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What is (dis)agreement?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
  • Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that pwhen we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too vague; for what it is to believe simpliciter ought to be explained in terms of degrees of belief.

This paper presents several possible notions of agreement, and corresponding notions of disagreement. It indicates how the findings are fruitful for the epistemology of disagreement, with special reference to the notion of epistemic peerhood.

Funding Information
This paper results from an ongoing General Research Fund project on ‘ComputationalSocial Epistemology and Scientific Method’ (#341413), funded by Hong Kong’s Research Grants Council. {341413}
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
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Citation Information
Rowbottom, D. P. (2016). What is (dis)agreement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12354