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Article
Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism
Journal Articles
  • Daniel B. Kelly, Notre Dame Law School
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2009
Publication Information
17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173 (2009)
Abstract
Since Kelo v. City of New London, the preferred litigation strategy for challenging a condemnation that benefits a private party is to allege that the taking is pretextual. This Article contends that, although pretextual takings are socially undesirable, the current judicial test for identifying such takings is problematic. Yet an alternative, intent-based test might be impracticable, as well as underinclusive: condemnors often have mixed motives, particularly when confronted with a firm's credible threat to relocate. Instead, the Article develops a framework that emphasizes informational differences between local governments and private developers. When the government lacks information regarding the optimal site for an assembly, the government may need to rely on a private party to identify, as well as develop, a particular site. However, when the government itself possesses information regarding the site, pre-condemnation private involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Such involvement increases the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without any corresponding public benefit. The Article concludes that a burden-shifting framework, analogous to Title VII's test for identifying pretext, can be adopted in the takings context. The new framework is then applied to several situations in which allegations of pretext are likely to arise.
Comments

Reprinted with permission of Supreme Court Economic Review.

Citation Information
Daniel B. Kelly. "Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism" (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/daniel_kelly/5/