Rewriting the Balkans: Memory, Historiography, and the Making of a European Citizenry

Dana N. Johnson, University of Massachusetts Amherst

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/dana_n_johnson/2/
REWRITING THE BALKANS: MEMORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN CITIZENRY

A Thesis Presented

by

DANA N. JOHNSON

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

September 2012

Anthropology
REWRITING THE BALKANS: MEMORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN CITIZENRY

A Thesis Presented
by
DANA N. JOHNSON

Approved as to style and content by:

______________________________
Krista M. Harper, Chair

______________________________
Julie Hemment, Member

______________________________
Ventura R. Pérez, Member

______________________________
Elizabeth Chilton, Chair
Department of Anthropology
DEDICATION

To Gaga, one of the best teachers I ever had.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank the staff of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe for welcoming me in their Thessaloniki office during some turbulent times in Greece. A special thanks goes to Corinna for her unwavering support of my research, especially when I was not its strongest advocate. I would also like to thank all the teachers, historians, and EUROCLIO staff involved in the project History that Connects, who good-naturedly included me in their meetings. At home at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, I would like to thank my advisor, Krista Harper, for her support, as well as committee members Julie Hemment and Ventura Pérez for their continued guidance. I was honored to be able to undertake this research as a part of the inaugural cohort of the department's CHESS program. I thank Elizabeth Krause for her mentorship in the field and the members of my cohort—Grace, Mackenzie, Jill, and Seung ho—for their company and counsel. In Serbia, Orli Fridman has continued to provide me with mentorship and friendship. Without Tamara and Ksenija I would have little to look forward to. And I remain indebted to all the Women in Black for first sparking my interest in the themes of this project. Finally, Drew deserves special thanks for enthusiastically joining me on this journey. Research for this thesis was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation (Award Number: OISE-0968575); and by a fellowship from IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board), with funds provided by the United States Department of State through the Title VIII Program. The views expressed herein remain my own.
ABSTRACT

REWRITING THE BALKANS: MEMORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND THE MAKING OF A EUROPEAN CITIZENRY

SEPTEMBER 2012

DANA N. JOHNSON, B.A. DEPAUL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Krista M. Harper

This thesis explores the work of historians, history teachers, and NGO employees engaged in regional initiatives to mitigate the influence of enduring ethnocentric national histories in the Balkans. In conducting an ethnography of the development and dissemination of such initiatives, I queried how conflict and controversy are negotiated in developing alternative educational materials, how “multiperspectivity” is understood as a pedagogical approach and a tool of reconciliation, and how the interests of civil society intersect with those of the state and supranational actors. My research sought to interrogate the field of power in which such attempts to innovate history education occur, with attention trained on the values encoded and deployed in this work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM: THE CONTEXT OF HISTORY EDUCATION REFORM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. OVERVIEW OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TRANSNATIONAL PROJECT SOCIETY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. NEW CONFIGURATIONS OF THE STATE AND CITIZENSHIP</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PEDAGOGIES OF CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Employability</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Accountability</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Competencies Assessment</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDRSEE Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe
CoE Council of Europe
EC European Commission
EU European Union
JHP Joint History Project
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RCC Regional Cooperation Council
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
USAID United States Agency for International Development
INTRODUCTION

Why do we teach students about the past? At first glance, this research project may seem to be mostly about means: how history should be taught; but it is also about this question of ends: why history should be taught. These two questions fundamentally informed the work of my interlocutors, and they constitute the foundation of this thesis as well. My research sought to critically engage with regionally focused, civil-society-initiated efforts to develop supplemental teaching materials that challenge the hegemonic national histories found in textbooks across the Balkans. I embarked on my fieldwork with a cluster of questions about memory and narrative; once in the field I became engrossed in an inquiry into decision-making processes, the place of “truth” in history, and the spaces between educational policy and civil society practice.

My research focused on the work of two organizations long engaged in educational reform across the Balkans. The first is the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE), whose flagship project is known as the Joint History Project (JHP). Begun in 1998 to foster democracy in southeast Europe through multiperspective history education, the main focus of the JHP has been the production and dissemination of a series of workbooks that serve as supplemental classroom materials on contentious episodes in the region’s past. The four workbooks published to date focus on the Ottoman Empire, nations and states in southeast Europe, the Balkan Wars, and World War II. Nine language editions of the workbooks reach the region’s various populations: Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian,
English, Greek, Macedonian, Serbian, Turkish, and most recently—Montenegrin. I was introduced to the Joint History Project through the podcast of a Serbian news program that I listened to at home in Massachusetts. Renowned historian (and country coordinator for the project in Serbia) Dubravka Stojanović was promoting the second edition of the JHP workbooks, and was being interviewed about reconciling the disparate historical narratives of the Balkan nations. I had long been interested in this theme, though in the context of processes of “facing the past” and grassroots antiwar activism. As I was in the initial stages of developing my research proposal, the podcast interview prompted me to consider how the field of education intersects with contests of collective memory. I wondered: how do alternative educational initiatives—and the texts they produce—mediate the tension between official history and counter-histories? And how are the roles of civil society, the state, and supranational institutions negotiated in the process? I began to look into the work of the Joint History Project, and was soon convinced that CDRSEE would be an ideal primary field site for my research.

My interest in the second organization that came to have a prominent place in this project began with a late-night online research session as I prepared for my fieldwork. I stumbled upon an announcement for the first regional working session of the EUROCLIO project “History that Connects: How to teach sensitive and

---

1 The English-language edition of the workbooks serves as the master version from which other translations are produced. (It also serves as an accessible product for the project’s Western funders.) More about the JHP can be found at www.cdsee.org/projects/jhp. A further resource is an evaluation of the second stage of the project (commissioned by USAID and published in 2010) that contains a detailed description of the project’s background, methodology, and implementation. See “Out of the Broken Mirror: Learning for Reconciliation Through Multi-Perspective History Teaching in Southeast Europe,” available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACS531.pdf.
controversial history in the countries of former Yugoslavia” (hereafter History that Connects). As I would later learn, History that Connects builds directly on a previous EUROCLIO-sponsored project, “History in Action.” From 2005–2008, History in Action brought together members of the relatively newly formed history teachers’ associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia with their more established counterparts in Serbia to develop a set of classroom “workshops” on life in the former Yugoslavia. Besides the development and publication of the workshops in Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country: Everyday Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, 1945–1990, the project had the aim of building the capacities of the national associations and strengthening the working relationships between their members. At the end of the project, participants decided to continue their cooperation while tackling more controversial issues and time periods; it was thus decided that the focus of History that Connects would be “sensitive and controversial” issues from 1900–1945.

In addition to History that Connects and History in Action, EUROCLIO has organized several other methodologically similar projects in the region, whose results—supplemental classroom materials—are published as Retelling the History (focused on recent Macedonian history) and Change and Continuity in Everyday Life in Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia 1945–2000. EUROCLIO itself has existed since 1993 as an umbrella association of history educators’ associations across Europe. The organization maintains a secretariat in The Hague, staffed by Founding President and Executive Director Joke van der Leeuw-Roord, several senior and
project managers including Senior Manager Jonathan Even-Zohar (who assists Joke on projects in the former Yugoslavia, including History that Connects), and a regular roster of trainees.\(^2\) The secretariat supports a pan-European network of history educators that includes membership by over 75 history educators’ associations from more than 45 countries. In addition to numerous long-term projects—both Europe-wide and regionally or nationally specific—EUROCLIO organizes annual international conferences and regular professional development trainings for its members. EUROCLIO is supported by core funding granted through the Jean Monnet Programme (part of the EU Lifelong Learning Programme) and raises funds from various other donors to support its projects.\(^3\)

Intrigued by the announcement for the History that Connects meeting, I emailed the organization and was graciously granted permission to attend the meeting as an observer. Thus, a few days after beginning my fieldwork at the end of February, I took the train from Belgrade to Sarajevo to participate in the first History that Connects working session. Over the course of two and a half days, around 20 participants from all republics of the former Yugoslavia discussed the parameters of their new project as I took vigorous notes, unsure of how the work of this group would fit into my research. I had hoped that the meeting would serve as an introduction to some of the key figures and current issues in history education reform, but was this a field site? I was fascinated by the discussions taking place, but

\(^2\) Everyone I interviewed gave me permission to use his or her full name, and I have chosen to do so here. I also use the full names of public figures. All other names of participants in workshops and meetings are pseudonyms.

\(^3\) See http://www.euroclio.eu/ for more information.
also felt uneasy about my unanticipated participation and my “observer” status, frequently finding myself at a loss to articulate my precise interests and intentions.

While my attendance at two of EUROCLIO’s History that Connects meetings came about rather unexpectedly, my participation in the work of CDRSEE was more regular, and anticipated in my original research proposal. CDRSEE has a long-standing internship program, and as I introduced myself over email, I suggested that I could complete an internship at the organization’s office in Thessaloniki, Greece in the context of my fieldwork. When I consequently arrived at CDRSEE one day in early April, Director of Programmes Corinna Noack-Aetopulos ushered me in the door with a gush of words of welcome. As she led me upstairs to the main work area, I learned that Nenad Šebek, CDRSEE’s executive director, was Serbian and generally worked out of Belgrade, with occasional whirlwind visits to the Thessaloniki office. Jennifer Antoniadis was the development officer, but that day was in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a teacher training and press conference. Corinna and Jen were my main companions for my three-month internship, with Corinna directly overseeing my work. In addition to the JHP, the organization also implements other projects broadly focused on democracy promotion and reconciliation; as a CDRSEE intern I worked on developing a proposal for one such project. Fitting myself into CDRSEE’s established internship program allowed me to adopt a formal role in the organization and “authorized” my part-time presence in the office. It also created moments of ambivalence and ambiguity, as the role of intern did not always map neatly onto that of researcher.
After Easter, Antonis Hadjiyannakis and Zvezdana Kovač joined the small CDRSEE staff to manage the JHP’s implementation in Albania and Montenegro, respectively. The organization had recently been awarded multi-year funding for expansion of the project through the European Commission’s Directorate General for Enlargement, and was consequently gearing up for publication of new editions of the JHP workbooks, initiating a presence in Montenegro, and fresh rounds of teacher trainings throughout the region. While I had hoped to attend multiple teacher trainings (I got to only one), the timing of my research coincided with a liminal phase of the project—final grant reports were being written for the JHP’s previous funders, and the difficult work of planning and coordination was beginning for this next phase of expansion. While my initial plans had to be modified, I soon realized that conducting participant observation in an office setting in this somewhat transitional context allowed me to gain unique insight into the logics and practices of the project, the organization, and the field of history education reform itself.

As my research unfolded I maintained an interest in how, along with challenging grand narratives, the work of CDRSEE and EUROCLIO places emphasis on the “European dimension” of history. The Europeanization of history education is, partially, a “process of marginalizing particular national identities and developing a unique European identity” (Karačić 2009:1–2) that has been accompanying integration at the behest of the institutions of Europe since WWII (see Soysal and Schissler 2005). But highlighting the “European dimension” is also seen as important in these projects given that the Balkans are still frequently regarded as
“Europe’s resident alien, an internal other” (Fleming 2000:1229). The rhetoric of Balkanism represents the region’s people as a homogenous mass: violent, backward, and destined to be always at each other’s throats. And yet “the East European narrative of a ‘return to Europe’ has no special resonance in countries that believe that they never left the continent” (Snyder 2009:12). Challenging this system of representations is a goal not only of my interlocutors but of my work as well. The intellectual history of European anthropology discussed in particular by John Cole (1977) and Robert Ulin (1991) highlights the complexity of this task. To escape this fateful trap we must avoid the “denial of coevalness,” whose result is “not only to eclipse the contemporaneity of the ‘other’ but to advance, albeit unwittingly, the object of anthropological inquiry as always other than contemporary” (Ulin 1991:8).

My research is situated within this genealogy of European anthropology and the attention to dynamics of power that it suggests. I aimed to locate my interlocutors within the asymmetrical field of power in which attempts to innovate history education occur, attending to the values embedded and deployed in their work. My own position as an American student researcher colored what it was possible to discover, and the history of Western intervention and academic engagement in the region colored others’ expectations of what my interests would be.

Mine is thus not a case study of curriculum or textbook reform or even a direct analysis of the alternative educational materials produced by my interlocutors. Rather, I was interested in what these projects could reveal about the complex webbing of national, international and supranational institutions, actors
and discourses that characterizes the “transitional” former Yugoslavia. This thesis is
centered on a network of people who care deeply about history and the way it is
taught, and their efforts to change how we relate to the past. It is about the
possibilities, the limitations, and the strategies for changing the educational status quo. It is about their views of the “normal” place of history in a “normal” country.

The content of this thesis will thus undoubtedly be a surprise to some of its readers. In its focus on the mundane, ethnography “examines the instability of meaning rather than defining successful outcomes of expert design” (Mosse 2011:55). As this has the potential to appear threatening to professional communities, I emphasize that my research should not be construed as an evaluation of either organization with whom I worked. I support the work of both groups and have enormous respect for everyone who contributed to this project. My analysis is based on five and a half months of fieldwork that captured particular moments in the professional lives of my interlocutors and their projects. The case studies of History that Connects continued to be refined in further meetings after my departure. And the work of CDRSEE and the Joint History Project continued to develop as it hit the ground in new settings. While such partial and situated knowledge (Haraway 1988) is the typical product of the ethnographic enterprise, my interlocutors will undoubtedly find numerous flaws in my approach. One of the limitations of this research is that I am unable to do justice in these pages to the specific processes of educational reform as experienced in each national context. As JHP series editor and historian Christina Koulouri explained to me, “the aim of the
project was not to replace the one and only national history with the one and only new Balkan history. Our effort focused on presenting the various and complex aspects of a shared past. Besides, there is not only this shared past. The Balkan nations also followed different paths and there are not only similarities; there are also differences” (interview with author, June 28, 2011). I likewise wish to avoid contributing to a falsely homogenous Balkan historiography. Yet because of my focus on regional reform efforts, I will at times necessarily gloss over national differences in implementation and impact. There are also, of course, numerous differences between the organizations with which I worked. In the pages that follow, I am less interested in drawing out these differences than in highlighting the unique contributions that engagement with each site provided.

In chapter 1 I briefly explain the background of history education reform in the Balkans, and in chapter 2 I give an overview of the theory and methodology that informed this project. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 comprise the analytical meat of this thesis. In chapter 3, I position the work of my interlocutors within the long trajectory of international engagement in the region. I query which educational discourses inform their work, and how their practices are situated in relation to policy processes. In chapter 4, I analyze manifestations of the shifting relationship between civil society and the state in the former Yugoslavia, and the consequences implied for the citizenship goals of education. The final chapter focuses on the methodology of “multiperspectivity” championed by my interlocutors and examines the claims of reconciliation promoted through this work.
CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM: THE CONTEXT OF HISTORY EDUCATION REFORM

*A system of education is a system of expectations. All you need to know about the ways in which a polity imagines and defines its members could be found in its education.*

On March 25, 2011, Serbia’s striking teachers’ unions took to the streets in protest as I looked on. For months already the unions had been demanding that education be returned to its rightful place as a state priority. When striking teachers expressed frustration with their low salaries and the crumbling infrastructures of their schools, government authorities repeatedly responded that they didn’t understand what the unions wanted, while parents replied that teachers were lucky to have jobs at all. But below the surface disruption in public and private life caused by the 2011 teachers’ strike is a deeper rift around how to best prepare Serbia’s youth for an uncertain place in the Europe of tomorrow. Nowhere are the corners of this debate more apparent than in history class—a school subject that, according to one interlocutor, is in danger of disappearing altogether.

It is often when such controversy breaks out over a state’s educational system that the processes of negotiation and institutionalization of national narratives are laid bare (Hein and Selden 2000). Narratives of various kinds are critical to the enterprise of establishing “violent imaginaries” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001:9) that render present-day violence as a continuation of past violence. And

---

4 Hemon (2012).
history textbooks have a unique role to play in the transmission or interruption of narratives that feed violent conflict, as “digest collection[s] of indispensable messages from the past” (Stojanović 2004:335).

As elsewhere, the official history taught in schools across the Balkans is one that draws on “schematic narrative templates” (Wertsch 2002) to ensure the continued hegemony of a monolithic national history. Breaking the powerful grip of these narratives is a central goal of my interlocutors’ projects. But what does such monolithic and xenophobic national history look like? It is less that the history textbooks contain discrete inaccuracies or offensive terminology (though this is certainly true). More troubling are the cumulative and persistent effects of the history curricula taken as a whole. Numerous studies have illuminated how history textbooks contributed to the provocation of nationalism and xenophobia that made the wars of the 1990s possible (see Koren and Baranović 2009; Stojanović 2004, 2009). For example, the history curriculum in Serbia was changed in 1993 as Slobodan Milošević waged war to break up Yugoslavia. Textbooks were rewritten with the goal of historically situating, and justifying, conflict between Croatia and Serbia. The supposedly intractable conflict between these two nations indeed became the central truth of history, one “dated back with great precision to the year 1525, when the first open conflict between the two nations was detected—a date that could not be found in previous scientific historiography” (Stojanović 2011). Placed for students in this context, the conflict begun in 1991 appeared inevitable.
After Milošević was ousted in 2000, the history textbooks were again reworked. And yet, according to historian Dubravka Stojanović, “despite the 'cleaned up' text, it is interesting that the matrix of interpreting the dissolution of Yugoslavia remained fundamentally identical to the one in Milošević’s textbooks” (2011). History textbooks thus continue to ensure that myths of heroic victimization (Bakić-Hayden 2004; Čolović 2002; Volkan 1996) and “the denial syndrome” (Rame 2007) in Serbia, for example, maintain a framework in which all historical conflicts become wars of self-defense or liberation waged against forces seeking to destroy the nation (see Obradović-Wochnik 2009; Yerkes 2004; see Koulouri 2002; Slater 1995 for discussions of similar processes across southeast Europe). The political expediency of such “blurring of the distance between past and present” (Šuber 2006:5) is a theme that is well covered in studies of the wars in the former Yugoslavia (see Popov 2000). While the current projects of EUROCLIO and CDRSEE do not directly address the period of the breakup of Yugoslavia, they challenge students' understanding of more recent events by complicating the schema through which they interpret history. As Jonathan elaborated on EUROCLIO’s approach, “History is what you make of it to tell it. So, it’s not about teaching that there is no truth, it’s about showing how a truth is constructed...if you do it well, it hopefully empowers students to actually consider the value of their arguments” (interview with author, May 12, 2011). The methodology promoted through the alternative educational materials of EUROCLIO and CDRSEE hinges on the power of multiperspectivity to poke holes in tightly woven national narratives.
It is important at this juncture to situate the work of my interlocutors within a wider European context. While the often fraught relationship between Eastern and Western Europe is a theme of this thesis, it is also true that “remembering old wars within the framework of present political and social contexts and conflicts does not in itself seem to be specifically Balkan” (Höpken 1999:191). From the 2006 controversy over the depiction of Josef Stalin in Russian textbooks to France’s 2005 draft law that encouraged history teachers to present the French colonial empire in a more positive light, recent public debate over how the past is to be presented in history class has spanned the European continent and beyond. Long before these controversies exploded, international textbook revision committees were undertaking the difficult work of revising the versions of sensitive international history taught in schools, most notably through the Franco-German textbook commission and the German-Polish textbook commission (Leeuw-Roord 2008:3).

While historical narratives—especially narratives of war—are commonly used to bolster national identity as well as to “transmit officially desired social values and virtues” (Höpken 1999:192), there is perhaps something unique that distinguishes Balkan national narratives from those of Western Europe. Historian Charles Ingrao argues that it is a “fortuitous absence of domestic enemies or previous foreign subjugation that separates most Western historical narratives from those of most other countries. There is no need to base virtue and loyalty on the repudiation of ‘others’ who live among you or nearby” (2009:183). The repudiation of domestic enemies and close neighbors has certainly been a central feature of
historical narratives transmitted through Balkan history textbooks. Further, since 1989, history has been thrust into the public sphere in a similar way across much of postsocialist Europe. But in the former Yugoslavia, the country’s bloody dissolution and the prominent place of the past in justifying its wars ensured that “history was a discipline everyone practiced at all times” (Stojanović 2011). This sense of history as a subject situated rather “abnormally” in the public sphere was a sentiment echoed by my interlocutors, who saw their reform efforts in part as attempts to restore history to its “normal” status as an interpretive science removed from continuous public and political controversy.

While strides have been made in this project to interrupt the transmission of mutually exclusive national narratives in history classrooms across the region, progress has been spotty. The content of the curriculum, the quality of available history textbooks, and the freedom that teachers have in choosing the book they will use and implementing the curriculum varies greatly across the region. History education remains most starkly divisive in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it is part of the “national group of subjects” for which the curriculum changes depending on the ethnicity of the students. The “two-schools-under-one-roof” system in place in some towns assures that students of different ethnicities never meet in the classroom. In a hypothetically integrated classroom, Bosniak, Croat and Serb students would break apart for each history lesson (Hemon 2012).5

5 This system is in place in schools in some areas of the Bosnian Federation only, as no provision for minority students exists in Republika Srpska (Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity). A landmark ruling by the municipal court of Mostar on April 27, 2012 determined that the two-schools-under-one-roof
Yet, reform efforts have been ongoing for at least the past ten years. In the field of education, Western influence and funds channeled through international organizations and multilateral institutions have crucially shaped the reform process that began in earnest at the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. Mapping wider trends, international intervention in education in the former Yugoslavia shifted over time from a humanitarian focus on helping to rebuild schools impacted by war to promoting a broader human rights agenda (Bassler 2005:2–3). As elsewhere, educational change in the Balkans has been caught up in the complex interplay of political, economic, and social forces pressing for democratization and the “transition” of authoritarian systems (McLeish and Phillips 1998; Mebrahtu et al. 2000:11). At times, donor-initiated efforts have been central to educational reforms; at other times their role has seemed “like some mirage” whose impact remains elusive (Bassler 2005:9). Of course, individual intellectuals, academic historians and history educators have also had important roles in these efforts, which have played out rather differently in each national context (Dimou 2009:15–17). Before delving into my analysis of some aspects of these continuing reform projects, I first turn to a brief overview of the theory and methodology that informed my research.

---

system violated antidiscrimination law, and ordered schools in the towns of Stolac and Capljina to merge their classes by the start of the school year. Immediate compliance with the ruling is unlikely, however, in no small part because a unified curriculum does not exist for such students to learn from (see Jelin 2012).
CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

I did not set out to design a multi-sited project. I spoke Serbian, I had lived in Serbia for two years, and returning to Belgrade to conduct my fieldwork seemed like a given. But as I began to hone in on history education reform, it emerged that this topic—seemingly a clear-cut nationally bounded issue—was anything but. Conducting fieldwork across multiple sites slowly revealed itself to me as both necessary and logical, because the projects I was interested in studying were themselves so constituted. While it will eventually be implemented at the most local level, History that Connects was developed in The Hague. The product of long-term academic exchange and numerous regional meetings, CDRSEE’s Joint History Project is administered in Thessaloniki. Both are meted out in intense weekend meetings that bring together participants from across the region, and both are disseminated through local teacher trainings.

My project was thus multi-sited in the strictly geographical sense: I conducted fieldwork in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Subotica, Serbia; in Sarajevo, Bosnia; in Thessaloniki, Greece; and in Veles, Macedonia. My interlocutors lived in these cities and beyond—in The Hague, in Zagreb, in Athens. While I did spend two months based in Serbia, my field site was not “Serbia” and the culture of interest was not that of “the Serbs” but rather a transnational, multiethnic group of historians, history teachers and NGO professionals who coalesced around efforts to
“modernize” history teaching. I primarily wanted to investigate how this group of actors sought to mitigate the influence of enduring ethnocentric national histories in the Balkans through their joint work. As the initiatives of my interlocutors were regional in nature, I realized that my approach must be as well.

At the same time, in defining these efforts as my object of study, my project became multi-sited in a sense beyond the geographic. While I don’t locate my work at the farthest end of those who have taken up George Marcus’s famous 1995 call for multi-sited ethnography, my project does aspire to fit within his frame of an ethnography both “in and of the world system,” such that “the world system is not the theoretically constituted holistic frame that gives context to the contemporary study of peoples or local subjects closely observed by ethnographers, but it becomes, in a piecemeal way, integral to and embedded in discontinuous, multi-sited objects of study” (Marcus 1995:98). Locating myself in two different primary sites—the office of CDRSEE in Thessaloniki and regional meetings of EUROCLIO’s History that Connects project—allowed me to encounter and explore two very different nodes along the chain of civil-society-initiated history education reform. In this way, I aimed to attend to the “circuits of power and knowledge” through which social memory is negotiated (Alonso 1988:49), and to construct my object of inquiry as encounters that are implicated in new configurations of culture and power (Tsing 2005). I was thus able to approach my research question from different vantage points; to encounter its enactment on differing levels and scales.
Of course, the benefits I reaped by extending my project across the Balkans and beyond were balanced by numerous methodological and logistical challenges. Besides having to “set up camp” on three separate occasions (my itinerary was Belgrade–Thessaloniki–Belgrade), I felt chronically ill served by background preparation that was largely specific to the activist scene in Serbia. The “culture” of my interlocutors was sometimes that of international NGO professionals, sometimes history teachers from across the former Yugoslavia, and sometimes academic historians whose jokes and references I struggled to comprehend. I found the pace of my fieldwork alternately overwhelmingly intense (as at my first two-day EUROCLIO meeting), and impossibly plodding (as when working quietly at the CDRSEE office). I also frequently had the sense of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, subject to the scheduling of meetings over which I had no control. Of course, in these challenges multi-sitedness converged with the experience of first fieldwork and the exploratory nature of my project. Over time, I did become more accustomed to the “improvisational” nature of fieldwork, with how “ethnography entails constantly adjusting one’s tactics and making judgments based on particular contexts that one can never fully anticipate” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007:20).

Traveling and working in multiple sites amongst this far-flung group of people allowed me to better understand their projects as I believe they saw this work: of fundamental importance but without immediate rewards, uneasily tethered to Western influence, and rife with political conflicts that at times appeared intractable. Participant-observation was the cornerstone of my approach—I worked
as an intern for three months at the CDRSEE office, attended two regional meetings of the EUROCLIO History that Connects project and one CDRSEE local teacher training. I tested my observations in semi-structured interviews with nine actors variously engaged in the development of alternative educational materials. Though my site was sometimes shifting, privileging “being there” as much as possible allowed me to approach a “closer fit between the order of words and the order of things” (Borneman and Hammoudi 2009:14).

My interlocutors were natural mediators of the order of things in several ways. The history teachers I encountered were responsible for interpreting the national curriculum, textbooks, and alternative materials into lessons for their students. The academic historians were translators from historiography to history education. The NGO professionals and trainers mediated between the policies of US- and EU-based donors and everyone else. All fit within a Gramscian understanding of the intellectual, as a group that includes “all those with a responsibility to instill knowledge into others and ensure, in however minor a way, that a given way of seeing the world is reproduced” (Crehan 2002:132). The group of intellectuals who were my interlocutors were indeed engaged in this role, attempting to provoke a transformation in the way the world is seen through how history is taught. Their projects aimed at disrupting, student-by-student, the reproduction of monolithic national narratives in each of the Balkan nations.
Querying the extent to which these transformative efforts could be considered counter-hegemonic thus became a central preoccupation. What are the possibilities for contestation and counter-hegemonic projects in the educational systems of the Balkans? Addressing this question required me to train critical attention on the shifting constellations of power between the state, civil society, and supranational institutions—all actors implicated in educational reform. Yet, the boundaries between these fields of actors should not be taken as static. While at times Gramsci defines the state in terms of domination and in opposition to civil society, he later remakes this sense of the state in the term “political society” and includes it along with civil society in his definition of the “integral” state: “the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (SPN 244 in Crehan 2002:102; see also SPN 262–3 in Forgacs 2000:235). As will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, governance can no longer be considered solely within the purview of the national state but is implicated in the role of supranational institutions as well. Further, now at the center of the tangle of influence on educational reform are nongovernmental organizations, and my research certainly echoes the theme that “NGOs are caught in the double binds created by global and local funding sources, governmental regimes, and manifestations of neoliberalism” (Mertz and Timmer 2010:174). I was thus interested in the field of possibilities in which my interlocutors found themselves, and how they navigated their positions as mediators of particular, shifting, social worlds.
In this investigation I take up Eric Wolf’s challenge to “spell out the processes of power which created the present-day cultural systems and the linkages between them” (1974:261). This is the final sense in which my fieldwork was multi-sited, as I became engaged in studying policies that emanated from EU institutions, but were constructed out of global discourses of development and education whose authors remain elusive and whose meaning was not made in one particular site (Shore and Wright 1997:11; Wedel et al. 2005). Tracing policy processes thus required attention to connections and interactions, but also to the documents in which policy is typically consolidated. Understanding ruling relations as textually mediated (Smith 2001:164), I collected key EU documents related to educational policy, NGO promotional publications, meeting reports, donor guidelines, training materials, and the alternative educational materials of my interlocutors themselves. My work is situated within an anthropology of policy in which “whatever else it might be, policy must also be understood as a type of power as well as the embodiment of a certain kind of instrumental reason” (Wedel et al. 2005:37). Policy is a tool of governance that has the ability to fashion subjectivities (Shore and Wright 1997:5), and it is thus through policy processes that “we are able to observe the way fragments of culture and society are brought into new alignments with each other to create new social and semantic terrains” (Shore and Wright 2011:2). Mapping some of the contests of power that occur on—and over—this terrain is a central goal of this thesis.
CHAPTER 3
TRANSMATIONAL PROJECT SOCIETY

"History is made neither by objective forces nor dialectical laws; it is made instead by people, who act to transform their world within the limits of historical possibilities."

Introduction

While neither EUROCLIO nor CDRSEE is based in the former Yugoslavia, implementation of both History that Connects and the Joint History Project relies on the continued interest of donors to fund such work in the region. Foreign interest in supporting civil society in the former Yugoslavia began in the early 1990s, with an influx of humanitarian aid that first arrived as the wars in Croatia and Bosnia wound down (BCSDN 2012:11). Local NGOs were incorporated in droves. Foreign donors assumed that implicit in these new formations was a liberal-individualist understanding of civil society as mediator between the family on the one hand and the state on the other, predicated on autonomous individual agency (Hann 1996). And yet, the contexts for social action and subsequent practices of civil society in the region imbued the concept with a powerful “flexibility and ambiguity” that diverged significantly from this ideal (Gal and Kligman 2000:92). In contrast to the liberal conception of civil society as allowing individuals the agency to associate and pursue their interests, Gal and Kligman argue that the postsocialist form of civil

---

6 The title of this chapter is derived from Steven Sampson’s characterization of the NGO scene in the Balkans as “project society.” See Sampson (2002).
7 Sher (1977).
8 The Joint History Project also spans a wider regional range, including Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania and Turkey.
society in Eastern Europe has provided space for the formation of such identities and interests (2000:105).

   The postsocialist and postconflict promotion of civil society in the Balkans largely focused on increasing the number of NGOs, and subsequently increasing the “capacity” and “sustainability” of these NGOs (Sampson 1996:128). Similar processes had already unfolded across postsocialist Europe: in Russia, while under socialism civil society had been imagined as a path between capitalism and communism, it became a postsocialist “signifier” of the triumph of the capitalist system, a professionalized realm linked to the project of neoliberal governmentality (Hemment 2007). In the context of the global encroachment of neoliberalism, NGOs have become “de facto agents of democracy rather than products of a thriving democratic culture” (Kamat 2004:156). With little to no financial support from national governments or private citizens, NGOs in the countries of the former Yugoslavia remain inextricably linked to, and dependent on, foreign aid (see Coles 2007; Hann 1996; Sampson 1996). To a great extent in Balkan public discourse, civil society has become synonymous with this professionalized world of NGOs and associated with foreign intervention.

   For some time, the Stability Pact for Peace and Economic Development in the Balkans was the most significant channel for multilateral funding of civil society in the region. Initiated by the European Union in 1999 and signed by regional national governments as well as the US and major international organizations, the Stability
Pact was an effort to implement a comprehensive and proactive strategy for regional development and the prevention of further conflict. While education was not originally a Stability Pact priority, it soon became one, and support for educational reform consequently expanded in the region (Bassler 2005:2). During this time (2002–2008), the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact was Dr. Erhard Busek, a former Minister for Education in Austria and long-time member of the CDRSEE board. In 2008, the Stability Pact was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). While the RCC continues to fulfill the mandate of the Stability Pact to encourage regional cooperation and European integration, it is primarily a “catalyst and ‘incubator’ of activities” (RCC 2010:2) rather than a donor entity itself.

A cluster of multilateral and bilateral donors and private foundations remains engaged in educational reform in the Balkans, including the Open Society Institute (OSI), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), OSCE, USAID, the national embassies of some European countries, and of course, the European Union. In Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, the EU is the largest funder of civil society across all sectors, with funding allocated to civil society in 2010–11 ranging from 2.1 million Euros for Macedonia to 4.5 million Euros for Albania. In Serbia, the EU, OSI and SIDA each provided 2 million Euros of civil society funding in 2010–11 (BCSDN 2012:51).9 Since 2007, European Union funding to candidate and potential candidate countries is channeled through “IPA,”

---

9 As an EU member state since 2004, Slovenia was not included in BCSDN’s study, nor was Croatia, as a candidate country that many multilateral donors have left.
the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, with the goal of bringing these
countries in line with the “European standards” detailed in the *acquis
communautaire*, or body of European Union law that must be adhered to by each
member state (European Communities 2009:4–5).10 The Balkan Civil Society
Development Network—a Skopje-based network of 15 southeast European civil
society organizations—recently concluded that the EU is a “potential hegemonic
power,” as

it gives extensive provision of support to a wide variety of issues,
ranging from ‘political’ to ‘developmental’ and ‘governance-oriented’. . . . This potentially places the EU in a strong position to determine the
focus of democracy promotion agendas and assistance. It also means
that the effectiveness of the [European] Commission’s intervention is
a critical driver of how international assistance in the Western
Balkans is perceived and legitimized. [BCSDN 2012:51]

My interlocutors considered the EU to be more than just a “potential”
hegemonic power. EU grants were deemed the most difficult to apply for and to
actually get, but also the most coveted, as they potentially provided sufficient
funding to implement large-scale, multi-year projects. However, whether
characterized as promoting “democracy,” “reconciliation,” or “history education
reform,” the perception amongst my interlocutors was that their work was not a
funding priority of the EU or other donors. Jen frequently lamented that CDRSEE’s
cause of “democracy” is simply not one to which donors flock, characterizing it as
“too theoretical, too abstract.” Jonathan from EUROCLIO held a similar view, telling
me that “this issue we are working with, to develop and strengthen history teaching

---

10 More information about the Stability Pact and the RCC can be found at
across Europe and beyond is very much a political story, so it’s not that easy to obtain funds in a similar way as let’s say, AIDS prevention or AIDS education, or awareness-raising campaigns” (interview with author, May 12, 2011). Over lunch one day at CDRSEE, Corinna and Jen reiterated their mock agreement to write a project proposal to introduce polar bears in the Balkans, because cute polar bears are a cause to which people would give money (field notes, June 20, 2011).

Such views stem from recognition of the decline in overall donor interest in the region and the fact that “current funding tendencies have ‘fragmented’ SEE into sub-regions of donors’ priorities or country-focused activities” (USAID 2010:iv). But they also express a widely shared sentiment that these projects are rather exceptional, eternally mismatched with the discourses of education and development into which they must be translated for funding proposals. In this chapter, I aim to parse the tensions between the impact my interlocutors strove to make in the field of history education reform, and the interests and requirements of the donors from whom they sought funding. As this interaction was at the forefront of daily activity in the CDRSEE office, I draw primarily on field notes from my three-month internship, as well as on my interviews with the CDRSEE staff. To better map the terrain of donor interests, I also conduct a word count analysis of 29 key European Union documents focused on education policy. Throughout this analysis, I ask: what are the dominant discourses that impact civil-society-initiated efforts to promote history education reform, and how are these discourses made
authoritative? How does policy act to organize the work of my interlocutors, and what kinds of responses does it provoke?

**Discourses of Education: From People-to-People to Accountability**

The organizations with which I worked had each been sustained over the past ten years by an array of donors, and their staff had experience fundraising on both small and large scales. The leadership of both organizations invested a significant amount of time in pitching projects to potential donors. Other staff members also devoted considerable effort to the task of fundraising and were continually shepherding project proposals through the submission process. As mature, professional organizations with impressive experience implementing multinational projects, neither EUROCLIO nor CDRSEE fit the profile of a fledgling community-based initiative struggling to get off the ground. Nevertheless, decoding and translating the interests and expectations of donors occupied much time and attention. Corinna emphasized that the EU has made available a “project cycle management guide” that while difficult to understand, once mastered, provides the key to handling applications (personal communication, August 4, 2012). But for those less thoroughly initiated into the bureaucratized world of project management—and for myself as a CDRSEE intern—a cloud of mystery surrounded the expectations and operational procedures of the largest donors, in particular the granting bodies of the European Union. Jen perceived a difference in this regard between major funders. As she explained,
USAID I find is really good in the sense that they always explain what they want, and they’re always really clear in why they’re rejecting you, why they’re accepting you, but also I mean, they ask a question, they don’t just use a word that’s a real jargon word that no one knows about, they actually give you documents to explain what they mean. So, you never go in blind. Whereas with the EU, you’re talking about terms and requirements that you don’t always understand, they don’t clarify them, and their system is really difficult to get any extra information on anything . . . the EU is just a bit of an administrative black hole, you know, you just can’t get anything out of it. [interview with author, June 17, 2011]

Jen was referring to USAID’s rather exceptional practice of providing feedback on rejected proposals, as CDRSEE had recently received such a letter for a project proposal submitted to USAID’s Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation Programs Fund. The Fund is earmarked for “people-to-people” projects to “bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war” (USAID 2011a:5). This project would have been carried out in Bosnia. The program guidelines stipulate that “successful applications under this funding opportunity will describe a people-to-people approach based on a context and conflict analysis that leads to a concrete program change hypothesis. Programs should be based on best practices, build capacity of local partners, and incorporate gender analysis into the proposed approach” (USAID 2011a:6). When the rejection letter arrived, Jen accepted the reviewers’ apparent reservations about the sustainability of the project, as they had not been able to find a suitable local partner to meet the stated goal of “building capacity.” But she was crestfallen about another critique, saying “I really read about the people-to-people thing, and thought we really explained it” (field notes, May 27, 2011).
As Jen’s comments suggest, what USAID means by “people-to-people” was detailed in a separate document, the Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management’s 33-page “People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide” published in January 2011. This guide explains that people-to-people “entails bringing together representatives of conflicting groups to interact purposefully in a safe space,” with the goal of building relationships, understanding and trust between parties formerly in conflict (USAID 2011b:6). But while “people-to-people” may have been presented by USAID as a relatively new programmatic focus based on good practices in the field of conflict management, it also joins the ranks of “capacity building,” “empowerment,” and “participation” as the latest addition to a fluctuating cluster of development concepts that form a powerful discourse—one necessary to master in order to secure project funding.

Such terms have alternately been characterized as development jargon or “buzzwords” (Cornwall and Eade 2010), “key words” (Apthorpe 1997), “developmentspeak” (Eade 2010:iix), or “project-speak” (Sampson 1996:123). Developmentspeak is “simultaneously descriptive and normative, concrete and yet aspirational, intuitive and clunkily pedestrian, capable of expressing the most deeply held convictions or of being simply ‘full of sound and fury, signifying nothing’” (Eade 2010:iix). In other words, it is simultaneously vacant of meaning and determinant of the boundaries of how fundable projects are articulated. Critiques of development discourse have been articulated by the leading figures of post-developmental theory, particularly in the 1980s and 90s, and it is not my aim to
rehearse such arguments here (see Escobar 1995; Sachs 1992). But considering
development as a “historically produced discourse” (Escobar 1995:6), I am
interested in the spaces where development and education coincide, in what
discursive patterns can be found in the educational policies of the EU, and in how
such patterns help to determine the range of possibilities available to my
interlocutors in advancing their projects of alternative history education reform.

To begin to address these questions, I performed a word count analysis of 29
documents considered by the European Commission to be its “main policy
initiatives and outputs in education and training” published between February 2001
and February 2011.\footnote{Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/policy-framework_en.htm.} Included are reports on “modernizing education and training,”
“education for sustainable development,” and Council\footnote{Refers to the Council of the European Union, one of the EU’s three decision-making bodies, along
with the European Parliament and the European Commission. Not to be confused with the Council of
Europe (CoE), an intergovernmental organization that is not part of the EU institutional structure but
whose membership includes 47 countries, including all 27 EU countries.} conclusions on how
education articulates with the EU’s new \textit{Europe 2020} strategy, or the previous
“Lisbon strategy.” Ranging in length from two to 263 pages, taken together, the
document set contained 159,271 words.\footnote{The word count was performed using MaxQDA software. Words were counted that were 5
characters or longer. A stop-list of common words deemed irrelevant for my purposes (such as
“therefore” and “almost”) was applied. I then performed a stem search for high-scoring words,
combining and re-ranking words such as “education” and “educationally.” Words are ranked by their
absolute frequency. See Appendix for a full table of the top 50 words used in this document set.} Certain development buzzwords that I
expected to encounter, such as “capacity-building” and “empowerment,” did not
appear in the resulting list of the top 50 words used across these key policy
initiatives. Others, like “participation” and “cooperation,” did appear, but relatively
far down the list (ranks 35 and 39, respectively). Instead, my word count analysis of these policy documents suggests a preoccupation with two concepts in particular: employability and accountability. A concern with employability is demonstrated by the high rankings of the terms in Table 1, while a focus on accountability can be gleaned from the terms in Table 2.

Table 1: Employability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>lifelong</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>skill/s/ed</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>adult/s</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>qualification/s</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>vocational/ly</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>labour</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Accountability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>level/s</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>policy/ies</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>implement/ation/ed/ing/s</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>quality</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>strategy/ies</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>progress</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>measures</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>objectives</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concern over the “qualifications” and “skills” of the European workforce, as seen in Table 1, mirrors a fixation on competitiveness expressed in the latest overall strategy of the EU, *Europe 2020*. The strategy suggests that Europe’s path to “sustainable recovery” from the current economic crisis can be addressed in part through “lifelong learning:” educational initiatives aimed at increasing the vocational skills and qualifications of adults on the labor market (European Commission 2010:9–10). This strategy codifies and reinforces a longer-term concern with the employability of young Europeans that preceded the economic meltdown (see Pépin 2007 for a full discussion of how “lifelong learning” became a strategic objective of the EU). Over at least the past 15 years, a turn towards a vocational focus in education has married with an emphasis on professional skills to prepare students for roles as producers and consumers in a competitive European economy (Hill and Kumar 2009:18; Hirtt 2009:215).

A concern with employability goes hand-in-hand with a focus on the implementation of policies, programs, and strategies that contain objectives and measures of levels of quality and progress—in other words, accountability, as seen in Table 2. In the context of education, a primary result of the preoccupation with accountability has been a diversion of attention from the substance of learning (Harris 2007:89). The EU’s new initiative “Youth on the Move” urges member states to “enhance the openness and relevance of education systems by building national qualification frameworks and better gearing learning outcomes towards labour market needs” (European Commission 2010:11). The terms in Table 2 index
practices of audit that migrated from their original context in financial accounting to new areas of life during the 1980s and 1990s (Shore and Wright 2000:59). The flexible yet seemingly stable terms of audit constitute a technique of governance at a distance (Rose 2006:156–157). The technologies and discourses of accountability fit within a moral order in which they act as “agents for the creation of new kinds of subjectivity: self-managing individuals who render themselves auditable” (Shore and Wright 2000:57), a result that will be addressed more directly in chapter 4.

The increased preoccupation with efficiency, standards, and measures in schools is a hallmark of our neoliberal era and thus a worldwide trend (see Hill and Kumar 2009). But in focusing my analysis above specifically on EU educational policy, I wanted to show how European Union funding for education in candidate and potential candidate countries can be understood as steeped in the discourses of employability and accountability, where “economic efficiency” and “good practice” must proceed together (Strathern 2000:2). It has recently been argued that “NGOs cannot be sustainable if they disregard or fail to adapt to reigning hegemonic discourses emerging from funding and governmental agencies” (Timmer 2010:265). While this is certainly true, it is also true that NGO practices are not simply determined by such discourses but “develop within local ethical regimes and particular historical contexts” (Curtis 2010:202). The practices of the NGOs I worked with demonstrate responses that range from promotion of, to consent to, and complaisance with the discourses of employability and accountability that
colored donors’ expectations of their projects. I now turn to a consideration of how these practices played out.

**Promotion, Consent and Complaisance**

The contemporary hegemonic discourses of education that privilege employability and accountability are the result of a convergence of wider educational trends involving a range of international institutions, including UNESCO. In 1996, the report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century established four pillars of education: learning to know, learning to do, learning to live together, and learning to be (Delors 1996:20–21). These pillars have slowly morphed into eight “key competencies” deemed necessary to ensure “personal fulfillment and development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment” (European Communities 2007:3).14 Definitions of these competencies and an explanation of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes related to each one are detailed in a “European Reference Framework” brochure published by the Lifelong Learning Programme of the EC’s Directorate General for Education and Culture. As the Framework explains, these eight competencies are interrelated and further informed by the “themes” (elsewhere referred to as “transversal competencies”) of critical thinking, creativity, initiative, problem-solving, risk assessment, decision-taking, and constructive management of feelings (European Communities 2007:3).

---

14 The eight key competencies are: communication in the mother tongue; communication in foreign languages; mathematical competence and basic competencies in science and technology; digital competence; learning to learn; social and civic competencies; sense of initiative and entrepreneurship; and cultural awareness and expression (European Communities 2007:3).
I was first introduced to the concept of competencies at the EUROCLIO-facilitated History that Connects meetings. At the end of the second meeting (which was dedicated to workshopping the draft modules that participants had prepared on select historical controversies) we were given copies of the Framework brochure. In small groups, we were tasked with evaluating the extent to which we thought the materials produced through the project would meet the goal of imparting these clusters of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. EUROCLIO Executive Director Joke van der Leeuw-Roord had explained to the project participants, “this gives you an opportunity to show that what you do is related to that thinking” and “I want you to refer to that to be sure you also work within a larger framework” (field notes, June 26, 2011).

My small group (composed of meeting “observers” rather than the core participants) found it difficult to determine off-hand whether or not the teaching modules of History that Connects would respond to any or all of the competencies presented in the brochure. But the point had been made—this was a framework to be taken seriously. This message was reinforced at the end of the session when Joke left us to complete an evaluation of the two-day working session that included an assessment of whether or not the draft modules contributed to the development of competencies referred to as “historical skills” and that resonated with the transversal competencies named above (see Figure 1).
It is hardly surprising that the work of EUROCLIO is tightly bound to the discourses of education championed by the institutions of Europe. The association was formed in close cooperation with the Council of Europe, and while History that Connects is notably not funded by the EU, EUROCLIO receives its core funding from the European Commission, and the project was structured to fit within the EU's objectives for lifelong learning. Joke later emphasized to me that:

The whole issues of competencies ... is that educators have tried over the last 30 years to get a better understanding what education is about. The European Reference document ... is a rather comprehensive attempt to give meaning to what we in education want to achieve. And for history education the citizenship competency is most relevant as well as what are called the transversal competencies with issues such as critical thinking and creativity. [personal communication, June 23, 2012]

“Competencies” can thus be viewed as an advancement in pedagogical theory and practice, spurred into codification in EU policy through the advocacy work of educators. But competencies also serve the EU policy goals of employability and
accountability: while history education has come under the neoliberal knife for contributing little to its instrumentalist goals, the language of competencies holds the potential to save the subject from irrelevance to the newly marketized sphere of education, as the acquisition of competencies, rather than general knowledge, ensures the production of a flexible and adaptable workforce able to compete on the neoliberal market (Hirtt 2009:218).

At CDRSEE one day in late May, Jen and I were in the final stages of drafting a proposal for a project aimed at building the capacity of women’s organizations (in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia) to be submitted under the EU’s Civil Society Facility.¹⁵ The previous day had been spent working out the budget with CDRSEE’s accountant. I had thus spent several hours the previous night carefully reading through the first half of the proposal, as creation of the budget had necessitated several adjustments and I wanted to ensure that the narrative portrayed the project consistently. I continued this work in the morning at the office, as Jen quickly drafted the budget justification based on a previous one for a similar grant request. She then sat with me at my computer as we worked through the last remaining sections of the proposal that I had felt ill equipped to tackle on my own. The final columns of the logical framework (a required component of the proposal know as the “logframe,” detailing the logic of the project’s objectives, activities, and expected results) turned out to be more work than I had anticipated, even with Jen’s help. She seemed to have a pretty good handle on what was expected, and led the way through the tedious

¹⁵ The Civil Society Facility is a specific budget line of IPA dedicated to civil society development.
process of figuring out what the “assumptions,” “conditions,” and “objectifiably verifiable factors” were that we could list for each project objective and result.

I felt my whole being rejecting this task—it was hot, I was tired, and I had little interest in what seemed like a purely bureaucratic exercise. While I knew that she felt the same way, Jen kept repeating that the logframe “actually is helpful” and that “this should have been done first.” I sympathized with her on this point, as having the framework completed beforehand would have made it easier for me to put the right words in the right places in the narrative of the proposal. Jen insisted that the language needed to match up exactly, meaning that I had to double-check and change my wording so that the “specific objectives” mentioned in numerous places in the narrative matched those listed in the logframe. Throughout the three-month process of drafting the proposal and particularly on this final day, I was struck by how the requirements of the application procedure all but ensured that the “language used in a funding application was more important than the project itself” (Timmer 2010:268).

Faced with the task of developing projects for what she characterized as the “administrative black hole” of the EU, Jen had the sense that project funding largely boiled down to “pure luck.” And yet she accepted the validity of the EU’s requirements for conceptualizing and developing a project. While sometimes the practices of the NGOs I worked with could be characterized as consent to or even promotion of the discourses of education circulating through the institutions of
Europe and beyond, at other times resistance to these discourses was expressed in the form of frustration or cynicism. As elsewhere, the NGO actors I worked with sometimes found themselves caught in the “double binds” of needing to master and deploy a professional discourse that they didn't necessarily see as relevant to their work, with sometimes sincere but often cynical results (Mertz and Timmer 2010:174). There was a general sense that the projects of my interlocutors were essentially un-measurable, and resistance was expressed in particular to donors’ insistence on quantitative measures of the success of projects. One teacher trainer explained that while he understood that funders sought such figures, “a way to follow the fate of the workbooks simply does not exist. How many of them ended up on the shelf and how many are in the classroom? I don’t know, and we will never know.”16 Or as CDRSEE’s executive director put it, “We work on changing the mindset. That’s a process that takes time . . . so none of our projects are shorter than two years, something like that. And usually they bring rewards significantly later” (interview with author, July 25, 2011).

Following Riles (2006) and Mosse (2011) we can explain cynicism as a part of the development or NGO persona, that “the true professional is a bit cynical” (Mosse 2011:57). But taking a cue from Abu-Lughod (1990), reading cynicism as a form of resistance may be most useful in alerting us that we have stumbled upon an important field of power. Scholars have argued that a double bind requires not only “paradoxical communication” but also the threat of force and a relationship of

16 This and all other translations are my own.
dependency to be in place (Urban 1985; Walker 1989:184). While direct coercion is not relevant in this case, the second point is quite germane—donors have the money that applicants desperately want.

Given this complex terrain of power, Yuson Jung’s sense of “complaisance” (2010) may be the best tool for describing the way in which promotional and consenting practices couple with resistance in the responses of my interlocutors in navigating the policy worlds of which they are a part. Described as “the inability not to follow,” complaisance is something like reluctant acquiescence; it “emphasizes that not all ‘playing along’ implies complicity by the follower, and highlights that agency can be exercised in spaces other than resistance or complicity” (Jung 2010:318). In analyzing the dominant discourses of education and laying out a continuum of responses to these discourses, in this chapter I aimed to highlight that “policy worlds open up ambiguous spaces in which actors and agents compete for influence” (Shore and Wright 2011:19); spaces in which my interlocutors employed a range of strategies and occupied a range of positions. One of the more successful strategies used to promote alternative projects of history education reform was to tether such projects to a discourse of reconciliation, the results of which I will consider in chapter 5. I first turn to an analysis of how the increasing influence of supranational institutions and discourses has affected the relationship between civil society and the national state.
CHAPTER 4
NEW CONFIGURATIONS OF THE STATE AND CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

CDRSEE’s Joint History Project began in earnest with a series of workshops dedicated to exploring history education in the nations of southeast Europe and the subsequent publication of *Clio in the Balkans*. The research in this comparative volume showed that “the weaker the state, the more important its leadership usually feels it is to control history teaching, in the not unreasonable expectation that such control, manifested alike in curricula, textbooks and teaching, would over time strengthen the feelings of ethnic solidarity and state allegiance of pupils” (Carras 2010:1). Ana Alonso similarly argues that the reproduction of the hegemony of the nation-state is accomplished through the production of official historical discourses that appropriate and subordinate counter-histories, resulting in a hegemonic ideology that reproduces relations of domination and subordination (1988:44–49). The central role of education in bolstering the legitimacy of the nation-state and consolidating national identity has been well established (Gellner 1983; Smith 1991). The theories of Gramsci, Althusser and Bourdieu have shown that the dissemination of official historical discourses through the apparatus of the educational system is one way in which the hegemony of the nation-state is perpetuated and the prevailing social order maintained (Althusser 1971; Bourdieu 1977; Gramsci 2000). And yet, as discussed in chapter 3, new constellations of power are influencing education across the Balkans. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has
argued, "in the era of globalization state practices, functions, and effects increasingly obtain in sites other than the national but that never fully bypass the national order (2003:89). Even in this era of neoliberalism, capital requires an interventionist state (Harvey 2005:21), particularly in the endeavor to produce “an ideologically compliant but technically and hierarchically skilled workforce” (Kumar and Hill 2009:3).

As discussed in chapter 3, the Balkans has emerged as a key site for democratic and nation-building projects—interventions that include the bolstering of civil society as a pillar of democracy (Brown, K. 2006; Coles 2007). While the development of NGOs in the Balkans must be understood within this particular postsocialist and postconflict context, their proliferation is also an outgrowth of the worldwide neoliberal turn. Since the 1980s, NGOs have increasingly been forced into the void left by the neoliberal shrinking of certain aspects of national states and the expansion of markets (Harvey 2005:177; Kamat 2004). One interlocutor commented that while she viewed the now frequent cooperation between NGOs and schools in Serbia as a positive development, an unexpected consequence is that the relevant state institutions seem to regard aspects of their traditional mandate to be within the purview of NGOs. This observation points to an ongoing debate and continued tension around what the proper roles of civil society and the state should be. As Kate Crehan characterizes Gramsci’s complex notion of this relationship: “The state and civil society . . . do not represent two bounded universes, always and forever separate, but rather a knot of tangled power relations which, depending on
the questions we are interested in, can be disentangled into different assemblages of threads” (Crehan 2002:103). If we consider the state as more than an entity or a set of institutions and acknowledge the existence of the “state-idea,” the state as ideological project (Abrams 1988), then theorizing the state becomes an ever-more complex task in an era of global neoliberal governance and intense international oversight of the Balkans (Greenberg 2010:54). This chapter aims to bring ethnographic insight to the project of disarticulating the strands of this tangled knot. I first examine the ways in which my interlocutors interact with traditional representatives of state authority. To what extent do their projects challenge the traditional authority of the state over history education? Can their projects be considered counter-hegemonic? I then turn to the first meeting of History that Connects to consider what the meeting itself suggests about the nature of governance in the context of shifting power relations between the state, civil society, and supranational institutions.

**Negotiating the State**

One of the key features of the Joint History Project is that the support of the government is not actually required for the materials to reach teachers, and yet while working at the CDRSEE office I noticed that Executive Director Nenad Šebek and other staff members spent a good deal of time conducting advocacy meetings at the ministries of education of the countries where the project was active. Nenad explained:
There was an era, the nineties, where you had dictatorships or whatever you want to call them, authoritarian regimes, in Serbia, Croatia, everywhere, basically, where the civil society sector was actually doing the job of the opposition. There was no parliamentary opposition worth mentioning, and there were very few critical media, and so on. And so basically, civil society was functioning as the voice of reason in the society, which was thanks to the authoritarian and dictatorial regimes. In other words, at that time it was ‘us versus them,’ we the NGOs, them the government... basically, we are [now] in an era where to actuate genuine results and changes in the society, we need to see governments and the civil society sector working together... And a number of people in the NGO field still refuse to see that reality, which is hurting the civil society sector at the moment in the Balkans, a lot; this refusal to accept that hey, different times, different era, different problems, different solutions. [interview with author, July 25, 2011]

During the 1990s, civil society in the former Yugoslavia largely manifested in forms of popular protest in opposition to the authoritarian regimes. It is now something rather different, and is understood in a variety of ways by differently positioned actors across the region. While an oppositional stance remains amongst some elements of civil society, donors overwhelmingly expect NGOs to demonstrate cooperation with state institutions. Nenad noted that large donors like USAID and the European Union give to governments many times what they give to civil society, “so they’re interested in changes in the governments. And they’re interested in acceptance by the governments. And, they’re a little bit wary of controversial projects which will not be met with approval by the governments, especially on sensitive issues” (interview with author, July 25, 2011).

Nenad told me that while it was the donors who first encouraged the organization to work with the ministries of education, he came to be grateful for it. A pragmatist, Nenad’s gratefulness stems from recognition that in transnational
development discourse the state remains a primary agent for the implementation of policy (Sharma and Gupta 2006:21). And yet his comments belie the history of shifting cooperation of state institutions, the patchy nature of this cooperation across the region, and the time-consuming work of pursuing such cooperation. Not all of my interlocutors shared his view that cooperating with state institutions was worth the effort, although all of them understood it as a necessary exercise in order to secure future funding.

Goran Miloradović, Serbian historian and teacher trainer, had perhaps the most pessimistic view of the relationship between the state and civil society. We were talking at his home near Belgrade, and the conversation turned to the teacher training where we had met. He told me: “In Subotica, what you saw last weekend, that was a really good training. People were motivated, interested, and in the end, satisfied with the program.” Goran contrasted this experience with another training that had been held in Subotica the previous year. Someone from the local secretariat for education and culture had been in charge of recruiting teachers to attend, a task he accomplished by phoning the school directors and telling them to send their teachers. 45 teachers showed up, twice the expected number, and Goran described them as angry, saying that they clearly hadn’t wanted to be there. His point was this: “That’s what happens when you try to involve the state. Civil society can work parallel to the state, but where we need help with something, at the intersection of the state and civil society, that’s where we run into problems” (interview with author, July 12, 2011).
Goran later elaborated that he was sure that the seminar had not been intentionally hampered, but that this result occurred spontaneously. He explained:

The problem arose because the school directors understand all information that they get from higher authorities (so from the city administration as well) as orders (even when no one is ordering them!). We shouldn’t forget, those are people educated in a totalitarian society and during the wars of the 1990s. This time, they were informed by the responsible authorities that a seminar will be held and that they should inform the teachers in their schools to visit it. But the school directors ordered the teachers that they must attend the seminar. And that’s the crux of the problem. The majority of teachers understand themselves as part of the opposition, and the majority of directors understand themselves as a part of the government. When NGOs begin to cooperate with the state (through the directors), the teachers experience them as a part of the government as well. And the state doesn’t cooperate with citizens, it issues them orders. [personal communication, June 11, 2012]

Goran’s interpretation of the failed seminar highlights the fact that the social order invoked by both the school directors and teachers is one that no longer actually exists (see Greenhouse 2002:2). While “postsocialist citizens seek out and express a desire to be subject to disciplinary regimes of power—a state that works” (Greenberg 2011:90), a disconnect emerges here between the postsocialist shift in state power and the response prompted amongst teachers as though the Yugoslav state were still intact. As we talked a bit more about the relationship between civil society and the state in Serbia, Goran said, “listen, we are living in a state in which there isn’t consensus on where its borders are.” He gestured to one of the publications in front of us and said, “so this, what we are doing, this is useful and important, but it is only a small thing in a country with a lot of problems, problems that teachers face everyday.” He repeated: “These teachers are living in a country that doesn’t know where its borders are. So we can make the materials as good as
possible, we can make them interesting, colorful, but you still have textbooks in each country with completely different interpretations of the same events” (interview with author, July 12, 2011). Goran’s position was that without systemic reform, the influence of NGOs promoting alternative history education materials would ultimately be limited, because the textbook still holds center stage in the classroom. But Goran was not just referring to institutional reform; he told me that while democratic institutions exist in today’s Serbia, a “democratic and tolerant social environment” does not. He considered that the state should be working on creating such an environment, in which civil society could develop on its own, but that the region’s totalitarian legacy made this a difficult project.

As Goran concluded, “it is easier to change institutions than the habits of people” (personal communication, June 14, 2012). And yet the habits of people are exactly what the Joint History Project targets. The fact that the JHP publications are workbooks (i.e. additional materials) rather than textbooks was continually emphasized to me, as well as to the project’s many critics over the years. As Nenad explained to me, this was the outcome of a strategic decision

... not to try and go and change the national curricula, very close to mission impossible, not to try and effect changes in the official textbooks; certainly not look for a unique textbook for the whole region, because, mission impossible squared, but, rather we decided to choose this way; instead of sort of fighting with the ministries, and with the curricula, we decided to fight for the hearts and minds of the teachers themselves. [interview with author, July 25, 2011]

The idea behind the publications of CDRSEE and EUROCLIO is to target the time that teachers are allowed to deviate from the state-mandated curriculum, an amount
that ranges from 10–20 percent of classroom time across the region. Provided with high-quality, colorful, modern workbooks and model lessons—complemented by training in how to use these alternative materials—teachers can thus make use of the opportunity “to escape the narrative of the Other,” as one interlocutor put it. But teachers face numerous obstacles to meeting this lofty goal, including subtle forms of state obstruction.

I spoke with Krešimir Erdelja, a secondary-school teacher in Zagreb, textbook author, and teacher trainer. He explained to me that teachers have a lot of freedom in Croatia, and that they no longer have “those problems” with undue state interference in their work. But Krešimir then told me about a training that had been organized by the Ministry of Education in Croatia. He had been invited to run a workshop on the Joint History Project workbooks. Before he began, one of the government advisors for history spoke “in the vein of, ‘those workbooks are lovely, they contain fantastic materials, but, just so that you all know, dear teachers, our ministry has not approved their use.’” Krešimir told me that he kept his response brief, and focused on informing the teachers present that “no kind of approval is necessary in order to use the workbooks in class.” As he explained to me, “They are historical sources; I can bring Mein Kampf into school and use it as a historical source, so I don’t see any reason that any one of these sources wouldn’t be able to be used” (interview with author, July 2, 2011).
The JHP may have strategically skirted a direct “fight with the ministries,” as Nenad put it, but in this example, state power takes the form of suggestion: not exactly disapproval, but not exactly approval of the materials or the project as a whole. The dynamics of power between Krešimir and the government advisor are enacted somewhere on a continuum of consent and coercion. Following Gramsci, the process by which the agent of “political society” asserts her power is here framed as an appeal to the traditional authority of the state. Meanwhile, the representative of “civil society” frames his oppositional argument in terms of freedom of speech, a stance that aligns him and the project with the normative values and moral authority of liberal democracy (Brown, W. 2006:37).

Krešimir also told me the following story of butting heads with state authority. We had been talking about his use of multi-perspective sources in the classroom, and he mentioned that he had also co-authored four history textbooks with a fellow teacher. I asked him if they were able to include such sources and new teaching methods in the textbooks, or if they had to follow the traditional format in order to be accepted and published. He replied:

Well, we have had problems with the textbooks, as we included those kinds of sources in our first textbook which was published before these [JHP] workbooks even got started... it’s been four years since there was a new eighth grade textbook, and it was returned to us three times. Meaning, the commission that evaluates textbooks returned it to us because the president of the commission didn’t like the way we portrayed President Tuđman. And here he had his own suggestions, right? How that should look, exclusively apologetic, of

---

17 Franjo Tuđman was elected president of Croatia after the country declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1990. He died in 1999 with his personal legacy and that of his ultra-nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Party still greatly disputed.
course, right? . . . But of course, they didn’t want to admit that they returned the textbook to us because of that. . . . so, it’s not simple, it was a month-long nightmare for me, the phone never stopped ringing. . . . I don’t think that this kind of work should attract such attention here, but unfortunately it does, and it’s necessary so that something like this can be pushed through, something basically normal, right? [interview with author, July 2, 2011]

In this example, textbook authors attempting to challenge the official historical narrative engage in a protracted debate with the state authorities in which the exact terms of the debate remain obscured. Interestingly, in Croatia, individual textbook authors have been called “catalytic” in initiating revisions that challenge the official government line, while different processes have been of significance in the other countries of the former Yugoslavia (Dimou 2009:14).

Krešimir’s distaste for the attention garnered by the issue references the very public debates over history education that have periodically erupted in Croatia since the second half of the 1990s. Calls for reform of the history curriculum and changes in the processes of textbook production and selection have also been debates about what the role of the government ought to be in such matters (see Koren and Baranović 2009:99–105). Krešimir’s story continued:

Of course, we had to accept some compromises, though nothing too big. What was important remained, and then this, the role of President Tuđman, now in this new textbook, for the fourth grade of gymnasium, we completely withheld judgment. In this one, we didn’t speak in the first person about the problematic aspects of his administration. Rather, we wrote in a neutral way: “critics have objected to this, this and this,” which is really how it was, right? And now, we didn’t even do that, rather we put four sources about Tuđman, two affirmative, and of those, of those two, one was from that president of the commission [laughs]. Some people got what that was about, professors were calling us, like “hey, nice work!” . . . So, two such apologetic sources, and two really critical ones. Signed, of course.
With the reference to where and who published it, so there, it’s on the students to read and think about it, right? [interview with author, July 2, 2011]

Having already faced off with an unyielding state, Krešimir and his co-author’s new strategy was to rely on the method of multiperspectivity to allow dissenting interpretations to reach the students. Considering that “hegemony, at its most effective, is mute; ideology invites argument” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:29), the relative openness of this contest suggests that it is best described not as a counter-hegemonic project but as an ideological struggle. At the heart of this struggle is the question of what history education is for; why history should be learned. The shaping of students’ identities and affiliations to the state remains one of the most contested aspects of the subject. In this instance, the question of “whether the goal of history instruction is to promote critical thought and reflection on texts—that is, to engage in the practice of analytical history—or to inculcate collective memory grounded in ‘state-approved civic truth’” (Wertsch 2002:71) is laid bare. Krešimir’s new textbook was able to slip past the state authorities in part by making use of a methodology that aligned it with “modern” European educational practices and discourses. While national states “cling ever more to their role in defining citizenship and the ethnic content of that citizenship” (Trouillot 2003:88), “state-effects” are also produced by transnational actors. In the next section, I return to the first History that Connects meeting to further consider the citizenship consequences of transnational projects of alternative history education reform.
Toward a European Citizenry

A few days after I began my fieldwork, I traveled to Sarajevo to join the history teachers, historians, museum personnel and others who were gathered to represent their respective national history teachers’ associations in launching History that Connects. Over the course of two and a half days, the 20-odd participants from all republics of the former Yugoslavia discussed their new project. A continuation of regional cooperation established between the history teachers’ associations of the former Yugoslavia, it had already been decided that the aim of this project would be to develop alternative materials for teaching what was characterized as “sensitive and controversial history” from 1900–1945. I arrived at the meeting interested in how those engaged in such initiatives understood and enacted the methodologies they promoted, and how their efforts articulated with discourses of Europeanness, reconciliation, and democracy.

The second day of the Sarajevo History that Connects meeting was devoted to “World Café Sarajevo,” an extended exercise based in small-group brainstorming and dialogue. As introduced by EUROCLIO Senior Manager Jonathan Even-Zohar, the challenge of the day was to arrive at a common understanding of what a controversy is. We sat at four-person tables and began to consider the question: What is a controversy? The members of my group, from Bosnia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, plus myself, began to trade examples that ranged from personal stories of shocking behavior to well-known public debates. Jonathan shortly announced the next step in the World Café process: one person from each table was to remain as a “host of
meaning,” while the others were to switch tables, becoming “ambassadors” of the meaning that had been arrived at in our original groups. We then repeated these steps in considering a further question: How do controversies become sensitive?

After a coffee break, we reconvened in our original groups. With each table armed with a fresh piece of white paper and a pad of Post-it notes, we began to focus on the period 1900–1945. On each Post-it note, we were to record the name of a controversial event, a brief description, and a response to the prompt, “for whom is it sensitive?” Dragana asserted herself as our group leader and began a rapid-fire recitation of controversial events from her Bosnian perspective, beginning with “the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” “the agrarian question,” “the Balkan Wars,” and the “creation of the first Yugoslavia.” We thus proceeded in a more or less chronological fashion, with Dragana naming new events and instructing Enver in how to record them and where to situate them on the timeline drawn on the paper in front of us. I lent occasional spelling assistance and Alenka joined in from time to time to note whether a particular event was or was not “sensitive” for Slovenians. Most in question were not.

My group only made it to about 1918 before Jonathan announced the next step in the process. Over the course of three more table rotations, we first considered why the historical events we had just named as controversial should be taught, then what the obstacles to teaching this history are, and finally, again, why, despite these obstacles, this history should be taught in schools. When all the Post-it
notes had been placed on the common timeline spanning one conference room wall, the large group discussed the result.

At the end of the day, participants and organizers alike seemed pleased with the results of the World Café process. I was left uncertain that a shared understanding had actually emerged, either on what constituted “controversial and sensitive history” in general, or what this specifically entailed for the former Yugoslavia. The diverse views of the participants had certainly been aired and collected, but it was not clear to me how the outline of the project would emerge from this exercise. Instead, in my view, the process had primarily served to (1) reinforce collaboration as a value in itself and (2) construct attention to controversial and sensitive history as a moral imperative, one for which the teacher is personally responsible. Such components fit neatly into a “postnational” model of citizenship education that privileges civic values, including personal responsibility, and skills, including working collaboratively, over a common history (Keating 2009:138). I thus argue that the meetings that constitute the development of the project itself do the work of creating a democratic public through what Bradley Levinson has characterized as “[combining] the political socialization goals of civic education with the multifaceted aim of ‘ethical’ value formation” (2005:332).

It has long been demonstrated that history is one site where EU cultural policy works to encourage the coalescence of a European consciousness (Shore 2000), and also that national histories must be reworked to provide evidence of the
“Europeanness” of each new EU member state (Michaels and Stevick 2009:227). But as discussed in chapter 3, Europe has recently turned from a focus on shared history and culture to a focus on shared competencies and skills, along with shared values and vision for the future. European educational policy closely links education with citizenship, decoupling citizenship from the nation-state in the process (Keating 2009:146-147).

In foregrounding the values of collaboration and personal responsibility in the context of the Europeanization of history education in the Balkans, the process of developing alternative educational materials becomes less about addressing sensitive and controversial history and more a project of educating the history teachers themselves for democratic citizenship in an enlarged European Union. Even if the World Café workshop should not be regarded as a “pedagogy of conversion” (Das and Poole 2004:9), it was certainly a “project of persuasion” (Hemment 2007:61)—a technique of governance aimed to “responsibilize” participants as individual teachers capable of governing themselves and instilling the same “postnational” values in their students. The final chapter will consider the consequences of framing such projects within a discourse of reconciliation.
CHAPTER 5
PEDAGOGIES OF CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION

“War is framed in a code of legitimation that declares the assertion of interests to be related to moral imperatives. The most important code of the legitimation of war is its historicity.”

Introduction

It is far from controversial to state that during the wars that brought Yugoslavia to a bloody end, memory mattered. Figuring out exactly how it mattered is trickier business, but one that scholars of the former Yugoslavia have dedicated themselves to wholeheartedly (see Gödl 2007; Ramet 2004; Živković 2011).

Likewise, the literature on how violence is communicated and remembered, and the impact of such remembrance of past violence on the present is broad, spanning contributions from across the social sciences (see Halbwachs 1992; Lambek and Antze 1996; Wertsch 2002, 2008; Zerubavel 1996). Memory is found intertwined with notions of trauma (Alexander 2004; Sarat et al. 2007), denial (Cohen 2001), silence (Passerini 2003; Winter 2010), and acknowledgment (Cohen 2001; Zerubavel 2006). It also emerges as simultaneously individual and collective, as “to think about history, suffering and memory implies the need to move between public and private, psychic and social, therapeutic and political, for all these have a bearing on the complex relations between the three terms” (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003:103). Just as direct, cultural, and structural forms of violence can be viewed as overlapping spheres, so too can the long-term consequences of these forms, constituting violence not as a singular event but a “transformative process within a

---

18 Schröder and Schmidt (2001:9).
historical trajectory” (Pérez 2010:1). The historicity of violence, its “symbolic value” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001:1–21), thus comprises an important dimension of understanding the expression of war and violence as culturally meaningful (Whitehead 2005, 2009).

Of course, the point is hardly just academic. A proliferation of efforts has prodded the people of the former Yugoslavia to “deal with the past” so that it will no longer haunt their present relations and future prospects. One assumption that underpins such efforts is that “processes of coming to terms with the past foster democracy and promote peace and respect for human rights, and thus act as a deterrent against future conflict and abuses” (Dragović Soso 2010:34). This assumption seemed implicit in the work of my interlocutors as well. They certainly wanted to provoke a re-orientation toward the past—firstly amongst their students, and by extension within society as a whole. And yet, while accepting the premise that “conflicts depend on narratives” and “narratives also create conflict” (Rotberg 2006a:vii), the alternative educational materials that were the focus of this research emphatically do not attempt to resolve the tensions between the national narratives of the Balkan nations. These projects do not aim to reconcile competing accounts of the past. They are also not about establishing the “truth” of what happened in the common past. And yet they do profess to promote the goal of reconciliation, along with democracy. I argue that the strategy articulated by my interlocutors and embedded in their educational materials can be characterized as a strongly
pragmatic approach, a type of “reconciliation for realists” in the words of Susan Dwyer (1999).

Part of the political rationale for dealing with the past is that it promotes negotiation and compromise; it ideally “achieves a degree of social consensus about the past and recognizes the abuses that have taken place, thus removing history as a point of contention” (Dragović Soso 2010:37). In contrast, the methodology promoted by EUROCLIO and CDRSEE aims to expose contentious points of history for critical inspection, but without the aim of pursuing consensus on the past. As I began my fieldwork, I was fascinated with this approach, and I asked everyone I interviewed about the methodology of “multiperspectivity” and how it is received by teachers and students. This prompted interesting conversations about the place of “truth” in history education, the tensions between epistemologies of academic history, and the relationship between historiography and history education, but I heard little that specified the contribution of multiperspectivity to regional reconciliation. What does it mean to turn to multiperspectivity to ground reconciliation efforts rather than competing projects that would aim to construct a shared narrative of the past? Do some facts have to be established; must some minimal consensus emerge in order to move forward? These are questions that informed my original research proposal, and they sparked my interest in the processes of negotiation that were enacted during the meetings and daily office work that formed the core of my fieldwork. The first section of this final chapter will aim to tease out some implications of my interlocutors’ decidedly pragmatic
approach to reconciliation. The second section will draw on my field notes from the second History that Connects meeting, to consider this discourse of reconciliation as a pedagogical tool invoked in the context of the meeting itself.

**Reconciliation for Realists**

During my fieldwork, I never witnessed any theoretical discussions on the topic of reconciliation. In the day-to-day work of CDRSEE and the project meetings of EUROCLIO, it remained implicit that “reconciliation” was the ultimate goal, which was also ultimately un-measurable. Rather than arguments about moral or psychological imperatives to reconcile, it was pragmatism that grounded my interlocutors’ ties to the field of reconciliation. As Nenad explained, “You know this mantra, ‘you can’t reconcile without facing the past’? Yes, it’s true, you can’t reconcile without facing the past. But we have to accept the fact that you and I will never see the past eye-to-eye. We never will. And, starting with that difference, we should work toward something” (interview with author, July 25, 2011). In this view, the work of “facing the past” is differentiated from that of reconciliation, and becomes a necessary precursor to it. But neither requires agreement about the past.

This is not to say that the relationship between reconciliation and the project methodologies remained unarticulated. On the contrary, EUROCLIO’s 2011 “roadmap” for responsible history teaching quotes scholar Elizabeth Cole in arguing that the work of the organization is grounded in the contention that revisions to the content and methodology of history education “can promote long-term
reconciliation by enhancing critical thinking, the willingness to question simplistic narratives, promoting empathy skills and promoting the ability to disagree about interpretations of the past and their implications for present social issues without resort to violence” (EUROCLIO 2011:7, emphasis added; see also Cole 2007:21). But Joke also clarified to me that reconciliation is something of a “donor-led, policy element.” Rather than reconciliation per se, EUROCLIO’s primary focus is on developing “responsible and innovative history education” (personal communication, June 23, 2012). In the work of producing alternative educational materials, it is thus an emphasis on methodology that rises to the surface. Similarly, rather than promoting a new historiographical narrative, the workbooks of CDRSEE’s Joint History Project comprise a rigorously collected set of sources that “propose to rewrite history through a lesson of method rather than content” (Koulouri 2009:10).

A central feature of the modern methodology promoted by these projects is the principle of “multiperspectivity.” Simply put, multiperspectivity is “a way of viewing, and a predisposition to view, historical events, personalities, developments, cultures and societies from different perspectives through drawing on procedures and processes which are fundamental to history as a discipline” (Stradling 2003:14). Multiperspectivity is thus rooted in the methodology of academic historians, with the goal of extending the scope of historical analysis. The idea is that by building lessons around some of the same primary sources that historians might use, students will develop a critical awareness of historical
narratives as constructed, of the interpretive nature of history as a discipline, and of the widespread and ongoing manipulation of historical narratives for political ends.

As suggested above, multiperspectivity also holds the promise of the ability to “agree to disagree.” It theoretically allows for difficult and controversial history to be addressed in schools without requiring that a consensus on the past first be reached. In acknowledging the existence and legitimacy of multiple truths, the projects of CDRSEE and EUROCLIO situate themselves in the field of reconciliation while distinguishing their approaches from truth-seeking and consensus-building efforts. Meaning, they are explicitly not engaged in an enterprise to “uncover, in precise detail, who did what to whom, and why, and under whose orders” (Rotberg 2000:3). Some of my interlocutors doubted that initiatives such as the current REKOM effort to establish a regional truth commission in the former Yugoslavia were the best way forward. They also expressed skepticism toward various initiatives aimed at composing a “shared narrative” of the past.19 In the view of several of my interlocutors, such efforts were doomed to produce the doubtful result of only the “lowest common denominator” or an unacceptable “middle truth.”

Several different issues intersect in these concerns. It is not just about the “best” way to achieve the “most” reconciliation, but also the role that history

19 The Center for History, Democracy, and Reconciliation is one institutionalized effort to bring together academics from across the former Yugoslavia in the production of shared historical narratives. The “Scholar’s Initiative” is a related collaboration between regional and Western scholars to systematically revisit some of the most contentious episodes of the wars of 1990s. The results of this latter effort were published in the volume Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies (see Ingrao and Emmert 2009).
education can play in such efforts, the relationship between history education and historiography, the role of teachers, the significance of the educational system in relation to other site of social memory production, and organizational attempts to define, position, and fund their work. But I think it is worth isolating multiperspectivity from this context for a moment to consider its merits as one narrative strategy of reconciliation amongst others.

Multiperspectivity holds the potential to lay bare contradictions in differing accounts of the past. And setting out such differences for closer inspection may help students to better “understand the roots of the conflict and the differentially distorted prisms that fuel it,” as Robert Rotberg argues is possible in the context of the “double helix” of Israeli and Palestinian narratives (2006b:2). But I argue that multiperspectivity also holds the potential to only bring students that far—to maroon them in a land where they forever regard past injustices claimed by the Other as merely “a catastrophe from their point of view” (Azoulay 2009).20 Multiperspectivity does not encourage students to regard the narrative of the Other as part of their own, and this may be its main limitation—one with the possible effect of obscuring the logics of conflict. Laying bare the logics of conflict may in fact be a role best fulfilled by academic historiography; educational projects that promote multiple narratives need not be regarded as incompatible with academic or civil society efforts to “narrow the range of permissible lies” (Ignatieff 1996:113).

---

20 I am indebted to Orli Fridman for helping me to recognize this argument.
Educational experts argue that multiperspectivity in the classroom supplements the linear form of historical narrative, contextualizes events, demonstrates relationships between perspectives, and helps to illuminate the role of conflicts of interpretation in “actual” conflicts (Stradling 2003:19–21). I have no doubt that the method has the potential to accomplish all of these functions, and that such an approach is pedagogically useful. In making the above critique, I merely propose that caution is warranted in claiming an unproblematized link between these outcomes and “reconciliation” in the abstract. But whatever else it does, multiperspective history education is simultaneously understood as more democratic, more European, and ultimately, the only practical solution to the so-called “memory problem” in a region where contradictory national narratives of the common past don’t appear to be disappearing. I thus argue that multiperspectivity functions as a kind of discourse of Europeanness, a methodological strategy that helps to situate civil-society-initiated history education reform within a discourse that claims the persistence of moral controversy to be the vanguard of democracy (Rotberg 2000:6). In the final section below, I turn to the second History that Connects meeting to illustrate how multiperspectivity and the set of teaching methods to which it is linked enables circumvention of direct, collective, engagement with the difficult past.

**Lessons in “European” Conflict Resolution**

Three months after meeting in Sarajevo, the EUROCLIO country teams workshopped the teaching modules they had developed at a second gathering in
Veles, Macedonia. The reaction to the Croatian team’s presentation provides a snapshot of the larger discussion that occurred. As Ivo concluded his presentation of the Karadžorđević regime’s relationship towards culture, Staša broke in:

Staša (from the Serbian team): I have to ask, what is controversial here?
Ivo: They are all from Zagreb, left-oriented, it is just one view [trails off]
Lino (also from the Croatian team): We need to look through the eyes of our students; is it controversial today?
Staša: I disagree.
Lino: Well, what is controversial, then?
Staša: It’s not controversial unless you put two points of view.

Joke attempted to mediate, reminding us that the project is not just looking at controversial issues, but also those that are sensitive, and as she said, “this is sensitive” (field notes, June 24, 2011). I found it significant that any shared understanding of controversial and sensitive history that participants had developed seemed to have dissipated since the first project meeting in Sarajevo. In fact, the country teams had chosen to develop case studies on topics that were far from what could easily be argued as the most controversial and sensitive issues of the selected era, namely, the events of World War II. In explaining the Bosnia team’s decision to focus on migrations, Dragana had said: “You know, we will never agree on the assassination of King Alexander,\(^\text{21}\) so we chose to focus on the regular people” (field notes, February 27, 2011).

Such tipping of the balance away from national political history is part of a convergence of educational trends that have garnered support over the past forty years.

\(^{21}\) Alexander I was the first king of interwar Yugoslavia. He was assassinated in 1934 by a member of the Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. The dictatorial nature of his rule as well as the role of the Croatian fascist Ustaše in his assassination remains controversial.
years (Stradling 2003:9–11). Dragana’s view also closely maps the position of the Council of Europe on teaching history in conflict and post-conflict areas. In a 2009 report, the Council acknowledged, “there has been recognition of the need for controversial, sensitive and tragic events to be balanced with more positive and inclusive topics that are not exclusively political in nature and which extend beyond national boundaries” (Council of Europe 2009:3). Such adjustments in the field of education have of course also trickled down from the “poststructuralist assault on truth” that has swept across the social sciences, challenging dominant narratives and giving rise to contests over representation of the past (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003:1–2). But this episode also resonates with Abu El-Haj’s work with Palestinian-American youth who (through the creation of short films about identity) carve out new spaces for belonging, but in the process render unspeakable the fundamental political conflicts that inform their identities (Abu El-Haj 2009). In a similar way, the doubt expressed that the Croatian case study was addressing anything controversial at all, and Dragana’s call to focus on the “regular people,” signal a process of depoliticization at work. Appealing to modern teaching methods and discourses becomes a way of avoiding collective engagement with political controversy.

As discussion on the Croatian case study continued in Veles, someone stated that the majority of members of the police force in Croatia at the time were ethnic Serbs, a fact related to an issue raised in the presentation. A brief but heated argument erupted over whether police officers were hired specifically on the basis of their ethnicity. Within the space of several seconds, the exchange was reduced to
Lino’s “yes, they were” being countered by “no, they were not” from Ivana. Preventing an escalation of the debate, Joke broke in with “this is clearly controversial!” She then induced an end to discussion, saying: “it would be interesting to see more complexity.” As we broke for coffee, one participant commented to me: “you see that it is very controversial, but I hope that in the end their friendship will overcome. It always comes down to the relationship between Croatia and Serbia; the other countries don’t have the same unresolved tensions” (field notes, June 24, 2011).

The suggestion that conflicts over what happened in the shared past should be resolved not by debate and the weighing of evidence but by “friendship” can be said to reflect the individuation process of becoming an autonomous European subject (Mälksoo 2009:655). Promotional materials for the World Café workshop model used in Sarajevo assert a similar value in stating that “the Café is built on the assumption that people already have within them the wisdom and creativity to confront even the most difficult challenges” (The World Café 2008:7). In this view, one that is consistent with the discourse of postnational citizenship discussed in chapter 4, it is autonomous individuals who are imbued with the agency to resolve conflicts (see Abowitz and Harnish 2006). Reconciliation thus becomes a personal imperative, and the “unresolved tensions” between Croatia and Serbia become depoliticized as mere inter-personal problems (Brown, W. 2006:13–24).
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, it is clear that there is an individual element to reconciliation. But when conflict becomes depoliticized, the assumption is made that “human beings can triumph over their contexts through sheer force of will; that economy, culture, and society are the aggregate product of individual action and intention” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:10). There is perhaps an inherent tension between the developing postnational citizenship goals and the collective memory goals of history education in the Balkans; reconciling this tension is the task faced by history teachers in their classrooms every day.
CONCLUSION

*Knowledge of history frees us to be contemporary.*

*Who has the authority to write history?* In addition to the two questions with which I began my thesis, this was another theme ever present in my research. One teacher quipped that in the Balkans, “everyone is a historian and a football coach”—history is more often seen as a political hot potato or a matter of opinion than as a scientific pursuit that while interpretive in nature, has some exactness. Those involved in the projects I encountered engaged in their work with a certain rigor, a seriousness that indicated that they wanted to lift up their profession, to reclaim for the discipline of history a moral authority they felt it ought to have. The teachers and historians recognized a need for history to be weighty. And yet they wanted to challenge the grand narratives that kept their students pinned to national ground. What they wanted to do was, in fact, to complicate these narratives.

In this thesis, I have sought to show how this work is carried out on an uneven terrain of power, and some of the consequences of that. The NGOs with which I worked employed a range of strategies in navigating a world of project funding saturated with the discourses of employability and accountability. The terms of “competencies” has become one way that history education is made relevant in an output- and employment-obsessed world. The discourse of reconciliation is another. The results of both are ambiguous. All the while, project meetings serve to

---

constitute participates as postnational European subjects where the “rough edges” of national identity are smoothed out but political conflicts can also be circumvented. At the same time, the shifting constellation of power between civil society, the national state, and supranational actors creates spaces for resistance, innovation, and the shaping of policy processes.

The parallels between the projects of my interlocutors and my own came into sharp relief as I was writing this thesis. In their call for anthropology to be a stronger site of theory production, Borneman and Hammoudi critique what they call the "repetitive theoretical claims" of anthropology: "Things are constructed; things are plural; things are unstable; things have histories; most things are in-between" (2009:5). I laughed in recognition when I first read these words. These claims can more or less be read in this thesis, and they also resonate with what the work of my interlocutors seeks to demonstrate as well. Complicating dominant narratives is a shared goal. At the risk of being “repetitive,” this thesis will take its small place as an unabashedly descriptive ethnography, one in which theory is first and foremost utilized in the service of description (Graeber 2009:513). I believe that value remains in describing complexity in an increasingly simplified world. It is the first step in imagining and enacting a better future.
APPENDIX

WORD COUNT TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>education /al/ally</td>
<td>5166</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>learn /ing/ers/ed</td>
<td>3406</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>train /ers/ee/er/ing</td>
<td>2969</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>europe /'s/an/ans</td>
<td>2447</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>develop /ment/s/ed/ing</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>level /s</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>national</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>competence /s</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>school /s/ing</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>lifelong</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>teacher /s/'s</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>policy /ies</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>implement /ation/ed/ing/s</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>skill /s/ed</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>council</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>social</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>quality</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>adult /s</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>state /s</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>qualification /s</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>programme</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>strategy /ies</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>support /s</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>systems</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>framework /s</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>commission /s/'s</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>member /s</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>progress</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>institution /al/s</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>measures</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>people</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>student /s</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>vocational /ly</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>participation</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>needs</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>mobility</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>programmes</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>labour</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>objectives</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>working</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>reports</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>early</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>young</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>process</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>research</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>areas</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>knowledge</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>access</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abowitz, Kathleen Knight, and Jason Harnish

Abrams, Philip

Abu El-Haj, Thea Renda

Abu-Lughod, Lila

Alexander, Jeffery C.

Alonso, Ana Maria

Althusser, Louis

Apthorpe, Raymond

Azoulay, Ariella
Bakić-Hayden, Milica

Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN)

Bassler, Terrice

Borneman, John, and Abdellah Hammoudi

Bourdieu, Pierre

Brown, Keith

Brown, Wendy

Carras, Costa.

Cerwonka, Allaine, and Liisa H. Malkki
Cohen, Stanley

Cole, Elizabeth A.

Cole, John

Coles, Kimberley

Čolović, Ivan

Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff

Connerton, Paul

Crawford, Keith

Cruikshank, Barbara

Cornwall, Andrea, and Deborah Eade, eds.

Council of Europe
Crehan, Kate  

Curtis, Jennifer  

Das, Veena, and Deborah Poole  

Delors, Jacques  

Dimou, Augusta  

Djurović, Arsen  

Dragović Soso, Jasna  

Dwyer, Susan  

Eade, Deborah  

Escobar, Arturo  
EUROCLIO
2011 Responsible History Education in a Globalizing Society: EUROCLIO’s Roadmap Towards Innovative History Education. The Hague: EUROCLIO.

European Commission

European Communities


Fleming, K.E.

Foucault, Michel

Gal, Susan, and Gail Kligman

Gellner, Ernest

Gödl, Doris

Graeber, David

Gramsci, Antonio
Greenberg, Jessica


Halbwachs, Maurice

Hann, Chris

Haraway, Donna

Harper, Krista

Harris, Suzy

Harvey, David

Hein, Laura, and Mark Selden

Hemment, Julie

Hemon, Aleksandar
Hirtt, Nico

Hodgkin, Katherine, and Susannah Radstone, eds.

Höpken, Wolfgang

Ignatieff, Michael

Ingrao, Charles

Ingrao, Charles, and Thomas A. Emmert, eds.
2009 Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.

Janjetović, Zoran

Jelin, Elizabeth

Jelin, Tina

Jung, Yuson

Kamat, Sangeeta
Karačić, Darko  
2009 History in Schools in East Central Europe: An Overview of Curricula and Textbook Development.  

Kattago, Siobhan  

Keating, Avril  

Koren, Snježana, and Branislava Baranović  

Koulouri, Christina, ed.  


Krause, Elizabeth L.  

Kumar, Ravi, and Dave Hill  

Lambek, Michael, and Paul Antze  

Leeuw-Roord, Joke van der  
Levinson, Bradley A.U.

Mälksoo, Maria

Marcus, George

McLeish, Elizabeth A., and David Phillips, eds.

Mebrahtu, Teame, Michael Crossley, and David Johnson

Mertz, Elizabeth and Andria Timmer

Michaels, Deborah L., and E. Doyle Stevick

Mosse, David


Obradović-Wochnik, Jelena
Oushakine, Serguei Alex  

Passerini, Luisa  

Pépin, Luce  

Pérez, Ventura R.  

Philippou, Stavroula, Avril Keating, and Debora Hinderliter Orloff  

Popov, Nebojša, ed.  

Ramet, Sabrina  


Rebel, Hermann  


Regional Cooperation Council  
Riles, Annelise

Rose, Nikolas

Rose, Nikolas, Pat O’Malley, and Mariana Valverde

Roseberry, William

Roseberry, William, and Jay O’Brien

Rotberg, Robert I.


Sachs, Wolfgang, ed.

Sampson, Steven

Sarat, Austin, Nadav Davidovich, and Michal Alberstein

Sassatelli, Monica

Schröder, Bettina E. and Ingo W. Schmidt

Seymour, Susan

Sharma, Aradhana, and Akhil Gupta

Sher, Gerson S.

Shore, Cris

Shore, Cris, and Susan Wright


Slater, John

Smith, Anthony D.

Smith, Dorothy E.

Snyder, Timothy
2009 The Historical Reality of Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies 23(7):7–12.

Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu, and Hanna Schissler

Stojanović, Dubravka


Stradling, Robert

Strathern, Marilyn
Steinberg, Shosana, and Dan Bar-On

Šuber, Daniel

The World Café

Timmer, Andria D.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph


Tsing, Anna

Volkán, Vamik

Ulin, Robert C.

Urban, Michael E.

USAID


Volcic, Zala

Walker, Rachel

Wedel, Janine R.

Wedel, Janine R., Cris Shore, Gregory Feldman, and Stacy Lathrop
2005 Towards an Anthropology of Public Policy. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 600:30–51.

Wertsch, James V.


Williams, Raymond

Winter, Jay

White, Jr., Lynn
Whitehead, Neil L.


Wolf, Eric

Yerkes, Maryanne

Zajda, Joseph, and Rea Zajda

Zerubavel, Eviatar


Živković, Marko