member's position on an issue.⁶ Of course, a group must have a capacity to undertake grassroots lobbying. The point here is that grassroots lobbying, when performed, may be directed at any committee member regardless of the legislator's prior position.

But given that a group also wants to affect the content of legislative proposals in committee, *direct* lobbying efforts will be used to target allies in committee. Indeed, there is evidence that groups are much more likely to lobby directly their allies in committee than they are opponents or fence-sitters (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Committee leaders and members of relevant subcommittees also are more likely than other committee members to be lobbied directly (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998) because of the opportunities they have to serve as cue givers for other legislators, to shape the content of proposed legislation, and to affect the conditions under which issues move to the floor (C. Evans 1989). Direct lobbying of undecided members and especially legislative opponents is much less likely to occur in committee unless it is accompanied by a grassroots appeal. During the initial stages of the legislative process, the use of direct appeals alone to change the positions of committee members who have a record of opposing an organization may not have a positive payoff for that organization. Committee members are the best-informed legislators about issues that fall within their jurisdictions. Therefore, they are likely to be the toughest to persuade, and will possibly be much less susceptible than rank-and-file members of the House to changing their positions. A group's appeals to a legislative foe are likely, then, to be most effective only if direct appeals are supplemented with constituent-based contacts.

Our second expectation is that the use of grassroots lobbying in committee will be less prevalent than will be the use of direct lobbying in committee. Both direct lobbying and grassroots lobbying will be used in committee because both sets of tactics are useful for accomplishing groups' legislative goals. But the overall level of grassroots lobbying, especially as an exclusive strategy, is expected to be relatively less common during committee deliberations than will be the use of direct lobbying; this is because most groups are likely to give more weight to shaping the content of legislative proposals than

⁶ Because grassroots efforts are costly, groups may not put forth the same effort to lobby an opponent through the grassroots as they would to reach an undecided member. From the standpoint of an organization, the odds of gaining support from a committee member who is undecided about an issue are likely to be greater than the odds of changing an opponent's position. Groups may engage in grassroots lobbying of their allies for organizational maintenance and to enhance their chances of holding together their legislative coalition (R. Smith 1984).

to coalition building and maintenance.⁷ Many researchers argue that the substance of legislation is determined in committee (Bacheller 1977; C. Evans 1989; Hall and Wayman 1990; S. Smith 1989; Smith and Deering 1990), and that "trying to change legislation on the floor . . . is a chancy strategy" (Berry 1997, 163).

Issues, Groups, and Data

We examine organized interests' use of different lobbying strategies in committee on four issues that were considered during the 104th Congress: product liability, financial services deregulation, crime control and criminal justice reform, and grazing use and management.⁸ We produced a list of 648 groups that could conceivably be interested in one of these four issues by drawing on subject or policy categories in the *Washington Representatives* (1995) and *Congressional Quarterly's Washington Information Directory* (1996–97), issue-related stories appearing in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* and the *National Journal* between November 1993 and March 1996, and congressional committee reports of organizations testifying at issue-related hearings.⁹

⁷ Similarly, Wright (1996) expects that groups will be more likely to use grassroots lobbying during floor deliberations. "The reason is simply that constituents are more easily mobilized on bills under consideration by the full chamber, because these bills receive greater media attention and therefore are more visible and easily understood than bills under consideration at the committee level" (44–45). Moreover, some groups may choose not to work directly to expand the size of their coalition if they can successfully enlist legislators to alter the contents of a bill so that it conforms to their interests. Other organizations may make concessions on less important provisions of a bill in order to expand support for the measure or in exchange for more favorable treatment on future legislation.

⁸ Product liability refers to the various proposals that were introduced to cap punitive or noneconomic damage awards in lawsuits. Financial services deregulation includes measures that were introduced to give banks and securities firms access to each other's markets (i.e., the overhauling of the Glass-Steagall Act), as well as proposals to modify or repeal bank regulations, consumer laws, and the ability of banks to sell insurance. Crime control and criminal justice reform refer to the various bills that were introduced to rewrite sections of the 1994 anticrime law, and to repeal the ban on certain assault-style firearms. The measures that would overturn sections of the existing anticrime law include proposals to allow the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, to combine grant programs for police hiring and crime prevention into a single block grant program, and to limit federal appeals by state prisoners, including death row inmates. Grazing use and management refers to a set of proposals that would overhaul regulations instituted by Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt in 1995 that affect grazing fees and grazing practices on public lands. We selected these issues because they differ in terms of their public visibility and their scope of conflict. Among our four issues, crime and, to a lesser extent, tort reform, have attracted the most media attention. The debate over these two issues also has attracted the attention of a broad array of organizations representing diverse interests. In contrast, the grazing-use and management proposals and the financial services measures have attracted minimal media attention, and affect the interests of a narrower array of groups.

⁹ The approach we have taken to identify organized interests is similar to the strategies for group selection used by several researchers including Laumann and Knoke (1987), Salisbury et al. (1987), and Wright (1990).

We selected 241 groups for the product liability issue, 119 groups for financial services deregulation, 160 groups for anticrime proposals, and 128 groups for grazing use and management.¹⁰

We sent mail questionnaires to representatives of these 648 sample organizations in May 1996. A set of follow-up questionnaires was mailed a month later to organizations that did not respond to the initial request for information. Of the 211 organizations that responded to the survey (a response rate of 33%), 69 indicated that they were active on one of the four issues.¹¹ Even though our study examines only this subset of respondents, we have shown that these 69 organized interests are representative of the overall universe of groups that were active on these issues (see Hojnacki and Kimball 1998).

Analytic Approach

The present research examines interest groups' choices of lobbying strategies during committee deliberations using the group-legislator dyad as the unit of

¹⁰Our project budget required that our overall sample size not exceed 650 groups. For financial services deregulation, the anticrime proposals, and proposals involving grazing use and management, all groups identified as conceivably having an interest in the issue were included in the sample. For product liability, we randomly sampled 241 organized interests from the list of 447 organizations that we identified as potentially having an interest in that issue. The size of the sample for each remaining issue area is as follows: financial services deregulation (119), anticrime proposals (160), and grazing use and management (128). There are two reasons for these cross-issue differences in sample size. For one, the number of organizations active in an issue area differs. Second, there is some substantive overlap that exists across the study issues (e.g., both product liability and financial services deregulation are of interest to insurance-related interests). This means that, in some cases, the same groups appeared on the sample lists for more than one issue. Because this would involve asking groups to complete multiple questionnaires (see below), organizations were restricted to a single issue. This restriction was accomplished using a multistep procedure. First, we examined whether the group had testified or submitted written testimony on a particular issue, or if the group had been mentioned in a particular issue-related story in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* or *National Journal*. Then if the group could be linked to a single issue using these sources, it was kept on the sample list for that issue. If we were unable to link an organization to a particular issue using these sources, we randomly assigned the group to one of the lists on which it appeared.

¹¹The response rates for each issue area are as follows: product liability and tort reform (29%), financial service deregulation (29%), anticrime and criminal justice reform (33%), and grazing use and management (42%). The remaining 142 not active groups (211 respondents – 69 active) are organizations that responded but refused to participate in the study (12 groups), groups incorrectly identified as having an interest in the study issues (82 groups), groups that do not lobby or engage in advocacy (33 groups), organizations that had disbanded or could not be located (3 groups), and organizations that reported that the issue had implications for their interests but that they were not engaged in advocacy on the issue (12 groups). We exclude the 12 latter groups from our sample for analysis because, by opting to remain inactive on the issue, these groups never faced a decision about whom they would or would not lobby in committee. That these groups had not reached such a decision is made clear by their reports that they took no position on the issue (4 groups) and could not identify allies or opponents in the House (another 7 groups).

analysis.¹² We use this approach for two reasons. First, one of our primary hypotheses is that organizations are likely to lobby individual committee members differently so that some members will not be lobbied, some members will be lobbied directly, others will be lobbied through the grassroots, and other members will be lobbied both directly and through the grassroots. Second, we contend that the choice of how to lobby a legislator may be affected by variables specific to the dyad (e.g., a legislator's expected position on an issue relative to a group's position), as well as those specific to the organization and the legislator. With this unique approach, we are able to test our dyad-specific hypotheses, and we are able to test simultaneously presuppositions about the targets and tactics of groups' lobbying efforts.

For each group-legislator pair, we observe whether and how each legislator is lobbied by each organization. For our statistical analysis, the dependent variable takes on one of four values: 3 = the group lobbied the legislator both directly and also through the grassroots, 2 = the group lobbied the legislator directly but not through the grassroots, 1 = the group lobbied the legislator through the grassroots but not directly, 0 = the group did not lobby the legislator.¹³ Thus, the dependent variable indicates which of $N = 4$ lobbying strategies interest group i adopts for legislator j on issue k , as indicated by groups' responses to our survey. The number of observations equals the number of groups active on an issue multiplied by the number of legislators on the relevant House committee and the leaders of both parties in the House summed across the four issues. Given that our sample includes 69 active interest groups and each issue featured roughly 46 relevant House committee members and leaders, the total number of dyads in our analysis is 3,173.¹⁴ We estimate a

¹²We also use this dyadic approach in our investigation of whom organizations lobby directly in committee (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Diana Evans (1996) and John Kingdon (1989) use similar research designs to examine lobbying success and legislators' voting decisions, respectively.

¹³The question wording is: "We would like to know about your Washington and grassroots lobbying/advocacy efforts on [the relevant issue]. By Washington lobbying/advocacy we mean direct contacts with the legislator, in person or by phone, or contacts with members of the legislator's staff. By grassroots lobbying/advocacy we mean any one of the following—letter writing or telegram campaigns, special alerts, distributing leaflets or other information, organizing telephone calls, fly-ins, or other constituent contacts. For each of the following members of Congress, can you please tell us: (1) whether your organization's efforts for Washington lobbying were strong, medium, or weak to none at all, and (2) whether your organization's efforts for grassroots advocacy were strong, medium, or weak to none at all." A group lobbied a legislator if they reported a strong or medium lobbying effort for direct lobbying, grassroots lobbying, or both direct and grassroots lobbying.

¹⁴The relevant committees are those that wrote the original legislation. The committees for each issue are as follows: (1) product liability—House Judiciary Committee, and members of the House Commerce Committee who served on the Conference Committee (Bliley [R-VA], Oxley [R-OH], Cox [R-CA], Dingell [D-MI], and Wyden [D-OR]); (2) financial services—House Banking Committee; (3) crime—House Judiciary Committee; and (4) grazing use and management—House Resources Committee. Groups were asked whether they lobbied each member of the relevant committee and whether they lobbied any member of the party leadership in the House. Groups interested in product liability were asked about only the Commerce Committee members who sat on the Conference Committee so as not to add to the length of the survey.

multinomial logit (MNL) model of groups' lobbying strategy choices because the dependent variable has four unordered response categories.¹⁵

The logic underlying the MNL model is that the i th group facing N lobbying strategies chooses strategy n if the utility of choice n (U_{in}) is greater than the utility it derives from the remaining $N - 1$ strategies. For our purposes the U_{in} are presumed to be dependent on a set of characteristics (x_m) that vary across the organization-legislator dyads. The statistical model is based on the assumption that the random disturbance terms associated with each lobbying strategy for the i th organization (i.e., the ϵ_{in}) are independent and identically distributed with a Weibull distribution: $F(\epsilon_{in}) = \exp(\epsilon^{-\epsilon_{in}})$ (Greene 1993, 665).¹⁶ This assumption leads to the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(LS_i = 0) &= \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} e^{\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{nm} x_m}} & \text{for } n = 0 \\ \text{Prob}(LS_i = n) &= \frac{e^{\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{nm} x_m}}{1 + \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} e^{\sum_{m=1}^M \beta_{nm} x_m}} & \text{for } n = 1, 2, \dots, N - 1 \end{aligned}$$

which give the probabilities for organization i 's choice of the N lobbying strategies, with LS_i denoting the lobbying strategy we observe. The two subscripts, n and m , that are associated with the estimated parameters (β) in these equations show that for each β_m the MNL model provides $N - 1$ sets

¹⁵ Readers may wonder why we did not examine groups' lobbying decisions in committee as a set of nested choices, where the lobbying strategy process is characterized by two decisions: (1) a group's initial decision whether to lobby or not, and (2) if lobbying, a group's decision to use a particular lobbying strategy. Organizations probably decide whether or not to take action on an issue before they decide whom to lobby and exactly what form their advocacy campaign will take (the 12 groups we discuss in note 11 support this view). But we are not studying groups' decisions to act on an issue or not. Rather, we are investigating the decisions groups make about how to lobby individual committee members given their decisions to be active on an issue. As a model of this process it is hard to imagine that groups choose first the legislators they will lobby and then return to their lists to decide how each legislator will be lobbied. Alternatively, groups may first choose a tactic and then select the members they will contact. However, we found several instances where the same group used different lobbying methods to reach different legislators. For these reasons, we believe it is more reasonable to imagine that, for each legislator, active organized interests face four choice options: do not lobby, lobby directly, lobby through the grassroots, lobby both directly and through the grassroots.

¹⁶ The assumption that the random disturbance terms associated with each lobbying strategy are independent and identically distributed implies that the ratio of the probability of making any one choice to the probability of making any other choice is not affected by the availability of the other choice options (e.g., the ratio of the probability of an organization choosing a grassroots strategy

of estimates so that the total number of estimated parameters is $M(N - 1)$. The probability of not lobbying serves as our base alternative so we obtain estimates of the effects of the x_m on the probabilities of an organization choosing only grassroots lobbying, only direct lobbying, and both direct and grassroots lobbying.

Because each element of a dyad appears in several other dyads, we cannot assume that our observations are independent, a presumption one makes when using a standard MNL analysis. For this reason, we base our inferences on robust standard errors adjusted for the clustering of observations by organization (StataCorp 1997).¹⁷

The Independent Variables

Each set of variables (the x_m) that we believe affects group lobbying decisions is described below. Table 1 provides summary statistics for each variable in our model and includes the expected effect of each variable on a group's choice of how to lobby.

The first set of variables in our model indicate legislators' prior issue positions relative to the group and legislators' roles in committee. A legislator's prior position on the issue relative to the group's current position is measured using a set of dichotomous variables. The first variable, *Uncertain*, is coded 1 if the legislator's prior position on the issue is unclear. The second variable, *Opponent*, is coded 1 if the legislator's prior issue position is at odds with the group's current position on the legislative proposal. The omitted category represents the situation where the legislator's prior position is consistent with the

over the probability of it choosing a dual strategy is not affected by the presence of the direct strategy option or the no lobbying option). Because we were unsure whether this assumption, known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives, was appropriate for our model, we investigated whether the coefficient estimates associated with each lobbying choice and each variable were substantially affected when our model was estimated with one of the four choice options eliminated. Although we did observe some changes to the coefficient estimates and standard errors that we report in Table 3, the statistical and substantive inferences we draw from our analysis are unchanged when choice options are eliminated. If the errors associated with each lobbying strategy were highly correlated, the elimination of choice options should have altered considerably our results (Greene 1993, 671).

¹⁷Specifically, in *Stata 5.0* we use the *svymlog* procedure with the *psu* option to estimate our model. We also used this procedure to estimate the robust standard errors that apply to each cluster of observations that are identified with a single legislator. The inferences we draw from these latter standard errors provide stronger support for the results we present than the inferences we draw from the robust standard errors that are adjusted for the clustering of observations by organization. In the absence of clear guidelines or diagnostics to assess whether the results from the model with standard errors adjusted for clustering by organization are superior or inferior to the results from the model with standard errors adjusted for clustering by legislator, we take a conservative approach and present the results that are less supportive of the hypotheses we test.

TABLE 1
Descriptive Information: Variables Affecting Organizations'
Committee-Level Lobbying Strategies

Variable	Mean	Value Range		Valid Observations	Expected Effect on Choice of Strategy	
		Minimum	Maximum		Grassroots	Direct
Lobbying Strategy	1.30	0	3	2,397		
<i>Legislator's Prior Position</i>						
Opponent	.30	0	1	3,011	ns ^a	—
Uncertain	.27	0	1	3,011	ns	—
<i>Legislator Characteristics</i>						
Committee Leader	.13	0	1	3,173	ns	+
Subcommittee Member	.43	0	1	3,173	ns	+
<i>Lobbying Capacity</i>						
District Support	.67	0	2	2,214	+	+
PAC	.37	0	1	2,991	ns	+
Coalition Member	.76	0	1	3,133	ns	+
<i>Reliance on Individual Members</i>						
Rely on Dues from Individuals	.47	0	1	2,844	+	ns
<i>Context of the Issue Debate</i>						
Importance	.80	0	1	3,173	+	+
Oppose Status Quo	.57	0	1	2,636	+	—
Contract Issues	.60	0	1	3,173	—	—

^aWe anticipate no significant effect on the use of this lobbying strategy.

group's current position on the issue.¹⁸ We expect that legislative opponents are less likely to be lobbied directly, relative to legislative allies, and that undecided members will be targeted directly less often than allies, but more frequently than opponents. In contrast, we anticipate that groups' tendencies to lobby solely through the grassroots will be unaffected by committee members' issue positions. Our model also includes separate dummy variables for *Committee Leaders* (i.e., committee and subcommittee chairs and ranking members) and *Subcommittee Members*. Organized interests are expected to give priority to direct interactions with these committee members.

The next set of variables in our model measures different dimensions of groups' resource capabilities. Our measure of a group's *District Support* is coded 2 if the

¹⁸Two pieces of information were needed to create this set of dichotomous variables—a legislator's prior issue position and a group's position on the issue proposal under consideration by the committee. We used several sources to code legislators' prior positions on each issue. For one, we examined how each committee member voted on similar legislative proposals prior to the 104th Congress. We identified these "similar legislative proposals" in conversations with group representatives, through stories that appeared in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, and through subject searches in the *Legi-Slate* database. In addition, we examined the content of bills that legislators sponsored or cosponsored in the 103d Congress in an effort to gain additional information about their positions prior to the start of the 104th Congress. Third, we examined publicly available interest group ratings as a validity check on our coding (we used ACLU scores for the crime issue, ratings from the National Association of Manufacturers, Business-Industry PAC, Chamber of Commerce, Consumer Federation of America, and Public Citizen on product liability and banking, and League of Conservation Voters' scores for grazing). The interest group ratings confirmed our coding of several legislators who did not behave like their fellow party members (e.g., a probusiness Democrat or a Republican gun control advocate). Fourth, because past vote and sponsorship data were not available for freshmen committee members, we examined the biographies of freshmen legislators appearing in the *Almanac of American Politics* (1996) and *Politics in America* (1995) to determine whether they emphasized the relevant issue in their campaigns for office and whether they took a public position on the issue. We also examined freshmen responses to issue surveys available on the *Project Vote Smart* Web site. For the product liability and crime issues, we checked whether Republican legislators had signed the Contract with America. All of this information was used to sort committee members into one of three groups: those likely to support the current legislative proposal, those likely to oppose the current proposal, or those with an unclear position on the current legislative proposal. While we cannot be certain that we have classified legislators exactly as organizations would have, we feel our coding method is quite close to the method employed by interest groups. We conducted interviews with interest group lobbyists active on each of the four issues in our study. While groups would not share their legislator ratings with us, they were willing to say how they estimate the prior positions of legislators. According to the people we talked to, the first and most important research they conduct is to look at previous roll call votes on related issues and bill sponsorship activity.

The second piece of information—groups' positions on the legislative proposals under consideration by the 104th Congress—was obtained through the mail survey. Organizations were asked to indicate whether they supported, opposed, or had no position on a series of key provisions of the study issues. Groups' patterns of response to this question were used to determine their position on the legislative proposal under consideration by the 104th Congress. Finally, the dichotomous prior position variables for our analysis were created by comparing the prior positions of each legislator with the group's position on the issue.

organization's base of support in the legislator's district is strong, 1 if the base of support is moderate, and 0 if the base of support is weak or nonexistent.¹⁹ We expect positive coefficients for this variable for each type of lobbying strategy, but the magnitude of the district support coefficients associated with choices that include grassroots lobbying (alone or in conjunction with direct contacts) will be larger than the respective coefficient for direct lobbying. Groups with PACs are distinguished from organizations that are not affiliated with a PAC by using a single dummy variable. Similarly, our indicator of *Coalition Membership*—a proxy indicator of an organization's access to resources such as staff, research support, money, and so on—equals 1 if the organization reported that it joined a coalition to take action on the issue, and is 0 otherwise. We expect *PAC* and *Coalition Membership* to have a positive impact on direct lobbying but little or no effect on groups' use of grassroots lobbying.

We also expect that the nature of the issue debate may affect the inclination of interest groups to lobby directly, through the grassroots, or through both direct and grassroots channels. Our measure of issue *Importance* is coded 0 if the issue is less important than other issues on a group's agenda, and is coded 1 otherwise. Second, the model we estimate includes a variable to indicate whether an organization supported (coded 1) or opposed (coded 0) the legislation that was considered during the 104th Congress.²⁰ Groups that *Oppose the Status Quo* (i.e., supporters of the proposed legislation) are expected to be more risk acceptant and therefore more willing to use grassroots lobbying to achieve their goals.²¹ Third, we include in our model a single indicator that distinguishes the banking and grazing issues (coded 0) from the two *Contract Issues* (i.e., issues that were part of the Republican Contract with America, coded 1). The two latter issues—product liability and crime—moved quickly through the relevant committees in the House, affording groups minimal time for lobbying.

We also include in our model a single dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if individual dues comprise at least 10% of an organization's budget, and 0 otherwise.

¹⁹The question wording is: "For each of the following members of Congress, can you please tell us whether your group's organizational presence or base of support—in terms of members, supporters, and their level of activism—in each legislator's state or district is strong, medium, or weak to none."

²⁰As we mention in note 18, groups' positions on the legislative proposals under consideration by the 104th Congress were obtained through the mail survey. Organizations were asked to indicate whether they supported, opposed, or had no position on a series of key provisions of the study issues. Groups' patterns of response to this question were used to determine their position on the relevant legislative proposal under consideration by the 104th Congress. Groups whose positions were ambiguous are excluded from our analysis.

²¹Our argument here is based on the idea that it is more difficult to change status quo policy than it is to stop change. Therefore, even though the legislative proposals in the study were Republican initiatives in a Republican-controlled House, actual passage of these proposals required supporters to build up momentum for change because none of the study issues had a clear majority. Unity among Republicans could (and did) break down even on the issues included in the Contract with America.

Organizations that *Rely on Dues from Individuals* for support are expected to have more reason to use grassroots lobbying.

Finally, a set of multiplicative terms is used to account for the differential impact that district ties have on groups' tendencies to lobby their legislative opponents and undecided legislators. Each of the two prior position variables is multiplied by the measure reflecting an organization's strength in the legislator's district (*District Support* $\times$ *Uncertain*, *District Support* $\times$ *Opponent*). Consistent with our previous research (Hojnacki and Kimball 1998), we expect both of these interactive terms to have a positive impact on organizations' decisions to lobby directly because district ties enable organizations to move more easily beyond their core supporters in their direct contacts with committee members. The multiplicative effects associated with direct lobbying, however, should be smaller in size than the coefficients associated with each of the variables measuring legislators' prior positions. That is, despite district ties, allies will be targeted most often through direct lobbying exclusively because they are most likely to make effective use of the information conveyed solely through direct appeals. We also anticipate positive coefficients for the interactive terms associated with a dual lobbying strategy. The difference between these terms and the coefficients for the respective indicators of prior position should be much less substantial than the differences we anticipate for the direct lobbying coefficients (i.e., the likelihood of lobbying nonallies through direct channels exclusively should be less than the likelihood of lobbying nonsupporters using grassroots lobbying to supplement direct appeals). But our expectations are less precise for the coefficients associated with the multiplicative terms for grassroots lobbying. Recall that we anticipate no differences in the likelihood of a group lobbying its allies and nonallies through only grassroots channels. If groups have support in the district of an undecided legislator or opponent, they may be more inclined to communicate constituents' preferences to these legislators than to their allies, thereby taking advantage of an opportunity to expand their base of support (a positive coefficient for the multiplicative terms associated with grassroots lobbying exclusively). Alternatively, groups that use grassroots mobilization in part to cultivate their clientele may target allies and nonallies alike through the grassroots (the relevant coefficients will be effectively 0). In addition, we expect that groups will always be more inclined to lobby undecided legislators using any means than they will be to lobby their opponents, so that the coefficients for the multiplicative terms between *Uncertain Legislator* and *District Support* should always have larger positive values than the coefficients for the respective interaction terms for opponents.

Results

Before we examine why organizations choose particular lobbying strategies in committee, consider the figures we present in Table 2, which show the relative

TABLE 2
The Use of Different Lobbying Strategies in Committee

Lobbying Strategy	Number of Group-Legislator Dyads	Percent of Group-Legislator Dyads
Did Not Lobby	1,163	48.5
Grassroots Only	129	5.4
Direct Only	338	14.1
Grassroots and Direct	767	32.0
Total	2,397	100.0

use of different lobbying strategies across the organization-legislator dyads. Overall, groups are much more likely to rely on both direct and grassroots contacts when they lobby (32% of the dyads) than they are to use only direct appeals (14%) or only grassroots lobbying (5%). But as expected, fewer groups lobby through the grassroots in committee than lobby directly. That groups often choose not to lobby particular committee members also is apparent from Table 2.

The MNL estimates for our model of organizations' committee-level lobbying choices appear in Table 3. The first column of Table 3 shows the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for each of the exogenous variables associated with the decision to lobby only through the grassroots relative to not lobbying; robust standard errors, adjusted for the clustering of observations by organization, appear in parentheses below each coefficient. The second column of Table 3 shows the same information for the decision only to lobby directly relative to not lobbying, and the third column shows this information for the decision to use both grassroots and direct advocacy relative to not lobbying. Overall, the MNL model predicts correctly the lobbying choices of about 73% of the dyads that are included in this analysis, and the results provide support for our conceptual model of organizations' choices of lobbying tactics and targets in committee.²²

The results in Table 3 confirm our expectations about how groups' perceptions of the objectives legislators can help them accomplish affect the lobbying strategies they employ. For one, organized interests are more likely to target their allies on a committee than they are to target undecided legislators or opponents exclusively through their Washington offices (see the significant and negative coefficients under "Legislator's Prior Position" in the second column). Organizations also are more likely to lobby their allies in committee using direct and

²² Other specifications of the model were estimated with measures that controlled for legislator's freshman and party leader status, and the size and type of an organization's membership. We also tested whether groups' choices of lobbying strategies are affected by the number of opposing organizations that lobby their allies (i.e., counteractive lobbying). None of these indicators had a significant impact on groups' lobbying choices so that the results we present in Table 3 remain essentially the same under these alternative specifications.

TABLE 3

**Multinomial Logit Analysis of Organizations' Committee-Level
Lobbying Strategies (Robust Standard Errors Adjusted
for Clustering of Observations on Groups)**

Variable	Grassroots Only	Direct Only	Grassroots and Direct
Constant	-7.348 (1.735)	-4.371 (1.518)	-7.863 (1.798)
<i>Legislator's Prior Position</i>			
Uncertain	-0.456 (.485)	-1.037*** (.307)	-0.815*** (.326)
Opponent	-0.704* (.548)	-1.534*** (.464)	-1.867*** (.450)
<i>Legislator Characteristics</i>			
Committee Leader	0.195 (.339)	0.470** (.238)	0.865*** (.273)
Subcommittee Member	0.361 (.293)	0.285* (.177)	0.301* (.212)
<i>Lobbying Capacity</i>			
District Support	1.844*** (.472)	0.828** (.467)	2.810*** (.457)
PAC	-1.709** (.799)	-0.374 (.612)	0.484 (.586)
Coalition Member	0.461 (.866)	1.761*** (.716)	1.914** (.956)
<i>Reliance on Individual Members</i>			
Rely on Dues from Individuals	0.728 (1.008)	1.559** (.744)	1.577* (.979)
<i>Context of the Issue Debate</i>			
Importance	3.199*** (1.271)	2.387*** (.841)	3.748*** (1.273)
Oppose Status Quo	1.440** (.798)	-0.167 (.489)	0.931* (.713)
Contract Issues	-0.116 (.693)	-1.059** (.528)	-1.598*** (.554)
<i>Interactive Effects</i>			
District Support × Uncertain	0.858* (.548)	0.581 (.523)	0.814* (.549)
District Support × Opponent	0.398 (.567)	-0.363 (.536)	0.569 (.461)
Number of observations	1,800		
Pseudo R^2	.37		
Log-likelihood	-1281.94		
Correctly predicted (%)	73.39		

Notes: Figures in each column are maximum likelihood estimates (robust standard errors adjusted for clustering of observations on organizations are shown in parentheses below each coefficient). Lobbying strategy is coded 3 if the committee member was lobbied directly and through the grassroots by the group, 2 if the committee member was lobbied directly by the group, 1 if the committee member was lobbied through the grassroots by the group, and 0 if the committee member was not lobbied.

***Estimate significant at $p = .01$ level (one-tailed test).

**Estimate significant at $p = .05$ level (one-tailed test).

*Estimate significant at $p = .10$ level (one-tailed test).

grassroots contacts than they are to contact undecided members and opponents using a dual approach, but the difference in probability between allies and undecided legislators is not especially large (a point we discuss in more detail below). Organizations are equally likely to lobby allies and fence-sitters using grassroots channels but somewhat less likely to lobby opponents in this way. In addition, legislators who are committee leaders and members of relevant subcommittees are more likely than rank-and-file committee members to be lobbied either directly or through a combined grassroots and direct approach. But regardless of their committee leadership or subcommittee status, committee members are equally likely to be lobbied exclusively through grassroots channels.

The data shown in Table 3 provide mixed support for our expectations about how a group's resource capacity affects its choice of lobbying strategy. First, organizations do tend to lobby members representing districts where they have a strong base of support. Any form of lobbying is more likely when an organization has ties to a legislator's district. However, the magnitude of the coefficients associated with this indicator show that a group's district support has a much larger impact on their decisions to undertake grassroots efforts than on their decisions to lobby legislators solely through personal contacts. There is also evidence that a base of local support takes on greater importance when groups decide whether to lobby undecided (but not opposing) committee members through the grassroots or through a combined grassroots and direct lobbying effort (see the interactive effects in Table 3—one-tailed $p = .07$ and $p = .08$, respectively).

Turning next to Washington-based resources, organized interests are, as expected, more likely to engage in a combined direct and grassroots lobbying effort or use direct channels exclusively when they are allied with other organizations. If we assume that organizations working in coalition have access to a wider array of Washington-based resources through their ties to other groups (e.g., research staff, issue specialists, money), their greater capacity for direct and dual lobbying makes sense. The negative relationship we observe between presence of a PAC and grassroots lobbying implies that, relative to groups that do not sponsor PACs, organizations that sponsor PACs generally eschew the exclusive use of their members and supporters to contact legislators in committee.

The results in Table 3 also show that when groups are relatively more reliant financially on individual members, they are more inclined to lobby directly (one-tailed $p = .02$) and through a combined direct and grassroots effort (one-tailed $p = .06$) than are groups that are less reliant on individual members for financial support. But it does not appear that a reliance on individual members increases the use of an exclusive grassroots approach to contact committee members.

The results presented in Table 3 also lend support to the idea that the context of the issue debate has implications for groups' lobbying strategies in committee. For one, although groups are in general more likely to lobby when issues are important to their interests, the results of our analysis illustrate that the more

time-intensive strategies—grassroots efforts, and combined direct and grassroots advocacy—are more often used by groups active on high-priority issues. Second, organizations advocating a change to the legislative status quo are much more likely than proponents of the status quo to lobby either solely through the grassroots (one-tailed $p = .04$), or through a combined approach of direct and grassroots advocacy (one-tailed $p = .10$). Third, the overall incidence of lobbying by groups declines when legislative proposals move quickly through committees in Congress. As shown in Table 3, organized interests were significantly less likely to lobby committee members through direct or combined approaches on the two issues that were contained in the Republican Contract with America.

The three sets of parameter estimates produced through our analysis make it difficult to grasp how likely organizations are to use different lobbying strategies in committee in order to lobby different committee members. The set of scenarios we present in Table 4 illustrate how the variables in our model shape organizations' decisions to use certain lobbying tactics and to forego others in committee. Based on the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates shown in Table 3, we calculate and present in Table 4 how organizations' probabilities of using only grassroots contacts, only direct appeals, and both direct and grassroots contacts are affected by changes in groups' capacities to lobby (i.e., their district ties and coalition membership), their positions on the issues (i.e., support for or opposition to the legislative status quo), and legislators' expected issue positions. The probabilities relevant to organizations that supported the legislative status quo (i.e., organizations that opposed the proposed legislative changes) appear in the first three columns of Table 4, and those relevant to groups opposing the status quo appear in the next three columns. These probability estimates are relevant to organizations involved in the financial services or grazing-use issues (i.e., the non-Contract issues), and organizations with values for *Importance* and *Reliance on Individual Dues* that are equal to the mean for the active sample of organized interests.²³ We also assume that the legislator in our example is not a committee leader or a member of a relevant subcommittee.

The first point that is evident in Table 4 is that the use of grassroots lobbying alone is likely to be quite rare during the committee stage of the legislative process. A grassroots strategy alone is probably used only when groups opposing the status quo have a strong capacity to mobilize their supporters in a legislator's district.

The second point that is apparent from Table 4 is that when groups have no district support but do have access to Washington-based resources (i.e., they are

²³ In order to keep the presentation as clear as possible, we do not show the respective probabilities for the issues contained in the Contract with America. Overall, the probabilities for the Contract issues are lower than those we show in Table 4, but the impact of groups' resources, groups' issue positions, and legislators' positions on the use of each form of lobbying that are apparent in Table 4 are no different from what we observe for the Contract issues.

TABLE 4
Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Different Lobbying
Strategies in Committee

	Support Status Quo			Oppose Status Quo		
	Legislator's Expected Issue Position			Legislator's Expected Issue Position		
	Ally	Uncertain	Opponent	Ally	Uncertain	Opponent
<i>No district support, coalition member</i>						
Grassroots Only	.01	.01	.01	.04	.04	.03
Direct Only	.48	.26	.18	.42	.22	.15
Grassroots and Direct	.05	.03	.01	.05	.03	.02
<i>Moderate district support, coalition member</i>						
Grassroots Only	.02	.04	.04	.06	.10	.12
Direct Only	.45	.33	.18	.25	.17	.10
Grassroots and Direct	.34	.41	.26	.57	.61	.43
<i>Strong district support, working alone</i>						
Grassroots Only	.07	.12	.14	.13	.20	.25
Direct Only	.14	.08	.03	.05	.03	.01
Grassroots and Direct	.65	.73	.57	.75	.74	.63

Notes: Table entries are the predicted probabilities that an average organization will lobby an average legislator with different expected issue positions exclusively through the grassroots, exclusively through direct appeals, or through a combined grassroots and direct approach on the financial services and grazing-use issues under different resource scenarios. For each scenario importance and reliance on individual dues are set equal to their sample mean values, and the organization is presumed not to have a PAC. District support ranges from strong (set equal to 2), to moderate (set equal to 1), to weak to none (set equal to 0). An “average” legislator is one who is not a committee leader or a member of a relevant subcommittee. The predicted probabilities are computed using the maximum likelihood estimates shown in Table 3.

working in coalition with other groups), they tend to engage exclusively in direct lobbying of allied committee members. Absent district ties, an organization with no resources to make grassroots contacts has less incentive to lobby directly legislators who do not share its preferences because these members are unlikely to work on the group’s behalf.

Third, when an organization has moderate district support and access to Washington-based resources, lobbying targets and tactics are contingent upon its preferences for policy change. Groups that are working to change the status quo are quite likely to exploit their district ties and lobby through the grassroots to supplement their direct lobbying efforts in Washington. The targets of these dual lobbying contacts will most often be undecided members and groups’ allies in committee. In contrast, defenders of the status quo are most likely to target friendly legislators in committee through direct personal contacts only. These, of course, are the groups that are attempting to limit the attention being paid to an

issue so they have little reason to take advantage of their moderate capacity for grassroots lobbying. But when in the hopes of enhancing the prospects of broadening legislative support status quo supporters supplement direct contacts with grassroots appeals, they contact committee members whose preferences are uncertain because these members are most susceptible to persuasion.

Finally, Table 4 shows that when organized interests have strong district ties but few Washington-based resources, they are able to capitalize on their constituency connections and gain access to legislators and their staff. In this way, district ties are likely to be seen as a superior resource because they provide groups not only with a capacity to give committee members policy-relevant information via direct appeal, but also with the infrastructure to communicate constituents' preferences to legislators. Through their district ties, groups have an advantage in reaching out to a broad array of committee members, contacting allies in committee and legislators who do not share their preferences for policy. A group that lacks district ties will not be able to translate its Washington-based resources into a capacity for grassroots lobbying.

Concluding Comments

Given our assumptions about the goals organizations pursue in committee and groups' reliance on particular lobbying strategies to accomplish each of their goals, we have shown how the methods groups use to lobby in committee are affected by the following: their preferences for policy; their expectations about whether and how committee members are likely to help them achieve their goals; and their capacities for making Washington- and grassroots-based appeals. In other words, organized interests select targets and tactics strategically to provide committee members with the type of information that is most likely to help groups achieve their legislative objectives.

Many scholars suggest that interest group influence is most likely to be apparent in congressional committees because committee activity usually takes place outside of the public spotlight (Hall and Wayman 1990; Wright 1990). Our results suggest that groups indeed lobby in ways designed to wield the most influence in committee. When groups enjoy strong constituent ties to a legislator's district, they tend to pursue a combined grassroots and direct lobbying campaign, regardless of the legislator's position, which may help groups expand their supportive coalitions. In the absence of strong district ties, groups tend to rely on direct contacts with committee allies, in the hopes that their friends will be mobilized to participate on their behalf. Under what is probably the more typical condition of moderate district support, organizations attempting to prevent policy change can be expected to reach out to their allies in committee through one-on-one meetings so that allies have the information they need to ensure that legislative proposals do not have adverse implications for groups' interests. These groups also may try to contact undecided legislators directly and through

the grassroots in order to convey the merits of supporting their issue positions. In contrast, groups that are attempting to secure policy change most often work through their grassroots ties to supplement the data they convey to legislative supporters and nonsupporters directly. Status quo opponents must poise themselves for the difficult battle beyond committee if they hope to increase their chances of changing current policy by providing a broader range of information to a wider pool of legislators. In this way our analysis underscores the importance of district ties to groups' abilities to impact public policy. Unlike supporters of the status quo, organizational advocates of change are likely to face obstacles in realizing their policy goals if they lack ties to the districts of legislative opponents and fence-sitters who facilitate coalition building in the legislature.

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