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## Response to my Critics

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3 **Response to My Critics**

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5 **Daniel P. Aldrich**

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8 *This article responds to the questions and criticisms raised by six reviewers about my book *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery*. I focus on the distinctions between social capital types (bonding, bridging, and linking), the difficulties in pinning down widely accepted proxies for social capital, the double edged nature of social networks, race, class, and ethnicity, and public policies which can deepen reservoirs of social capital. Given the ubiquitous nature of disasters and society’s need to move beyond technical and engineering-based responses to crisis, this article continues an important dialogue on the role of human factors in disaster management and response.*

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14 **KEY WORDS:** social capital, social networks, disaster recovery, disaster management

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18 **Introduction**

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20 I am honored to receive feedback from the six world class scholars who have  
21 taken the time to set down their thoughts on my new book (Aldrich, 2012). It is a  
22 rare opportunity to dialogue with experts from the United States and Japan who  
23 have carried out extensive fieldwork and research on topics of disaster recovery,  
24 social capital, and resilience. I want to use this space to highlight several  
25 important themes raised by the critics and then suggest ways of responding to  
26 them. As Rick Weil points out in his review, the book has served like an “opening  
27 salvo” in the discussion of social capital and recovery. My hope is that this  
28 dialogue in the pages of *Risk, Hazards, and Crisis in Public Policy* provides a way of  
29 extending the conversation on the topic rather than presuming to be the final  
30 word on this still-developing area of study.

31 My book *Building Resilience* sought to raise the profile of the role of social  
32 networks and social capital in disaster situations around the world, during both  
33 pre- and post-disaster phases. Disasters are “wicked problems” in that no amount  
34 of engineering or infrastructure development (such as raising houses on stilts,  
35 improving the quality and management of levees, building higher seawalls, etc.)  
36 will be able to completely eliminate loss of life and property. Anthropogenic  
37 global warming will only increase the vulnerability of populations increasingly  
38 relocating to coastal metropolitan areas. Against this backdrop, I gathered micro-

1 level, quantitative and qualitative data on neighborhoods affected by large scale  
2 disasters—the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the 2004 Indian  
3 Ocean tsunami, and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina—to investigate the factors  
4 influencing recovery. I sought to disentangle the effects of multiple candidate  
5 factors that may explain why some neighborhoods in these disaster-affected  
6 communities were able to recover population and businesses while other  
7 neighborhoods could not. Across time and space, I found that the stronger social  
8 ties (measured through collective actions such as rallies, demonstrations, and  
9 voting along with social engagement through events like weddings and funerals)  
10 correlated with better post-disaster recovery more strongly than any other factor  
11 (including those factors more typically thought to be key predictors, such as  
12 levels of wealth, damage from the disaster, population density, quality of  
13 governance, and inequality). The book focuses on the roles played by community  
14 solidarity, collective action, and democratic participation in promoting successful  
15 disaster recovery, together with an extensive analysis of the “dark side” of social  
16 capital (Williamson, 2012).

17 In addition to providing data and analysis about the role of social networks  
18 in the specific catastrophes that I focused my field research on, I used the last  
19 section of *Building Resilience* to suggest a number of ways that decision makers,  
20 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and citizens can take the lessons to  
21 heart to build resilience in their own communities. My experiences working as an  
22 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) fellow at the  
23 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) showed me the  
24 importance of moving ideas beyond the ivory tower into actual policies and  
25 programs. Happily, these and other reviewers seem to have, by and large,  
26 accepted at least the core arguments of my book, but they have pushed me to  
27 think more deeply about a number of topics.<sup>1</sup> I have selected five topics raised by  
28 the reviewers for further elucidation: distinctions between social capital types;  
29 indicators; the double edged nature of social capital; race, class, and ethnicity;  
30 and new public policies.

### 31 **Distinctions Between Social Capital Types**

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34 Early on in my research I grew frustrated by studies which spoke of “social  
35 ties” and “social capital” as if all connections between people were the same, as  
36 this was clearly false; the particular context of relationships matters. Whom you  
37 know and how you know them are important factors which affect how those  
38 people can assist you. Having a loyal friend that lives next door can be an  
39 incredible asset in many situations, but when trying to navigate the labyrinthine  
40 bureaucracy of a university, having a mere acquaintance at the registrar’s office  
41 may be far more helpful. As Mark Granovetter pointed out decades ago, even  
42 “weak ties”—that is, friends of friends whom one knows only vaguely, if at all—  
43 serve as important sources of information during job searches at all levels  
44 (Granovetter, 1973). In *Building Resilience* I drew on the work of Woolcock and  
45 Narayan (2000) and Szreter and Woolcock (2004) to emphasize that the types of

1 connections available to us—whether to people similar to us, different than us, or  
2 with more power than us—matter during and after disasters. Ilan Noy and Jim  
3 Gannon, in their reviews, emphasize that my recognition of three types of social  
4 capital—what social scientists have labeled as bonding, bridging, and linking—  
5 serves as a key element in the book. Specifically, bonding social capital indicates  
6 connections to people similar to us (what sociologists would call *homophily*), while  
7 bridging social capital involves connections to those from different backgrounds,  
8 socioeconomic classes, religions, and ethnicities. Linking social capital is a  
9 connection to an individual with a different level of power—for example, a tie  
10 between a resident of a poor, rural Indian coastal village in the state of Tamil  
11 Nadu and the local government representative known as a collector.

12 In her review, Kathleen Tierney argues that it “shows that while bonding and  
13 bridging social capital convey significant advantages for group members, linking  
14 social capital often makes the biggest difference in recovery, because this form of  
15 social capital involves vertical connections between disaster-stricken neighbor-  
16 hoods and communities and extra-community sources of assistance, such as higher  
17 levels of government.” I was especially heartened by Gannon’s extended descrip-  
18 tion of his own experiences which underscored the importance of the linking social  
19 capital in a recent post-disaster situation. Gannon, who has worked closely with  
20 Kaimishi City in the Tohoku region severely affected by 2011’s triple disaster  
21 argues that “where Kamaishi has differed from many has been in its strong linking  
22 social capital, which is partly the legacy of several distinct decades-long efforts to  
23 bring together local government, business, and nonprofit leaders with leading  
24 national and international experts to recalibrate and revitalize a local economy that  
25 had been declining well before the disaster struck. These linkages have helped  
26 channel much-needed expertise and financial resources to Kamaishi, but impor-  
27 tantly this has been done in a deliberate manner on local terms rather than for  
28 purposes delineated by outsiders. It is too early to be certain, but Kamishi  
29 definitely appears to be recovering much more quickly than the communities  
30 around it that lack this linking social capital.” These sorts of observations drive  
31 home the importance of separately considering the various types of social capital.

32 Additional work by Hawkins and Maurer (2010) and by Elliott, Haney, and  
33 Sams-Abiodun (2010) on post-Katrina recovery in New Orleans supports the idea  
34 that research on social capital and resilience must look closely at the types of social  
35 connections. These scholars showed how different types of connections mattered at  
36 different moments following the disaster, and that simply having deep reservoirs of  
37 bonding social capital—a condition often found in poorer neighborhoods around  
38 the world—is not sufficient for a strong recovery.<sup>2</sup> If the book’s theoretical  
39 contribution has been to solidify the often slippery concept of social capital through  
40 the use and application of these three types of connections, I would be quite happy.

### 41 Indicators

42 No book manuscript ever seems perfect to its author, and I struggled very  
43 hard as I collected data from these disasters over time and space to find a way to  
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1 handle the issue of proxies and indicators for social capital. As Francis Fukuyama  
2 said long ago, “one of the greatest weaknesses of the social capital concept is the  
3 absence of consensus on how to measure it” (2001: 12). For me, the initial  
4 challenge involved finding historically and culturally appropriate indicators from  
5 the 1920s in Tokyo, the 1990s in Kobe, and the 2000s for India and New Orleans  
6 that would accurately capture the ability of individuals to connect as a  
7 community.

8 Identifying useful proxies for social capital that could be quantitatively  
9 measured was a key aspect of my fieldwork, which involved extensive digging  
10 through archives. Some examples I used in the book include the records of  
11 marches, rallies, and demonstrations kept by local police officers in 1920s Tokyo,  
12 as well as participation in local weddings and funerals in Tamil Nadu (struck by  
13 the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami). Although I felt satisfied with the proxies I  
14 decided to use for my analysis I was fully aware that not everyone would be  
15 convinced. Gannon, for example, cautions that “some of the individual indicators  
16 that he unearths could just as easily be touted as evidence that socioeconomic  
17 status is the key determining factor in how well communities recover.” Readers  
18 may, indeed, see these proxies as capturing other concepts, whether political  
19 power or economic resources. However, my analysis included factors that more  
20 directly reflect political and economic power, such as wealth and caste, and used  
21 those factors as controls in order to isolate the effect of social capital reflected in  
22 my chosen proxies. Thus, although the proxies I used may be an admixture of  
23 various factors in addition to social capital, I believe that, particularly in the  
24 context of my analysis, they are effective proxies for a reasonably uncontaminated  
25 quantification of social capital.

26 That being said, the challenge of good indicators for social capital remains a  
27 serious one for the field and I hope that in the future we will have better datasets  
28 on social capital from which to draw. Weil’s description of his own challenges in  
29 seeking to collect believable information on social networks in New Orleans  
30 following Hurricane Katrina provided me some comfort. He credits me with  
31 doing the field “an enormous service by showing us what we need to do, namely,  
32 collect better data that will better satisfy our standards.” Because of the  
33 difficulties I had in finding these data, I have put all of the datasets I used for  
34 *Building Resilience* in an online repository called the DataVerse Network (DVN)  
35 hosted by Harvard University’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science. Readers  
36 can download the data themselves—for free—and test it to their delight or add  
37 new indicators and update the datasets. The creation of any set of indicators for  
38 social capital on which all social scientists would agree seems very unlikely, so it  
39 is our job to continue to push ourselves to find, justify, and make transparent our  
40 efforts at capturing this critical part of the human condition.

### 41 **Double-Edged Nature of Social Capital**

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44 When carrying out research for the book, I came across a number of sources  
45 which seemed to naively imagine that greater levels of social capital inevitably

1 created more positive outcomes for the communities facing adversity through  
2 manmade or natural pressures. For example, Adger (2003) and Adger, Hughes,  
3 Folke, Carpenter, and Rockström, (2005) argued that social capital will aid in  
4 adaptation to climate change, but these highly cited articles focus purely on the  
5 positive benefits of coordinated action and mobilization. As Rieko Kage points  
6 out in her review, “[a] major theoretical contribution of the volume is that in  
7 contrast to much existing research, Aldrich recognizes both the positive and  
8 negative externalities of social capital.”

9 My first academic encounter with the “dark side” of social capital came from  
10 the work of Sheri Berman (1997) and then later from Nagar and Rethemeyer  
11 (2007). It was clear that, like all other resources, social capital could have benefits  
12 and accompanying negative externalities. With my co-author Kevin Crook I had  
13 first discussed the concept of social capital as a Janus-faced or double-edged  
14 sword (Aldrich & Crook, 2008), and Tierney in her review argues that “such  
15 findings offer a caution against viewing social capital as an unalloyed positive  
16 force in the aftermath of disaster.”

17 Gannon also notes the double-edged nature of social capital, as does Kage in  
18 her review, who argues that “well-organized and vocal communities in New  
19 Orleans refused to site trailers in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, even though  
20 accepting the trailers may have accelerated the recovery of the entire region.  
21 Some communities hit by the Indian Ocean tsunami refused to disburse aid to  
22 single women. Such a keen awareness of the “Janus-faced” nature of social capital  
23 is a welcome correction to the sometimes proselytizing tone that characterizes  
24 much of the social capital literature.” Scholars set on seeing social capital as a  
25 panacea should keep these outcomes and the difficulties they caused during the  
26 difficult recovery periods in the Gulf Coast and Tamil Nadu in mind. Other  
27 experts have looked at the massacre of Koreans in Tokyo following the 1923  
28 earthquake because of false rumors that they had poisoned wells or taken action  
29 to harm fellow survivors (Allen, 1996; Ryang, 2003). It is difficult to deny that at  
30 times man’s inhumanity to man has been catalyzed by the fear and destruction  
31 wrought by earthquakes, floods, and other disasters, and that this violence has  
32 been directed against the Other.

33 While some reviewers may have appreciated my recognition of the potential  
34 dark sides of social capital, two had specific suggestions for rethinking this  
35 approach. Kage pushes me to recognize that it “is not theoretically clear that  
36 bonding social capital should always yield negative results.” She raises several  
37 examples of individuals with high levels of bonding social capital—as seen  
38 through their strong patriotism—who did not necessarily feel hostile to foreign-  
39 ers. She suggests looking closely at the work of social psychologists like Amélie  
40 Mummendey who have studied ingroup favoritism and intergroup differentiation  
41 in a variety of experimental settings (cf. Mummendey, Otten, Berger, and  
42 Kessler, 2000). Noy goes further, arguing that “To use Aldrich’s language, ‘the  
43 cost’ associated with social capital is its occasional absence for the out-groups,  
44 rather than its presence for the in-groups.” That is, for those who suffer  
45 negatively from relational discrimination following disasters, “[t]hey are not

1 defined by their exclusion from existing social networks, but through ethnic or  
2 caste distinctions that predated existing social networks and isolated these groups  
3 behind barriers that have persisted for centuries." I believe that Noy and Kage  
4 have valid points which *Building Resilience* does not fully address.

### 5 6 Race, Class, and Ethnicity

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8 Building on the concern raised by Noy about the need to focus more fully on  
9 ethnic, caste, and racial distinctions which have created barriers to participation  
10 and recovery, Thad Williamson argues that I have paid insufficient attention to  
11 race and class and suggests that I marry social capital to severe inequality and  
12 solidarity. He points out that "Katrina became the occasion to declare New  
13 Orleans a fundamentally flawed, unlivable city, a mindset which in turn was  
14 used to justify shutting down public housing, implementing radical changes in  
15 the public schools, and refusing to make rebuilding high poverty areas such as  
16 the Lower Ninth Ward a top priority." In *Building Resilience* I sought to capture  
17 issues of caste and race whenever possible; in my investigation of post-Katrina  
18 New Orleans, for example, I looked closely at the role of race and socioeconomic  
19 status, while in my studies in India I also made sure to understand the role of  
20 caste and income. I would agree that—whether or not decision makers in New  
21 Orleans actively sought to deny aid to African-Americans and the poor, as  
22 Williamson suggests—the world watched in horror as one of the richest  
23 democracies failed to aid those in need. U.S. decision makers then did little to  
24 mitigate decades of discrimination and prejudice against those made vulnerable  
25 by poorly designed social policies and mismanagement of existing infrastructure.

26 Williamson also argues that by uncritically comparing Japan to the United  
27 States without focusing on different, nationally held ideologies I "missed an  
28 opportunity to contrast the contemporary U.S. with (for instance) Japan: the idea  
29 that all citizens in need are worthy of (unconditional) help is not a consensus or  
30 even dominant view in the U.S." Interestingly, though, while neo-liberal  
31 approaches to disaster recovery may be ascendant among some policy makers in  
32 the United States (see the discussion below), the Japanese government itself long  
33 denied any aid to individual survivors of disasters. It was only after the  
34 tremendous destruction of the 1995 Kobe earthquake that the Japanese central  
35 government modified existing laws to allow individual survivors to receive aid;  
36 until that point, any government subsidies went for house repairs. This is in  
37 contrast to the long standing policies of the Federal Emergency Management  
38 Agency (FEMA), which provides financial assistance to individuals and families  
39 regardless of their status as homeowners or renters.

40 Williamson closes by saying that "But (to amplify a point Aldrich makes with  
41 respect to the Indian Ocean tsunami case) a concern for *social justice* also requires  
42 that government make special, intentional effort to reach—and act on behalf of—  
43 precisely those individuals and communities who are disadvantaged with respect  
44 to social capital, and hence most likely to have their interests and needs  
45 overlooked in recovery processes." Having researched the placement of often

1 unwanted projects in the backyards of the least mobilized and coordinated  
2 communities (Aldrich, 2008), I agree that *Building Resilience* could have sharpened  
3 its push for a concern for social justice. The connection between social ties,  
4 ethnicity, and existing frameworks of discrimination (at the individual and  
5 societal levels) is an important topic which deserves further research.

### 6 7 **New Public Policies**

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9 In the conclusion of the book, after seeking to convince readers that social  
10 networks serve as critical engines for post-disaster recovery, I identify a number  
11 of policy programs that have been field-tested and shown to increase and/or  
12 strengthen social capital. These included a “Mr. Rogers” type outreach program  
13 for individuals that encourages them to reach out to their neighbors and to have  
14 critical information on hand. Additionally, I propose borrowing from an existing  
15 Japanese government policy which provides financial support for local festivals  
16 and events around the country. Given the importance of social capital, it can be  
17 built through new events such as *matsuri* (religious festivals), block parties, and  
18 other social events at which individuals “take a chance” and begin taking limited  
19 but real risks (Herrera and Kydd, 2012). Examples of interactions involving very  
20 small risks might be striking up a conversation with someone from a different  
21 ethnic, racial, or religious group (and overcoming the fear of potential rejection or  
22 ridicule). (For those unconvinced of the costs of rejection in social settings, I  
23 suggest watching school children select their seat mates during lunch period.)  
24 More risky interactions may involve shared childcare, joint community policing  
25 patrols, donations to communal money-lending funds, and participatory planning  
26 events (the failure of any of which can have serious consequences). Two other  
27 social capital-strengthening interventions which have been tested in communities  
28 in South Africa, Nicaragua, Japan, and Canada, to name a few, include focus groups  
29 which bring together people for common cause and community currencies which  
30 seek to motivate fence-sitters to participate in community activities.

31 Some reviewers worry that that for both governments and NGOs prioritizing  
32 the strengthening (or building) of social capital in the post-disaster period may be  
33 quite difficult. As Gannon says, post-crisis urgency “tends to create pressures for  
34 governments and aid groups to use funding for easily quantifiable and readily  
35 comprehensible efforts—distributing meals, providing schoolbooks, building  
36 houses, and so on—rather than the crucial but amorphous and less photogenic  
37 long-term work of strengthening social capital. It is almost inevitable that, months  
38 after a major disaster, the media will turn to the tried and true storyline of  
39 exposing a given government agency or aid group for only having distributed a  
40 small portion of its funds to disaster victims, ignoring the fact that efforts to  
41 leverage social capital and build the base for a sustainable recovery necessitate  
42 patient and deliberate efforts over a sustained period rather than quick and flashy  
43 disbursements of funds that will then dry up quickly.”

44 Noy goes further to say that “The interventions that are suggested in this  
45 book can be divided into almost costless policies (e.g., do not distribute people



1 into temporary shelters based on lotteries, and attempt to keep communities  
2 together) and more costly policies (e.g., enhance bonding capital through pre-  
3 disaster investment in community programs). Careful cost-benefit analysis of  
4 some of the interventions that Aldrich suggests is naturally outside the scope of  
5 his book, but it would seem to be the next logical step for anyone who  
6 is convinced that stronger social capital may provide a key to making communities  
7 more resilient." He is correct that a careful analysis of the costs of these programs  
8 is absent in *Building Resilience*, but several communities have already undertaken  
9 very similar programs and believe the financial costs are worth the social benefits.

10 The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) program known as Seed Vouchers and Fairs,  
11 for example, combines elements of the community currency program with the idea  
12 of bottom-up, community-based recovery. Seed Vouchers and Fairs is a durable  
13 community-based approach to urgent food distribution needs post-disaster.  
14 Following a disaster or crisis, the most vulnerable members of the community (the  
15 elderly, those who are sick, and so forth) receive vouchers from CRS to purchase  
16 seeds from local farmers who themselves obtain seeds from their own fields, from  
17 neighboring communities, or from local markets. This is in contrast to the standard  
18 operating procedure where international NGOs or other foreign governments  
19 provide food assistance or seeds to disaster-struck communities. By in-sourcing the  
20 provision of seeds through vouchers, this program strengthens local farmers (who  
21 receive the payment from their community) and builds food capacity at the local  
22 level (by creating a new crop cycle). The program has shown results: "Agricultural  
23 systems in northern Mozambique all but collapsed during the prolonged civil war.  
24 Meanwhile, in neighboring Malawi, pigeonpea was emerging as an important cash  
25 crop for small farmers. Following the peace agreement, farmers in Mozambique  
26 have been able to access pigeonpea technologies and the export market; with the  
27 result that Mozambique is now a leading producer of pigeonpea for export" (CRS,  
28 ICRISAT, and ODI, 2002). This program recreates the kind of "virtuous cycle" I  
29 describe in *Building Resilience* through the use of community currency where a  
30 policy intervention encourages the creation of social and financial ties locally which  
31 are then sustained through future transactions.

32 Another ongoing program which has taken social capital seriously is the  
33 Neighborhood Empowerment Network (NEN) in San Francisco. NEN seeks to  
34 build capacities in neighborhoods throughout the city by applying best practices  
35 in the field of community-level disaster mitigation. Given the likelihood of a large  
36 earthquake in the future in California, NEN is working with other local  
37 organizations in the Bay Area to help create local nodes for recovery on each  
38 block. NEN pushes community members to get to know each other, to work  
39 together on community improvement projects, and to serve as members of  
40 planning committees and participate in decision making. This program brings  
41 together the "Mr. Rogers" individual-level approach along with the block-party  
42 approach to try to increase neighborhood connections. While there have been no  
43 major earthquakes since the instigation of these new NEN policies, anecdotal  
44 evidence and interviews with participants reveal new consciousness about the  
45 role of neighbors and more intense block-level preparation for potential disasters.

1 While my approach prioritizes the agency of the local community, Tierney  
2 underscores in her review that I “also seem reluctant to consider what higher  
3 levels of government can actually do to improve recovery outcomes, which turns  
4 out to be a good deal.” Her criticism meshes with the scholarly work of Kage  
5 (2011) who has skillfully documented the ways in which local pockets of  
6 mobilization and strong social capital interacted with aid from the government  
7 following the devastation of World War II. She demonstrates that Japanese  
8 prefectures that had strong social connections (measured by the volume of postal  
9 mail) recovered most strongly when interacting with directed aid from the central  
10 government. I agree with Tierney that government plans which support bottom-  
11 up mitigation efforts at the community level are indeed a good investment. In the  
12 book, I was more hesitant to attribute a strong role for central or regional  
13 governments in the recovery process because of the negative outcomes so clear to  
14 me in post-tsunami India. Many NGOs in Tamil Nadu saw the massive influx of  
15 often poorly thought out aid from the Indian government and outside agencies as  
16 the “second tsunami.” In *Building Resilience* I discussed a number of negative  
17 consequences of this aid, including early marriages for underage women and the  
18 breaking apart of long-standing community ties. Weil similarly argues that that  
19 simply pumping money into affected communities has rarely produced positive  
20 results in his studies of post-Katrina New Orleans: “Also, as Aldrich notes, we  
21 found that huge amounts of government or nonprofit recovery assistance seem to  
22 have been either directed to administrative ends, or not gotten through to disaster  
23 survivors, sometimes going through many layers of subcontractors before the  
24 work was finally carried out by the same local backhoe operator who was  
25 probably going to do it in the first place.” Tierney is right when she points out  
26 that “supra-local entities can provide incentives and help communities achieve  
27 positive recovery outcomes” and I could have better stressed this point in the  
28 book.

29 Nevertheless, because of their distrust of the government, some have pushed  
30 post-disaster neoliberal approaches which would seek to move government  
31 functions to private sector operators through outsourcing and privatization  
32 (cf. Gotham, 2012; Johnson, 2011). I did not take this approach, and instead  
33 sought to place the agency of local residents—not private firms or outsourced  
34 corporations—front and center. Weil cautions against simply redirecting more  
35 resources at local NGOs and neighborhood associations in an attempt to  
36 strengthen their ties and deepen their capacity for action: “outside assistance  
37 often creates dependency and uncertainty among the local receiving organiza-  
38 tions, and bureaucratic reporting requirements can increase their burdens and  
39 reduce their effectiveness.” There is no silver bullet when it comes to policy  
40 interventions, but I think that programs such as the Catholic Relief Services and  
41 the Neighborhood Empowerment Network are the cutting edge of new  
42 approaches to disaster mitigation and recovery. Rather than employing large,  
43 multinational firms, these programs put the focus back on local residents, their  
44 visions of their communities, and their daily lives. Instead of creating dependency  
45 on outside agencies (which are usually well-intentioned), these approaches to

strengthening social capital focus on capacity building and democratic empowerment at the community level. I hope to see more programs like these which prioritize social networks in the toolkits of agencies such as USAID, DFID (the UK Department for International Development), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and WorldVision.

### Concluding Thoughts

I have learned a great deal from this exchange and appreciate the thought the reviewers have put into their suggestions and criticisms. I am currently in the middle of a Fulbright research fellowship focused on the ongoing recovery from the compounded 3/11 disasters in the Tohoku region of Japan. The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdowns have created financial, social, and logistical challenges for the people living along the northeast coast of the country. Japan, of course, is not the only country which faces or will face such catastrophes. Around the world, we must reorient our thinking about disaster recovery from an infrastructure or engineering perspective to a social one. As Eric Kleinenberg said recently, "We have failed to recognize the significance of our social infrastructure, the way in which communications matters, the way in which our relationships with neighbors, and family and friends matters; the way in which our neighborhood can protect or imperil us, depending on where we are ... Because when a real disaster strikes, it's the social stuff that might make the difference between life and death" (quoted in Inskip, 2013). I could not agree more, and hope that *Building Resilience* will begin altering minds and policies in the field of disaster mitigation and recovery.

**Daniel P. Aldrich** is associate professor of public policy at Purdue University and during the 2012–2013 year Fulbright research professor at Tokyo University. He has published two books (*Site Fights* and *Building Resilience*) along with more than 80 peer reviewed articles, reviews, OpEds, and writings for general audiences in the New York Times, CNN, the Asahi Shinbun, and other outlets. His research focuses on the themes of disaster recovery, social capital, and controversial facilities.

### Notes

The author thanks the six reviewers who contributed to this volume along with Heather Bell for her assistance and Ken Hartman for his suggestions.

1. Initial reviews from the academic blogging community (such as Patrick Meier's blog *iRevolution*, Prucia Buscell's *Plexus Institute*, Tokyo Tom's *Lost in Tokyo*, The Saguaro Seminar's *Social Capital Blog* and Jacqueline Merrill's *Philanthropy Daily*) along with those from the general public (on Amazon.com) have been favorable.
2. This is because bonding social capital helps people "get by," but does not boost them enough to "get ahead" (Aldrich, 2011).

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# AUTHOR QUERY FORM

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Dear Author,

During the copyediting of your paper, the following queries arose. Please respond to these by annotating your proofs with the necessary changes/additions using the E-annotation guidelines attached after the last page of this article.

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
Query No.	Query	Remark
Q1	A running head short title was not supplied; please check if this one is suitable and, if not, please supply a short title of up to 45 characters that can be used instead.	
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## USING E-ANNOTATION TOOLS FOR ELECTRONIC PROOF CORRECTION

### Required Software


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Once you have Acrobat Reader 8 on your PC and open the proof, you will see the Commenting Toolbar (if it does not appear automatically go to Tools>Commenting>Commenting Toolbar). The Commenting Toolbar looks like this:



### Note Tool — For making notes at specific points in the text

Marks a point on the paper where a note or question needs to be addressed.




#### How to use it:

1. Right click into area of either inserted text or relevance to note
2. Select Add Note and a yellow speech bubble symbol and text box will appear
3. Type comment into the text box
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Strikes red line through text and opens up a replacement text box.




#### How to use it:

1. Select cursor from toolbar
2. Highlight word or sentence
3. Right click
4. Select Replace Text (Comment) option
5. Type replacement text in blue box
6. Click outside of the blue box to close

### Cross out text tool — For deleting text when there is nothing to replace selection

Strikes through text in a red line.



#### How to use it:

1. Select cursor from toolbar
2. Highlight word or sentence
3. Right click
4. Select Cross Out Text

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


#### How to use it:

1. Click on the Stamp Tool in the toolbar
2. Select the Approved rubber stamp from the 'standard business' selection
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**Highlight tool — For highlighting selection that should be changed to bold or italic.**

Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box.




**How to use it:**

1. Select Highlighter Tool from the commenting toolbar
2. Highlight the desired text
3. Add a note detailing the required change

**Attach File Tool — For inserting large amounts of text or replacement figures as a files.**

Inserts symbol and speech bubble where a file has been inserted.




**How to use it:**

1. Click on paperclip icon in the commenting toolbar
2. Click where you want to insert the attachment
3. Select the saved file from your PC/network
4. Select appearance of icon (paperclip, graph, attachment or tag) and close

**Pencil tool — For circling parts of figures or making freeform marks**

Creates freeform shapes with a pencil tool. Particularly with graphics within the proof it may be useful to use the Drawing Markups toolbar. These tools allow you to draw circles, lines and comment on these marks.



**How to use it:**

1. Select Tools > Drawing Markups > Pencil Tool
2. Draw with the cursor
3. Multiple pieces of pencil annotation can be grouped together
4. Once finished, move the cursor over the shape until an arrowhead appears and right click
5. Select Open Pop-Up Note and type in a details of required change
6. Click the X in the top right hand corner of the note box to close.

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For further information on how to annotate proofs click on the Help button to activate a list of instructions:

