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Article
The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument
Studia Logica
  • Darrell Patrick ROWBOTTOM, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, and University of Bristol, United Kingdom
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
10-1-2007
Keywords
  • Dutch Book,
  • degree of belief,
  • coherence,
  • probabolistic theories of rationality,
  • subjective interpretation of probability
Disciplines
Abstract
It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
DOI
10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2
E-ISSN
15728730
Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer 2007

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Additional Information
The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Citation Information
Rowbottom, D. P. (2007). The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument. Studia Logica, 87(1), 65-71. doi: 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2