Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?

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IS THERE A MARKET FOR ORGANIC SEARCH ENGINE RESULTS AND CAN THEIR MANIPULATION GIVE RISE TO ANTITRUST LIABILITY?

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ABSTRACT
Google has been accused of manipulating its organic search results to favor its own services. We explore possible choices of relevant antitrust markets that might make these various antitrust allegations meaningful. We argue that viewing Internet search in isolation ignores the two-sided nature of the search-advertising platform and the feedback effects that link the provision of organic search results to consumers on the one hand, and the sale to businesses of advertising on the other. We conclude that the relevant market in which Google competes with respect to Internet search is at least as broad as a two-sided search-advertising market. We also ask whether Google has a duty to provide organic search results that are neutral with respect to whether the displayed listing is for a Google rather than a non-Google business. We articulate and apply a standard that asks whether various practices related to Google’s organic search results would harm competition that would have otherwise occurred.

JEL: L41; L44

I. INTRODUCTION
Google answers users’ questions ("search queries") with lists of relevant websites and other information ("organic search" results), which are accompanied by advertising.1 In recent years, Google has been accused of manipulating its

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3. These queries may be "navigational searches," where the user just wants to go to a particular website—for example, ebay.com—and enters "ebay" as a query in the search engine rather than typing "ebay.com" in the web browser’s address field. More relevant for search advertising, a user can issue an informational query (for example, "how high is Mount Everest?") or a transactional query (for example, "cordless drill"). See Elisa Gabbert, The 3 Types of Search

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organic search results to favor its own services. These allegations have often been accompanied by appeals for regulatory or antitrust intervention. While often asserted with passion, the public protestations about alleged antitrust violations are often made without legal or economic rigor. In particular, it is difficult to discern precisely what alleged relevant markets are implicated either as sources of alleged market power or as loci of alleged harm to competition. Moreover, the boundaries of relevant markets are often assumed or asserted without the required analysis.

In this article, we focus on the core antitrust issues that have been raised. We explore possible choices of relevant markets that might make the antitrust allegations meaningful. We test some of these possible relevant markets against basic principles of market definition. However, we do not perform the detailed factual and economic analyses required to determine the specific boundaries of any relevant market.

As part of the evaluation of potential relevant markets for consistency with basic market-definition principles, we discuss and describe Google’s business model, which is primarily a two-sided platform to sell advertising. In particular, we analogize the organic search results that Google provides its users to the types of content many other advertising-selling two-sided platforms provide to their audiences.

In particular, we consider the conclusory assertion that Internet search in isolation—that is, as distinct from and not intertwined with the sale of search advertising—is a relevant market for antitrust analysis. Such a conclusory assertion ignores the two-sided nature of the search-advertising platform and the feedback effects that link the provision of organic search results to consumers'
on the one hand, and the sale to businesses of advertising accompanying those search results on the other.

Whether the feedback effects are sufficient to require that a relevant market encompass both sides of any particular two-sided platform is ultimately an empirical matter specific to that platform. In the present context of organic search and search advertising, however, it is clear that these feedback effects are highly significant and, indeed, vital to the viability of the search-advertising platform, because organic search offered to consumers for free would not be a viable standalone business.

Thus, the relevant market in which Google competes with respect to Internet search is at least as broad as a two-sided search-advertising market. Our conclusion is justified both by principles of market definition in two-sided platforms as well as more general market-definition principles when firms engage in multiple activities whose prices are interrelated.

We also explore questions of what Google’s obligations with respect to its organic search results, if any, might be to interested parties, whether consumers or businesses. In particular, we ask whether Google has a duty to provide organic search results that are neutral with respect to whether the displayed listing is for a Google business rather than a non-Google business.

Although many parties have made allegations that Google has harmed competition by manipulating a wide variety of organic search results it displays to users, we will focus on a subset of these allegations and theories of harm articulated in two white papers by an industry group, FairSearch.

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The FairSearch white papers implicitly assert that Google has monopoly power in both a market for search and a market for search advertising, referring to “Google’s monopoly grip on search and search advertising”\(^5\) and to Google’s “monopoly in Internet search and search advertising.”\(^6\) FairSearch states that “Google has entered into competition with the very same websites which depend upon Google to reach consumers” and, as a result, instead of “direct[ing] users as efficiently as possible to the sites most likely to respond to their queries,” Google “tries to answer those queries directly with its own products like Google Places (hotels, restaurants, and destinations), Google Product Search (product information and price comparisons), Google Finance (investment and other financial issues), Google Maps (location and direction information), and YouTube (video content).”\(^7\) FairSearch describes an alleged concern that “Google has both the incentive and ability to manipulate its search results in ways that steer users to its own (possibly inferior) services and away from competitors—and thus deprive these competitors of the customers they need to survive.”\(^8\)

Elsewhere, FairSearch explicitly states that Google’s allegedly exclusionary acts are “leveraging its dominance in search to subdue its rivals.”\(^9\)

The FairSearch white papers are not specific about the alleged relevant markets implicated by their allegations. These white papers appear to allege that Google leverages power in a market for search (for example, “leveraging its dominance in search to subdue its rivals”\(^10\)). Presumably other relevant markets at issue would be relevant markets in which, for example, vertical search competitors of Google compete. These vertical-search competitors

\(^5\) FAIRSEARCH, CAN SEARCH DISCRIMINATION BY A MONOPOLIST VIOLATE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS?, supra note 4, at 1.
\(^6\) FAIRSEARCH, GOOGLE’S TRANSFORMATION FROM GATEWAY TO GATEKEEPER, supra note 4, at 1.
\(^7\) Id. at 2.
\(^8\) FAIRSEARCH, CAN SEARCH DISCRIMINATION BY A MONOPOLIST VIOLATE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS?, supra note 4, at 1.
\(^9\) Google Strategy: If You Can’t Buy ‘Em, Use Your Dominance to Crush ‘Em, FAIRSEARCH (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.fairsearch.org/search-manipulation/google-strategy-if-you-cant-buy-em-use-your-dominance-to-crush-em/. This is one of several examples of FairSearch invoking a “leveraging” formulation. Sean Morris asserts that Google is an “essential facility from a commercial perspective, but it does not necessarily meet the criteria of an essential facility under antitrust law” and that the relevant market is Internet search (by which he appears to mean—as is implicit in his market-share calculations—organic search in isolation). His assertion of the relevant market is offered without any economic or legal foundation. P. Sean Morris, Solving Google’s Antitrust Dilemma: Cognitive Habits and Linking Rivals When There Is Large Market Share in the Relevant Online Search Market, 13 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 303, 330 (2013). We discuss claims that Google is an essential facility in Part IV.A, infra.
\(^10\) Google Strategy, FAIRSEARCH, supra note 9.
might include, for example, Yelp, Expedia, or TripAdvisor in a market that includes travel-related vertical search.

Our analysis will emphasize the significant difference between a market for search—that is, the provision of organic search results to consumers in isolation from other activities—and a market for search advertising. Whether search advertising is a relevant market in which Google competes is ultimately a matter to be determined by factual and economic analyses in the context of the legal antitrust issues that are raised.\(^{11}\) We will argue in Part V that there is no relevant market for organic search itself. Before we can articulate this argument, we must first discuss Google’s business model.

II. A GENERAL MODEL OF A PLATFORM THAT MONETIZES CONSUMER ATTENTION THROUGH THE SALE OF ADVERTISING

In order to sell their products, services, ideas, or politicians to consumers, the sellers need to communicate the availability, features and characteristics, and prices of their offerings.\(^{12}\) A publisher attracts consumers that are willing to provide attention to messages the publisher delivers on behalf of advertisers. When communications lead to consummated transactions, the seller (that is, the advertiser) benefits. Consequently, the advertiser has a willingness to pay a publisher for the opportunity to deliver its message to consumers.

Such advertising platforms are two-sided markets. As we have explained before:

The sale of advertising to businesses and the display of advertisements to consumers take place in a two-sided market at the hub of which sits the content publisher (and any other intermediaries facilitating the sale or display of the advertising). The publisher’s function is to match consumer eyeballs with the marketing messages of businesses; the publisher profits when it is able to attract the consumer eyeballs at a cost less than the amount the businesses are willing to pay the publisher to display their advertisements to these consumers.

In many two-sided advertising scenarios, the profit-making side (the advertisers) must subsidize the consumer side, where the subsidy to the consumer is the provision of the non-advertising content—typically for free or at least below the average cost of producing and distributing the content—that attracts the consumers in the first place. The publisher pays for the creation and distribution of the content from the revenue it receives from the advertisers.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) See Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 3 (discussing the issues at hand).

\(^{12}\) Communications of a less objective nature can also enhance the demand for the product being promoted. For simplicity of exposition, we refer to the advertiser as a seller and to the target of the advertising as a consumer, recognizing that the transaction sought by the advertiser may not be a sale and that the target of the advertising may be a business or other decision maker acting in a role other than as a consumer.

A. Publishers Attract Consumers’ Attention

Publishers use various mechanisms to attract consumers. The attention attractant could be cash or a gift, as in the case of a promoter of timeshare properties who offers an iPad to qualified leads in return for attending a sales presentation. More common and more relevant to this article, the attention attractant may be factual and informative or entertaining. We refer to “organic content” as content that is meant to attract consumers’ attention and for the delivery of which the publisher is not directly paid by any advertiser. Examples include the weather, the news, this week’s winning lotto numbers, astrological forecasts, sports scores, relationship advice, political rants, jokes, how-to guides, financial advice, short stories and poetry, denials of humans’ role in climate change, baby pictures or cat videos, and “status updates” of “friends.”

B. Organic Content Can Benefit Consumers and Third Parties

Organic content attracts consumers precisely because it offers the prospect of consumption benefits. In expectation of greater advertising revenue, publishers often offer organic content to consumers for free or at a price lower than what publishers would charge if they did not also display advertisements.


The attention attractant is often offered free of charge to the consumer. This is the case for platforms that are supported purely by advertising. Hybrid models—where consumers pay subscription or other access fees, and there is also advertising—are also in use.

A publisher may offer a hybrid inducement to a consumer that combines organic content with other incentives. For example, Microsoft offers Bing Rewards, whereby consumers “[g]et rewarded for searching and doing with Bing . . . including gift cards, Microsoft Points for Xbox, movie nights from Redbox, and more.” Bing Rewards, MICROSOFT, http://www.bing.com/explore/rewards (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). Pre-Bing, Microsoft offered “Microsoft Live Search cashback” service, where “[c]onsumers who buy items from participating merchants after searching for them and clicking on an ad can get a cash rebate.” Jessica E. Vascellaro & Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Offers Reward: Consumers Can Get Cash for Purchases Via Search Service, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121136250134610255.html. The publisher does not always need to bear the full burden of attracting consumers but instead can take advantage of consumers attracted by others. For example, an outdoor sporting event or music festival can bring together a large crowd. A publisher unrelated to these events could exploit this aggregation of consumers by employing a sky-writing airplane or a logo-emblazoned blimp to fly over the crowd. Other examples are billboards and other signs that are viewed simply because they come into the consumer’s line of sight—that is, the in-your-face nature of the advertising causes its message to be consumed by consumers without requiring their intention to do so.

It may be the case that nothing is required to attract highly motivated customers to attend to the advertiser’s message. For example, before Craigslist, job seekers would purchase the local newspaper and turn directly to the want-ad section (that is, bypassing the editorial content) to review advertisements for job openings.
Because content accompanied by advertising is voluntarily consumed, we conclude through revealed preference that consumers—at least in expectation—are better off having consumed the combination of organic content and advertising, even accounting for the time required and any annoyance caused by the advertising.\textsuperscript{17} We note that on most advertising-supported platforms, only a fraction of advertising impressions generates a sale of the product or service advertised. It follows that the content itself has significant value apart from the direct value of the advertising to consumers.

Thus, the \textit{ex ante} “price” a consumer “pays” to consume the publisher’s content is equal to the negative of the consumer’s expected value from consuming the content (net of any costs due to consuming the associated advertising). Clearly, consumers typically benefit from the publishers’ organic content even when those consumers never purchase from an advertiser or never click on an advertisement (that would thereby generate revenue for the publisher). A notable example of this phenomenon is the provision of advertising-supported news.

The content that attracts consumers might also deliver benefits to third parties. For example, a publication that wants to sell advertisements to suppliers of computer and mobile-device products may provide coverage of Apple’s latest product launch, even though Apple may not advertise in the publication or otherwise pay the publication for the editorial coverage.\textsuperscript{18} For the publisher, this content serves to attract consumers’ attention, which it monetizes by displaying advertisements from paying advertisers. For Apple, the publisher’s content serves as free publicity. The publisher chooses this content, irrespective of the benefit to Apple, because it will effectively attract consumers’ attention.

Free publicity is a benefit for third parties that do not pay for it and have no right to demand it. A company receives free publicity only to the extent that it is in the publisher’s interest to provide it. Such a company has no right to

\textsuperscript{17} As we noted above in the want-ad example, advertising is not necessarily annoying and need not otherwise create disutility. The advertisements may be perceived as valuable by the audience as the organic content. Indeed, the advertisements themselves may serve the attention-attracting role of organic content and even make organic content unnecessary to attract consumers’ attention, as with publications (for example, Craigslist) that are predominantly advertisements. Simon Anderson, Joshua Gans, and Justin Johnson consider the effects of consumers’ ability to employ ad-avoidance technologies on market outcomes and the provision of organic content. See Simon P. Anderson & Joshua S. Gans, \textit{Platform Siphoning: Ad-Avoidance and Media Content}, 3 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 1 (2011); Justin P. Johnson, \textit{Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance}, 44 RAND J. ECON. 128 (2013).

\textsuperscript{18} A publication may present content related to a paying advertiser in the organic content section. Further, a publication might condition what would otherwise be free publicity for a firm on that firm purchasing paid advertising. Alternatively, an advertiser may sponsor organic content directly; this is known as “native advertising” or “sponsored content.” See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, \textit{Sponsors Now Pay for Online Articles, Not Just Ads}, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/business/media/sponsors-now-pay-for-online-articles-not-just-ads.html.
demand free publicity, because that company has not given the publisher any consideration for this publicity.

C. Advertising Provides Greater Value When Its Message Can Be Targeted to the Consumers to Whom It Is Delivered

If the publisher can attract consumers and deliver an advertiser’s message to them at a cost lower than the amount the advertiser is willing to pay for message delivery, there is a surplus that can be shared between the publisher and the advertiser.\(^\text{19}\) This surplus will be larger when the publisher is able to better match the advertisers’ messages to the consumers that receive delivery of these messages.\(^\text{20}\) Consumers are heterogeneous, as are the products that advertisers want to promote.\(^\text{21}\) Delivering an advertising message for a particular product to a consumer who has no interest in the product provides no benefit to the advertiser, and squanders the opportunity to have a more relevant message presented to that consumer. Targeting the advertising messages—that is, matching advertising messages to the consumers to whom they will be delivered—is more important when a consumer’s interests are narrow or when a product’s appeal is narrow.

Effective targeting requires that the publisher (1) understand the types of consumers that are most likely to have at least a latent interest in the advertiser’s product,\(^\text{22}\) and (2) be able to identify the relevant characteristics of consumers its content attracts.\(^\text{23}\) The relevant characteristics of consumers might

\(\text{19}\) The consumer also benefits from the advertising when the message delivered from the advertiser informs the consumer and helps him or her to make better choices—in addition to the benefit to the consumer from the content.

\(\text{20}\) See Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 660–62 (discussing the value from targeted advertising). The degree to which an advertisement can be targeted to an audience is only one factor in determining the optimal choice of advertisements to display. An advertisement for a high-margin product that, however, cannot be well targeted may produce more surplus to be divided between the publisher and advertiser than an advertisement for a low-margin product that can be well targeted. Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti explore the implications of the greater precision of targeting in online media for the competition between online and offline media. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline Versus Online Media, 42 RAND J. ECON. 417 (2011).

\(\text{21}\) We will use the term “product” to refer generally to a product, service, idea, politician, and the like being promoted.

\(\text{22}\) By “latent interest in the product,” we mean an interest that the consumer would not acknowledge before being exposed to the advertiser’s message but would acknowledge after exposure.

\(\text{23}\) This formulation, “identify the types of consumers its content attracts,” is best suited when the composition of the attracted consumers is independent of the particular advertiser. In this case the publisher will seek advertisers that are well matched to the attracted audience. Alternatively, a publisher may attempt to attract consumers that are particularly well matched to particular advertisers’ messages. For example, a publisher that wants to sell advertising to distributors of high-performance automobile accessories may create a magazine with content that is of interest to car enthusiasts.
involve demographic characteristics or might be signaled by the consumer’s choice to read an article on a particular topic, by the consumer’s previous purchases, or—as in the case of a search query—by the consumer’s explicit identification of an interest—for example, “hotels near the Empire State Building.”

Improved targeting of advertisements can lower the advertiser’s acquisition cost of a sale when its advertisements are better targeted. We note, however, a model presented by Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro in which decreased advertising costs, due to better targeting, may reduce advertisers’ profits by increasing the severity of price competition. Although a high-targeting equilibrium may make all advertisers worse off, it would still be the case that an individual advertiser, taking the targeting by other advertisers as fixed, could benefit from better targeting. Consumers can benefit from better-targeted advertisements that they see are more relevant to their purchasing decisions and they may be beneficiaries of greater price competition.

D. A Publisher Can Advertise Its Own Products at an Opportunity Cost Equal to the Value the Publisher Could Alternatively Receive From Selling Advertising to an Unaffiliated Advertiser

A publisher may sell advertising to unaffiliated advertisers and may also display advertisements for the publisher’s own products or products of affiliated business units (so-called “house advertisements”). For example, United Airlines’ (“United’s”) Hemispheres in-flight magazine has organic content relating to topics of interest to United’s customers. When these customers read the magazine, they are also exposed to advertisements purchased by advertisers unaffiliated with United. In addition, there is content—some styled as organic content and some styled as traditional sold advertising—that informs the reader about United’s own products and services. Another example is Forbes.com, which advertises its Forbes BrandVoice™ product, which allows marketers to create content on the Forbes digital publishing platform.

It would be incorrect to say that a publisher provides free advertising to itself for its own products for two reasons. First, the publisher incurs the costs of providing the platform on which the advertisements are displayed. Second, advertisements for the publisher’s own products are displayed with an opportunity cost. Had the publisher not displayed advertisements for its products, the publisher could have displayed advertisements paid for by an unaffiliated advertiser.

24 A publisher may well charge a higher price, whether per-impression or per-click, for a better-targeted advertisement than for a less-well-targeted ad. The resulting higher probability that the impression or click will generate a sale for the advertiser offsets those higher advertising prices—that is, it reduces the advertiser’s acquisition cost of a sale.
advertiser. Thus a cost to a publisher of advertising its own products is an opportunity cost equal to the value the publisher would have received by selling the same advertisement-display inventory to the highest-value unaffiliated advertiser.

We noted in the United Airlines’ *Hemispheres* example that a publisher can include content that is not styled as traditional sold advertising, but nevertheless promotes the publisher’s affiliated businesses. This practice is quite common when publishers have affiliated businesses that could benefit from promotion. Google’s inclusion of links to its affiliated businesses within organic search results is another example of this practice. In Part IV, we discuss the tradeoff that any publisher with an affiliated business faces when deciding whether to use its content to promote those affiliated businesses. Because the publisher internalizes the benefits to its affiliated businesses from promotion in the publisher’s content, the publisher can have incentives to feature its affiliated businesses in the content to a greater degree than would be the case if those same businesses were unaffiliated with the publisher.

E. A Publisher Will Co-Determine Its Organic Content and Its Advertising Messages to Maximize Its Profit

For any given set of advertisers and their advertisements, different choices of organic content can result in higher- or lower-quality matching between the consumers attracted and the advertisements displayed. Conversely, for a given set of consumers attracted, different choices of advertisements will be better or less well matched to these consumers. It follows that a publisher will choose its organic content and the advertisements it displays to jointly maximize the publisher’s profit over the long run.

III. GOOGLE’S TWO-SIDED PLATFORM MONETIZES THE ATTENTION OF CONSUMERS ATTRACTED TO THE DISPLAY OF ORGANIC SEARCH RESULTS BY SELLING ADJACENT ADVERTISING

Google’s sale of search advertising through its two-sided platform is a special case of the general model described above in Part II. Google plays the role of publisher as defined there. Google allows consumers to ask questions in the form of search queries. In reply to such a query, Google responds with pages and pages of links to web-resident documents of information. The list of links with which Google responds to a query is made possible by Google’s continuous indexing of content on the Web. The owner of a website or its content does not pay Google to be captured in Google’s index or to be listed in organic search results.\(^{27}\)

\(^{27}\) A website can prevent Google from indexing its content through the use of special meta tags. For example, embedding the HTML code “\(<\text{meta name = "googlebot" content = "noindex"}>\)”
The consumer may benefit directly from the list of organic search results—for example, when the answer to the consumer’s question (for example, “in what year did Kramer vs. Kramer win Best Picture?”) is contained at the top of the organic search results. Other times, the consumer benefits indirectly from the organic search results (and through advertisements as well) by clicking on one of the listed links to find information elsewhere on the Web that is relevant to the consumer’s query.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{A. The User’s Search Query String Plays a Special Role in Improving the Matching of Advertisements to Consumers}

We described in Part II.C how improved targeting of advertisements to consumers can increase the value for advertisers, publisher, and consumers. Users’ visits to Google’s search site are typically prompted by the user having a concrete question to answer or topic to explore.

The fact that a consumer enters a query search string when she arrives at Google’s search site provides Google with specific information about the visiting consumer’s interests at the moment of the visit. Google can combine information gleaned from the user’s search query with any other information Google has in order to optimally choose advertisements to display to the user.

\textbf{B. Google Would Maximize Return Visits by Consumers and Advertising Opportunities by Providing Relevant Results to Users’ Queries}

The more Google can attract users to its search site, the greater the users’ expectations that visiting Google’s search site will be valuable. Users’ expectations will be largely formed and maintained by the users’ actual experiences visiting Google’s search site. The value a user derives from a visit to Google’s

search site will be directly related to whether she found a satisfactory answer to her question, or whether the links displayed led her to information about her topic that she found valuable.

The key characteristic of organic search results that would lead a user to find the organic search results valuable is that those results be relevant to her search query. In some cases, the relevance of a result can be viewed \textit{ex ante} (before the user clicks on the result) and \textit{ex post} (after the user clicks on the result).\footnote{Note that in many cases a search engine will give the answer to the query directly in the results—that is, without requiring the user to click on a results link. An example of such a query is “how tall is the empire state building?” In such cases when the searcher’s question is answered without clicking on a link, there is no meaning to \textit{ex post} relevance. \textit{See, e.g.}, Shashi Seth, \textit{A New Era of Search is About the Answers, Not Just the Links}, TECHCRUNCH (May 7, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/07/search-answers-not-just-links/}

A searcher’s decision whether to click on a results link for further information will be based on that link’s \textit{ex ante} relevance—that is, the searcher’s estimate of the link’s relevance based only on the text displayed in the search results. The searcher’s long-term satisfaction with Google as a venue for search will also depend on the \textit{ex post} relevance of the links presented—that is, how well the websites listed adequately addressed the searcher’s information needs. In particular, when the goal of the query is to identify a product or service that meets the user’s needs, search results that lead the user to more appropriate products or services would be judged \textit{ex post} to be more relevant.

IV. WOULD GOOGLE FIND IT PROFIT-MAXIMIZING TO TRADE OFF RELEVANCE OF ORGANIC SEARCH RESULTS AGAINST THE PROFIT FROM DISPLAYING LESS-RELEVANT ORGANIC RESULTS FOR AN AFFILIATED BUSINESS?

We noted in Part II.D that a publisher with affiliated businesses can promote those affiliated businesses both within its advertising and within its content (as content that is not styled as traditional sold advertising), and that Google’s promotion of its affiliated businesses within its organic search results is an example of this common practice. We also noted that, because a publisher internalizes the benefit to its affiliated businesses from such promotion, a publisher can have incentives to promote its affiliated business to a greater degree than were those businesses unaffiliated with the publisher.

In Part I, we pointed to the FairSearch assertion that “Google has both the incentive and ability to manipulate its search results in ways that steer users to its own (possibly inferior) services and away from competitors.”\footnote{\textit{FairSearch, Can Search Discrimination by a Monopolist Violate U.S. Antitrust Laws?}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 1} We now consider Google’s private incentives for ordering organic-search links to a Google-affiliated business relative to organic-search links to a competing non-affiliated business in a list of organic-search results.
As part of a wider investigation into Google’s business practices, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated this question. The FTC described its investigation and conclusions regarding allegations that Google’s biases its display of search results:

The FTC conducted an extensive investigation into allegations that Google had manipulated its search algorithms to harm vertical websites and unfairly promote its own competing vertical properties, a practice commonly known as “search bias.” In particular, the FTC evaluated Google’s introduction of “Universal Search”—a product that prominently displays targeted Google properties in response to specific categories of searches, such as shopping and local—to determine whether Google used that product to reduce or eliminate a nascent competitive threat. Similarly, the investigation focused on the allegation that Google altered its search algorithms to demote certain vertical websites in an effort to reduce or eliminate a nascent competitive threat. . . . [T]he FTC concluded that the introduction of Universal Search, as well as additional changes made to Google’s search algorithms—even those that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors—could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product and the experience of its users. [The FTC] therefore has chosen to close the investigation.31

FTC participants interpreted the findings. For example, the FTC’s outside counsel, Beth Wilkinson, stated that, “[u]ndoubtedly, Google took aggressive actions to gain advantage over rival search providers. However, the FTC’s mission is to protect competition, and not individual competitors. The evidence did not demonstrate that Google’s actions in this area stifled competition in violation of U.S. law.”32 FTC chair Jon Leibowitz opined:

We close that investigation, finding that the evidence does not support a claim that Google’s prominent display of its own content on its general search page was undertaken without legitimate justification. . . . Although some evidence suggested that Google was trying to eliminate competition, Google’s primary reason for changing the look and feel of its search results to highlight its own products was to improve the user experience. Similarly, changes to Google’s algorithm that had the effect of demoting certain competing websites had some plausible connection with improving Google’s search results, especially when competitors often tried to game Google’s algorithm in ways that benefitted those firms, but not consumers looking for the best search results. Tellingly, Google’s search engine rivals engaged in many of the same product design choices that Google did, suggesting that this practice benefits consumers.33

In this part, we put aside the FTC’s findings and ask under what conditions Google would have the incentive to take into account—in its decisions

32 Id.
regarding the rank ordering of organic-search results—whether a business is affiliated with Google or is unaffiliated with Google.

Returning to FairSearch’s assertion that “Google has both the incentive and ability to manipulate its search results in ways that steer users to its own (possibly inferior) services and away from competitors,” we note that the FairSearch white paper does not offer a basis on which Google would determine that a competing business is higher quality and therefore that a link to it would be more relevant than a link to the Google-affiliated business. For the purpose of this discussion only, we will posit that the Google-affiliated business is lower quality and therefore less relevant than the nonaffiliated business and that this fact is discernible by Google.

When Google displays a list of organic search results pointing to websites unaffiliated with Google, Google receives no consideration from the unaffiliated websites. As a result, Google’s incentives in choosing what organic search results to more prominently display are to choose those most relevant to the user’s query. This will maximize the user’s satisfaction with this search experience, and will strengthen or maintain the strength of the user’s expectation of the value she would receive by performing a subsequent search at Google.

The websites more prominently listed in the organic search results benefit from greater free publicity than websites listed less prominently or not at all. The benefit to those websites is not internalized in Google’s choice of organic search results as long as the more prominently listed websites are not affiliated with Google.

When a website affiliated with Google is relevant to some degree to a user’s query, Google’s calculus regarding what links to more prominently display is more complicated. If the Google-affiliated link is also the most relevant link to the user’s query, then the Google affiliation would not affect Google’s choice of prominently presented links: the most relevant website, which is also the Google-affiliated website, would be displayed most prominently.

Suppose, however, that the Google-affiliated website is to some degree less relevant to the user’s query than some other link. In this case, Google faces a tradeoff. If Google listed the less relevant Google-affiliated website more prominently, Google would benefit from the greater “free publicity” that website would receive. Conversely, choosing the less relevant Google-

34 FAIRSEARCH, CAN SEARCH DISCRIMINATION BY A MONOPOLIST VIOLATE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS?, supra note 4, at 1.
35 A typical search query on google.com results in more than 1 million results. Thus it is likely that every nontrivially relevant result in Google’s index is listed somewhere in the query’s results.
36 When a website is not affiliated with Google, Google does not internalize the enhanced free publicity that website would receive if more prominently listed in the organic search results. If the website is affiliated with Google, Google can internalize the free publicity the website receives.
37 We put “free publicity” in quotes when the phrase is used to characterize the value a Google-affiliated business receives from being listed in Google’s organic search results, whereas we did not do so when characterizing the value an unaffiliated business receives from being
affiliated website to display more prominently would, by assumption, lower the relevance of the organic search results. This effect, if nonnegligible, could cause the user to have a poorer search experience compared with one in which the more relevant link was listed more prominently. This could lead the consumer to lower her expectations of the quality and value of a Google search the next time she had a question to answer or a topic to research.38

When consumers have lower expectations for the value of searching on Google, they will search less on Google for two reasons. First, even if (contrary to fact) there were no substitutes for searching on Google, consumers would search less on Google because there would be searches that would have been worthwhile when Google had higher value that would no longer be worth the consumer’s effort if searching on Google had lower value. Second, if the value of searching on Google were perceived to be lower, some consumers who previously had judged Google the best search engine relative to competitors’ engines would now favor and shift their searching to such competing engines.

Consumers would become aware of any diminution in the relevance of Google’s results in both absolute and relative senses. In the absolute sense, if Google led consumers to a low-value vertical search service, consumers would determine that the Google search that led them there was of low value as well. This assessment requires no awareness by consumers of the existence of better vertical search services, or of what vertical search services are promoted by competing search engines. Indeed, if consumers did not have a different and more negative experience when led to an assumed lower-quality vertical search service than when led to an assumed higher-quality one, this would call into question the assertion that one was actually lower quality than the other.

In the relative sense, consumers would become aware if Google were featuring a lower-quality vertical search service when they become aware of a higher-quality vertical search service that Google disfavored. Even consumers who exclusively use Google as a general-purpose search engine could become aware of higher-quality vertical search services because general-purpose search is not the only means by which consumers can learn about vertical search services. News media would discuss and recommend high-quality vertical search services.39 Vertical search services can purchase search advertising on, for

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38 Note that all companies that provide a search engine along with other services face this same tradeoff as do any recommender services.

example, Bing, and can purchase non-search, display advertisements anywhere on the Internet. They can purchase traditional offline advertisements as well.\(^\text{40}\) Consumers who found better vertical search services would spread the word by sharing on social networking websites and in virtual and real-life personal communication (that is, the power of “word of mouth”).

Faced with this tradeoff, Google would then need to compare (1) the harm to users’ search experiences from the more prominent display of the less-relevant affiliated link, with (2) the benefit to the Google-affiliated website from the enhanced free publicity. We note in the process that the more a consumer uses some Internet services, the “stickier” these services become for that consumer. This implies that the consumer would have greater switching costs to change to a different service. An example would be photo-sharing services like the Google-unaffiliated Flickr (owned by Yahoo!) and the Google-affiliated Picasa. To change from one service to another could require the consumer to download the photographs from one website and then once again upload those photographs to the new website. Further, these websites have a social-networking component, which leads to further stickiness. However, the fact that consumers can develop switching costs for these services does not impede the competition between the services. Indeed, services may compete especially vigorously for new customer acquisitions knowing that, once acquired, they will be somewhat sticky to that service. We are aware of no argument that a consumer’s choice of Picasa makes the customer significantly stickier to Google as a search engine. Thus, this switching-cost aspect of these services does not change our analysis; this aspect would influence only the magnitude of the benefit to an affiliated business from a new customer.

In any case, Google would be more likely to more prominently display the assumed less-relevant Google-affiliated link (1) the less the relevance differential between the two websites (and hence the less harm to the user from more prominent display of the lower-quality website) and (2) the greater the beneficial effect of the enhanced free publicity on Google’s affiliated business. Conversely, Google would be more likely to more prominently display the more-relevant website (not affiliated with Google) the greater the relevance advantage of the non-Google website and the lower the beneficial effect of the enhanced free publicity on Google’s affiliated business.

We note that the FTC’s “finding that the evidence does not support a claim that Google’s prominent display of its own content on its general search page

was undertaken without legitimate justification”41 is consistent with an assessment by Google that the extent to which its vertical search services are inferior to competing vertical search services is small, zero, or even negative (that is, that Google’s vertical services could be superior to competitors’ vertical search services).

This discussion offers some guidance as to how one might give clarity to the term “search bias.” If search bias simply represents the practice of ranking one’s own websites higher in the presentation of search results, then the concept has little relevance from an antitrust perspective because it would not distinguish cases when such bias was procompetitive—for example, because it resulted from “innovations that improved [the search engine’s] product and the experience of its users”42—from cases when that “bias” might be anticompetitive according to a standard that we discuss in Part VI.43

One final caveat. In this article, we will not evaluate any non-antitrust claims that Google engaged in false advertising or other deceptive practices. In essence, we will assume that Google makes no representation or guarantee, explicitly or implicitly, that websites listed in its organic search results are listed in declining order of some metric of relevance.44 In other words, we assume that consumers understand that Google may elevate the search ranking of a Google-affiliated website because it is Google affiliated.45

45 Our understanding is that organic rankings of advertisers’ websites by Google, Bing, Yahoo!, and other search engines are determined on the basis of complex algorithms that take many factors into account, including the quality of the website and the relative value of the website in relation to other links. In June 2013, the FTC updated guidelines first laid out in 2002 in letters it sent to general search engine companies, including Google, Bing, Yahoo!, as well as vertical search services, to ensure that, “regardless of the precise form that search takes now or in the future, paid search results and other forms of advertising should be clearly distinguishable from natural search results.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consumer Protection Staff Updates Agency’s Guidance to Search Engine Industry on the Need to Distinguish Between Advertisements and Search Results (June 25, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/06/searchengine.shtm. See also Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Tells Search Engines to Label Advertising as Such, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/business/ftc-tells-search-engines-to-label-advertising-as-such.html.
V. THE PROVISION OF ORGANIC SEARCH RESULTS IS NOT A BUSINESS IN ITSELF AND CANNOT BE THE SCOPE OF A PROPERLY DEFINED RELEVANT ANTITRUST MARKET

We now consider the implicit allegation by FairSearch that search is a stand-alone relevant market for antitrust analysis. In isolation, organic search generates no revenue but requires substantial sunk investments and ongoing operational costs; in itself, organic search offered for free is unprofitable.

Further, as we explained in Part II.E, a publisher will optimally codetermine its organic content and advertising to maximize its profit. In other words, Google’s choice of organic search results, in reply to any given search query string, serves the interest of Google’s profit from its overall search-advertising business.

We now explain why Google’s organic search service cannot be meaningfully said to compete in a relevant market limited to the provision of organic search results. We argue from two different perspectives to arrive at the same conclusion. First, we argue that the interdependence of the economics of organic search and search advertising prevents a relevant market from being limited to only organic search. Second, we exploit the fact that Google’s search advertising takes place in a two-sided market and refer to the literature on market definition in two-sided platforms to conclude that the relevant market must incorporate both sides of the platform and, hence, cannot be limited to organic search alone.

A. When the Defendant Provides Interrelated Products, Analysis of the Relevant Market in Which It Competes Must Incorporate Those Interrelated Products

In an antitrust analysis of allegations of anticompetitive behavior, one or more relevant markets may be defined to aid that analysis. Generally speaking, a relevant market must be sufficiently broad that, if it were monopolized in fact or by hypothesis, the monopolist of the conjectured market would be able to profitably exercise market power within that market.

When some activities (such as pricing of some products) affect the demand for other products, an analysis must incorporate all of these activities and products in order to determine whether an exercise of market power would be profitable.

While directed toward merger analysis, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines nevertheless provide a useful explanation of the role of market definition in the analysis of potential

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46 See supra Part I (citing FairSearch references to “Google’s monopoly grip on search” and Google’s “monopoly in Internet search.” FairSearch, Can Search Discrimination by a Monopolist Violate U.S. Antitrust Laws?, supra note 4, at 1; FairSearch, Google’s Transformation From Gateway to Gatekeeper, supra note 4, at 1).
anticompetitive effects that has application to non-merger contexts as well.\textsuperscript{47} The \textit{Horizontal Merger Guidelines} make it clear that market definition can be a useful legal construct in evaluating alleged anticompetitive effects, but that market definition is not an end in itself.\textsuperscript{48} In a merger context, the \textit{Horizontal Merger Guidelines} propose that a relevant market is one in which a profit-maximizing hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable post-merger to "impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price ("SSNIP") on at least one product in the market."\textsuperscript{49} When the \textit{Horizontal Merger Guidelines} are applied to non-merger contexts, they are often interpreted to ask whether the hypothetical monopolist could set a price significantly and durably above the "competitive level."\textsuperscript{50}

The \textit{Horizontal Merger Guidelines} address the situation in which firms produce multiple products and the pricing of those products is interrelated—that is, the optimal price for one product depends on the pricing of the other products:

If the pricing incentives of the firms supplying the products in the candidate market differ substantially from those of the hypothetical monopolist, for reasons other than the latter's control over a larger group of substitutes, the Agencies may instead employ the concept of a hypothetical profit-maximizing cartel comprised of the firms (with all their products) that sell the products in the candidate market. This approach is most likely to be appropriate if the merging firms sell products outside the candidate market that significantly affect their pricing incentives for products in the candidate market. This could occur, for example, if the candidate market is one for durable equipment and the firms selling that equipment derive substantial net revenues from selling spare parts and service for that equipment.\textsuperscript{51}

This situation applies here in order to evaluate assertions that organic search is a standalone relevant market because Google does not produce organic search results in isolation; instead, organic search is a product that is complementary to Google's sale of advertising. Moreover, it is clear that the optimal price of organic search is interrelated with the prices of search advertising. Indeed, organic search is offered for free.\textsuperscript{52} Google's ability to offer organic search as a


\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} § 4 ("Evidence of competitive effects can inform market definition, just as market definition can be informative regarding competitive effects.").

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id.} § 4.1.1.

\textsuperscript{50} See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, \textit{Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm is Missing}, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913 (Wayne D. Collins ed., A.B.A. 2009) (discussing the application of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to non-merger contexts).

\textsuperscript{51} HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 9 n.4.

\textsuperscript{52} Randal Picker disputes that Google offers its organic-search results to consumers for free. In a presentation at a search-engine conference at George Mason Law School in May 2013, as well as earlier presentations, Professor Picker states that the ratio of the number of advertisement links to the number of organic links is a measure of an implicit "advertising price that search engines charge consumers." See Randal C. Picker, \textit{Presentation at the American Enterprise Institute: Google and Antitrust} (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://t.co/YwILtNyw; Randy Picker,
free service relies crucially on its concomitant revenue from the sale of search advertising. Were it not for the complementary search-advertising business, organic search would likely have to be offered on a paid basis or not at all.

This view of market definition when a firm produces interrelated products is consistent with the opinion of former FTC Commissioner Thomas Rosch. According to Commissioner Rosch, citing and quoting the above-referenced footnote from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, “if the price of one product affects the prices of another product sold by the same company then the two products should be placed in the same candidate market.”53 The District Court denied the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction—because it could not conclude “that the FTC has demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits”54—noting, consistent with Commissioner Rosch, that “Courts also generally find that a cluster of related products are in the same relevant product market . . . when the prices of the products are interdependent.”55

B. Any Analysis of Google’s Incentives to Manipulate Its Organic Search Results Must Be Performed Within a Market Broad Enough to Encompass Google’s Interrelated Activities

We have pointed out that if one were to look at Google’s provision of organic search results on a standalone basis, one would find that it provides no revenue to Google, but instead imposes substantial costs on Google, and is thus unprofitable. Moreover, any change in Google’s policies with respect to its provision of organic search results that generated revenue or any other benefits, or reduced Google’s cost of operating its search service, would likely improve

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55 Id. ¶ 147 (internal citations omitted).
that is, make less negative) Google’s profits from organic search viewed as a standalone business. Thus, Google is not profit maximizing with respect to organic search in isolation.

It is clear that viewing Google’s provision of organic search results as a standalone business is analytically incorrect. The fact that it is unprofitable when so viewed indicates that it is justified only by its effects outside that narrow scope. Likewise, one cannot understand Google’s incentives to make changes in its policies regarding the provision of organic search results without also looking for the effects of such changes outside the narrow scope of organic search as a standalone business.

Therefore, it would be analytically incorrect to define a relevant market for the purposes of antitrust analysis that includes only organic search. Instead, any antitrust analysis regarding Google’s activities with respect to the provision of organic search results must be performed on a broader terrain that includes at least Google’s broader search-advertising business as well as any other Google-affiliated businesses that rely significantly on their listing in Google’s organic search results.

This perspective elaborates on earlier discussion in Part IV, where we pointed out that Google must consider effects of its choices with respect to organic search results on its broader search-advertising business and any other Google-affiliated businesses that would benefit from more prominent display in organic search results.

C. The Literature of Two-Sided Markets Confirms That the Relevant Market Should Be Broad Enough to Encompass Both Search Advertising and Organic Search

The literature on two-sided platforms has developed significantly since approximately 2002.56 It is widely recognized that competition analysis, and market definition and the assessment of market power in particular, must include both sides of the platform.

In surveying this literature, Eric Emch and Scott Thompson report that “[o]ne robust finding of this line of research has been that welfare-maximizing and profit-maximizing prices on each side of the market depend on cost and demand on both sides of the market.”57 Emch and Thompson then go on to specify a methodology for market definition in two-sided industries that involves a SSNIP test using the hypothetical-monopolist paradigm. They

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56 The literature on two-sided platforms dates back at least to William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983). However, the literature has developed particularly intensively since the beginning of this century as marked by seminal papers such as Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002).

argue that it is not appropriate to apply a SSNIP to either side’s price in isolation but rather to “the sum . . . of the two prices charged to the two sides of the market.”\textsuperscript{58} Thus, their market-definition methodology explicitly incorporates both sides of the platform.

Similarly, David Evans states that, in market definition, “[t]he pricing analysis must consider all sides of the market and their interactions,” and that “[i]t is not possible to [address the question of market power in multi-sided platforms] without considering the combined and interrelated effects on all customer groups served by the platform.”\textsuperscript{59}

With respect specifically to a case involving the provision of organic content accompanied by advertising, David Evans and Michael Noel write that “it is not possible to analyze the competitive constraints on weekly television guides—the essence of the market definition and power examination—without considering the sale of advertising directly through the guides.”\textsuperscript{60}

Although both sides of the platform must be accounted for in any antitrust analysis, industries differ in the intensity of their two-sidedness, and, hence, in the degree to which one side disciplines the other.\textsuperscript{61} In the context of search advertising, however, there can be no doubt that the indirect network effects between organic search on the one side and search advertising on the other are highly significant, because it is obvious that those network effects are crucial for the viability of the platform. As we pointed out above, organic search is unprofitable as a standalone business.

VI. ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY ARISING FROM ALLEGED MANIPULATION OF ORGANIC SEARCH RESULTS

A. The Standard for Antitrust Liability Arising from Alleged Manipulation of Organic Search Results

We now discuss the appropriate standard that would underlie an analysis of Google’s potential antitrust liability flowing from the alleged manipulation of organic search results that favored a Google-affiliated business and disfavored a competing business that is not Google affiliated.

To sharpen the question, we consider a case more extreme than any facts we understand to have been alleged. We consider the case in which Google is accused of refusing to list a competing business in Google’s organic search results.\textsuperscript{62} We then ask, assuming the factual predicates of such an allegation

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.} at 53–54.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.} at 671, 695.
\textsuperscript{62} Professor Mark Patterson’s more moderate hypothetical would assume that Google lowered the ranking of a competitor’s organic-search entry. \textit{See} Mark R. Patterson, \textit{How Can We Measure
were proven, what additional findings would be required for this refusal to deal to be an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act. We note in passing that we are aware of no generalized duty to deal that would require any company, including a monopolist, to aid a competitor, including any duty to give free publicity to a competitor. We also note that the congressionally established Antitrust Modernization Commission endorsed “the longstanding principle that, in general, firms have no duty to deal with a rival in the same market.”

The Supreme Court explained the rationale for this view in its opinion in *Trinko*:

Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.

We believe that a plaintiff would need to establish at least two central claims for an antitrust allegation arising from Google’s alleged refusal to list a competitor within Google’s organic search results. First, the plaintiff would need to show that competition has been harmed in some well-defined relevant market. For example, a plaintiff might allege a relevant market for a particular type of vertical search. For purposes of discussion only, we assume that there exists such a properly defined relevant market in which both a Google-affiliated business such as Google’s Flight Search service and an unaffiliated business such as Cheaptickets.com compete.

Second, for Google’s assumed refusal to deal to be anticompetitive, we presume that the plaintiff is required to show that Google’s behavior was predatory, in that Google’s refusal to deal is not competition on the merits but rather would make business sense (that is, is profit maximizing) for Google only if it resulted in the demise, or severe weakening, of the excluded unaffiliated competitor.

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66 This is a variant of the “profit-sacrifice test,” which has been debated in the courts and in legal commentary. For an explication of the profit-sacrifice test and its value, see A. Douglas Melamed, *Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to...*
B. Whether Google’s Assumed Refusal to Deal Harmed Competition in a Relevant Market for Vertical Search

We now ask whether the act we assume for purposes of discussion only—that Google refused to list its unaffiliated competitor within Google’s organic search results—harmed competition in a relevant market for the relevant flavor of vertical search. In theory, such behavior might be deemed predatory under a vertical foreclosure theory. However, this would require showing that exclusion of a competitive business from placement in Google’s search results would lead to actual foreclosure of that competitor. Then we would need to show that such foreclosure ultimately harmed consumers.

First, we note the obvious—Google’s assumed refusal to deal, by delisting the unaffiliated competitor from Google’s organic search results, certainly would harm that unaffiliated competitor by depriving the competitor of valuable free publicity. To achieve the same effective level of publicity, the competitor would have to expend greater funds on alternative methods of advertising and promotion; alternatively, the competitor would have to accept lower levels of customer interest and the consequent lower levels of business.

Second, as is well understood, harm to a competitor is not a signal of an antitrust violation any more than harm to a competitor is a signal of intense competition on the merits. In essence, antitrust law seeks to protect competition, not competitors.

The only impact that this assumed refusal to deal has on the unaffiliated competitor is to deprive it of a particular source of free promotion. We do not need to consider what the antitrust implications would be if Google’s organic search listings were the only mechanism by which competitors in this vertical-search relevant market could promote their businesses, because that is clearly counterfactual. Indeed, it is difficult to see how Google’s assumed refusal to list a competitor in its organic search results could foreclose the competitor’s access to ways to promote its business given the variety of alternative promotional vehicles, including general search services, that are available.

Furthermore, whatever market power Google might have in an assumed search-advertising market, it is clear that Google has no such power in broader

67 As we noted in Part VI.A, supra, we take no position on whether a relevant market exists for any particular type of vertical search. In order for our analysis to progress, however, we assume that there is such a relevant market for the purposes of this discussion only.  
69 “As Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote more fifty years ago, and as the federal courts have consistently ruled since, the focus of our law is on protecting ‘competition, not competitors.’” Leibowitz, Opening Remarks of Federal Trade Commission at the Google Press Conference, supra note 41, at 5.  
70 See supra Part IV.
markets, such as in an alleged market for Internet advertising more generally or, *a fortiori*, an alleged market for advertising broadly defined. There are many other avenues for companies to promote their businesses other than to be listed in Google’s organic search results.

Thus, while it is clear that the assumed refusal to deal by Google would hurt the excluded competitor, it is difficult to conceive of a way in which the assumed refusal to deal harmed that unaffiliated competitor’s ability to compete or harmed competition in the assumed vertical-search relevant market.

C. Whether Google’s Assumed Refusal to Deal Made Business Sense Only If It Injured the Unaffiliated Businesses’ Ability to Compete

Suppose that Google considers whether to preferentially elevate the listing for a Google-affiliated business higher than it would be listed if that business were instead unaffiliated with Google, and that this disadvantages an unaffiliated business that competes in the same assumed relevant market for vertical search.

Further suppose that Google judges that the introduction of this nonneutrality into the organic search results will disadvantage its rival, but will not restrain the competitor’s ability to compete with Google in the vertical-search relevant market.

In light of this further supposition, we would conclude that Google’s introduction of nonneutrality into the organic search results constitutes competition—not exclusionary behavior.

Thus, a relevant question is whether Google’s assumed refusal to deal would make business sense for Google even if the unaffiliated competitor remained a viable competitor in the vertical-search market.

We discussed Google’s incentives to introduce such nonneutrality above in Part IV. Google’s decision as to whether to introduce nonneutrality—assuming that nonneutrality is even necessary to justify featuring Google’s affiliated business prominently—depends upon the extent to which, if at all, the unaffiliated business is more relevant to the query than is the Google-affiliated business and upon how much the greater prominence of a non-neutral display of the Google-affiliated business would benefit Google’s affiliated business but possibly harm its search-advertising business.

If Google were to nonneutrally favor its vertical-search business, the question would be whether the above assessment critically relied on expected harm to the excluded unaffiliated business’s ability to compete, or whether Google’s assessment would have been the same even if the unaffiliated business had remained viable.

71 If Google’s vertical-search business is just as relevant to the query as the unaffiliated vertical-search business, then Google’s algorithms would appropriately display the link to Google’s vertical-search business more prominently than the link to the unaffiliated business would be displayed, and this result would not require nonneutrality.