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Contribution to Book
Enforcement antitruste em mercados digitais: o CADE e os remédios em fusões nos mercados de inovação
Defesa da Concorrência em Plataformas Digitais (2020)
  • Daniel Favoretto
Abstract
Merger review is distinguishingly among the many fields of law currently challenged by digital markets. This paper analyzes these challenges and makes a comparative study over the Brazilian and international experience in this topic. The performance of merger remedies depends directly on the structure and functioning of the markets where those remedies are applied. Thus, highly dynamic and little explored markets, such as the digital ones, challenge the use of remedies by competition authorities. These market uncertainties create the risk of either excessive intervention, hindering efficiencies and liberty, or insufficient intervention, leaving competition and stakeholders vulnerable to anticompetitive conduct. A contractual dilemma arises from these risks, when competition authority and market players agree upon merger remedies: generalized remedies can reduce transaction costs, but enhance enforcement costs, while specific remedies can reduce enforcement costs, but enhance transaction costs. This dilemma is not itself new to CADE, as precedents in innovation markets demonstrate, but it requires a new perspective in the context of digital markets.
Publication Date
December 30, 2020
Editor
Catarina Barbieri
Publisher
Know-How Editorial
ISBN
978-65-87355-15-3
Citation Information
Daniel Favoretto. "Enforcement antitruste em mercados digitais: o CADE e os remédios em fusões nos mercados de inovação" Defesa da Concorrência em Plataformas Digitais (2020) p. 312 - 335
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/daniel-favorettorocha/10/